Victory at the Black Parliament: Robert the Bruce and the Domestic

Hoch, Ross 2019 History Thesis

Title: Victory at the Black Parliament: Robert the Bruce and the Domestic Political Struggle of the First War of Scottish Independence Advisor: Eric Knibbs Advisor is Co-author: None of the above Second Advisor: Released: release now Authenticated User Access: Yes Contains Copyrighted Material: No

Victory at the Black Parliament:

Robert the Bruce and the Domestic Political Struggle of the First War of Scottish Independence

Ross Hoch

Eric Knibbs, Advisor

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts with Honors in History

Williams College Williamstown, MA

April 15, 2019

Table of Contents:

Acknowledgements 2

Introduction 4

Chapter One: Out of the Frying Pan and Into the Fire: 1314 -1320 18

Chapter Two: The Soules Conspiracy -- the True Turning Point 36

Chapter Three: The Fruits of the Black Parliament: 1320-1329 54

Conclusion 61

Bibliography 62

Appendix A: Timeline of First Scottish War of Independence 64

Appendix B: Glossary of a Few Archaic Medieval Words 66

Acknowledgements

I’ve certainly had a love-hate relationship with this thesis and I could not have gotten through it without all the help I received from the excellent community of history scholars and fellow academics here at Williams College. I would like to especially thank my advisor

Professor Eric Knibbs and fellow student Vincent Gudenus who helped me to appreciate and find the humor in medieval history in spite of its archaic qualities in the Hundred Years War tutorial I took in the fall of 2017. Of course, I also thank Professor Knibbs for all the helpful guidance he gave me over the course of this thesis, particularly in the early stages when I had no clue how to approach my topic, but also in the later stages when he provided the merciless, and quite helpful criticism that pushed me to improve my arguments. Thank you to my fellow medieval thesis students, Zeke Cohen and Patrick Smith, who provided feedback and more importantly moral support throughout the process, in the classroom, the library, and our meetings at the Purple Pub.

I would also like to acknowledge my freshman year WWI tutorial partner Kevin Silverman, our class together is one of the reasons I became a history major, and your frequent carrel visits were lifesavers in my moments of intense anxiety and boredom at Sawyer. I am grateful for the help of all my thesis student comrades in the history thesis seminar, who consistently read and provided helpful commentary on my less than pretty first drafts. And of course thank you to Professors

Eiko Siniawer and Aparna Kapadia, who were the faculty readers of my early drafts, and in

Professor Siniawer’s case, the leader of the thesis seminar.

Thank you to my friends in the Williams College Cross Country team and the Ebenezer

Fitch House for keeping me upbeat throughout this whole senior year, and knowing when to ask about my thesis and when not to ask about my thesis. I’d like to thank the unsung heroes in the

Williams thesis programs: all the people who have listened to me complain about my thesis, and all those who’ve asked supportively about what I’ve been doing holed up in Sawyer, only to be forced to listen to ten minutes of Ross mumbling on about the wholly different sociopolitical context of the feudal era and the legitimacy of various claims to the Scottish throne. Finally, thanks to you dear reader, for taking the time to read the work of a fledgling historian.

Introduction

As a country that was part of a union with the English and the rest of Great Britain since

1707 Scotland has less than a full deck of national heroes and triumphs to draw upon as

Durkheimian symbols of national identity. In the search for a truly Scottish national hero, Scots have been forced to harken back to the Medieval Era when Scotland often existed as an independent kingdom. Of course, the Scots’ biggest struggle in the Medieval Era was a struggle for autonomy vis-a-vis the English, most notably in the First War of Independence from

1296-1328. These wars were ultimately won when King Robert the Bruce led the Scots to success on the battlefield and at the negotiating table. As a result, Robert the Bruce has long been a figure of nationalist iconography, deified ever since 1373 when John Barbour wrote the epic poem, The Brus, recounting Robert’s accomplishments. Thus, in a recent poll of the Scottish public, Robert I was named the “third most important Scot” over such major figures as Adam

Smith and David Hume.1 Bruce’s victory at Bannockburn is loudly proclaimed by legions of

Scottish Rugby fans in Scotland’s unofficial national anthem “Flower of Scotland.”

Though Robert had a major impact on the formation of Scotland as independent nation, the historical Robert the Bruce was a shrewd political actor, navigating a complex pre-national feudal era. Thus, the heroic narratives surrounding Bruce’s accomplishments are complicated by the fact that before freeing Scotland from Edward

Longshanks’ tyrannical rule, Robert fought for that same Edward, held lands in England, and

1 Michael A. Penman. "Robert Bruce's Bones: Reputations, Politics and Identities in Nineteenth-century Scotland." International Review of Scottish Studies Vol. 34, 2009.

killed the rival claimant to Scottish throne, John Comyn. Still in many ways, Robert the Bruce has been valorized and held up as an enduring symbol of Scottish nationalism and national character since his death in 1329. Early modern historians, often taking Barbour’s epic poem as a literal re-telling of historical events, have done much to bolster and perpetuate this image of

Robert the Bruce as a Scottish national hero.2 Nonetheless, historians tend to give greater emphasis to the feudal context of the wars of independence.

Before engaging with historiographical perspectives on Robert the Bruce, I will first provide a brief introduction to the historical context which shaped Robert the Bruce and his actions, and a brief introduction to the First War of Independence. The war took place between

England and Scotland in the midst of the feudal era. This was an era in which lords paid homages and taxes to their overlords and kings, in return for a high degree of autonomy and control over their land and peasants. Allegiances were first and foremost localized, and there was little conception of nationalism, or national identity at the start of the war in 1296, though one might argue by the end of the war that had begun to change among members of the nobility.

At the beginning of the war many nobles held lands in both England and Scotland, and the kingdom of Scotland had in the past had varying levels of autonomy in relation to England, though both kingdoms had centuries-old histories of independence.

The representative institution of parliament had developed over the course of the thirteenth century from the king’s great council as the kingdom’s leading nobles realized their ability to influence rulers, and rulers realized their need to legitimize support for their policies in order to execute them. However, given the lack of specifications for what constituted a

2 See Evan Macleod Barron. The Scottish War of Independence. J. Nisbet, 1914. for further information.

parliament, the term parliament was often used interchangeably with councils referred to as assemblies or colloquia in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.3 Parliament had both judicial and legislative components, and statutes, decisions to major legal disputes, and major taxes, were all passed or enacted in parliament.4 Attached to each parliamentary document would be a collection of the seals of all the nobles present. Thus, the parliamentary institution was much more informal, vaguely defined and ad hoc than the institution we associate with parliament today. Parliaments were not annual events, but assemblies of important nobles and clergymen called for by the king, and led by the king. Moreover, given the lack of specifications for what constituted a parliament, the term parliaments was often interchangeable with councils referred to as assembly or colloquia in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.5 However, important parliamentary rulings were often published and proclaimed throughout the realm.

The king could also make smaller decisions unilaterally via the issuing of royal acts, charters, grants, confirmations, inspections, letters, tenures, easements, tailzies and the like.

Each of these was written by the king’s royal chancellor, who for the majority of Robert the

Bruce’s reign was Bernard abbot of Arbroath.6 These acts were sent out to any parties involved, registered and archived so as to maintain their policies’ legitimacy, and provide records to settle any legal disputes later on. Accompanying these acts were witness lists, of those present upon

3 Brown and Tanner. Parliament and Politics in Scotland, 1235-1560. The History of the Scottish Parliament ; v. 1 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004), 3-9. 4 A.A.M. Duncan "The Early Parliaments of Scotland." (The Scottish Historical Review 45, no. 139 (1966), 36-58. 5 Brown and Tanner. Parliament and Politics in Scotland, 1235-1560. The History of the Scottish Parliament ; v. 1 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004), 3-9. 6 Regesta Regum Scottorum V: The Acts of Robert I, 1306-29 , ed. A.A.M. Duncan (Edinburgh, 1986), 198-214. * From here on out I will refer to this document as RRS V, for brevity's sake. If the reference is to a royal act, the act number will be listed prefaced by the word ‘act’ If the reference is to prefatory material written by editor A.A.M. Duncan, the page number will be listed prefaced with a ‘p’ for page.

the royal sealing of the act. However, these witness lists were known to be something of a fiction, often listing the king’s close lieutenants, Thomas Randolph, or James Douglas, at times when they were known to be elsewhere. The editor of the compendium of Robert’s royal acts,

A.A.M. Duncan, writes that the witness lists “were known to be something of a fiction, the persons named having usually little or no knowledge of the transaction. At best they were some kind of assurance that this was not a hole-in-corner transaction, that they would testify to the king’s capacity and activity at about the time in question.” 7 Far more important were the seals attached to parliamentary documents, which though forgeable, (and far more subject to the wear of the intervening seven centuries) were commonly held to represent those who had actively assented to the document to which they were attached.8

Having provided a brief introduction to the feudal era, and its institutions of government,

I will proceed to offer a brief introduction to the First War of Scottish Independence. The relationship between Scotland and England was friendly during the reign of Alexander III

(1249-1286) but the sudden death of Alexander III, without a living child, created a power vacuum, which Edward I of England, would use to acquire more and more control of Scotland.

Scotland’s nobility, also created the convention of the guardianship, a set of six nobles, later two nobles, who would look out for the community of the realm. The upper nobility would also convene frequent councils over the course of this interregnum, thus developing the notion of the community of the realm which Barrow highlights.

The most legitimate claim to the throne was held by the king’s infant granddaughter

7 RRS V, p. 116. 8 Hence, when Edward I conquered Scotland, he collected a ‘Ragman Roll’ of all the nobles who had assented under coercion to profess their allegiance to Edward I’s rule of Scotland.

Margaret, the Maid of Norway, who currently lived in Norway. At the Treaty of Salisbury

(1289) it was agreed that Margaret would be granted safe passage to Scotland, and the support of the English, on the condition that she married Edward II, the king’s heir but the Scots exacted a guarantee that in the event of such a marriage, Scotland would still be a free and independent kingdom. However, the death of Margaret, in 1290 provoked a succession crisis, in which

Robert the Competitor (Robert the Bruce’s grandfather), and John Balliol had seemingly equally valid claims to the throne. In order to prevent civil war, the Scots accepted Edward I, as a temporary overlord, to mediate the selection process of the new king, through the Treaty of

Birgham (1290).9 The council of Scottish and English delegates selected John Balliol to be the independent king of Scotland, but his authority was quickly undermined by Edward I, who encouraged legal plaintiffs to appeal cases to the English court, attempted to force the Scots to fight with the English against the French and eventually forced John I to pay homage to him.

This effectively striped him of his authority as the king of Scotland in the Scottish nobility’s eyes, and the guardianship began to play an active role in the government of Scotland once more.

In response, Edward I sacked Berwick, and coerced large portions of the Scottish nobility into oaths of homage. A rebellion against Edward I’s authority led by the guardianship won victory at

Stirling Bridge in 1296 only to be defeated at the Battle of Falkirk, in 1298, and gradually subdued over the course of the following eight years.10

Having submitted himself to Edward I’s reign in 1302, Robert the Bruce, having inherited his grandfather’s claim to the throne, chose to kill his rival claimant John Comyn, in the

9 G. W. S. Barrow, Robert Bruce and the Community of the Realm of Scotland Classic ed., 2013, 27-51 10 "Scotland’s History: The Wars of Independence" BBC Scotland, 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/scotland/history/articles/the_wars_of_independence/

church at Dumfries, renounce his homage to Edward I, and claim the throne in 1306. Bruce was hastily crowned at Scone, before being defeated by the English at the Battle of Methven (1306), but recovered to successfully wage a guerilla war against the English, and gradually gather the support of large segments of the Scottish nobility.11 Finally, in 1314, Robert the Bruce, defeated the English at the Battle of Bannockburn, thus consolidating his position, and gaining the necessary legitimacy to disinherit his enemies at the Parliament of Cambuskenneth that

November.

In terms of the historiography, all contemporary works have responded to the seminal work on Robert the Bruce, G.W.S Barrow’s Robert the Bruce and the Community of the Realm, originally published in 1965. Barrow takes a more nuanced view of the Barbour poem’s historical accuracy, and the limits of the modern historian’s ability to write a complete biography of Robert the Bruce. Barrow is careful to note that:

It cannot be said too often that Scotland in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries was an intensely feudal and conservative kingdom. This fact more than any other governed the relations of King Robert with the nobility … we must clear away … myths which threaten to entangle the main thread of Scottish political history.. The first … the belief … that the war of independence was fought and won by the common people in defiance of aristocratic apathy or hostility.12

Barrow instead constructs the Scottish success in the First War of Scottish Independence as the result of a collaboration between Robert the Bruce’s tremendous leadership and a proto-republican community of the realm comprised of highest members of the Scottish nobility.

11 Edward I died in 1307 and was succeeded by his son, Edward II. 12 G. W. S. Barrow, Robert Bruce and the Community of the Realm of Scotland Classic ed., 2013, 351.

Barrow’s emphasis on the elitist, feudal nature of the War of Independence, and his expert knowledge of the Middle Ages, helps him to avoid some of the anachronistic, unscrupulous pitfalls of early modern historians and popular histories. These histories gave primacy to the colorful accounts of Barbour’s epic poem, and the other chroniclers, instead of carefully scrutinizing primary source documents such as Robert the Bruce’s acts, Scottish parliamentary records, and clerical and financial records as Barrow did.

Nonetheless, Barrow places Robert I within the context of the “community of realm” that had developed during the years of the interregnum, and claims that Robert I worked with this community of the realm through parliament to develop the notion, government, and reality of a sovereign Scotland. This narrative begins with the development of the community of the realm over the course of the interregnum, and then picks up with Robert the Bruce’s assumption of the kingship in 1306. From this point, Barrow writes of how despite a semblance of broad support exemplified in the 1309 document of Robert’s chancellor the Declaration of the Clergy, Robert the Bruce’s reign is troubled by disunity, and military weakness. Nonetheless, through adopting superior battlefield tactics, guerilla warfare and mobilizing the community of the Realm, Robert ultimately triumphs at the Battle of the Bannockburn in 1314. Barrow briefly treats the remaining 15 years of Robert’s reign as a predetermined denouement in which Robert gradually consolidates control over Scotland, while redistributing lands and offices towards his supporters, increasing taxes, and giving Parliament more of a political role. Indeed, the remaining 15 years

13 This ‘community of the realm’ both refers to the ruling councils of the interregnum, informal councils of the king, and the emerging common political identity of the Scottish nobility). Robert himself would use the phrase in statutes issued via parliamentary proceedings.

are presented as an afterthought, only referenced in a cultural and political portrait of the era, outside of the chronological narrative that culminates in Bannockburn.14 Barrow’s narrative and most others culminate in the triumph at Bannockburn, and thus complex questions relating to how Bruce formed and governed an ill-defined, loosely connected “kingdom” divided by decades of war have been understudied.

Despite Barrow’s exemplary scholarship, it is fair to question the proto-nationalist bent present in his narrative, especially given his social and philosophical links to the Scottish independence movement both within the St. Andrews scholarly community, and through being the favoured professor of future SNP Leader Alex Salmond.15 Barrow occasionally lapses into hero worship as when he calls Robert I “one of the best of medieval kings, prudent, conscientious, vigorous and patriotic.” His heavy reliance on Barbour’s The Brus to provide detail when other sources are lacking, and adherence to its main narrative structure, including its lack of detail in describing Bruce’s post-Bannockburn rule, encourage us to question his narrative, re-examine some of the details in his work, and fill in the historical gaps in his post-Bannockburn reign. Indeed, the recent trend of academic scholarship has gone in this direction.

After Bannockburn, Robert first dispossessed those Scottish nobles still loyal to Edward at the Cambuskenneth Parliament. He then proceeded to alter the line of succession away from his rivals, the Balliols, and towards his family members via the tailzies of 1315 and 1318, all the while still conducting frequent raids into the English countryside and fending off English

14 This is despite the fact that governmental records for these final 15 years of Robert’s reign are far superior to those in the first eight years of Robert’s reign. 15 Crawford, Robert. Bannockburns : Scottish Independence and Literary Imagination, 1314-2014, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014), 177.

invasions with guerilla tactics. In 1320, Robert’s administration sent out an emissary to the Pope that was purported to be Parliament’s declaration of Scottish autonomy and support for Robert the Bruce. This brilliantly written document, now termed “The Declaration of Arbroath” has gone down as one of the founding texts of the Scottish nation in nationalist history.16 A few months after the Declaration of Arbroath another parliament was held at Scone in August to try those charged with plotting a conspiracy against Robert’s reign. After future military successes at

Berwick and Byland in 1318 and 1322, successes of other kinds followed in 1323 as Robert’s diplomats successfully negotiated a thirteen year truce with English, and Robert’s wife Elizabeth de Burgh birthed a male heir to the throne. In his final years, he was able to pass and collect a

“king’s tenth” tax to pay for the costs of war at Cambuskenneth in 1326, renew the Auld

Alliance with France in the Treaty of Corbeil (1326) and despite the resumption of war with in

England in 1327 with the death of Edward II, the English agreed to a lasting peace treaty with

Robert I in 1328, before Robert’ death in 1329.

More recent scholarship has complicated some of the events in the latter half of Robert’s reign, and questioned whether this string of events represents the expected denouement in the wake of a triumph, or rather a period of fierce contestation and instability more continuous with the pre-Bannockburn years. The presence of a large-scale conspiracy six years after Robert’s great triumph at Bannockburn and merely three months after what was presumed to be the

16 1320, 6 April, 'Arbroath' Record of Assembly in The Records of the Parliaments of Scotland to 1707, eds. K.M. Brown et al (St Andrews, 2008-),http://www.rps.ac.uk. The declaration contains such stirring passages as: “for, as long as a hundred of us remain alive, we will never on any conditions be subjected to the lordship of the English. For we fight not for glory, nor riches, nor honours, but for freedom alone, which no good man gives up except with his life.” Note: From hereon I will refer to Parliamentary records from the Records of the Parliaments of Scotland website with ‘RPS’ followed by their year, and clause number as this is the manner in which they are listed on the RPS website. I.e. RPS 1320/4/1 for Arbroath.

greatest political triumph of Robert’s reign at Arbroath, seems to imply a strong argument against the narrative presented by earlier scholars in the vein of Barrow.

Most polemically, St. Andrews scholar R.J. Tanner has suggested that parliament was little more than a propaganda tool for King Robert I. Tanner suggests that Bruce’s administration used forgery, coercion and other dubious methods to obtain many of the seals on key parliamentary documents like the Declaration of Arbroath, and furthermore that many of these documents were written by the king’s chancery rather than Barrow’s “community of the realm.” Tanner’s St. Andrews colleague Duncan Brown has questioned the narrative that parliaments functioned as a supportive assembly completely. Brown asserts that the constant warfare of Robert’s reign and continued resistance to his rule from within Scotland, forced

Robert to call parliaments solely for the conduct of war or as an instrument of propaganda. For

Brown and Tanner, Parliament’s propagandistic role during Robert the Bruce’s reign stood in stark contrast with the autonomy and importance parliament had gained in its role representing the community of the realm during the interregnum. In direct opposition to Barrow, Brown and

Tanner argue that Bruce viewed Parliament as an obstacle to his efforts and thus Bruce called

Parliaments only to communicate the king’s political will or legitimize his contested reign through the coercion of parliament 17

University of Glasgow Ph.D student Alison McQueen tempers Tanner’s enthusiasm, noting that many signatories of questionable loyalty would have likely signed documents in order to guard against charges of conspiracy. For McQueen, after his success at Bannockburn

17 The documents cited as instances where coercion occurred are the Declaration of Arbroath (1320), Declaration of the Clergy (1309-1310), lost declaration of the nobles (1309), letter to Philip IV of France (1309), Statute of Disinheritance (1314), two Bruce tailzies (1315 and 1318).

and the community-backed disinheritance of his enemies at the 1314 Cambuskenneth parliament

Robert the Bruce had consolidated enough power to use parliaments for specific policy ends, rather than merely as a way to bolster the legitimacy of his actions and coerce nobles and clergy of dubious loyalty into supporting him. McQueen writes of the parliamentary period between

1315 and 1320, “While this included his most famous piece of propaganda, the Declaration of

Arbroath, this phase.. marks a significant step forward in the extent of Robert's power expressed within parliaments... The business, attendance, overall style and purpose of these gatherings show that a different role had been developed for parliaments as the reign progressed.” 18

In his 2014 biography of Robert the Bruce, Michael Penman tries to address the gaps in the historiography of Robert the Bruce after Bannockburn and takes a more nuanced view of

Bruce’s relationship with the Scottish community. Penman positions himself between Tanner and Barrow in arguing that while Bruce often used parliament to legitimize his own rule, parliament acted as a force in itself as well. He notes Robert’s regime’s “efforts to control the attendance, agenda, and resulting ‘community decisions and statements of the estates, especially in the first few challenging years of his rule (1309-1313) when his meetings also served as swift war councils’ but also at moments of subsequent political crisis (1318-1320).19 Yet, Penman also notes that in several instance Robert received dissent in the form of criticisms, petitions, and calls for debate in a parliament or assembly. For Penman, then Robert’s rule was “marked by an astute mixture of authoritarian action (as in 1309, 1313, 1314, or 1320) with timely assurances,

18 McQueen, Alison AB. "The origins and development of the Scottish Parliament, 1249-1329." (PhD diss., University of St Andrews, 2002), 244.

19 Michael Penman. Robert the Bruce : King of the Scots (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 176.

concessions and genuine governmental consultation.”20 Nonetheless, Penman argues in the biography that Robert the Bruce’s rule was far less stable post-Bannockburn than has been initially thought. Hence, Penman reframes his narrative to focus more on the post-Bannockburn period of Robert the Bruce’s life and reign.

On the understudied topic of the Soules conspiracy, recent popular Scottish biographies of Robert I follow A.A.M. Duncan’s lead in noting that it was a “much more dangerous threat 21 than can be deduced from the brief records that exist.” Nonetheless, despite emphasizing its underrepresentation in narratives of Bruce’s life, popular historian J.A. Mackay described the conspiracy merely as a manifestation of the “death-throes of the long-standing feud between the

22 Bruce and Balliol-Comyn factions— at least in the lifetime of Robert I.” In his 1992, article ‘The War of the Scots, 1306-23’ Duncan attempted to fill some of the gaps in Barrow’s scholarship, most notably pontificating on the importance of the pro-Balliol; sentiment “which

23 lingered in Scotland and at the French and papal courts” As discussed earlier Duncan took a more in-depth look at the Soules conspiracy, suggesting that the conspiracy was a reaction to the hard-handed tactics Robert used to procure the Declaration of Arbroath, by a still powerful

Balliol faction that resented their gradual marginalization. Taking into account these various historiographical perspectives while examining a series of primary source documents which

20 ibid, 320. For the best example of this see the Scone Parliament of 1318 in which the parliament makes a number of provisions to protect against the looting, and abuse of Scottish villages by Robert’s armies, and the Cambuskenneth Parliament of 1326, in which a large bodies of signatories agree to pass a king’s tenth for Scotland’s reign.

21 R McNair Scott, Robert the Bruce, King of Scots (London 1982), 199. 22 J.A. Mackay, Robert Bruce, King of Scots (London 1970), 156. 23 A.A.M. Duncan, ‘The War of the Scots, 1306-1323’ Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 6th Series, 2 (1992), 130.

include the parliamentary documents, Robert’s collection of royal acts, and a collection of treaties and diplomatic documents compiled by E.L.G. Stones, I argue that the turning point in

Bruce’s reign was not Bannockburn, but the undocumented Black Parliament of 1320 in response to the Soules Conspiracy where Bruce finally dealt with the majority of his detractors, either through execution, imprisonment or intimidation. While Bannockburn is the greatest symbolic victory in Bruce’s reign, it was Bruce’s strategic series of adept political maneuvers which culminated in his effective quashing of the Soules Conspiracy, that made him such a successful ruler. It was Bruce’s shrewd mixture of carrot and stick policies, gradual redistribution of land, and increased use of parliament for both cooperative, coercive, and propagandistic purposes, and ruthless elimination of his opposition in the crucial moment during the Soules Conspiracy, that allowed him to be remembered by romantic chroniclers as Scotland’s great warrior king.

Despite their obvious differences, both Bannockburn and the Black Parliament contain potent similarities. They were both conflicts in which Bruce’s supporters were arrayed against the disinherited and the English, which Bruce won convincingly and followed with convictive parliaments (Cambuskenneth and the Black Parliament) which cemented his legitimacy. In the wake of these Parliaments, Bruce enacted a bevy of legislation patronizing his supporters, shoring up his defenses, disinheriting his enemies, and solidifying his rule and the law of the land. The chief difference is that after Bannockburn, the disinherited remained a force to be reckoned with, and Bruce’s reign remained on shaky ground. Indeed, Bannockburn’s fame is more as a result of its symbolic power than its importance in shaping the war.

Meanwhile, the Soules Conspiracy has been consciously downplayed both by Bruce himself and historians in order to increase Bannockburn’s strategic significance, and cement

Bruce’s legacy as a warrior hero. Bannockburn itself was perhaps not the greatest strategic victory of Robert the Bruce’s reign, as Bruce’s strategic Fabian retreat in 1322 and subsequent victory at the Battle of Byland proved more effective in attriting the English forces, and forcing the English to accept a peace agreement. Indeed, where Bruce truly excelled was in political maneuvering, not in battle. Bruce’s victory at Bannockburn, was only an incremental step in solving the fundamental weakness of Robert the Bruce’s reign, the legitimacy crisis caused by his murder of John Comyn in the church the controversy of the great cause. To solve this he needed not to defeat his enemies across the border, but rather to defeat his enemies inside the border, as he did at the Black Parliament.

After the Soules Conspiracy, Bruce suffered few remaining setbacks, having effectively eliminated internal resistance to his reign. The famous dictum of Carl von Clausewitz says that war is a continuation of politics by other means. The most generous interpretation of this statement, might be that in a civil war, there is little difference between domestic political maneuvering and the war itself. So it was in Robert the Bruce’s reign, where the Battle of

Bannockburn was merely a victory more symbolic than strategic but the Black Parliament was the turning point in the war.

Out of the Frying Pan and Into the Fire? The Slow Simmer of Discontent after Bannockburn:

1314-1320

The conventional narrative around Robert’s reign between mid 1314 and 1320 is one of

Robert’s gradual consolidation of power as he unified Scotland while achieving incremental military successes against the English. During this period Robert capitalized on England’s political paralysis, as Edward II and his favoured advisor Piers of Gaveston were met with fierce resistance from much of the rest of the English nobility led by Thomas of Lancaster. Such a narrative assumes a relatively continuous trajectory of success from Robert’s victory at

Bannockburn (August 1314) to the disinheriting parliament at Cambuskenneth (November 1314) to Robert’s successful repelling of an English invasion in 1322, and then to the Treaty of

Northampton in 1323, and the final peace (and acknowledgement of Scottish independence) in

1328. However, a more careful reading of the parliamentary record, Robert’s acts and the military record indicates that in response to Robert’s consolidation of power there arose an equally steady current of contestation and struggle. This “countercurrent” highlights the limited nature of Robert’s victory at Bannockburn. In presenting this more careful reading I will analyze the parliamentary record of the period specifically the record of Robert’s redistribution of land, his acceptance of homage, and key military events of the period within the context of the greater geopolitical picture.

Despite the emphatic nature of Bannockburn in 1314, the strategic shakiness of Robert’s military position and his lack of unanimous support in Scotland made it impossible for the Scots

to sue for peace in the immediate aftermath of the victory. Indeed Scottish efforts to negotiate a treaty or truce were continuously rejected by the English over the entire period from 1318-1320, indicating both Edward II’s continued belief in his chances to retake Scotland and the Scots’ lack of leverage to force the English to the bargaining table.

One might expect that Robert I’s resounding victory at Bannockburn would at least give him the political support needed to rule with an iron fist and generously reward his supporters at the expense of those Scots who had fought against him. Given the harsh context after the bloody prelude to his kingship when he killed rival John Comyn in a church to claim the throne, Bruce had been a rather lenient king. Up until 1314 Robert’s reign had chiefly been characterized by reward not punishment, for as a result of the patchy nature of his support he was still attempting to win over allies. Perhaps the most shocking example of this is when he generously repatriated land to William II, Earl of Ross in 1308, after William had taken Robert I’s daughter and wife hostage and executed two of Robert’s brothers two years earlier. William II switched back to the

English side shortly after this, but was again found on the Scottish side in documents written after Bannockburn.24 Bruce changed his tune in the prelude to the Battle of Bannockburn, stating that within a year all who had not pledged fealty to him would forfeit their Scottish lands, and proceeded to begin repatriating land away from those still loyal to Edward II, and towards his supporters at the parliament of Cambuskenneth in 1314. Yet, the record of redistribution post-1314 is far more mild than any ultimatum would suggest.25 Despite the declaration of the disinheritance of those not having been in Robert’s peace by the time of the Cambuskenneth parliament mentioned below, several previously disloyal members of the nobility led by Duncan

24 See RPS 1308/1. 25 Michael Penman, Robert the Bruce : King of the Scots (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 176.

Earl of Fife failed to pay homage to Robert until 1315, but were still allowed to keep their pre-existing landholdings.26 Even in 1319, Robert was appointing former rival and English supporter William de Soules to be Butler of Scotland, the same de Soules who would betray him two years later.27 Efforts like these to continue to make firm supporters of nobles of dubious loyalty and English records hint at concerted resistance to Robert’s rule even a half decade after his triumph in Bannockburn.28 Historian Ronald McNair Scott points out the scale of punishment in the wake of the Soules’ Conspiracy is surprising particularly given the scarcity of records of the conspiracy.29

Several months after Robert I’s great victory at Bannockburn he summoned various carefully selected nobles to a parliament to gather at the Cambuskenneth on November 6, 1314.

The consensus of scholarship on Robert the Bruce’s parliaments is that Robert and his advisors would carefully curate parliaments in order to both avoid dissent and force recent converts to

Robert’s cause to display their allegiance publicly. Thus, the 1314 parliament’s fifty two tags and seals30 represent an interesting assemblage of the Scottish nobility and clergy, conspicuously different than what one would find from taking a random cross-section of the community.31 The assemblage is chiefly comprised of Robert’s supporters, but includes a surprising portion of those in lower classes, who are scarcely documented in other writings of the time. The seals also

26 Michael Penman Robert the Bruce : King of the Scots (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 152. Presumably, these nobles either held out in the hopes of gaining a more favorable deal with Robert, or took until 1315 to realize the error of their ways. 27 See the witness lists of RRS V, Acts 164-168. 28 Michael Penman "The Soules Conspiracy of 1318-1320." Innes Review 50, no. 1 (1999), 25-57. 29 Ronald Mcnair Scott Robert the Bruce: King of Scots. Peter Bedrick Books, 1984, 199. 30 Several charters dated to the two weeks surrounding the Scone Parliament, bear other names, so it is likely that the Scone assembly was even larger than fifty two people. 31Alison AB McQueen. "The origins and development of the Scottish Parliament, 1249-1329." (PhD diss., University of St Andrews, 2002), p. 240.

included several men like Andrew Bishop of Argyll who were recorded as being in Edward I’s pay only eight months earlier. We are left to wonder whether the Bishop of Argyll was a recent convert of Robert’s being forced to publicly declare his loyalty, or whether his seal was copied and used without his consent on the grounds that the Bishopric of Argyll was generally in favor of Robert’s rule. In addition, Tanner has noted several other nobles and clergy who had less than loyal records towards Robert, both before and after the Cambuskenneth Parliament, suggesting that Robert may have purposely misrepresented his support in order to falsely legitimize his reign.32 At the very least, Robert’s harsh declaration, and ultimatum forced dubious supporters to pay homage to Robert and legitimize his reign, despite their misgivings.

What records we have of the parliament itself are short but nonetheless incredibly important in framing the narrative of Robert the Bruce’s reign. The key passage in which those gathered agree to disinherit those not in homage to Robert reads:

it was finally agreed by the counsel and assent of the bishops and other prelates, earls, barons and other nobles of the kingdom of Scotland, and also all the community of the aforesaid kingdom, that all who died outside the faith and peace of the said lord king in the war or otherwise, or who had not come to his peace and faith on the said day, although they had been often summoned and lawfully expected, should be disinherited perpetually of lands and tenements and all other title within the kingdom of Scotland. And they should be considered as the king and kingdom's enemies henceforth, perpetually deprived from any further claim of right whatsoever hereafter for themselves or their heirs. 33 As stated previously, the obvious implications of the document are made abundantly clear:

Robert legally disinherited all those who had not come to pledge fealty to his reign either on the day of the Parliament, or in the days before. This was done with the assent of a large counsel.

Robert and his chancellor clearly made an effort to highlight this fact in order to legitimize his

32 Brown and Tanner. Parliament and Politics in Scotland, 1235-1560. The History of the Scottish Parliament ; v. 1 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004), 62-64. 33 RPS 1314/1.

reign, and convince his audience that his early era of shoddy support, and questionable claims to the throne, sparked by his murder of John Comyn, had ended. Ironically, this attempt to display the community of the realm’s widespread support occurred in the very same act that disinherited a number of the powerful nobles of Scotland opposed to Robert’s reign. These nobles and their heirs, either belonging to the Balliol-Comyn faction or closely aligned with the English, were explicitly labeled as enemies of the king and kingdom, and denied any right to their former property. The harsh language and substantive message of the act, strikes a stark contrast with

Robert’s frequent repatriation of his enemies in the years before Bannockburn, among them, such important figures as the aforementioned William, Earl of Ross. Certainly, Robert’s victory at Bannockburn, gave him the leverage, security, and political capital, to make such a harsh statement. However, such a strong statement was more a rhetorical, propagandistic assertion of strength, than an indication that Robert intended to immediately disinherit all of his enemies in perpetuity. Moreover, it gave Robert the legal precedent and leeway to disinherit, any of his current enemies, in the manner he wished, but also allowed for the possibility of Robert to show mercy to any of his current enemies, who might suddenly turn conciliatory.

Indeed, despite the harsh language used in the Parliament, Robert’s need for broader political support in the face of the English threat in the South forced him to softly enforce this

Parliamentary act, such that the disinheritance was a piecemeal process that stretched from

1314-1318, and allowed for later converts to pass into Robert’s rule.34 Lastly, the use of the word “finally” in the act is curious. Perhaps this implies that Robert had been forced to wait to get this act passed either in the Parliament itself, or that Robert had been forced to wait in the

34 Michael Penman Robert the Bruce : King of the Scots (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 157-176.

grand scheme of his reign. More specifically, the word ‘finally’ may have been referencing the

Robert had hinted at frequent “summoning” and “lawful expectation” or forewarnings described in the text of the document. Both Duncan and Penman have speculated that this referenced an ultimatum issued a year earlier, that required that all former Balliol supporters renounce their loyalty to Balliol in favor of Robert, or forfeit their land within the year.35

Another peculiarity in Robert’s acts, suggests that the Robert’s sudden disinheritance of his detractors at Cambuskenneth was not as forceful as it seemed. A.A.M. Duncan notes, after

1314 (and not until then) frequently “described as formerly held by another,” rather than forfeited or resigned. Such language gave King Robert the leeway necessary to potentially restore the “former holders” in the event of peace with England or just the “former holders.”

Those described as former holders but not forfeited included John Balliol and the other heirs of the Galloway lordship, Ferrars and la Zouche, all important members of the Balliol-Comyn faction who had allied themselves with the English. 36 Bruce’s decision to leave space in his redistribution of their land, for a future restoral suggests both that he hoped to lure them into his allegiances and undercut Edward II’s remaining Scottish supporters, and that he wished to leave open the possibility of some restorals as a sort of bargaining chip in eventual peace negotiations

35 Duncan, A.A.M. "The War of the Scots, 1306-23." Transactions Of The Royal Historical Society 2 (1992), 149. Duncan reaches this conclusion both from the references to previous warnings in the Cambuskenneth parliament and a passage in Barbour’s The Brus, describing an ultimatum Barbour places immediately after Bannockburn, but which only aligns logically with the Cambuskenneth Declaration if placed at the end of 1313. The passage reads: “After the great encounter the king...had a proclamation...that anyone who claimed to have a right to hold land or feu in Scotland should come and claim it with twelve months” and pay homage to the king, or else be disinherited would explain the timing of Edward’s invasion in the summer of 1314, in order to defend his supporters’ claims in Scotland.” John Barbour and A. A. M. Duncan, The Bruce (Edinburgh: Canongate, 1997), p.518 36 RRS V, p. 20. Notably, Bruce chooses to omit mention of John Comyn from his acta, even when repatriating his land to others, so as to avoid references to the murderous and illegitimate means by which he claimed the throne in 1306.

with England.

the increased legitimacy and Robert’s increased confidence in his position Nonetheless, post-Cambuskenneth, is confirmed by the drastic increase in the number of charters written by

Robert in the 2 years following the passage of Statute at Cambuskenneth passed on November 6

1314. Our collection of Bruce’s signed charters goes from 12 signed in 1313, and then 6 charters in 1314, to 33 charters each in 1315 and 1316, nearly three times as many charters passed as in three years prior. The charters passed after the Soules Conspiracy, were chiefly grants of land to his supporters, but also confirmation of the rights of churches, political appointments, royal letters, charter inspections, taxes and rents, and other miscellaneous confirmations of Robert’s will and the law of the land.37

Robert the Bruce succeeded in patronizing his two closest supporters, Walter Stewart,

and two closest powerful relatives, Edward Bruce, and Thomas Randolph, and James Douglas with continued grants throughout his reign.38 The king’s relatives were given fuller titles than other men. Randolph was given the lord of Nithsdale then earl of Moray in 1312;39 to this earldom, first lord of Man in 1316,40 then lord of Annandale and Man,41 were added. In the same way Edward Bruce is first lord of Galloway, then earl of Carrick and lord of Galloway, and finally king of Ireland.42 Initially, Nithsdale, Galloway and Man were not possessed by

Randolph or Bruce -- the lordships were an incentive to reconquer them… While other lords’

37 RRS V, p. 7 38 RRS V, p. 110 Interestingly, in witness lists Bruce’s and Randolph’s names are constantly accompanied by their lordships, where lesser lords’ names aren’t. Presumably the discrimination is a measure of the social importance of Edward Bruce and Randolph and their kinship to the king. 39 RRS V Act 389 40 RRS V Act 101 41 RPS 1319/1 42 RRS V, p. 110

titles were not mentioned, in their listing as witness on acts, Randolph and Edward Bruce were always mentioned with their respective lordships. Presumably the discrimination is a measure of the social importance of Edward Bruce and Randolph and their kinship to the king.

Similarly, Walter Stewart, newly married to Robert’s daughter Marjorie de Bruce was granted the baronies of Bathgate and Ratho in the wake of the Cambuskenneth Parliament on the 26th of

April 131543 and Walter and Marjory’s son Robert was quickly rewarded with several land grants, to be inherited by Walter on the event of Robert’s premature death.

James Douglas was the most frequent grantee of anyone during Robert’s reign.

Douglas’s grants did not begin until 1318, when he was granted the region of Polmoody for twelve broad arrows annually.44 Later on the 6th of May 1320, James Lord of Douglas received the barony of Staplegordon, the forest of the Sheriffdom of Roxburgh on the 6th of May 1320, the town and castles of Jedburgh and Bonjevard and the forest of Jedworth for 100 shillings annually and the service of one knight.45 In these grants to Douglas, one sees both the king’s heavy redistribution to his supporters but also that King Robert waited to dole out grants to some of his most important supporters until as late as 1318. Furthermore, we see that Robert’s redistributions come in the southwest, near Robert’s own home earldom (Carrick), and that

Robert had begun reviving the dated practice of making land grants conditional on military service, especially in the years after Bannockburn.46

This revived emphasis on military service in the more vulnerable Southern sheriffdoms, and somewhat delayed granting to Robert’s supporters, hints that Robert was not as secure as his

43 RRS V, Act 391 44 RRS V, Act 143 45 RRS V, Acts 166, 167. 46 RRS V, p. 49-50.

victory at Bannockburn, and strong declarations at Cambuskenneth, Scone, and Ayr would make it seem.

The most significant and well-documented parliament in this period was the parliament at

Scone on December 3, 1318. The parliament was called in order for Robert to pass his aforementioned second tailzie, in response to the death of Robert’s brother, Edward the Bruce, in an ill-advised campaign against the English for the Irish throne. Due to Robert’s lack of a male

This campaign (supported financially heir, Edward had been first-in-line for the Scottish crown. and militarily by Robert the Bruce himself) ended disastrously in the Battle of Dundalk on

October 14, 1318, with the destruction of nearly the entirety of the Scottish invasion force, numbering up to 3,000 men.47 In contrast to this disaster off the coast of Scotland, Robert had scored an important victory closer to home as his Lieutenant James Douglas diminished English control of the Lothians by taking the important coastal fortress of Berwick in April 1318.

Legally, the 1318 Parliament at Scone fully abnegated the Balliols’ claim to the throne.

It thus represented a particularly stark instance of Robert I using his ultimate authority to disregard the feudal society’s political conventions, (in this case he was disregarding the customs of succession). However, the 1318 Parliament was also quite notable in the size of the assembly called to order (thirty seals were appended, and the preamble notes that the assembly is made up of “bishops, earls, and barons”), the length and breadth of the acts passed and the distribution of the Parliamentary acts to all the justiciars, sheriffs, and bailiffs of Scotland. One portion reads:

we command and firmly instruct you that you cause the said statutes to be read and proclaimed publicly at our courts to be held in your bailiaries and in other places where people often assemble, and to be observed inviolably by all as much in the courts of prelates, earls and barons and all others ... [and] we wish that these people should be given a copy of the statutes by you in 47 Michael Penman, Robert the Bruce : King of the Scots (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 189.

order that they do not hold themselves to be excused by ignorance.48

Robert and his parliament’s insistence on the widespread distribution of the Acts indicates both the greater breadth of control Robert had at this time geographically and in the sense of a larger federalized administration, and perhaps hints at Robert’s continued fears of dissent and insurrection.

The acts passed in the 1318 parliament at Scone chiefly relate to war measures with clauses restraining Robert’s armies from looting and pillaging,49 requirements for nobles to provide soldiers and war materials, and checks on the government administration’s abuse of power. These indicate that Robert was in a position in which he had enough control to expect continued loyalty from his adherents even as he reined them in. McQueen writes that 1318 parliament represents, “the first opportunity Robert seems to have had to create any substantial new legislation to reform his kingdom, beyond the statute of Cambuskenneth in 1314. It is important as it highlighted his strengthened position and ability to govern, rather than merely fighting or producing propaganda to gather support for his kingship.50 Generally, the record of

Robert’s parliaments from 1314-1318, indicates a king with an expanded base of power, stability, and support, able to use a broad parliament for specific purposes like legal reform, and the redistribution of land, rather than merely for its historical purpose of legal settlements, and war measures.

48 RPS, 1318/1. 49 The pro-Bruce chronicler John Barbour records the Scots massive looting and pillaging upon the taking of Berwick in April 1318. John Barbour and A. A. M. Duncan, The Bruce (Edinburgh: Canongate, 1997), XVII, 95-200. 50McQueen, Alison AB. "The origins and development of the Scottish parliament, 1249-1329." PhD diss., University of St Andrews, 2002, 256.

Yet despite the impressive slate of reforms passed in the 1318 parliament there are several elements which hint that Robert’s position was not as strong as the record would seem to indicate particularly when viewed with a knowledge of the coming Soules Conspiracy. Firstly, one wonders why it took Robert nearly four years to hold a parliament capable of passing these substantial but seemingly to-be-expected reforms. The only parliaments that have survived in written record held after Cambuskenneth and before the Scone Parliament of 1318, were the

1315 Parliament in Ayr, and a 1317 Parliament in Scone. The absence of substantive parliaments after Robert’s victory at Bannockburn is conspicuous particularly in light of the regularity of substantive parliaments in the 1320s. One wonders if disputes between the nobility and Bruce’s supporters also prevented Bruce from securing the necessary support and stability to call a parliament of such scale and legislative importance.

Upon close inspections the 1315, 1317, and 1318 parliaments, belie the attempts to cover up the weakness of the Bruce regime.51 The 1315 assembly in Ayr was not actually referred to as a parliament in the documentation of the proceedings itself because of the limited number of those at the assembly. Nonetheless, Robert and his chancellor Robert the Bruce presented the

“bishops, abbots, acts passed as representative of the community of the realm, prefacing it with priors, deans, ….earls, barons, knights and others of the community of the kingdom of Scotland, both clerics and laymen...unanimously agreed and ordained in the form which follows.” 52

Moreover, in contrast to the 1318 parliament, the 1315 parliament was filled with many of

51 What record we have of the 1317 Parliament discusses the rights of Dunkeld Cathedral to a portion of the forfeited property of forfeited lands within the earldoms of Atholl and strathearn both of which, held important nobles whose lands were forfeited within Bannockburn. The act is not so significant that I thought it worth writing more on, but it is significant that the list of seals, seems particularly small. Of the 10 seals remaining, one bears the name of Roger Moubray, a future conspirator of 1320. 52 RPS 1315/1.

questionable loyalty to Robert the Bruce, among whom were the future Soules conspirator, Sir

John de Logie, and Thomas Dalton Bishop of Galloway, who was supporting the English by

1319 53 while such major supporters supporters as James Douglas and Walter Stewart were conspicuously absent.54 Such a notably odd assembly composition suggests that Robert used this assembly to coerce nobles into supporting and legitimating his revision of the line of inheritance, in favor of his own family. This narrative is furthered by the tailzie’s inclusion of a pledge

“obey and faithfully defend in all ways the magnificent prince and lord their among all present to liege lord Robert by the grace of God illustrious king of Scots and his heirs male to be legitimately begotten of his body, as their king and liege lord against all mortals.”55 Like at

Cambuskenneth, Robert led and coerced a carefully orchestrated assembly of nobles of dubious loyalty, into pledging undying fealty to him, and presented his legislation as a broadly supported decision, rather than a top-down directive to which the nobility assented.

The chief order of business at the 1315 assembly, was the passage of a tailzie which would alter the line of succession, replacing Robert’s young daughter Marjorie, with his brother

Edward Bruce, as first in line for the throne. Presumably, the purpose of this decision was to avoid the possibility of a weak female minority in a time of war with the English, by placing the

“vigorous”56 and battle-tested Edward Bruce ahead of her in the line of succession.57 Of course, such a line of succession completely ignored the more legitimate Balliol claim to the throne, now

53 Brown and Tanner. Parliament and Politics in Scotland, 1235-1560. The History of the Scottish Parliament; v. 1 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004), 14. 54 RPS 1315/1. 55RPS 1315/1 56 ibid. 57 The Scots were of course familiar with the weaknesses of a female minority, as it was the issues arising from the young maid of Norway’s inheritance of the Scottish Crown, her arranged marriage and her death that had sparked the disputes which led to the war of independence. Nonetheless, since the Bruce claim to the throne, went through Robert the Bruce’s grandfather’s mother.

held by Edward Balliol, after the death of John Balliol in 1314.58

The 1318 Parliament’s efforts to rein in Bruce’s supporters and armies so as not to injustice and displease Robert’s subjects suggests that Bruce was still working to gain the support of a significant faction within the Scottish nobility that was upset with his assumption of power and repatronage. The efforts to spare regions in conflict of unnecessary burden, hint at the tremendous costs of the war.59 One must also wonder about how the Scottish nobility reacted to bearing the costs of Edward the Bruce’s failed venture in Ireland. When paired with efforts to place supporters of dubious loyalty in positions of power from 1318-1320 the argument that the

1318 parliament at Scone shows Robert was still campaigning for the support of much of a disgruntled nobility in this period seems to hold weight.60

Thirdly, the 1318 document explicitly claims the right to execute "an inventor of tales of rumours by which a matter of discord shall be able to arise between the lord king and his people"

61 suggesting that King Robert (quite rightly) feared an attempt to unseat him from power. That

Robert felt the need to include a preamble in which all of Robert’s subjects affirmed their utmost loyalty more than a decade after he had been crowned king also hints that Robert’s position was not nearly as secure as it may have appeared to be at first glance.62 Moreover, textual and stylistic similarities between the 1315 and 1318 Parliaments hint that the 1318 settlement was very likely drafted by Robert’s chancellor Barnard Abbot of Arbroath using the 1315 tailzie, making the addition of a particularly harsh clause threatening to punish any traitor even more

58Michael Penman, Robert the Bruce : King of the Scots (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 153 59 Alas, the only financial records we have during Robert’s reign are in the years 1328-1329. 60 See, for instance William de Soules’ appointment as butler of Scotland in 1318 or 1319. 61 RPS 1318/1 62 A.A.M. Duncan, "The War of the Scots, 1306-23." Transactions Of The Royal Historical Society 2 (1992), p. 128.

conspicuous. This altogether odd and conspicuous addition would certainly seem to indicate

Robert’s significant and perhaps specific fear of internal rebellion.63

Finally, though the parliament was comprised of a much more supportive group of nobles than those present at Ayr in 1315, two nobles who later took part in the Soules Conspiracy were sealers to the document, William de Soules himself and Roger Mowbray.64 Tanner and Brown have thus claimed that the 1318 Parliament had the same propagandistic function as earlier Bruce parliaments, as disloyal men were forced to publicly declare support for kingly acts, falsely presented as collaborations between the community of the Realm and the king. Penman, too noted in his article “The Soules Conspiracy” that several charters written around this time,

(presumably discussed at the parliament) bear the seals of other significant suspected Soules conspirators, such as the Earl of Menteith and the Earl of Fife.65

Ultimately, then, we can see the 1318 statutes as those of a king finally able to govern in a somewhat normal fashion, enacting legislative reform, and involving the community in decisions, yet a king still using tactics like coercion, false seals, and propagandistic language, to maintain his grip on a throne that he very much feared losing.

I should note that in December of 1319, in an effort to relieve the northern baronies of the repeated losses inflicted upon them by the Scots’ successful raids, the English sent a delegation to Berwick, led by Aymer de Valence, and Hugh the Despenser the Younger to negotiate a truce.

The Scots delegation, led by the Earl of Moray, would agree to a two year truce with disputes to

63 RRS V, p. 68 64 Mowbray had consistently fought against Robert the Bruce before his victory at Bannockburn, but died before being tried at the Black Parliament his family managed to escape to England in 1321, where they would support the Balliols through the 1330s. 65 Michael Penman. ": The Soules Conspiracy of 1318-1320." Innes Review 50, no. 1 (1999), 44.

be settled by guardians of both sides and no new fortresses to be built in the sheriffdoms of

Berwick, Roxburgh, and Dumfries.66 While the willingness of the English to finally negotiate a truce of more than a year 67 indicates Robert’s stronger position, such a truce was perhaps more reflective of mutual war-weariness, after the Scottish failures in Ireland, and the English’s failure to relieve Berwick, as well as the result of the need to recover from the devastating cattle plague in 1319 that wrought havoc on Scotland and England’s economies.68

The final and most famous document of the post-Bannockburn, pre-Soules Conspiracy period is the Declaration of Arbroath, a letter sent from the Scottish nobility to Pope John XXII.

The document begins by grandiloquently tracing the Scottish kingdom’s long and illustrious history from ancient times, through the tribalism of the Picts, and through to a concocted unbroken chain of “113 kings” only to be assailed by the catastrophic villainy of Edward I.

Thankfully, the authors write, through “divine providence” “the valiant prince Robert” set

Scotland free from the shackles of Edward’s illegitimate misrule. Then, in its most quoted passage the declaration states:

Yet if he should give up what he has begun, seeking to make us or our kingdom subject to the king of England or to the English, we would strive at once to drive him out as our enemy and a subverter of his own right and ours, and we would make some other man who was able to defend us our king; for, as long as a hundred of us remain alive, we will never on any conditions be subjected to the lordship of the English. For we fight not for glory, nor riches, nor honours, but for freedom alone, which no good man gives up except with his life. Such passionate, dramatic, seemingly proto-democratic, proto-nationalist prose has led the declaration to go down in popular history as an inspiration for the declaration of independence.69

66 RRS V, Act 162. 67 Truces lasting less than a year had been negotiated in 1309 and 1313. 68 Michael Penman, Robert the Bruce : King of the Scots (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 211-212. 69 Ronald Mcnair Scott Robert the Bruce: King of Scots. (Peter Bedrick Books, 1984), 200.

Yet, despite what America’s founding fathers may or may not have thought about Scottish history, the modern historical consensus is that the Declaration of Arbroath was a masterpiece of

Robert I’s practice in political propaganda. This actually comes from Barrow who notes that the document has the telltale writ of Robert’s chancery.70 The document’s similarity with the charters written by Barnard of Arbroath at around the same time, suggest that the charter was drafted at Arbroath, and then sent around Scotland in order for the nobles to append their seals to it. McQueen and others have posited that the general contents of the letter were likely agreed upon at an assembly a month earlier in Newbattle, for there is no record of any parliamentary assembly at Arbroath. The document’s actual purpose seems to have been an attempt to legitimize Robert’s rule in the eyes of the pope who had excommunicated Robert after his murder of John Comyn in 1306.71 If the pope repealed the excommunication and began to address Robert as king, this would aid Robert in international relations with the French and the

Flemish, while also bolstering his legitimacy at home and opening the way towards peace negotiations with England through the church.

Five of the forty-four sealers,including William de Soules himself, would later be definitively involved in the Soules Conspiracy just a few months later.. A.A.M. Duncan has posited that Robert’s heavy-handed method of collecting seals via his chancery and appending them to the document in order to pass off the Declaration of Arbroath as a document of the community of the Realm, provoked a counter reaction in the Soules Conspiracy72 Like Penman

70 G. W. S. Barrow, Robert Bruce and the Community of the Realm of Scotland Classic ed., 2013, 305. 71 Despite this, Robert had the support of most of the Scottish Clergy, who had declared their support of his kingship with the Declaration of the Clergy in 1309. A.A.M. Duncan "The War of the Scots, 1306-23." (Transactions Of The Royal Historical Society 2: 1992), 130. 72Michael Penman. "The Soules Conspiracy of 1318-1320." Innes Review 50, no. 1 (1999), 25-57.

Duncan has posited that Robert I consciously erased the conspiracy from the record and pinned it on William de Soules, so as to refuse to acknowledge Edward Balliol’s continued claim to the throne.

Several other factors indicate Robert’s limited strength in this period, and continued fear of a Balliol threat to the throne. Like the Scottish kings before him, Robert I stressed his predecessors in the preamble of his royal acts. However, even after John Balliol’s death in 1314, his name is conspicuously absent in Robert’s reference to the kings that went before him. Most obviously, this is because Robert was not descended from Balliol himself. This attempt to delegitimize John I’s historical kingship also suggests Robert’s continued fear of the Balliol claim to the throne being resurrected, even after his triumph at Bannockburn and John I’s death.

Thus, despite evidence of limited success in the period, when one looks closely at the messy assortment of portions of parliamentary acts, redistribution of lands, and scattered military campaigns, the picture that emerges is one of Robert attempting to consolidate power only to be met by constant struggle. Even in the aftermath of the Battle of Bannockburn and John Balliol’s death, Robert continued to face the same threats of English invasion, and internal revolt from the

Balliol faction that he had faced ever since solidifying his position enough to conduct formal governmental affairs and draft the Declaration of the Clergy in 1309. Indeed the struggle between Bannockburn and the Soules Conspiracy was not altogether that different from the struggle Scotland was immersed in from 1309-1314, though the war between England and

73 RRS V; Norman H. Reid “Crown and Community under Robert I” in Grant, Alexander, and Stringer, Keith. Medieval Scotland: Crown, Lordship and Community. Edinburgh University Press, 1998, p. 209.

Scotland was certainly more ‘hot’ during the earlier period. In the aftermath of Bannockburn, there is little record of triumphant celebrations, or singing in the streets.74 Bruce and his contemporaries knew Bannockburn to be merely a big step forward in a long and arduous war.

Yet, in the effort to perpetuate the narrative of the medieval warrior hero, Barrow and modern historians have taken to lift up Bannockburn, at the expense of the lengthy, grimy political struggle that took place afterwards. Such a narrative, overshadows the political maneuvering that culminated in the failed Soules conspiracy in 1320. It was the brutal suppression of this conspiracy that would be Robert the Bruce’s most important victory in the grand scheme of things, one that would give him the political strength to negotiate a lasting truce in 1323, and force the English to concede Scotland’s right to independence in 1328.

74 Michael Penman, Robert the Bruce : King of the Scots (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 149.

The Soules Conspiracy -- the True Turning Point

“Gret lordis off ful gret renoune Mak a fell conjuracion Agayn Robert the douchty king. Thai thought till bring him till ending And to bruk eftre his dede The kynrik and to ryng in hys steid. The lord the Soulis, Schry Wilyam Off that purches had mast defame, For tht principale tharoff was he Off assent of that cruelté 75 John Barbour

In the wake of Bannockburn, Robert the Bruce set off a process of gradual, but major redistributions of power and land at the Cambuskenneth Parliament, rewrote the line of succession with the tailzies of 1315 and 1318, passed a major set of legislative reforms at the

Scone Parliament of 1318. He was strengthened on either side by his lieutenants, each now in possession of large swathes of redistributed land and new titles, James Douglas, William

Stewart, and Thomas Randolph. Robert had continued to have military successes in the form of highly profitable raids across the border and the capture of the fortress at Berwick, while suffering no major defeats on mainland Scotland.

And yet upon closer inspection, Bruce’s position was only marginally stronger than it had been in 1314. His armies had suffered a major defeat in an ill-advised invasion of Ireland, and

Bruce’s only legitimate successor, his brother Edward, had perished in the attempt. His alliance

75 Barbour, John, and A. A. M. Duncan. The Bruce . Canongate Classics ; 78. Edinburgh: Canongate, 1997.Ch. 19, lines 5-14. A.A.M. Duncan’s translation reads: “lords of very good reputation made a wicked conspiracy against Robert, the brave king. They meant to bring his life to an end and to enjoy the kingdom after his death, reigning in his place. Sir William, the lord Soulis, had the greatest disgrace from that project, for he was the principal in it, in agreeing to that infamy.”

with France had broken down, and he still did not have the support of the Pope. Robert’s redistribution of land in the wake of Cambuskenneth had been done much more cautiously than the legislation would indicate, suggesting that Bruce probably feared upsetting his detractors.

Bruce had curiously brought back antiquated feudal requirements for military service, especially in the Southwest, suggesting potential weakness in an area whose nobles had lingering allegiances to the Balliol-Comyn faction that had only been partially displaced in the wake of

Cambuskenneth, Moreover, Bruce’s language in the Parliament at Scone in 1318 had been overly cautious, indicating that he feared a coup.

All this is not to suggest that Robert’s policy of coercion of the community of the realm to extract oaths, produce propaganda, and legitimate tailzies, and his policy of gradual land redistribution in return for military service were unwise. Rather, without dealing a death blow to

Balliol-Comyn supporters, and the questions of legitimacy that plagued Robert’s reign even the fruits of the most artfully executed political maneuvers could not be fully realized. Indeed, the initial success of these maneuvers fostered greater resentment among the disinherited, and heightened the risk of a rebellion that could topple Robert the Bruce from the throne. Ultimately,

Robert’s political maneuvers gradually pushed the disinherited to their breaking point, yet, he was able to rely on his broadened network of support, to successfully sniff out and stamp out the rebellion, finally fully realizing the incremental gains of years before. Indeed, it was only several months after Bruce’s chancery produced an impressive work of propaganda, espousing the legitimacy of and widespread support for Robert’s reign that Robert’s grip on power was nearly toppled from within, in the Soules Conspiracy.

Unfortunately in the case of the Soules Conspiracy chronicles like Barbour’s provide the only direct records of the Conspiracy itself. No records exist of the Scone parliament at which conspirators were tried along with many deemed innocent, termed the ‘The Black Parliament’ and dated to early August 1320 in John Fordun’s chronicle76 and no surviving acts were issued between May 20 and November 24, 1320.77 Thus despite my critique of nationalist historians for reliance on The Brus as an accurate primary source, the dearth of primary sources for the Black Parliament, forces us to rely on chronicle evidence, particularly, that of Barbour’s The Brus.78 However, several factors contribute to my greater confidence in the historical accuracy of the parliaments in this period. The first being the similarities between several chronicles written within a century or so of the conspiracy, Barbour’s The Brus, the Lanercost chronicle, Fordun’s chronicle, Walter Bower’s Chronicle Scottichron, and Thomas Gray’s Scalacronica. Each contains similar, corroborating material but key differences suggest that the chroniclers used different sources (rather than one document from which they selected information and added stylistic flourishes). The second reason to expect greater accuracy from the chronicles in this instance is that the political nature of the Soules Conspiracy is less ripe for excessive creative license than battles or religious matters in which the chroniclers often lapse into odes to chivalry or piety. Lastly, little in the chronicles is contradicted in our collections of Robert’s acts, while much aligns with them.

76 John Fordun et al. John of Fordun's Chronicle of the Scottish Nation. The historians of Scotland, v. 4. Edinburgh, Edmonston and Douglas, 341. 77 RRS V, Acts 168-169. Such a large gap between acts is certainly significant at this stage in Robert’s reign, but several other similar gaps exist: 27 July 1318- December 3, 1318 and October 1321- February 1322 May 1322- November 1322, October 1323 -January 1324, and August 1326 November 1326. 78 RRS V, p.150

Though the Scottish parliamentary records are spotty at best in this period, it is reasonable to wonder at the conspicuous lack of official evidence surrounding the Soules

Conspiracy. For this was no minor housekeeping matter, but a decisive crushing of an attempt to overthrow the king by a coalition of those disinherited in the wake of Cambuskenneth. Even

Barbour, who hardly dramatizes the conspiracy, notes that William Soules showed up with a

79 retinue of some 360 soldiers with him when he was arrested at Berwick. As Penman writes,

“In all, almost a quarter of the nobles whose names or seals are attached to the barons letter from

Arbroath can be tied to the conspiracy, with almost as many implicated from contemporary

80 record sources.” It is important to note that Penman is including those tried but not convicted, and those who fled Robert’s loyalty or contested Robert the Bruce’s power in the following two years. One would think that a Parliament of such importance would have an extensive paper trail in the written record. Yet our only sources for the Conspiracy are near contemporary chronicles, and the steady stream of acta repatriating land away from those involved in the conspiracy to

Robert’s supporters and the clergy.

Barbour’s passage in the epigraph that begins this chapter, on this “felle conjuracione agayn Robert the douchty king,” continues for another 105 lines, as Barbour names Gilbert

Malherbe, John of Logy, Richard Brown, and David Brechin as co-conspirators convicted of treason, and describes their trials and public executions. Interestingly, Barbour writes that “gud

81 Schry Davy of Brechin” was guilty only of failing to report the conspiracy to Robert, but was

79 John Barbour and A. A. M. Duncan, The Bruce (Edinburgh: Canongate, 1997), XIX, 35-39. We can hardly trust the exact number of 360 given that Barbour’s chronicle is the only one to mention Soules’ men-at-arms, but it seems reasonable to infer from Barbour’s account that Soules did have a significant fighting force. 80 Michael Penman, Robert the Bruce : King of the Scots (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), p. 226. 81 Ibid, 19, 50

still condemned to be drawn, hung, and quartered. For Barbour, Ingram de Umfrauville’s indignance at this injustice led him to leave Scotland with Robert’s consent. In fact, given their quite suspicious records of allegiance to Robert and the improbability of Barbour’s tale it is quite likely that both Brechin and Umfrauville were both conspirators. After fighting for the English,

Brechin was captured by the Scots in 1312, and finally decided to pledge fealty to Robert I and the Scots in November of 1314, after it was clear that his Scottish lands would be forfeit otherwise.82 Moreover, in Thomas Gray and John Fordun’s chronicles Brechin is not distinguished from the other conspirators. Meanwhile, Umfrauville had fought for the English at

Bannockburn, and was closely aligned with the Comyns.83 Thus, his sudden decision to leave

Scotland and his land there seems far more likely to be the result of fear for his life in response to the conspiracy than the result of idealistic principles of justice.

Fordun also tells us that Agnes Countess of Strathearn was imprisoned for life for her part in the crime, and that “The lords Eustace of Maxwell, Walter of Barclay, sheriff of

Aberdeen, and Patrick Graham, knights, Hamelin of Troupe, and Eustace of Retreve (Rattray),

84 esquires, were accused of the same crime, but were not found guilty in any way.” Lastly,

Fordun writes that the corpse of the recently deceased Roger Mowbray was brought to stand

85 trial, convicted and condemned to be drawn, hung, and quartered.

Both Fordun and Thomas Gray mention that Murdoch of Menteith, formerly in Edward’s allegiance, caught wind of the conspiracy while in England and returned home to report the

82 Michael Penman, Robert the Bruce: King of the Scots (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 222. 83 ibid, 225. 84 John Fordun, et al. John of Fordun's Chronicle of the Scottish Nation. The historians of Scotland, v. 4. Edinburgh, Edmonston and Douglas, 341. 85 Yet, Fordun notes the merciful Robert allowed Mowbray’s body to be re-buried by the church. In fact, one would assume that Robert was chiefly concerned with ensuring Mowbray was convicted of conspiracy in order to repatriate Mowbray’s land, which he quickly did.

86 conspiracy to Robert the Bruce. In return for tipping Robert off to the conspiracy Murdoch was generously rewarded with the earldom of Menteith upon the death of his nephew Alan, earl of

87 Menteith. Barbour is alone in writing that Robert heard of the conspiracy from a woman. Gray writes that Murdoch of Menteith “had lived long in England in loyalty to the King, and returned home in order to discover this conspiracy,”88 leaving the historian at a loss as to which king

(Edward or Robert) was the object of Murdoch’s loyalty.

If we piece together the narrative strands around the Soules conspiracy from the various near contemporary chronicles, the logic of the synthesized narrative of the chronicles seems relatively sound with the exception of Barbour’s questionable line of logic around Ingram de

89 Umfrauville and David de Brechin. The only area of discrepancy between the chronicles of

Barbour, Fordun and Gray is in who informed Robert of the Conspiracy: Murdoch of Menteith,

Agnes of Strathearn, or another woman? Murdoch of Menteith seems the most reasonable of the informants, given that the records prove he received an earldom and another generous land grant, shortly after his return to Scotland.90 91Acting quickly, Robert assembled a force of loyal knights

86 John Fordun, et al. John of Fordun's Chronicle of the Scottish Nation. The historians of Scotland, v. 4. Edinburgh, Edmonston and Douglas, 341. Sir Thomas Gray. Scalacronica : The Reigns of Edward I, Edward Ii and Edward Iii, As Recorded by Sir Thomas Gray, and Now Translated by Sir Herbert Maxwell. Glasgow: J. Maclehose, 1907, 60. 87 John Barbour, Book XIX, 23-24. 88 Sir Thomas Gray. Scalacronica : The Reigns of Edward I, Edward Ii and Edward Iii, As Recorded by Sir Thomas Gray, and Now Translated by Sir Herbert Maxwell. Glasgow: J. Maclehose, 1907, 60. 89Also, of note is an internal contradiction within Barbour’s the Brus about the motives behind the conspiracy. Barbour first writes that the conspirators meant to “rule in Bruce’s stead” with Soules’ being the principal of an assembly of conspirators, something which would make no sense in the feudal era, but later writes that Soules alone wished to “reign in his stead.” 90 A..A.M. Duncan has introduced further uncertainty in speculating that the members of Scottish mission to the papacy in Avignon were the ones to inform Bruce of this conspiracy, having caught wind of efforts to support to Balliol while in France. However, besides the short timeframe that I have taken issue with, this speculative argument is only based on a fragmentary, undated, unpublished English report that the leader of the mission Earl Patrick, returned to Scotland from France with news that caused turmoil, and also mentioned an upcoming Scottish council in Scone. See A.A.M. Duncan, ‘The War of the Scots, 1306-1323’ Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 6th Series, 2 (1992) 122-151 91 RRS V, Acts 501 and 546.

to arrest the chief conspirators along with many other suspects connected to the Balliols and

Comyns. Many of these conspirators may have had a significant number of forces at their command, as in Barbour’s description of Soules’ 360 men. However, Robert’s superiority deterred any of the conspirators from challenging him on the battlefield, although one can speculate that the recently deceased Roger Mowbray may have been killed in an act of violence related to the conspiracy. Robert subsequently hastily assembled his loyal nobles for a

Parliament at which those implicated in the crimes by informants and those of dubious loyalty were tried. William Soules, Agnes Countess of Strathearn, David de Brechin, Gilbert of

Malherbe, John of Logie, Richard Broun, and Roger Mowbray were convicted guilty of lèse majesté, and David, Gilbert, John, and Richard Broun were hung, drawn, and quartered while

William Soules and Agnes Countess of Strathearn were sentenced to life in prison and Roger

Mowbray’s dead body was found guilty before he was interred. Meanwhile, Eustace of Maxwell,

Walter of Barclay, Patrick of Graham, Hamelin of Troupe, and Eustace of Rattray were found not guilty. In the aftermath of the events, Alexander Mowbray, William Comyn, William de

Caerlaverock, Malcolm de Kinninmonth, Thomas and Patrick Thorinborne, William Haresfield,

John Ferrour, Hugh de Crawford, Ingram de Umfrauville and a dozen other named servants would flee to England.

However, one major logical issue arises in the chronicles’ narratives. Why would

William Soules have led a conspiracy meant to dethrone Robert? Soules’ great uncle, John

Soules had been a guardian of Scotland from 1301 to 1304, and his father Nicholas was a claimant to the throne during the Great Cause of 1290-1292 but his claim was instantly

92 dismissed as inferior to the Balliol and Comyn claims. Though Soules surely would have felt jilted in his less than favorable role in Robert’s Scotland given his family’s importance, he surely could not have expected to gain enough Scottish or even English support to be crowned king of

Scotland. Soules’ lack of hereditary right to the kingship, and perhaps less than primary role in the conspiracy is certainly suggested by the fact that Soules was only subjected to life in prison, while most other conspirators were condemned to grisly public deaths. Indeed, the most likely explanation for the difference in Soules and Agnes of Stathearn’s punishment is that they turned king evidence. Penman provides another interesting possibility, speculating that Soules’ in fact escaped as an English chronicle records William Soules’ death at the Battle of Boroughbridge in

93 1322.

Meanwhile, a much stronger candidate to the throne, Edward Balliol, lay in wait in

Edward II’s court. If Murdoch of Menteith had caught wind of the conspiracy while in Edward’s court, might the English have been involved in the conspiracy planning to send a force along with Edward Balliol to meet the rival conspirators and establish a legitimate rival to Robert for the throne? Could Robert have perhaps blamed the conspiracy post facto on Soules’ attempt to cover up the greater attempt to restore the Balliols to the throne? The lack of written record surrounding the Black Parliament certainly lends itself to this narrative. Moreover, Robert the

Bruce was careful to avoid reference to John Balliol’s kingship when referencing his predecessors in royal acts and tailzies. Though Robert’s acts frequently refer to his predecessors, especially his predecessor Alexander III, John Balliol is hardly ever mentioned and still less

92Michael Penman. “The Soules Conspiracy of 1318-1320." Innes Review 50, no. 1 (1999), p. 25-57. 93Michael Penman. “The Soules Conspiracy of 1318-1320." Innes Review 50, no. 1 (1999), p. 54.

94 frequently mentioned as being king. Moreover, significant evidence exists in the English parliamentary records of an effort to assemble a coalition of exiles around Edward Balliol, in the hopes of propping him up as a rival ruler to the Bruce line, as they would eventually succeed in doing in 1332.95 The coalition of Balliol-aligned supporters involved in the Soules Conspiracy, and the fact that de Soules himself was not executed, and Bruce’s consistent omission of the

Balliol line in documents, all present a compelling narrative that the rebellion was one led to restore Balliol to the throne, with English backing. And the suspicious lack of parliamentary record for the Black parliament in Scone, combined with Soules’ convenient death in 1321, suggest that Robert reframed the conspiracy in the historical record as a minor conspiracy led by

Soules, in order to legitimize his rule, overemphasize his power, and improve his legacy.

We might also speculate that William Soules’ position within Robert’s court as Butler of

Scotland, gave him the access necessary to assassinate Robert the Bruce. From here, one can see how chroniclers could have conflated Soules’ position as a potential assassin of Robert the

Bruce, with his being the leader of the conspiracy who hoped to become king. Or more cynically, it takes no small leap to see how Robert could have blamed this conspiracy on this would-be assassin in order to avoid publicizing the great deal of support for Edward Balliol that existed in Scotland in 1320.

The idea that the Soules’ conspiracy was not a brief outburst of a Balliol-Comyn faction in its death throes, but the manifestation of a broadly-backed opposition to Robert’s reign is further reinforced by a reflection on Robert’s anxious declaration in the Scone Parliament of

94RRS V, p. 21. 95Michael Penman, Robert the Bruce: King of the Scots (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 221. English financial records have Edward Balliol present at Westminster on 6 July 1320.

1318 that “no one was to be a conspirator nor inventor of tales nor rumours through which matter

96 of discord may spring between the lord king and his people. This, oddly specific anxiety over so little as rumours that might have caused “discord” between the king and his people after

Robert had seemingly consolidated his gains after Bannockburn and recently retaken the border city and fortress of Berwick reinforce the idea that Robert was aware of, and actively seeking to eliminate a serious domestic threat to his rule. Robert’s attempts to quash evidence or ‘rumours of the conspiracy in the historical records,’ further supports this thesis.

The chroniclers make no connection between the Soules Conspiracy and the Declaration of Arbroath, despite the fact that the Black Parliament took place only three months after the

Declaration of Arbroath was signed, 5 of the 44 sealers were convicted of conspiracy at the

Black Parliament, and many more were likely connected to the plot. Of course, this was because none of the chroniclers wrote about the Declaration of Arbroath, likely because they had no

97 knowledge of its existence. Specifically, William Soules, David de Brechin, Ingram de

98 Umfrauville, Gilbert Malherbe, and Roger Mowbray were the sealers convicted of conspiracy.

Such a conclusion immediately lends credence to the emerging skepticism in Scottish medieval studies surrounding the strength of Robert’s reign in the six years after Bannockburn. As

Penman writes, the simple fact that 5 of the 44 signees were convicted of conspiracy at the Black

Parliament obviously demonstrates that Robert’s reign did not have the wide community basis that the rhetoric of the Declaration of Arbroath would lead one (specifically Pope John XXII to

96 RPS, 1318/1. 97 The absence of one of the key political documents from Robert’s reign, shows both their limited usefulness, and spotty sourcing, as well as their chivalric or religious bent, which tended to discount carefully crafted political and diplomatic victories. 98 RPS 1320/4/1

99 whom the declaration of Arbroath was addressed) to believe. A.A.M. Duncan, and later

Roland Tanner have further stretched the narrative, with Duncan speculating that it was the reaction to Robert’s hard-handed coercion of the nobility into sealing the Declaration of

Arbroath. R.J. Tanner extends Duncan’s argument by adding that certain nobles might have been angered by potential forgeries in the Declaration of Arbroath, which precipitated the Soules

Conspiracy. This however would imply that the conspiracy began after the declaration of

Arbroath was sealed on April 6th, 1320 (or at least in the few weeks before if the seals were collected in a piecemeal manner). That gives only 3 months for the conspiracy to have developed, gathered a large following, spread to Edward II and Edward Balliol, been discovered by Murdoch of Menteith in England, reported to Robert in Scotland, been prevented by a series of arrests by an armed force, and finally forcefully punished with the convictions of the Black

Parliament in early August. Such a theory certainly seems dubious given the slow speed of transport and information in the Middle Ages. It thus seems likely that the seeds of the conspiracy had already been sewn before the Declaration of Arbroath, but that the aggressive tactics Robert used in order to procure a broadly backed statement of the community of the realm’s steadfast support of his rule may have contributed to the conspiracy’s development, and impressive breadth of support.

In the preceding chapter, I discussed the possibility that the sealers of the Declaration of

Arbroath might have chosen to sign the Declaration in an attempt to get Robert to let his guard down, before the planned conspiracy. The validity of this theory is dependent on the importance one assigns to the Declaration of Arbroath. As the declaration was widely shared throughout

99 Michael Penman "The Soules Conspiracy of 1318-1320." Innes Review 50, no. 1 (1999): p. 27

Scotland and England, it seems doubtful that the conspirators would have lent their seals of support to such a powerful piece of political propaganda. Indeed, even the explicit purpose of the declaration, the Scottish mission, which brought the Declaration of Arbroath to the pope seems to have been very successful in improving relations with the pope, as by 1321 we find letters to Edward II encouraging him to find a peaceful solution to the conflict in Scotland, which may have contributed to the truce of 1323 and in 1324 the pope repealed his excommunication of

100 Robert.

Sorting through Robert’s acts in 1321, one finds an assortment of land redistributions that help to flesh out our image of the Soules Conspiracy. Large swathes of the land of the conspirators and deserters would be redistributed to Robert’s closest supporters over the next few years. The first existing record of land repatriated from a Soules conspirator comes in a letter to the Blackfriars of Perth awarding “forty cartloads of peat annually from the forfeited tenement of the late John de Logy knight, to be cut, dried and carried to their house by the men of the

101 tenement.” Clearly, the men of the tenement had already inherited the land, and thus redistribution came later. Interestingly, though the land is described as forfeited (implying a conspiracy) John de Logy is merely described as “late” with no reference to his part in a major conspiracy against Robert’s reign. This contrasts with other instances of betrayal unrelated to the

102 conspiracy in which the betrayal was typically addressed much more directly in the acta. For instance, when Piers Labaud betrayed Robert “he was convicted in our court of betrayal towards

103 us and our realm” rather than described as merely forfeited. It is also noteworthy that the use

100 See A.A.M. Duncan, ‘The War of the Scots, 1306-1323’ Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 6th Series, 2 (1992) 122-151 101 RRS V ,Act 173 102 RRS V, p. 21. 103 RRS V, p. 84.

of the word forfeiture implies that no restoration was imagined, in contrast to earlier land confiscations after Cambuskenneth which left open the possibility of restoration in the event of a

104 lasting peace. Such language seems to reinforce the notion that Robert and his chancery made a concerted effort to downplay and even erase the Soules Conspiracy from the historical record.

Several months later while in Berwick, Robert signed several acts repatriating land away from the traitors convicted in the Conspiracy. Most significantly on the 20th of April he granted his favored vassal and military lieutenant James Douglas “half the barony of Westerker forfeited

105 by William Soules, knight. In July of 1321, we find a charter to Dunfermline Abbey of the

106 patronage of Inverkeithing Kirk, “forfeited by Roger de Mowbray.”

On the 4th of August, a letter from Robert asked the baillies of Norway in Orkney

“whether Alexander Brown, a Scottish traitor, had been received in Orkney in violation of the

107 treaty between Norway and Scotland.” Alexander Brown was presumably a relative of the executed conspirator Richard Brown, though we find little evidence of his existence elsewhere in records. That Robert would go to the effort of pressing the Norwegians on the whereabouts of such a minor conspirator illustrates the lengths Robert was willing to go to quash all his detractors and stamp out any remaining traces of the conspiracy.

On October 15, 1321, some of the remainder of Soules’ land in Westerker was confirmed

108 to have been granted to Melrose Abbey. Finally, the “late” John de Logy is mentioned again as late as 26 April 1323, in a letter patent recording, ratifying and ordering the enforcement of an

104 RRS V, p. 20. The Earls of Percy, Wake, and La louche were English loyalists, and were thus stripped of their lands after Cambuskenneth, yet they had some of their Scottish lands restored after the treaty of Edinburgh-Northampton 105 RRS V, Act 184. 106 RRS V, Act 188 107 RRS V, Act 195 108 RRS V, Act 201

annual grant to the Blackfriars of Perth of forty cartloads of peat, that de Logy had granted before. Once again, Robert’s chancery uses “late” and forfeiture to vaguely refer to the Soules conspiracy. We may also speculate as to whether this grant was genuine, or (if the document was forged by Robert’s chancery) if it was merely another mechanism by which to regrant more of de Logy’s former wealth to the Blackfriars of Perth several years after the forfeiture.

What then are we to make of this collection of documents primarily from 1321 dealing with the aftermath of the Soules Conspiracy? Firstly, we must note that the documents fit in well with the narrative from the chronicles, and thus serve to substantiate much of their evidence.

Soules’ forfeiture and John de Logy’s forfeiture are each mentioned twice, and the forfeiture of

Roger Mowbray is mentioned once. In addition to their being written in 1321, the year after the conspiracy, the unique vagueness with which the redistributions are described, (no reasons are given for the forfeitures) links each redistribution together, and suggests that each was related to a major event like the Soules Conspiracy that Robert wished to sweep under the rug.

When paired with the other acta of 1320 and 1321 one must note the particularly opportune benefits of the repatriations Robert was able to make with the Soules’ conspiracy.

Robert repatriated land to his most reliable and militarily able supporters like James Douglas, including areas of spotty support like the Southwest.109 Of course, the Southwest was also an important strategic front, as the English could send troops there by land, up through Northumbria or by sea, from Ireland, so in return for these generous grants of the conspirators’ land, Robert required military service. Indeed, there are five land grants issued in regions of Southern

Scotland in the year after the Black Parliament requiring archer service in return (for context,

109 RRS V, Act 184.

only one request for archer service was issued in the prior two years). 110 He also donated forfeited lands generously to the church, surely partially out of piety, but also likely to maintain the support of a majority of the Scottish clergy in spite of the papal opposition to Robert’s reign.

The conspiracy thus allowed him not only to decisively weaken a widespread domestic movement against his rule, but also allowed Robert to strengthen areas of military, political, and religious weakness.

On a more macroscopic level, Bruce’s successful repression of the Soules’ conspiracy, and the forfeited land it gave him seems to have given him much greater powers of patronage and legislation, in the following year. Though the royal records contain only 16 charters in 1317 and

1318, 19 in charters in 1319 and 8 charters in 1320, we have record of 33 charters signed in

1321, the year after the Soules Conspiracy, far and away the most passed since Bruce signed 33 charters in 1315 and 1316, when he was repatriating land and consolidating his power in the wake of Bannockburn.111 Indeed, it seems almost poetic that Bruce passed the same number of charters in the year following his biggest military victory at Bannockburn, as in his biggest political victory in the Black Parliament of Scone. Like after Bannockburn, the charters passed after the Soules Conspiracy were chiefly grants of land to his supporters, but also confirmation of the rights of churches, political appointments, royal letters, charter inspections, tax exemptions, and other miscellaneous confirmations of Robert’s will and the law of the land. The increase in the number of acts not directly related to the lands forfeited at the Black Parliament, are perhaps an even greater indication of Robert’s increase in power after the Black Parliament, than those seemingly more relevant charters since these indicate that the repression of his detractors and

110 RRS V, p. 48. see . RRS V, Acts 176, 177,178, 186, 189. 111 RRS V.

continued patronage of his supporters had given his regime the legitimacy, and stability to act more broadly across the realm.

In sum, a careful study of the three primary sources for the Declaration of Arbroath, the chronicles, the suspicious seals from the Declaration of Arbroath, and the acts in the aftermath of the Black Parliament, reinforce the notion that the Soules Conspiracy was a major widespread rebellion against Robert’s rule, one that appears to be underrepresented in the current historical narrative of Robert the Bruce. The lack of references to Balliol in Robert’s acts, the lack of references or records of the Soules conspiracy, and the extent to which Robert went to punish the

112 conspirators further this thesis.

More feasible yet still provocative arguments have yet to be made in the historiography:

Could the Soules conspiracy have been orchestrated in part by Edward II? After all, everyone knew Edward Balliol to be a thoroughly English man who had spent his entire youth at the

English court. Though Balliol had left England to inherit his father’s lands in France in 1315,

English crown payments to him in fall of 1318 show that he had returned to York by that time.

Disgruntled over losing Berwick in 1318 to 1319, Edward II may have chosen to attempt to undermine Bruce from the inside, seeking to capitalize on the grievances caused by the 1318 tailzie, Bruce’s weakened position after losing forces in Ireland, and his lack of an heir.

Moreover, during this period Edward II had temporarily mitigated his issues with the Ordainers led by Thomas of Lancaster. As Penman notes, William de Soules had a safe conduct to

England in the spring of 1320, and while it is unclear that he used it, this clearly gave de Soules an opportunity to coordinate the support of the king, and other Scottish exiles in England.

112Colin McNamee. The War of the Bruces: Scotland, Ireland, and England 1306-28 (East Linton 1997) 235-236.

It is clear that Robert’s position was greatly strengthened from his swift and decisive suppression of the Soules Conspiracy. It finally allowed him to successfully either eliminate his detractors, and repatriate their lands to his most loyal supporters, force their exile, or intimidate them into submission. His later parliaments would no longer be dominated by the same level of propaganda, political maneuvering and unilateral action that hinted at Robert’s insecurity, and political weakness. Moreover, after 1320 Robert was able to fight and negotiate from a position of strength. This allowed him to choose not to needlessly fight a risky, potentially decisive battle, during the English invasion of 1322 and gain leverage and international support in the peace talks that would lead to the Truce of 1323.

The considerable gains Robert received from his ruthless suppression of the conspiracy, and the ease with which he succeeded in snuffing it out, opens up an intriguing final possible speculative narrative. Could the Soules Conspirators perhaps have been framed by Robert himself in a masterstroke of merciless political manipulation, in an act even more ruthless than his murder of John Comyn in 1306? The lack of documentary evidence once again makes this difficult to strictly disprove. Nonetheless, several factors make me dubious of such an appealing proposition. Firstly, there is the number of those tried but found not guilty. Would Robert really have arrested so many of those still loyal to him only to give the illusion that the conspirators were given fair trials? Secondly, there is the timing of the Conspiracy in such close proximity to the Declaration of Arbroath. Why work so hard to coerce a wide-ranging cross-section of the nobility, including the conspirators, to seal a document proclaiming their steadfast commitment to Robert, only to frame them for a coup attempt three months later? Surely this would undermine the veneer of a unified Scotland that Robert had worked so hard to develop. Finally,

one would think that if the conspiracy was indeed a fiction written by Robert, he would have worked harder to emphasize its validity, by executing its supposed leader or at least blaming the root of the conspiracy on a more convincing candidate like Balliol.

There do however, remain broader conclusions that one can draw about the role of the

Soules conspiracy. The skill with which Robert disposed of the Soules Conspirators, and solidified the regions from which the conspiracy had flared up, speaks to Robert’s skill as a political operative. Indeed, in the next chapter, as Robert’s gains from the Soules Conspiracy allowed him to consolidate power and act more decisively, one sees that it was Robert’s political skill, as much as his military successes that brought him such a fruitful reign, and ultimate success in the war. Secondly, when placed in the context of Robert’s redistribution of land and royal positions from 1314-1320, the significant portion of the high-ranking nobility involved in the Soules Conspiracy shows the factional nature of Robert’s rule from 1314-1320. It also makes clear that nationalistic readings of the Declaration of Arbroath, which take its proclamation of Robert as Scotland’s most valiant saviour, whom the community of the realm shall serve to death, are clearly inaccurate. Scotland’s independence was not reclaimed through a united effort, but through hard-handed, messy, bloody political maneuvering. When peace was finally won in 1328, the community of the realm that presided over that peace, had a far different familial composition and far less autonomy than the community of the realm that had existed before Robert I took the throne.

Chapter Three: The Fruits of the Black Parliament

Having consolidated his power, suppressed or eliminated his detractors, and reinforced his base of support in the years immediately after the Soules Conspiracy, Robert’s regime finally had the popular legitimacy and strength to achieve a string of meaningful successes over the final years of his reign. Specifically, Bruce won another major victory over the English by successfully repelling the English invasion of 1322, which put him in a position to conclude the

Thirteen Years Truce with Edward II in 1323, pass a king’s tenth tax at the Cambuskenneth

Parliament in 1326, and negotiate an alliance with the French (The 1326 Treaty of Corbeil) before finally cementing his gains, by negotiating peace with the English in the 1328 Treaty of

Edinburgh Northampton. It is important to note that Bruce’s reign was also aided by the emergence of a direct male heir that came with the birth of his son, David, future David II, in

1324. Moreover, the general trend of Bruce’s collection of acts and Parliament, displays a king who was finally able to reward his supporters, expand his parliament, and avoid the dubious acts of political forgery and manipulation that characterized his earlier reign.

Firstly, one must note that Bruce simply was able to pass acts and hold parliaments more frequently than in the earlier period of his reign. From 1306-1314 our collection of Bruce’s acts, suggests that Bruce passed about five acts per year, from 1315-1320, Bruce passed about 21, and from 1321 to 1329 Bruce passed about 24 acts per year. Meanwhile, Bruce held approximately two parliaments before Bannockburn (June 6, 1314), approximately five parliaments after

Bannockburn, but before the Soules Conspiracy (August 1320) and then nine parliaments over the course of his reign.113 Moreover, the membership in those parliaments increased from a

113RRS V

select, hand-picked manipulated few, to a broader coalition. The summons to Bruce’s final parliament at Edinburgh in 1328 asks for the attendance not just of “bishops, abbots, earls, and barons” but also “freeholders and six sufficient persons from each of the communities of the burghs in your bailiary.”114 Such an invitation to freeholders and representatives of each of the burghs, represents a significant expansion of the scope of Robert’s parliament.115 It is clear, that

Robert no longer had to rely on manipulation, and coercion in order to push his policies through representative forums, but could instead rely on a broader cross section of the community of the realm, to support his rule and his policies, even when the policy in question was the renewal of a hefty tax, and the passage of a peace treaty promising a large indemnity to England, as the policy in question was at Edinburgh in 1328.

Only a year, after the passage of the Soules Conspiracy, the English resolve showed signs of weakening, as they sent emissaries requesting a peace negotiation in 1321. In the year since, the Soules conspiracy, Robert and Edward II’s domestic situations had almost flipped, as Robert had suppressed his detractors and consolidated his power, while Edward II’s position was once again threatened by his enemies in the North, the Lords Ordainer led by the Earl of Lancaster, who vehemently opposed the privileged position and patronage given to Hugh Despenser the

Younger and his father. Perhaps seeking to solidify his northern border before domestic conflict broke out, and prevent an alliance of the Lords Ordainer and the Scottish, Edward appointed

English envoys on January 19, 1321 to negotiate with the Scots for a peace or a prolongation of

114 RPS 1318/1a 115 McQueen, Alison AB. "The origins and development of the Scottish parliament, 1249-1329." PhD diss., University of St Andrews, 2002, 297

the two year truce then in force.116 Robert responded by issuing letters of safe-conduct for the

English envoys to come to Berwick on the 26th of January 1321.117

What emerges from the English envoys to Edward II, is a series of legalistic negotiations, in which little headway was made “there were great delays” and the Scots would agree only to a

“long truce, for example of twenty-six years.” 118 Eventually, the negotiations appear to have withered either due to lack of foreseeable headway, or perhaps more likely the growing chaos created by the Lancastrian revolt against Edward II and the Despensers, and the truce was allowed to lapse in December of 1321. It seems that the Scots were reluctant to make peace negotiations, at this time, most likely, because they both hoped to capitalize on the coming

English civil war, and were wary of making peace with a king who did not have sovereignty over his own realm. Where the English had long resisted coming to the table for peace negotiations even after Bannockburn, after putting down the internal resistance to his reign, Robert was now in the position to dictate the terms of the peace, while Edward was forced to the table. The

English’s resistance, to the “long truce” also indicates that they may not have been willing to make lasting concessions, that would give Robert the time to establish a stable line of succession in the case of a long truce, or in the case of a peace treaty, concessions that would involve renouncing the English claim to Scotland. Importantly, the English never referred to Robert the

Bruce as a king of Scotland, nor did they refer to the “realm of Scotland” 119 as a kingdom.

116 E. L. G. Stones, Anglo-Scottish Relations, 1174-1328; Some Selected Documents. Medieval Texts. (London: Nelson, 1965), 146. 117 RRS V 171. 118 E. L. G. Stones, Anglo-Scottish Relations, 1174-1328; Some Selected Documents. Medieval Texts. (London: Nelson, 1965), 147-153 119 ibid, 148.

Robert would eventually negotiate an abortive alliance with the Lancastrian rebels, and launch a very successful raid into Northern England that went largely unopposed as Edward focused on combating the rebels. However, Robert’s plans to join forces with the Earl of

Lancaster, and capitalize further on the alliance were thwarted when the rebels were decisively defeated by Andrew Harclay and the English at the Battle of Boroughbridge in March 1322.120

The decisive victory, gave Edward II the legitimacy, and free hand to move against Robert I.

Edward II’s forces, no longer likely to receive support from the Balliol-Comyn faction in the

Southwest after the Soules Conspiracy, elected to move through Southeast Scotland towards

Edinburgh Yet, Edward II’s invasion force was only readied by August, and Robert’s well prepared army, proceeded to use the Fabian tactics they had honed in previous defenses of

Scotland, so that by the time the English reached Edinburgh, they were so starved and ill-supplied that they were forced to retreat.121 At this point, Robert’s forces engaged in a rapid counter-raid into Northern England that caught the English forces unprepared at the Battle of Old

Byland in November 1322, and devastated the English army.

With Northern England in ruins following years of warfare against the Lancastrian rebels and the Scots, Andrew Harclay, Earl of Hereford, took matters into his own hands, and negotiated a peace treaty with the Scots that he hoped to present to Edward II for further ratification. Edward II quickly executed Harclay for treason via negotiating peace without the express authorization of his monarch, and the truce was voided. Nonetheless, its terms would foreshadow the terms of the eventual peace treaty to be signed in 1328, including such features

120Michael Penman, Robert the Bruce : King of the Scots (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 238. 121 Barbour provides a colorful anecdote, in which the English’s earl of surrey remarks This is the dearest beef I ever saw. It surely has cost a thousand pounds and more! John Barbour and A. A. M. Duncan, The Bruce (Edinburgh: Canongate, 1997), 289

as a hefty war indemnity to be paid to the English, and the arrangement of a marriage between

Robert’s male heir and an English princess. However, the treaties differed on one crucial point, the question of the restoration of those disinherited on either side. The treaty with Harclay reads,

“if agreement is reached between the kings... neither of them on this account shall be bound to receive in his realm a man who has been opposed to him, nor to render him the lands that he or his ancestors had in his realm, if he does not wish to do it of his special grace.”122 With the memory of the Soules Conspiracy fresh in his mind in 1323, and the fruits of the suppression of the disinherited so clear at this point in time, Robert was careful to guarantee that there would be no chance of re-opening the legitimacy crisis that had plagued the first 14 years of his reign. In the treaty of Edinburgh-Northampton, no similar clause denying the need for restoration existed.

Perhaps, the memory of the Black Parliament had faded in the old king’s mind by this time. The king’s restoration of several English nobles, “by [his] special grace” to their former lands in

Scotland,123 in the wake of the treaty, would prove to be a mistake, when the rest of the disinherited pressed to be restored during the minority of David II, leading to the Second War of

Independence.

In place of the abortive treaty with Harclay, Bruce and Edward II negotiated a thirteen years truce.124 Edward II, may have been hesitant to conclude a peace treaty with Robert, as given his absence of a direct male heir, the possibility of another succession crisis loomed.

Nonetheless, the negotiation of such a lengthy truce, was clearly a measure of Robert the Bruce’s continued success and legitimacy.

122 RRS V, Act 215. 123 RRS V, Act 353 The nobles restored were Henry Percy, Thomas Wake and Henry Beaumont. 124 RRS V, Act 232.

With the birth of his son, David II, in 1324, the last hurdle in establishing the legitimacy of Robert’s reign, was cleared, and Edward Balliol’s claim looked increasingly weak. This internal strength would give Robert’s regime the security and leverage to score a string of political and diplomatic successes. The Treaty of Corbeil, ratified on July 12, 1326, renewed the

Auld Alliance with King Philip IV of France after a period of lapse,125 and three days later, parliament passed the aforementioned king’s tenth tax to be collected annually until Robert’s death.126 Such a large tax was unprecedented in the history of Scotland, and speaks to both the strength of Robert’s rule at this point in time, and the growth of Parliament as an institution now able to pass such a major reform. Significant, as well, is the fact that the tax was equally distributed across all the king’s subjects, signalling that Robert was secure enough to dispense with the discriminatory carrot-and-stick policies he used to placate resistance, and win supporters earlier in his reign.

Robert’s final political success was the negotiation of the Treaty of

Edinburgh-Northampton in 1328, which ended the war and acknowledged Robert as the king of an independent Scotland.127 The treaty also arranged a marriage between David II, and Joan,

Edward III’s (the new English king) sister. In addition, the Scots arranged to pay 20,000 sterling spread out over three annual installments. Though, this may at first seem to indicate weakness on the part of Robert, it is likely that this was considered repayment for all of the sums taken from

125 RRS V, Act 299 126 1326/1; Michael Penman. Robert the Bruce : King of the Scots (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 270. 127 E. L. G. Stones, Anglo-Scottish Relations, 1174-1328; Some Selected Documents. Medieval Texts. (London: Nelson, 1965), 161-170. The treaty reads begins stating that both England and scotland have agreed “that there be a true, final, and perpetual peace between the kings, their heirs and successors, and their realms and lands, and their subjects and people, on the one side and the other”

Northern England through blackmail in the previous 20 years. Moreover, the fact that the sum was paid by January 1331, indicates that Robert’s regime was able to collect taxes remarkably well.128

Robert’s gains from the Soules Conspiracy allowed him to consolidate power and act more decisively, one sees that it was Robert’s political skill, as much as his military successes that brought him such a fruitful reign, and ultimate success in the war. When peace was finally won in 1328, the community of the realm that presided over that peace, had a far different familial composition and far less autonomy than the community of the realm that had existed before Scotland took the throne.

128 E. L. G. Stones, Anglo-Scottish Relations, 1174-1328; Some Selected Documents. Medieval Texts. (London: Nelson, 1965), 161-170, XXIX

Conclusion

Robert the Bruce’s legacy in contemporary Scotland is one of a warrior king, who boldly led the Scots to victory against the English. He is depicted in a statue at the Bannockburn, in full medieval armor, gallantly surveying the battlefield, astride his majestic horse, ready to take down as many English as it takes in the quest for independence. Understandably, such an image of

Robert the Bruce has proved salient in Scotland’s independence movement, as they consider whether to cast off English authority. Yet, the life of Robert the Bruce, is not so much a life of the battlefield as a life of political strife. Robert was a king who embodied the feudal era, rather than the landscape of contemporary nationalist politics. He was willing to change allegiances, murder rivals, forge seals, produce propaganda, forcibly extract oaths of allegiance, and brutally punish his enemies to attain and maintain power. Yet Robert also was willing to compromise, work with the Community of the realm, reward former enemies who came into his allegiance and use incremental legislative change to strengthen his position, and reassure his subjects that he would not abuse his power. It is in this, dogged pursuit of power, through the mobilization of the

Community of the realm that Robert truly excelled.

The culmination of Robert’s battle to secure his hold over Scotland, occurred not at

Bannockburn in 1314, but in the summer of 1320, as Bruce attempted to create legitimacy through the propagandistic Declaration of Arbroath, provoked rebellion, and then secured legitimacy through the harsher means of execution, and disinheritance at the Black Parliament.

That Bruce and his followers were able to alter the historical record, so that future generations would see the Black Parliament as a historical afterthought, is merely a testament to Robert the

Bruce’s skill at a politics of manipulation and revisionism.

Bibliography

Primary Sources Anglo-Scottish Relations, 1174-1328: Some Selected Documents , ed. E.L.G. Stones (Oxford, 1965). Barbour, John, and A. A. M. Duncan. The Bruce . Canongate Classics ; 78. Edinburgh: Canongate, 1997. Fordun John, et al. John of Fordun's Chronicle of the Scottish Nation. The historians of Scotland, v. 4. Edinburgh, Edmonston and Douglas. Froissart, Jean, and J. E. A. Joliffe. Froissart's Chronicles. London: Harvill Press, 1967. Gray, Thomas, Scalacronica : The Reigns of Edward I, Edward Ii and Edward Iii, As Recorded by Sir Thomas Gray, and Now Translated by Sir Herbert Maxwell. Glasgow: J. Maclehose, 1907, 60. The Records of the Parliaments of Scotland to 1707, eds. K.M. Brown et al (St Andrews, 2008-),http://www.rps.ac.uk Regesta Regum Scottorum V: The Acts of Robert I, 1306-29 , ed. A.A.M. Duncan (Edinburgh, 1986) Stones, E. L. G. Anglo-Scottish Relations, 1174-1328; Some Selected Documents. Medieval Texts. London: Nelson, 1965.

Secondary Sources Barron, Evan Macleod. The Scottish War of Independence. J. Nisbet, 1914. Barrow, G. W. S. Robert Bruce and the Community of the Realm of Scotland . Classic ed., 2013. Brown, Keith M., and Roland. Tanner. Parliament and Politics in Scotland, 1235-1560. The History of the Scottish Parliament ; v. 1. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004. Brown, Michael. The Wars of Scotland, 1214-1371 . Edinburgh University Press, 2004. Crawford, Robert. Bannockburns : Scottish Independence and Literary Imagination, 1314-2014. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014, p. 177. Duncan, A. A. M. "The Early Parliaments of Scotland." The Scottish Historical Review 45, no. 139 (1966): 36-58. Duncan, A.A.M. "The War of the Scots, 1306-23." Transactions Of The Royal Historical Society 2 (1992): 125-51. Grant, Alexander, and Stringer, Keith. Medieval Scotland: Crown, Lordship and Community. Edinburgh University Press, 1998. Penman, Michael A. Robert the Bruce : King of the Scots . 2014.

Penman, Michael. ": The Soules Conspiracy of 1318-1320." Innes Review 50, no. 1 (1999): 25-57. Prestwich, Michael., and Edward I. The Three Edwards : War and State in England, 1272-1377 . Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1980. McQueen, Alison AB. "The origins and development of the Scottish Parliament, 1249-1329." PhD diss., University of St Andrews, 2002. R, Rait The Scottish Parliament before the Union of the Crowns (London, 1901) Rait, Parliaments pp. 30-2, 125-6, 195-7 Scott, Ronald Mcnair. Robert the Bruce: King of Scots. Peter Bedrick Books, 1984 Sumption, Jonathan. The Hundred Years War. Volume I, Trial by Battle . First paperback ed., 1999.

Appendix A: Timeline

1286: Alexander III, king of Scotland dies. 2 year old Maid of Norway next in line for the throne. 6 guardians of Scotland appointed to look out for the independence of the realm. 1289: Treaty of Birgham, between Scots and English. Maid of Norway affirmed as queen of Scotland, on the condition that she marries the king of England’s son. Clauses tenuously safeguarding Scotland’s independence also included 1290 Maid of Norway dies en route to Scotland. Treaty of Birgham appoints Edward I, king of England to choose her successor. 1292: John Balliol crowned as king of Scotland with the support of Edward I. 1293-1295: Edward hears Scottish disputes in English court. Forces John Balliol to pay homage to him, impinges upon Scottish independence 1296 Outbreak of war. English sack Berwick. John Balliol abdicates. 1297: Scots defeat English at the Battle of Stirling Bridge. William Wallace becomes guardian of Scotland 1298: English defeat Scots at Battle of Falkirk. 1302: Robert the Bruce pledges fealty to Edward I of England. 1304: John Comyn pledges fealty to England 1305: William Wallace executed by Edward I 1306: Robert the Bruce murders John Comyn. Robert the Bruce is crowned king. Robert the Bruce flees to the west after being defeated by English troops at the Battle of Methven. 1309: St. Andrews Parliament. Declaration of Clergy. 1313: Possible Dundee Parliament, and ultimatum, giving Robert’s enemies one year to pay homage to him or else be disinherited. 1314: Scots defeat English at Battle of Bannockburn. Cambuskenneth Parliament disinherits Robert’s enemies. 1315: Ayr Assembly and Tailzie 1318: Scots capture border town of Berwick. Death of Edward Bruce and failure of Irish expedition. Scone Parliament. 1319: English siege of Berwick repelled. Two year truce between England and Scotland begins. 1320: Declaration of Arbroath. Soules Conspiracy. Black Parliament convicts Soules Conspirators. Lords Ordainer rebel against Edward’s rule led by Earl of Lancaster. 1322: Edwardian loyalists defeat Lancastrian rebellion. English invasion forced to retreat due to lack of supplies. Scots victory at Battle of Byland. 1323: Both sides agree to a Thirteen Year Truce. 1324: Birth of David Bruce gives Robert a male heir. 1326: Treaty of Corbeil renews alliance with France. Passage of king’s tenth tax at Parliament of

Cambuskenneth 1327: Edward II deposed by Queen Isabella and her love Roger Mortimer. 13 Year Truce broken. War resumes. 1328: Treaty of Edinburgh-Northampton ends First War of Independence. 1329: Death of Robert the Bruce

Appendix B: Glossary of a Few Archaic Medieval Words

Bailiff -- Powerful court official. Chancery -- The royal writing office which wrote archived and published the king’s official documents, and kept the king’s royal seals. In Scotland, each document was written by the royal chancellor, who for most of Robert’s reign was Bernard abbot of Arbroath. Chronicle -- Medieval narrative account of facts and events arranged in chronological order. Justiciar -- High-ranking legal official one of the king’s lieutenants, had legal jurisdiction over a large region Seal -- Distinctive imprint, made in wax, by a metal matrix. Each noble would have their own specific seal. Tailzie -- Legal document specifying the inheritance of property or title.