The Inventory of Historic Battlefields – Battle of Falkirk II
The Inventory of Historic Battlefields is a list of nationally important battlefields
in Scotland. A battlefield is of national importance if it makes a contribution to the understanding of the archaeology and history of the nation as a whole, or has the potential to do so, or holds a particularly significant place in the national consciousness. For a battlefield to be included in the Inventory, it must be considered to be of national importance either for its association with key historical events or figures; or for the physical remains and/or archaeological potential it contains; or for its landscape context. In addition, it must be possible to define the site on a modern map with a reasonable degree of accuracy.
The aim of the Inventory is to raise awareness of the significance of these nationally important battlefield sites and to assist in their protection and
management for the future. Inventory battlefields are a material consideration in the planning process. The Inventory is also a major resource for enhancing the understanding, appreciation and enjoyment of historic battlefields, for promoting education and stimulating further research, and for developing their potential as attractions for visitors.
Designation Record and Full Report Contents
Name
- Context
Alternative Name(s) Date of Battle
Battlefield Landscape
- Location
Local Authority NGR Centred
- Terrain - Condition
Date of Addition to Inventory Date of Last Update Overview and Statement of Significance Inventory Boundary Historical Background to the Battle
- The Armies
Archaeological and Physical Remains and Potential Cultural Association
- Commemoration and Interpretation
Select Bibliography
- Information on Sources and
- Publications
- - Numbers
- Losses - Action - Aftermath and Consequences
- Full Bibliography - Primary Sources - Cartographic and Illustrative Sources - Secondary Sources
Events and Participants
Inventory of Historic Battlefields FALKIRK II
Alternative Names: None 17 January 1746 Local Authority: Falkirk NGR centred: NS 868 787 Date of Addition to Inventory: 21 March 2011 Date of last update: 14 December 2012
Overview and Statement of Significance
The second battle of Falkirk is significant as the penultimate battle of the period of the Jacobite Risings. The Jacobite army at Falkirk is the largest ever assembled, and it was the first time in the '45 Rising that the Jacobites faced an experienced Government force in battle. It is the last time the Jacobites would win a battle in pursuit of their long standing goal to restore the Stuart dynasty, although it does nothing in the end to improve their fortunes.
The battle of Falkirk was the first battle to be fought in Scotland following the return of the Jacobite army from its unsuccessful invasion of England in 1745. The Jacobite army, led by Bonnie Prince Charlie (grandson of the exiled King James VII and II), returned to Scotland and had reached Stirling by early January where they laid siege to the Castle.
The Hanoverian army , tasked with bringing the Jacobite army to battle, marched from Edinburgh to Falkirk, planning to advance on Stirling. The Jacobites moved first and set out to meet the Government forces. Although the ensuing battle was a victory for the Jacobites, it was clumsy and unsatisfying and marked the beginning of a downturn in their fortunes.
Inventory Boundary
The Inventory boundary defines the area in which the main events of the battle are considered to have taken place (landscape context) and where associated physical remains and archaeological evidence occur or may be expected (specific qualities). The landscape context is described under
battlefield landscape: it encompasses areas of fighting, key movements of troops across the landscape and other important locations, such as the positions of camps or vantage points. Although the landscape has changed since the time of the battle, key characteristics of the terrain at the time of the battle can normally still be identified, enabling events to be more fully understood and interpreted in their landscape context. Specific qualities are described under physical remains and potential: these include landscape features that played a significant role in the battle, other physical remains, such as enclosures or built structures, and areas of known or potential archaeological evidence.
The Inventory boundary for the Battle of Falkirk II is defined on the accompanying map and includes the following areas:
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Lands to the west and south-west of Greenbank. The direction of the advance of the Jacobite army and their initial deployment into battle array.
South Bantaskine Estate and land to the north of Greenbank. The direction of the approach of the Government troops and their initial deployment into battle array. This land includes the potential remains of buildings which were used as shelter by the Government right.
Greenbank Farm and lands to the south. The core of the battlefield including the vantage point of Charlie’s Hill.
Lands to the east and south-east of Greenbank, now housing estates on the west of Falkirk. The probable route of the Government retreat. This area includes the possible location of the mass grave at Dumyat Drive and has high potential for burials.
The terrain of the moor including the Greenbank ravine and the views out from the marshland from the Jacobite position and the steep sloping scarp to the north which the Government troops climbed onto the moor. These well preserved landscape features are key to understanding the manoeuvres of both armies.
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Inventory of Historic Battlefields Historical Background to the Battle
The Jacobite Risings intermittently spanned more than half a century between 1689 and 1746. Their motivation was the return of the exiled Stuart monarchy to the throne, James II & VII having been ousted in 1688 by the Glorious Revolution. The last of the risings commenced in 1745 when Charles Edward Stuart, grandson of the exiled king, and better known as Bonnie Prince Charlie, arrived in Scotland from France in July, raising his standard at Glenfinnan on 19 August. His aim was to put his father, known by his supporters as King James III and VIII, on the throne in place of the Hanoverian George II.
Following victory at Prestonpans in September, the Jacobite army marched south, hoping to collect support from England before moving on London. Upon arriving at Derby it became clear that advance further south was futile, especially as two Government armies were now in pursuit, one of them led by the George II’s son, the Duke of Cumberland. Following a rearguard action at Clifton, the Jacobite army crossed back into Scotland on 20 December. After combining with fresh forces raised in the north and limited numbers of Scots and Irish troops in French service, the Jacobite army began a siege of Stirling Castle. Meanwhile, a strong Government force under Lt-General Hawley began its preparations for a counter-offensive in Edinburgh. Following a foraging raid by Jacobites into Linlithgow, the Government army marched out of Edinburgh and occupied Falkirk, establishing their camp to the west of the town.
Instead of waiting for the Government force to attack them at Stirling, the Jacobites advanced to the high ground to the south of Falkirk, from where they proposed to attack the Government camp. In the absence of effective Government scouting, the Jacobite commander, Lord George Murray, was able to take the initiative and approached Falkirk Moor, located to the south of the town, from the west. The Jacobite position on the moor had good flank protection but the topography did not facilitate clear lines of sight. The Government army, under Major General Hawley, responded and marched on to the moor from the north. Due to the wet ground and steepness of the hill the artillery had to be abandoned part way up. The two forces deployed roughly north-south, with a steep slope defining the battlefield on the north side and marshy ground to the south. A deep, steep sided ravine, cutting into the ground from the north, separated the armies but there was open ground in the centre and to the south.
The Jacobite army comprised a combination of Highland clan forces, traditionally dependent on the Highland charge, together with Lowland infantry that included a small body of professional French troops, trained according to contemporary European military practice. The Highlanders were placed in the front line, with the Lowland infantry as support in the second line, together with a small infantry and cavalry reserve. But the Highland charge that was so successful at Prestonpans in 1745 had been against troops that had never seen action. At Falkirk the Government army was made up largely of veterans trained to form up three deep and volley fire muskets at about two rounds a minute. Hawley believed this tactic, when employed by battle hardened troops, would be effective against the Highland charge. He therefore deployed
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in two lines of infantry, with the dragoons on the front left. He placed his inexperienced troops, the militias (often ordinary citizens), which were well trained but had no combat experience, as a left rear flank guard and on the slopes on the right.
The first engagement came with a left flank Government dragoon attack on the Jacobite right, but this was fought off, initially by the delivery of a musket volley by the Highland troops under Murray. Despite heavy losses to this fusillade, the dragoons crashed into the Jacobite line but were fought back at point of sword and dirk; while fleeing to the east they disordered Government infantry regiments on the left, including the militia. Some of the dragoons fled northward between the lines and suffered flanking fire from the Jacobite centre. The left flank units were unable to reform in time to fire the intended volley before the Highlanders charged and came in to hand to hand combat. The Highlanders had supposedly attacked contrary to Lord George Murray’s intentions, forcing him to send the second line of Lowland infantry forward in support. Under this pressure, the Government regiments on the left and centre left broke, carrying the militia reserve with them. Highlanders then rushed on in pursuit. Though it was important to keep the broken Government troops from reforming, the success on the Jacobite right ought to have led to a flank attack on the hard pressed Government left. Instead, many of those troops on the Jacobite right pursued the Government forces off the moor and pillaged their camp.
Meanwhile, Ligonier’s regiment on the Government right, which had not been disordered and had the added protection of a steep ravine to prevent enemy attack, held the line against the Jacobites. They were joined by Barrel’s and other rallied units, some from the second line, and a strong fighting position was at last adopted, with the left flank anchored on some buildings and the right on the ravine. Just as Hawley had expected from all his infantry, the intense musket fire caused the Jacobite left to recoil and some fled. There is some disagreement between several of the secondary accounts as to the detail of the action on the Jacobite left, but it would appear that the lack of effective command and control within the Jacobite forces put them at a severe disadvantage. The failing light and heavy rain precluded a Government offensive at such a late stage, even though so many of the Jacobite forces were disordered or had left the field, and Hawley therefore retreated back to his camp and then back towards Edinburgh.
The battle was relatively short and saw the Jacobites effectively left in command of the field but in reality the victory was a hollow one. The Government forces certainly did not see Falkirk as a defeat, though the round of courts martial and executions which followed suggest that the outcome had caused considerable embarrassment. Faced by the difficulties of a winter campaign and growing numbers of deserters, the Jacobites abandoned the Stirling siege and marched north, with many of the Highlanders dispersing until a new muster in the spring.
The Armies
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A detailed break down of the units involved on both sides is provided by Reid (1996). The Jacobite front line, which appears to have been arrayed three men deep, ran from the left to right thus: Lochiel’s Regiment, The Stewarts of Appin, The Master of Lovat’s Regiment, Lady MacIntosh’s Regiment, Farquharson of Monaltirie’s Battalion, Lord Cromartie’s Regiment, Cluny’s Regiment, and then the MacDonald Regiments of Clanrannald, Glengarry and Keppoch.
In the second line were: Two battalions of Lord Lewis Gordon’s Regiment, two battalions of Lord Ogilvy’s Regiment and the three battalions of the Atholl Brigade. The third line was made up from cavalry under Sir John MacDonnell and French regular infantry, including Picquets from the Irish and Royal Ecossois (Scots in regular French service) under Lord John Drummond.
In total, Reid has some 5,800 Jacobite infantry on the field and 360 cavalry, but this is considerably less than other commentators have suggested, with figures ranging from 10,000-8,000.
As far as the Government force is concerned Reid, in agreement with all others, has from left to right: three dragoon regiments (mounted infantry - Ligonier’s 13th, Cobham’s 10th and Hamilton’s 14th). Then came the infantry: Wolfe’s 8th, Cholmondley’s 34th, Pulteney’s 13th, 2/Royals, Price’s 14th and Ligonier’s 59th.
The second line consisted of: Blakeney’s 27th, Munro’s 37th, Fleming’s 36th, Barrell’s 4th and Battereau’s 62nd with Howard’s 3rd in reserve. In addition, there were troops from the Glasgow and Paisley Regiments, volunteers from Edinburgh and Stirling and around 800 Highlanders from the 43rd and 64th and the Argyll Militia.
According to Reid’s figures, based on Hawley’s returns from January 13 and later arrivals, the Government force at Falkirk numbered around 5,488 regular infantry, 800 dragoons, 800 Highlanders and around 700 militia (often ordinary citizens).
Numbers
No further information.
Losses
Overall, losses appear to have been heavier on the Government side, though most of the Government accounts from the time claimed the opposite –
‘the rebels, by all accounts lost many more men than the King’s forces’
According to one Government account, 300 were reported missing, while in another Munro is listed as wounded and captured by the enemy. In addition to Munro and his surgeon brother, who died while tending him on the field, LtColonels Whitney, Powell and Biggar were also killed. A number of prominent Jacobites were wounded, these being Lochiel, Lord Perth and his brother, while MacDonald is the only named captured Jacobite. The official Jacobite account puts Government losses at more than 600 with 700 captured, while their own losses were said to be around 40, with double that figure wounded.
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To be added to Government losses should be those men shot after courts martial for dereliction of duty, while four Irishmen, formerly of the Royal, Ligonier’s, Pultney’s regiments and Hamilton’s dragoons, were hung for deserting to the French army while on the Continent the year before. Large numbers of spectators, including a number of churchmen killed by the Jacobites, were also victims of the battle.
Action
The Government dragoons formed on the crest of the hill to the south of the Slamannan road as it runs east to west. The Jacobite right, made up of highlanders under the command of Murray, were already formed up on a marsh down slope to the dragoons. Kept under strict control by Murray and his aides de camp, the Jacobites held their fire until the dragoons were within ten yards, first having goaded them forward by delivering a front rank only volley which largely went over the enemy’s heads (Bailey 1996). At this close range, the second volley had a devastating effect and around 80 dragoons fell dead from their saddles. The charge, however, continued and a fierce melee ensued as Jacobites thrust their dirks into horse’s bellies and pulled riders from their horses. Some of the dragoons turned and fled to the north-east, scattering the Glasgow militia as they went. Cobham’s dragoons, however, on the right, retired up the hill to the north-west, passing along the now forming Jacobite centre, which delivered a second damaging fire into their flank. Despite Murray’s attempts to hold them back, many of his Highlanders set off in pursuit of their routed foe and, if to return at all, were very slow in doing so. Murray, who due to the lie of the land had little idea what the Government centre and right (infantry) was doing, had little option but to try and plug the gap in the line by bringing the second line forward, though some of the Lowland troops had already fled at the site of the impressive dragoon charge, which in places had managed to crash through the front rank.
All of this occurred while the Jacobite centre and left was still forming up, with the centre straddling the spine of the ridge and the left linking up with the ravine on the relatively flat ground to the north, before the ground dropped down toward Falkirk.
Even before the Government infantry line had finished forming, it was first disrupted by the galloping horses of Cobham’s retiring dragoons and then further by the Jacobite centre and left, which charged sword in hand toward the enemy. It was too much for the front line regiments on the Government infantry left and Blakeney’s and Wolfe’s regiments broke almost immediately. Soon after, all the front line regiments but Ligonier’s on the right had broken, to be pursued off the hill by sword-wielding Jacobites. Sir Robert Munro was killed at the head of his regiment in the second left, which broke behind him and abandoned him to his fate. The Government force was now perched on the edge of total disaster and surely would have been entirely shattered if the Jacobite right moved to fold up the Government line by moving on its exposed left flank. Even Hawley, who had been stationed on the Government left, from where he had tried to stem the retreat of the regiments, was swept back down off the hill, back toward the camp. However, due to the topography of the moor it was impossible for Murray, down in the hollow, to see what was
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happening up on the top of the ridge, and vice versa. This situation was quickly exploited by Government commanders such as Cholmondley, who had seen his own regiment flee along with Wolfe’s from the first line and Blakeney’s from the second line of the Government left. Under his leadership, Ligonier’s regiment, which was on the far right, remained anchored to the edge of the ravine and was joined on the left by Barrel’s, which moved forward from the second line and anchored its own left on a farmhouse (Bailey 1996).
With nothing further to do on the right wing, Murray climbed the hill toward the Government left, but the Jacobite centre and much of the right had already surged toward the north-east, and in doing so suffered controlled flanking fire from the Government right. As the storm worsened the battle continued. The left wing of the Jacobite army, which up until that time had been positioned on the west side of the ravine, moved out to charge the Government left, in the form of Barrell’s and Ligonier’s regiments. With great composure these regiments began to deliver platoon fire into a charge by the Jacobite left and centre, the latter having moved up the line to engage the only intact part of the Government line remaining.
The Jacobite left suffered a terrible mauling and, like the Government left before it, was broken by the right wing of their enemy. It was estimated that by the time the fighting was over, every man from these regiments had fired around 15 rounds apiece, an incredible quantity by the standards of warfare at the time. In the wake of this success, the Government line joined Howard’s, the only other Government regiment not to have folded. In addition, remnants of Price’s and Battereau’s, both of which had been on the far left, were rallied by Huske and joined onto Howard’s to complete a re-formed line well over 1,000 men strong.
Cholmondley, having set in motion the rebuilding of the infantry, set about assembling a body of dragoons and leading them back up the hill but they dawdled behind him and at one point he was forced to discharge a pistol in their direction in order to provide some encouragement. On reaching the top of the hill it became obvious that the Jacobite army was scattered and spent and so he brought the three regiments of foot on the left forward.
The Jacobite right was isolated and some distance away, but Murray’s force was bolstered by elements of the centre which had disengaged from the reformed Government right. Some confusion was, however, caused by a body of spectators to the left, which were at first thought to be an enemy force and therefore delayed Murray’s move to join up with the depleted left, which by this time consisted largely of John Drummond’s Irish Picquets and some cavalry, from the second and third Jacobite lines. These troops were advancing on the newly returned dragoons (Cobham’s), which quickly turned and went back down the hill that they had so cautiously climbed. Cholmondley had returned to the Government right and given the failing light, the lack of a coherent force to fight and the added issue of damp powder he wisely led his troops off the field in good order. The removal of these men effectively brought a very confused battle to an equally confused close.
Hawley abandoned the camp for the town, taking with him what provisions and equipment he could. The horses from his carriage were used to pull three of the four mired guns out of the mud and what couldn’t be carried was put to
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the torch, though after several hours of heavy rain this cannot have had much of an effect. The Jacobites were scattered across the moor, many of them not knowing whether the battle was won or lost. Murray arrived at the deserted camp with a force of around 700 men and joined with other Jacobite elements, none of them really knowing what the situation was. Hawley, by this time, had retired into the town where he may have initially intended to set up a defence. It was not long, however, before Jacobite scouts, some of whom had apparently gone into the town disguised as women, reported that the Government army was retiring toward Linlithgow. Eager to find shelter the Jacobites, whose numbers were all the while growing as stragglers came off the hill, cautiously made their way into the town and looked for somewhere to rest their tired bones. Only slowly did it dawn that they had won a victory, but as Hawley marched away with most of his army intact, it must have seemed a rather hollow one.