The Motives, Mores, and Character of White Collar Criminals
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St. John's Law Review Volume 82 Number 2 Volume 82, Spring 2008, Number 2 Article 1 Why Do They Do It?: The Motives, Mores, and Character of White Collar Criminals Pamela H. Bucy Elizabeth P. Formby Marc S. Raspanti Kathryn E. Rooney Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. ARTICLES WHY DO THEY DO IT?: THE MOTIVES, MORES, AND CHARACTER OF WHITE COLLAR CRIMINALS PAMELA H. Bucyt ELIZABETH P. FORMBYtt MARC S. RASPANTIttt KATHRYN E. ROONEYtttt INTRODUCTION Why do talented, bright, highly educated, successful people, who have "made it," risk it all by lying, stealing, and cheating, especially when what they're stealing is not much compared to what they have? The simple answer is, "because they can." This Article looks at the more complex answer. Based upon extensive interviews with seasoned prosecutors and accomplished defense counsel, we explore the views and perceptions traditionally held about white collar criminals.1 From January through April 2007, we conducted lengthy interviews with forty-five nationally recognized experts in the area of white collar crime.2 The t Bainbridge Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law; Assistant United States Attorney, E.D. Missouri, 1980-1987. ft J.D. Candidate, 2008, University of Alabama School of Law. itt Partner, Pietragallo Gordon Alfano Bosick & Raspanti, LLP, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Mr. Raspanti is a former Philadelphia prosecutor and the chair of the firm's White Collar Criminal Defense practice group. He also is involved in whistleblower, or qui tam litigation, under the federal and state statutes throughout the United States. tt J.D. Candidate, 2008, University of Alabama School of Law. 1 See 45 C.F.R. § 46.102 (2007). Approval from the University of Alabama Institutional Review Board, No. 06-OR-213 (on file with the Univ. of Ala. Institutional Review Bd.). 2 The authors express their appreciation to the following individuals who participated in this survey: Daniel R. Anderson, Marcella B. Auerbach, Bernard S. Bailor, Raymond Banoun, James M. Becker, Robert S. Bennett, John T. Boese, Plato Cacheris, Leslie R. Caldwell, Peter W. Chatfield, Ian M. Comisky, Stephen S. Cowen, James E. Crowe III, Suzanne E. Durrell, Robert Fabrikant, Gerald A. Feffer, ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82:401 interviewees included federal prosecutors, qui tam relators' counsel, and private defense counsel who specialize in defending those accused of white collar offenses. 3 The range of years of experience of study participants was vast. All interviewees had at least fifteen years of relevant experience; 4 over half had between twenty-six and thirty-five years of experience; and Karen F. Green, Frederick G. Helmsing, Brian J. Hennigan, Gabriel L. Imperato, Nancy S. Jones, Anthony A. Joseph, Paul L. Knight, Albert J. Krieger, David M. Laigaie, Frederick M. Levy, Michael K. Loucks, Abbe D. Lowell, Nancy Luque, Vincent L. Marella, Gregory P. Miller, William R. Mitchelson, Jane W. Moscowitz, James F. Neal, Kevin F. O'Malley, Martin S. Pinales, Larry S. Pozner, Michael W. Ramsey, Jack W. Selden, James G. Sheehan, Barry A. Short, Judson W. Starr, David J. Stetler, Robert L. Vogel, and Joe D. Whitley. 3 i Types of Current and Former Legal Practice 100% 82% 80% 71-/ 60% 40% 20% 9% 900 0% Current Federal Current Private Current Qui Tam Past Federal or Prosecutor Defense Counsel Realtors' Counsel State Prosecutor Infra app. A. 4 Study Participants' Years of Experience 1nn/. 100% 80% 60% 53% 40% 29% 18% 20% 0% At Least 15 15-25 Years 26-35 Years 36 or More Years Years Infra app. A. 2008] WHY DO THEY DO IT? almost one-fifth had thirty-six or more years of experience.5 Eighty-six percent of the defense counsel served as federal or state prosecutors prior to entering private practice.6 The interview questions in our study are contained in Appendix A; the responses are in Appendix B. We tested the following hypotheses: (1) most white collar criminals fall into two categories: "leader" or "follower;" (2) those falling into each category display distinct personality profiles; and (3) the methods for deterring crime differ for each category. We found that our hypotheses were generally accurate. Our study results provide guidance, not reflected in current scholarship, for how to effectively deter white collar crime. Part One of this Article begins with definitions. Part Two discusses our study results, comparing our findings to current scholarship. Part Three concludes with our observations and conclusions. I. DEFINITIONS AND BACKGROUND For purposes of this study, "white collar crime" refers to non- violent, business-related violations of state and/or federal criminal statutes.7 At the beginning of the twentieth century, 5 Infra app. A. The participants also had a high caseload involving corporate defendants. Experience with Organizational Defendants 40% - 36% • 30% 25% 1 20% 18% 15%13 11% 9% 10% 4% 5% 0% _ 0% 1-24.9% 25- 50- 75- 100% Other 49.9% 74.9% 99.9% Percentage of caseload involMng corporate defendants Infra app. A. 6 Infra app. A. 7 Almost without exception, study participants defined "white collar criminal" as someone who commits a non-violent, business-related crime. See infra app. B, § I, question I. Word choice differed from one to the next, but the same general idea runs through each response. Some also described such perpetrators as being in positions of power or "high social standing," some cited specific crimes such as tax or stock ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82:401 crime was evaluated from the classical perspective, in which criminal theorists maintained that humans all held the potential to engage in force or fraud out of self-interest, making no distinction between what scholars today segregate into white collar and more violent crime. 8 Criminal theory then evolved into the positivists' perspective, which took the classical theory even further by speculating that "crime is evidence of biological, psychological, or social pathology" and that force or fraud could only be explained by "special motive or compulsion."9 Positivists believed that such compulsion could be traced to "low social class, poverty, or inequality,"10 which left no room for the possibility that crime was committed by the wealthy in addition to the poor. Perhaps in reaction to positivist theory, sociologist Edwin Sutherland changed the course of criminology when he coined the term "white collar crime" in a 1939 paper he presented to the American Sociological Society and later detailed in his book, White Collar Crime." He defined white collar crime as "a crime committed by a person of respectability and high social status in 1 2 the course of his occupation." Statistical studies indicate that white collar crime occurs quite frequently. For example, according to the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners ("CFE"), fraud accounts for 6% of corporate losses in America annually, totaling an estimated $660 billion each year. 13 Small businesses of less than 100 employees appear to be more frequent targets of white collar crime, with 46% of frauds being committed at these companies. 14 The largest corporations experience the smallest percentage of fraud fraud, and several included the distinction that white collar criminals have not committed street crimes or drug crimes. See infra app. B, § I, question I. Nearly all participants used the word "business," "financial," or "economic" when describing such crimes. See infra app. B, § I, question I. 8 See MICHAEL R. GOTTFREDSON & TRAvIs HIRSCHI, A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME 181 (1990). 9 Id. 10 Id. 11 EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME 7 (Yale Univ. 1983) (1950). 12 Id. 13 AS'N OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAM'RS, REPORT TO THE NATION ON OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD AND ABUSE, at iii (2004), available at http://www.cfenet.coml documents/2004RttN.pdf. The CFE found that over 40% of the victimized corporations are privately-held, while just over 30% are public corporations (the balance is represented by government agencies and non-profit organizations). Id. at 5. 14 Id. at 6. 20081 WHY DO THEY DO IT? schemes, though on average fraud in these companies costs more 5 than schemes in much smaller companies.' II. STUDY RESULTS A. White Collar Criminals: "Leaders"and "Followers"? The notion that white collar criminals can be described as either "leaders" or "followers" is strongly supported in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which, in large part, prescribe sentences based on two factors: the offense conduct and the defendant's criminal history. 16 The Guidelines provide stiffer sentences for those who actually commit a crime versus those who aid and abet, are accessories, or who participate as co- conspirators. 17 In this sense, the Guidelines recognize a distinction between those who lead the crime and those who 8 assist in it. 1 Most of the study participants (77.8%) agreed that white collar criminals fall into categories of either "leaders" or "followers."19 One-fourth of these respondents provided caveats to their responses, 20 for example, by identifying a third category as those who "retaliate" either by becoming whistleblowers or by agreeing to testify for the government in exchange for complete immunity, a reduced charge, or a reduced sentence. 2' Another example would be those who wander unknowingly into white 22 collar crime schemes, never realizing they are violating the law. 15 Id. Corporations with more than 10,000 employees lose on average $105,500 per scheme, corporations with 1,000 to 9,999 employees lose $87,500 per scheme, corporations with 100 to 999 employees lose $78,500 per scheme, and those with fewer than 100 employees lose $98,000 per scheme.