Seminar Cyber Defense FT 2014

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Seminar Cyber Defense FT 2014 DEPARTMENT OF COMPUTER SCIENCE Seminar Cyber Defense FT 2014 Prof. Dr. Gabi Dreo Peter Hillmann Frank Tietze Sebastian Seeber (Hrsg.) Report 2014-02 Oktober 2014 Werner-Heisenberg-Weg 39 • 85577 Neubiberg • Germany 2 Inhaltsverzeichnis 1 Elliptische Kurven5 Martin Wandtke 2 Virtuelle W¨ahrungen 37 Moritz Kroß 3 Security of Powerline Networks 57 Stefan Horn 4 Software defined Networks und neue Routingans¨atze 67 Marcel Odenwald 5 IT Security Checks fur¨ Beh¨orden und Industrie 99 Lukas Muller¨ 6 IT-Sicherheitsmanagement vs. interne Sicherheitsbedrohungen 157 Caroline W¨olkert 7 Kommunikationsstrukturen und Vorgehen von Hacktivisten 189 Thomas Salwasser 8 Netzwerksicherheit und -monitoring vs. Datenschutz 213 Julian Petery 3 4 Kapitel 1 Elliptische Kurven Martin Wandtke Durch die st¨andige Weiterentwicklung der Medien und insbesondere von Net- zen und Technologien, die Netze nutzen, spielt Sicherheit eine immer gr¨o- ße Rolle. Die Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) l¨ost hierbei ¨altere Verfah- ren ab und sorgt aufgrund des Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithmus Problem (ECDLP) fur¨ hohe Sicherheit. Diese Seminararbeit befasst sich mit den ma- thematischen Grundlagen von ECC und zeigt Vorteile wie das ECDLP und weitere von ECC in der kryptographischen Anwendung. Zuletzt werden die verschiedenen Einsatzbereich von ECC vorgestellt und einige Verfahren bei- spielhaft vorgestellt. 5 6 Inhaltsverzeichnis 1.1 Einleitung.......................7 1.2 Warum \Elliptische Kurven Kryptographie"?.8 1.3 Elliptische Kurven Kryptographie - ECC.... 10 1.3.1 Mathematische Grundlagen............. 11 1.3.2 Das kryptographische Verfahren.......... 23 1.3.3 Diskrete Logarithmus-Problem........... 25 1.3.4 Hinweise........................ 25 1.4 Anwendung in der Praxis............. 26 1.4.1 The Elliptic Curve Public Key Cryptosystem... 27 1.4.2 The Elliptic Curve Based Signature Algorithms.. 29 1.4.3 The Elliptic Curve Key Agreement Algorithm... 32 1.5 Zusammenfassung.................. 34 Martin Wandtke 7 1.1 Einleitung \Cryptography is the study of mathematical techniques related to aspects of information security such as confidentiality, data in- tegrity, entity authentication, and data origin authentication." [1] Diese Definition von Kryptographie gibt an, dass Vertraulichkeit, Inte- grit¨at von Daten, Authentizit¨at von Datennutzern und Originalit¨at von Daten durch Techniken der Kryptographie sichergestellt werden. Gerade heutzutage ist es aufgrund der Entwicklung von Medien, Technik und Netzen immer wichtiger, die Sicherheit von Informationen zu gew¨ahrleisten. So gilt als einfaches Beispiel fur¨ die Anwendung, dass jeder bei einer Kommunikation uber¨ E-Mails sicher sein will, von wem die Nachrichten kommen und ob die Nachrichten nur die richtigen Personen erreicht. Im Zuge der steigenden Sicherheitsanforderungen und der Schwierigkeit durch wachsende Rechenleistung sichere Verfahren zu entwickeln, sollen elliptische Kurven die Kryptographie-Verfahren verbessern. Bereits 1985 haben die beiden Mathematiker Koblitz und Miller unabh¨angig voneinander die ma- thematische Basis dafur¨ gelegt. Mit dieser Basis konnten elliptische Kurven in asymmetrische Verfahren angewendet werden, so dass diese aufgrund des diskreten Logarithmus-Problem die Sicherheit von bekannten Verfahren er- h¨ohen. Asymmetrische Verfahren oder auch Public-Key-Verfahren bestehen aus einem Schlusselpaar,¨ welches einen ¨offentlichen Schlussel¨ zur Verschlus-¨ selung und einen privaten Schlussel¨ zur Entschlusselung¨ beinhaltet. Diese Verfahren werden unter dem Begriff Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) zusammengefasst und von Institutionen wie dem Bundesamt fur¨ Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) oder auch dem Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) [2] standardisiert und aufgearbeitet. In dieser Seminararbeit wird zun¨achst erkl¨art, welche Vorteile ECC bietet und weshalb es eingesetzt wird. Im Anschluss daran folgt die Erl¨auterung der Grundlagen fur¨ ECC im Kapitel 1.3, unter denen die mathematischen Grundlagen und die Basis aller ECC-Verfahren wie die Domain Parameter und das diskrete Logarithmus-Problem geh¨oren. Im darauffolgenden Kapitel wird die Anwendung von elliptischen Kurven in verschiedenen Verfahren der Bereiche Nachrichtenverschlusselung,¨ Signaturalgorithmen und Schlus-¨ selaustauschverfahren gezeigt und teilweise durch Beispiele veranschaulicht. Abschließend wird ein Fazit zum Einsatz von ECC gezogen und eine Zusammenfassung zur Seminararbeit gegeben. Zus¨atzlich zu der oben aufgefuhrten¨ Struktur wurden Konventionen ge- troffen, um die Verst¨andlichkeit und Lesbarkeit dieser Seminararbeit zu verbessern. Um englische Begriffe zu kennzeichnen, werden diese kursiv geschrieben. Ferner werden Begriffe, die als Abkurzungen¨ verwendet werden, 8 einmalig in der Einfuhrung¨ ausgeschrieben. 1.2 Warum \Elliptische Kurven Kryptogra- phie"? Bei der Anwendung von kryptographischen Verfahren wird immer die Frage gestellt, ob das jeweilige Verfahren alle n¨otigen Anforderungen erfullt.¨ In der Kryptographie haben sich dabei als Hauptkriterien die Sicherheit und Effizienz herauskristallisiert. Genau diese zwei Aspekte werden im Folgenden fur¨ die ECC diskutiert und zur besseren Evaluierung mit dem RSA-Verfahren (Rivest, Shamir und Adleman) verglichen. Abbildung 1.1: Vergleich der Security Levels [12] Sicherheit Wenn es in der Kryptographie um Sicherheit geht, ist es wichtig, dass es m¨oglichst schwierig ist, einen Schlussel¨ zu berechnen. Wie der Graph in der Abbildung 1.1 zeigt, steigt die Schlussell¨ ¨ange bei dem RSA-Verfahren mit der Zeit enorm an. Dies bedeutet, dass sich die Schlussel¨ nach einer gewissen Zeit einfacher berechnen lassen. Der Grund dafur¨ ist, dass fur¨ das Faktorisierungsproblem (siehe RSA-Verfahren) und ebenfalls das Diskrete Logarithmus-Problem subexponentielle Algorithmen zur L¨osung existieren. Diese lassen sich beispielsweise mit heutigen Quantencomputern Martin Wandtke 9 sehr gut berechnen, w¨ahrend der beste bekannteste Algorithmus zur Be- rechnung des Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarigthm Problem (ECDLP) eine exponentielle Laufzeit besitzt. Damit und der Abbildung 1.1 ist eindeutig, dass ECC sicherer als RSA ist. Abbildung 1.2: Vergleich Aufwand der Operationen Signieren und Verifizieren [3] Effizienz Mit Effizienz ist gemeint, dass versucht wird mittels eines Verfahrens die Ressourcen m¨oglichst sparsam zu verwenden. Im Falle der Kryptographie ist diesbezuglich¨ das Ziel, eine hohe Sicherheit trotz kleiner Schlussel¨ zu gew¨ahrleisten. Die Abbildung 1.2 veranschaulicht dazu den Vergleich des Aufwands der n¨otigen Operationen beim Signieren und Verifizieren bei ECC und RSA. Beim Signieren f¨allt in der Abbildung auf, dass ECC wesentlich schneller ist, jedoch sich das Blatt beim Verifizie- ren wendet und RSA besser abschneidet. Als Anwendungsbeispiel dient hierzu die Smartcard, bei der Schlussel¨ immer auf der Karte gespeichert werden muss und weiterhin die Signierung auf dieser stattfindet. Da eine Verifikation jedoch nicht auf der Karte sonder sp¨ater vollzogen wird, ist das ECC-Verfahren vorteilhafter. Da Signieren und Verifizieren zu einem Verfahren geh¨oren, ist eine weitere Betrachtung die Summe des Aufwands der beiden Operationen. Bei dem Vergleich der Summe f¨allt jedoch schnell auf, dass ECC wesentlich besser abschneidet als RSA, wodurch die Einzel- betrachtung und Gesamtbetrachtung dies nun best¨atigt hat. Ebenso ist aus der Abbildung 1.3 abzulesen, welche Berechnungszeiten bei den Verfahren ECC (fur¨ eine Schlussell¨ ¨ange von 571) und RSA (fur¨ eine Schlussell¨ ¨ange von 15380) der einzelnen Stufen Generierung, Signierung und Verifikation gebraucht werden. Trotz verschiedener Schlussell¨ ¨angen ist die gleiche Sicher- heit gew¨ahrleistet, weshalb diese Zeiten so verglichen werden k¨onnen und 10 die bereits angesprochen Aspekte durch diese Abbildung nochmals best¨arkt werden. Abbildung 1.3: ECC und RSA Berechnungszeiten im Vergleich, vgl. [4] Um aber zus¨atzlich auf die Schlussell¨ ¨ange einzugehen, hilft der Blick zuruck¨ auf die Abbildung 1.1. In dieser wird deutlich, dass obwohl der Schlussel¨ des ECC-Verfahrens kleiner als der des RSA-Verfahrens ist, bringt dieser Schlussel¨ die gleiche oder eine bessere Sicherheit mit sich. Wie sich in den zwei oben aufgezeigten Aspekten erwiesen hat, ist das ECC- Verfahren offensichtlich fur¨ kryptographische Anwendungen geeignet. Des Weiteren muss erw¨ahnt werden, dass die Basis des ECC-Verfahrens nicht die elliptische Kurve ist sondern die Gruppe, die durch diese definiert wird. Insbesondere dies und die fehlenden Standards fur¨ das ECC-Verfahren fuhren¨ dazu, dass sehr viele verschiedene Implementierungsm¨oglichkeiten existieren. Gleichzeitig wird durch die verschiedenen Implementierung zus¨atzlich die Si- cherheit gesteigert, da somit nicht einfach ein Nachrichtenaustausch zwischen zwei verschiedenen Programmen durchgefuhrt¨ werden kann und vorher ein Abgleich stattfinden muss. Im folgenden Kapitel wird nun auf das ECC-Verfahren und dessen mathe- matischer Hintergrund genauer eingegangen. Da das ECC-Verfahren zu den Public-Key-Verfahren geh¨ort, besitzt dieses dementsprechend die Funktio- nalit¨aten der Verschlusselung,¨ Signaturen und Schlusselvereinbarungen,¨ die nach der Erl¨auterung des Verfahrens mit Beispielen beschrieben werden. 1.3 Elliptische Kurven Kryptographie - ECC Bevor ein Verfahren angewendet und an Beispielen erl¨autert werden kann, muss immer erstmal die Basis dafur¨ geschaffen werden. Aufgrund dessen Martin Wandtke 11 werden anfangs in diesem Kapitel die mathematischen Grundlagen
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