Vance of the Canadians to Chilly and of the French First Army to Andcchy and Marquivillers, the Allied Offensive Before Amiens Temporarily Ceased
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CHAPTER XVII - HAIG‘S SECOND STROKE (AUGUST ZIST-Z~TH) WITH the capture of Lihons and Proyart, following the ad- vance of the Canadians to Chilly and of the French First Army to AndCchy and Marquivillers, the Allied offensive before Amiens temporarily ceased. It has already been explained that Foch on August 10th elated by the swift progress of the French Third Army in that morning’s attack, and believing it to be due to the enemy’s demoral- isation, urged Haig that Rawlinson and Debeifey should now strive with all available strength to reach the bridge-head s on the Somme from PCronne southwards ; and that Haig, though not be- lieving that demoralis- ation among the Ger- mans was general, consented to order an advance to seize the crossings of the Somme. His hesitation was certainly justified; the lack of resistance to the Third French Army was due to the Eighteenth German Army’s having on the previous night with- drawn by order to a prepared line. All parts of the British battle-line south of the Somme reported the Germans’ resistance to be stiffening.l Haig foresaw great difficulties in driving 1 On Aug. II (apparently when he attended a conference of Gen. Monash and the five Australian dwsional commanders at Villers-Bretonneux) he actually received the impression that the 1st Aust. Div. at Lihons had received a serious defeat through the 5th Rav Div.’s counter-attack. This was the opposite of the 713 714 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [Aug., 1918 them across the old Somme battlefields, whose edge the main advance had now reached. For eight miles in breadth and over twenty-five in width that wilderness-most like a long aban- doned, stoneless grave-yard-was gridironed by old trenches (then overgrown ditches) while bands of rusty entanglement here and there marked the main trench-lines of 1916. Events of August 11th proved it impossible country for cavalry and favourable for German delaying tactics. Considerable German reserves must now be arriving and Haig had learnt from past failures that, as soon as opposition stiffened, he should use his own reserves, which were few, for a surprise elsewhere. He had chosen for the place the Third Army’s sector north of the point where the German retirement hinged. There he would try to crash through to Bapaume. Later, when the Third Army in its turn had attracted German reserves, the Fourth Army would resume its offensive. This would greatly widen the extent of the enemy’s fluid line and the Third Army, driv- ing south-east from Bapaume, could outflank the Somme line at PCronne and help the Fourth to cross that difficult obstacle. In the north the Third Army would be helped by the First, north of Arras. Haig had made these plans before Foch saw him on the Ioth, and though in loyalty to Foch he pointed out to the Canadian general, Currie, the advantage of crossing the Somme on the enemy’s heels, he came back from his interview with Maj .-General Lambert2 more than ever determined on his own plan. Meeting General Byng3 he warned him to be ready to attack as soon as reserves could be transferred to him. At the same time Maj.-General Montgomery, chief of Rawlinson’s staff, suggested to Maj .-General Davidson at G.H.Q. that, to avoid the cost of continuing to thrust against increasing resistance, Fourth Army should for a few days merely keep touch, and then make a full dress attack about truth-even German histories agree that this counter-attack failed disastrously. ?e 1st Div. was. however, seriously checked by the Bavarian defence and lost heavily in forcing its way through it. Haig may have been misled by a false report that Lihons had been captured on Aug. IO. and may have assumed, that it was subse- quently lost. At this conference he thanked the Australian leaders and their troops for their effort. ‘See e. 668. 8 At Monash’s H.Q. on Aug 11 Byng previously had not wished to attack across the ?Id Somme battlefield 11th-20th Aug., 19181 HAIG‘S SECOND STROKE 715 August 14th, after the troops had rested. Haig decided to order both operations ; Foch approved, and the orders were sent out next day. On August 15th at dawn the Fourth British and First French Armies would attack Chaulnes and the high ground east and north-east of Roye. Subsequently, about August 20th, the Third Army, strengthened by four infantry and two cavalry divisions and 200 tanks, would strike towards Bapaume. The main task in the Chaulnes-Roye attack would fall to the French and Canadians. The Australian Corps would make a flank for them, as indicated in the marginal sketch (p. 716). The 5th and 4th Divisions, then mostly resting around Villers- Bretonneux and Corbie were ordered to assemble south of Harbonnitres on the night of the 13th. At the moment, 4th Division was responsible for the sector taken over from I11 Corps north of the Somme, but was holding it only with its 13th Brigade and the 131st Regiment, US. Infantry. Monash had already obtained leave to organise these troops as a division, to be called the “Liaison Force” and to be commanded by General Wisdom of the 7th Brigade.4 The 4th Division was thus free to make the attack with its two other brigades. On the night of August 14th the 5th and 4th Divisions would relieve the 1st Division as well as the left brigade of the 1st Canadian Division south of the Chaulnes railway, and would attack at dawn.6 North of ‘The clearing of Etinehem peninsula on Aug. 13 and 14 was carried out under Gen. Wisdom’s orders. The Liaison Force comprised the following troops: 13 Aust. Inf. Bde. 13th Fld. Coy. 131st Regt. U.S. Inf. 13th Aust. Fld. Amb. 58th Div. Artillery. 130th US. Provisional Amb. Coy. 5th Bde.. R.H A. 27th Coy., A.A.S C. 104th U.S. M.G. Bn. One troop 13th A.L.H. 13th Aust. M.G. Coy. The staff was: Commander- Intelligciice- Br.-Gen. E. A. Wisdom (7th Bde.) Lt. C. J. Brossois (18th Bn ) General Staff- “8” Branch (Staff Captain)- Maj. R. G. Casey (Aust. Corps, HQ.) Capt. R. V. Spier (Aust. Corps H.Q.) Capt. E T. Bareley (6th Bde H Q ). Capt. C. Ahey (1st Aust. Div. Train) Lt. G. F. Priestky (1st Aust. D.H.Q.) -410 A D M s - Maj. T. C. C. Evans (13th Pld. Amb.) ‘The 13tnd American Re mas allotted to 4th Div. as reserve brigade. Each division would be supported fy about 25 Mark V tanks and some carriers, and the 5th Div. also by whippets. The artillery would cover them with barrage as far as it could, and then advance giving all possible support. Counter-battery work would be almost impossible, the German batteries not having yet been located. 716 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [ 13th-Igth Aug., 1918 them the 2nd would have to swing up its flank, but the rest of the Corps would ~ confine itself to bombard- ment and peaceful penetra- tion. To give the 3rd Division a short rest, the -- 17th British Division, though already ear-marked for Third Army's offensive, was put in for a few days south of the Somme. Orders were issued, the artillery grouped,B and ofi- cers sent to reconnoitre, when messages arrived on August 13th delaying the attack for one day: and next day postponing it indefinitely. Of the reason for this General Monash writes.8 It transpired later that General Currie had made very strong private representations to the Fourth Army against the plan. He questioned the wisdom of expending the resources of the Canadian Corps [in an attempt] to repeat, over such broken country, covered as it was with entanglements and other obstacles, the great success of August 8th. He urged that the Canadian Corps should be transferred back to the Arras district-which they knew so well. It was country lending itself admirably to operations requiring careful organisation. Haig apparently heard unoficially of Currie's views and then invited Rawlinson to state his opinion. On August 14th Rawlinson brought him a letter from Currie, and also air photo- graphs showing the belts of old wire. To have the Canadians back on the front north of Arras suited Haig's plan admirabl~.~ He now decided to limit the Somme attack to a series of set stages and on August Igth, at Foch's Headquarters at Sarcus, thrashed the issue out with him. Stressing his responsibility for the safety of the British Army he told Foch of his scheme a Railheads for supplies for Aust. Corps were now at Villers-Bretonneux Corbie, and (for reserve troops) Amiens. Railhead for the right division wa; being advanced to Guillaucourt. 'Because Gen. Debeney said he could not be ready by the 15th. 0 Australian Vtctmrer tn France, p. 141. 0 Haig had discussed some of his plans-possibly including this ontnot only with Byng and Horne but with Rawlinson, Currie and Nonash. ~sth-z~stAug.,1g18] HAIG‘S SECOND STROKE 717 and-though this was probably beyond his rights-that he had given instructions for it to be carried out. Hews had reached Haig on the previous day that the Germans facing Third Army were retiring. He believed that the withdrawal might be extensive, and had ordered Byng to press on the enemy even before the extra troops had been sent to him. Foch approved, and reversed his attitude as to Fourth Army’s rde, agreeing that it should attack after Third Army, which at first it would support only with its left, north of the Somme.