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FOR OFFICIAL CIRCULATION ONLY Lessons Taught by the Attack of March 21 ^>f^ JBY'THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF KOTECTioN AGAINST AIRPLANES GAS; PROTECTION TELEPHONE DISCIPLINE COMMENTS (MAP) REPORT OF CONFERENCE JSSUED TO REGIMENTAL AND BATTALION COMMANDERS BY SECOND SECTION GENERAL STAFF A. E. F 17 AUGUST 1918 No. 3 LESSONS TAUGHT BY THE ATTACK OF MARCH 21 NOTES BY THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF Chief of Staff of the Army in the Field. Ia/2, 7429. Secret Op. April 1, 1918. Some of the lessons taught by recent fighting, which do not yet seem to be generally known and which are of importance for future battles, are given below. 1. The success of an attack does not depend on the number of rifles and bayonets; in addition to the intrepid push by the infantry the following must also be con­ sidered : (a) Artillery preparation and its direct utilization by infantry. (b) The fire strength of the infantry, particularly with light and heavy machine guns and accompanying artillery which are assigned to it (particularly, light trench mortars). A very large number of units in too confined a space only complicates the task of command, increases the losses and renders the advance of the artillery and of the various services of supply difficult, if not impossible. 2. In open warfare fighting it seems that the concen­ trations of artillery fire are not always carried out ac­ cording to a single and uniform method; it seems also that the infantry expects this fire to do everything. It must be emphatically insisted on that the artillery can neither annihilate the eneni}' nor entirely destroy his organizations. 3. In fighting against hostile artillery a vigorous use of gas shells will obtain complete results. Similarly, against hostile infantry the use of gas (blue-cross gas shell, arsine) will ha»ve a moral effect and may have a very considerable material effect. It is to be remembered that when artillery preparation in view of LESSONS TAUGHT an attack is carried out the rear lines are to be thoroughly shelled. Nevertheless the infantry must expect to find some points of resistance and machine-gun nests still intact when the attack is made. 4. The rolling barrage of March 21 seems to have preceded the infantry advance with too much speed. Circumstances will decide whether in the coming offen­ sive fighting, against positions less strongly organized, this rolling barrage will actually serve a purpose; it is likely that concentrated fire on located positions, on the lines in rear and on points of support will be preferable. 5. The advanced positions must be rapidly captured by the infantry, under the protection of the artillery and trench mortars. Heavy and light machine guns will be in readiness and cover the enemy's from their own positions. 6. For overcoming points of support in rear, ma­ chine gun nests and other points of resistance which, in spite of artillery preparation, are still capable of fighting, the method indicated under Paragraph 4 is not sufficient. An infantry attack made at top speed and without artil­ lery support only results in heavy losses. The fighting against machine gun nests will have the most chance of success when carried out by single light trench mortars placed under the orders of the advanced infantry which follow it as closely as possible and fire on these objectives with direct and short range fire. Under the cover of the fire from these pieces the infantry advances by rushes, in small groups between which light machine guns are distributed. It is advisable that the same batteries be always assigned to the same battalions. The heavy machine guns will be used, as in­ dicated under Paragraph 5, and will be in readiness to cover the objectives of the attack in the course of the advance; they will follow by rushes. They will form, furthermore, the nudleus of points of resistance in case of hostile counter-attack. BY THE ATTACK OF MARCH 21 Picked machine gun detachments will be used like the heavy machine gun sections referred to above or against airplanes. 7. The attack of March 21 has again demonstrated the extraordinary power, from the moral and material point of view, of medium and heavy trench mortars. This will be taken into account in the use of trench mor­ tar companies during the advance, so as to bring medium trench mortars into action as soon as the advance is stopped; these trench mortars will be used mainly against fortified villages, farms, and similar points. The use of heavy trench mortars and smooth-bore mortars (firing winged bombs), insofar as transportation facili­ ties permit, is recommended for making advanced posi­ tions ripe for the assault. That this artillery will follow the advance of the infantry is without question. 8. We are not sufficiently versed in the technique of marching. We are too timid in bringing up the re­ serves and we leave reserves in columns on the roads too long instead of seeing that they make rapid marches at one stage and that they get their rest at the appointed time. 9. Large accumulation of troops along the roads of­ fers aviators good opportunity to weaken us. 10. The command pays too much attention to the rear 11. The troops of the several sectors of attack will support each other mutually. Even if an attack in one sector is checked, the divisions in the neighboring sectors will develop their own success and not be brought back into alignment. If a sector is weakened the command will bring up new forces from the rear. If a gap is formed at some point it will be stopped up by means of fresh elements in the neighborhood. (Signed) LUDENDORFF PROTECTION AGAINST AERIAL BOMBARDMENTS TRANSLATION OF A GERMAN DOCUMENT: FROM FRENCH G. Q. G. BULLETIN, AUGUST 13,1918 CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY IN THE FIELD. la. No. 9193. Secret. Op. GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, July 10,1918. MEMORANDUM ON THE IMPORTANCE OF DEFENSIVE MEASURES AGAINST AIRPLANE ATTACKS As a result of the constantly increasing frequency of hostile airplane bombardments of our cantonments, camps, roads, etc., more rigorous measures will be taken to avoid unnecessary losses. These losses are largely due to the imperfect organization of our cantonments, and to some extent also to the carelessness and indifference of the men and to the inefficiency of the «alarm discipline)). It is mainly in the occupied camps not properly protected that losses occur at each bombardment. It has been possible to reduce the losses to a consider­ able degree by the following measures: 1. Construct camps of as great a number as possible of huts separated by wide intervals. Large huts increase the number of casualties. Erect them, if possible, in the woods. 2. Do not construct the sheds for men or horses on the surface of the ground but dig them in about one meter (still deeper for stable-sheds), in order to protect the men against shell fragments. 3. Wherever the nature of the ground or standing water do not permit them to be dug in, pile up splinter- proofs of earth or sandbags around the huts to a height of at least one meter for the huts occupied by the men and to a greater height for the stable-sheds, in order that the standing horses may be protected from shell frag­ (4) PROTECTION AGAINST AIRPLANES ments flying horizontally. This arrangement is to be carried into effect with all existing hutments where not already adopted. 4. When neither shelters nor utilizable cellars are at hand, the organization of the men's cantonments will be completed by the establishment of shelter trenches situated in the immediate proximity of the buildings. Zigzag trenches consisting of rectilinear sections 5 meters long and 2 meters deep have given the best results. 5. If shelters are constructed on slopes, in quarries, or other similar terrain, their entrance must be protected by means of splinter-proofs of earth. 6. The conduct to be followed in case of an alarm must be taught the men in the course of drill. This point still leaves much to be desired. 7. When an individual finds himself in the open where there is no protection against shell splinters, he must throw himself flat upon the ground as quickly as possible, keeping his head on the ground (it is useless to raise the head to see what is going on!). The men will be accustomed by frequent exercises during maneuvers, marches, etc., to throw themselves quickly upon the ground for protection against bombs. Assuming the numerical superiority of our enemies, it is indispensable that in the matter of the protection of camps as in other matters every commanding officer be constantly preoccupied with the idea of conserving the fighting force represented by each of our combatants; we must economize our horses as they cannot be replaced. It is important that the men be made to see that this is absolutely necessary in order to carry the war to a vic­ torious conclusion. (Signed) LUDENDORFF. GERMAN GAS PROTECTION TRANSLATION OF A GERMAN DOCUMENT: FROM FRENCH 1ST ARMY BULLETIN, JULY 28, 1918. The following two orders, issued within a week of one another, illustrate the precautions taken by the enemy with respect to yellow cross gas shell. The first of the two was evidently based on a document signed by Ludendorff, a translation of which was pub­ lished in SUMMARY OF INFORMATION, No. 125, August 4,1918. HEADQUARTERS XVIIITH ARMY la/Army Gas Officer. No. 3329. ARMY HEADQUARTERS, July 1, 1918. BULLETIN I. DESCRIPTION OF THE GAS. In their artillery shell and probably also in their trench mortar shell the French use a yellow cross shell which has an odor of garlic, onion, horseradish, burnt rubber and of mustard, and which after a lapse of time causes irritation of the eyes and breathing organs.

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