FOR OFFICIAL CIRCULATION ONLY

Lessons Taught by the Attack of March 21

^>f^ JBY'THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF

KOTECTioN AGAINST AIRPLANES GAS; PROTECTION TELEPHONE DISCIPLINE COMMENTS (MAP) REPORT OF CONFERENCE

JSSUED TO REGIMENTAL AND BATTALION COMMANDERS BY SECOND SECTION GENERAL STAFF A. E. F 17 AUGUST 1918 No. 3 LESSONS TAUGHT BY THE ATTACK OF MARCH 21 NOTES BY THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF Chief of Staff of the Army in the Field. Ia/2, 7429. Secret Op. April 1, 1918. Some of the lessons taught by recent fighting, which do not yet seem to be generally known and which are of importance for future battles, are given below. 1. The success of an attack does not depend on the number of rifles and bayonets; in addition to the intrepid push by the infantry the following must also be con­ sidered : (a) Artillery preparation and its direct utilization by infantry. (b) The fire strength of the infantry, particularly with light and heavy machine guns and accompanying artillery which are assigned to it (particularly, light trench mortars). A very large number of units in too confined a space only complicates the task of command, increases the losses and renders the advance of the artillery and of the various services of supply difficult, if not impossible. 2. In open warfare fighting it seems that the concen­ trations of artillery fire are not always carried out ac­ cording to a single and uniform method; it seems also that the infantry expects this fire to do everything. It must be emphatically insisted on that the artillery can neither annihilate the eneni}' nor entirely destroy his organizations. 3. In fighting against hostile artillery a vigorous use of gas shells will obtain complete results. Similarly, against hostile infantry the use of gas (blue-cross gas shell, arsine) will ha»ve a moral effect and may have a very considerable material effect. It is to be remembered that when artillery preparation in view of LESSONS TAUGHT an attack is carried out the rear lines are to be thoroughly shelled. Nevertheless the infantry must expect to find some points of resistance and machine-gun nests still intact when the attack is made. 4. The rolling barrage of March 21 seems to have preceded the infantry advance with too much speed. Circumstances will decide whether in the coming offen­ sive fighting, against positions less strongly organized, this rolling barrage will actually serve a purpose; it is likely that concentrated fire on located positions, on the lines in rear and on points of support will be preferable. 5. The advanced positions must be rapidly captured by the infantry, under the protection of the artillery and trench mortars. Heavy and light machine guns will be in readiness and cover the enemy's from their own positions. 6. For overcoming points of support in rear, ma­ chine gun nests and other points of resistance which, in spite of artillery preparation, are still capable of fighting, the method indicated under Paragraph 4 is not sufficient. An infantry attack made at top speed and without artil­ lery support only results in heavy losses. The fighting against machine gun nests will have the most chance of success when carried out by single light trench mortars placed under the orders of the advanced infantry which follow it as closely as possible and fire on these objectives with direct and short range fire. Under the cover of the fire from these pieces the infantry advances by rushes, in small groups between which light machine guns are distributed. It is advisable that the same batteries be always assigned to the same battalions. The heavy machine guns will be used, as in­ dicated under Paragraph 5, and will be in readiness to cover the objectives of the attack in the course of the advance; they will follow by rushes. They will form, furthermore, the nudleus of points of resistance in case of hostile counter-attack. BY THE ATTACK OF MARCH 21

Picked machine gun detachments will be used like the heavy machine gun sections referred to above or against airplanes. 7. The attack of March 21 has again demonstrated the extraordinary power, from the moral and material point of view, of medium and heavy trench mortars. This will be taken into account in the use of trench mor­ tar companies during the advance, so as to bring medium trench mortars into action as soon as the advance is stopped; these trench mortars will be used mainly against fortified villages, farms, and similar points. The use of heavy trench mortars and smooth-bore mortars (firing winged bombs), insofar as transportation facili­ ties permit, is recommended for making advanced posi­ tions ripe for the assault. That this artillery will follow the advance of the infantry is without question. 8. We are not sufficiently versed in the technique of marching. We are too timid in bringing up the re­ serves and we leave reserves in columns on the roads too long instead of seeing that they make rapid marches at one stage and that they get their rest at the appointed time. 9. Large accumulation of troops along the roads of­ fers aviators good opportunity to weaken us. 10. The command pays too much attention to the rear 11. The troops of the several sectors of attack will support each other mutually. Even if an attack in one sector is checked, the divisions in the neighboring sectors will develop their own success and not be brought back into alignment. If a sector is weakened the command will bring up new forces from the rear. If a gap is formed at some point it will be stopped up by means of fresh elements in the neighborhood. (Signed) LUDENDORFF PROTECTION AGAINST AERIAL BOMBARDMENTS TRANSLATION OF A GERMAN DOCUMENT: FROM FRENCH G. Q. G. BULLETIN, AUGUST 13,1918 CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY IN THE FIELD. la. No. 9193. Secret. Op. GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, July 10,1918.

MEMORANDUM ON THE IMPORTANCE OF DEFENSIVE MEASURES AGAINST AIRPLANE ATTACKS As a result of the constantly increasing frequency of hostile airplane bombardments of our cantonments, camps, roads, etc., more rigorous measures will be taken to avoid unnecessary losses. These losses are largely due to the imperfect organization of our cantonments, and to some extent also to the carelessness and indifference of the men and to the inefficiency of the «alarm discipline)). It is mainly in the occupied camps not properly protected that losses occur at each bombardment. It has been possible to reduce the losses to a consider­ able degree by the following measures: 1. Construct camps of as great a number as possible of huts separated by wide intervals. Large huts increase the number of casualties. Erect them, if possible, in the woods. 2. Do not construct the sheds for men or horses on the surface of the ground but dig them in about one meter (still deeper for stable-sheds), in order to protect the men against shell fragments. 3. Wherever the nature of the ground or standing water do not permit them to be dug in, pile up splinter- proofs of earth or sandbags around the huts to a height of at least one meter for the huts occupied by the men and to a greater height for the stable-sheds, in order that the standing horses may be protected from shell frag­ (4) PROTECTION AGAINST AIRPLANES ments flying horizontally. This arrangement is to be carried into effect with all existing hutments where not already adopted. 4. When neither shelters nor utilizable cellars are at hand, the organization of the men's cantonments will be completed by the establishment of shelter trenches situated in the immediate proximity of the buildings. Zigzag trenches consisting of rectilinear sections 5 meters long and 2 meters deep have given the best results. 5. If shelters are constructed on slopes, in quarries, or other similar terrain, their entrance must be protected by means of splinter-proofs of earth. 6. The conduct to be followed in case of an alarm must be taught the men in the course of drill. This point still leaves much to be desired. 7. When an individual finds himself in the open where there is no protection against shell splinters, he must throw himself flat upon the ground as quickly as possible, keeping his head on the ground (it is useless to raise the head to see what is going on!). The men will be accustomed by frequent exercises during maneuvers, marches, etc., to throw themselves quickly upon the ground for protection against bombs. Assuming the numerical superiority of our enemies, it is indispensable that in the matter of the protection of camps as in other matters every commanding officer be constantly preoccupied with the idea of conserving the fighting force represented by each of our combatants; we must economize our horses as they cannot be replaced. It is important that the men be made to see that this is absolutely necessary in order to carry the war to a vic­ torious conclusion. (Signed) LUDENDORFF. GERMAN GAS PROTECTION TRANSLATION OF A GERMAN DOCUMENT: FROM FRENCH 1ST ARMY BULLETIN, JULY 28, 1918. The following two orders, issued within a week of one another, illustrate the precautions taken by the enemy with respect to yellow cross gas shell. The first of the two was evidently based on a document signed by Ludendorff, a translation of which was pub­ lished in SUMMARY OF INFORMATION, No. 125, August 4,1918. HEADQUARTERS XVIIITH ARMY la/Army Gas Officer. No. 3329. ARMY HEADQUARTERS, July 1, 1918. BULLETIN I. DESCRIPTION OF THE GAS. In their artillery shell and probably also in their trench mortar shell the French use a yellow cross shell which has an odor of garlic, onion, horseradish, burnt rubber and of mustard, and which after a lapse of time causes irritation of the eyes and breathing organs. On contact with the gas, either in dense clouds or in liquid form, the skin becomes in­ flamed and forms boils. Splashes of the liquid pene­ trate the clothing and, in course of time, the leather of foot-gear also. II. How CAN I PROTECT MYSELF? The mask abso­ lutely protects the eyes and respiratory organs when ad­ justed immediately on noticing a faint smell. With each burst of fire the mask should be adjusted; do not return to the dugout without having this precaution. The mask will not be removed in the shelled areas until several hours after the firing has ceased, when the odor is no longer perceptible and only after the order has been given. In terrain subjected to yperite sleep only with the mask on, if there are no gas watchers, for the gas mixes afresh with the air as soon as the wind rises or under the action of the sun. Awaken everyone who may GAS PROTECTION be sleeping; adjust the mask firmly; avoid the neighbor­ hood of points of burst. Do not lie down, sit down or knee in places which have been gassed or which have been splashed. The latrines in shelled areas are to be closed until cleaned. Do not touch or collect shell frag­ ments or objects which may have been in contact with the gas liquid. Wipe splashes off the skin immediately with chloride of lime and, if necessary, with water or moistened earth. The dense clouds stick to the clothes like tobacco smoke. Change contaminated clothes as well as the mask and air them thoroughly in the wind or sun for two or three days in order to clean them until all smell has disappeared. Thoroughly wash clothes con­ taminated by splashes, using a stick for the purpose, in water heated by 60 or 80 degrees Centigrade, the water to be changed three times. Do not touch the water which has been used for washing. Wash high boots and lace shoes thoroughly before entering dugouts, scraping off carefully all earth mixed with yellow cross gas, and sprinkle them with chloride of lime. Wear the hair and beard short. All fire in the dugouts will be put out every time a gas attack occurs. As soon as a smell of gas is noticeable in a dugout adjust the mask. The airing of dugouts into which the gas has penetrated will not be undertaken by fire, fans, etc., until the outside atmosphere has been completely cleared of gas. Do not open the curtains and doors too soon; a fresh liberation of gas may always be counted on as soon as the sun shines or the wind stirs. Men whose clothes have been splashed by the gas liquid or who have remained for some time in contact with dense clouds of gas will not enter dugouts clear of gas be­ fore taking off their clothes or changing them. Yellow cross gas shells making a direct hit on a dugout will ren­ der the dugout and all it contains unusable. The point of burst and the splashed area about them in the neighborhood of dugouts, artillery positions, roads, and other points of traffic will be covered with earth, then with a layer of chloride of lime and again with earth in order to hide the region from the view of avia­ tors. The mask will always be worn in this work. GAS PROTECTION

Do not use wood coming from regions subjected to gas shelling for burning. The water found in places fired on by yellow cross gas shell will be boiled, whether required for washing or for drinking, as long as unre­ stricted occupation of the region by the troops has not been authorized. Small arms, guns, wagons, etc., which have been in contact with yellow cross gas will be cleaned by sprink­ ling them with chloride of lime, scrubbing them with a wet broom and rinsing them with water. Uncovered food which has been in contact with clouds of yellow cross gas will not be consumed. Chief of Staff, (Signed) KIRCH, Lieutenant-Colonel. * * * HEADQUARTERS XVIIITH ARMY la/Army Gas Officer. No. 3494. July 8,1918.

CONDUCT IN CASE OF BOMBARDMENT BY YELLOW CROSS GAS SHELL 1. Observations by the Army Gas Officer on the causes of the recent cases of gas poisoning make the fol­ lowing addition to the Bulletin of the XVIIIth Army, Ia/Stogas, No. 3329, necessary: In case of yellow cross gas fire (smell of onion, horse­ radish, garlic, burnt rubber, mustard or similar smells), everyone must keep on his mask for at least three hours after the fire is completed even if the odor is no longer perceptible and not to remove it except on order by the superior officer. On the terrain gassed, sleeping with­ out mask is not allowed. 2. On the first and second morning after a fire of this kind the mask will be worn under all circumstances immediately after sunrise in the region subjected to the yperite and for at least three hours thereafter. It will not be removed except on order from the superior offi­ GAS PROTECTION cer when the latter made certain that there is no more odor or other indication of the presence of the gas or of its return. The same rules will be observed as long as traces of yellow cross gas remain on the ground. The men must be repeatedly warned that the injurious effect of the gas on the eyes and the breathing organs has already begun when the nose perceives the presence of the gas in the air; when the eyes or the breathing organs are red or irritated it is because they were not protected by the mask for several hours before the odor was noticed. 3. Places of refuge properly chosen (taking into consideration the requirements of fighting, of the proxi­ mity of the position to be evacuated and of ventilation) will be reconnoitered, and if the tactical situation per­ mits will be occupied as quickly as possible. If it be necessary to reoccupy a gassed position it may be done by a party which has taken precautions and is protected by the mask. A rapid evacuation is necessary, but it will in general not take place until after the firing has ceased in order to avoid the temptation of removing the mask while running under heavy fire. The men have a tendency, after having worked fairly long with the mask on, to remove it for a moment. 4. Alternative positions will be reconnoitered and occupied if an evacuation of the former positions is re­ quired owing to repeated bombardment with yellow cross gas or if it is a question of a contamination of long duration after a heavy gas fire. It must be considered that the transportation of fighting materiel within the gassed area involves danger to the men and horses and a great delay in the evacua­ tion. 5. If complete evacuation of a gassed position even when only temporary is not possible for tactical reasons, attempt will be made to relieve the men periodically so as to render the prolonged wearing of the mask in the region fired on with yellow cross gas possible, even if it may thus be necessary to leave the guns provisionally without personnel. 10 TELEPHONE DISCIPLINE

The habit of wearing the mask even for a period of several hours, under difficult conditions and with all the work demanded by the service, will be acquired by mak­ ing all officers and men wear the mask for long periods every week while at rest at least during one maneuver. The gas protection centers will pay particular attention to the parts of the mask serving for adjusting it in place. Chief of Staff, (Signed) KIRCH, Lieutenant-Colonel. HEADQUARTERS IIID ARMY CORPS, JULY 13, 1918. NOTE. In carrying out Paragraph 5 the battery com­ mander will order relief in the battery positions. In the firing positions a prolonged drill, for two or three hours, will be held at least once a week with the mask. Chief of Staff. (Signed) VON BOCK,

GERMAN TELEPHONE DISCIPLINE TRANSLATION OF A GERMAN DOCUMENT: FROM FRENCH G. Q. G. BULLETIN, JULY 24, 1918. VTH ARMY la No. 9,057 ARMY HEADQUARTERS, March 10, 1918. From the statements of prisoners belonging to the 120th French Division, it has been established that the enemy, as a result of intercepted German telephone con­ versations, knew on March 4 of the operation which the 56th Division was to undertake on March 6. The French Command w.as therefore able to make all dispositions for the attack. The French opened up a very heavy bar­ rage just at the moment when our assault detachments were leaving the trench (6.30 a.m.). Our losses amounted to: 3 officers killed; 2 officers wounded (one taken prisoner); 12 men killed; 51 men wounded; 9 men missing. TELEPHONE DISCIPLINE 11

In spite of all warnings and instructions, the neces­ sary prudence in the use of the telephone has not yet been learned. In the case cited above, the carelessness of the men who held those treacherous conversations on March 4 was the cause of our losses. The instructions on the danger resulting from inter­ cepted conversations must again be earnestly brought to the attention of all the men (Note). In all cases, delinquencies must be most severely punished whenever it is possible to ascertain the guilty parties. The General Commanding the Army, (Signed) VON GALLWITZ, General of Artillery. NOTE: In connection with the necessity for care in the use of the telephone, the above may be compared with the following extracts from German orders: EXTRACT FROM AN ORDER OF THE GERMAN XVIIITH ARMY, FEB. 4,1918: Telephone Discipline: 1. Do not speak of any secret matter over the tele­ phone. The enemy also can hear up to 10 km. behind our front. Agents or spies of the enemy may have put a wire over our lines, particularly in the rear. Our own telephone operators hear everything said in telephone conversation. 2. Telephone communication is established only as far as the sector commanders. Have all unused lines removed. 3. Make report to the superior authority, who will immediately advise the military secret police, of every suspicious incident on the telephone lines which leads to the belief that hostile agents are interfering. 4. Supervise telephone communication in the tele­ phone centrals by means of officers authorized for that purpose. 12 COMMENTS

EXTRACT FROM AN ORDER OF THE SIGNAL DETACHMENT OF THE 273D REGIMENT, 197TH DIVISION, MAY 22, 1918: 1. By order of the 197th Division all telephone equipment in advance of regimental command posts will be placed under seal beginning May 23. The echelons concerned will be informed that these seals may be broken in case the situation demands (for example, for the request of barrage and other urgent cases). The execution of this order will be reported on the evening of 23d instant; in case the seals of an apparatus are broken, report will immediately be made to the regimental signal detachment. Telephone relay-stations will continue to be oc­ cupied as formerly. I direct non-commissioned officers to exercise particularly strict supervision over the personnel.

COMMENTS ALLIED OFFENSIVE ON THE SOMME, AUGUST 8, 1918 The failure of the German offensive of July 15 had involved very large consequences. Faced by a heavy toll of casualties, by a reinvigorated Allied army, and by the fact that it would take many weeks, at the best, to pre­ pare a new offensive, and that with an army of lowered morale, the German High Command showed symptoms of having come to a clean cut decision to resume the de­ fensive in France. It is early, as yet, to be sure of the scope of the measures decided on, but logically the de­ fensive called for a shortening of the front, and there were indications that the German army might be taken back to a shorter and better defensive line. While it was not as yet possible for the Allies to con­ tinue pressing on from the line of the Vesle, in front of Amiens were fresh divisions and ample supplies. It was decided to seize the first favorable opportunity for sur­ prising the enemy at this point. For this was where the German army threatened most danger to a vital position of the Allies; every mile gained would relieve materially a dangerous pressure. COMMENTS 13

The night of August 7-8 brought favorable atmos­ pheric conditions. There was a dense morning fog at all points along the line. At 5 a. m. the British 4th Army (Rawlinson) and French 1st Army (Debeney) were sent in by Sir Douglas Haig. The attack was on a front of over 30 kilometers E. and S. E. of Amiens, between Braches to the south and Morlancourt to the north, in other words, between the Avre and the Ancre. The artil­ lery preparation was short and violent; it was im­ mediately followed by one of the most successful tank attacks that has yet been delivered. Motor machine guns and cavalry also played a part in an extraordinarily rapid advance. In a dense fog the tanks quickly passed through the anti-tank gun line with slight loss and reached at some points the German battle artillery line. At this stage the German resistance stiffened and heavy infantry fighting occurred. By noon the Allied objectives had substantially been reached with the line at Ples­ sier-Rozainvillers — Beaucourt — Caix — Framerville —Chipilly—W. of Morlancourt. About 14,000 prisoners were taken; the losses were slight. On the following day, August 9, the attack was re­ newed, and the gains were considerable. By noon the Pierrepont — Arvillers — Rosieres — Rainecourt — Mor- court was reached. A salient was thus formed which threatened to turn the Germans out of Montdidier to the south. Further north the Allied line had reached and passed the old line of the eastern defences of Amiens. The number of prisoners captured rose to 17,000 with from two to three hundred guns. On the third day, August 10, quite as marked suc­ cesses were gained. On the left the French had begun a new attack east of Montdidier, and the Germans inevit­ ably abandoned this part of their line under the double pressure. In three days the French had gained some 20 kilometers and had captured 8,000 prisoners and about 200 guns. British tank tactics continued effective. In close liaison with airplanes, which located the enemy and screened the tanks with smoke bombs, they frequently reached positions whence they could fire on columns of 14 REPORT OF CONFERENCE retreating German infantry densely packed on the roads. American troops were in the English line this day, assist­ ing in the capture of Morlancourt. The line reached Lihons—Fresnoy-les-Roye—Lignieres—Conchy. On the fourth day, August 11, the fighting tended to become stabilized. The French on the right still made an appreciable advance, about a couple of kilometers. But the Germans were now counter-attacking with fresh divisions at many points, notably near Lihons, and the Allied advance could not for the moment be pressed further. There were indications, however, that a general re­ treat was being carried out by the Germans, and that re­ newed fighting and advances would soon take place.

REPORT OF CONFERENCE OF THE INTELLIGENCE AND SCOUT OFFICERS OF A DIVISION, DATED JULY 26, 1918. After five weeks' experience in the line in open warfare the Intelligence and Scout Officers of the Divi­ sion were called together in conference and were able to offer some suggestions which are worthy of serious consideration. In view of the fact that this was one of the first American Divisions to gain knowledge, first hand, by practical experience in open warfare as it exists today the following suggestions may carry weight. * * * * * It is advocated that instead of taking men from companies and training them for scouts and observers, that these men be formed into an organization, which would have some degree of permanence in maintaining its personnel. Such an organization would overcome some of the evils existing under the present system of taking men from their different companies to be utilized temporarily when needed. These men are taken for dangerous *md trying services, after which they are returned to their companies and are sometimes not ac­ corded a hearty reception by their company sergeants and the services rendered, not being under the observa­ tion of their permanent company commander, receive REPORT OF CONFERENCE 15

but little recognition in his eyes. Company promotions are made and these men are often overlooked. An organization of their own would allow the opportunity of constant exchange of ideas and close contact would assist instruction. It would create an esprit-de-corps and would tend to allow more satisfactory training. At least, it is advisable that even under the present arrange­ ments that the scouts and observers mess together so as to be brought in contact, one with the other, and with the Intelligence personnel as much as possible. Detailed men are doubtful of their assignment. They have a dual authority, their permannt company commanders and temporary commanders in the Intelligence Section. Snipers get much valuable information which should be collated systematically by the Intelligence Officers. This collating is often not done. It appears that fre­ quently the sniper observes and learns things that are not passed on.

The Aerial Service in the Sector reports that liaison with the front line was not satisfactory. The Aviation Section states that the markings as at present prescribed, such as were encountered in wooded terrain, cannot be seen and recommends that Bengal Flares be used as much as possible although this method reveals our own lines.

Regimental Intelligence Officers and Battalion Scout Officers insist that their work could be much better ac­ complished if they had motorcycles for circulation. They claim in this connection also, that the Regimental Intelligence Service should have one horse-drawn ve­ hicle. Frequently visits to the Aviation Section in the vicinity would be desirable. Intelligence Officers claim that they are not familiar with the habits and methods of our own planes, and desire to familiarize themselves as often as the occasion offers with the Aviation Section in their immediate rear.

Printed forms to be distributed to platoon com­ 16 REPORT OF CONFERENCE manders. These forms to show items of Intelligence in­ formation required. It is believed this will expedite and systematize reports to Regimental Intelligence and Scout Officers. It is ascertained that men in the front line often observe things which they do not report even to their platoon commanders. Printed forms distributed to squads, explaining points on which reports should be made would be advantageous. One instance in the recent fighting shows lack of appreciation on the part of the soldier to pass on information he may gain of the enemy. Three or four soldiers saw one of the enemy carrying coffee up a ravine. Upon almost running into the Ameri­ can soldiers he dropped his coffee, turned on his heel and ran. This instance was not reported although it showed, as later brought out, the location of a kitchen. The officers in conference stated company reports on in­ telligence generally carry but little information, as intel­ ligence is often an after-thought, following a request for rations, equipment, etc. Hence the suggestion for printed forms.

Extra clothing should be available at all times for men on patrol. After this arduous service when the clothing is usually wet the Scout Lieutenants maintain that a change of clothing is necessary. Shoes should be without nails, especially on rocky ground. Patrols at present wrap their shoes with cloth which makes it dif­ ficult to cross wire entanglements. The English gas masks also make it difficult to crawl any distance.