The Gorran Movement in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq

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The Gorran Movement in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq 1 From the publication series of KCCRC 28 Kurdistan conflict and Crisis Research Center The Gorran Movement in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq Hawre Hasan Hama From the publication series of KCCRC 28 2 Kurdistan conflict and Crisis Research Center All Rights Reserved for: Kurdistan Conflict and Crisis Research Center www.kurdistanc.com [email protected] facebook.com/kurdistanccrc 053 - 318 2929 @KCCRC1 March 2020 3 The Gorran Movement in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq Hawre Hasan Hama the elections. This research divides The Gorran Movement’s conduct and effectiveness into three primary stages; Abstract: (1) the opposition stage, which can be The Gorran Movement (‘Goran’) described as The Gorran Movement’s was founded in 2009 to address the golden period; (2) the government Kurdistan Region of Iraq’s demand participation stage after 2013, which for political and economic reform. can be described as The Gorran Corruption, lack of transparency in Movement’s period of weakness; and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq’s income (3) the post Nawshirwan Mustafa and expenditure, the lack of legitimate stage, which can be described as The and active institutions, the existence in Gorran Movement’s period of political political party interference in all sectors entrenchment. The central argument of the Kurdish region and the region of this research is that The Gorran wide power-sharing agreement between Movement fundamental problem has the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and been that instead of being able to be the Kurdistan Democratic Party has all a catalyst for reform, it became a part worked to create a feeling of discontent of the very issues that it had for many among the Kurdistan Region of years campaigned against. Iraq’s residents. In 2009, The Gorran Movement took advantage of this Introduction feeling of disenfranchisement in the The Gorran Movement Movement is a region to demand a complete change reformist liberal political party which in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq’s was founded in 2009 by Nawshirwan political structure that were built by Mustafa. Nawshirwan Mustafa the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and was previously the Deputy General Kurdistan Democratic Party. Using Secretary of the Patriotic Union of this message The Gorran Movement’s Kurdistan. After Nawshirwan Mustafa first participation in elections saw it became disillusioned with the prospect become the second biggest political of reforming the Patriotic Union of force in the Kurdistan Region of Kurdistan from within he decided to spit Iraq and the biggest political party from the party. Immediately following in the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan’s its establishment in 2009, The Gorran traditional zone of influence by beating Movement took party in the Kurdistan the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan in Region of Iraq›s legislative elections. 4 In contrast to the predictions of political Barzani family. The Patriotic Union observers, The Gorran Movement of Kurdistan was less a family centred was able to win 22 per cent (25 out political party, in particular during of 111) of the seats in the Kurdistan the Jalal Talabani period. However, Parliament. In the same elections after his death, the Patriotic Union of the Kurdistan Alliance list, which Kurdistan also became a political party was a coalition between the Patriotic based around the Talabani family. The Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan power-sharing arrangement between Democratic Party was only able to the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and secure 43 parliamentary sears. This Kurdistan Democratic Party has been election demonstrated that The Gorran synonymous with corruption, lack of Movement had become the second legitimate and effective institutions, major political power in the region and the politicisation of the majority of became the primary opposition to the the Kurdistan Region of Iraq sectors Patriotic Union of Kurdistan-Kurdistan (security, military, education, and Democratic Party government in the economy. The Gorran Movement was Kurdistan Parliament. In the 2013 formed as a reaction to this Patriotic elections, The Gorran Movement was Union of Kurdistan-Kurdistan able to maintain its position as the Democratic Party stranglehold over second largest parliamentary political the region. The new party’s objective force in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq was to instigate region-wide reform. and the largest in the Patriotic Union This research divides The Gorran of Kurdistan’s zone of influence by Movement’s conduct and effectiveness securing 24 parliamentary seats. In into three primary stages; (1) the the same elections, the Kurdistan opposition stage, which can be described Democratic Party was able to achieve as The Gorran Movement’s golden 38 seats while the Patriotic Union period; (2) the government participation of Kurdistan won 18. (1) While The stage after 2013, which can be defined Gorran Movement was founded as as The Gorran Movement’s period of a reaction to the Patriotic Union of weakness; and (3) the post Nawshirwan Kurdistan-Kurdistan Democratic Party Mustafa stage, which can be described governance, the Patriotic Union of as The Gorran Movement’s period of Kurdistan and Kurdistan Democratic political entrenchment. The research Party drew their strength, not from also discusses the reasons behind political policy but their two charismatic The Gorran Movement’s weakening leaders, Jalal Talabani (19752017-) political status in the Kurdistan Region and Massoud Barzani (1975 onwards). of Iraq’s political process. The central The Kurdistan Democratic Party argument of this research is that The is in no small extent considered a Gorran Movement primary problem political party based in rural family has been that instead of being able to be tribalism that is dominated by the a catalyst for reform, it became a part 5 of the very issues that have plagued Iraq’s political system. For example, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan Kurdistan Democratic Party since engaged in violent confrontation 1992. with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and Kurdistan Democratic Party in Political Opposition in the 1993 and 1999. Therefore, because Kurdistan Region of Iraq the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan did not believe in the Kurdish In 1991, following the retreat of Iraqi political process and refrained from regime forces in Southern Kurdistan entering the government, it cannot be and the establishment of a safe haven considered a political opposition in for the Kurds on the part of the the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. In 1994 United States, France and the United a civil-war between the Kurdistan Kingdom the Kurdish political forces Democratic Party and the Patriotic were able to fill the administrative Union of Kurdistan erupted and lasted vacuum left by the Iraqi government until 1998. During the period of the in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. In civil war, there was still no political 1992 the Kurdistan Democratic Party opposition in the Kurdistan Region of and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan Iraq. In 1998 the Kurdistan Democratic together with other political entities Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan formed a grand coalition government. came to a ceasefire and power-sharing (2) The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan agreement under United States and Kurdistan Democratic Party as two mediation. The deal split the Kurdistan of the most significant political forces Region of Iraq’s governance between were able to divide the majority of the the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and regional ministerial portfolios between Kurdistan Democratic Party essentially themselves. They allowed some minor creating a dual administration system portfolios to go to smaller party to keep until 2002. The Patriotic Union of them satisfied. (3) During this period no Kurdistan governed in the province of opposition force existed in the Kurdish Sulaymaniyah and the Garmian area, political system as all the political sides while the Kurdistan Democratic Party had a stake in the Kurdistan Region of governed in Erbil and Duhok provinces. Iraq government. However, the Islamic These geographies of these two areas Movement of Kurdistan rejected the became known as the Patriotic Union notion of participating in the Kurdish of Kurdistan and Kurdistan Democratic parliament as it was a Salafist Jihadi Party zones of influence. (4) Between Islamist movement and believed the 1998 - 2005 there continued to be political system in the Kurdistan no opposition political force in the Region of Iraq to be un Islamic. Instead, Kurdistan Region of Iraq. However, it believed in the use of force to reform in 2002 a group splintered from the and change the Kurdistan Region of Islamic Movement of Kurdistan and 6 formed a new Islamist group called divided the government between Ansar al-Islam and rejected the notion themselves in a 50:50 split. Their of taking part in the Kurdistan Region agreement paid no regard to the smaller of Iraq’s political process. This group parties operating in the Kurdistan was a Salafi Jihadist Islamist group Region of Iraq’s political system, such that had the aim of overthrowing the as the Islamic Union of Kurdistan, the secular government of the Kurdistan Islamic Movement of Kurdistan and Region of Iraq and bringing about a the Communist party of Kurdistan. (6) Sharia law. With this objective, the As a result, a number of political crises group began its armed conflict against emerged in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and such as the lack of active and effective Kurdistan Democratic Party. In March political institutions, the weakening of 2003 the United States began bombing democratic institutions (parliament), Ansar al-Islam as part of its wider war the emergence of widespread against terrorism. With the assistance corruption, lack of transparency in the of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan Kurdistan Region of Iraq’s income Peshmerga, the United States was able and expenditure and political party to defeat the group.
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