Minimalist Set Theory
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“The Church-Turing “Thesis” As a Special Corollary of Gödel's
“The Church-Turing “Thesis” as a Special Corollary of Gödel’s Completeness Theorem,” in Computability: Turing, Gödel, Church, and Beyond, B. J. Copeland, C. Posy, and O. Shagrir (eds.), MIT Press (Cambridge), 2013, pp. 77-104. Saul A. Kripke This is the published version of the book chapter indicated above, which can be obtained from the publisher at https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/computability. It is reproduced here by permission of the publisher who holds the copyright. © The MIT Press The Church-Turing “ Thesis ” as a Special Corollary of G ö del ’ s 4 Completeness Theorem 1 Saul A. Kripke Traditionally, many writers, following Kleene (1952) , thought of the Church-Turing thesis as unprovable by its nature but having various strong arguments in its favor, including Turing ’ s analysis of human computation. More recently, the beauty, power, and obvious fundamental importance of this analysis — what Turing (1936) calls “ argument I ” — has led some writers to give an almost exclusive emphasis on this argument as the unique justification for the Church-Turing thesis. In this chapter I advocate an alternative justification, essentially presupposed by Turing himself in what he calls “ argument II. ” The idea is that computation is a special form of math- ematical deduction. Assuming the steps of the deduction can be stated in a first- order language, the Church-Turing thesis follows as a special case of G ö del ’ s completeness theorem (first-order algorithm theorem). I propose this idea as an alternative foundation for the Church-Turing thesis, both for human and machine computation. Clearly the relevant assumptions are justified for computations pres- ently known. -
Set Theory, by Thomas Jech, Academic Press, New York, 1978, Xii + 621 Pp., '$53.00
BOOK REVIEWS 775 BULLETIN (New Series) OF THE AMERICAN MATHEMATICAL SOCIETY Volume 3, Number 1, July 1980 © 1980 American Mathematical Society 0002-9904/80/0000-0 319/$01.75 Set theory, by Thomas Jech, Academic Press, New York, 1978, xii + 621 pp., '$53.00. "General set theory is pretty trivial stuff really" (Halmos; see [H, p. vi]). At least, with the hindsight afforded by Cantor, Zermelo, and others, it is pretty trivial to do the following. First, write down a list of axioms about sets and membership, enunciating some "obviously true" set-theoretic principles; the most popular Hst today is called ZFC (the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms with the axiom of Choice). Next, explain how, from ZFC, one may derive all of conventional mathematics, including the general theory of transfinite cardi nals and ordinals. This "trivial" part of set theory is well covered in standard texts, such as [E] or [H]. Jech's book is an introduction to the "nontrivial" part. Now, nontrivial set theory may be roughly divided into two general areas. The first area, classical set theory, is a direct outgrowth of Cantor's work. Cantor set down the basic properties of cardinal numbers. In particular, he showed that if K is a cardinal number, then 2", or exp(/c), is a cardinal strictly larger than K (if A is a set of size K, 2* is the cardinality of the family of all subsets of A). Now starting with a cardinal K, we may form larger cardinals exp(ic), exp2(ic) = exp(exp(fc)), exp3(ic) = exp(exp2(ic)), and in fact this may be continued through the transfinite to form expa(»c) for every ordinal number a. -
Computability and Incompleteness Fact Sheets
Computability and Incompleteness Fact Sheets Computability Definition. A Turing machine is given by: A finite set of symbols, s1; : : : ; sm (including a \blank" symbol) • A finite set of states, q1; : : : ; qn (including a special \start" state) • A finite set of instructions, each of the form • If in state qi scanning symbol sj, perform act A and go to state qk where A is either \move right," \move left," or \write symbol sl." The notion of a \computation" of a Turing machine can be described in terms of the data above. From now on, when I write \let f be a function from strings to strings," I mean that there is a finite set of symbols Σ such that f is a function from strings of symbols in Σ to strings of symbols in Σ. I will also adopt the analogous convention for sets. Definition. Let f be a function from strings to strings. Then f is computable (or recursive) if there is a Turing machine M that works as follows: when M is started with its input head at the beginning of the string x (on an otherwise blank tape), it eventually halts with its head at the beginning of the string f(x). Definition. Let S be a set of strings. Then S is computable (or decidable, or recursive) if there is a Turing machine M that works as follows: when M is started with its input head at the beginning of the string x, then if x is in S, then M eventually halts, with its head on a special \yes" • symbol; and if x is not in S, then M eventually halts, with its head on a special • \no" symbol. -
GTI Diagonalization
GTI Diagonalization A. Ada, K. Sutner Carnegie Mellon University Fall 2017 1 Comments Cardinality Infinite Cardinality Diagonalization Personal Quirk 1 3 “Theoretical Computer Science (TCS)” sounds distracting–computers are just a small part of the story. I prefer Theory of Computation (ToC) and will refer to that a lot. ToC: computability theory complexity theory proof theory type theory/set theory physical realizability Personal Quirk 2 4 To my mind, the exact relationship between physics and computation is an absolutely fascinating open problem. It is obvious that the standard laws of physics support computation (ignoring resource bounds). There even are people (Landauer 1996) who claim . this amounts to an assertion that mathematics and com- puter science are a part of physics. I think that is total nonsense, but note that Landauer was no chump: in fact, he was an excellent physicists who determined the thermodynamical cost of computation and realized that reversible computation carries no cost. At any rate . Note the caveat: “ignoring resource bounds.” Just to be clear: it is not hard to set up computations that quickly overpower the whole (observable) physical universe. Even a simple recursion like this one will do. A(0, y) = y+ A(x+, 0) = A(x, 1) A(x+, y+) = A(x, A(x+, y)) This is the famous Ackermann function, and I don’t believe its study is part of physics. And there are much worse examples. But the really hard problem is going in the opposite direction: no one knows how to axiomatize physics in its entirety, so one cannot prove that all physical processes are computable. -
The Logic of Brouwer and Heyting
THE LOGIC OF BROUWER AND HEYTING Joan Rand Moschovakis Intuitionistic logic consists of the principles of reasoning which were used in- formally by L. E. J. Brouwer, formalized by A. Heyting (also partially by V. Glivenko), interpreted by A. Kolmogorov, and studied by G. Gentzen and K. G¨odel during the first third of the twentieth century. Formally, intuitionistic first- order predicate logic is a proper subsystem of classical logic, obtained by replacing the law of excluded middle A ∨¬A by ¬A ⊃ (A ⊃ B); it has infinitely many dis- tinct consistent axiomatic extensions, each necessarily contained in classical logic (which is axiomatically complete). However, intuitionistic second-order logic is inconsistent with classical second-order logic. In terms of expressibility, the intu- itionistic logic and language are richer than the classical; as G¨odel and Gentzen showed, classical first-order arithmetic can be faithfully translated into the nega- tive fragment of intuitionistic arithmetic, establishing proof-theoretical equivalence and clarifying the distinction between the classical and constructive consequences of mathematical axioms. The logic of Brouwer and Heyting is effective. The conclusion of an intuitionistic derivation holds with the same degree of constructivity as the premises. Any proof of a disjunction of two statements can be effectively transformed into a proof of one of the disjuncts, while any proof of an existential statement contains an effec- tive prescription for finding a witness. The negation of a statement is interpreted as asserting that the statement is not merely false but absurd, i.e., leads to a contradiction. Brouwer objected to the general law of excluded middle as claim- ing a priori that every mathematical problem has a solution, and to the general law ¬¬A ⊃ A of double negation as asserting that every consistent mathematical statement holds. -
I0 and Rank-Into-Rank Axioms
I0 and rank-into-rank axioms Vincenzo Dimonte∗ July 11, 2017 Abstract Just a survey on I0. Keywords: Large cardinals; Axiom I0; rank-into-rank axioms; elemen- tary embeddings; relative constructibility; embedding lifting; singular car- dinals combinatorics. 2010 Mathematics Subject Classifications: 03E55 (03E05 03E35 03E45) 1 Informal Introduction to the Introduction Ok, that’s it. People who know me also know that it is years that I am ranting about a book about I0, how it is important to write it and publish it, etc. I realized that this particular moment is still right for me to write it, for two reasons: time is scarce, and probably there are still not enough results (or anyway not enough different lines of research). This has the potential of being a very nasty vicious circle: there are not enough results about I0 to write a book, but if nobody writes a book the diffusion of I0 is too limited, and so the number of results does not increase much. To avoid this deadlock, I decided to divulge a first draft of such a hypothetical book, hoping to start a “conversation” with that. It is literally a first draft, so it is full of errors and in a liquid state. For example, I still haven’t decided whether to call it I0 or I0, both notations are used in literature. I feel like it still lacks a vision of the future, a map on where the research could and should going about I0. Many proofs are old but never published, and therefore reconstructed by me, so maybe they are wrong. -
UNIVERSALLY BAIRE SETS and GENERIC ABSOLUTENESS TREVOR M. WILSON Introduction Generic Absoluteness Principles Assert That Certai
UNIVERSALLY BAIRE SETS AND GENERIC ABSOLUTENESS TREVOR M. WILSON Abstract. We prove several equivalences and relative consistency re- 2 uBλ sults involving notions of generic absoluteness beyond Woodin's (Σ1) generic absoluteness for a limit of Woodin cardinals λ. In particular,e we R 2 uBλ prove that two-step 9 (Π1) generic absoluteness below a measur- able cardinal that is a limite of Woodin cardinals has high consistency 2 uBλ strength, and that it is equivalent with the existence of trees for (Π1) formulas. The construction of these trees uses a general method for building an absolute complement for a given tree T assuming many \failures of covering" for the models L(T;Vα) below a measurable car- dinal. Introduction Generic absoluteness principles assert that certain properties of the set- theoretic universe cannot be changed by the method of forcing. Some pro- perties, such as the truth or falsity of the Continuum Hypothesis, can always be changed by forcing. Accordingly, one approach to formulating generic ab- soluteness principles is to consider properties of a limited complexity such 1 1 as those corresponding to pointclasses in descriptive set theory: Σ2, Σ3, projective, and so on. (Another approach is to limit the class ofe allowede forcing notions. For a survey of results in this area, see [1].) Shoenfield’s 1 absoluteness theorem implies that Σ2 statements are always generically ab- solute. Generic absoluteness principlese for larger pointclasses tend to be equiconsistent with strong axioms of infinity, and they may also relate to the extent of the universally Baire sets. 1 For example, one-step Σ3 generic absoluteness is shown in [3] to be equiconsistent with the existencee of a Σ2-reflecting cardinal and to be equiv- 1 alent with the statement that every ∆2 set of reals is universally Baire. -
Cardinality of Accumulation Points of Infinite Sets 1 Introduction
International Mathematical Forum, Vol. 11, 2016, no. 11, 539 - 546 HIKARI Ltd, www.m-hikari.com http://dx.doi.org/10.12988/imf.2016.6224 Cardinality of Accumulation Points of Infinite Sets A. Kalapodi CTI Diophantus, Computer Technological Institute & Press University Campus of Patras, 26504 Patras, Greece Copyright c 2016 A. Kalapodi. This article is distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. Abstract One of the fundamental theorems in real analysis is the Bolzano- Weierstrass property according to which every bounded infinite set of real numbers has an accumulation point. Since this theorem essentially asserts the completeness of the real numbers, the notion of accumulation point becomes substantial. This work provides an efficient number of examples which cover every possible case in the study of accumulation points, classifying the different sizes of the derived set A0 and of the sets A \ A0, A0 n A, for an infinite set A. Mathematics Subject Classification: 97E60, 97I30 Keywords: accumulation point; derived set; countable set; uncountable set 1 Introduction The \accumulation point" is a mathematical notion due to Cantor ([2]) and although it is fundamental in real analysis, it is also important in other areas of pure mathematics, such as the study of metric or topological spaces. Following the usual notation for a metric space (X; d), we denote by V (x0;") = fx 2 X j d(x; x0) < "g the open sphere of center x0 and radius " and by D(x0;") the set V (x0;") n fx0g. -
CS 173 Lecture 13: Bijections and Data Types
CS 173 Lecture 13: Bijections and Data Types Jos´eMeseguer University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 1 More on Bijections Bijecive Functions and Cardinality. If A and B are finite sets we know that f : A Ñ B is bijective iff |A| “ |B|. If A and B are infinite sets we can define that they have the same cardinality, written |A| “ |B| iff there is a bijective function. f : A Ñ B. This agrees with our intuition since, as f is in particular surjective, we can use f : A Ñ B to \list1" all elements of B by elements of A. The reason why writing |A| “ |B| makes sense is that, since f : A Ñ B is also bijective, we can also use f ´1 : B Ñ A to \list" all elements of A by elements of B. Therefore, this captures the notion of A and B having the \same degree of infinity," since their elements can be put into a bijective correspondence (also called a one-to-one and onto correspondence) with each other. We will also use the notation A – B as a shorthand for the existence of a bijective function f : A Ñ B. Of course, then A – B iff |A| “ |B|, but the two notations emphasize sligtly different, though equivalent, intuitions. Namely, A – B emphasizes the idea that A and B can be placed in bijective correspondence, whereas |A| “ |B| emphasizes the idea that A and B have the same cardinality. In summary, the notations |A| “ |B| and A – B mean, by definition: A – B ôdef |A| “ |B| ôdef Df P rAÑBspf bijectiveq Arrow Notation and Arrow Composition. -
The Cardinality of a Finite Set
1 Math 300 Introduction to Mathematical Reasoning Fall 2018 Handout 12: More About Finite Sets Please read this handout after Section 9.1 in the textbook. The Cardinality of a Finite Set Our textbook defines a set A to be finite if either A is empty or A ≈ Nk for some natural number k, where Nk = {1,...,k} (see page 455). It then goes on to say that A has cardinality k if A ≈ Nk, and the empty set has cardinality 0. These are standard definitions. But there is one important point that the book left out: Before we can say that the cardinality of a finite set is a well-defined number, we have to ensure that it is not possible for the same set A to be equivalent to Nn and Nm for two different natural numbers m and n. This may seem obvious, but it turns out to be a little trickier to prove than you might expect. The purpose of this handout is to prove that fact. The crux of the proof is the following lemma about subsets of the natural numbers. Lemma 1. Suppose m and n are natural numbers. If there exists an injective function from Nm to Nn, then m ≤ n. Proof. For each natural number n, let P (n) be the following statement: For every m ∈ N, if there is an injective function from Nm to Nn, then m ≤ n. We will prove by induction on n that P (n) is true for every natural number n. We begin with the base case, n = 1. -
Elementary Functions Part 1, Functions Lecture 1.6D, Function Inverses: One-To-One and Onto Functions
Elementary Functions Part 1, Functions Lecture 1.6d, Function Inverses: One-to-one and onto functions Dr. Ken W. Smith Sam Houston State University 2013 Smith (SHSU) Elementary Functions 2013 26 / 33 Function Inverses When does a function f have an inverse? It turns out that there are two critical properties necessary for a function f to be invertible. The function needs to be \one-to-one" and \onto". Smith (SHSU) Elementary Functions 2013 27 / 33 Function Inverses When does a function f have an inverse? It turns out that there are two critical properties necessary for a function f to be invertible. The function needs to be \one-to-one" and \onto". Smith (SHSU) Elementary Functions 2013 27 / 33 Function Inverses When does a function f have an inverse? It turns out that there are two critical properties necessary for a function f to be invertible. The function needs to be \one-to-one" and \onto". Smith (SHSU) Elementary Functions 2013 27 / 33 Function Inverses When does a function f have an inverse? It turns out that there are two critical properties necessary for a function f to be invertible. The function needs to be \one-to-one" and \onto". Smith (SHSU) Elementary Functions 2013 27 / 33 One-to-one functions* A function like f(x) = x2 maps two different inputs, x = −5 and x = 5, to the same output, y = 25. But with a one-to-one function no pair of inputs give the same output. Here is a function we saw earlier. This function is not one-to-one since both the inputs x = 2 and x = 3 give the output y = C: Smith (SHSU) Elementary Functions 2013 28 / 33 One-to-one functions* A function like f(x) = x2 maps two different inputs, x = −5 and x = 5, to the same output, y = 25. -
On Families of Mutually Exclusive Sets
ANNALS OF MATHEMATICS Vol. 44, No . 2, April, 1943 ON FAMILIES OF MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE SETS BY P . ERDÖS AND A. TARSKI (Received August 11, 1942) In this paper we shall be concerned with a certain particular problem from the general theory of sets, namely with the problem of the existence of families of mutually exclusive sets with a maximal power . It will turn out-in a rather unexpected way that the solution of these problems essentially involves the notion of the so-called "inaccessible numbers ." In this connection we shall make some general remarks regarding inaccessible numbers in the last section of our paper . §1. FORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM . TERMINOLOGY' The problem in which we are interested can be stated as follows : Is it true that every field F of sets contains a family of mutually exclusive sets with a maximal power, i .e . a family O whose cardinal number is not smaller than the cardinal number of any other family of mutually exclusive sets contained in F . By a field of sets we understand here as usual a family F of sets which to- gether with every two sets X and Y contains also their union X U Y and their difference X - Y (i.e. the set of those elements of X which do not belong to Y) among its elements . A family O is called a family of mutually exclusive sets if no set X of X of O is empty and if any two different sets of O have an empty inter- section. A similar problem can be formulated for other families e .g .