“The Church-Turing “Thesis” as a Special Corollary of Gödel’s
Completeness Theorem,” in Computability: Turing, Gödel, Church,
and Beyond, B. J. Copeland, C. Posy, and O. Shagrir (eds.), MIT Press
(Cambridge), 2013, pp. 77-104.
Saul A. Kripke
This is the published version of the book chapter indicated above, which can be
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© The MIT Press
The Church-Turing “ Thesis ” as a Special Corollary of G ö del ’ s 4 Completeness Theorem 1
Saul A. Kripke
Traditionally, many writers, following Kleene (1952) , thought of the Church-Turing thesis as unprovable by its nature but having various strong arguments in its favor, including Turing ’ s analysis of human computation. More recently, the beauty, power, and obvious fundamental importance of this analysis — what Turing (1936) calls “ argument I ” — has led some writers to give an almost exclusive emphasis on this argument as the unique justification for the Church-Turing thesis. In this chapter I advocate an alternative justification, essentially presupposed by Turing himself in what he calls “ argument II. ” The idea is that computation is a special form of math- ematical deduction. Assuming the steps of the deduction can be stated in a first- order language, the Church-Turing thesis follows as a special case of G ö del ’ s completeness theorem (first-order algorithm theorem). I propose this idea as an alternative foundation for the Church-Turing thesis, both for human and machine computation. Clearly the relevant assumptions are justified for computations pres- ently known. Other issues, such as the significance of G ö del ’ s 1931 Theorem IX for the Entscheidungsproblem , are discussed along the way.
4.1 The Previously Received View and More Recent Challenges
It was long a commonplace in most writings on computability theory that the Church-Turing thesis, identifying the several mathematical definitions of recursive- ness or computability with intuitive computability, was something that could be given very considerable intuitive evidence, but was not a precise enough issue to be itself susceptible to mathematical treatment (see, for example, Kleene ’ s classic trea- tise [1952, section 62, 317 – 323]).2 Some reservations to this view are already expressed, albeit relatively weakly, in Shoenfield (1967) , section 6.5 (see 119 – 120), though the rest of the section follows Kleene (I owe this observation to Stewart Shapiro). Later 1 IP CABM 5: ? /EE CABM ? ? ?> in 1993, Shoenfield expressed himself more explicitly (see Shoenfield 1993, 26). What we would need, according to him, would be some self-evident axioms for, or
1 I?E G> 0 6 =D ?M E C-1 I M