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Moral Self-Love, Altruism and Moral Motivation in the Works of Joseph Butler

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Moral Self-Love, Altruism and Moral Motivation in the Works of Joseph Butler MORAL SELF-LOVE, ALTRUISM AND MORAL MOTIVATION IN THE WORKS OF JOSEPH BUTLER Judith Chambers Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree Master of Arts (by Research) with coursework component and Shorter Thesis October 2012 Philosophy Department: School of Historical and Philosophical Studies The University of Melbourne Produced on acrchival quality paper Abstract Is genuinely moral altruism possible? This paper claims that Butler distin- guishes the issue \Why be moral?"from the issue of sceptical doubt about the possibility of genuinely virtuous altruism. It proposes that Butler's defence of altruism rests on his unique conception of self-love. It argues that Butler uses three different types of self-love throughout his works; one as a rational princi- ple, another as a selfish drive, and a third as an affection or moral emotion. It proposes that moral self-love, which is experienced as an unintended by-product of performing a genuinely virtuous act, can help to cultivate altruistic habits in moral agents. Thus, re-visiting Butler's works allows us to contribute to the con- temporary, empirically-informed philosophical debate on altruism. In particular, the influence of empathy on altruism is discussed. The analysis reveals that em- pathy is neither necessary nor sufficient for genuinely moral altruism. This paper suggests that much of our moral conduct is motivated by psycho- logical egoism or psychological pluralism. It outlines the difficulties associated with demonstrating the existence of genuinely moral altruism when using mod- els that include existing relationships between friends, family and colleagues. It suggests that the best empirical evidence for genuinely moral altruism is action which benefits strangers, such as blood donation. It argues that Butler provides a plausible account of how genuinely moral altruism is possible for moral agents. By building on Butler's work the paper argues that the satisfaction of moral self-love can help to promote genuinely moral altruism in moral agents by strengthening the agent's belief that she ought to obey the commands of her conscience. The paper argues that moral self-love depends on genuinely moral motivation and as such, moral self-love is distinct from simple \warm glow" feelings produced by egoistic or pluralistic motivation. i Declaration This is the certify that, i) The thesis is only my original work towards the Master of Arts degree, except where indicated in the preface. ii) Due acknowledgement has been made in the text to all other materials used. iii) The thesis is (20-22,000 words in length) exclusive of bibliographies and appendices. Signature ii Acknowledgements I would like to thank Dr Karen Jones, Dr Colin Marshall, Dr Francois Schroeter and the audience at my completion seminar for helpful discussion of the themes of this paper. I am very grateful for the wonderful support my supervisors and family have given me while writing this paper. iii Contents 1 Introduction 1 2 An Overview of Butler's Moral Psychology 5 3 Other Readings of Butler 12 4 My Reading of Butler 19 4.1 Part One . 20 4.2 Part Two . 29 5 Butler's Claim About the Harmony of Virtue and Self Love 31 6 Empirical Work and Altruism 34 7 Conclusion 45 iv 1 Introduction When people act benevolently toward others how can we account for their motivation? Three positions provide possible answers. They are Psychological Egoism, Psychologi- cal Pluralism and Psychological Altruism. Psychological Egoism is the view that holds that the ultimate goal of the individual who helps others is some form of self-benefit, so that the helping action they perform is merely an instrumental means to this benefit. Psychological Pluralism is the view that holds that the ultimate goal of the helping indi- vidual is both helping others coupled with obtaining some form of self-benefit. Neither of these positions gives a controversial account of what can motivate moral conduct. However, the notion that psychological altruism, - \a willingness to act in consideration of the interests of other persons, without the need of ulterior motives" 1 - can account for moral conduct, is contentious. Some reasons to accept that notion come from empir- ical research. If egoistic ulterior motives can be successfully minimized through careful experimental design then the nature of two alternative sources of motivation, empathy and an agent's commitment to moral principles, can be examined more closely. Em- pirical research conducted by Daniel C. Batson and colleagues over the past 20 years reveals that egoistic motives to act benevolently do not fit well with the experimental data. Thus, Batson has tentatively concluded that empathic emotions such as sympa- thy and compassion can evoke altruism (Batson, 1991, 2011). One problem with this finding is that it makes empathy-induced altruism look rather like a simple mechanical response to the needs of others. It exposes the fact that empathy-induced altruism may lack reflective endorsement by the agent and, as such, empathy-induced altruism may violate standard moral principles like impartiality. Consequently, the question I am concerned with in this paper is whether genuinely virtuous 2 altruism can be plausibly explained. I contend that Butler gives us a plausible account of the moral psychology of genuinely virtuous altruistic agents, one that highlights the requirement of the agent's reflective endorsement. According to Butler, when we reflect on the morally right action we have performed from morally right motivation, we experience a \unique type of satisfaction" 3 as an unintended by-product. I propose that the unique satisfaction 1Nagel, 1970, 79. Altruism is a concept without a settled definition. Some commentators think that altruism involves some cost to the altruist. In this paper, I accept Nagel's definition of altruism and argue that personal cost to the altruist is not necessary for altruism. 2In this paper I assume that a moral agent's commitment to core moral principles such as the principle of justice and veracity can be motivating for her. In other words, her motivation for acting altruistically can be derived from her commitment to the moral principles which she has internalized as action guiding principles by which to live her life. 3a) Butler speaks of the \unique satisfaction"I refer to here in both volumes of his works. In the Analogy he goes so far as to call it a \secret satisfaction"evident as a certain tranquillity of mind. (Vol 1 Butler describes is a moral affection that we can have toward ourselves, namely moral self-love. According to my interpretation of Butler, he suggests that we can experience moral self-love toward ourselves when our conscience approves of our moral selves and our moral conduct. At this point I go beyond my interpretation of Butler's third form of of self-love by building on Butler's work regarding habits of virtue found in the Analogy (Vol 1. pp.88-113) 4. I propose that the affect of moral self-love (the satisfaction of morally approving of one's self) helps to cultivate a habit of genuinely virtuous altruism in moral agents by strengthening the belief that they ought to act on the judgement of their conscience. The idea proposed here is that moral motivation involves a relationship between agency, affect, belief and habit formation which is not dependent on an instrumentalist story. By drawing on Butler's analysis, I argue that empathy is not necessary for al- truism. Following Butler, I also argue that when empathy alone evokes altruism with- out the approval of conscience, a moral agent's moral psychology is not working as it should. I submit that the appropriateness of empathy-induced altruism requires the approval of conscience, since empathy-induced altruism without reflective endorsement may sometimes be immoral. According to Butler, motivating principles of benevolence and compassion ought to be subservient to conscience and reflection in a moral agent whose moral psychology is working properly (Vol 2. p.188). Butler argues that only conscience is capable of providing an ultimate judgement for a moral agent to act on and thereby consistently regulate her moral conduct. Thus, revisiting Butler's works allows us to contribute to the contemporary, empirically-informed philosophical debate on altruism, since the debate focuses on empathy. My claim about Butler's account of moral motivation rests on my interpretation of the variegated meaning he gives to the term \self-love". I argue that a careful reading of Butler's works reveals that he proposes his own unique conception of self-love, a conception which features three different types of self-love, only two of which have been recognized and discussed by previous commentators. The basis of my claim for a third form of self-love in Butler's moral psychology is that he sometimes refers to self-love as an affection (Vol 2. p.159,163). This third type of \self-love", I argue, is crucial to understanding what Butler means when he claims that \self-love, though confined 1. p.67 and Vol 2. pp.167-169). b) Throughout this paper all references to Butler's Works will be made to \The Work's of Joseph Butler, D.C.L Sometimes Lord Bishop of Durham"in Two Volumes, Volume 1 Analogy, Volume 2 Sermons, Edited by the RIGHT HON. W. E. Gladstone, Oxford, Clarendon Press 1897 by volume and page number. 4In this chapter Buter talks of the power of habits on moral motivation. He states, \Mankind, from the very constitution of their nature, before habits of virtue, are deficient, and in danger of deviating from what is right: and therefore stand in need of virtuous habits, for security against this danger" (Vol 1. p.99) 2 to the interests of the present world, does in general perfectly coincide with virtue; and lead us to one and the same course of life" (Vol 2.
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