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Journal of Phi Sigma fSSN: 0012-2246 @ ut wMwMu& CONTENTS FrankJackson's Knowledge Argument against Materialism GaryFurash,BowdoinCollege ...... Of Paradigms,Saints, and Individuals:The Questionof Authenticity N. Karl Haden, Universityof Georgia 7 QuantumParadoxes and New Realism David E. Fenner,University of Miami. 15 Conscience,Sympathy, and Love: Ethical Strategiestoward Confirmation of lvletaphysicalAssertions in Schopenhauer MarkCyzyk, Tbmple University .. .... .. 24 BOOKSRECEIVED ....... 14 ABOUTTHEAUTHORS... 6 JOURNALOFPHI SIGMA TAU NATIONAL HONOR SOCIETY FOR PHILOSOPHY OCTOBER1989 VOLUME32 NO. 1 DIALOGUE OCTOBER1989 ABOUTTHE AUTHORS GARY FURASHis a senior at Bowdoincollege majoringin philosophyand----r psychol_ Ogy. E J f9r *.H*DAVTDs.FBNNbRi'-u'lJi*,i8ffi {$P*S-t:: "111',9* !he.ph.p.1t,+e upversle of Georgia. #:FTr3:,*:,Y;il:il'J?":i,Xiffiff ,'#t;t;ffi ,",t";:r"#fir: University.I'f"*:.:y2??ffi;1;,g#:1fr !,u-atremp,e DIALOGUE OCTOBER1989 CONSCIENCE,SYMPATHY AND LOVE: ETHICAL STRATEGIES rOwano COi{Ft RMATIOn| OF M ETAPHYSICAL ASSERTIONS INSCHOPENHAUER Mark Cyzyk TempleUniversity The problem generallywith "intuitively gard to this matter is, though hardly irrele- certain-' or "self-evident" truths is that vant. rather indiscernible. Even so, the they often are not certain or self-evident to textual evidence is such that I would like anv but their author. Hence, intuitive to think Schopenhauer well aware of the knbwledge has frequently been attacked meaning, both from a philosophical and a on epistemologicalgrounds as not certain, literary-perspective, oi the stiiking inter- and-in many cases, as not constituting relatednessof his metaphysicaland ethical knowledge. In the forthcoming pages it doctrines, and how one facet of his will be shown how Schopenhauer'sproof thought could be easily utilized, if not as that the world is will rests on just such an proof of the other (for to do so would risk intuitive base. As such, his proofs are not I circle insteadof resulting in simple radi- entirely satisfying. But Schopenhauer cal interrelatedness),at least in an illustra- himself admits that explanation by its very tive, heuristic way suggestiveof its credi- nature must reach a point beyond which it bilitv. cannot go; that all explanation leaves In the preface to the first edition of The something unexplained; that all accounts World as Will and Representatio,n Scho- of the world leave unexplained a qualitas penhauer states with regard to his great occulta. This does not, however, change work that: "What is to be imparted by it is the fact that his argument in support of the a single thought." And the reader imme- assertion that the world is will remains diately wonders what this thought is-a somewhat dissatisffing. The acceptance thought that required, in 1818, a large or rejection of Schopenhauer'sphilosophy volume (and, we are told, a second read- ultimately rests on the acceptance or re- ing of that volume) for its proper imparta- jection of this, his (not entirely satis$ing) tion, and then, in 1844, a second volume explanation of explanation. of comparable size yet added to that re- Howeveq whereas Book Two of the first quirement-all for the communication of volume of The Worl.das Will and Repre- a single thought. The thought itself is sim- sentation contains these proofs-that expla- olv stated:The world is will.Indeed Scho- nation cannot be ultimate and the world is i"ntrauet repeats this thought again and (known in some intuitive way as) will-it asain.But what, one wonders,is the con- is my contention that Schopenhauer,in te-ntof the thought? This of course is what Book Four, offers yet more support for his occupies the two volumes of The World as metaphysical assertions. I shall seek to lYill and Representation and is the founda- illustrate how his writings on conscience, tion for the whole of Schopenhauer'sphi- sympathy,and love (containedin his ethi- losophy; it seemsone cannot acceptScho- cal writings) can serve, whether Scho- penhauer's notion of the world as will penhauerintended them to do so or not, as without also accepting the rest of his sys- aAAitional strategies toward confirmation tem (at least, that is what he seeksto per- of his metaphysical assertions in Book suade the reader), and, vice versa, one Tlvo of The World as Will and Representa- cannot accept any particular facet of his rlon. Schopenhauer's intention with re- thought without at the same time accept- 24 DIALOGUE OCTOBER 1989 ing the notion of the world as will (this have a representationof my body as an because of the radical interrelation be- object in a world with other objects. But it tween his metaphysicalassertions and all seemsthat I am more than a mere bodv. a subsequent philosophical elaboration- mere object-that there is something perhaps a manifestation of any system of which differentiates myself from mere thought espousingan idealistic monism). representation. Schopenhauer calls this Hence "the world is will" is the root and something"will." foundation for Schopenhauer'saesthetic, political, and ethical thought. To the subjectofknowing, who appearsas an But it is here the contentof "the world is individualonly throughhis identity with the will" must be questioned. What leads body,this body is givenin two entirelydiffer- Schopenhauerto this notion? And how entways. It is givenin intelligentperception as much credibility or, in current terminol- representation,as an object among objects, lia- ogy, what sort of validity does his notion ble to the lawsof theseobjects. But it is also have? givenin quitea differentway, namely as what Schopenhauer'sadmiration for Kant is is knownimmediately to everyone,and is de- renowned,and it is precisely the problems notedby the wordwill.2 he found in Kantian philosophy that serve There is an immediacy when I look for as a departure for his own system. The myself that is not present, it would seem, origins of Schopenhauereanthought lie when I regard representationsof external along a decidedly Kantian line and depict objects. The will is this immediacy. As representation and its relation to the prin- such, Schopenhauerwould claim, it is not ciple of suff,rcientreason as the basis and mediated in any way; space, time, and origin for any inquiry concerned with causality do not shapeit as they do repre- knowledge. Furthermore, both men felt sentations;it is not itself a representation deeply the desire to know the thing-in- but, rather, it is the ground of representa- itself.'But, whereasKant could not set tion, the conditioning possibility of repre- beyond the representation, whereasin tl-re sentation. Schopenhauer'sappeal to the Kantian system anything underlying or individual and the individual's experience prompting representationsmust lie out- of his own body is well-founded.It would side of those representationsand hence seem, at first. that our bodv has more outside of human comprehension, Scho- significance than other repiesentations. penhauer felt the need both to know those Schopenhauersimply terms this special things-in-themselves andthat it is possible significance will. And becauseit is unme- to give an account of how we do know diated, becauseit is the thing laid bare, it them. His philosophy as a whole is such is thereforean in-itself: the thing-in-itself. an account. It is just this doubleknowledge of our own Wewant to knowthe significanceof thoserep- body which gives us informationabout the resentations; to askwhether this world is noth- bodyitself, aboutits actionand movement fol- ing more than representation.In that case,it lowingon motives,as well as aboutits suffer- wouldinevitably passby like an emptydream, ing throughoutside impressions, in a word, or a ghostly vision not worth our consider- aboutwhat it is, not as representation,but as ation.Or we askwhether it is somethingelse, somethingover and above this, andhence what somethingin addition, and if so what that it is in itself. We do not havesuch imrnediate something is.' informationabout the nature.action. and suf- Schopenhauerbegins his searchfor sig- fering of any otherreal objects.3 nificance by considering the body as rep- From this we can conclude that lzy self resentation. Surely one has a representa- is will. and thus that will is the in in-itsetf tion of one's body as existing subject to of myself; that I am immediatelyaware o? the principle of sufficient reason?: I can the noumenalreality which forms the pos- see my body, that is, I perceive my body sibility of my objectihcation in the phe- as existing in spaceand time and as having nomenalrealm. In this way,contraKant,I a causal relationship with other objects. I am awareof a thing-in-itself.But this will, 25 OCTOBER 1989 DIALOGUE subjectto the principle of suffi- this thine-in-itself remains singular' It is thus is nor It is therefbrenot ratlonally vet onlv-an individual wtll- cient reason. ' immediate or self-evident Thuifar Schopenhauerhas arrived at a knowable but is ThoughSchopenhauer fre- verv solipsisticposition or. as he calls it, a in somesense. quentlv we know the wlll' thls positionbf theoreticalegoism. This posi- saysthat 'know' is quite a different iion has been distastefulthroughout the dseofihe ierm (and sense from what we nor- history of philosophy-.andis one which elusive) by the term. This "knowl- Schopenhaueras-well seeks to avoid' mally mean ralionalor representational- Howiver. he acknowledges,thefutility. of edse-"is not be certain from the text. But trvins to invalidate such a posltlon of ihat we can This is a rather difficult thiou-ghphilosoPhical Proofs. is it empirical? questionto answer.He doesindeed claim Theoreticalegoism, of course,can neverbe that aoprehensionof the will is a poste- retutedby proofs, yet in philosophyit has riori."'but what could it meanto saythat I neverbeen positively used otherwise than as a have an experience of something that is skepticalsophism, i.e., for the sakeof appear- aspatial,atemporal, and is not affectedin un"i. A" a seriousconviction, on the other a iausal wav?This is to use "experience" hand,it couldbe foundonly in a madhouse;as in a very noveland strangesense.
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