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CONTENTS

FrankJackson's Knowledge Argument against GaryFurash,BowdoinCollege ......

Of ,Saints, and Individuals:The Questionof Authenticity N. Karl Haden, Universityof Georgia 7

QuantumParadoxes and New Realism David E. Fenner,University of Miami. . . . 15

Conscience,, and Love: Ethical Strategiestoward Confirmation of lvletaphysicalAssertions in Schopenhauer MarkCyzyk, Tbmple University ...... 24

BOOKSRECEIVED ...... 14

ABOUTTHEAUTHORS... 6

JOURNALOFPHI SIGMA TAU NATIONAL HONOR FOR OCTOBER1989 VOLUME32 NO. 1 DIALOGUE OCTOBER1989

ABOUTTHE AUTHORS GARY FURASHis a senior at Bowdoincollege majoringin philosophyand----r psychol_ Ogy. E J f9r *.H*DAVTDs.FBNNbRi'-u'lJi*,i8ffi {$P*S-t:: "111',9* !he.ph.p.1t,+e upversle of Georgia. #:FTr3:,*:,Y;il:il'J?":i,Xiffiff ,'#t;t;ffi ,",t";:r"#fir: University.I'f"*:.:y2??ffi;1;,g#:1fr !,u-atremp,e DIALOGUE OCTOBER1989

CONSCIENCE,SYMPATHY AND LOVE: ETHICAL STRATEGIES rOwano COi{Ft RMATIOn| OF M ETAPHYSICAL ASSERTIONS INSCHOPENHAUER

Mark Cyzyk TempleUniversity

The problem generallywith "intuitively gard to this matter is, though hardly irrele- certain-' or "self-evident" is that vant. rather indiscernible. Even so, the they often are not certain or self-evident to textual evidence is such that I would like anv but their author. Hence, intuitive to think Schopenhauer well aware of the knbwledge has frequently been attacked meaning, both from a philosophical and a on epistemologicalgrounds as not certain, literary-perspective, oi the stiiking inter- and-in many cases, as not constituting relatednessof his metaphysicaland ethical knowledge. In the forthcoming pages it doctrines, and how one facet of his will be shown how Schopenhauer'sproof thought could be easily utilized, if not as that the world is will rests on just such an proof of the other (for to do so would risk intuitive base. As such, his proofs are not I circle insteadof resulting in simple radi- entirely satisfying. But Schopenhauer cal interrelatedness),at least in an illustra- himself admits that explanation by its very tive, heuristic way suggestiveof its credi- must reach a point beyond which it bilitv. cannot go; that all explanation leaves In the preface to the first edition of The something unexplained; that all accounts World as Will and Representatio,n Scho- of the world leave unexplained a qualitas penhauer states with regard to his great occulta. This does not, however, change work that: "What is to be imparted by it is the fact that his argument in support of the a single thought." And the reader imme- assertion that the world is will remains diately wonders what this thought is-a somewhat dissatisffing. The acceptance thought that required, in 1818, a large or rejection of Schopenhauer'sphilosophy volume (and, we are told, a second read- ultimately rests on the acceptance or re- ing of that volume) for its proper imparta- jection of this, his (not entirely satis$ing) tion, and then, in 1844, a second volume explanation of explanation. of comparable size yet added to that re- Howeveq whereas Book Two of the first quirement-all for the communication of volume of The Worl.das Will and Repre- a single thought. The thought itself is sim- sentation contains these proofs-that expla- olv stated:The world is will.Indeed Scho- nation cannot be ultimate and the world is i"ntrauet repeats this thought again and (known in some intuitive way as) will-it asain.But what, one wonders,is the con- is my contention that Schopenhauer,in te-ntof the thought? This of course is what Book Four, offers yet more support for his occupies the two volumes of The World as metaphysical assertions. I shall seek to lYill and Representation and is the founda- illustrate how his writings on conscience, tion for the whole of Schopenhauer'sphi- sympathy,and love (containedin his ethi- losophy; it seemsone cannot acceptScho- cal writings) can serve, whether Scho- penhauer's notion of the world as will penhauerintended them to do so or not, as without also accepting the rest of his sys- aAAitional strategies toward confirmation tem (at least, that is what he seeksto per- of his metaphysical assertions in Book suade the reader), and, vice versa, one Tlvo of The World as Will and Representa- cannot accept any particular facet of his rlon. Schopenhauer's intention with re- thought without at the same time accept-

24 DIALOGUE OCTOBER 1989

ing the notion of the world as will (this have a representationof my body as an because of the radical interrelation be- object in a world with other objects. But it tween his metaphysicalassertions and all seemsthat I am more than a mere bodv. a subsequent philosophical elaboration- mere object-that there is something perhaps a manifestation of any system of which differentiates myself from mere thought espousingan idealistic ). representation. Schopenhauer calls this Hence "the world is will" is the root and something"will." foundation for Schopenhauer'saesthetic, political, and ethical thought. To the subjectofknowing, who appearsas an But it is here the contentof "the world is individualonly throughhis identity with the will" must be questioned. What leads body,this body is givenin two entirelydiffer- Schopenhauerto this notion? And how entways. It is givenin intelligentperception as much credibility or, in current terminol- representation,as an object among objects, lia- ogy, what sort of validity does his notion ble to the laws of theseobjects. But it is also have? givenin quitea differentway, namely as what Schopenhauer'sadmiration for Kant is is knownimmediately to everyone,and is de- renowned,and it is precisely the problems notedby the wordwill.2 he found in Kantian philosophy that serve There is an immediacy when I look for as a departure for his own system. The myself that is not present, it would seem, origins of Schopenhauereanthought lie when I regard representationsof external along a decidedly Kantian line and depict objects. The will is this immediacy. As representation and its relation to the prin- such, Schopenhauerwould claim, it is not ciple of suff,rcientreason as the basis and mediated in any way; space, time, and origin for any inquiry concerned with causality do not shapeit as they do repre- knowledge. Furthermore, both men felt sentations;it is not itself a representation deeply the desire to know the thing-in- but, rather, it is the ground of representa- itself.'But, whereasKant could not tion, the conditioning possibility of repre- beyond the representation, whereasin tl-re sentation. Schopenhauer'sappeal to the Kantian system anything underlying or individual and the individual's experience prompting representationsmust lie out- of his own body is well-founded.It would side of those representationsand hence seem, at first. that our bodv has more outside of human comprehension, Scho- significance than other repiesentations. penhauer felt the need both to know those Schopenhauersimply terms this special things-in-themselves andthat it is possible significance will. And becauseit is unme- to give an account of how we do know diated, becauseit is the thing laid bare, it them. His philosophy as a whole is such is thereforean in-itself: the thing-in-itself. an account. It is just this doubleknowledge of our own Wewant to knowthe significanceof thoserep- body which gives us informationabout the resentations; to askwhether this world is noth- bodyitself, aboutits actionand movement fol- ing more than representation.In that case,it lowingon motives,as well as aboutits suffer- wouldinevitably passby like an emptydream, ing throughoutside impressions, in a word, or a ghostly vision not worth our consider- aboutwhat it is, not as representation,but as ation.Or we askwhether it is somethingelse, somethingover and above this, andhence what somethingin addition, and if so what that it is in itself. We do not havesuch imrnediate something is.' informationabout the nature.action. and suf- Schopenhauerbegins his searchfor sig- fering of any otherreal objects.3 nificance by considering the body as rep- From this we can conclude that lzy self resentation. Surely one has a representa- is will. and thus that will is the in in-itsetf tion of one's body as existing to of myself; that I am immediatelyaware o? the of sufficient ?: I can the noumenalreality which forms the pos- see my body, that is, I perceive my body sibility of my objectihcation in the phe- as existing in spaceand time and as having nomenalrealm. In this way,contraKant,I a causal relationship with other objects. I am awareof a thing-in-itself.But this will,

25 OCTOBER 1989 DIALOGUE

subjectto the principle of suffi- this thine-in-itself remains singular' It is thus is nor It is therefbrenot ratlonally vet onlv-an individual wtll- cient reason. ' immediate or self-evident Thuifar Schopenhauerhas arrived at a knowable but is ThoughSchopenhauer fre- verv solipsisticposition or. as he calls it, a in somesense. quentlv we know the wlll' thls positionbf theoreticalegoism. This posi- saysthat 'know' is quite a different iion has been distastefulthroughout the dseofihe ierm (and sense from what we nor- history of philosophy-.andis one which elusive) by the term. This "knowl- Schopenhaueras-well seeks to avoid' mally mean ralionalor representational- Howiver. he acknowledges,thefutility. of edse-"is not be certain from the text. But trvins to invalidate such a posltlon of ihat we can This is a rather difficult thiou-ghphilosoPhical Proofs. is it empirical? questionto answer.He doesindeed claim Theoreticalegoism, of course,can neverbe that aoprehensionof the will is a poste- retutedby proofs, yet in philosophyit has riori."'but what could it meanto saythat I neverbeen positively used otherwise than as a have an experience of something that is skepticalsophism, i.e., for the sakeof appear- aspatial,atemporal, and is not affectedin un"i. A" a seriousconviction, on the other a iausal wav?This is to use "experience" hand,it couldbe foundonly in a madhouse;as in a very noveland strangesense. And so' suchit wouldthen need not so mucha refuta- Schopenhauer'suse of the term "knowl- tion asa cure.4 edsel' with regard to the will would be' p16perly speaking. a misstatement What must occur if we are to avoid sol- tthoueh6ne whictr. due to the functioning is for the outsidematerial world, iosism of laiguage, would be a necessaryone not simply our individual body, to^ and were Sch6penhauerto properly achieve have a degree bf inner significance itself communicationof his Point).' it is not merely representatlonanc so that Briefly then, Schopenhauer's strategy actually erists (assumingwe are al- hence in rejectingthe Kantianignorance of nou- to use suchvocabulary in reference lowed menal and subsequentassertlon object transcendingthe Principle of to an that the worid is will runs thus: (l) The Reason) outside of our repte- Sufficient world is representation, and hence my thus making a solipsisticac- sentations, bodv is representationl(2) My body is not of self and reality infeasible' By count merLly representationbut it seemsto have allowine this, by requiring this, Scho- an inner'significance-a signifrcance..of penhau6rnot only claims that I am will' which I am-awareimmediately; (3) Solip- but also the world is will. sismis a positionwe shouldavoid; (4) If If wewish to attributethe greatest known real- we areto ivoid solipsismthen the material ity to the materialworld' which immediately world must not merely be (my) represen- eiists only in our representation,then we give tation but, rather, like the body' it ryy9t (5) This it thatreaiity which our ownbody has for each- have its own inner significance; of us, for to eachof us this is the mostreal of inner significanceis will. criti- things.But if nowwe analyzethe reality of this Schopienhauer'sassertions can be bodyand its actions,then, beyond the fact that cized on severalcounts. First, he seemsto it is our representation,we find nothingin it havea questionablereading of Kant' Cer- but the will; with this evenits reality is ex- tain passagesin the first volume of The to hausted.Therefore we can nowherefind an- WorMas iyiil ana Representationseem other kind of reality to attributeto the material isnore the fact that Kant had offered the existenceof the world. fi therefore,the material world is to be D"roofsfor, at least, somethi.ngmore than our mererepresenlation' ihine-in-itselfpreciselyin orderthat a sol- wemust say that, besides being the representa- ipsiitic position could be avoided.These of tion, and hencein itself and of its inmostna' droofs are contained. in the Critique Ana- ture, it is what we find immediatelyin our- Pure Reason,in the Transcendental selvesas will's lvtic. specifically within the chapter ex- the Postulatesof Empirical It must be emphasizedthat this inner ooundine well as in the Paralogismsof significance is nbt a representation and thoushtls

26 DIALOGUE OCTOBER 1989

Pure Reason.sBriefly, Kant's proof runs The mystery of this inner way, this elu- thus: (1) I am awareof myself as existing sive (if that is the correct in time; (2) Time is a function of how we term) is the crux of the problem with come to have representations; (3) Time Schopenhauer'sassertion that the world is determinations are possible only relative will. We want to be able to validate (or to something stable or permanentoutside invalidate) his claim-a claim, that he of those time determinations; (4) Some- claims, is so immediate, so given to expe- thing in-itself exists outside of the time rience as to be untouchable by logical/ determined representationof myself that rational/philosophical inquiry (or media- forms the basis-the possibility-for me tions). It is upon the acceptance or to have such a time determination. I see non-acceptanceof this fundamental in- no reason why Schopenhauercould not sight, this single thought, that the whole have cited theseproofs to his own beneht. ofSchopenhauer'ssystem stands, or falls. Their conspicuousabsence from his dis- Schopenhauer's "proofs" that the cussion may lead the reader to wonder world is will are, on his own admission, whether he understood Kant as, in some not entirely satisfying. However, in the sense,maintaining a position of theoreti- fourth book of volume oneof The WorMas cal egoism. Will and Representationit is my conten- A secondmajor criticism is that there is tion that Schopenhaueroffers additional no reason to suppose the inner signifi- proof that the world is will through his canceof the material world is the sameas discussionof lived statesor what may be the inner significance we frnd in our- referredto as existential realizationsof the selves. Insofar as we must attribute to the world as will. In Book Two Schopenhauer material world an "inner sisnificance" to foundedhis argumenton an intuitive base. avoid , it is similir to what we In Book Four he offers experierzceswhich frnd in ourselves. But the inner signifi- serve as realizations of the world as will. cance of the material world could be dif- These experiencesare conscience,sym- ferent from our own. It could haveits own pathy, and love. It is also interesting to distinctive significance utterly alien from note, considering our adoption of termi- our inner significance. Supposedly,Scho- nology, e.g., "existential," that Scho- penhauer demandsthe inner significance penhauermentions the notion of dread rn of the world and of ourselvesbe the same a passagethat is directly relevant to our to avoid solipsism, but he offers no proof discussion. It is with this brief mention for this claim. It is, ashe says,an assump- that we shall begin, since it serves as a tion. prelude to the other three. However, Schopenhauerhas conceded In Section 63, Schopenhauer defines that, not only cana reasonnot be given for eternaljustice as that which "rules not the the fact that the inner significance of the but the world. " It is not retributive world is the sameas the inner significance , as in the justice of the State, but of our body. but that we cannot give a ratheq it is the justice of existenceitself.n reason or make a rationally valid k;:'owl- It is in this context, that of eternaljustice, edgeclaim with regardto how we "know" that Schopenhauernotes that a state of our own inner significance in the first dread (Grausen)exists in the world or, at place. In the secondvolume of The World least, that it is part of the human condi- as Will and Representationhe makes this tion. explicit. When the form of knowledee is called into question, whenthe Princifium Indivi- . . . I havestressed that other that we are duationis is felt to be undermined in some not merely the knowingsubject, but that we way, when one is led to question phenom- ourselvesare also among those or en- enal existence itself, dread arises. Scho- titieswe requireto know,that we ourselves are penhauer likens Man's clinging to the the thing-in-itsef.Consequently a wayfrom Principle of Sufficient Reasonto the cling- within standsopen to us to that real natureof ing of a boatman to his boat in the bound- thingsto whichwe cannotpenetrate from with- Iesssea. out.e

27 DIALOGUE OCTOBER 1989

Just as the boatman sits in his small boat, - ethical proof for the existenceof an under- ing his frail craft in the stormy sea that is lying will. Schopenhauerclaims that, boundlessin every direction, rising and falling from a moral standpoint, if we consider with the howling, mountainouswaves, so in the what a guilty conscienceor the "sting of midst of a world full of and misery conscience" (Gewissensangst)is, we will the individual man calmly sits, supported by find that it is the feeling brought about or and trusting theprincipium Individuntionis, or the result of performing an act. This is the way in which the individual knows things a rather commonsensical observation. as phenomenon.rl What is interesting about Schopenhauer's claim regarding conscienceis the reason On occasion, Man wonders at the futil- why it arises. Why does one often feel ity of his knowledge. This confusion, this guilty after causingharm to another?Why estrangement from the Principle of Suffi- is there a guilty conscienceat all? cient reason is dread. Schopenhauer claims that the guilty From this presentimentarises that ineradicable conscienceis a realization that the world dread, common to all human beings (and pos- is will. It is an insight, on the part of the sibly even to the more intelligent ), morally evil agent, that his actions in- which suddenly seizes them, when by any crease the sufTering of another and in other of its forms seemsto undergo an excep- some way increase his own suffering as tion. For example, when it appearsthat some well; his consciencemakes him suffer. In changehas occurred without a cause, or a de- this way the Principium Individuationis is ceased person exists again; or when in any bridged resulting in a grasp ofthe world as other way past or the future is present, or the will. The evil man feels himself harmed in instant is near. The fearful terror at anything of someway by his own actions. This feeling this kind is basedon the fact that they suddenly is a recognition that, on some level, he become puzzlel over the forms of knowledge and his victim are one. of the phenomenonwhich alone hold their own He has a presentimentthat, howevermuch of the individuality separate from the rest time and spaceseparate him from other indi- world. This separation, however, lies only in vidualsand the innumerable miseries they suf- the phenomenon and not in the thing-in-it- fer, indeedsuffer through him; howevermuch self.r2 time andspace present these as quite foreign to him, yet in themselvesand apart from the rep- Dread is confusion over phenomenal, resentationsand its forms,it is theone will-to- individual existence. Dread is a realiza' live appearingin them all which, failing to tion of tutility-the tutility of the individ- recognizeitselfhere, turns its weaponsagainst ual in the face of the whole. The object of itself, and,by seekingincreased well-being in dread is the thing-in-itself, and the thing- one of its phenomena,imposes the greatest in-itself is beyond all . This sufferingon another.He dimly seesthat he, seeming contradiction, that the object of the bad person,is preciselythis whole will; dread is not an object in the normal sense thatin consequencehe is not only the tormen- since it transcends all objectivity, is what tor but alsothe tormented,from whosesuffer- distinguishes dread from mere confusion ing he is separatedand kept free only by a or . The object of dread cannot be delusivedream, whose form is spaceand discussed, analyzed, or in any way ration- time.13 ally explicated. It is the thing-in-itself. Hence it can be said that dread is a sudden Schopenhauer presents the pangs of insight, a realization of the thing-in-it- consclenceas an rmmediate awarenessof self-of the will. the world as will, the thing-in-itself. But The relationship which holds between he also presentsthe consciencein dread and its "object," is analogous to the samelight. that which holds between conscience and what prompts conscience. It is with con- The oppositeof the stingof conscience. . is , and later with sympathy and love, the good conscience,the satisfactionwe feel that Schopenhauer offers a practical or afterevery disinterested deed. It springsfrom

28 DIALOGUE OCTOBER1989 the fact that sucha deed,as arisingfrom the (caritas)is of its naturesympathy or compas- direct recognitionof our own inner being-in- sion. The sufferingalleviated by it, to which itself in the phenomenonof another,again af- everyunsatisfied desire belongs, may be great fordsus the verificationof this knowledge,of or small.We shall therefore have no hesitation theknowledge that our true selfexists not only in sayingthat the mere concept is asunfruitful in our ownperson, in this particularphenome- for genuinevirtue as it is for genuineart; that non, but in everythingthat lives.t4 all true andpure affection is sympathyor com- ,and all love that is not sympathyis Thus Schopenhauerpresents both the selfishness.r6 good and the guilty conscienceas some- his that the world is how verifying claim The objection may be raised that Scho- is will. Exactly how this verification penhauerhas been inconsistent. Whereas problematic. Again, achieved remains he previously statedthat "all love is com- knowl- Schopenhauerwould say that such passion or sympathy," in the passagejust given or intuitively edge is immediately cited he seemsto saythat there is a type of is important here, however, certain. What love that is nol sympathetic-a love that is "the is not how world is will" is verified, purely selfish. Whereas sympathetic love the but that Schopenhauerclaims, through is basedon our knowledge of others' suf- conscience, ir is verified. Schopenhauer fering, selfish love-love of or for one's here with regard to offers no innovation self-is basedsolely on knowledgeof per- previously as proof what he had offered sonal suffering. But such love remains will in Book Two. What that the world is sympathetic; it is sympatheticto personal on con- is innovative about his writings suffering. It is sympathy with one's self points specific expe' scienceis that he to a and one's own situation; it is of course, proof we rience which he claims is that possible to feel pity for one's self. This, nature can know or directly apprehend the however, may be stretching the meaning of in Book of the thing-in-itself. Further sympathytoo far. There are other grounds points other Four, Schopenhauer to two though for rejecting Schopenhauer's as verification of experiencesthat serve seeming inconsistency.What has not yet assertionas well. These his metaphysical been pointed out is that Schopenhauerhas and love. two experiencesare sympathy been presenting different aspects of the 66 Schopenhauer At the end of Section same thing. "All or sympa- states: love is compassion Throughout his discussionof sympathy "" 67 then servesas clarifica- thy. Section Schopenhauertries to maintain two sepa- meansby sym- tion of what Schopenhauer rate stances,two perspectiveson the mat- patfi (MitleiQ. the great degree of Given ter. First he presentsknowledge of others' of his internal coherenceand consistency suffering as primary, then knowledge of is work it is not surprising that sympathy personal suffering as primary. But, Scho- the acknowledgementof others' suffering penhauerwill argue, such individual per- recognition of our own suf- based on the spectives depend on fragmentation of a two; we feel fering and the likenessof the larger more comprehensive perspective. we rec- sympathetic for another because This larger perspectiveis suffering in gen- person's as analo- ognize that suffering eral-not necessarilythe suffering of oth- -sous to our orrvn. ers, or personal suffering, but suffering states that this Schopenhauer further itself . sympathy is love. Sympathy and love, and conscience, Whatevergoodness, affection, and magnanim- and dread for that matter, are all experi- ity do for othersis alwaysonly analleviation of ences governedby the Principium Indivi- their ;and consequentlywhat can duationis; they are eventsin the phenome- movethem to gooddeeds and to worksof af- nal world. But they are human events or fectionis alwaysonly knowledgeofthe suffer' that, so Schopenhauer main- ing of others,directly intelligiblefrom one's tains, somehow lead beyond themselves. own suffering,and put on a leveltherewith. It This transcendence,is what Scho- followsfrom this, however,that pure affection penhauerclaims is the intuitive apprehen-

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that Schopenhauer sion of the world as will. And such appre- It is in this passage presentinga. human hensionis not governedby the Principleof most closely comesto proof for his assertionthat Sufficient Reaion. Hence it is impossible exDerienceas It must be noted here to adequatelydiscern what the ground of th6 world is witt. conceptionof con- such eiperidnce is. for it Iies beyond.all that Schopenhauer's into sucha proof' It obrectivjty.Such a ground, however,is a sciencealio easilyfits conscience, for neiessary condition for theseexperiences' will be rememberedthat resultof an imme- That ihis interPretation of Scho- Schopenhauer,was the is one, that the penhauer'sthought is sound. that these diate realizationthat all divided into human experiencesare intimately con- human realm is not so sharply "persons" as it nected wilh the will, and that Scho- atomistic units called prima seem to be. Con- oenhauerwould want moral experienceto would. facie, notion as well: *erve as further evidence in favor of his scienceis a syhpathetic person guilty consciencefeels assertionthat the world is will-these are the wiih a of his v.ictim' later confirmed in a few passagesof his sympathyfor the suffering person with a good con- essav"On " in VolumeTwo of The Likewise the his acts were Worid as will and Representatio,n.With science realizes that in sympathywith the reeard to the intimate connectionbetween prompted or were m6rahty and Schopenhauer well-beineof others. hand, is not so eas- states: Dread,-onthe other ilv subsumedunder the generalheading of more Moral investigationsare incomparably syoi,--orhrrmpathY,as cs :"1'-?i:^"::nonqcience 3:9and i:v-eLlove :1".are. ; lI' This importantthan physical, and in generalthan all ii Arietoitre fact that, whereasthe sympa- other; this follows from the fact that they al- thetic experience retains a somewhat most immediatelyconcern the thing-in-itself, hisher degree of the Principium Indivi- namelythat phenomenon of it which, directly diationis.-i.e., the true relationshipbe- discoveredby thelight of knowledge,it reveals tween the moral agent and other living i$ true natureas will.l1 creaturesis realized while the moral agent remains an individual, on the other hand Aeain, Schopenhauerdoes not offer an in a dreadfuI situation the moral agent's exolination of what constitutesthis reve- individuality completely dissolves. Dread lation but only that, in the moral realm, is thus a fi'r moie radical, violent, and sucha revelationdoes indeed occur. Scho- shockingexperience than sympathy.But I penhauerlater explicitly statesthat sym- think it dan6learly be seenhow both expe- oathv is a key expertenceln the recognl- riences serve to support Schopenhauer's iionbf the world is will. He doesthis in a claim in some way that the world is will' nesative way, reminiscent of lknt. by The objection migtrt. quite-rightly.. be shSwingthaithe will as thing-in-itselfis a raisedthai I experiencemyself as will just conditi6n for the sympatheticexperience' as much as when I experience, say, sym- myself On this metaphysicalidentiry of the will as 'rorn6tto*oathv-that the experience of thing-in-itselfrest in generalthree phenomena, "gives" the will whereas the in spiteof theinfinite multiplicity of its appeg- svmpathetic experience presupposeslt' ances,and thesethree can be broughtunder fnis is undoubtedly true within Scho- for the commonconcept of sympathy:(l) sympa- Denhauer's'schopenhauei.system. But the problem thy or compassion,which is, asI haveshown, and the specific p-oint.l the basisofjustice and philanthropy,caritas; havebeentrying to make. is that if he is (2'l sexrul love, with capriciousselection, soins to claim some sort of intuitive im- amor, whtchis thelife of thespecies, assertlng hediacv asthe groundof his assertionthat its precedenceover that of individuals;(3) the woild is w-ill, and if he is going to -ofir,to whichalso belong magnetism attempt al account of that immediacy, andsympathetic cures. Accordingly, sympathy^ then he is going to need a very powerful is to be definedas the empiricalappearance ot heuristic deviceto convince those skeptics the will's metaphysicalidentity' throughthe who fail to "see" the substance of his physicalmultiplicity of its phenomena'r8 claim. What hasbeen brought out and em-

30 DIALOGUE OCTOBER 1989

phasized in the preceding pages is pre- phers of the late nineteenthand twentieth cisely the way that Schopenhauer,rather centuries (although what I have said, as ingeniously to my , uses emotional well as his well-known influence on or moral states,e.9., dread, conscience, Nietzsche, will attestto his importance to sympathy, love, as compelling psychical that movement), but rather to show how heuristic devicesto lead us to an immedi- his assertion that the world is will has ate intuitive realization of all he meansby slightly more credibility if it is understood "the world is will"-that through thes-e with regard to, not merely his intuitive states we can somehow begin to "see" claims in Book Two, but his presentation what he means and that onc6 we thus be- and explication of existentially significant gin to empathize we can "throw away the lived statesin Book Four. With thesestates ladder" so to speak and attain a non-ra- in mind his claim would seemto be. if not tional, non-representationalinsight that vindicated, at leastmore substantial,more the world is will. worthy of serious consideration by those In short and more generally.my pur- who would dismiss it as a claim based posehas been, not to depictSchopenhauer solely on highly questionable intuitive as a precursor to the existentialistphiloso- grounds.

FOC[NOTES

l. ArthurSchopenhauer,TheWorldaslVilland.Representation,trans.E.F.J.Payne(NewYork:Doverpublications,Inc., 1966), I, pp.98-99. Hereafter cited,asWWR. 2. WWR, I,p. 100. This is a most profound obsenation on Schopenhauer's part. Late nineteenth/early twentieth 'proprioception' century neurologists, in fact, coined the tem to refer to this senseof imediate "givemess" of one's body. They go sL far as to refer to it as a sixth sense.Their ground for such a claim is that there have been caseswhen persons haveactually bJ this senseof identity with their body; the body is only experiencedu representation, as an objtrt among other objects in the world. In such cases,one's body sems wholly disconnectedfrom the senseof self, and thus one feels to be, in a very real and frightening sense,disembodied. For an intercsting and radable casehistory of this see "The Disembodied Lady" in Oliver Sacks, ihe Mai Wo Mistook His Wife For a Flar, (New York: Harper & Row, 1987). This scientific evidenceposes serious difficulties especia.llyfor Schopenhauer'sprcject since his system is so dependenton the double experienceofone's body (as represenlationand as "witl"). And though it is unclear what Schopenhauer'sresponse might be, he perhapswould changehis position such that, insteadofexperiencing the body in two distinct ways, we experieni" ou, two distinct ways: as a body (representation)and as an imediate object (will). (Though my body is not identical with *y ""yin."if it surely is part ofit, and, I submit, vice versa with regard to mind. I think Schopenhauerwould agree with this though such a statementis difficult to anribute to a monistic idealist since the mind/body distinction must, for them, ultimately be fise.) The problem with this position, however, is that the person lacking proprioception does not feel his body to be part of his self; it is merely a piece offlesh that is somehow always present. The difficulty for Schopeniauer here is intriguing, and cunent discoveries in neurology provide, at once, impetus for a reconsidemtion of Schopenhauer as well as what seems priru facie a devastating critique of his position. 3. wWR,I, p. 103. 4. wwR,I, p. 104. 5. WWR,I, p. 105, emphasismrne. 6. WW,II, p. 196. 7. Again, this seemsto be a problem accompmying any monistic when philosophical distinctions arise; if,,all is one," how then should we speak of distinctions? Rather, how do we account for distinction in the world or, indeed. within our account of that world? Schopenhauerwould undoubtedly retort, with the , that distinction is ultimately illusion or ruya. But when offering a philosophical account to ground such claims he must use a distinctive vocabulary to comunicate his (substantivally distinct) point. It is here, with the distinctions that language brings (to what may or may not essentially be one), that he fa.lls into trouble. 8. ImanuelKant,Critiqueof PureReason,ftNs. NomanKempSmith(NewYork: St. Martin'sPress, 1965),pp.344-352. 9. WwR,I,p.332. r0. WWR, I, pp. 350-351. ll. WWR,I, pp.352-353. 12. wWR,I, p. 353. 13. WWR,I, p.365. 14. WwR,l,p.373. 15. wwR,l, p.374. 16. wwR,I,pp.375-376. 17. WWR,II, p. 589. 18. WwR,II, pp. 601-602.

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