E

EVALUATION OF FAO ACTIVITIES IN TAJIKISTAN (2004-2009)

FINAL REPORT

October 2009

Table of Contents

Pages

Executive Summary 6

I. Introduction 13

II. Approach and Methodology 13

III. National Context 14

A. THE COUNTRY’S RURAL AGRICULTURAL BACKGROUND 14 Crop Production 16 Livestock 16 Land Reform 18

B. CONSTRAINTS AND POTENTIAL FOR AGRICULTURE DEVELOPMENT 18

C. DONOR ASSISTANCE 21

IV. FAO Office in Tajikistan 21

A. THE HISTORY OF FAO’S PRESENCE IN TAJIKISTAN 21

B. STRUCTURE AND FUNDING OF THE FAO OFFICE IN TAJIKISTAN 22

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C. WORK OF THE PROJECT COORDINATION OFFICE 24 Project Administration 24 Advocacy, Programme Development and Participation in the UNCT 24

D. TECHNICAL BACKSTOPPING 25

E. IMAGE OF FAO IN TAJIKISTAN 26 The FAO Coordinator 26 Problems and Issues 26

F. THE FUTURE OF THE FAO OFFICE IN TAJIKISTAN 27

V. Activities and Results by Theme of Intervention 28

A. PRIORITY FRAMEWORK AND ACTIVITY PORTFOLIO 28 National Medium-Term Priority Framework (NMTPF) 28 FAO Project Portfolio for Tajikistan in the Period 2004-09 29

B. LIVESTOCK HEALTH AND PRODUCTION 29 Support to the Setting-up of Private Veterinary Field Services 30 Brucellosis Control 34 Preparedness for and Control of New and Emerging Diseases (PPR, HPAI) 35 Pasture Management and Forage Production 36 Livestock-related Input Distribution Programmes 37 Distribution of Animals to the Poor 39

C. SEEDS AND OTHER AGRICULTURAL EMERGENCY INPUTS 40 Emergency Input (seed and fertiliser) Distributions 40 Strengthening National Seed Systems 48 Regional Seed Activities in Central Asia involving Tajikistan 49 Future Outlook 50

D. LOCUST CONTROL 50 Background and Context 50 Description of FAO’s Interventions 51

E. WATERSHED MANAGEMENT AND COMMUNITY MOBILISATION 52 Background to Interventions and their Relevance 52 Description of Interventions 53

F. LAND REFORM 55

G. FOOD SECURITY (INFORMATION, STATISTICS AND EARLY WARNING) 58 FAO Interventions and their Relevance 58

H. OTHER POLICY-RELATED INITIATIVES 61

VI. Gender Mainstreaming and Women in Development 61

A. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 61 iii

B. GENDER IN LAND REFORM 62

C. WOMEN’S ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT AND FOOD SECURITY 63

D. LIVESTOCK 63

E. CROPS AND SEEDS 64

VII. FAO Functions in Tajikistan 65

A. POLICY ASSISTANCE 65

B. SHARING AND APPLYING KNOWLEDGE 66

C. RESOURCE MOBILIZATION 66

D. CAPACITY BUILDING 67

E. PARTNERSHIP DEVELOPMENT 67

VIII. Conclusions and Recommendations 68

A. THE FAO IN-COUNTRY PRESENCE 69

B. FOCUS OF FAO ACTIVITIES AND TRANSITION FROM EMERGENCY TO DEVELOPMENT 70 Recommendations 70

C. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON SECTORAL WORK 71 Livestock (animal health, production, feeding and restocking) 71 Crops and Seeds, including Emergency Interventions 72 Locust Control 72 Watershed Management and Community Mobilisation 73 Land Reform 73 Gender Mainstreaming and Women in Development 74

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Acronyms and Abbreviations ADB Asian Development Bank AFC AgroFood Centre AFF FAO Finance Division AFS FAO Administrative Services Division AKF Aga Khan Foundation AKDN Aga Khan Development Network AI Artificial Insemination ALMGC Agency for Land Management Geodesy AOS Administrative Overheads and Support ATAC Agricultural Training and Advisory Service CAMP Central Asian Mountain Group CAWMP Community Agriculture and Watershed Management Project (OSRO/TAJ/3102/WB) CBO Community Based Organisation CERF Central Emergency Response Fund CIDA Canadian International Assistance Agency CIG Common Interest Group CIMMYT Centro Internacional de Mejoramiento de Maiz y Trigo (International Research Centre for Maize and Wheat) CIP Centro Internacional de la Papa (International Potato Research Centre) CIS Commonwealth of Independent States (ex USSR) CGIAR Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research CRI Crop Research Institute CTA Chief Technical Advisor CAWMP Community Agricultural and Watershed Management Project DCC Donor Coordination Council DFID U.K. Department For International Development EC European Commission ECHO European Commission Humanitarian Organisation EFSSIP Emergency Food Security & Seed Import Project ELISA Enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay EU European Union FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations FAOR FAO Representative FAS Field Office Accounting System 2

FBA Field Budget Authorisation FDRS Farm Debt Resolution Strategy FFS Farmer Field School FFW Food For Work FP Facilitating Partner FMD Foot and Mouth Disease FSIP Food Security Investment Programme GAA German Agro-Action GDP Gross Domestic Product GOP General Operations Expenses GoT Government of Tajikistan GPS Global Positioning System (s) GTZ German Technical Cooperation Agency (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit) HH Household HPAI Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza HR Human Resources IA Impact Assessment IPM Integrated Pest Management IDA International Development Association IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development IFC International Finance Corporation INGO International Non Government Organisation IP Implementing Partner IPM Integrated Pest Management IT Information Technology JDC Jamoat Development Committee JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency LA Land Agency LAC Legal Advisory Centre LIFDC Low Income Food Deficit Country LoA Letter of Agreement LRWG Land Reform Working Group LSC Local Service Contract LTO License to Operate MoA Ministry of Agriculture MoEDT Ministry of Economic Development and Trade MSDSP Mountain Societies Development & Support Programme (Aga Khan) 3

NC National Correspondent NDS National Development Strategy NDP National Development Plan NPFS National Programme for Food Security NGO Non-government Organisation NMTPF National Medium-Term Priority Framework NPFS National Programme for Food Security NPO National Project Officer NPP National Project Personnel NR National Responses NSF National Security Fund OCD Office for Coordination of Normative, Operational and Decentralized Activities O&M Operation and Maintenance PBEE FAO Evaluation Office PCO Project Co-ordination Office PCU Project Coordination Unit PISU Programme Implementation Support Unit PIWMP Participatory Integrated Watershed Management Project (TCP/TAJ/2903) PMFSU Project Monitoring and Food Security Unit (now known as the AgroFood Centre) PMU Project Implementation Unit PRSP Poverty Resolution Strategy Paper PRA Participatory Rural Appraisal PES Payments for Environmental Services PPR Peste des Petits Ruminants SAT Seed Association of Tajikistan SDC Swiss Development Corporation SEC FAO Sub-regional Office for Central Asia SENAS Support to the Establishment of a National Agricultural Advisory Service Sida Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency SSC State Steering Committee SSA State Statistical Agency SVD State Veterinary Department SVI State Veterinary Inspectorate TAAS Tajikistan Academy of Agricultural Sciences TACIS EC - Technical Assistance to the Confederation of Independent States (CIS) TCE FAO - Emergencies and Rehabilitation Division TCEO FAO - Emergencies Operations Service 4

TCP Technical Cooperation Programme (FAO) TiP Tokhum-i-Parwar (Seed Production – a potato seed organisation) TOC Theory of Change TVA Tajikistan Veterinary Council UNCT United Nations Country Team ULV Ultra Low Volume UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund UNDAF United Nations Development Assistance Framework UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNIFEM United Nations Development Fund for Women USAID United States Agency for International Development UTF Unilateral Trust Fund VAM Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping VAT Value Added Tax VDC Village Development Committee VFU Veterinary Field Unit VMRF Veterinary Medicines and Remedies Fund WB World Bank WDC Watershed Development Committee WFP World Food Programme WUA Water Users Association

Glossary of Local and Other Terms Aylaq Summer grazing in the mountains Chakka Yogurt with most of the liquid drained off through a cloth Chalma Dried dung pats used for fuel Dekhan / Deqan Small hold farmer Dekhan / Deqan farm Type of group farm leasehold under the present system Goskomstat State Statistical Agency Hukumat Administration (Tajiki) Jamaot District (Tajiki) Kishlak/Kishlaq Village (literally, a winter quarter from Turkish word for winter) Kolkhoz Collective Farm (Under USSR) Lalmi Rainfed/dryland agriculture Lucerne Alfalfa ( Medicago sativa) Oblast Province (Russian) Ogarod Household vegetable garden Qurut Small balls of dried buttermilk 5

Raion District (Russian) Rais-e-mahalla Village/community head Rais-e-zanon Head women of community women’s group Sainfoin Important fodder legume (Onobrychis viciifolia) Somoni Tajikistan currency (about 4.45 / USD at time of mission). Sovkhoz State Farm (under USSR) Vezarat Ministry viz. “Vezarat e Kesharwarzi” (MoA) Tajiki Ministerstva selskova khezaistva – Russian - MoA Viloyat Province (Tajiki) 6

Executive Summary

a) The Programme and the Evaluation Report i. The evaluation reviews FAO activities in Tajikistan for the five-year period 2004 to 2009, with a view towards improving the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and impact of its work; providing accountability about performance and assessing the role of FAO in a transition from emergency assistance to a more normal development mode. Throughout the period, and despite increased economic growth as the country emerged from the effects of civil war, t he economy of Tajikistan remained fragile. The country faces a number of challenges, including in the agricultural sector. There has been a chronic absence of reliable household income for the rural population which has been exacerbated by periodic years of drought, the last being 2007/2008. There is a continuing high level of rural poverty. The poorest groups of the population spend over 70 percent of their income on food and a sizeable level of the population is subject to chronic or seasonal food insecurity. ii. Within the context of this challenging environment, the evaluation examined 42 projects that were implemented by FAO in Tajikistan during the review period. Of these, 30 were purely national projects and 12 were global or regional projects in which Tajikistan participated to various degrees. The nature of FAO activities in Tajikistan has changed over the years from almost exclusively input distribution to more development-oriented activities such as establishment of veterinary field units, livestock and pasture rehabilitation, land reform, watershed management and food security issues. The evaluation also examined the work of the FAO Coordination Office in the country. One of the chief reasons for undertaking the Tajikistan country evaluation was to assess the performance of FAO in a period of transition from emergency to development. In addition this was the first country evaluation where there has not been a resident FAO Representation.

b) The FAO Office in Tajikistan iii. The FAO programme in Tajikistan is one of the largest without an accredited FAO Representative. The Project Coordination Office (PCO) is funded almost entirely from emergency resources and is administered by the Emergency Operations and Rehabilitation Division (TCE). Staff are funded from project contributions and there is no criteria for apportioning costs among projects. The PCO handles a volume of work comparable to a medium sized FAOR. The evaluation found an imbalance between project support costs retained by TCE in Rome and those devoted to the Project Coordination Office. It concludes that there is a strong prima facie case for examining the distribution of support costs in order to provide more predicable support for the Dushanbe office. iv. Over the evaluation period improvements have been made to the financial administration of the office. Conditions of service for staff have been improved. Under the present Coordinator, advocacy and programme development have been stepped up, in areas where this fits with FAO’s mandate. FAO has also increased its activity as part of the UN Country Team (UNCT). v. The evaluation made suggestions to further decentralize authority for decision-making to the PCO, including to make the Coordinator the Budget Holder for all national projects, similar to what is done for FAO Representatives.

c) Livestock Health and Production vi. Livestock health and production have been a major focus of FAO’s attention during the evaluation period and projects have covered a number of key areas, including support to setting up private veterinary services, brucellosis control, preparedness for and control of new and emerging diseases, pasture management, fodder production and livestock-related input distribution. The evaluation report stresses the following points: 7

• For interventions to be considered successful and ensure sustainability, it is essential that they are embedded in local institutional structures. A good example of this has been the development of private veterinary practice through the Tajikistan Veterinary Association (TVA). • Many of the activities engaged in by FAO would have been better managed as long term development programmes rather than as short term projects with ‘emergency’ funding. • There has been a range of distribution and training activities more or less complementary to the other ongoing projects. Support to the setting-up of private Veterinary Field Services vii. Over a period of ten years, FAO has implemented a series of projects that have achieved ever increasing national coverage with privatized veterinary service. These have been highly relevant to national needs and these projects have in general been effective in achieving their objective of building a private veterinary service in rural Tajikistan. The Tajik Veterinary Association (TVA) now takes a leading role in training veterinarians and in the provision of drugs. However, the privatization is being done without any well-defined and agreed policy or strategy and without any legal framework to provide regulations and protection. viii. The interventions have led to a steady, albeit limited income for participating vets. Through training and provision of equipment and drugs, veterinary services in the country have improved and farmers are now willing to pay for these services. Significantly, the incidence of diseases (e.g. brucellosis in areas where the vaccination programme was carried out, and PPR) has noticeably decreased. Brucellosis Control ix. The FAO has managed two Brucellosis control projects over the evaluation period mainly funded by the EC. These projects have effectively lowered the incidence of Brucellosis in small ruminants from 10% to less than 2% in the locations where it has been focused. However, the projects’ real effectiveness is reflected in the fall in the incidence of brucellosis in the human populations where the project has operated. x. The aim should now be to cover the whole country if it is to be really effective. To achieve this,external support is necessary as it is unlikely that the GoT will have sufficient funds to budget for this unassisted. Preparedness for Control of New and Emerging Diseases (PPR & HPAI) xi. These projects have all been relevant to the development of the veterinary field services and have been the driver for restructuring, investment and capacity building in the veterinary service at all levels and have opened up avenues for regional collaboration. PPR has been dramatically reduced since the vaccination campaigns started but this does not guard against new outbreaks. The effectiveness of HPAI has not yet been effectively tested. Improving laboratory capacity has been carried out but there does not seem to have been any overall plan to develop the national veterinary diagnostic capacity. xii. Discussion on a compensation fund in response to outbreaks of HPAI have not been conclusive. Such a fund would help the sustainability of the programme. Pasture Management and Forage Production Livestock Production and Pasture Rehabilitation xiii. Since the collapse of the USSR there has been a need to develop new pasture management and access policies and strategies. The strategy of introducing legume seed into existing pastures has been ineffectual and does not solve the problem of how the pasture land is managed. The project has not concentrated pasture work in locations known to have serious problems of degradation. The project’s long term impact is unlikely to be significant and without settling basic issues of pasture management, ownership and access is unlikely to be sustainable. 8

Livestock-related Input Distribution (distribution of fodder seeds, minerals, stock feed & vaccines) xiv. These interventions were for the most part not really in response to emergencies (i.e. threats to mortality if no action is taken). Fodder seeds are part of a medium term strategy; vitamins and minerals do not save animals’ lives; vaccine for FMD is not justified as an emergency measure in countries where FMD is endemic. Vaccine for PPR or Newcastle disease may, however, be justified as emergency interventions. xv. Distribution of Animals to Poor Families Poultry are a good means by which poor rural households can help to feed their families. However, high production type layers were provided, without improvements in housing and feeding and also without any cockerels to ensure that they reproduced. Losses were quite high as a result. The principle of the programme was not bad, but its technical implementation was flawed. xvi. The Hissar breed ewes could be seen as a long term asset, but do not provide food or income to the beneficiaries in the short term, especially as recipients were obliged to give away the first two lambs to a poor neighbour.

d) Seeds and Other Agricultural Emergency Inputs xvii. Over the past ten years FAO has managed a number of emergency seed/fertilizer distribution projects under the emergency programme of TCE, the largest of which was in response to the drought and harsh winter of 2007/2008. xviii. The relevance of this intervention was questioned. In spite of the previous harsh winter and drought of 2007/2008 the snow and rainfall of the winter, spring and early summer of 2008/2009 turned out to be very good for wheat cultivation. Insufficient understanding of traditional farmer to farmer exchange of seed meant that there was in reality no shortage of seed per se as evidenced by the farmers’ perception that the project was not aimed at filling a need for seed but to introduce better and improved varieties of wheat. xix. Nonetheless, the project was implemented and monitored very efficiently. The majority of potential beneficiaries fitted the criteria laid down by the project leading to an egalitarian distribution and remarkably little dissatisfaction. xx. Little was actually known in advance about the performance of the varieties distributed by the project. Those of Russian origin at best performed no better than what the farmers already had and at worst performed less well. The project was also widely criticized by other agencies operating in Tajikistan for being a ‘free’ input distribution that undermined the objective of stimulating local markets. e) Strengthening National Seed Systems xxi. To date, little has been done by FAO to support the development of local seed production. One project assisted in the production of virus-free potato seed. The programme has continued quite successfully under the management of the national project staff who formed an NGO. f) Locust Control xxii. These interventions have helped to control a recurring and serious pest that effects not only Tajikistan but the surrounding countries. Unfortunately, requests for assistance have often come very late. Furthermore, doubts remain as to the accuracy of the estimations of the areas protected, and 2/3rds of the applications of pesticide are recorded from areas planted with cotton which raises doubts as whether locusts were actually targeted. xxiii. The Locust control techniques used in Tajikistan need to be brought up to date. Locusts are a recurring problem also in Tajikistan’s neighbouring countries, which indicates need for a regional approach including monitoring, management and control on a regular basis. 9

g) Watershed Management and Community Mobilization xxiv. About 93% of Tajikistan is mountainous, much of it degraded and subject to erosion. The good management of the country’s watersheds and catchments is important but neglected. xxv. An FAO-TCP pilot project in “Participatory Integrated Watershed Management” was successful in deriving lessons for management that are still applied today. However, the lessons learned and the examples demonstrated have not been replicated elsewhere in the country. xxvi. FAO acted as a Facilitating Partner for a World Bank funded project on Community Agriculture and Watershed Management. After a slow start, the project is now proving to be an effective instrument for community mobilization, motivation and development through the formation of Community Interest Groups (CIG) for small agricultural/horticultural/livestock enterprises and land improvement schemes. The sustainability of these CIGs once the FAO support as ‘Facilitating Partner’ for the WB ends remains to be seen. h) Land Reform xxvii. Between 2004 through 2008 FAO implemented three projects related to land reform. Major outputs of these projects included: the establishment of a working group on land reform made up of Government bodies, civil society organizations and donors; the establishment of five legal advisory centres offering legal consultations and information on farm reorganization and land reform to rural citizens and farm members the establishment of information and legal consultation centres in 16 districts in partnership with the State Committee on Women and Families to raise awareness among women on their land rights; and the conduct of public awareness campaigns in over 45 communities to explain the process of farm reorganization and monitor progress in completing reorganization of collective farms. xxviii. FAO’s work was found to be largely relevant. The most significant impact of FAO’s work has been the development of partnerships between government and donors by establishing the Land Reform Working Group (LRWG), which became the model for the future. Also the public awareness raising efforts and legal consultative assistance had a positive impact where these activities were conducted. xxix. While the FAO model for the LRWG has proved sustainable over time and is still used by both Government and donors as the accepted model, the FAO’s legal advisory services have proved more difficult to sustain in the long term without continued support. A Land Strategy was developed by FAO without the involvement of key Government bodies such as the Land Agency, who are reported to have been unwilling to participate. i) Food Security (Information, Statistics and Early Warning) xxx. FAO assisted the Government through three projects to develop its capacity in food security information, data gathering and analysis, statistics and the development of early warning systems. xxxi. It is difficult to assess the degree to which FAO’s work improved national food security assessment capacity. Certainly some skills remain in the MoA at provincial and district level in accurate grain crop assessment and farm production data collection. However, there remains only limited capacity in Government to address food security policy issues and the mechanisms to effectively use crop assessments and farm surveys have not yet been developed. j) Gender Mainstreaming and Women in Development xxxii. FAO projects in Tajikistan have made special efforts to include women as beneficiaries and indeed in a number of projects women and female headed households have been the primary focus of project attention. But much more needs to be done and some of these projects would/could have been more effective had they been designed after consultation with the potential beneficiaries to better ascertain their real needs. The evaluation makes suggestions about how gender could have been better considered in projects relating to livestock and crop production. 10

k) FAO Functions in Tajikistan xxxiii. The evaluation addressed FAO’s overall performance in five areas where the Organization claims to have comparative advantage. xxxiv. Policy assistance: The evaluation found that engagement on policy issues was limited, due in part to it being handled from the Regional Office that must cover many countries with limited resources. Recently, there has been increased dialogue on policy issues through the Project Coordination Office. FAO is appreciated by both the GoT and the donors as a potential source of unbiased technical advice and there is scope for it to play a more significant role in assisting with the development of policy and agricultural strategy. xxxv. Sharing and Applying Knowledge: The evaluation found little knowledge in Tajikistan about the information materials produced by FAO. This was attributed to several factors including the country’s level of development, which makes adaptation of information without accompanying technical assistance difficult; few materials in Russian; and poor Internet access generally in the country. A positive example of applied knowledge was the establishment of the VFUs, which drew on lessons gained from a similar programme implemented in Afghanistan. xxxvi. Resource Mobilisation: For much of the period FAO has not been active in donor forums and has generally been more reactive to opportunities for project funding, as opposed to developing programmes. Future prospects for resource mobilization from external sources are largely tied to the success of Government reform efforts. xxxvii. Capacity Building: Capacity building represents a considerable challenge in Tajikistan, as the country faces many of the problems found in other nations at similar levels of development. These include low levels of salary paid to Government employees and a high turnover of staff. There are few incentives for good performance. The evaluation found a mixed picture with regard to capacity building activities – some successful, others less so. The challenges involved to effective “upstream” capacity building in Tajikistan need to be carefully weighed when planning such activities. xxxviii. Partnership Development: Possibilities for partnership development in Tajikistan are more limited than in many countries. Some good examples were noted, but cooperation with the UNCT was weak for some of the period. The FAO country office (Project Coordination Office in Tajikistan) plays a decisive role in the image of FAO at country level and is almost entirely responsible for the development of partnerships. l) Conclusions and Recommendations i) FAO In-country Presence xxxix. The FAO Project Coordination Office has performed with variable quality throughout the evaluation period but is presently under strong leadership. There is uncertainty about the future of the Office due to present funding mechanisms. R. 1. Tajikistan should have a secured, full-time residential FAO presence . R.2. The Project Coordinator should be designated as Budget Holder for all national projects in Tajikistan R.3. A significant percentage of AOS income from both development and emergency projects should be assigned to the Project Office, to allow it to operate without depending on allocations from individual projects. ii) Focus of FAO Activities and Transition from Emergency to Development xxxx. Some projects were less effective because they were implemented in the absence of a policy framework. I t was difficult for FAO (as well as other international organizations and donors) to engage the Government on policy issues, even when this was part of project strategy. Effective transition work requires greater involvement of other technical Divisions and 11

Departments, besides TCE. The NMTPF presents an opportunity to articulate transition work in a more formal and detailed manner. R.4: FAO should provide support aimed at a better understanding of the economic background of production and promoting agriculture as a profitable business, thus enhancing the appeal of agriculture as a means of livelihood. Emphasis should be on creating an effective legal framework (e.g. market reforms, appropriate trade regulations; land tenure; micro-credits). This support should aim at ensuring that agricultural enterprises, when undertaken, represent an acceptable return on investment. R.5: Policy dialogue and formulation is an area where FAO should assist the Government of Tajikistan. Key areas of FAO comparative advantage include: definition of public and private responsibilities in animal health; grazing rights; upland conservation and management. R.6: A new National Medium-Term Priority Framework should be prepared that clearly specifies FAO’s comparative advantages to undertake areas of work in Tajikistan and includes outcomes to be achieved. iii) Sectoral Work Livestock (animal health, production, feeding and restocking) xxxxi. The animal health interventions have been relevant and the establishment of a private veterinary service effective but most of the interventions would have been better as part of a long term development programme. R.7: FAO should seek means to assist the Government in development of appropriate veterinary policy and legislation which should have as main objectives to foster an enabling environment for improving food security, reducing poverty and increasing availability of safe livestock products. Crops and Seed, including Emergency Interventions xxxxii. Projects for the distribution of free seed and other agricultural inputs are no longer warranted in Tajikistan. FAO has a role to assist Tajikistan in producing high quality seed for wheat and a variety of other crops. R.8: FAO should assist the development of commercialized seed production in Tajikistan. R.9: FAO should negotiate a revised grant with the World Bank away from free seed distribution in order to support greater sustainability. Locust Control xxxxiii. The locust control techniques used in Tajikistan need to be brought up to date. At regional level, locust control capacity should be increased and a culture of cooperation across borders encouraged. R.10 FAO should encourage adoption of modern methods of locust control and prevention and support the creation of a properly staffed and funded unit dedicated to locust control . R.11 Continue the development of a regional approach to locust control Watershed Management and Community Mobilisation xxxxiv. The Got recognizes the need for an integrated approach to the management of upland watersheds and catchments. The success and sustainability of such management systems will only be achieved with the full participation of the local rural communities. R.12 A second phase of the CAWMP in the Toirsu watershed Danghara should be developed as an appropriate platform for an ‘Integrated Participatory Watershed Management’ project. 12

Land Reform xxxxv. Land reform is a critical and highly politicized issue in Tajikistan. A major achievent by FAO was its role in establishing the first working group on land-reform, thus creating a partnership between Government, civil society, and donors. R.13 FAO should play a leadership role on land and agricultural policy. Gender Mainstreaming and Women in Development xxxxvi. In general, FAO projects have made efforts to include women. In some projects women and women headed households have been the primary focus of attention. However, some projects, particularly those distributing inputs, did not effectively consider or understand the gender dimension. R. 14: Specific strategies should be developed to address gender considerations, particularly in projects aimed at restoring and improving livelihoods. 13

I. Introduction 1. At its May 2005 session, the FAO Programme Committee recommended that FAO should undertake “an evaluation drawing conclusions on the basis of ... the totality of FAO’s work in individual countries”. Country evaluations respond to General Assembly Resolution 59/250 of 2004, which stresses that the operational activities for development of the United Nations system should be valued and assessed on the basis of their impact on the recipient countries as contributions to their capacity to pursue poverty eradication, sustained economic growth and sustainable development. 2. FAO began evaluating its work at country level in 2006 and presented a synthesis of evaluation findings, based on the first four country evaluations carried out 1 to the Programme Committee in May 2008. The Committee found that the synthesis contained many good lessons. It requested that country evaluations should continue as a regular evaluation activity of FAO and that future evaluations should focus on countries at different levels of development. 3. Since 2007, FAO has begun evaluations in countries where the bulk of its activities are financed under emergency programmes. These country evaluations have been requested by TCE and are funded through a Trust Fund established for evaluation of FAO’s emergency and rehabilitation-related activities. One has already been completed in DR Congo and another is scheduled in Sudan later this year. 4. The nature of the FAO activities in Tajikistan has changed over the years, from almost exclusively input distribution to development-oriented activities such as establishment of veterinary field units, livestock and pasture rehabilitation, land reform and watershed management. One of the chief reasons for undertaking the Tajikistan country evaluation was to assess the performance of FAO in this type of transitional country. In addition, Tajikistan was the first country evaluation where there was not a resident FAO Representation. 5. The main purposes of the Evaluation are: a) to improve the relevance, design, implementation, results and impact of FAO cooperation with Tajikistan; b) to provide accountability to the Government of Tajikistan and to other FAO member countries about FAO performance at country level; c) to identify the factors affecting the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and impact of FAO cooperation at country level; and d) to assess FAO performance in assisting the country in its transition from emergency to development.

II. Approach and Methodology 6. As with previous country exercises, the evaluation took place in three phases. The first phase was for information gathering, which included consultations with FAO staff in Rome, Ankara and Budapest that had been dealing with activities in Tajikistan over the past five years. The culmination of this phase was an Inception Mission to Tajikistan, which took place from 30 November-8 December 2008, undertaken by two members of the Evaluation Service. The Inception Mission met with FAO staff in Tajikistan, Government officials, key donors and members of the UNCT. The Inception Mission produced a report that included issues to be covered in the evaluation, identification of the technical expertise needed and a proposal for an impact assessment to be carried out as part of the evaluation.

1 Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Cambodia, Honduras. 14

7. The second phase of the evaluation was the impact assessment of Veterinary Field Units (VFUs), the establishment of which had been an important focus area for FAO’s work throughout the period covered by the evaluation. The impact assessment, conducted by a staff member of the Evaluation Service and two consultants (one international, one national) took place over four weeks in April-May 2009 (see Annex III). 8. The third phase was the final evaluation mission, which took place from 4 June – 1 July 2009. The evaluation included a two-day briefing in Rome, a three week mission to Tajikistan, a one day debriefing in Ankara for staff of the FAO Sub-regional Office for Central Asia by the Team Leader and Evaluation Manager and a one-day debriefing in Rome for FAO HQ staff. 9. The members of the evaluation team and their areas of coverage were: • Mr Anthony Fitzherbert (UK) – Team Leader plus food security and watershed management • Mr Robert Moore (USA) – Evaluation Manager (FAO Evaluation Service), Administration and Management of FAO office in Tajikistan • Mr Olivier Cossée (France) – Agronomy (FAO Evaluation Service) • Mr Stevan Dobrilovic (USA) – Land Reform • Mr Anton van Engelen (Netherlands) – Livestock • Mr Najmidin Jamolidinov (Tajikistan) – Rural Development • Ms Nouchine Yavari d’Hellencourt (Iran) - Gender

III. National Context

A. THE COUNTRY’S RURAL AGRICULTURAL BACKGROUND 10. Tajikistan is a landlocked Central Asian country with an area of 143,000 sq. km, of which almost 93% is mountainous with only about 7% suitable for cultivation. About half of the land lies at over 3,000m. The mountain ranges with their snow and numerous glaciers are the origin of significant water resources. This has allowed the development of elaborate irrigation systems that support intensive irrigated agriculture in the plains and valleys. However the irrigation and drainage systems developed under the USSR are in poor repair and in considerable need for rehabilitation and maintenance. The cultivation of cotton dominates the cropping system in the irrigated lowlands. Cotton production is still dominated by vested interests that constrain effective reform of land ownership and the development of more flexible and varied cropping/farming systems. The farmers have been locked into an ever spiralling cycle of debt by the financing system for cotton production. 11. More than 73% of the country’s 7 million population lives in rural areas and about 2/3 of the total labour force are employed in the agricultural sector, but only 20.6% of the GDP is produced by this sector of economy 2. 12. The first seven years of independence between 1991 and 1997 were marked by civil war and economic hardships caused by the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union’s centralized command economy. Between 1990 and 1997, GDP fell by 60% and rural poverty was widespread. Since 1998, with the advent of a political settlement and despite occasional serious drought, the economy has improved and the agricultural sector has made a considerable contribution. Between 1998 and 2004, the agricultural sector output increased by 65% in real terms and it is now reckoned to have returned to the level of 1990. Rural poverty, although still significant, fell to 65% of the rural population by 2006 compared to an estimated 82% in 1999. However, the present global economic crisis continues to have a detrimental effect. A significant effect of the current global economic situation is the return of thousands of Tajik migrant workers from Russia.

2 Food security and poverty information bulletin of the Republic of Tajikistan. 3/2008. Dushanbe. 15

13. Tajikistan is the poorest country in Central Asia, with at least 65% of the population living below the poverty line of USD 2/person/day. The country ranks 122 nd out of 177 on the UN Human Development Index. Compared to other Central Asian countries, Tajikistan has the highest numbers of female-headed households due to the labour migration 3. The poorest groups of the population spend over 70 percent of their income on food. Around 10% of the rural population are estimated to be chronically food insecure and a further 17% are vulnerable to food insecurity. National agricultural policies are widely acknowledged to have contributed to declining productivity. 14. The food security situation in Tajikistan during the last year is believed to have deteriorated further due to the global increase in food and energy prices and the reduction in the remittances of Tajik migrant workers from Russia and other countries. The food security situation was exacerbated by the drought and severe winter of 2007/2008 and locust infestation in the south, with consequent losses in crop production. 15. The economic situation remains fragile due to uneven implementation of structural reforms, widespread unemployment, the high level of external debt and the country’s geographical location in a region highly prone to natural disasters. The country’s already fragile economy was destroyed by civil war and the disintegration of its industries and other sectors of national economy after collapse of the Soviet Union, in 1990/1991. This led to massive unemployment. There has been no clear agricultural development strategy. The command economy remains largely intact in the agricultural sector, which functions very inefficiently. There has been a chronic absence of reliable household income for the rural population which has been exacerbated by periodic years of drought, the last being 2007/2008. The combination of these factors has contributed to the continued high level of rural poverty. 16. The basic food production sector has suffered seriously during the 18 years. There has been no clear agricultural development strategy. The agricultural production base has suffered from a lack of high quality agricultural inputs, deteriorating agricultural infrastructure including irrigation and drainage systems and absence of processing facilities. There has been only limited freedom to farm and conduct profitable agricultural business. Veterinary and agricultural extension services have been poor. Although the country’s veterinary services are still to a large extent within the state sector, they are effectively operating on a commercial basis and livestock owners are increasingly accustomed to paying for services and inputs such as remedies and vaccines. 17. The rural population depends to a high degree on household garden plots ( ogarod ) for their household subsistence. These plots are largely free of state interference; farmers can choose what they produce, consume, or sell. The size of household plots is about 0.10–0.15 ha for irrigated land, and about double that for non-irrigated land. Household plots are also by far the most productive segment of agriculture, accounting for well over 50% of the value of agriculture production on about 12% of arable land. There is also more incentive for those in the possession of ‘presidential’ plots to invest in better production. 18. There has been limited access to agricultural credit services although a number of agencies and NGOs are providing some assistance with rural credit and agricultural advisory services. The farm machinery base, most of which dates back to the last years of the USSR, is in very poor condition. The monoculture of cotton and the cotton debts has locked many lowland farmers into a cycle of debt, dependency and poverty. There has been a general lack of technical and economic/business expertise among the farming population who have had little access to advice or extension services except through various NGO managed projects. It is generally acknowledged that there has been inadequate coordination among development partners, donors and others, including the GoT.

3 UN Flash Appeal 2008. 16

Crop Production 19. The main irrigated crop in the lowland plains and valleys is cotton. But in recent years more grain (wheat and maize) and some other crops such as melons and potatoes are being cultivated. Orchards and plantations of fruit and nut trees are found in the upland valleys, mainly dating from the Soviet era, although there is some evidence of new private plantation. Extensive crops of rain-fed ( lalmi ) wheat, barley, flax and some dryland melons are cultivated on the medium elevation mainly ‘loess’ foothills as well as semi irrigated and or rainfed crops of lucerne (Medicago sativa) and sainfoin (Onobrychis viciifolia) Vegetable production mainly occurs in household plots (agarod) and on Presidential land. The main irrigated crop in the lowland plains and valleys is cotton. But in recent years more grain (wheat and maize) and some other crops such as melons and potatoes are being cultivated. Orchards and plantations of fruit and nut trees are found in the upland valleys, mainly dating from the Soviet era, although there is some evidence of new private plantation. Extensive crops of rain-fed ( lalmi ) wheat, barley, flax and some dryland melons are cultivated on the medium elevation mainly ‘loess’ foothills as well as semi irrigated and or rainfed crops of lucerne (Medicago sativa) and sainfoin (Onobrychis viciifolia) Vegetable production mainly occurs in household plots (agarod) and on Presidential land. 20. Crop production, which accounts for 74 percent of agricultural output, is dominated by cotton. Cotton is grown on more than half of the country’s irrigated farmland and is undertaken by three-quarters of farm households. Low producer incentives, distorted markets and inappropriate policies have led to declining outputs and yields and perforce some reduction in the area planted in recent years. Some local governments have required farmers to grow cotton, or lose their land rights. Quotas have been imposed for the minimum production of cotton on irrigated land on a district ( jamoat ) basis. Credit, sales and trading are non-transparent and focused on production volumes, not profit. Presently, cotton debts amount to $US 548 million. Of this, $US 435 million is credit investment and $US 113 million is debt to commercial banks. These debts will now be written off, subsequent to the approval of a Farm Debt Resolution Strategy developed with donors, culminating in a Presidential Decree signed 30 May 2009. Livestock 21. Since independence the Tajik livestock sector has gone through a number of significant changes, which have had a profound effect. The profoundest change was a shift from state to private ownership of livestock. Table 1 below illustrates the speed with which this has taken place. After an initial reduction in the years following the collapse of the USSR, numbers are steadily increasing. This calls for forward planning and interventions to guarantee that there is sufficient feed and fodder produced. This change has also led to a situation in which animals are now kept in mixed herds and flocks. Managed breeding and the possibility for performance testing and genetic selection no longer exists. 17

Table 1: Ruminant Numbers and Distribution over Different Owners (*1000, source CSO) 1991 1997 2000 2005 2008 Cattle Total inventory 1390,5 1050,2 1061,7 1303,3 1702,5 State farms 515 174,3 134,2 95,7 63,4 Households/family farms 875,7 869 907,8 1143,8 1547,5 Dehqan Farmers - 6,9 19,7 63,8 91,6 Sheep & goats Total inventory 3354,9 2221,6 2221,7 2816,5 3798,4 State farms 1557,3 732,6 572,5 529,2 438,4 Households/family farms 1797,6 1460,5 1565,8 2100,2 3058,8 187,1 301,2 Dehqan Farmers - 28,5 83,4

22. The state and collective farming system played an important role in the provision of essential livestock services and inputs for the family farms and households. With the decline of the state and collective farm system, service provision collapsed. Government veterinary services, which had been fully responsible for the control of more than 40 diseases, now limits itself to the control of only eight and does this poorly due to budgetary, institutional and human resource constraints. 23. There has been a general decline in animal productivity and production. This is not primarily the result of “genetic erosion” as is often claimed but mainly an increased incidence of disease and the sub-optimal nutrition of the animals. Serious weight losses during winter have to be recuperated in spring. 24. Livestock fodder production has declined drastically during the last 10 years. This is a result of the large area of irrigated land under enforced cotton production and the reduced area under irrigation due to the deteriorated irrigation infrastructure. The large-scale import of feed from other republics during the Soviet period to compensate for the shortfall of feed during winter in Tajikistan stopped with the collapse of the USSR and animals are now mainly dependent on locally available feed and fodder resources. 25. Under the Soviet system, small individual herds and flocks were assisted in their seasonal passage to the summer pastures ( ayloq ) in the high mountains along with the state owned animals and the herdsmen. Although there is anecdotal evidence to show that many animals are still being taken to the summer alpine pastures, the collapse of the old system has meant that it is more difficult for owners of only a few sheep or cattle to make the annual migration unless they combine with neighbours and hire herdsmen. In some places, this is reported to have led to the overuse of the lower elevation grazing close to the settlements and the underutilization of the higher elevation summer pastures in other places. However, this is a situation that requires much closer study as the true picture is not clear and as the present (2008/09) season has shown, when snow and rainfall are plentiful, even the most apparently worn out pastures have remarkable powers of regeneration. 26. Intensive commercial poultry production collapsed with the break down of the Soviet supply system, high grain prices and competition from large-scale, often subsidized, import of eggs and poultry. The commercial pig industry declined rapidly with the departure of the ethnic Russian population and is now virtually non-existent. 18

Land Reform 27. Land reform in Tajikistan began in 1992 with passage of the Law on Land Reform. Presidential Decrees No. 342 of 1995 and No. 874 of 1997 transferred a total of 75,000 hectares of state and collective farm land to private household plots. 4 By June 1, 2004 the reorganization of 567 state and collective farms had resulted in the formation of 2,914 collective Dehqan (peasant) farms and 21, 281 individual or family Dehqan farms using privately held land. 5 By June 1, 2009 the total number of Dehqan farms reportedly has reached over 39,000, the majority of which are individual and family farms. Nevertheless, land reform has progressed slowly due to State interests in maintaining control over agricultural, mainly cotton production, and the failure of the State to equitably distribute land and offer security of land tenure to private farmers. For example, collective Dehqan farms still hold the majority of irrigated land and informal cotton plans are implemented each season with local authorities typically requiring a farmer to plant 70 percent of irrigated land under cotton. 28. The State’s hold over agriculture has been slipping as difficulties in financing farm production have increased. In 2008, commercial banks made TJS 195.7 million (approximately USD 46 million) in loans to farms producing cotton, but the banks have resisted large scale lending due to the perceived risk in the sector. 6 The lack of working capital financing has further driven down the production of cotton over the last few years, making the pressure of local authorities on farmers to plant cotton unsustainable. In 2006, land planted under cotton totalled 263,000 hectares; in 2009 only 172,000 hectares of cotton have been planted. 7 29. These recent developments present a new opportunity for meaningful reform in agriculture and more equitable distribution of land to occur. Presidential Decree No. 663 of May 30, 2009 on Additional Measures to Support the Agricultural Sector provides for the resolution of cotton debt of Dehqan farms. This Decree provides the opportunity for Dehqan farms to eliminate their debt burden and secure greater freedom to farm outside of the command economy. The Government has since developed an Action Plan to implement the Presidential Decree and specify how the Government will resolve the debt crisis and improve conditions for market oriented agriculture.

B. CONSTRAINTS AND POTENTIAL FOR AGRICULTURE DEVELOPMENT 30. Crop production, diversification and technology: Irrigated crop land in Tajikistan has the potential to be highly productive. Both climate and soils are suitable for the production of a wide variety of crops, including fodder as well as fruits and nuts. The country should be capable of not only feeding itself, but producing a surplus of horticultural and other crops for export. The fact that much of the country’s agricultural production is from individual garden plots ( ogarod ) indicates the country’s greater potential if the policy conditions were right. With a view to the development of private farming, there is a need to rebuild the agricultural sector, from appropriate adaptive agricultural research to the commercial production of high quality seeds. Cotton would still have a place in a more balanced rotation based cropping system. There are also opportunities to produce high value crops, herbs and spices for niche international markets. The country’s

4 Land Legislation in the Republic Of Tajikistan, USAID ARD/Checchi Commercial Law Project, Renee Giovarelli, 2004.

5 Report on the Results of the Land Reform Audit in the Cities and Districts of the Republic of Tajikistan, Bulletin of the Land Committee of the Republic of Tajikistan, 2004.

6 Data from Ministry of Agriculture.

7 2006 data from State Committee on Statistics of the Republic of Tajikistan; data for 2009 from Ministry of Agriculture. 19 worn-out farm mechanization base, much of it dating back to the last round of inputs from the USSR in the 1980s, needs to be re-established with more appropriate equipment. Systems of integrated pest management need to be encouraged and improved on and off-farm post harvest management practices introduced. The present attempts to introduce effective agricultural technical support and extension services under various donor /NGO initiatives need to be strengthened and expanded as do inputs supplies, agricultural credit and marketing. 31. There is a considerable need to discourage cultivation of steep mountain slopes both for rain-fed and irrigated farming. Much of this is the result of rural poverty and the economic struggles of upland communities. This is particularly evident on the medium elevation loess hill land and is a cause of increased landslides with sometimes catastrophic consequences. Such practices are destructive to both the environment and rural livelihoods and should be replaced by more sustainable land management. Table 2: Agricultural land per capita in the Republic of Tajikistan, 2006 Total 000 hectares Hectares per capita Irrigated arable 498.1 0.070 Rain-fed arable 231.5 0.030 Sown to cotton, 2005 288.7 0.041 Sown to cotton, 2006 263.0 0.037

Source: Land Fund of the Republic of Tajikistan, 1 January 2007 32. Irrigation: Many of the extensive systems of irrigation and drainage established under the USSR are in a poor state of repair. The capital investment required to put these systems back into good working order would be huge and some parts, especially systems dependant on pump stations may never again be economically viable. There is a need for the country’s irrigation systems to be reviewed and rationalized with rehabilitation investment concentrated where it is likely to be most cost effective. There is also a considerable need to train farmers in the more effective use of irrigation water and rural communities in the management of their systems through the formation of water users associations (WUA). 33. Livestock: There is potential for more development of livestock production, especially in the peri-urban districts to supply the towns with meat, milk and eggs. Self-sufficiency of poor rural households could be increased through encouraging the raising of poultry (chickens, turkeys and ducks) and highly productive small stock such as rabbits or milking goats, or encouraging traditional household activities such as silk production or beekeeping which can be done in or close to the home. 34. With assistance from FAO and others, some progress has been made to assist the effective privatization and commercialization of the veterinary services, but much still needs to be done. Assuming this is to continue and expand, the government would need a policy for the strategic provision of viable and effective veterinary services based on public/private collaboration, cost recovery and paid services. There is need for clear new policies and strategies for veterinary services, pasture access and management, the provision of support services and the private supply of inputs. 35. Generally there is a poor understanding of good animal husbandry, feeding practices, pasture and grazing management and fodder production and preservation among the new private farming population. These new farmers need extensive guidance on all aspects of livestock husbandry including the recognition of diseases and the need for their animals to be vaccinated without relying on a free government service. 36. Poor pasture management and inefficient feed and fodder production contribute to low animal production. It is not so much a question of current livestock numbers being beyond the present carrying capacity and feed resources of the country, as is sometimes maintained but rather 20 the country’s intrinsic inability to produce sufficient pasturage, forage and fodder. This situation is unlikely to improve unless there is a rationalization of pasture use and better management of fodder and feed production 8. Any efforts aimed at improving livestock breeding will only pay off if feed and fodder of the right quality is produced. There needs to be better access to pasture land with grazing rights protected within an equitable legal framework and better management of the seasonal grazing and forage. 37. Some improvement in fodder production could be achieved by reducing the present cotton acreage and the introduction of fodder legumes into the rotation without any loss in overall yield, as this would help improve soil fertility and soil structure. 38. Lack of market infrastructure and remoteness: Access to markets is problematic, although slowly improving. There are few established input suppliers. The lack of adequate storage facilities and a local processing industry forces most farmers to sell their agricultural output at local markets or along the road at harvest time, further depressing prices. Tajikistan’s topography means that many rural communities are very remote and even if the land is productive, their inaccessibility makes marketing a real challenge that is likely to remain so. 39 Access to capital: Cash to finance operations is largely unavailable in the rural economy. Credit for working capital and investment in farming operations is difficult to obtain partly because of the existing legal ambiguities, but also because commercial banks deem agriculture as risky. 40. The potential for agro-industry: At present, such agro-industry as remains after the collapse of the Soviet Union is mainly focused on cotton. But the country has a huge and largely unfulfilled potential for the processing, drying, packaging and export of things such as dried fruit and nuts as any visit to one of the urban or rural markets indicates. There are other potential for the revival of traditional industries such as silk and possibly also for the production of high value crops such as herbs and spices that should be investigated. 41. Land reform: The ambiguous existing legal framework related to land and agriculture in Tajikistan is often misinterpreted and can be easily manipulated. The laws governing a Dehqan farm contain numerous ambiguities which complicate its operation and legally prevent it from engaging in many contractual relations. For example, Article 7 of the newly passed Law on Dehqan Farms provides that the Dehqan farm is not a legal entity which according to the Civil Code prevents it from entering into credit agreements and output sale contracts. The principles of the Law on Dehqan Farms also conflict with the Land Code, which allows only citizens to possess land use right certificates, making it practically impossible for the Dehqan farms to possess land and use it as collateral for credit. The legal framework also inadequately protects individual rights of farm members by not providing them adequate opportunity to participate in governance of the farm enterprise and leaving key decisions solely in the hands of the farm manager. Procedurally, obtaining a land use right certificate is unnecessarily complex and time consuming, requiring some 25 steps and numerous approvals to complete. It is reported to cost between USD 300 and 800 to obtain a certificate to agricultural land. Adding to the high cost is frequent rent seeking from local officials who are required to approve issuance of certificates. 42. The Government is actively soliciting support from donors to implement the recently adopted Action Plan. Working through the Donor Coordination Council, the donors have already assisted in development of the Action Plan, are expected to help assess and recommend policy and legislative changes, and should support implementation of needed actions. In this environment, FAO technical capacity on agricultural policy and land reform could offer valuable expertise and experience to structure and implement these reform initiatives.

8 Visual observations made by the evaluation team indicate that in a year such as the present one when plentiful rainfall has led to an abundance of vegetative growth on the medium-altitude hills, it is more a question of the local population’s inability to manage these resources. 21

C. DONOR ASSISTANCE 43. With the assistance of the international development partners the Government of Tajikistan has developed a medium and long term National Development Strategy (NDS) and Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS). These documents were intended to provide the Government with a platform for development, implementation of economic reform, and a set of priorities for international assistance working towards achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. The NDS was accepted by the international development agencies and financial institutions, which provided funding for assistance and rehabilitation programmes. 44. Among main donors who have provided assistance to Tajikistan are: the International Monetary Fund (IMF); the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), USAID, the European Union (EU), the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Japan International Co-operation Agency (JICA), The UK – Department For International Development (DFID), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), Islamic Development Bank, the German Government - GTZ, the Swiss Development Corporation (SDC) and other smaller institutions all provided substantial financial support to Tajikistan.

IV. FAO Office in Tajikistan

A. THE HISTORY OF FAO’S PRESENCE IN TAJIKISTAN 45. As was the case for all the newly independent states that emerged from the break-up of the USSR, FAO was slow in establishing a working presence in Tajikistan. The first engagements were mainly in response to emergency requests for agricultural inputs and assistance for returning refugees, ex-combatants and the victims of drought and an Emergency Coordination Office was opened in 1996. Donor support at this time was primarily from UNHCR, Sweden and Norway. 46. In January 2002, a Project Coordination Office was opened in Dushanbe with an international Coordinator. Between January 2002 and October 2004, the position of Country Project Coordinator was held by one person on consultancy contracts. Although essentially set up to manage an ‘emergency’ programme, this established FAO as an organizational presence in Tajikistan and there was some vision of gradually moving from ‘emergency’ to ‘rehabilitation’ and ‘development’ particularly in respect of Animal Health and Land Reform. 47. The position was again filled in January 2005 by a new Coordinator who held the position until May 2006. The second incumbent continued to encourage an emphasis on ‘rehabilitation’ and ‘development’ as is clear from his ‘hand over notes’ written in May 2006. But at that time most donors were only interested in providing funds for short term ‘emergency’ type projects in Tajikistan - a problem that continues to the present time. These two incumbents established FAO as a credible presence in Tajikistan as evidenced by the consistency with which donors sought out FAO as their implementing and technical partner. 48. From July 2006 to March 2008, FAO became less proactive, as the incumbent Coordinator reportedly saw his role as being one of an implementer for on going projects that were developed and designed elsewhere. During this period, improvements were made in administrative and financial systems in the Project Office. However, FAO was largely absent from the donor community in Dushanbe and did not play much of a role in the UNCT. This Coordinator was relieved of his duties in March 2008. 49. There then followed a series of rather short inputs by a series of ‘temporary’ Co- ordinators. The first was the desk officer from Rome. She was succeeded by a Coordinator who was supposed to be long term but served for only 4 months before resigning to take another job. A temporary Coordinator (retired FAOR) filled the post from September to December 2008 and a 22 senior CTA acted as Coordinator until February 2009. The present Country Project Coordinator was appointed and took up his position in February 2009.

B. STRUCTURE AND FUNDING OF THE FAO OFFICE IN TAJIKISTAN 50. With the exception of a few countries with special conditions (e.g. Saudi Arabia with a large UTF programme, Somalia), Tajikistan is the country with the largest FAO project portfolio without an accredited FAO Representative. 51. The vast bulk of FAO’s work in Tajikistan is administered through the Project Coordination Office (PCO, formerly Emergency Coordination Office), reporting to TCE in Rome. Besides the PCO, the FAO establishment includes a Government employee posted in the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) who receives a supplementary stipend paid by the Regular Programme to act as FAO’s National Correspondent. The National Correspondent reports to the FAO Sub- Regional Coordinator in Ankara. Friendly and cooperative relations are maintained between the PCO and the National Correspondent. Additionally, some of the larger projects operating in the country have dedicated administrative staff, who initiate project-related administrative and financial matters and interact on these with the PCO. 52. The PCO staff includes the Coordinator, a Finance Officer, a National Programme Officer, an Administrative Officer, two Finance and Administration Assistants, an IT specialist, three drivers, a receptionist and a cleaner. The Coordinator and Finance Officer hold fixed-term contracts as FAO employees; all the others serve with National Project Personnel (NPP) contracts. This is a recent innovation and restored improvements (e.g. medical coverage) compared to the situation that prevailed since 2006. These improvements in conditions of service were decided after Audit and HR missions in 2008. 53. The FAO programme in Tajikistan has changed considerably over time. When the Emergency Coordination Office of FAO was established in 1996, all projects were of the traditional emergency type, i.e. emergency needs assessments, distribution of agricultural inputs. As mentioned above, starting around 2002, under the guidance of a new Coordinator who arrived at that time, FAO began to take on projects with a greater developmental orientation. While there have been projects exclusively for emergency input distributions in recent years, most recently after the extremely cold winter of 2007-08, most projects have had a rehabilitation and development focus, where input distribution has played a minor role if any. 54. The unusual situation of the FAO Project Coordination Office in Tajikistan is that it finds itself financed and administered as if it were a temporary, emergency coordination office, while in fact it is supporting what is essentially a development portfolio. Although mainly performing the same tasks as an FAO Representation, it does so from a position of dependency for financial survival on projects that contain specific provisions for staffing the Project Office, or else having to finance staff salaries from General Operating Expenses (GOE, see Section D below). This uncertainty about office funding is highly prejudicial to staff morale and sends a message of uncertainty to other actors about FAO’s intentions in Tajikistan. 55. There are no set criteria for apportioning staff costs, which is done opportunistically on the basis of project size and donor willingness to shoulder costs. Budgeting for staff posts in the PCO is a complex exercise, handled by the Coordinator and the Finance Officer 9. Staff can be charged to several projects in any given year and the duration of staff contracts is thus uncertain. Contracts can only be extended when new projects are approved, or old projects extended. Other costs of running the Office, e.g. rent, utilities, are also charged to the GOE budget in projects. 56. The sustainability of the office is further compromised by the fact that none of the project support costs (AOS) earned by FAO from projects operated in Tajikistan are returned to the

9 An exception is the Coordinator’s costs, the apportionment of which is decided by TCE at HQ. 23

Office. The entire sum is retained by FAO HQ, and 60% of this is directed to TCE, with 21.25% allocated to other units of FAO HQ 10 and 18.75% to a reserve fund. 57. For emergency projects administered through offices where there is an FAOR, 7% of the AOS is given to the FAOR for administrative support. Additional resources are sometimes also given on an ad hoc basis. For development projects, which are administratively generally more complex than emergency projects (greater number of administrative actions per dollar spent), 50% of the AOS is given to the FAOR. In the case of Tajikistan, none of the AOS goes to support the Project Coordination Office. 58. Table 3 below was prepared to compare the costs of the Project Coordination Office with total HQ overheads, including the TCE share. The costs of the Project Coordination Office are comprehensive, including staff costs, office rent, vehicles, internet access, etc. Table 3: Project Delivery and Overheads (Jan. 2007-May 2009) No Description 2007 2008 May-09 Total

1 Total Project 2,269,053.00 8,269,472.00 2,717,866.00 13,256,391.00 Delivery 2 Local Project Delivery 801,693.00 2,743,703.00 1,432,758.00 4,978,154.00

3 Cost of Coordination 305,057.00 336,057.00 136,902.00 778,016.00 Office 3 TCE share of HQ 136,143.18 496,168.32 163,071.96 795,383.46 Overheads (60%) 4 Total HQ Overheads 238,304.25 858,638.06 285,881.47 1,382,82 3.78

59. In addition to the overheads mentioned above, some funding of Headquarters Operations Officers is also funded from project budget lines (e.g. five months from OSRO/TAJ/805/EC). 60. The Evaluation does not have all the elements at hand to recommend what should be the proper ratio between costs of the Coordination Office and the amount spent on overheads for TCE. Although the evaluation did not examine the HQ support structure (this was already being done by another evaluation on FAO’s Operational Capacity for Emergencies), it noted the very heavy organizational structure for Tajikistan in TCEO (the Service Chief, a Senior Officer with multiple country responsibilities, a Budget Holder with multiple country responsibilities, an Operations Officer and Operations Clerks). The TCE HQ structure contains an additional two bureaucratic layers, compared with the previous situation for FAO development projects, when all were implemented from HQ. This unwieldy structure may have been a contributing factor to some of the administrative problems noted by the evaluation team. It is also very costly, as shown clearly by the fact that the TCE share of support cost income is higher than the total expenditure on the FAO Office in Dushanbe. The evaluation finds that there is a strong prima facie case for examining the distribution of support costs, and to direct a certain amount of support cost funds to the Office in Dushanbe. This would provide more predictable funding for the Office’s posts. Furthermore, if the evaluation recommendations are accepted for decentralizing operations in Tajikistan, and as staff costs are much lower in Dushanbe than in Rome, there would be a possibility to enhance technical capacity and increase efficiency at no additional cost.

10 Of this 21.25%, nearly one-third (7%) is allocated to the Administrative Services Division and the same amount to the FAO Representations. However, since Tajikistan has no FAOR, it receives none of this. 24

C. WORK OF THE PROJECT COORDINATION OFFICE Project Administration 61. The PCO Office provides a variety of services to FAO operations in Tajikistan. These include preparation of new projects and budgets, tendering and procurement for purchases of USD50,000 or below, preparation of project budget revisions, preparation of field budget authorizations (FBA), preparation of financial reports to donors, preparation of financial statements, issuance of contracts, making requests for imprest account replenishments, and servicing visitors to the country. With local disbursement of $US 2.7 million in 2008 and a similar amount expected in 2009, the Office handles a volume of expenditure comparable to a medium- sized FAO Representation. 62. TCE is involved in many of the administrative processes, but only to check the work that has been initiated by the Project Office Administrative and Finance Unit and then approved by the Coordinator. After examination by TCE, documents are passed to AFF or technical divisions, depending on the subject matter. This includes project documents, budgets and revisions, procurement requests above $US 50,000, FBAs and financial reports. 63. Over the period covered by the evaluation, major improvements were made in office administration. Before 2006, financial administration in the Office was described as ‘chaotic’, with controls lacking, no access to corporate accounting systems and most operations conducted on a cash basis. After a mission by TCE, an imprest account was opened in early 2007. Previous to this, non-cash payments were made through UNDP, which resulted in delays and lack of accountability. Around the same time, the Office gained access to corporate systems such as Oracle, Data Warehouse and the Field Accounting System (FAS). Despite the improvements, there are problems related to the use of Oracle system for project managers. Complete expenditure information from Oracle is made available to project managers with some 1-2 months delay. Project staff often have to translate Oracle expenditures into the required donor format and this takes up much time and effort. An improved tracking system would be required to enable managers to make timely decisions. 64. Some in-country training was provided on corporate systems and the Finance Officer received a week’s training in Rome. In December 2007, the Project Coordinator was granted a procurement approval authority to $US 50,000, the same as that granted to most FAO Representatives. Although uncertainty over the duration of staff contracts remains a problem, conditions of service have been improved through the use of NPP contracts since 2008. The problem of delayed issuance of contracts and payments has been largely solved through decentralization of authority to the FAO Project Coordinator. 65. The Evaluation noted that the results of all measures due to decentralization of authority have been positively received by the FAO Project Coordination Office and have led to greater efficiency in operations. Based on this, further decentralization of operational authority should be encouraged. Advocacy, Programme Development and Participation in the UNCT 66. Advocacy and responsibility for programme development are not normally tasks carried out by an Emergency Coordinator, because in most countries there is also an FAO Representative who carries those remits. 67. Part A above deals to some extent with this topic. The evaluation had most information about the work of the present Coordinator, who clearly sees that it is his role to engage in advocacy and programme development in areas where FAO has an appropriate mandate and is deemed to have a comparative advantage. He has actively engaged in donor cooperation forums, participated in the UN Country Team and consulted with Government departments related to agriculture and rural development. FAO is now pursuing initiatives in the following areas: 25

a) Development of a long-term agricultural strategy. Working through the Donor Coordination Council, where FAO now represents the UN system on agricultural issues, the Office has been advocating an approach involving donors (USAID, DFID, EC), NGOs (German Agro-Action) and the Government. The idea is to pull together existing policy documents and assemble an implementation tool for national agricultural policies (e.g. right to land, right to water), to be applied on a pilot basis in 6-7 districts. b) The Green Initiative. In December 2008, the UNDP Resident Coordinator proposed the launching of a Green Initiative for Tajikistan, similar to what had been done previously in Afghanistan. The Green Initiative, a partnership between the UN, donors and Government, would include aspects of reforestation, livelihoods improvement, watershed management, alternative fuel use and fruit tree propagation. FAO was requested to make specialist inputs for the preparation of a Concept Note; its contribution is being backstopped by the Forestry Department in Rome and the FAO Coordinator. The two-month FAO consultancy input is being financed by UNDP. c) Information system for crop assessment and agricultural marketing. This would be for food security information needs and would likely involve a project commitment of 2-2 ½ years. The EC would be a likely funding source for such an initiative. d) Irrigation. Work has begun to address the perceived need to coordinate the diverse activities currently being implemented related to Water Users’ Associations (WUA) and develop a coherent national strategy for irrigation management. e) Seed multiplication. After years of free seed distribution as humanitarian aid, the Government and donors are moving towards development of a national seed production capability. Sida, which has started an initiative in this area but is now withdrawing from Tajikistan, is looking for another agency to build on its initiative. There have also been some discussions with the World Bank. f) Locust monitoring and control. The Office has been involved in discussions to set up a regional locust control programme, which is being promoted by AGPP. 68. FAO is now an active member of the UN Country Team (UNCT), a fact that is acknowledged by other members. Because of the turnover in Coordinators, FAO did not play a strong role the development of the current UNDAF, which covers the period 2009-2015. This being said, agriculture is recognized by all parties as a key driver of economic development in Tajikistan. As a result, the new UNDAF includes agriculture as a UN system priority, as did the previous one.

D. TECHNICAL BACKSTOPPING (From Headquarters, Regional and Sub-regional Offices) 69. Information made available to the Evaluation indicates that FAO staff from HQ technical divisions and Regional and Sub-regional offices spent a total of 465 person-days in Tajikistan during the period January 2005 – May 2009. Of this amount, HQ technical divisions (AF, ES, FI, FO, NR, LEGN) accounted for some 65% (302 days) with the balance from the Regional and Sub-regional Offices (163 days). These missions represented about 40% of the total visits by FAO to Tajikistan in the review period; the balance was from Administration and Finance, TCE, the Investment Centre and others (including the Evaluation Service). 70. The Sub-regional Office in Ankara was established in September 2006. According to available information, staff from that office have spent some 75 days in Tajikistan since then, including three visits by the Investment officer and two each by the fisheries and forestry officers, the latter in connection with TCP projects being implemented in the country. 71. Nearly all the technical visits were project-related and funded, except for a very few days related to attendance at meetings. It has proved difficult to assess the quality of the backstopping, 26 due to lack of institutional memory in both the FAO Project Coordination Office and in Government departments. However, the overall impression is that greater familiarity with FAO’s technical services is needed. The Government has not actively solicited FAO’s technical assistance outside of projects. Should some of the programme initiatives mentioned previously begin to develop, demands for FAO technical services are likely to increase.

E. IMAGE OF FAO IN TAJIKISTAN The FAO Coordinator 72. Previous country evaluations have shown that the FAO Representative is the most important factor in determining the image of FAO in a country 11 . As the FAO Project Coordination Office has effectively served as the face of FAO in Tajikistan, the person serving as Project Coordinator has served as the “face” of FAO in the country. 73. Throughout the evaluation period, the image of FAO in Tajikistan has had its ups and downs, as noted above. Coordinators have had differing levels of engagement with the Government, donors and the UNCT. The new Coordinator, aware of the damage done to FAO’s reputation by the “revolving door” of Coordinators over the previous year, immediately set out to repair the image of FAO in Tajikistan, by establishing and maintaining contacts with Government and donors, and active participation in donor forums and the UN Country Team (see C.2 above). For example, previously UNICEF was the UN representative for agriculture in the Donor Coordination Council (DCC). FAO has assumed this role since March 2009. He also has actively sought to improve communication within the PCO through regular meetings, so that the various projects are aware of each other’s activities and objectives and to ensure a coordinated approach to programme implementation that had been lacking previously. 74. The results from this active engagement are apparent from discussions with UN, donor and Government representatives met by the mission. Unanimously, they note the improvement in FAO’s engagement in development issues and state that FAO has now assumed a prominent role in the agriculture sector among the international actors. The evaluation notes, however, that this engagement has largely been due to the effort and character of the Coordinator and not to the increased delivery of technical services by the rest of the Organization. It will be a key task for the rest of the Organization to support the initiatives being launched, particularly at the programme development stage. Problems and Issues 75. FAO enjoys a good reputation in Tajikistan for the technical competence of its work and there is a clear desire on the part of both donors and the Government for greater involvement of FAO. FAO is seen as particularly valuable for the neutral role it can play in very sensitive issues related to agricultural reform that are currently being discussed. 76. This being said, FAO’s operational capacity was criticized on numerous occasions. Implementation delays and long periods in which administrative and financial matters have been left pending without resolution, have led to a negative picture of FAO’s capacity among key donors. 77. The most serious situation, and one with the most urgent need of repair at the time of the evaluation in June 2009, was with the EC. Despite numerous requests and promises, FAO has been unable to provide financial reporting at the necessary level of detail for the first EC-funded brucellosis project (OSRO/TAJ/501/EC), some 2 ½ years after the project completed its operations. It is understood that the difficulties stem from poor reporting by the NGO implementing partner for the education component of the project and problems in the transfer of

11 “FAO Effectiveness at Country Level – A Synthesis of Country Evaluations” (PC 99 3b), May 2008. 27 equipment. Despite repeated requests, FAO has not addressed the issue with the EC in a forthright way. The EC is exasperated that funds remain unused and/or unaccounted for in a project that ended its operations such a long time ago. 78. At the time of the evaluation, the relationship had been further hampered by actions subsequent to the EC awarding a Contribution Agreement for a third brucellosis project earlier in 2009. The Call for Proposal of the EC required a 20% co-financing of the total eligible cost. When the Agreement was sent to the Director, TCE for signature, a clause was inserted in the letter accompanying the signed agreement “reserving FAO’s right to withdrawal from the same, should co-financing funds not materialize”. This was unacceptable to the EC, since secured co- financing was a pre-condition for submitting a Proposal. Subsequent to the evaluation visit, co- funding was provided through the approval of a TCP project. 79. FAO’s credibility was also tarnished by a perceived commitment from a visiting staff member for support to the Head of the unit for Donor Coordination, which had the effect of delaying a search for funds from other potential sources at a critical time for negotiations between the Government and donors. This unfortunately added to FAO’s credibility problem with the EC, which is a prominent member of the donor group. FAO subsequently provided $US 10,000 (out of approximately $US 500,000 being sought) as a contribution to stopgap funding. 80. There is a general perception among project staff that FAO HQ takes too long to respond on matters and this complicates project implementation. The evaluation compiled anecdotal evidence on a variety of matters, including delays in response to tenders that had been submitted, delays in processing of reports (another source of irritation for donors) and overdue payments to drivers. In these cases, there was an absence of evidence of proactive measures being taken by HQ. This has given the appearance that nothing was done. 81. The Evaluation believes that communication between FAO HQ to the FAO field office about actions being taken or contemplated needs to be improved. For the matters mentioned above, it is the country office that has had to bear the brunt of donor criticism, for decisions or actions made in HQ that have not been its responsibility. There is a clear need for FAO HQ to be more responsive and attentive to the needs of the PCO.

F. THE FUTURE OF THE FAO OFFICE IN TAJIKISTAN 82. At present, the FAO Project Coordination Office is operating better than it had been for some time. Despite the improvements, there is a great deal of uncertainty about the future of the Office. As noted previously, the emergency projects that are the source of funding for the office, are coming to an end. 83. By the time of the evaluation, there had been no corporate level discussion to consider the role of FAO in Tajikistan. The parties currently involved include TCE, OCD and the Sub- Regional Office for Central Asia in Ankara. This Evaluation gives the opportunity to consider the role of FAO in Tajikistan, as part of the management response process. An informed corporate decision is required on FAO’s future presence in Tajikistan and the evaluation puts forward the following suggestions for consideration: • The type and form of the FAO institutional presence in Tajikistan will depend on both country needs and the likelihood of a continued active field programme . Because of the food security situation and due to the potential for a vibrant programme of FAO assistance in Tajikistan, the evaluation feels that a residential presence for FAO in Tajikistan is justified. Tajikistan has social indicators that are worse than many countries where FAO has a full representation. It is a land-locked LIFDC. There is considerable potential for agricultural development as a vehicle of economic growth and the agricultural sector is a key Government priority. At the present time, all the projects being implemented by FAO in Tajikistan, with the exception of the new Brucellosis III project, have NTE dates not later than April 2010, with the majority ending in 2009. 28

Thus, under the present arrangements, the FAO Project Coordination Office will have very limited funds for operations, unless new projects can be found 12 . The Project Coordinator is well aware of this, and he is actively working with the donors based in Dushanbe to identify viable development oriented opportunities for FAO to implement. The ability to participate in these processes and develop project initiatives depends on a residential presence in the country. The new Coordinator has begun a number of activities that could result in projects and a full-time country presence is required to bring these initiatives to fruition. It is highly unlikely that they could be nurtured from Rome or Ankara. • An arrangement with the Sub-Regional Coordinator as FAO Representative and a resident Assistant Representative does NOT correspond to the role expected from FAO in Tajikistan . The Sub-Regional Office for Central Asia serves six countries (Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan), besides Turkey where the Office is located. The Sub-Regional Representative has already been accredited as FAOR in Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan and in these countries, a resident Assistant FAOR has been or will be appointed. It is understood that consideration is being given to extend this arrangement to other countries of the sub-region, should they request FAO representation. The Evaluation feels that this arrangement would not be suitable for Tajikistan. The level of interaction with Government and donors is such that an experienced, senior officer with broad international experience is required to carry out the job successfully. This will require investment of resources and autonomy of responsibility, in order for the person representing FAO to carry out this task. The Evaluation feels that an Assistant Representative will not be able to perform this task. • The role and authority of the Project Coordinator should be further strengthened . Over the past year, the position of the Project Coordinator has been enhanced through a number of worthwhile measures, such as increasing the level of authority to approve purchases, ability to issue NPP contracts and the fact that the new Coordinator has been given a fixed-term staff contract. In order for the Coordination office to play the role expected for it, the Evaluation feels that it should resemble, in terms of responsibility and authority, a FAO Representation. The next logical step in the transition would be to designate the Project Coordinator as Budget Holder for all national projects in Tajikistan and assign a percentage of AOS income from both development and emergency projects, to allow the Office to operate without entirely depending on allocations within individual projects.

V. Activities and Results by Theme of Intervention

A. PRIORITY FRAMEWORK AND ACTIVITY PORTFOLIO National Medium-Term Priority Framework (NMTPF) 84. The first National Medium-Term Priority Framework (NMTPF) was prepared for Tajikistan in 2007 13 , covering the period 2007-09. It was prepared under the responsibility of the Regional Office for Europe. 85. The NMTPF is intended to give direction to the development of FAO’s interaction with a country. It is a priority-setting mechanism, agreed between FAO and the country. In the case of Tajikistan, it proved difficult to achieve the desirable level of buy-in from Government institutions on the process. While Government bodies made suggestions for projects when they were consulted, there was little active participation in the elaboration of the document, which was

12 One project (GCP/TAJ/001/SWE) is likely to be extended to Dec. 2010 with no additional budget. 13 Dated 5 December 2007. 29 done by the responsible Senior Policy Officer. The NMTPF was never formally endorsed by the Government, as per normal procedure for the NMTPF. 86. The NMTPF defined three thematic priorities for FAO cooperation with Tajikistan (policies and activities to enhance growth of individual agriculture; management of natural resources in the rural sector with an emphasis on prevention of disasters; and governance and regulation of the rural sector focused on the basic public good functions of government for market agriculture) and three operational priorities (building more effective partnerships with major development partners in the framework of the UN reform; strengthening working relations with government institutions through capacity building; and proactively exploring opportunities for further resource mobilization both for bilateral and multilateral cooperation). The evaluation team endorses these broad priorities as being important for Tajikistan. Most of the subject matter areas were those where FAO had intervened in the past, i.e. land reform and land management; farmer group formation for management of natural resources and marketing; livestock health; locust control; pasture and grazing land management; rural development; food security information; food safety and policy advice. The main new idea was for studies on markets for horticultural crops and high-value livestock products, which were to be financed under the TCP facility. 87. Perhaps the most serious weakness of the NMTPF is that it does not discuss outcomes in the intervention areas. As FAO moves toward Results-Based Management, specification of outcomes should be an important part of an NMTPF. It also does not contain information on the activities of other actors (donors) and therefore it is difficult to assess the degree to which FAO’s priorities are harmonized with them. The NMTPF called for the establishment of a steering committee to monitor its implementation. This never moved beyond an idea on paper. 88. The current NMTPF expires this year but a new one is not yet under preparation. From discussions in Dushanbe, it seems that several new priorities will need to be considered, where FAO could in principle interact with other donors. These include joint development of a long- term agricultural strategy and participation in the new Green Initiative, which will be part of the new UNDAF and involve other members of the UN Country Team. There is thus a prospect of greater partnership in a revised NMTPF. FAO Project Portfolio for Tajikistan in the Period 2004-09 89. The evaluation examined 42 projects that were implemented in Tajikistan during the review period. Of these, 30 were purely national projects and 12 were global or regional projects in which Tajikistan participated to various degrees. Thirteen of the projects were funded by the FAO TCP; of these eight were national and four were regional or inter-regional. Six of the eight national TCPs (i.e. all except two for the TCP Facility) are separately reviewed in Annex II. 90. Of the 22 donor-funded projects, 20 carried “OSRO” prefixes in the project designation, meaning that they were implemented as “Emergency” projects (i.e. Budget Holder responsibility with TCE). The two exceptions were the latest version of the project to establish and strengthen private veterinary services in the country (GCP/TAJ/001/SWE) and the largest agricultural input distribution project implemented in the evaluation period (UTF/TAJ/004/TAJ), which is World- Bank funded. However, for both these projects the Budget Holder is also TCE. TCE was also the Budget Holder for three of the TCP projects that were classified as “Emergency”; for the other projects the Regional or Sub-Regional FAO Office was the Budget Holder. The full list of projects examined by the evaluation appears in Annex I. 91. The sections that follow review FAO’s interventions by sector.

B. LIVESTOCK HEALTH AND PRODUCTION 92. Through a number of mainly short-term projects, FAO has assisted the Tajik farmers and the national veterinary system adapt to the profound changes that have taken place since the collapse of the USSR. Livestock are important assets that provide rural people with capital, 30 income and food security. They are thus a vital component of the country’s rural livelihoods and require support and protection. 93. Livestock health and production was the major intervention area for FAO during the evaluation period. Projects covered a number of key areas, including support to setting up private veterinary services, brucellosis control, preparedness for and control of new and emerging diseases, pasture management and fodder production and livestock-related inputs distribution. 94. In addition, there has been a range of distribution and training activities, which have been more or less complementary to these ongoing projects. In general it can be said that most of the livestock projects executed by the FAO created synergy between one another. The fact that the project staff of all these different projects have been based together in the same office in Dushanbe has undoubtedly contributed towards this synergy. 95. Many of the activities would have been better managed as long-term development programmes. However, donor funding was only available for short term ‘emergency’ type projects. In these circumstances it is commendable how FAO has managed to find resources for a succession of short term projects for the development of the various livestock-related initiatives. Support to the Setting-up of Private Veterinary Field Services (GCP/TAJ/001/SWE) 2.1 Background and context 96. GCP/TAJ/001/SWE is the latest in a series of projects implemented over a period of 10 years, aimed at ever increasing national coverage of private clinical veterinary service provision. The projects, which involve material and technical support to veterinary staff, were deemed necessary for providing an effective clinical veterinary service to the numerous individual small farmers that have emerged since the collapse of the kolkhoz / sovkhoz system and the old state veterinary service (see also Annex III – Impact Assessment of Veterinary Field Units in Tajikistan). 97. The private veterinary services network contributes towards the execution of regulatory veterinary services tasks such as sero-surveillance for HPAI and improvement of public health, through brucellosis vaccination on a contract basis. This could be expanded in future to Rabies and Echinococcosis control, both of which are increasing in the country. It also facilitates surveillance work for new and emerging diseases and is as an extremely valuable asset for the Tajik livestock sector. Besides regulatory veterinary services it provides farmers with curative veterinary services for which farmers pay a service charge and if they do not provide the drugs used themselves, they pay the veterinarian for the drugs used. Over 50% of all veterinary interventions are currently being carried out on a payment for service basis and private veterinary service provision is clearly there to stay for both public and private tasks. Relevance 98. This project was relevant to consolidate the achievements of the earlier projects supporting private veterinary field services and to expand the coverage of veterinary field services in the country. When this project started the Tajikistan Veterinary Association (TVA) was not in a position to take the lead in supporting the existing VFUs as no decision had been made on which structure would manage the available funds for the purchase of veterinary drugs and vaccines. It also had to address the issue of developing an exit strategy that was not done in earlier projects, also because earlier projects had not been of sufficient duration to put the system on a sound footing to continue without project support. Private veterinary services are still not regulated by Tajik law. This still poses a threat to the sustainability of the system and would need to be addressed in the near future. 31

2.2 Effectiveness 99. After a slow start, the TVA has now taken a leading role in the training of veterinarians and the provision of veterinary drugs and other requirements. It manages a revolving fund and supervises the network with a staff of five in Dushanbe and 34 veterinarians positioned in various “bases” in the provinces and districts. The TVA should also be seen as the FAO’s ‘exit strategy’ as in two or three years it should be capable of taking on many of the training and coordinating tasks that FAO presently carries out. 100. The project has now reached full coverage of the country with VFU’s, which however in some areas are not as yet sustainable business propositions. The availability of quality assured veterinary drugs and services has increased dramatically. The veterinarians working with the programme use drugs of guaranteed quality and farmers appreciate the service. A recent survey has shown increasing willingness by the farmers to pay for services, vaccines and/or drugs 14 . This indicates increasing trust in the quality and effectiveness of the services provided by the private veterinarians. 101. The creation of a market for veterinary drugs has promoted the establishment and growth of private veterinary drug importing companies, which is an alternative to the TVA managed revolving fund and will assist in avoiding a monopolistic or oligopolistic market for veterinary drugs. In 2007 it was estimated that only 10% of the veterinary drugs required for an optimal livestock production are currently being used 15 . With decreasing poverty levels farmers will be more prepared to invest in the purchase of veterinary drugs to increase their livestock production. 102. Very little research has been done on the business aspects of private veterinary practice in Tajikistan. The large number of trained veterinarians who stopped private veterinary activities (a survey conducted in 2007 showed that over 60 percent of all trained veterinarians were inactive/ dead/emigrated) should be reason enough to pay more attention to the business aspects of private veterinary practice. For private veterinary practice as a model to be effective the government will have to reconsider its licensing and taxation system of private veterinary services. 2.3 Efficiency 103. General project implementation efficiency suffered from sluggish decision making procedures in HQ and difficult communication between the Project Coordination office and TCE Rome. There have been various international coordinators involved in this project. Some were located far from the national staff doing the actual work. This led to delays in decision-making. The last international project coordinator with intricate knowledge of language, the country and the people, managed in a relatively short period to solve many of these issues and make the project work efficiently. His involvement in the project ended prematurely. 104. The veterinarians were given access to drugs and equipment on a basis of credit to initially the project/FAO and later the TVA. Through this revolving fund, veterinary association members originally had access to in-kind credit of around $US 500 per person. This upper limit was eliminated in 2007 and some vets are now borrowing considerably more than that. With a total fund of around $US 442.024 in February 2009 16 in cash, stock and VFU debts, this should in theory give a reasonable amount of money for the approximately 400 VFUs making use of the fund. In reality the amount of cash actually rotating is far less (around $US 140.000) because much of the total fund is tied up in stock. The total volume of sales of medicines in 2008 was

14 Vinod Ahuja et all (2009): Willingness to pay for disease prevention: Case of brucellosis control in Khatlon Oblast of Tajikistan (DRAFT- FAO). 15 Cummings G. (2007): Mission report (FAO) 16 Mehraban, Abdul Baqi (2009): Progress Report “Support to animal health sector in Tajikistan” GCP/TAJ/001/SWE (FAO). 32

$US181.732, a 67 percent increase compared to 2007 although it is likely that there was a small additional capital injection into the fund through the project. This indicates increased efficiency in the use of the fund. It may have been more efficient to use part of the revolving fund as a guarantee to underwrite bank loans taken out by trusted veterinarians to purchase the necessities for the proper execution of their work, such as drugs, vaccines, equipment and transport. This would have meant a shift of the responsibility for credit monitoring from the TVA to a financial institution with access to more funds, thus opening the possibility for some veterinarians to expand the volume of their business, provided the drugs were available. Giving starting private veterinarians a kit of veterinary drugs also harbours the risk that he is provided with certain drugs and remedies, which do not have a ready market, thus locking up capital he could have used on faster moving drugs. 105. The TVA is increasingly responsible for the management of the network and the revolving fund. For efficient operation, it is necessary to take account of management costs, inflation, currency devaluation and the increase in the price of drugs, in order to preserve the buying power of the fund. In 2008, consumer inflation was 13.1 percent 17 . Shifting responsibility for the fund from (tax-exempt) FAO to TVA means that VAT and import duty now need to be paid. These add another 29 percent to the cost. There is also a small level of bad debts which must be recouped if the fund is to maintain its purchasing power. Efficiency in use of money requires that its cost be incorporated in its “price” without taking account of profit margins. 106. The TVA’s running costs are now largely covered by the various service contracts (LoA) it holds with the FAO managed projects. This is, however, temporary and in the long run its running costs should be paid for mainly from a mark up on the existing revolving fund business. There is thus need for a longer-term business plan for the TVA, taking into account its roles in educating its members, organizing and providing veterinary services for public tasks to the government, defending the rights of private veterinarians and running the input supply network. The sources of income would be from public-private contracting (which in most instances will be through projects), service provision and the mark up on drugs, vaccines and equipment. 2.4 Impact 107. The first impact has been the creation of a steady, albeit limited income for the private veterinarians. For some, the project has supported the establishment of small clinics, through a small loan of around USD 2500. Often a telephone is also provided. The loans given for the construction / rehabilitation of the clinics have had a great impact on visibility and almost certainly on the quality of work. Many other veterinarians would like to develop clinics, but funds are difficult to come by. As with the revolving fund the possibility of a guarantee fund to underwrite loans taken out by registered members for 1-2 years to fix up their clinics might have been considered as an option to facilitate more veterinarians to take out a loan for their clinics. 108. All contracted private vets have received training and equipment and have had access to the veterinary drug loans managed by TVA. This has been an important driver to become and/or remain active and has led to a great improvement in the level of veterinary activity during the last year. Together with the training these contracted private veterinarians should now be able to continue with their business in a sustainable way. 109. The impact of this programme on the livestock sector’s and indirectly the people’s health has been large and can be measured. The incidence of brucellosis in the 8 rayons where the control project was executed has gone down from above 10% to in some cases less than 2%. Although the Ministry of Health does not produce the statistics to show a decline in the incidence of brucellosis in people, this must be happening since the Brucella bacteria has become less widespread. The incidence of PPR in the country has been drastically reduced and thus the mortality due to this disease. Both diseases are being controlled through vaccination programmes

17 http://indexmundi.com/tajikistan/inflation_rate_(consumer_prices).html accessed 8-7-2009. 33 executed by the network of private veterinarians. Through curative interventions, animal lives are saved and their production increased. These are all results of the programme which farmers notice and appreciate; they do not need serological evidence to notice less people with Brucellosis and more animals surviving. 110. The impact of the project on the government’s way of thinking about private veterinary service provision is hard to measure. The fact that vaccines purchased with national budgetary funds are not channelled through the TVA and private veterinarians gives the impression that there are still elements in government who have not accepted the change in paradigm for the provision of veterinary field services. 2.5 Sustainability 111. Sustainability of private veterinary services as well as the sustainability of its support structures such as the TVA depends entirely on the possibility of private vets being able to make a living from private veterinary practice, provision of additional services such as AI and the sale of drugs, vaccines and other livestock requirements. The GoT also needs to facilitate the necessary changes in the system and legislation to make this possible. It is appreciated that there was first need to demonstrate that private veterinary practice can work in Tajikistan. The next step will be to ensure that it is thoroughly embedded within the system. This requires the service to be an integral part of development policy, strategy and legislation of the government for the livestock sector. Meaningful public/private contracting principles need to be developed for the “compulsory” vaccinations and surveillance work. An enabling environment for the further development of private veterinary practice should be developed through revision of the currently extremely expensive licensing system and the uncontrolled taxation and “rent seeking” by various government entities. Private veterinarians should pay tax to only one institution. 112. It is unfortunate that the private veterinarians have insufficient access to the eight “government controlled” vaccines and reagents 18 when these are purchased from the national budget, as the amount of vaccine procured is insufficient to cover the total livestock population in the country. This mainly goes to serve the official livestock inventory, the number of which is generally much smaller than the real situation. These vaccination programmes usually achieve a high level of satisfaction from client farmers. If the vaccination campaigns were managed by the private veterinarians, it would undoubtedly increase their businesses. For this to happen, the government will have to rationalize its policies on vaccination and availability of vaccines based on accepted international standards, principles and experience. This would leave the government in the regulatory role for vaccination strategy for diseases with a public health aspect (brucellosis, anthrax and rabies) and quality assurance of all vaccines brought into the country by the licensed and registered private sector, supervised by the public veterinary services. 113. Most practicing veterinarians are still linked with the government and many VFUs are still situated in or near former government veterinary facilities. A private veterinarian doubling as a government vet still needs to obtain official sanction before he/she can charge money for services. The tax regime stifles private initiative and is one of the reasons why many opt to continue operating with “two caps”, i.e. both government and private. Exemption from import duty and VAT is normal in many countries that want to promote local livestock production and private veterinary practice. This would send a powerful message that the GoT is serious about supporting the development of private veterinary practice. A clear definition of the division of responsibilities for public and private veterinary services and a civil service policy reform are necessary elements for the development of an effective and efficiently operating national veterinary service, consisting of a public regulatory and a private clinical veterinary service part.

18 Anthrax, Foot and Mouth Diseases, Brucellosis, PPR, Rabies, NCD, Sheep pox, tuberculine for testing 34

Brucellosis Control (OSRO/TAJ/303/NOR, OSRO/TAJ/405/CAN, OSRO/TAJ/501/EC, OSRO/TAJ/805/EC) 3.1 Relevance 114. Brucellosis melitensis is an extremely debilitating zoonosis, leading to chronic human illness and disabilities. Its control in sheep and goats should be carried out primarily as a human health measure and secondly to increase animal production. After the collapse of the former system, many former Soviet republics have experienced a drastic increase in the incidence of brucellosis in both animals and people. 115. The project has piloted a “least cost maximum impact” approach, which is currently being copied in neighbouring countries. Serological evidence on the incidence of brucellosis in animals over the period 2003-2009 proves that this approach is effective, but also shows that there are still questions to be answered, which most probably are related to sufficiently high vaccination coverage, improvements in the cold chain and available manpower resources for an as complete and effective as possible vaccination campaign. 3.2 Effectiveness 116. The programme has been effective in terms of lowering the incidence of Brucellosis melitensis in small ruminants from 10% to less than 2% in some locations. In areas where the reduction in seroprevalence has been less dramatic, the vaccination rate was below 80%. This is seen as the minimum level of vaccination necessary for an effective campaign. 117. At some stage the brucellosis control programme needs to cover the whole country if it is to be truly effective. The sale and translocation of infected animals (e.g. through bride price, inheritance) and mixed grazing of vaccinated and non-vaccinated animals can be sources of a new spread of infection. 118. The programme is jointly managed by both FAO and SVI, which have developed a cordial working relationship. It is important to involve the TVA so it can eventually take over the role currently played by the FAO in assisting the SVI in planning and executing the campaigns. 3.3 Efficiency 119. For planning purposes it is important to have a good idea on existing livestock numbers in the various areas. There tends to be serious under-reporting of animal numbers. This leads to inefficiencies in planning and executing vaccination campaigns and discrepancies between the number of animals planned for and actually vaccinated. 120. As with the private veterinary services programme, the brucellosis programme has operated with a succession of short term projects. This could have led to inefficiencies if campaigns had been missed due to shortage of funds. Fortunately, FAO staff have been sufficiently trusted by the private veterinarians, who have done the work in a timely fashion, agreeing that payment could come later. 3.4 Impact 121. The most important impact indicator is the fall in the incidence of brucellosis in humans. There is evidence of a decline in the number of new cases reported in the 8 districts in the Rasht Valley, where the brucellosis control programme started first. Sero-surveillance in animals shows an overall decrease in infection in the locations where the projects have been operational. . 3.5 Sustainability 122. The sustainability of brucellosis control requires continuation of the programme for at least five more years, especially to expand it to areas not yet covered. This should include locations were the known incidence of the disease is lower than in Khatlon, where the programme started. If the incidence of brucellosis has been sufficiently reduced, the strategy could change to 35

‘test and slaughter’. In this case funds would be required to pay for testing and the payment of compensation to farmers or the construction of a specialized plant that could process sero-positive animals. 123. It is unlikely that the government budget will ever be sufficient to buy enough vaccine to cover the whole country. Cost sharing and cost recovery mechanisms should be developed so that in future more animals can be vaccinated within the same government budget allocation. A recent study shows that farmers would be prepared to pay for brucellosis eye drop vaccination. 124. The role of Tajikistan’s neighbouring countries in the control of brucellosis infection is critical. Regional agreements on the control strategies should be developed, particularly relating to the transboundary movement of animals. FAO is in a unique position to promote this as it is working in Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and will soon start providing TA to a WB/EU-funded veterinary programme in Kyrgyzstan. Preparedness for and Control of New and Emerging Diseases (PPR, HPAI) (GTFS/INT/907/ITA, TCP/TAJ/3002, OSRO/TAJ/701/WBK) 4.1 Relevance 125. These projects have all been extremely relevant for the development of the veterinary field and services in Tajikistan. They have been a driver for restructuring, investment and capacity building in the veterinary field. Staff were trained, contingency plans prepared, laboratory diagnostic capacity improved and international OIE standards have been adopted within the national system. The projects have opened up new avenues for regional collaboration. The experts involved with these projects have been instrumental in developing more interaction between the various national public veterinary services and familiarity and application of internationally agreed upon standards for brucellosis control, PPR control and HPAI preparedness and awareness. 4.2 Effectiveness 126. In its first year, project GTFS/INT/907/ITA worked towards OIE “freedom from rinderpest disease” status, which was verified. Then it started to work on PPR control and established a situation baseline before starting control measures. It created capacity for regular monitoring and response in case of new outbreaks. Although the incidence of the disease has decreased dramatically since the vaccination campaigns started, there are likely to be outbreaks that may go unnoticed if the cause of mortality is misdiagnosed as Pasteurellosis, which has happened before. PPR has been reduced as the result of the FAO work but has not been eradicated. Nonetheless the project introduced vaccination as a control measure and provided knowledge and diagnostic capacity to keep PPR under control. It is not clear from available information, whether SVI is capable to import sufficient PPR vaccine and organize an effective vaccination campaign to prevent future outbreaks and stop the spread of PPR. 127. The effectiveness of the HPAI projects has not been tested as there have been no outbreaks of the disease in Tajikistan to date. Simulation exercises can only test the effectiveness to a certain extent. A simulation exercise is reportedly planned for September 2009. 4.3 Efficiency 128. These projects have included a component to improve laboratory capacity. This is a laudable initiative and very necessary, but has been carried out in a haphazard fashion. Most of the investment in laboratories under the HPAI programme was for laboratories already established in the Foot and Mouth Disease Institute rather than to the Veterinary Laboratory, where major reconstruction has also been taking place, but with insufficient funds to complete the work. 129. There does not seem to have been an overall plan to develop the national veterinary diagnostic capacity, which would have helped establish a veterinary diagnostic system in the 36 country. The current 75 veterinary laboratories (52 in markets) are far more than the country needs or can afford. 130. Inaccurate statistics on animal numbers make efficient planning of vaccination campaigns difficult and lead to surplus vaccine in one place and inadequate supply in others, with the risk of spoilage. The efficiency of the system would be improved by the establishment of a database to monitor the movement of vaccines against zoonosis and places of storage. Accurate reporting of animals vaccinated would help keep track of the movement of vaccine and overall planning and control. The management of the other vaccines would most probably be more effectively and efficiently handled by the private sector than the government. 4.4 Impact 131. These projects have had impact at the level of improvement of laboratory infrastructure, equipment availability and training of laboratory staff. Farmers have received some information on HPAI and PPR and should be better able to protect themselves better against HPAI and their livestock against PPR, if there were sufficient PPR vaccine in country. Veterinarians have received training and some benefited from contract work for HPAI surveillance work and PPR contract vaccination. All these investments in infrastructure, equipment and human resources have however not lead to the setting up of a routine epidemiological surveillance system for PPR, HPAI and other diseases in the country and sufficient availability of PPR vaccine. Therefore the post-project impact of the investments in HPAI and PPR preparedness will be limited. 4.5 Sustainability 132. The state budget will not be able to maintain activities under these projects, which will continue to rely largely on outside funding. A better idea of the future requirement for veterinary diagnostic capacity and a plan for veterinary diagnostic laboratory development would help focus investment where it is most needed. It seems that at the moment there is the risk that laboratories are developing diagnostic capacity for the same diseases. 133. An important issue relating to all essential vaccinations is a system of cost recovery. The current quantity of vaccines available is not enough to achieve satisfactory vaccination coverage. A system of purchase, distribution and payment should be developed. The current practice of individuals and companies taking their own initiative to import vaccines is undesirable and potentially dangerous. 134. Preparedness to respond to an HPAI outbreak is nowadays increasingly dependant on a system of compensation funds. Discussion on a compensation fund in Tajikistan has thus far been inconclusive. This is unfortunate as such a fund could be the means of creating more sustainability in the control and prevention of HPAI and possibly other diseases such as Newcastle disease. This would be an ideal construction for a public/private partnership. Pasture Management and Forage Production (OSRO/TAJ/605/EC Livestock Production and Pasture Rehabilitation) 5.1 Relevance 135. The previous system of controlling and managing pastures is no longer adequate for the current situation with many individual livestock owners. There is a need to develop new pasture management and access policies and strategies. The FAO project strategy of introducing legume seed (sainfoin and lucerne) into the existing natural vegetation without a clear idea of how the grazing land will be used or managed does not seem to be very relevant to future sustainable use. 5.2 Effectiveness 136. The interventions observed in the field do not seem capable of improving soil fertility or the quality of the hay or grazing to any significant extent. The work observed did not appear to have led to any demonstrable improvement. 37

137. The land sown with sainfoin and lucerne for seed production had very high infestation of weeds and a rather poor level of management. Assuming that a seed crop would be harvested, the mechanisms for subsequent seed distribution are confused. It was unclear why 10% of the forage crop seed harvested should be sold through the local VFU and the rest to be given to a seed bank to be redistributed to the ‘needy’. It is unlikely that such an activity will have a lasting beneficial effect on the use and availability of forage seeds. 138. Forage seed production is important, but management through village development groups does not necessarily seem to be the most effective way to develop a sustainable production system. It would have been better if the project had identified interested and skilful individual farmers interested in producing good quality seed on contract for an agreed price. 5.3 Efficiency 139. This project suffered from an extremely slow start up. Only after the arrival of the present international project manager and his national coordinator in 2008 did implementation pick up. 140. The project has a number of design features which make it rather inefficient. Project activities are implemented in only one village in each jamoat, which has meant that project activities are widely scattered and logistically difficult to support and monitor. 141. Instead of concentrating the pasture improvement work in locations known to have serious problems of degradation, it was decided to confine project activity to 8 widely dispersed sites scattered over the Khatlon region. The plots were not based on any identified need for forage seed in any particular community. It is likely that these plots will serve as more of a demonstration rather than being an important source of forage seed for the village. 5.4 Impact 142. It is questionable whether it will have any impact in the long run. 5.5 Sustainability 143. Improvements in pasture management will only have an effect when there are mechanisms to protect the improvements against indiscriminate use by other parties. At the moment access to pastures, grazing rights and the management of grazing land are not well defined and thus effective technical pasture improvement measures are rather premature. It might be better for FAO to concentrate on assisting the GoT to review the present situation and help to develop and design policy, strategy and a legislative framework that establishes the rightful users of pasturage and meadows and protects their rights. Without this, technical interventions to improve management are unlikely to be very useful. 144. Seed production is a private good and should be promoted as such, linked into systems for quality control and the introduction of higher yielding varieties. The VDC can play a role in managing a forage promotion fund, but should not itself become engaged in seed production. Livestock-related Input Distribution Programmes Distribution of seeds, minerals, vitamins, stock feed, vaccines (OSRO/TAJ/801/SWE, OSRO/TAJ/802/EC, OSRO/TAJ/804/SWI) 6.1 Relevance 145. To be relevant, emergency interventions related to livestock should be in response to the threat of mortality if no action is taken. In practice, this means emergency vaccinations in the case of outbreaks of lethal diseases or the provision of feed and fodder to tide animals over a period of drought until there is again enough grazing and or feed available. 38

146. The distribution of minerals and vitamins does not save animals’ lives. The distribution of fodder seed is a medium-term solution, which might even compete for limited land with human food crops where access to irrigated land is limited for the poor families. 147. Vaccination for FMD cannot be justified as an emergency measure in the absence of diagnosis of the disease. Vaccinations against PPR in sheep and goats and Newcastle Disease in poultry are some examples of vaccinations that do have an emergency justification because without immediate vaccination, large numbers of animals may die. It should be taken into account that such vaccination campaigns are a potential source of revenue for the local private vets and should only be executed with and through these local private veterinarians. 6.2 Effectiveness 148. It is hard to establish what happened to the distributed vitamins and minerals. Implementing partners indicated that they were used. It is unclear, however, how they were used if poor farmers had no grain or oil seed cake with which to mix it to feed their animals. 149. Post-distribution monitoring reports indicate that 93% of the beneficiaries planted the fodder seeds. However, in one of the villages visited, the evaluation team tried to find the plots of sanfoin and were eventually shown a field of 25 meter by 1 km in which the sainfoin seed had been under-sown in a crop of flax (linseed). This would produce its first hay crop only in 2010. This could hardly be described as an emergency measure to meet an immediate need for fodder at short notice. Also, because of the plentiful rainfall in 2009 there is an abundance of fodder of all kinds everywhere and in fact more than the capacity of the local population to harvest it in a timely fashion. 150. In the case of the projects where stock feed was distributed, a fixed amount per beneficiary was distributed, irrespective of the number of animals any individual owned. In any case, the quantity provided was not enough to carry the animal through the whole winter. 151. Of more potential use in educating farmers to improve the quality of their livestock husbandry has been the extension training and pamphlets that accompanied the distribution. Villagers spoken to were better informed about the need for vaccination, proper feeding etc. If the information and training took place in locations where such inputs are already available from the local VFUs or agro-shops the training should have had a positive effect not only on livestock production but on both veterinary and agro-shop business. If neither vaccines nor other useful livestock inputs are available in the locality, it will have made little difference. 152. Training has been contracted out to local service providers (e.g. the NGO ATAC). It also includes the formation and training of women’s milk processing groups which follows a farmer field school (FFS) concept. For the other elements (pasture management and fodder production) a more traditional approach of training and information sessions has been followed. 6.3 Efficiency 153. It is very difficult to procure such inputs and deliver them in a timely fashion to the beneficiaries. Seed reportedly arrived too late or after farmers had already sown all their land. In future it might be better to work out a system whereby representatives of the agricultural input supplies networks are contracted to supply specified items and let farmers collect their package(s) against a voucher. 6.4 Impact 154. The direct impact of this type of distribution on preventing livestock mortality has almost certainly been very low. However, it has introduced villagers to technologies that were new to them. The training and extension brochures could well have had more effect and a longer-term impact. 39

6.5 Sustainability 155. Emergency distribution of inputs at no cost is by definition not sustainable. Sustained availability of these items can be achieved through supporting the local emerging agro-input supply businesses and through support for seed producers’ association. Distribution of Animals to the Poor (OSRO/TAJ605/EC Livestock Production and Pasture Rehabilitation) 7.1 Relevance 156. Livestock are an important asset with which people can gain food security, especially in areas where crop production is unreliable. The distribution of small, fast breeding livestock such as poultry (chickens, turkeys and ducks) or rabbits can quickly help poor families produce more food or generate cash income. The distribution of sheep or cattle is less relevant to assisting a poor family in distress. Such large animals require high maintenance, especially in the winter, and returns are delayed to when offspring can be sold, although there may be interim benefits from milk and manure. However, when funding is limited it is better to concentrate on small livestock such as poultry, rabbits or even milking goats, when providing assistance to poor rural families. 7.2 Effectiveness 157. The projects distributed chickens and sheep. The chickens selected were commercial layers, which were distributed without a cockerel, in contrast to what was reportedly suggested by project staff. This meant that if the beneficiaries (mainly female-headed households) wanted to produce chicks, they will have to use a local cockerel. As such types of layers have been bred not to brood, the eggs would have to be hatched under a local chicken or turkey. However, the chickens were given out with a supply of layers’ mash, giving an immediate addition to the family diet in the form of eggs and possibly some income. 158. The Hissar sheep, also distributed to female-headed households, were a valuable long- term asset but only generate income after two years, at the earliest. The project demanded that the first two lambs were given away to a poor neighbour. This means that these large mutton sheep will need to be fed and maintained through two winters before providing any direct benefit to the poor household and will provide no immediate contribution towards poverty alleviation. 7.3 Efficiency 159. The FAO procedures introduced an element of inefficiency in the case of the sheep procurement. It might have been better to buy local sheep from the same area but this was impossible due to tender requirements. Another lot had to be rejected because they tested positive for brucellosis. It was finally decided to buy Hissar sheep from a government breeding farm. 160. The chickens were bought from a commercial outlet, just like the fodder and this process was very efficient. The layers were being kept as ordinary village hens would be kept, which was inappropriate for bird capable to lay 300 eggs or more per year under appropriate conditions. It would have been better if the project had also provided support for the construction of improved chicken coops to go with the hens. The high mortality experienced over the winter is an indication that some of the women were not ready and/or prepared to keep this type of better quality chicken. A hardier type of chicken would be more appropriate to village conditions and experience fewer losses. 7.4 Impact 161. The impact of the layers introduced is likely to be short-lived, considering the high mortality over winter and the inability of farmers to multiply them in the absence of cockerels of the same breed. The women beneficiaries are unlikely to be able to afford to buy replacement stock each year. 40

162. In some cases, the distribution of the Hissar sheep led to envy and possible further isolation in their society of the poor families who received them. It is important that it is the community decides not only who will be the first beneficiaries but also to whom second or third generations of animals are passed on. 7.5 Sustainability 163. Despite their high maintenance there is little doubt that the sheep are seen as a valuable asset and will be kept well. As such the introduction of this heavy mutton type sheep will now continue within the villages where they have been distributed. It is likely that male offspring will be kept and used as breeding rams by some people, possibly to improve their local animals. If the burden of maintaining them is too heavy, then the beneficiaries may sell them to wealthier neighbours. 164. The poultry activity as designed and executed is not sustainable and it is more than likely that after a second winter, when the birds stop laying eggs the families will choose to eat them. Without a suitable cockerel, they will produce no purebred chicks and that will be the end of these layers in the project villages.

C. SEEDS AND OTHER AGRICULTURAL EMERGENCY INPUTS Emergency Input (seed and fertiliser) Distributions a) Background and context 165. Under the Soviet command economy, wheat and other grains were mainly supplied from Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. This integrated regional economy ended with the collapse of the USSR and since independence, agriculture in Tajikistan has become more diversified. Increasing the country’s capability to produce its own supply of high quality seed is therefore required for crops such as wheat, potato, pulses, forage legumes, oil crops and vegetables. 166. Unfortunately, progress in this area has been slow. The seed production system is still largely characterized by varieties, standards and procedures inherited from the Soviet Union. The certification system in particular does not function. Few of the wheat varieties being used in emergency and development programmes by GoT, the NGOs or UN agencies have been officially released in the country. Organisations distributing seed (including FAO) rely upon ad hoc permission by the MoA to release imported seed from customs. 167. A few seed farms are still operating, most of which are under State control, but they do not satisfy national demand and are not operating efficiently. The MoA regularly procure seed from abroad, e.g. 742 mt and 1,298 mt of wheat seed were procured from Russia in 2008 and 2009, respectively. 168. Tajikistan also needs to introduce and disseminate new varieties that will result in better quality of the end product, such as high yielding rust resistant wheat 19 with good bread making qualities and cotton with better lint quality. 20 169. Marketing agricultural inputs is in its infancy. There have been a few interventions by international and local NGOs to set up agro-shops in their areas of operation. At the national level, USAID has supported the creation of the Agribusiness Association of Tajikistan (AAT) while Sida has helped establish the Seed Producers Association of Tajikistan (SPAT).

19 It should be noted that a particularly virulent strain of stem rust – Ug99 that has spead from Africa through the Middle East, was observed in Iran in 2008 and it is thought to be only a matter of time before it reaches Afghanistan, Central Asia and the Indian sub-continent. 20 Project document for TCP/INT/3102. 41 b) Interventions 170. The main project financing seed and fertiliser distribution during the period covered by the evaluation has been the WB-funded Emergency Food Security and Seed Import Project (EFSSIP - UTF/TAJ/004/TAJ). The project was implemented between September 2008 and July 2009, at a cost of USD5 ml. Other interventions in the area of seed and fertilizer distribution are all rather small components of more complex projects. The main example is project OSRO/TAJ/301/SWE which supported 4,100 female-headed households with 2,173 kg of vegetable seeds, 200 tonnes of potato seed and 4,100 tonnes of mineral fertilizer. OSRO/TAJ/602/CAN also distributed seeds and fertilizers to a small number of farmers. But these interventions were relatively small and completed several years ago. The evaluation did not have access to further information about these interventions. This section therefore focuses on the EFSSIP project. 171. Like some other emergency projects implemented by FAO, the EFSSIP was initiated in response to the harsh winter in 2007-2008, which was accompanied by drought that resulted in reduced cereal production. At the same time, Tajikistan was suffering from the sharp increase and volatility of global food prices. A food security assessment conducted jointly by WFP, UNICEF and FAO in April/May 2008 concluded that 7 to 9% of all households (and 17% of severely food insecure households) lacked wheat seeds 21 . Khatlon and the Rasht Valley were identified as severely food insecure and selected to be the foci of assistance under EFSSIP. The project has three components: a) Component A – Distribution of wheat seed and fertiliser to 70,000 food insecure households in selected districts in Khatlon. b) Component B – Distribution of a package of veterinary services (vaccinations and anti-worm treatments) and concentrates to food insecure households in selected districts in the Rasht Valley. It was later decided to change this component to the provision of lucerne (alfalfa) seed and fertiliser to 7,000 beneficiary households. Assistance was also extended to another 10,000 beneficiaries who received inputs (seeds and fertilizer) to produce maize on 0.1 ha per household. c) Component C – Project management. 172. The original project objective was to: “increase domestic food production and reduce the loss of livestock to help at least 28,000 of the poorest households in a timely manner to reduce the negative impact of high and volatile food prices.” During negotiations in July-August 2008, the GoT requested that local authorities manage the selection of beneficiaries and the distribution of project inputs, rather than NGOs as proposed by FAO. The local government authorities themselves were to cover the relevant distribution costs. GoT also asked that local NGOs be used to monitor beneficiary selection rather than international NGOs, as was originally intended. The resultant cost savings could then be used to increase the number of beneficiaries to approximately 77,000. c) Relevance and design issues 173. The project took three months to negotiate, from June to end of August 2008. While the issue of whether to distribute free seed in a one-off emergency project was debated, the MoU between the GoT and FAO was the main point of discussion, in particular the percentage of funds to be utilized by the FAO PCO to implement the project (finally set at 8%).

21 Emergency Food Security Assessment in Rural Areas of Tajikistan - Joint Food Security, Livelihoods, Agriculture and Nutrition Assessment - WFP, FAO, UNICEF, Government of Tajikistan – April/May 2008. Interestingly, the same food security assessment concluded that 28% of the severely food insecure households lacked potato seed, i.e. a larger share than for wheat seed, but the EFSSIP project has so far not distributed any potato seed. 42

174. Another difficulty arose about who should select the beneficiaries and who should distribute the goods. Finally it was agreed that FAO would deliver the goods to the jamoat (sub- district) authorities. The jamoat officials and rais-e-mahala (village heads) would establish beneficiary lists under the supervision of the World Bank and supervise distribution. FAO’s concerns that this might result in an unfair distribution were relieved somewhat when a condition was added that two independent NGOs would be selected to verify that beneficiary lists were drafted in accordance with selection criteria, that the listed beneficiaries actually received the goods, that they had sown the seed and that it was growing well. This would be carried out through three successive surveys. The sample varied according to the nature of the different components. It was largest for component A (15%, i.e. 5% in each of the three surveys). 175. In the end, the MoU was signed by the FAO coordinator on 1 st September 2008, a few hours before her departure from the country. 176. Towards end of August, FAO became concerned that there would not be enough time for implementation before the planting season, and requested that its responsibilities for project implementation be qualified in the following way: “The Recipient (government), aware of the possible delays, exonerates FAO of all responsibility, including yields and post evaluations of the project, in case, notwithstanding FAO’s timely efforts, the inputs are delivered or distributed beyond the deadlines foreseen in the Emergency Project Paper on a Grant to the Republic of Tajikistan for the Emergency Food Security and Seed Import Project dated 27 May 2008. Furthermore, the recipient will hold FAO harmless for any eventual damage associated with late delivery and/or distribution of the inputs.” (Memorandum of Agreement UTF/TAJ/004/TAJ. Article II, para. 2.2) 177. The relevance of the project is probably its weakest point. In spite of the preceding harsh winter, most farmers found wheat seed to plant, as witnessed by the massive acreage planted in wheat during 2008/2009 (125,000 ha) on both irrigated and rain-fed land. As is often the case, coping strategies (particularly seed exchange within communities) were underestimated. Good snow and rainfall during the winter of 2008/2009 followed by exceptional rainfall in the spring of 2009 have ensured a very productive wheat crop. 178. In fact, the project was not perceived locally, by either farmers or jamoat officials, as meeting a shortage of seed per se but rather as introducing new improved varieties. Farmers met by the evaluation team routinely assessed the project in this light. Its success has been judged on the performance of the distributed wheat varieties when measured against the performance of farmers’ own varieties. 179. Little information was available on the performance of some of the distributed wheat varieties before the project, as the variety list was approved by the MoA without extensive in- country testing. This highlights a serious technical weakness of the project design. It is simply not good practice to approve large scale distributions of seed of varieties which have not been tested as being suitable for the locations and environment to which they are being introduced, even in an emergency. 180. Even if one concedes that the poorest segment of rural society was in need of seed (as asserted in the WFP/FAO food security assessment), the distribution of free seed and fertilizer in a one-off emergency operation was not a sustainable response. Indeed it was perceived locally as a return to Soviet-style centrally-controlled economics, and thus contradicted the position that both the WB and FAO have been promoting for years to support the privatization and commercialization of agricultural services and input supply in Tajikistan. 181. FAO has successfully pursued this approach in the case of veterinary. There is no reason to believe that a similar commercial and cost-recovery approach would not work in the case of agricultural inputs and supplies. 43

182. Finally, the distribution of hybrid maize seed in the spring 2009 is very questionable on the grounds of sustainability. Provided the hybrid maize seed (PR39F58 imported from Pioneer- Austria) is distributed to farmers with good land, access to ample irrigation water and adequate fertilizer, it could well produce very high yields. However, providing most vulnerable beneficiaries with ‘hybrid’ maize seed contradicts the project objective as this will be a ‘one off’ result. There is no facility for this ‘hybrid’ seed to be reproduced in Tajikistan and grain produced from the crop cannot be re-planted with any expectation of achieving the same results. d) Efficiency 183. If relevance was the weakest part of the project, efficiency in project implementation has been its strongest point. Close coordination between the MoA and FAO project staff was maintained throughout and rapid and sensible logistical decisions were taken. The long negotiations between FAO and MoA in July and August allowed FAO to prepare tender documents that were issued very quickly for component A (wheat seed and urea). 184. As a result, the project delivered its first package of inputs in the late autumn planting season, i.e. in early November (Table 4), i.e. slightly over two months after the signature of the MoU. FAO emergency projects typically take a minimum of three months to deliver inputs to farmers so this was quite fast. The EFSSIP was therefore very successful from the point of view of timeliness in implementation. Only in a few villages was the distribution delayed by jamoat officials to December or January. This was mainly in higher altitude villages due to lack of time and /or interest from farmers whose seed arrived too late for autumn sowing. 185. Transport became an issue for the urea (silitra) distribution during the winter, especially for jamoats located in highlands such as Baljovan and Khovaling. However, this delay was not a serious problem since nitrogen fertiliser is best applied as a spring top dressing. 186. The project was also cost-effective. Under the advice of the GoT, the goods were distributed by jamoat officials and rais-e-mahala without charge 22 . Cost calculations indicate that the packages of seed and fertiliser were worth $US 36.95 per beneficiary household for component A, $US 21.95 per beneficiary household for component B and $US 33.44 per beneficiary household for component A extension. However, it must be pointed out that about 5% of all inputs – i.e. about $US 142,000 – were used to pay for storage and transport costs incurred locally by the jamoats. Since FAO covered transport costs only up to jamoat centres, villages located far away from a centre had to incur greater transport costs and therefore beneficiaries tended to receive less per household than those located close to the centres. 187. The project contracted two national NGOs to monitor the distribution of inputs and the state of the wheat crop after planting, a very positive step. However, appropriate monitoring forms were not developed for the NGOs until monitoring had actually started. In some cases, the NGOs had already designed their own forms which they were then told to change. This led to some confusion and frustration.

22 NGOs typically distribute such inputs for a fee. 44

Table 4: Inputs Procurement and Delivery Item Volume Source Tenders Delivery to Distribution Cost Nb of Finalized Dushanbe Benefi- ciaries Component A (Khatlon)

Russian wheat $916,200 varieties - First 19 (Karsnodar 99, 765 mt Tajikistan Sep 2008 Oct 27, 2008 Districts: Starshina, Tanya, Oct 27-Nov (1,200 $/mt) Yasaul) 11, 2008

- 3 jamoats $735,050 71,353 of Fakhor + Turkish wheat 2 invalid variety (Konya 500 mt Turkey Sep 2008 Oct 29, 2008 societies: (1,470 $/MT Nov 27, 2002) including 2008 transport)

Urea 2102 mt Afghanistan Sep 2008 Nov 11-27, Dec 3-16, $1,193,936 72,864 2008 2008 (568 $/mt) Component B (Rasht Valley) Urea 70 mt Afghanistan March 30, Mar 31-Apr 6, $39,760 2009 2009 Super Phosphate 210 mt Pakistan Feb 5, 2009 March 26, $84,000 (SSP) 2009 (300 $/mt + April 10-12, 100 $/mt for 7,222 2009 transport) Alfalfa Seed 13 mt Tajikistan Mar 20, 2009 Mar 31, 2009 $74,520 (5,732 $/mt?) Component A extension (Khatlon) $115,609

Maize seed 30 mt Austria May 15, 2009 June 2009 (3,159 $/mt + 695 $/mt transport) June-July estimate: Super Phosphate 200 mt Pakistan May 18, 2009 June 2009 2009? $82,000 10,000 (SSP) Potassium Chloride 100 mt Pakistan May 18, 2009 June 2009 $80,000 Urea 100 mt Afghanistan May 17, 2009 June 2009 $56,800 approx. Total 90,000 e) Appropriateness of beneficiary selection 188. Beneficiary selection was a hurried process, delegated entirely to the jamoats and village chiefs. While NGOs were contracted to verify 5% of the lists made by local officials, verification was interrupted by the start of distribution in the case of component A. In only a few instances was it possible to change defective lists before distribution. The process of checking lists was 45 sometimes hampered by a lack of communication between the NGOs and the jamoats .23 The jamoats had little time or resources to allocate to the distribution and sometimes they resented being monitored. An additional irritation for the jamoat officials was that the NGOs were paid to do their work whilst the district officials were not. 189. The NGOs found that an overwhelming majority of potential beneficiaries (80% to 90%) fit the selection criteria. This being said, those criteria were rather vague since they did not define precisely who should be considered as “vulnerable”. The stated criteria were: i) vulnerable households with 3 or more children under 5 years old; “In Kirov Jamoat, Octyabr village, the ii) vulnerable households headed by females; households that received wheat seeds did iii) availability of more than 0.1 ha of land; and not get the fertilizer, given to people iv) minimum livestock of either 1 cow or 2 small who did not receive wheat seed. This ruminants (for Component B) arrangement was agreed between the people and the village chief. People are 190. As observed by the evaluation team, the result was in fact a happy because they are all equal.” rather egalitarian distribution. The project supported small to average farmers, often excluding the richer farmers in the area. Sometimes the inputs were given to all farmers in a village by decreasing the amount given to each household, in order to avoid dispute. 191. In component A, some wheat seed and urea were kept by jamoat officials and village chiefs. This is well documented thanks to the work of the Sharvand NGO. Based on NGO reports, the evaluation team estimates that about 25 MT of wheat and 50 MT of urea were kept by jamoat officials and village chiefs, i.e. some 2% of delivered goods. FAO project staff are reviewing available documentation and are expected to come up with a more precise estimate of the quantities involved. 192. There was little dissatisfaction among beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of component A. The mission met a number of non-beneficiaries. Some were resentful about not being selected as beneficiaries. However, generally the better-off have accepted the rationale that they have more resources than those who received the free inputs. The people who received only part of their normal entitlement (17.5 kg of wheat and 30 kg of urea) because the jamoat officials or village chiefs had kept some back were philosophical about it, explaining that this sort of thing is to be expected. In some cases they did not want to talk to the NGO monitors because they feared that the local officials might exclude them from future distributions. 193. Beneficiary lists were better prepared for the later distributions (component B, B Extension), after a distribution review in January 2009. Safeguards were introduced such as pre- packing of individual HH-entitlements. The distributions in 2009 also covered fewer jamoats than in 2008. Post distribution monitoring of August 2009 concluded that almost 100% of beneficiaries received their full entitlement. 194. Monitoring of beneficiary selection by an independent NGO is considered a good practice, particularly where distribution has been carried out by local government officials. However, such independent verification should be given sufficient time for the verification of beneficiary lists (one month) and for adjusting any lists that are found to be flawed (another month). This amount of time was simply not available in component A. FAO should also have sent observers / monitors to participate in the distribution, as is being done for the extension of component A (maize seed).

23 The lists were supposed to go to from the jamoats to the WB then to FAO and finally to the NGO. In practice many jamoats directly gave the lists to the NGO in a spirit of good cooperation. However, some jamoat officials resented being monitored by an NGO. 46 f) Impact on beneficiaries 195. The wheat seed donated by the project represented about 2.5% of all wheat seed planted in the autumn of 2008 (255,000 ha) and 9.5% of seed planted on “presidential plots” (66,000 ha). 196. Approximately 20% of the beneficiaries had already sown all their household and presidential land (or what they could afford to cultivate) by the time the FAO wheat seed was distributed. They mainly opted to sow the FAO seed on Dehqan farms if land was still available there, or in the following spring. Sowing the seed on Dehqan farms was likely to result in poor yields, while sowing it is spring resulted in little or no yield as the distributed seed was of winter wheat varieties that required vernalisation. 197. The distributed varieties (Figure 1) were of two different origins: Russian varieties produced and procured in Tajikistan (Krasnodar 99, Starshina, Tanya and Yasaul), and CIMMYT varieties procured in Turkey (Konya 2002). 198. All of the distributed varieties were considered by farmers to be less susceptible Figure 1 : to lodging than local varieties due to their Varieties of Wheat Distributed under EFSSIP (Autumn 2008) short straw. Heavy rainfall as late as May Konya 2002 and even into June 2009 caused a lot of 39% lodging in the older, longer stemmed Krasnodar 99 varieties. However, the shorter stem wheat 9% was also more easily overwhelmed by weed competition than the older varieties, as Starshina observed by the evaluation team. Weeds are 11% a very serious problem in wheat cultivation

Yasaul in Tajikistan, due to a lack of crop rotation Tanya 31% and unclean seed. 10% 199. The fact that the FAO seed was relatively well cleaned may have helped in this regard. According to superintendent’s reports, most lots had an acceptable content of “other seed” (see Table 5). However, the variety Tanya did not meet international standards and AGPS refused to technically clear it. Tanya was nevertheless distributed by FAO and the Government, under the explicit responsibility of the MoA which considered the seed clean enough. Beneficiaries received 18.5 kg each instead of 17.5 kg to compensate for the lower quality, and were advised to clean the seed by hand. 200. In the view of the evaluation mission and based on its limited field observation, the distribution of Tanya did not add an unbearable weed seed burden to fields that are already infested with all sorts of weeds. However, the fact that seed was distributed without the appropriate technical clearance raises an issue of principle. What is the purpose of asking for technical clearance if, when it is declined, it is ignored and the goods are distributed anyway? Another important issue of principle is: can FAO be associated with the distribution of seed of poor quality, even if this quality is acceptable by local standards? The evaluation feels that FAO should provide solutions to the weed problem, rather than perpetuating it. 47

Table 5: Content of Seed Other than Wheat in Distributed Varieties Other Seed Content Varieties as per SGS (international) State Seed Control Inspection (national) Convolvulus arvensis: 11/kg Yasaul 15/kg Galium spp. 2/kg Convolvulus arvensis: 33/kg Tanya Galium sp. 3/kg 46/kg Scandix sp. 1/kg Avena fatua: 4/kg Starshina 17/kg Galium sp.: 6/kg Krasnodar 99 Medicago stativa: 3/kg 0/kg Konya 2002 Convolvulus arvensis: 2/kg n.a.

201. From a varietal standpoint 24 , all distributed varieties seemed to perform generally on a par with local varieties, sometimes producing slightly less or slightly more depending on the district. That project seeds achieved on average only about the same results as non-project seeds may be a result of the timing of distribution. Non-beneficiaries mainly planted their seeds at the optimum planting time in October while beneficiaries planted their seeds only in November and December. Nevertheless, Konya 2002 (Turkish variety originating from the CIMMYT programme) was much appreciated by those farmers who received it, who plan to keep the seed and/or sell or exchange it for grain with their neighbours, while Krasnodar and Tanya are awn-less varieties 25 , which make them more vulnerable to bird damage than awned local wheat. This is particularly true of the early maturing Tanya. As well as grain losses, this causes extra labour and expense at harvest time to guard against birds. 202. The evaluation concludes that varieties of CIMMYT origin such as Konya 2002 may have a greater potential to help raise yields in Tajikistan than the varieties of Russian origin, which are already well-known and commonly cultivated in Tajikistan. Varieties selected from CIMMYT material suited to different local conditions have been very successfully used by FAO in Afghanistan for the last twenty years. FAO in Afghanistan has tested different lines over a wide variety of environments before selecting particular lines for multiplication through a network of contracted farmers and farmers groups. Interestingly, the use of some of these CIMMYT selections released and multiplied successfully in Afghanistan under very similar climatic and soil conditions was proposed by FAO for Tajikistan. But, the MoA did not agree to importing varieties until they had been tested in Tajikistan, a technically correct decision. The way forward is therefore to test CIMMYT and other genetic material in Tajikistan for comparison with local as well as Russian varieties. 203. The fertilizer distributed by the project (mainly urea, but also super phosphate and potassium chloride) was much appreciated by beneficiaries, who not only used it on their wheat crop but also on their other crops (e.g. potato, vegetables).

24 These observations are based on the mission’s direct observations and should be complemented with the result of an impact assessment currently ongoing. 25 Awns are the long spines or “beard” on the ears of wheat. 48 g) Effects of free seed distribution on national seed production and markets 204. The project drew criticism from NGOs (Winrock International, Save the Children Fund and ACTED) that claim to set up more sustainable commercial supply lines for farming inputs. An evaluation report written by the World Bank 26 analysed the issue in some depth and identified three broad areas of concern: i) emergency seed aid was a disincentive to the development of sustainable markets for farm inputs; ii) the project had compromised seed production activities by other agencies; and iii) there was a general lack of coordination within EFSSIP. 205. The NGO operations are described in detail in the WB report. The present evaluation mission supports the WB’s views expressed in points 1 and 3 above. Point 1 is particularly problematic. The project stakeholders (WB, FAO and the GoT) have sent the wrong message to the farmers. When they should be telling farmers that good seed and fertiliser come at a cost and have a value, they gave the impression that these will continue to be provided free as was the case under the USSR. 206. However, the evaluation team considers that Point 2 above is debatable in reality because on the whole the various organisations’ programmes did not overlap geographically. SCF distributed seed free plus cash in a completely unsustainable fashion. The failure of Winrock to sell 600 mt of wheat seed to 400 small-scale farmers can hardly be blamed on FAO, as Tajik farmers are not in the habit of purchasing so much seed. 27 Strengthening National Seed Systems a) Description of interventions 207. FAO sought funding for several initiatives in this area and two projects were actually funded: i) OSRO/TAJ/201/SWE - Post-drought agricultural assistance to ex-combatants and rural poor ($US 468,998 - 2002-2004). This project contracted four farmers groups to produce 465 tonnes of improved wheat seed (Jagger and Stecklovidnaja varieties) and 1,100 kg of carrot seed. Part of the seed produced was distributed to additional households. The project also rehabilitated six irrigation pumps and 36.5 km of irrigation and drainage canals, and distributed wheat and vegetable seeds 28 to 1,330 and 1,670 households respectively. It also started the formation and support of rural women groups, an activity that would continue under 301/SWE and 404/CAN. ii) OSRO/TAJ/401/CAN - Establishment of disease-free seed potato production ($US 545,519 – 2004-2006). This project helped to establish in-country production of virus-free potato seed through meri-stem tissue culture using a laboratory belonging to the Institute of Plant Physiology and Genetics, with multiplication of micro-tubers carried out by contracted farmers in a number of locations (Jirgatal, Muminabad, Qonchi and Faizabad). Clones were also imported from the CIP programme and tested in laboratory conditions for a variety of characteristics (drought, salinity tolerance, early maturity) and multiplied by the project. The project did not manage to complete the full cycle of micro-tuber multiplication before it ended. However, it was followed up by project staff and contract farmers who formed an NGO called Tukhm-i-

26 Emergency Food Security and Seed Import Project - Preliminary Project Evaluation - June 8th, 2009. 27 Ibid. 28 Carrot, onion, turnip, kohlrabi, cabbage, pumpkin, tomato, cucumber and radish. 49

Parvar (TiP, meaning “seed production”) which has since continued to multiply and sell healthy potato seed. b) Relevance, efficiency and impact 208. These activities were relevant in that they tried (and in the case of the potato seed project, succeeded) to establish sustainable seed production in the country rather than relying on imports. Moreover, potato is the second staple crop in the country. 29 209. FAO did not pursue the potato project because funds could not be mobilised. FAO included in the UN Tajikistan Appeal for 2006 a project profile entitled “Highland Agriculture and Potato Crops” designed as Phase II of OSRO/TAJ/401/CAN. A full-fledged project proposal was further prepared in 2006 as a donor encouraged FAO to submit a project proposal. Despite significant efforts and the strong lobbying of the Government of Tajikistan, no funding could be secured for the project. In addition to this lack of funding, the coordinator at the time had doubts about the in-country capacity for such a project. To be fair, the original project included a number of sophisticated activities for which there was little justification, such as ELISA and PCR viral testing and antiserum production, but the fact that seed potato production has continued without FAO support indicates that the basic concept of the project was not only sound but viable.30 210. It is interesting to note that these interventions were started by a previous coordinator who was trying to use emergency funds to lay foundations for the rehabilitation of the agriculture sector in the country. They were later discontinued under another coordinator who preferred to revert to “classic” emergency projects involving mere procurement and distribution of seed and fertiliser. In the view of the evaluation mission, this was a retrograde step and contrary to the FAO mandate and to what would have been needed in Tajikistan, i.e. support to the country’s capacity to produce its own seed on a commercial basis. 211. The tissue culture laboratory in the Institute of Plant Physiology and Genetics is still working. The NGO Tukhm-i-Parvar continues to multiply micro-tubers from the Institute into healthy potato seed on 12 hectare of its own land and started to distribute seed to contract farmers for further multiplication in 2007. TiP sold its first seed to NGOs (GAA, OXFAM) in 2008 31 and has applied for its first variety release (Dusti). Both the Institute and the NGO are being supported through training and new potato clones by the CIP Tashkent office. 212. The mission could not travel to Jirgatal to assess the impact of the potato seed project at the farmers’ level. In other locations the project impact cannot be observed yet since TiP started to sell its seed only recently. However, the mission interviewed the NGOs who had used potato seed from TiP and verified that they were satisfied with the quality of the product. Regional Seed Activities in Central Asia involving Tajikistan 213. A small TCP is active in the region: TCP/INT/3102 - Strengthening seed supply in the ECO region, with specific emphasis on Central Asia ($US 445,422; 2006-2009). It operates under the aegis of the Economic Cooperation Organization ECO), Tehran, Iran 32 ; and is implemented by the CGIAR-Project Facilitating Unit (PFU) in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. There is significant involvement by ICARDA through the provision of TA. This project f
   

29 See for instance: Role of potato vs. wheat in the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus region before and after independence from USSR, Ibragimov, Z. and C. Carli, CIP-Liaison office for CGIAR-CAC, Tashkent, Uzbekistan.

30 In contrast, an earlier effort by project OSRO/TAJ/102/IRE during the 1990’s to create a “Potato Seed Fund” under the MoA proved unsustainable. The seed fund disappeared soon after project termination.

31 The FAO project OSRO/TAJ/602/CAN also procured 69 mt of potato seed from Tukhm-i-Parvar in 2008.

32 ECO comprises Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. 50

         Regional Seed Association (RSA) based in Ankara, Turkey. The association includes private and public-sector producers and covers all member countries of ECO. The project held three “Harmonization Workshops” in Islamabad (January 2007), Baku (May 2007) and Istanbul (June 2008) as well as a training course on “Seed Marketing and Promotion” (Istanbul, June 2007). Participants from Tajikistan included the Director of the Tajikistan Seed Producer Association established by Sida, who greatly appreciated the workshops. It is too early to analyse this project’s impact. Future Outlook 214. Since April 2009, the World Bank has been engaged in preparing a further extension of the EFSSIP which would involve an additional $US 6.25 million. WB have approached FAO with the proposal for another round of wheat seed and fertiliser distribution, this time for the autumn of 2009 and at a cost of $US 1.65 million. Other components of the project would be implemented by the WB-established PMU in the GoT Working Group with 8 members including one representative of the MoA. 215. FAO participated in the formulation of EFSSIP Phase 2 (May-June 2009) by way of one TCI staff. The FAO Project Coordination Office was also approached to discuss the project content during May 2009. However, the project document was only sent to TCE on 17 June 2009 and copied to FAO Dushanbe with a request to participate in a “Negotiation Meeting” with the GoT on 19 June 2009. The meeting did not go very well. At the time of writing, differences between the WB and FAO on the need for and implementation modalities of the project extension have not been reconciled. 216. The evaluation mission feels that, in a year when there is likely to be the best wheat harvest for a very long time, there is no justification for distributing any amount of free wheat seed in Tajikistan. Tajikistan needs support in rebuilding its own capacity to produce good quality seed on a sustainable commercial basis.

D. LOCUST CONTROL Background and Context 217. The country is mainly affected by the Moroccan Locust ( Dociostaurus maroccanus) in the south, along the borders with Afghanistan and Uzbekistan. The Italian Locust ( Calliptamus italicus ) is also found together with the Moroccan Locust in the north of the country, along the Uzbek and Kyrgyz borders. To a lesser extent, there have historically been problems with the Migratory Locust ( Locusta migratoria ) in the south. 218. Eggs hatch from mid-March to the end of April. This is the best period for destroying the insects as only a relatively small area needs to be treated. The wingless larvae go through 5 instars (development phases), culminating in adulthood when they become winged, highly mobile and fertile. Depending on the conditions of the vegetation in their hatching areas, they may move on to cultivated areas to find food at various stages of this development. Adults start to lay eggs in June, usually outside the cultivated areas, and usually die off in July. If conditions are favourable and control fails, they can further reproduce in July and even August. Swarms regularly move between neighbouring countries such as Afghanistan and Uzbekistan, making effective control operations a challenge. 219. The “Republican Anti-locust Service” was disbanded in February 2003. A Department on Locust Management was created in its place under the State Agency for Plant Protection, with three staff members. Following the 2007 outbreak, a stronger, dedicated unit was re-created as a parastatal, the State Republican Unitary Enterprise for Locust Control (GRUP “Locust Control”) in November 2007 with 17 staff members. The GoT is thinking of setting up a fully public unit for locust control and management to replace the GROUP. 51

Description of FAO’s Interventions 220. The collaboration of FAO with Tajikistan on locust control dates back to the large 1995 outbreak. A TCP project (TCP/TAJ/2902 – $US 338,465 – 2002-2004) provided 18,000 litres of various pesticides and introduced ULV formulations. 221. During the period under evaluation, the following two emergency projects were implemented thanks to CERF funding: • OSRO/TAJ/702/CHA - Emergency Assistance for food security and locust control in Tajikistan (USD 119,814 - 2007), which procured 6,085 litres of pesticides and treated 19,035 ha. • OSRO/TAJ/803/CHA - Emergency assistance for controlling the 2008 locust outbreak in Tajikistan (USD 410,163 – 2008) which procured 13,250 litres of pesticides and treated 22,177 ha; 204 sprayers usable for both ULV and emulsifyable concentrates (EC) were also procured and used, as well as 350 personal protective suits/masks; 240 persons benefited from a training of trainers through 27 district-level sessions and a brochure explaining good treatment practices was printed and dispatched to the locust control brigades. 222. In addition, a regional TCP project (TCP/INT/3202 - USD322,000, 2009-2011) has recently started. Regional consultations were held to discuss the ways and means of strengthening regional cooperation and effective control programmes. Emphasis has been placed on establishing the most effective institutional set up and meetings have been held with donors to explore how this might be funded. Much remains to be done to achieve planned project outputs (e.g. standard forms for locust surveys, national information bulletins). a) Relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability 223. These interventions were found quite relevant, as their purpose has been to help Tajikistan respond to real and immediate crises. More than 100,000 ha were reported to be infested by locusts in Tajikistan in 2008. At the same time, the projects have provided TA to promote up to date management approaches and techniques. However, these sporadic projects based on responses to crisis and emergency requests do not amount to a comprehensive and systematic approach to locust control. Similarly, a more concerted approach is required at a regional level. During Soviet times, regular joint surveys and control operations were performed along the Tajikistan-Afghanistan and the Uzbekistan-Afghanistan borders by Soviet specialists. Soviet– Afghanistan conferences on the locust situation were held annually. The collapse of the USSR has translated into a lack of collaboration and a fragmentation of efforts. It is therefore highly relevant for FAO to help build regional collaboration to tackle what has become a trans-boundary problem. 224. Timeliness in dealing with the locust problem is the essence of success, and hence this has been a central issue. In 2007, a request for the provision of pesticides was received by the competent FAO technical service (AGPP) at HQ in mid-February. Discussions continued for several months and the project was eventually signed on 13 June. Control measures started towards the end of June, when the locusts were already winged and mobile. The final project report claims that insecticide for 19,035 ha was provided from the project out of the 223,190 ha treated for locusts in 2007. FAO’s contribution to national efforts was therefore quite modest. Whatever the scale of this contribution, the project came too late anyway to contribute effectively to the control of the locust population. 225. For 2008, the GoT expected an even more important outbreak and submitted its request to FAO at the very end of December 2007. The proposal was further elaborated by FAO, submitted to the UN Resident Coordinator in April 2008 and quickly approved thereafter. The pesticides were procured immediately and treatments done during the second half of May, much better than in 2007 but still one month later than optimal time (from second half of April, just after hatching). 52

A total of 22,177 ha were treated with chemicals procured from the project, out of a total of 107,712 ha treated. 226. The delay in 2008 from the government request to the submission of a project to the UNRC was attributed to three factors: 1) climatic conditions (severe, prolonged winter) could have been detrimental to locust development so there was a risk to ask for funding before the emergency was manifest; 2) a tactical decision not to ask for CERF funding too soon since the funding was required from March to May 33 ; and 3) the departure of the FAO Emergency Coordinator in March which might have delayed the submission somewhat. 227. The 2008 campaign was stated to be much more successful than in 2007. However, it is unclear how precise and well-founded the estimates of areas protected are. The economic value of this impact was put at $US 18 million based on the wholesale market price per ton of protected crops and pastures. The economic impact of the entire campaign (including national efforts) was estimated at $US 100 million. 228. It appears that the GoT / MoA is primarily interested in protecting the cotton crop, while farmers are more interested in protecting other, more profitable crops. Two-thirds of the treatments during the 2007 and 2008 campaigns were reportedly on cotton. 229. The procurement by FAO of Dimilin ( Diflubenzuron, a chitin synthesis inhibitor) in November 2008 with leftover funds from OSRO/TAJ/803/CHA met with resistance from the MoA, which asked that at least half of the funds be used to procure a more traditional pesticide such as alpha-cypermethrin . FAO procured only Dimilin because it considered it as more environmentally-friendly and more specific to locusts than other insecticides which can be used to control a wider array of insects. Cotton cultivation requires very significant amounts of insecticides and the temptation to use the wide-spectrum insecticides that were demanded of FAO on cotton pests other than locusts could have been present. However, the MoA claimed to base their complaint on the fact that the Dimilin formulation tends to precipitate, the packaging was too bulky (200 l. drums) and they had insufficient Ultra-Low-Volume sprayers for its use. This being said, some 1,800 litres were reportedly used out of the 5,750 l. procured in 2008. The rest has been stored for use in subsequent years. 34 230. Locust control techniques used in Tajikistan date back to Soviet time and need to be brought up to date. For instance: − FAO has been recommending ultra low volume formulations for the past twenty-five years, while the Tajikistan government still uses “emulsifyable concentrates” (high volume formulations requiring a lot of water) and has just started using ULVs, with considerable reluctance. − The process for information collection, transmission, follow-up and analysis – the primary component of any effective locust control strategy – leaves much to be desired. Egg bed locations are mapped on inaccurate sketch maps drawn by hand, while the rest of the world has been using much more precise GPS handsets for a decade.

E. WATERSHED MANAGEMENT AND COMMUNITY MOBILISATION Background to Interventions and their Relevance 231. About 93 percent of Tajikistan is mountainous, and almost half of that is above 3,000 masl. The farming systems of the uplands include herding and pastoral activities with rain-fed farming and some irrigation. Since the break up of the Soviet Union, there has been a general breakdown in the seasonal management of pastures along with deforestation, an increase in

33 CERF projects usually have a duration of three months. 34 In 2009, the MoA sprayed 75,000 ha with chemicals left-over from the 2008 campaign, including Dimilin. 53 inappropriate rain-fed cereal cropping on steep hillsides, and leaking irrigation systems that are all leading to the degrading of the uplands and erosion. A combination of these factors, in particular the inappropriate cultivation of the middle altitude uplands (up to 2500 masl) for rain-fed agriculture is causing serious erosion leading to increasingly severe flooding, silting of reservoirs and irrigation systems, mudslides and a decrease in agricultural/pastoral productivity, with adverse consequences for livelihoods in these areas. 232. Since 1997, a number of agencies have been assisting the government of Tajikistan to undertake initiatives to encourage the sustainable management of upland resources and assisting the mobilisation of upland rural communities to identify and address their problems. These include the Aga Khan Foundation 35 programme in Gorno-Badakhshan (GBAO); ADB support for forestation round Lake Sarez; the World Bank, UNDP 36 , FAO and some INGOs such as German Agro-Action (GAA). 233. The GoT recognises the need for an integrated approach to the management of upland watersheds and catchments. The success and sustainability of such management systems will only be achieved with the full participation of the local rural communities. In December 2004, the GoT appointed the Soil Science Research Institute (SSRI) of the Agrarian Academy of Sciences, which is part of the MoA, as the lead institution in this field working in close collaboration with the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Forestry and the Land Commission. 234. FAO has been involved in two projects related to the above issues, one a TCP project (TCP/TAJ/2903) on Participatory Integrated Watershed Management Project (PIWMP) in Faizabad, which was concluded in 2005. The second (OSRO/TAJ/603/WB), still ongoing, is part of the World Bank’s support to the development of rural communities in Tajikistan in the Toirsu watershed of Danghara in Khatlon Province entitled Community Agriculture and Watershed Management Project (CAWMP). Description of Interventions 235. TCP/TAJ/2903 “Participatory Integrated Watershed Management in Upland Areas” (PIWMU) was intended to be a pilot project, in which the methodologies of Participatory Integrated Watershed Management would be implemented and tested. The experiences and lessons learned would then be replicated elsewhere in Tajikistan. In the true sense of the term, this was a project that involved the full participation of two adjoining rural communities sharing the Bodomo sub-watershed in the Sangbur catchment, Faizabad District, located to the northeast of Dushanbe. It was managed and implemented by a team of five national consultants drawn from the Soil Science Research Institute (SSRI) supported technically from FAO HQ. FAO worked in partnership with the INGO German Agro Action on the implementation of the project. GAA were particularly involved in community mobilisation and the formation of Common Interest Groups (CIG), with which they had considerable experience in Tajikistan. 236. Baseline studies and a PRA were conducted and common interest groups formed including women’s groups. Good management practices for grazing and pasture were encouraged as were improved methods of crop and horticultural production. A workshop was organised in September 2005 to discuss the experience of the project with a wider audience with the intention of replication in other parts of Tajikistan. 37 237. Following the PRAs, CIGs were formed, including women’s groups for income generation, agro-forestry, improved agricultural and horticultural practice, pasture and grazing

35 Aga Khan – Mountain Communities Sustainable Development Support Programme (MCSDSP) in Gorno Badakhhan Autnomous Oblast (GBAO); the Central Asian Mountain Programme (CAMP) in Khatlon.

36 UNDP initiative – Tajikistan Reconstruction Rehabilitation and Development Programme (RRDP).

37 Reference Bibliography under Watershed Management. 54 management. Training was given in soil and water conservation practices, integrated tree nursery management, surveying and participatory watershed management. Field trips were arranged for key project national staff to Nepal and India. 238. Almost four years after FAO and GAA ceased their direct involvement with the local communities, the evaluation found much of what had been established under the project still operating in terms of improved watershed, grazing, pasture and agricultural/horticultural management systems. Some, if not all, of the common interest groups (CIG) remain active especially when grouped around agricultural/horticultural and pastoral activities of common interest. Two women’s groups still survive. An exception was the greenhouse assisted by FAO belonging to the SSRI intended for the early propagation of trees, which was in a state of neglect. 239. OSRO/TAJ/603/WB “Community Agriculture and Watershed Management Project” (CAWMP) is due to finish in December 2009. However, project activities will continue to the end of 2010 managed by the Project Management Unit (PMU) in the MoA in Dushanbe and the project coordination unit (PCU) at the District ( Jamoat ) level in Danghara (Khatlon province). This project is one of four funded by the World Bank in different geographical locations: FAO in Danghara district of Khatlon; Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN) in Vanj district in GBAO; with UNDP in Zarafshan in Soghd, and German Agro Action in Rasht in the Gharm valley. All share a common theme of assisting the development of community mobilisation through the formation of self help groups and approved community development projects assisted with block grants provided by the World Bank. 240. The project is misleadingly titled. Although FAO’s involvement was stated in the prodoc to be based on the experiences and lessons learned during TCP/TAJ/2009, that project was not the main basis for the design of the CAWMP. Essentially OSRO/TAJ/603/WB is a Community Mobilisation and Development project with emphasis on the formation of common interest groups (CIG) established to implement activities related to agricultural enterprises (in its broadest sense), land use management and related subjects including rural infrastructure. It is not a participatory integrated watershed management project as such, albeit being situated within the Toirsu watershed in Danghara. This project’s relevance, effectiveness, impact and sustainability must therefore be assessed on the basis of community mobilisation and development, rather than on improvements in watershed management. 241. The project got off to a slow start all through 2007 under rather weak management, which coincided with a period when the FAO’s country coordination office in Dushanbe was also experiencing problems. Since 2008, it has caught up well under its present management, with much improved leadership provided by the Project Coordination Office. Achievements include: a) Formed 6 Jamaot Development Councils 38 in Pushing, Ismat Sharifof; Lolazor, Oqsu, Korez and Lahur in Danghara district. b) PRAs in 62 villages involving 2,820 beneficiaries of which 28% are women. Identified main needs. c) Formed 455 ‘common interest groups’ (CIG) established for projects. d) Formed 69 CIG for credibility investment projects of $US 1,000 each. Many of these CIGs are mixed groups of men and women and in 22 cases CIGs are headed by women. Addressed the three main project components which involve activities relating to: e) agricultural, horticultural and livestock enterprises and production. f) land management (mainly small farm/orchard establishment). g) infrastructure projects of mainly general community interest – such as irrigation channels, drainage, drinking water, roads etc. These are moving slower than the other two components.

38 Not to be confused with the official Jamaot administration (hukumat). 55

In addition, 68 Community Action Plans have been approved. 242. Both projects are entirely relevant to the need to assist the mobilisation and motivation of communities to identify their needs and address issues of common interest and importance. However, the PIWMU was more holistic in its approach, as it also addressed issues related to improving the sustainable management of the sub-watershed in which the two targeted communities are located. Effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability 243. PIWMU has successfully addressed both of community mobilisation and improving the management of a small sub-watershed/catchment through a participatory approach to integrated management and improved farming and pastoral practices. It has been very effective and its impact has been most noticeable within its own locality. Many of the improved agricultural, horticultural and pastoral management practices still remain. However, its impact is not as strong as it should be, because to date no serious attempt has been made to replicate the experiences and lessons learned in the Bodomo sub-watershed to other locations in Tajikistan. 244. CAWMP is now proving to be an effective instrument for community mobilisation, motivation and development. The projects developed by CIGs for small agricultural/ horticultural/livestock enterprises as well as small land development and land improvement enterprises are going well and the communities are demonstrating great interest in them. But it remains to be seen how sustainable these will be once FAO facilitating support ends and more importantly once the WB grant funds are expended and there is no more outside support. Much will depend on the financial viability of the small agricultural enterprises and land management / farm developments supported with WB grant funds. Some of the small farm, horticultural, orchard enterprises have a good chance of survival as do such enterprises as beekeeping provided a good standard of technical management is maintained and future technical support can be guaranteed. This might be provided by one or other of the NGO supported extension services such SENAS. No doubt some CIGs will survive while the less viable will fade away.

F. LAND REFORM 245. From 2004 through 2008, FAO conducted three projects with components related to land reform. OSRO/TAJ/301/SWE “Emergency Agricultural Assistance to Food Insecure Rural Households in Drought Prone Border Areas of Western Tajikistan, with Particular Focus on Female Headed Households” focused on input distribution (seeds and fertilizer) and knowledge sharing related to seed planting, land rights, and farm reorganization. OSRO/TAJ/402/CAN “Monitoring Progress of Land Reform in Tajikistan through Establishment of a Participatory Monitoring System” addressed the need to develop land reform policy and legislation through building partnerships between the government, civil society, and donors and increasing knowledge of citizens in rural areas on procedures related to farm reorganization and issuance of land use rights. OSRO/TAJ/602/CAN “Improved Food Security and Enhanced Livelihoods through Institutional and Gender Sensitive Land Reform in Tajikistan” continued FAO’s previous work on development of policy, partnerships, and dissemination of knowledge about land reform while also seeking to build capacity within the Land Agency to implement land reform efforts of the government. These projects have provided FAO with a continuous presence in Tajikistan on land reform issues over the period of evaluation. Besides these projects, within the EC/FAO Food Security for Action Programme, a study was carried out (October 2008) on the Economic Effects of Land Reform in Tajikistan. 246. Major outputs of these projects included the establishment of a working group on land reform made up of Government bodies, civil society organizations, and donor projects; the establishment of five legal advisory centres offering legal consultations and information on farm reorganization and land reform to rural citizens and farm members; the establishment of information and legal consultation centres in 16 districts in partnership with the State Committee on Women and Families to raise awareness among women on their rights to land and the process 56 of farm reorganization; and the conduct of public awareness campaigns in over 45 communities to explain to farm members the process of farm reorganization and monitor progress in completing reorganization of collective farms in these areas. a) Relevance 247. FAO support for land reform has been implemented in three areas: development of land policy; raising public awareness and monitoring of progress in implementation of land reform; and protection of citizens’ rights to land. These activities are highly relevant in ensuring the equitable distribution of agricultural land under the reorganization of state and collective farms and securing the land tenure of rural citizens. 248. The idea for a working group on land reform was novel and relevant, to create a partnership among Government, civil society, and donors in implementation of farm reorganization and land reform. The public participation component was also necessary and relevant, given the lack of knowledge and information among rural populations concerning the issues and processes of land reform. The strategy pursued was appropriate: public awareness campaigns in over 45 communities where farm reorganization was ongoing to encourage and facilitate the involvement of farm members in the decisions on farm reorganization and land distribution and establishment of legal aid centres to provide free of charge legal consultative services and advice to farm members and citizens wishing to obtain formal rights to land and establish Dehqan farms. Gender mainstreaming activities were aimed at improving women’s access to land and involvement in farm reorganization decisions (see Section VI. B). Monitoring of farm reorganization and land reform provided evidence of inequities in land distribution, prompting discussions among Government, civil society and donors on revision of existing legislation and procedures related to farm reorganization and land distribution. b) Effectiveness 249. Implementation of FAO projects has generally been effective, but not without problems. Independent assessment of the effectiveness of OSRO/TAJ/301/SWE was difficult because interlocutors were not available. However, a desk review of the project indicated that major outputs were achieved in a timely manner. 250. The Land Reform Working Group (LRWG), established under OSRO/TAJ/402/CAN, conducted meetings on a monthly basis. Reports are that stakeholders regularly attended these meetings and participated actively. The working group analyzed and developed proposals for improved land legislation based on the monitoring of land reform and allowed for constructive discussion among stakeholders to improve the implementation of land reform. 251. Public awareness activities were well organized and conducted on a timely basis, usually coinciding with the general assembly meetings of state and collective farms undergoing reorganization. Public awareness was designed to raise understanding of the farm reorganization process and rural citizens’ rights to land prior to initiation of the farm reorganization process. Its participatory monitoring approach provided reliable information on land rights and the process of farm reorganization under the law to rural populations and state authorities. Additionally, FAO offered training to the managers of newly formed Dehqan farms on farm management, focusing on basic, strategic, and financial management of farm operations. These trainings were timed to occur shortly after the new farm was formed. 252. Project OSRO/TAJ/602/CAN delivered its main expected outputs, including in areas begun on the previous project. FAO supported the protection of citizens’ rights to land by establishing five legal aid centres which provide free of charge legal consultative services and advice to farm members and citizens wishing to obtain formal rights to land and establish Dehqan farms. FAO and UNIFEM also partnered with the State Committee on Women and Families to establish information and legal consultative centres in 16 districts offering women with access to free legal consultations relating to their rights in farm reorganization. These centres often 57 extended their services to neighbouring districts, expanding the access of rural citizens to legal advice and consultations on farm reorganization and land rights issues. c) Efficiency 253. The main efficiency issues concerned implementation of OSRO/TAJ/602/CAN. Although the project delivered its outputs, it experienced some difficulties during start-up, taking some six months to complete the inception phase and sign its Letters of Agreement with UNIFEM (due to administrative and contractual issues), and in the implementation of some activities. During the inception phase, the project description was revised contributing to the delay in start-up and subsequent delays in implementing some project activities were caused by a lack of interest in the project by the FAO Coordinator. While initially there was interest to do so, FAO was unable to attract funding for a follow-on project due to the difficult institutional environment, even though additional work in land reform was clearly necessary and warranted. 254. On a positive note, efforts were made to coordinate regional coverage of legal centers and public awareness campaigns with other donor projects to avoid duplication, and to close gaps as much as possible. 255. The work to develop a Land Policy (renamed the Land Strategy) also raised implementation and design issues. It was developed with insufficient understanding on the part of key Government bodies such as the Agency for Land Management, Geodesy and Cadastre (ALMGC) about the nature of the project and their obligations. Consultants questioned during the evaluation reported that key personnel in the ALMGC and other government bodies were unwilling to participate in discussion on the Strategy and assist with its drafting. ALMGC personnel complained that work on the Land Strategy would consume much of their time and that they were busy with their normal work load. Moreover, the ALMGC staff was not getting paid to work on the drafting of the Land Strategy making it a low priority. Once FAO prepared a first draft, the ALMGC engaged in limited discussion and revision of the Strategy. In late 2008, the ALMGC submitted the Land Strategy to the Government for consideration, but prospects for its adoption in the near future seem poor. d) Impact 256. FAO’s most significant impact was its work to develop partnerships between government and donors by establishing the first LRWG. The LRWG became the model for future consultations among government, civil society and donor groups. FAO was a leader in creating this forum for dialogue on improving and monitoring the progress in land reform. The LRWG provided the Government with valuable technical assistance to improve the policy and legal framework related to land reform, resulting in proposals for legislative amendments, such as the amendments to the Land Code in 2004 and 2007 that were passed by Parliament. The LRWG was also instrumental in commenting on and revising the draft Law on State Registration of Immovable Property and the draft Law on Mortgage. All these activities helped improve the legal framework under which land reform is implemented and rights to land are secured. While the improvements have been modest to date, the working group has provided the main venue for ongoing discussion on the implementation of equitable land reform leading to improvements in the agricultural sector. 257. Public awareness-raising efforts and legal consultative assistance had a positive impact in areas where such activities were conducted. Over 39,000 individuals received reliable information on farm reorganization and rights to land from FAO activities. Some 12,000 citizens received legal consultations on issues related to obtaining rights to land and forming a Dehqan farm from Legal Advisory Centres established by FAO projects. 39 Some 74 radio programmes

39 Project final reports (OSRO/402/CAN and OSRO/602/CAN) provided figures for public awareness campaigns (38,905 people received information on farm reorganization and land reform from the project) and legal consultations (11,848 people received legal consultations on land issues). 58 were broadcast nation-wide. However, impact was mainly limited to the geographic areas in which these activities took place (mainly in the 45 communities served by the FAO projects). 258. FAO efforts to build the capacity of the ALMGC on monitoring land reform were only moderately successful. A monitoring unit was established and trained within the ALMGC, but reports are that it was only moderately effective in completing its mission during the project. Once funding stopped, the monitoring unit reportedly ceased operation. The Director of the ALMGC reported that after the FAO project ended in 2008 the monitoring offices were closed and personnel reassigned within the Agency. e) Sustainability 259. The FAO’s model for the LRWG (established under Project OSRO/402/CAN) has proved sustainable over the long term. The Government and donors have used the FAO working group as its model for a number of other working groups on policy and legislative issues. For example, in 2007 the Government formed the Working Group on Structural and Land Reform under the Independent Commission on Farm Debt Resolution. Subsequently, the Government has sought to form additional working groups based on the FAO model in key sectors of the economy, such as water use, energy, and health to encourage constructive dialogue on key issues between the government, civil society and donors. 260. FAO legal advisory services have proved more difficult to sustain over the long term. Cost recovery measures that were intended to be part of the project proved difficult to implement. It was observed that at least three of the five FAO legal advisory centers are still open, but struggling to operate. The centres are operated by dedicated lawyers interested in helping citizens defend their rights to land, but the lack of money for transportation, rent, office equipment, supplies, and salaries limits the effectiveness of the work. It was reported by lawyers at several centres that without project funding, the centres are unlikely to remain open for more than another 6 months (through end 2009). 261. The women’s information and legal advisory centres established by the last FAO project have proved to be sustainable, at least in Sughd oblast. Based on the results of the six centres established by the FAO project, the local administration in Sughd agreed to fund such centres in all 18 districts of the oblast. In other areas of the country the centres seem to have closed down when project funding stopped. The quality of service in the centres which still operate varies depending on the length of time the centre has been operating and whether the staff now employed in the centres was trained by UNIFEM. Over time, the focus of legal advisory services in many of these centres has drifted from land issues to general issues of concern to women in the community (e.g., domestic violence, divorce and property distribution, family law, etc.) to promote their sustainability.

G. FOOD SECURITY (INFORMATION, STATISTICS AND EARLY WARNING) FAO Interventions and their Relevance a) Background and context 262. Since its earliest involvement in Tajikistan, FAO has assisted the country in food security information, data gathering and analysis, statistics and the development of early warning systems. During the period covered by this evaluation, the assistance was mostly channelled through the global EC/FAO Food Security Programme (GCP/GLO/162/EC ) that included a component for Tajikistan that amounted to $US 360,000. Through this project, FAO provided technical and financial support to the State Committee for Statistics (SCS - Goskomstat) for the analysis and

59 validation of food consumption and income data from the 2005 Tajikistan Household Budget Survey (HBS). 263. The project also funded jointly with UNICEF and World Bank a‘ Living Standard Measurement Study ’ survey in 2007. The data from this is still being analysed. A study is being prepared on ‘ The impact of migration on Food Security ’ and work is still in progress on a food security profile for Tajikistan. Also funded was a translation into Russian of a food security manual to be used for future training in Tajikistan and the region and a legal study of the institutional and legal food security framework. 264. A paper called “Longitudinal Analysis” using panel data for assessing seasonality effects on the food security situation in Tajikistan in 2005 was presented at the EC-FAO Food Security Programme’s event at the Fourth International Conference on Agricultural Statistics (ICAS-4) in Beijing. Training was provided in the key concepts of food security and on conducting food security related analysis to experts responsible for drafting the National Development Strategy (NDS). Staff from the Goskomstat’s Agriculture Unit received training in compiling food balance sheets. 265. Goskomstat stated that the technical training and advice from the project was useful and has led to more accurate FS surveys and presentation of information in monthly and quarterly bulletins. Goskomstat appreciated that the FAO training workshops included qualitative measures, compared to other FS training that was much more quantitative. 266. Between January 2004 and April 2006, TCP/TAJ/3001 played a part is helping to establish a Project Monitoring and Food Security Unit (PMFSU) later renamed the AgroFood- Centre (AFC) and formulating a National Programme for Food Security (NPFS). This is dealt with in more detail in Annex II TCP Projects. 267. Project OSRO/TAJ/604/CAN was intended to increase the GoT’s capacity to formulate, implement and monitor food security policies in Tajikistan. This project provided some training in improved methodologies for data collection and analysis for staff from the MoA. It also supported the FAO/MoA grain crop assessment and farm production data collection in 2006. However, in 2007 the counterpart agency for the project was changed from the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) to the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade (MoEDT). Soon after, the project ground to a halt due to a breakdown in cooperation between the two ministries and between MoEDT and FAO. The problem seems to have been as much one of clashing personalities as of institutions, although the MoA was not happy that the responsibility for agricultural data collection had been taken from them. These events also occurred during a period of particularly weak leadership in the FAO Project Coordination Unit. The donor (Canada), acting on the recommendation of a CIDA project review mission, asked that the project be closed and for all unspent project funds ($US 230,000) to be returned, to which FAO agreed. b) Grain and crop/farm assessments 268. Between 2000 and 2006, FAO assisted the MoA to conduct an annual grain crop assessment (pre-harvest & harvest) and farm production survey. FAO provided assistance in designing the assessment and survey and in training national consultants so they could then provide practical on the job training to officials from the ministry and provincial and district agricultural departments. The techniques were new to Tajikistan as in Soviet times such data had been gathered from the annual state and collective farms’ returns. This work was supported by the projects referred to above including TCP/TAJ/3001, but was discontinued after 2007, when support from OSRO/TAJ/604/CAN was no longer forthcoming. 60

269. In the current season, 2009, after a lapse of two years FAO is again supporting the MoA to undertake a nationwide crop assessment and farm production survey using funds from three emergency seed (wheat and fodder crop), fertiliser and animal feed distribution projects. 40 270. This crop assessment and farm production survey, as well as serving a national purpose is also doubling as a beneficiary assessment of these three projects. This present crop assessment/ farm survey was on going at the time of the evaluation mission in five provinces and 20 districts. Assessment teams are comprised of some five persons, including an FAO National Consultant and officials from the ministry and the provincial and district agricultural departments, assisted if possible by representatives from the farm units. The survey has the following coverage: • Gorno Badakhshan ( 2 districts) • Kurgan Tube (4 districts) • Kulyob (5 districts) • DRD (5 districts) • Soghd (4 districts) 271. All types of farm unit are included – State farms, Dehqan farms; free Dehqan farms; Presidential land and household plots ( ogarod ). The evaluation team was positively impressed with the care and competence of the survey work. 272. In July, a small team will come from FAO GIEWS to assist in collating and analysing the information and data, which will then be published and circulated to all relevant GoT Ministries and Departments. The survey will be the subject of a seminar/workshop, to which donors and interested agencies will be invited. c) Relevance 273. Improving the capacity and competence of the GoT to address food security issues, (including food security surveys, analysis of results and establishment of systems providing early warning of possible food shortages) are entirely relevant. This is particularly so for a country with such variable climatic conditions and subject to so many hazards, both natural and man-made. This being said, the interventions have not been part of an overall effort to strengthen capacity and this has undermined their relevance. d) Effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability 274. Because the assistance in this area has been fairly small, it is difficult to assess the degree to which improvement in Goskomstat’s capability to accurately collect and analyse data is attributable to FAO’s interventions. FAO’s assistance has helped to train a core of national consultants and personnel of the MoA and the provincial and district departments of agriculture in accurate grain crop assessments and farm production data collection including livestock and a record of weed infestation, pests and diseases. The methodology has been developed in FAO HQ and followed up by in country training. The data being collected is very detailed and time consuming and how effectively it will be used and how it will be followed up remains to be seen. 275. There is still only limited local capacity by the GoT to address food security policy issues and a notable reluctance on the part of the GoT to accept the need for accurate statistics. The official national statistics are still generally perceived to be too inaccurate and manipulated, although improving to some extent. 276. Without continued external technical support, however, recent gains are likely to be lost. FAO has made a commendable effort to continue the work with unspent funds from three

40 UTF/TAJ/004/TAJ–Emergency Food Security and Seed Imports; TCP/TAJ/3101-Emergency assistance to raise food security and reduce livelihood vulnerability of very poor households in the Khatlon Region; OSRO/TAJ/801/SWE-Emergency supply of animal feed to weather affected livestock farmers in Tajikistan. 61 emergency input distribution projects, which end this year. However, the previous donor – Canada - has withdrawn from Tajikistan and there would be a need for FAO to resolve other issues with the main potential donor for this kind of work (EC) before a further project would be seriously considered. 277. The mechanisms to effectively use crop assessments and farm surveys have not yet been worked out, beyond preparing a report and holding a workshop/seminar in the late summer / autumn. Longer term funding, including with participation by the GoT, should be sought to assure the sustainability and institutionalisation of such an annual assessment / survey in the future if it is to serve a useful purpose. At the time of the evaluation, negotiations were begun with the EC for possible funding of mid-term Food security Monitoring and Market Information System.

H. OTHER POLICY-RELATED INITIATIVES 278. Through the Regional Office for Europe, FAO has contributed to the policy debate in Tajikistan with several initiatives, financed either through the TCP Facility or the Regular Programme. 279. Under the TCP Facility, an AGNS officer undertook a mission in early 2008 to assess the food control infrastructure and define priorities for improving the overall system. The mission proposed a follow-up TCP project to address key gaps, including through capacity development, reviewing and assessing food laws and standards and assisting Tajikistan to prepare for WTO accession. The TCP is still under consideration; however, in June 2009 a national workshop on food safety was organized jointly by WHO and FAO as a follow-up to the mission’s recommendation. 280. Also under the TCP Facility, FAO financed a study, published in October 2008, on crop diversification in cotton-growing areas, which could be relevant in the context of implementation of Presidential Decree 111. FAO also undertook a livestock sector strategic study, to define better the country’s needs in this area and to use with donors. The study, also financed by the TCP Facility, has been completed and was being translated into English at the time of the evaluation. 281. Other studies carried out in the evaluation period included a Cotton Farmer Survey, conducted in November-December 2008 and published in February 2009 for the Donor Coordination Council Secretariat; a study on the Economic Effects of Land Reform published in October 2008 and a study on Farm Debt Resolution published in January 2009. FAO also made technical comments on the January 2008 Land Use Planning Law. The evaluation was not able to ascertain if any use had been made as yet of these studies, which were generally quite recent, but all of them did address issues of importance in Tajikistan.

VI. Gender Mainstreaming and Women in Development

A. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 282. On the whole, at the time of independence, women in Tajikistan had a relatively high level of education, health care and opportunities when compared to some other countries in the region with similar historical cultures. However, the consequences of the civil war have set back the position of women, particularly rural women, in Tajik society in many ways. The increase of poverty and unemployment pushed many Tajik men to emigrate in Russia and neighbouring countries, with women remaining in the country to take care of the children, often while working in the state or collective farms for a very low salary. 283. FAO projects in Tajikistan have made special efforts to include women as beneficiaries and indeed in a number of projects women and female headed households have been the primary focus of project attention. This has notably been the case in FAO’s support for Legal and Information Centres, in projects providing agricultural and livestock assistance and in those with 62 formation of Common Interest Groups. While this is commendable, some of these projects could have been more effective had they been designed with more consultation with the potential beneficiaries to better ascertain their real needs.

B. GENDER IN LAND REFORM 284. When the first UN project to facilitate access to land for rural women was designed in 2001 41 , the gender dimension of Land Reform was not considered an issue in Tajikistan and the worrying situation of rural women was not perceived as linked to their exclusion from access to land. The work of UNIFEM and, later FAO and other organizations on the Land Reform in Tajikistan revealed that the problem was not the text of the Law, but its implementation. 285. The Land Law gives equal access to land to women and men. However, the institutional resistance and the interference of local authorities made the implementation of Land Reform difficult: land distribution was not equitable . While over three-quarter of the members of Collectives and State farms were women, only very few women could get access to land and most of the time the Dehkan farms registered under the name of women were actually managed by their husbands or fathers. 286. Several reasons explain this low number of female Dehqan Farms at the beginning of the Land Reform implementation: • Rural women were not aware of their rights and had no knowledge about land reform and land registration. • They were also lacking resource and technical expertise in the agricultural sector and their traditional networking, rooted in family relations, was not adequate to address this. • The heavy work burden of rural women in the fields and their traditional work at home was making them reluctant to accept additional responsibility. • In addition, gender discrimination in social and family life led to a lack of self- confidence, therefore many Tajik women felt that being Head of a Dehqan farm was a male job and too difficult for a woman. 287. As a result of the limited access to land, feminization of poverty particularly in rural areas was dramatic. 288. The FAO work on land reform is reviewed in Section V.F. above. The key results related to gender are: • The public awareness campaigns and monitoring of progress in implementation of the Land Reform informed and mobilized communities and particularly women to participate in the farm reorganization process. • The Land Reform Working Group (LRWG) integrated a gender component in Land Policy. • The Legal Assistance Centers (LAC) provided legal information on land rights and technical support for land registration and land-related conflicts. In partnership with UNIFEM and the State Committee on Women and Families, FAO contributed also through 16 District Task Force (DTF) and Information Centres to the monitoring and follow up of the distribution of agricultural land to secure land tenure for rural women. 289. Although baseline data is lacking, anecdotal evidence shows developmental impact subsequent to the implementation of these projects. In Vahdat where FAO worked in 4 villages of Guleston Jamoat, 400 Dehqan farms are headed by women and in Hisor, out of 100 complaints received by the District Task Force centre during the last 5 months, 85 were filed by women. The

41 A project focused on women's land rights was conceived in 2001 by UNIFEM to facilitate access to land for rural women in the course of the Land Reform. the implementation of the project started in 2002. 63 proportion was nearly the same in Legal Assistance Centres of Danqara where more than 200 (out of 800) Dehqan farm belong to women 104 out of 130 legal consultations were provided to women, for the same period. 290. However, the success of the FAO intervention has not been significant in the area where cotton constitutes the main crop 42 . The services provided by DTFs to women in the areas where cotton production dominates agricultural activities focused on private conflicts (domestic violence and family issues). The quality of the service is also different from one district to another depending also on the working conditions of the team members. The establishment of DTFs in Local Government buildings made it difficult for rural women to complain when the local authorities are involved in the conflict, particularly in land distribution/registration. 291. The poverty of rural populations, particularly women does not allow them to pay for services provided by the LAC. The independent LACs will become sustainable only if they work with big private farms which usually belong to men. 292. The situation is different for the District Task Force Centres (DTF) which have been established in the Local government office of Soqd region. While LAC have difficulties to continue their activities at the end of FAO projects, at the time of the evaluation mission, months after the end of the project, the 18 DTFs, financially supported by the local government, were still functioning.

C. WOMEN’S ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT AND FOOD SECURITY 293. Through project OSRO/TAJ/404/CAN during 2004-05, FAO sought economic empowerment of poor rural households in Khatlon and jointly with German Agro-Action in Faizabad. 294. As there had been no post-project monitoring, information was not available on the status of the groups formed under the project. The evaluation visited the heads of two groups in Faizabad. The revolving fund initiated by the project continues to operate. The money, usually given back within 8 months to the Head of the Women Group, is distributed among other woman and in a few cases where women were not able to return back the money, the group contributed collectively to solve the problem. The project started by involving 11 women in each visited village, at the time of the evaluation mission (June 2009) the number of beneficiaries had increased to 45 in one village and 91 in the other. The evaluation had no way to assess whether the positive image gained from the two visits could be generalized.

D. LIVESTOCK 295. Women mainly take care of the animals managed close to the house and the poultry. They feed them, clean their stables, make the dung pats for fuel ( chalma ), do the milking, and process the dairy products, look after the young animals and the sick. To address their concerns, programmes need to look beyond vaccination and include hygiene of the conditions in which animals are kept, fed, milked and in which dairy products are processed. 296. However, vaccination is also important and rural women tend to be less well informed about such programmes. They have different social networks and for instance do not attend Friday prayers in the mosque where such things are announced. Women do not have the same access to mobile telephones, do not have the same access to veterinary care and tend to be less well informed about such matters.

42 For example in Kan-e Badam, (in Soqd region) where Dehkan farms are huge and produce mostly cotton,only 6 out of 124 Dekhan farms belong to women. 64

297. Veterinary medicine – especially field practice – is an almost exclusively male profession. While there is no difficulty in a male vet visiting a woman’s house to treat her animals, it is more difficult for a village women to visit the vet’s house to ask for his help, particularly at night. 298. There is a need to develop better animal health communication and information networks such as through the Rais-e-Zanon system as well as trying to attract more women into professional positions in the TVA as vets, base managers and trainers. 299. The hygienic aspects of dairy production for household consumption are one thing. But, if the idea is to produce products for sale to provide an additional income for the family – a more careful study of the markets and local marketing systems is necessary. In many places a local marketing system already exists involving a network of middlemen traders and local entrepreneurs. Only if such local women’s self interest groups can market their products more effectively and profitably than these existing market networks will they flourish and survive as business entities and there was not so much evidence that this aspect of the business situation was well understood or addressed. 300. In the traditions of local village life, it is not usually socially acceptable to sell surplus milk or eggs to neighbours. Such commodities are either gifted (particularly to poor neighbours) or exchanged in a reciprocal fashion of ‘favours given and favours received’. This is a natural part of the cohesion necessary for rural community life, especially where people are in some way often related to each other or bound by ties of family and clan and dependant on each other in times of hardship. This means that ‘marketing’ means being able to sell such products in a local market to ‘strangers’ or to traders and middlemen rather than to neighbours. 301. The difficulties and dangers of preserving meat under village conditions without a reliable supply of electricity or refrigeration should be fully understood. Although there are certain traditional ways of cooking and drying meat for winter consumption, especially in the remoter mountain districts, these need to be carefully studied and understood for their possible health risks. 302. A number of ‘emergency’ input projects have provided either sheep or improved ‘layer’ hens. The issues relating to this have been referred to in detail in Section V.B. Before providing such assistance to such households, there should be a much better understanding of what is most appropriate. Poultry can provide immediate help to domestic food security and even some income. But, it is no good giving ‘improved’ layer hens to poor women without a cockerel to help them breed, some help with improved housing and feeding, health care/vaccination for the chickens and training. It would have possibly been more appropriate to have provided these village women with a hardier breed of chicken for the conditions in which they would live and be fed. If that had been the case there might have been fewer losses. 303. High maintenance animals such as ‘Hissar’ sheep only give a slow return in lamb sales and as they are not a milking breed, they will make no immediate contribution to domestic food security. Before implementing these emergency projects, FAO should better understand intended beneficiaries’ circumstances of life.

E. CROPS AND SEEDS 304. The emergency projects in Tajikistan have provided funds for seeds (wheat, maize, fodder) and fertilizer. Whilst these may have filled a perceived ‘need’ to bridge a shortage of wheat seed after years of conflict or drought, there is the question of whether wheat or fodder seed is what most poor women headed households actually need most to help them feed their families. In many cases, the only land that a woman controls is her kitchen garden ( ogarod). Evidence is that these kitchen gardens are far more productive than most other agricultural land. What may be needed most are seeds of other crops, vegetables - beans, onions, potatoes, cabbages, beets, carrots, as well as good fruit trees and berry bushes. When considering vegetable seed, notice should be paid to avoid providing ‘hybrid’ seed which must be replaced each year. It is better to 65 provide seed of open pollinated lines which provide the possibility for rural households propagating their own seed to replant the following year. 305. There has been insufficient attention paid to providing a choice. It is the rural women who are the primary guardians of their domestic food security and who need to be given a choice in such matters rather than having their seed needs decided for them by others in offices far away.

VII. FAO Functions in Tajikistan 306. The evaluation terms of reference call for an examination of FAO’s roles and functions in areas where it claims to have comparative advantage. The following section looks at each of these areas across all the sectoral work carried out during the evaluation period.

A. POLICY ASSISTANCE 307. One of FAO’s key roles is that of a neutral adviser to assist national governments formulate agricultural and related policy. FAO is intended to be a source of unbiased technical advice in this area. 308. During much of the last five years, the FAO Office in Tajikistan saw itself as being primarily responsible for implementation of an emergency and rehabilitation programme. Policy assistance was therefore largely handled from the Regional Office for Europe in Budapest, which in fact had the primary mandate for this type of work. Such engagement had to be limited; the office deals with a large number of countries and in the absence of dedicated project funding, staff and financial resources for dealing with Tajikistan or any other single country do not permit the presence that would be desirable. 309. Through the evaluation period, it was found that FAO’s engagement in policy dialogue with the Government has been uneven, although it has improved since the arrival of the present Coordinator in February 2009. In general, most of the policy dialogue relating to agriculture and rural development has been within the donor coordination mechanisms. Many attempts to work with the Government have failed. Hence, FAO has tended to focus more on field-based activities. As was noted above in Section V.F., land reform and resolution of the cotton debt have been key areas of agricultural policy engagement for the donors. Through much of the evaluation period, FAO has not played a significant role in these forums. In fact, it was only in March 2009 that FAO began to represent the UN system on the Donor Coordination Council for Agriculture. 43 310. Perhaps the most significant agricultural policy adopted by the GoT during this period was Presidential Decree 111 of March 2007. This provides a road map for agricultural sector reform in Tajikistan, including Government withdrawal from the cotton sector and protection of land use rights. FAO’s most ambitious attempt to engage the Government in the policy arena was through the development of a Land Strategy, undertaken in the context of project OSRO/TAJ/602/CAN. As already reported, the Strategy was intended to be prepared in conjunction with the responsible Government authorities. Unfortunately, this did not prove to be possible. 311. The evaluation believes that FAO would most effectively increase its role in policy assistance through a technically strong residential presence in Tajikistan. This would allow FAO to provide the GoT with better exposure to the types of policy assistance potentially available. It would also permit FAO to have better exchange with donors interested in funding the formulation of agricultural and related policy. 312. The evaluation found that FAO is appreciated by both the donors and the Government as a potential source of unbiased technical advice and there is a general wish for FAO to play a more

43 Prior to this, Agriculture has been represented by UNICEF. 66 active role helping the GoT formulate agricultural policy. Indeed the evaluation team were repeatedly told that FAO would be better fulfilling this much needed role, rather than being a competing player with NGOs and other implementing partners for input delivery at the grass roots level.

B. SHARING AND APPLYING KNOWLEDGE 313. Another of the key functions of FAO is to make available knowledge and experience gained in other parts of the world. This can be done at field level, by adapting/replicating similar experiences gained elsewhere to conditions in another country. It may also be achieved through the provision of technical material, either in electronic or written form. The FAO website is increasingly the medium of choice for the latter method. 314. The use of FAO information materials is governed by several factors. The main one is a familiar with what FAO has to offer and its perceived applicability at country level. On this count, the evaluation found that in Tajikistan there is little knowledge of the global public goods provided by FAO, at all levels. This is partly explained by the country’s level of development. Without technical assistance there are difficulties in adapting information. Another constraining factor is explained by the fact that very few FAO publications are produced in Russian. Finally, Internet access is not well developed in Tajikistan especially in Government offices, and connection speeds are slow. 315. When it comes to adapting knowledge and experience at the field level, the best example is the VFU project. This programme has been built on experience gained in Afghanistan and other countries where FAO has helped to develop community-level, private commercialised animal health services. Transfer of knowledge from the Afghan experience was facilitated by having one of the experts who had served with the Afghan project as the CTA of the project in Tajikistan. The TCP project on participatory, integrated watershed management was developed and based on successful experiences in other countries transferred to Tajikistan as part of a pilot project. 316. Knowledge sharing has also taken place through participation of Government officials and technical staff in regional and global meetings. However, aside from general comments that such participation is appreciated and useful, it is not possible to attribute changes at country level to this.

C. RESOURCE MOBILIZATION 317. This refers to FAO’s role in attracting funds and other inputs to development programmes in general and in the agriculture sector in particular. Apart from being involved in negotiating the projects in which it has been directly involved, FAO has not played a significant direct role in this respect during the evaluation period, although the Investment Centre has supported project preparation for the multilateral development banks. However, since the arrival of the present Coordinator and during the immediate pre-evaluation period, FAO has been much more active in this respect. 318. However, as already pointed out, for much of the period, FAO has not been active in donor forums and has been more reactive to opportunities for project funding, such as after the severe winter of 2007-08, than proactive in identifying and seeking funding for development initiatives. The GoT has not yet developed a national food security programme. This is something that FAO has helped to develop in a number of countries and which commonly serves as the pivot for FAO’s resource mobilization efforts. 319. The prospect for resource mobilization for agriculture more generally is closely tied to the success of Government reform efforts, i.e. the resolution of the cotton debt issue and the implementation of Presidential Decree 111 and especially the provisions relating to freedom to farm. It is too early to evaluate progress in this area. However, it is being closely watched by the 67 donor community in Dushanbe. If the reforms are deemed to be effectively implemented, considerable international resources could be mobilized to support this effort.

D. CAPACITY BUILDING 320. Many of the FAO projects implemented in Tajikistan, although classified as emergency interventions and implemented within the emergency operation framework, have had a developmental orientation. Such projects all included elements of training and capacity building. However, the input distribution projects have had only minor capacity building elements. 321. Capacity building represents a considerable challenge in Tajikistan, as the country faces many of the problems found in other nations at similar levels of development. These include low levels of salary paid to Government employees and a high turnover of staff. There are few incentives for good performance. On the other hand, the country has a relatively high level of education and literacy and the overall potential capacity is high compared to many other countries at similar levels of economic development. 322. The main focus of capacity building in FAO projects has been on Government staff, both at central and local level. The largest capacity building effort has been through the VFU projects. These have targeted veterinarians who continue to draw a Government stipend but are also in the process of becoming independent delivery agents for animal health services. The work with the TVA illustrates the need to go beyond training and tackle institutional development. There is evidence that capacity building through these projects has been largely effective, although more efforts are needed. 323. Food security projects have been highly focused on capacity building, but there is less evidence that any lasting institutional improvements have been achieved due to implementation difficulties and official institutional conservatism. However, there is evidence that some successful capacity building has been achieved in training a small corps of officials in the MoA and provincial departments of agriculture to carry out accurate crop assessments and in the collection of farm production data. 324. Some FAO projects have focused on grass roots capacity building, i.e. making people aware of their rights under land reform legislation, setting up common interest (CIG) groups within watershed management and community mobilisation projects and credit activities for women. It is more difficult for the evaluation to assess the impact of this type of capacity building, as much of the available evidence is anecdotal and small scale. However, some of the women’s credit groups are continuing without external assistance, as are some of the CIGs within the watershed management TCP project in Faizabad. The World Bank CAWMP – community mobilisation project in Danghara is still ongoing and it is too early to tell how sustainable the CIGs being established with WB grant funds will be once the project finishes. 325. Most of the activities being considered for development in the future are “upstream”, e.g. long-term agricultural strategy development, information system for crop assessment and agricultural marketing, development of a national strategy for irrigation. Such initiatives would surely include capacity building elements and it will be important to consider the challenges to carrying this out successfully in Tajikistan.

E. PARTNERSHIP DEVELOPMENT 326. The possibilities for partnership development in Tajikistan are more limited than in many countries. For example, whereas there are functioning international and national NGOs in the country, civil society organizations are virtually absent. FAO’s partnership possibilities include the NGOs (international and national), together with the donor community and the UNCT. FAO has been actively supporting the Tajik Veterinary Association (TVA) and this partnership with a potentially key civil society organization will hopefully continue in the future. 68

327. FAO’s profile within the UNCT became more active during the second half of 2008. This has continued and been enhanced by the present Coordinator since his arrival. This has been much appreciated within the UNCT. As noted earlier, FAO has played a strong supporting role in the elaboration of the “Green Initiative”, which is expected to be a major contribution from the UN system in the coming years. 328. Similarly, and as noted above, FAO did not actively participate in donor forums for much of the evaluation period, although there was a strong demand for this, especially with regard to the land reform issue. 329. Among the NGOs, FAO has had particularly good cooperation with German Agro-Action and the Aga Khan Foundation, both of which are major actors in Tajikistan. Various NGO initiatives to establish agricultural extension services such as SENAS and ATAC have been used to provide technical training at field level. 330. The evaluation found that, as in previous country evaluations, the Organization’s in- country presence (i.e. the Project Coordination Office in Tajikistan) plays a decisive role in FAO’s image in the country. The in-country office is almost entirely responsible for the development of partnerships. While FAO’s position has been generally weak for much of the evaluation period, the Organisation’s position has been enhanced in recent times and there are very good prospects for future improvement.

VIII. Conclusions and Recommendations 331. The evaluation has examined the FAO interventions in Tajikistan in each sectoral area against the commonly accepted evaluation criteria of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. It has also reached some general conclusions about FAO’s work that are reflected here. 332. Compared to FAO’s overall mandate relating to agricultural and rural development, the Organization has worked in a fairly limited number of areas in Tajikistan over the review period. This being said, the evaluation feels that the overall relevance of FAO’s interventions has been high for those activities that have a development orientation. Land reform is certainly one of the key areas for Tajikistan’s agricultural development and while this is a challenging area, FAO has been part of the debate. Its work has been credible and this is underscored by the desire of many interlocutors for more involvement in this area. The work on privatization of veterinary service delivery and animal health generally has also been highly relevant. Although on a much smaller scale, the work on natural resources management (particularly watersheds) has addressed a key problem in the country. 333. Agricultural input distribution activities have been less relevant. Although Tajikistan faced a number of challenges due to severe natural conditions during the evaluation period (most notably the harsh winter of 2007-08), there was less clear evidence that these interventions were necessary to alleviate food security concerns. Resources used for these interventions were not fungible, but if they had been, it is doubtful that agricultural input distribution would have been the highest priority at any time during the evaluation period. 334. The FAO interventions got mixed marks in terms of efficiency. The major inputs distribution project, which in terms of expenditure was by far the biggest during the evaluation period, was implemented very quickly once it was approved. The brucellosis vaccination programme, one of the major interventions in animal health, was also implemented efficiently, thanks to good relationships between programme administration and the veterinarians who had to administer the vaccinations. 335. Other projects were implemented less efficiently and one was even terminated early due to non-delivery. Some projects that started poorly did improve once changes were made in management, which underscored the need for effective leadership. There were also cases of 69 delayed decision-making on projects, which the evaluation believes could be addressed through greater decentralized authority to the Project Coordination Office. 336. Overall project effectiveness was variable. The main issue was that the FAO interventions were invariably partial responses to major problems, often undertaken within a limited time frame. In the most effective interventions, FAO has maintained a presence (e.g. private vets, brucellosis campaign) through repeated projects. However, a more critical issue is that some activities are implemented in the absence of a national policy framework and Government buy-in. These tend to be donor-driven: the development of the national land strategy is a good example of this. Indeed, the weakness of Government policy structures is perhaps the greatest evidence of the need for FAO’s advice, but unless that need is identified by the Government itself, such initiatives are likely to be ineffective. 337. The evaluation examined impact most systematically through a special study on VFUs, where FAO interventions have been going on for the longest time. The evaluation found some key indicators of positive impact, e.g. improved animal health due to the increased availability of veterinary medicines through the VFU programme and anecdotal evidence of reduced cases of brucellosis in humans in the 8 districts after the vaccination programme. The evaluation also identified challenges to maintaining the impact of these initiatives. Unsurprisingly, little impact was found in the case of projects that were less effective or relevant. 338. It is too early to judge the sustainability many of the interventions supported over the evaluation period. For example, one can be optimistic that private veterinary services are now well established in the country, even though the operational environment needs further improvement to solidify the gains already made. However, for many activities the follow-up has been weak, due to lack of funds (national or donor), absence of a policy framework as referred to previously, or lack of public information about successful initiatives. 339. The evaluation has arrived at the following conclusions and recommendations for FAO’s future work in Tajikistan.

A. THE FAO IN-COUNTRY PRESENCE 340. The FAO Project Coordination Office has performed with variable quality through the evaluation period, but now has sound leadership that hopefully will remain in place for several years. This is a key element to strengthening FAO’s image and presence, with the Government, donors, the UN family, NGOs and civil society. Despite this improvement, there is uncertainty about the future of the office due to its funding mechanism. Recommendation 1: Tajikistan should have a secured, full-time residential FAO presence. 341. The type and form of the FAO’s institutional presence in Tajikistan depends on both the country’s needs and the likelihood of a continuing active field programme. A combination of the on-going food security situation and the potential for a vibrant agricultural development programme indicates that a full-time FAO residential presence in Tajikistan to be based in Dushanbe is necessary and justified. The improvement of the agricultural sector is a key Government priority and there is considerable potential for agriculture as a vehicle of economic growth. 342. The long-term answer may be a full FAO Representation. However, in any case the evaluation recommends that the FAO Office be maintained with a resident Coordinator. The evaluation also concludes that an arrangement with the Sub-Regional Coordinator as FAO Representative and a resident Assistant Representative is not appropriate for FAO in Tajikistan. Recommendation 2: The Project Coordinator should be designated as Budget Holder for all national projects in Tajikistan. 70

Recommendation 3: A significant percentage of AOS income from both development and emergency projects should be assigned to the Project Office, to allow it to operate without depending on allocations from individual projects. 343. Assuming recommendation 3 is implemented, some of these funds should be used to address the assessed training needs for Project Coordination Office staff, as an investment in maintaining the necessary capacity for FAO operations in Tajikistan. 344. The evaluation is aware that the proposed course of action would be an innovation for FAO, but is justified by the particular circumstances of Tajikistan. The country has a comparatively large FAO project portfolio and is in transition from emergency to development. The evaluation believes that these measures would be in keeping with the spirit of reform in FAO and would demonstrate how the Organization can consider tailoring solutions to fit specific circumstances.

B. FOCUS OF FAO ACTIVITIES AND TRANSITION FROM EMERGENCY TO DEVELOPMENT 345. The evaluation found that some of the projects were less effective because they did not have a policy framework in which to operate. While interventions can have a pilot aspect to them, long-term impact and sustainability depend on an appropriate level of policy and financial support. This was the case particularly for efforts aimed at developing market-based agriculture and support systems, as was done in the case of animal health. 346. The evaluation also found that it was difficult for FAO (as well as other international organizations and donors) to engage the Government on policy issues, even when this was part of project strategy. However, attempts at dialogue must be persistent and FAO needs to strengthen its efforts on a few, high priority issues. There appears to be limited demand for policy development from the GoT, which at times seemed more comfortable with an ambiguous legislative framework than with a clear and precise one, e.g. on land reform. In the case of animal health, the development of a proper legal framework has been postponed by FAO and SVI because it was deemed premature, but it is now becoming imperative to protect private veterinarians. FAO could support the policy debate to reform the state vet service, including rationalizing the number, function and location of diagnostic labs, their capacity / equipment / training including a cost recovery policy. This rationalization is long over due and would help immensely to reform and improve the state veterinary service and the control of animal diseases and zoonoses in Tajikistan. 347. Because of the type of funding available from donors in Tajikistan, FAO has channeled its support in various programme areas (e.g. land reform, animal health, women’s self-help groups) through a series of short-term emergency projects. This is a practiced approach of FAO emergency programmes, to reconcile the need for longer-term involvement with the availability of short-term funding. However, so far these longer-term programmes had no formal existence in FAO planning instruments. Furthermore, effective transition work requires greater involvement of other technical Divisions and Departments, besides TCE. Ways and means of working together towards common ends must be found. The NMTPF presents an opportunity to articulate transition work in a more formal and detailed manner than would be the case without it. The NMTPF will need to be framed in the context of the planned national Agricultural Strategy now being developed. Recommendations Recommendation 4: FAO should provide support aimed at a better understanding of the economic background of production and promoting agriculture as a profitable business, thus enhancing the appeal of agriculture as a means of livelihood. Emphasis should be on creating an effective legal framework (e.g. market reforms, appropriate trade regulations; 71 land tenure; micro-credits). This support should aim at ensuring that agricultural enterprises, when undertaken, represent an acceptable return on investment. Recommendation 5: Policy dialogue and formulation is an area where FAO should assist the Government of Tajikistan. Key areas of FAO comparative advantage include: definition of public and private responsibilities in animal health; grazing rights; upland conservation and management. Better means for engaging the Government should be developed and agreed. Recommendation 6: A new National Medium-Term Priority Framework should be prepared that clearly specifies FAO’s comparative advantages to undertake areas of work in Tajikistan and includes outcomes to be achieved.

C. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON SECTORAL WORK Livestock (Animal health, production, feeding and restocking) Conclusions 348. The animal health interventions have been relevant. The most positive results have been achieved through supporting the development of private veterinary practice and the umbrella organization, the Tajikistan Veterinary Association (TVA). Less sustainable has been the free distribution of fodder seed and fertilizer, animal feed, vitamins and minerals. 349. Most of the FAO’s activities in the Livestock sector would have been better managed through long-term development programmes. In the circumstances it is commendable that FAO has managed to source successions of short term projects for the development of various livestock-related initiatives. Recommendation 7: FAO should seek means to assist the Government in development of appropriate veterinary policy and legislation which should have as main objectives to foster an enabling environment for improving food security, reducing poverty and increasing availability of safe livestock products. 350. Needs to be addressed could include: a) Better definition of public-private roles as part of the veterinary legislation. The government should be encouraged to clearly define which tasks and services are seen as a public task and which as private good and how they will be performed. b) Principles of cost recovery and payment for goods and services, whereby a clear division between vaccines for public and private good, based on economic and sound technical veterinary strategies is made and adhered to. c) Developing the partnership between SVI and TVA, in which the TVA will increasingly take over parts of the facilitating role currently played by FAO. d) Establishment of a National Development Plan for veterinary diagnostics. The development of an NDP for veterinary diagnostics would be an important instrument to help coordinate efficient and effective donor investments in laboratory facilities and capacity. An NDP would also help identify who should participate in training and study trips. e) Reform of the public veterinary service relating to the SVI staffing and funding policy, so that downsizing does not go together with proportional budget cuts, but at least maintains the same budget to improve the effectiveness of the SVI. f) Increase availability of quality assured livestock remedies and vaccines and veterinary services. 72

Crops and Seeds, including Emergency Interventions Conclusions 351. FAO’s ‘emergency’ projects providing free inputs of seed and other agricultural inputs may have been needed in the past, but this type of assistance is no longer warranted in Tajikistan. 352. Assisting Tajikistan to produce its own supply of high quality seed for wheat and a diversity of other crops in order to escape the country’s dependence on imported seed should be a high priority. The national seed production system neither functions efficiently nor produces good quality products. There is no system of seed certification. FAO has the experience and comparative advantage to help with this. Recommendation 8: FAO should assist the development of commercialized seed production in Tajikistan. 353. Possible intervention areas include: a) assisting the GoT with applied research and variety selection, establishment of seed laws, standards, an internationally acceptable system of seed certification and possibly the production of early generations of seed; and b) assisting the private sector in commercial seed production and multiplication. This could include clean virus free potato seed multiplication and commercialisation through a voucher and agro-shop system, as a follow-up to the successful CIDA- funded project for potato tissue culture. Recommendation 9: FAO should negotiate a revised grant with the World Bank away from free seed distribution in order to support greater sustainability. 354. Elements of the new project could be: a) a pilot voucher scheme for a broader range of inputs according to farmers’ choice- including potato and other types of seed; b) establishing trials of potentially good variety lines in a number of agro-ecological locations in the country; and c) selecting contract farmers and /or establishing farmer groups for commercial seed multiplication as has been successfully done under the FAO-led programme in Afghanistan. Locust Control 355. Conclusion: Locust control techniques used in Tajikistan need to be brought up to date, e.g. use of ULVs, improved information collection, transmission, follow-up and analysis. The GoT has shown great reluctance to adopt up to date methods of controlling locusts. Part of that resistance is based on the misuse of broad spectrum insecticides donated for locust control for control of cotton pests. 356. FAO should continue efforts to establish a regional forum for coordinated information collection on swarms, egg bed location and the promotion of an effective prevention and control strategy. Priorities must include developing national capacity and a culture of cooperation across national borders. Recommendation 10: FAO should encourage adoption of modern methods of locust control and prevention and support the creation of a properly staffed and funded unit dedicated to locust control . Recommendation 11: Continue development of a regional approach for locust control. 73

Watershed Management and Community Mobilisation 357. Conclusion: The GoT recognises the need for an integrated approach to the management of upland watersheds and catchments. The success and sustainability of such management systems will only be achieved with the full participation of the local rural communities. 358. CAWMP is proving to be an effective instrument for community mobilisation, motivation and development. However, it has not addressed issues related to participatory integrated management of the watershed. A second phase could be used to develop an integrated watershed management system for the Toirsu watershed involving all the communities, building on the lessons from the TCP project on integrated watershed management in Faisabad. Recommendation 12: A second phase of the CAWMP in the Toirsu watershed Danghara should be developed as an appropriate platform for an ‘Integrated Participatory Watershed Management’ project. Land Reform 359. Conclusion: Land Reform is a critical and highly politicized issue in Tajikistan. A major achievement by FAO was its role in establishing the first working group on land reform, thus creating a partnership between Government, civil society, and donors. Recommendation 13: FAO should play a leadership role on land and agricultural policy. 360. FAO has demonstrated how it can play a valuable advisory role by working within the structure of the Government-DCC agricultural working group. Given the new possibility for meaningful reform implemented by the Government as a result of Presidential Decree No. 663 of 2009, the FAO should: − take a leadership role in the sector through technical advisory support to the Government- DCC working group; − seek to develop strong working partnerships with key government institutions, such as the Agency for Land Management, Geodesy and Cadastre (ALMGC), to support development and implementation of new policy in the agriculture and land sectors by the key Government bodies responsible for implementation; and − seek the means to provide technical assistance to address key policy and legal issues raised by the working group. 361. In this connection, FAO should focus on working with Government bodies on project design and defining project objectives . The Land Strategy was completed by FAO without sufficient understanding by the ALMGC of its role and obligations. To avoid similar problems in future land reform projects, FAO should: − work closely with Government to structure objectives and activities, thereby clearly defining the roles of each partner, the resources (both human and material) that each partner intends to contribute to the project, and how the Government counterpart responsible for the project will take ownership over the project; − make clear and explicit its rules concerning payments to Government staff; − seek to build Government capacity by placing within the counterpart agencey the advisors responsible for outputs under an agreement with the relevant counterpart agency that included the advisors’ terms of reference and methods of engagement with agency staff. 362. As part of the Government buy-in, FAO should secure dedicated Government resources to fulfil project activities. For example, if Government staff is needed to develop policy initiatives, FAO should ask the relevant Government Agency to assign staff to complete this work in cooperation with the project. 363. FAO should no longer fund legal aid services. Other donor projects will continue support for legal aid to rural citizens. FAO does not have strong technical expertise and experience in developing legal aid services and systems. Two donors, Swiss Development Corporation (SDC) 74 and USAID, will soon begin projects that will fill the need to support the continued development of legal aid on land issues, making it possible for FAO to exit this field. Both have a strong background in the subject and these donor projects should provide sufficient resources to help make legal aid to rural citizens and farmers sustainable at a high level of service. Gender Mainstreaming and Women in Development Conclusions 364. In general, FAO projects have made efforts to include women. In some projects, women and women-headed households have been the primary focus of attention. However, some projects, particularly those which distributed inputs, did not effectively consider the gender dimension. Recommendation 14: Specific strategies should be developed to address gender considerations, particularly in projects aimed at restoring and improving livelihoods. 365. Possible activities in such projects may be: • inclusion of crops on which the household food security depends such as vegetables and fruit; • more training in processing, preserving and cooking of such crops; • provision of women with low maintenance, high productivity poultry and small livestock and appropriate extension advice, as opposed to large animals that may give a slow return at high maintenance costs; • training in other traditional skills that can be managed from the house and garden such as silk production or beekeeping; and • more training in marketing, the management of small business and credit.

E

REPORT

FAO TAJIKISTAN COUNTRY EVALUATION

ANNEXES

JULY 2009

ANNEX I The Existing and Ongoing FAO Programme

1. FAO Establishment – Tajikistan as at July 1 st 2009

Coordination Unit 1 Mr. Nassim Jawad FAO Coordinator 2 Mr. Shuhrat Igamberdyev National Program Officer

3 Ms. Manizha Nabieva Snr. Finance/Administrative Officer

4 Mr. Sergei Malitsky Administrative Officer 5 Ms. Zevara Khodjieva Finance Assistant

6 Mr. Behzod Tursumatov Finance/Admin Assistant

7 Mr. Alimahmad Mirov Snr. Driver 8 Ms. Shahnoza Khasanova Receptionist

9 Ms. Parvina Rakhmatulloeva Receptionist (temporary)

10 Mr. Asadullo Odinaev System Administrator/IT Specialist 11 Mr. Karimjon Azimjanov Driver

12 Mr. Hamrakul Abdurahmanov Driver

W0000

2

Emergency Projects 801/804/TCP 13 Mr. Khurshed Kholov National Project Manager 14 Mr. Maruf Salomov Procurement /Logistics Officer

15 Mr. Daler Nazarov Monitoring Officer

16 Mr. Sadriddin Juraev Monitoring Officer 17 Mr. Manuchehr Miralibekov Monitoring Officer

18 Mr. Azam Ibragimov Driver

Emergency WBK 19 Ms. Svetlana Livinets Int. Project Manager

20 Mr. Abdusaloh Rasulov National Project Manager

21 Mr. Vafo Hamroi Logistics Assistant 22 Ms. Sanavbar Sherova Project Assistant

23 Ms. Davlatmo Yusufbekova Monitoring/Reporting Officer

24 Mr. Rustam Raimnazarov Driver

Livestock (Animal Health Compound) 25 Mr. Karomatullo Khamroev National Project Manager

26 Mr. Solejon Mirzoev Assistant National Project Manager/TVA 27 Mr. Salim Nosirov Logistic Clerk

28 Mr. Tolibjon Hakimov National Database Specialist

29 Mr. Vladimir Mogilev National Project Finance/Admin Officer Assistant National Project 30 Mr. Zoir Musoev Manager/Trainings 31 Mr. Mahmadamin Sahimov Veterinary Trainer/Monitor Assistant National Project Manager on 32 Mr. Sharof Rahimov Animal Production 33 Mr. Mirshakar Negmatov Driver/Logistics Assistant

34 Mr. Rahmon Innoyatov Driver

Transboundary Diseases 35 Mr. Sangimurod Murvatulloev National Epidemologist

36 Ms. Kamila Yuldasheva Project Assistant 37 Mr. Muso Boborajabov Driver

Brucellosis II 38 Mr. David Ward Int. Project Manager 39 Mr. Adham Boltaev National Project Manager

40 Mr. Khurshed Muhabbatov Assistant Project Manager 3

41 Ms. Rukhshona Rajabova Data Base Spesialist/Project Assistant

42 Mr. Bahtiyor Tolibov Driver

Avian Influenza 43 Mr. Nodir Toshmatov National Project Manager

44 Mr. Abdukarim Muminov National Consultant 45 Mr. Saidmusayab Aliyamov Project Administrative Assistant

46 Mr. Farivar Afsahzod Project Administrative Assistant/Translator

47 Mr. Firuz Rakhimov AI Monitor Supervisor 48 Mr. Jamshed Usmanov AI Regional Monitor (Sugd)

49 Mr. Sijoudin Revojov AI Regional Monitor (Khatlon)

50 Mr. Murodbek Azizbekov AI Regional Monitor (GBAO) 51 Mr. Izatullo Ibragimov Driver

Livestock and Pasture Rehabilitation Project 52 Mr. Kuvat Bapaev International Project Manager 53 Mr. Ibrohim Ahmadov National Project Manager

54 Mr. Aziz Nabidjonov Finance Assistant/Project Assistant(605/EC) 55 Mr. Safarali Naimov National Consultant on Pasture 56 Mr. Azam Salimov National Consultant Entomologist

57 Mr. Adilzhan Yakubov National Consultant FSS Trainer National Consultant on Processing and 58 Mr. Shoahmad Mirzoahmadov Marketing

59 Mr. Hoji Karimov Driver Watershed Management Project 60 Mr. Azamjon Ibodov National Project Manager

61 Mr. Abdujabbor Hakimov National Consultant 62 Mr. Zumrad Bahdirova Facilitator

63 Mr. Doniyor Ibodov Admin/Finance Assistant

64 Mr. Boymurod Qurbonov Facilitator 65 Mr. Zulol Djalolov Driver

General Service 66 Mr. Yury Shaposhnikov IT Support Specialist 67 Mr. Shokir Hodzhiev Security Guard (AHC)

68 Mr. Nazarali Buriev Security Guard (AHC)

69 Mr. Batyr Norov Security Guard (AHC) 70 Ms. Zuhro Babaerova Cleaner (AHC) 4

71 Mr. Faizidin Oev Gardener (AHC)

72 Ms. Irina Merzlikina Cleaner (Coordination Office)

5

2. Ongoing Projects as at July 1 st 2009

# Donor Code Title Budget Project Duration Start End Ext Status location(s) 1 WB UTF/TAJ/004/TAJ E.F.S. and 5,000,000 DRS & 12 months Sep- Aug- On-going Seed Imports Khatlon 08 09 2 FAO TCP/TAJ/3104 (E) E.A. to T. 420,000 DRS & 15 months Apr- Dec- July- On-going aquaculture, 08 09 livestock, Khatlon 08 (concluding) assessment & programme development 3 EC OSRO/TAJ/805/EC Improving 1,563,620 Khatlon 24 months May- Apr- On-going living + 173.735 08 10 standards in co-fund Khatlon control of brucellosis 4 SDC OSRO/TAJ/804/SWI E.P. of animal 1,060,740 Khatlon 16 months April- Jul-09 On-going feed & fodder 08 seed, clinical (Muminabad, (concluding) vet services & Baljuvan & training Khovaling) 5 SIDA OSRO/TAJ/801/SWE E.S. of animal 496,650 DRS 18 months Feb- Dec- July- On-going feed to 08 08 09 affected (concluding) livestock farmers 6 FAO TCP/TAJ/3103 (D) Preparation of 374,000 Country- 27 months Sep- July- Dec- On-going a national wide 07 09 09 Forest Programme 7 W.B. OSRO/TAJ/701/WB Avian Flu 1,000,000 Country- 36 months Apr- Mar- On-going control and wide 07 10 pandemic preparedness & response 8 SIDA GCP/TAJ/001/SWE Support to 3,019,874 Country- 36 months Apr- Mar- On-going Animal Health wide 07 10 sector 9 EC OSRO/TAJ/605/EC Improved F.S. 1,114,860 Khatlon 24 months Jan-07 Dec- Dec- On-going in selected 08 09 areas. Enhanced livestock production and pasture rehab. 10 FAO TCP/TAJ/3101 (E) E.A. to raise 295,000 Khatlon 24 months Jan-07 Dec- Dec- On-going F.S. and 08 09 reduce livelihood vulnerability in Khatlon 11 WB OSRO/TAJ/603/WB Community 499,972 Khatlon 36 months Dec- Nov- On-going agriculture & 06 09 Watershed Management (CAWMP) 12 FAO TCP/TAJ/3102 & TCP Facility 56,585 Country- 33 months Mar- Dec- On-going wide (total) 07 09 13 TCP/TAJ/3201 155,424 Total Ongoing 15,429,725 6

+ 173,735 co funding Note: E.P = Emergency Provision; E.D. E.F.S. = Emergency Food Security. E.S. Emergency Supply. E.A. = Emergency Assistance. F.S. Food Security.

3. Completed National Projects referred to by the Evaluation

# Donor Code Title Funding Location(s) Time From To Exte Status scale nsio n 1 Sweden OSRO/TAJ/301/SWE E.A.A. to female 291,667 DRS; 12 m Apr- Mar- Completed headed hh Khatlon 03 04 2 Sweden OSRO/TAJ/302/SWE Devel’pmt of self- 962,662 DRS; 39 m Oct- Dec- Completed sustaining animal- Khatlon; 03 06 health & field support Sughd; services GBAO 3 Norway OSRO/TAJ/303/NOR Improved public health, 125,000 DRS; 12 m Aug- Jul-04 Completed Brucellosis control Khatlon 03 4 Canada OSRO/TAJ/604/CAN Monitoring F.S. in 326,632 DRS; 20 m July- Mar- Completed Tajikistan Khatlon; 06 08 Sugd; GBAO 5 Canada OSRO/TAJ/602/CAN Improved F.S. through 1,700,000 DRS; 26 m Oct- Dec- Completed institutional & gender Khatlon; 06 08 sensitive land reform Sughd; GBAO 6 Canada OSRO/TAJ/401/CAN Est’lmt of disease-free 551,519 DRS; 31 m June- Dec- Completed Seed Potato Production Khatlon; 04 06 to increase & sustain Sugd food availability 7 Canada OSRO/TAJ/402/CAN Monitoring progress on 394,157 DRS; 20 m May- Dec- Completed Land Reform Khatlon; 04 05 Sugd 8 Canada OSRO/TAJ/403/CAN Coord’n of emergency 509,354 20 m May- Dec- Completed & rehab ag. operations 04 05 9 Canada OSRO/TAJ/404/CAN E.A.A. to food insecure 252,462 Khatlon 20 m May- Dec- Completed female-headed hh 04 05 10 Canada OSRO/TAJ/405/CAN Assistance to control 392,132 DRS; 30 m. Jul-04 Dec- Completed Brucellosis , Khatlon 06 development & impl’tn of NBCP in 8 regions 11 E.U. OSRO/TAJ/501/EC Improving living 771,350 Khatlon 15 m Oct- Dec- Completed standards in Khatlon- 05 06 Brucellosis control + 300,000 c-fund 12 E.U./ECH OSRO/TAJ/802/EC E.S. of Animal Feed 272,315 Khatlon 6 m Mar- Aug- Completed O 08 08 13 UNHCR OSRO/TAJ/702/CHA E.A. to returnees & 119,814 DRS; 3 m June- Sept- land lease –Pvte Khatlon; 07 07 farmers Sugd 14 UNHCR OSRO/TAJ/803/CHA E.A. for controlling 410,163 DRS; 26 m Oct- July- Completed 2008 locust outbreak Khatlon; 06 08 Sugd; GBAO 15 FAO TCP/TAJ/2903 Participatory Int. 291,667 DRS 36 m Jan-03 Dec- Completed Water’d Mgmt 05 16 FAO TCP/TAJ/3001 Support for the 360,878 Khatlon 28 m Jan-04 Apr- Completed preparation of Investmt 06 projects –Agro-Food 7

Centre 17 FAO TCP/TAJ/3002 E.A. control of PPR 300,000 Khatlon 21 m Sept- May- Completed 05 07 Total 8,072,186 Funding + Plus Total Co- 300,000 funding c-fund

Note: E.P = Emergency Provision; E.D. E.F.S. = Emergency Food Security. E.S. Emergency Supply. E.A. = Emergency Assistance. E.A.A.= Emergency Agricultural Assistance. F.S. = Food Security.

In addition to the national projects, the Evaluation examined Tajikistan’s participation in a number of regional, interregional and global projects. It is not possible to quantify the budget for Tajikistan in these projects. They are:

1. GCPS/INT/814/EC “Intensified Monitoring of Food Security in Five CIS Low-Income Food Deficit Countries” 2. GCP/GLO/162/EC “EC/FAO Food Security Programme Phase II” 3. GTFS/INT/907/ITA “Controlling Transboundary Animal Diseases in Central Asian Countries” 4. OSRO/GLO/504/MUL “Emergency Assistance for the Control and Prevention of Avian Influenza” 5. OSRO/GLO/601/SWE “Emergency Assistance for the Control and Prevention of Avian Influenza - AI activities in Asia, Middle East and North Africa” 6. OSRO/RAS/601/ASB “Regional Coordination of Avian Influenza Control and Prevention in Asia” 7. OSRO/GLO/702/CAN “Contribution of the Government of Canada to FAO’s Global Programme for Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Control and Eradication” 8. OSRO/RAS/704/SWE “Support for the control and prevention of Highly Pathogenic Influenza (HPAI) in Asia” 9. TCP/INT/2902 “Support to Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) for the Preparation of a Regional Programme for Food Security” 10. TCP/INT/3102 “Strengthening Seed Supply in the ECO Region, with Specific Emphasis on Central Asia” 11. TCP/INT/3202 “Improving Management of Migratory and other Locusts in the Caucasus and Central Asia” 12. TCP/RER/3205 “Advice to Central Asian Governments on the Feasibility of Commercial Fish and Livestock Feed Production”

8

ANNEX II Technical Cooperation Programme (TCP) 1. It is FAO corporate evaluation policy that all major evaluations covering project activity should separately review TCP projects. This is to provide accountability to FAO’s membership on the use of TCP funds provided under the FAO Regular Budget and to draw lessons for other, similar projects that may be considered for further implementation. 2. During this review period (2005 to 2009), eight national TCP projects were implemented. The present document reviews six of these projects, i.e. all those except the TCP Facility, which is used for ad hoc consultancies that are mentioned in Section V.H of the main report. 3. Each of these national projects is scored in four areas: relevance; design and implementation; results/effects and sustainability/impact. The projects were scored against a 6- point scale corresponding to: 6=very high; 5=well above average; 4= slightly above average; 3=slightly below average; 2-well below average; 1=very unsatisfactory.

TCPs EVALUATED BY THE MISSION FOR THE EVALUATION OF FAO ACTIVITIES IN TAJIKISTAN 2005 to 2009

1. TCP/TAJ/2903: Participatory Integrated Watershed Management in Upland Areas Budget: US$ 291,667 – January 2003 to December 2005 (36 months) Status: Completed and reporting cleared a) Background and context of intervention 4. About 93% of Tajikistan is mountainous with almost half of that being above 3,000 masl. Poor management of grazing land, deforestation, and particularly the increase in inappropriate rain-fed cereal cropping on steep hillsides and in some places leaking irrigation systems are leading to erosion and the degrading of the uplands, of which as much as 98% are reported to be severely eroded. There is much loss of topsoil, increased flooding and siltation of reservoirs and lowland irrigation systems. If the negative impact on rural lives and livelihoods is to be reversed, this trend must be arrested and good systems of natural resource management introduced. This will only be achieved with the full co-operation and participation of the rural communities concerned. 5. A continuing legacy of the old Soviet system combined with the trauma of civil war and the struggle for daily existence is the passiveness of the rural population when it comes to taking initiatives to recognize and solve their problems. 6. FAO were requested by the GoT to assist with the development of Participatory Integrated Watershed Management, which gave rise to this TCP project. A suitable location was selected encompassing two rural Communities within the Bodomo sub-watershed in the Sangbur river catchment of Faizabad district, north east of Dushanbe. 7. In December 2004, the GoT appointed the Soil Science Research Institute (SSRI), part of the Agrarian Academy of Sciences (AAS), as the lead institution to tackle issues related to the improved management of the watersheds, working in close collaboration with the Ministry of the Environmental Protection and Forestry and the Land Commission. Five national consultants were recruited from the SSRI, led by its Director who was selected to be national project coordinator for the TCP. In addition, an INGO (German Agro Action) with experience of rural community development in Tajikistan came in with FAO as an Implementing Partner (IP). 9

b) Project objectives and design 8. The objective of the project was to assist the GoT in its efforts to reverse the degradation of upland resources and the deterioration of the income of the local people. It was intended to be a pilot project in which the methodologies of Participatory Integrated Watershed Management would be implemented and tested. The experiences and lessons learned would then be replicated elsewhere in Tajikistan. c) Project start up and implementation 9. The following project activities were implemented: a) the Bodomo –sub-watershed was delineated and participatory integrated watershed management approaches and techniques were tested and implemented with the collaboration of the rural communities; b) the social and economic conditions of the local communities were assessed and their needs identified through baseline studies and Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA); c) a package of income generating and management activities were identified and a number of common interest groups (CIG) established for improved cultivation and seasonal/rotational grazing management, including tree planting and income generating activities for women’s groups; d) national technicians, farmers, herdsmen and villagers were familiarized with the approaches and technologies of watershed management planning and the practical implementation of participatory watershed management activities; and e) five project profiles were prepared. 10. The project was implemented over a period of 24 months, starting in September 2003 and it was later extended for one month to permit holding a workshop to review experiences and lessons learned. d) Outputs, process and outcomes 11. The pilot project was very effective and successful. Much of what was established during the project is still in place in terms of improved grazing management and farming practices. CIGs formed around agricultural/horticultural enterprises are still working. Also still surviving are two women’s groups organized to assist small income earning enterprises with working capital from a revolving fund and membership fees. However, these are struggling in the face of rising costs. 12. Less effective was the support to a greenhouse for tree propagation managed by the SSRI a few km away from the Bodomo site, which was observed to be in a state of neglect, possibly because of lack of institutional funds to maintain it. e) Impact, catalytic role, impact, sustainability and follow-up 13. The evaluation observed that small private farming enterprises are continuing successfully and improved management practices are still being maintained. At the time of the evaluation visit, most of the village livestock were away in the higher mountains on the summer pastures ( ayloq ), so their condition could not be ascertained. However, the hill grazing immediately above and surrounding the villages was in exceptionally good condition, due in good measure to the fact that this has been an exceptional year for rainfall and the upland grazing is everywhere particularly good. 14. The project’s impact has been considerable in its immediate locality. But one of the main purposes of the project remains unfulfilled. As a pilot project it was intended that the experiences and lessons learned should be replicated elsewhere in Tajikistan on a more widespread basis. This has not yet been done. In this respect an opportunity has been missed although it is still not too late. 10

15. The similarly titled FAO project –OSRO/TAJ/603/WB “Community Agricultural and Watershed Management Project” in the Toirsu watershed in Danghara (Khatlon), although following some of this TCP’s methodology in respect to baseline survey, PRA and the establishment of CIGs, misses the essential ingredient of ‘participatory integrated watershed management’. CAWMP remains a community mobilization and development project within a watershed, but is not engaged in watershed management as such. f) Project priority and relevance 16. The project was entirely relevant to some important national issues relating to the country’s watersheds. This is a priority issue. The pity is that the successes, experience and lessons learned during the course of this TCP have not yet effectively been followed up or replicated elsewhere. TCP/TAJ/2903 Evaluation Summary Table for TCP projects Score 1-6

Overall relevance to country needs and priorities 6 Overall conformity to FAO priorities and comparative advantages 5 Feasibility, clarity and appropriateness of design (either at formulation or as 5 specified on project start-up) Implementation 5 Outputs and process, quality and quantity 5 Achievement and quality of Outcomes 5 Catalytic role/Sustainability 4

Follow-up (actual or potential) 2

*: 1=very poor; 2=poor; 3=inadequate; 4=adequate; 5=good; 6=excellent

2. TCP/TAJ/3001: Support to the Preparation of Investment Projects within the National Programme for Food Security (Agro-Food Centre) Budget: US$360,878- January 2004 to April 2006 (28 months) Status: Completed and reporting cleared a) Background and context of intervention 17. Before this project, FAO had been assisting the GoT improve its capability in addressing Food Security issues and establishing an early warning capability since the 1990s through a series of national and regional projects. These had consisted of in-country training and study trips for key people, mostly from Goskomstat and the MoA. The TCP was related to that effort. b) Project objectives and design 18. This project provided support to the Project Monitoring and Food Security Unit (PMFSU) in the MoA (later renamed as the Agro Food-Centre (AFC)) and other concerned government agencies in formulating a National Programme for Food Security. This included assisting the GoT to design, analyze and evaluate food security/agricultural programmes and projects. More specifically it aimed to: i) finalise the first National Programme for Food Security (NPFS) and its initial mid-term investment programme; 11

ii) strengthen the capacity of the AFC, MoA and other concerned government agencies; and iii) ensure that AFC became fully operational. 19. In view of the lack of capacity within the government agencies of this type, capacity building support is considered relevant. However, it should have been part of a long term capacity building effort, which would have been longer and therefore not amenable to solution with a TCP project alone. 20. The project was designed around the principles of national leadership and implemented using a participatory approach, involving national government, civil society and the private sector with considerable emphasis placed on coordination and cooperation between programmes and amongst national staff/workers on food security and other related issues. However, this did not really happen (see below). Emphasis was placed on on-the-job training in all aspects of food security. c) Project start-up and implementation 21. The project was implemented on time and carried out nearly all of an ambitious work plan. After an inception workshop, the project carried out information gathering and training and conducted food security surveys and rapid appraisals including: 1.1 Case Studies in Cotton and Wheat; 1.2 Crop and Food Supply Assessment; 1.3 Food Consumption Norms. 22. The project set up a Food Security Computer Monitoring System with computer databases for Food Consumption Monitoring and Food Security Monitoring. 23. The project’s main tasks were preparation of a national food security strategy (NFSS) and formulation of the Mid-term Food Security Investment Programme (FSIP), including investment projects. The project also was intended to establish a National Food Security Fund (NFSF), but during project implementation it was considered to be too early to establish it. d) Outputs, process and outcomes 24. Summarised below is the final outcome of the following:

i. Finalise the first National Programme for Food Security (NPFS) and its initial mid-term investment programme. According to the Final Report: “ A draft Food Security and AIC Development Strategy was jointly prepared by the Working Group consisting of the MoA, the Ministries of Land Reclamation and Water Resources (MLRWR), Health (MoH), Economy and Trade, Finance MoF) and the State Land Committee (SLC) as well as donors including the World Bankk, the EC, UNDP and FAO and the project international and national consultants and became a part of the National Development Strategy” . But the preparation of a detailed investment programme remained a recommendation only when the project closed and it is not clear that it developed much beyond this.

ii. Strengthen the capacity of the AFC, MoA and other concerned government agencies. iii. Ensure that AFC became fully operational. 25. The AgroFood Centre survived after the end of the project, but in name only and a number of its trained staff left the organization getting jobs with other agencies including the FAO leaving some individual capacity rather than institutional. 12

26. Some individual capacity in undertaking crop assessment and farm data collection remains in the MoA as referred to elsewhere, but at present without the institutional framework to give it national significance or credibility. 27. Although the project achieved some of its outputs, a number of significant institutional issues remained and there is little evidence that the Mid-term Investment Programme ever produced anything of substance. The project relied on collaboration between different ministries and agencies that were not used to working together. This pin-pointed a serious issue and weakness, and one of the project’s recommendations was that networking among different institutions and stakeholders should be strengthened at both national and regional level and a step- by-step action plan prepared setting out the rights and responsibilities of all parties involved. It was recognized at the end of the project that outside the MoA there was still poor awareness of food security issues among other government agencies and it recommended that the GoT should help to raise public awareness on food security issues. In particular it recommended that the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade (MoEDT) should be encouraged and involved and that FAO should support this. This happened but with adverse consequences. e) Impact, catalytic role, sustainability and follow-up 28. To quote from the Project’s final report: “Project Sustainability” “ Although the continuation of some activities has been secured through the EC (TACIS) and WFP programmes in Tajikistan, it is recommended that at MoA’s level all efforts should be made in financing and supporting the project activities such as the maintenance of the website; ongoing training; support of bulletins on agriculture and FS issues; support regular updating of statistics and FS security database.” 29. This seems to have been wishful thinking because in 2007 responsibility for such things was transferred to the MoEDT with the consequence that FAO’s following FS Project OSRO/ TAJ/604/CAN came to a premature end in March 2008 with unspent funds returned to the Canadian Government (see section on Food Security). 30. The experience of this project highlights some of the difficulties and challenges of working with government institutions in Tajikistan. In the existing political and institutional framework, this is bound to be a challenge and ultimate success will take time, effort and patience. Significantly, without continued FAO support the AFC ceased to function effectively. A number of the national staff trained by FAO later went on to work with other FAO and internationally supported projects so some of the technical capacity has been retained albeit not with the institution as originally intended. f) Project priority and relevance 31. The need for the GoT to have a capability to deal with food security issues remains as true now as it did in the 1990s when FAO began its assistance. The experiences gained through several ‘Food Security’ projects working with the GoT have shown how difficult it is to bring about changes in government institutional attitudes and mind set unless they have genuinely ‘bought in’ to the concept. Huge efforts are required for apparently limited returns. Although there is evidence of improved capacity at an individual level institutional inertia remains. However, with past experiences to build on, different personalities in place in both the relevant government offices and the FAO Project Coordination Office it would seem worthwhile reviewing the possibility of FAO re-engaging with the appropriate ministries and institutions to see how most effectively to assist the country improve its food security monitoring and early warning capabilities. 13

TCP/TAJ/3001 Evaluation Summary Table for TCP projects Score 1-6

Overall relevance to country needs and priorities 4 Overall conformity to FAO priorities and comparative advantages 6 Feasibility, clarity and appropriateness of design (either at formulation or as 4 specified on project start-up) Implementation 4 Outputs and process, quality and quantity 2 Achievement and quality of Outcomes 2 Catalytic role/Sustainability 2 Follow-up (actual or potential) 1

*: 1=very poor; 2=poor; 3=inadequate; 4=adequate; 5=good; 6=excellent

3. TCP/TAJ/3002: Emergency Assistance to Control an Outbreak of Pest des Petits Ruminants Budget: US$ 300,000- September 2006 to May 2007 (21 months) Status: Completed and reporting cleared a) Background and context of intervention 32. During the early period of FAO’s work on brucellosis control, farmers in certain areas reported high incidence of mortality in sheep and goats, which was originally attributed to Pasteurellosis infection. When it was observed that vaccination against Pasteurella did not reduce the mortality, blood samples from infected animals were sent to the OIE reference laboratory for PPR in France. In November 2004 the results returned positive for PPR. This was the first time there had been a confirmed diagnosis of PPR in Tajikistan. This was not surprising, given the large numbers of Afghan refugees that had come into the country in the nineties. PPR was already diagnosed in Afghanistan in 1995. The presence of adult goats and sheep with antibodies against PPR also led to the conclusion that the disease was already largely endemic in Tajikistan and country-wide surveillance would have shown many more foci than the reported ones. It was thus important to formulate a strategy for the control of PPR in Tajikistan if not for its complete eradication. Although there is a suspicion that PPR has already spread beyond the borders of Tajikistan this has not yet been properly investigated or officially reported. b) Project objectives and design 33. Although the objective as stated was “to protect the food security of the most vulnerable population groups and prevent a further descent into poverty through vaccination campaigns leading to reduction in PPR spread among sheep and goats”, it is clear that the real objective was to introduce a national control strategy and diagnostic capacity for PPR in the country. In a national PPR control programme, all sheep and goats should be targeted and all those owning small ruminants must be the target for training and information campaigns, poor and rich alike. 34. The specific objectives should have been correctly formulated as: reduce the impact of the current epidemic and bring it under control; and strengthen the foundation for future PPR control and other TADs in Tajikistan. 14

35. The project was designed to work in all oblasts of Tajikistan, in the districts in which the disease had been detected and 20km around newly identified outbreaks. The project strategy was to: i) reduce viral activity to prevent further spread of the virus through blanket vaccination in districts and where PPR presence had been identified; ii) vaccinate newborn animals in those districts after the third month of age; and iii) carry out ring vaccination around new outbreaks found by the GTFS/INT/907/ITA trans-border disease project or from serological evidence. 36. It is extremely difficult to budget for such a project as in the first place there is usually a large discrepancy between animals reported present in official statistics and those that exist in reality. To add to this difficulty, small ruminants in Tajikistan migrate between seasonal mountain pastures and it is difficult to predict how many animals will reside at any given time in a particular place. 37. Outbreaks cannot be predicted and thus it is difficult to guarantee that there is sufficient vaccine for the intended ring vaccinations. The largest project expense was for one million doses of vaccine, the other large element was for the contracting of veterinarians to apply the vaccine.

c) Project start–up and implementation 38. Although the project intended to do blanket vaccination in outbreak areas, it turned out that the number of sheep and goats was much higher than the officially reported figures, so that there was not enough vaccine for blanket vaccination. As it was found that many of the older animals had antibodies, the strategy was changed to vaccinating young animals between 6 and 12 months, in either spring or autumn. Tattooing the ears of animals to identify those that had been vaccinated proved cumbersome. It was proposed instead to cut notches in vaccinated animals’ ears, but the problem was the already common practice for owners to notch their animals’ ears for identification. So this also led to confusion. 39. The PPR laboratory diagnostic capacity was built up in the FMD institute. This is not the traditional place for routine veterinary serological diagnostic work. The planned sero-surveillance work to confirm suspected outbreaks is most probably not sufficient to keep close check on PPR. 40. The state budget can only purchase limited amounts of vaccines. The evaluation team believes that there is not a sufficiently large strategic stock of vaccines in the stores of the veterinary services at the moment, although this could not be independently confirmed. Due to the present state of the cold chain in most of the country, in any case it is impossible to store strategic stocks of vaccines. d) Outputs, processes and outcomes 41. The project ran for only one year, in which a total of 1.325.000 young animals were vaccinated against PPR. No reports were available at the time of the evaluation mission to say how the SVI continued with the activities. Although in one report there is mention of a proposal for a national PPR control strategy, there was no follow-up project. The control strategy is part of the “national veterinary plan”, which puts major emphasis on the vaccination against anthrax (near 100% coverage) and vaccination of animals on state farms against other diseases. This means that although the incidence of PPR may have been diminished, there is currently no clear strategy to control PPR in the future due to budgetary constraints.

e) Impact, catalytic role, impact, sustainability and follow-up 42. The project has created awareness among farmers and particularly among veterinarians about this new disease to Tajikistan. It has also assisted in creating a habit of reporting of notifiable diseases by veterinarians to SVI, and SVI to OIE. Laboratory diagnostic capacity was 15 created in the FMD institute, although there is a danger of confusion as to which institution will in the future be responsible for standard serological work for the veterinary services: the FMD institute or the State Veterinary Laboratory. 43. Between the current low government budget allocation, and the state of the veterinary services and cold chain, the PPR control strategy chosen in Tajikistan, i.e. twice yearly vaccination of young animals and ring vaccination around outbreaks, is not sustainable. As with the brucellosis control programme, sustainable control would need more resources. With a disease such as PPR, which farmers clearly associate with high mortality, it should be possible to introduce a paid vaccination scheme for young stock, at least in those locations, where people have experienced the effects of an uncontrolled outbreak of PPR. 44. The importance of the trans-border disease project (GTFS/INT/907/ITA) in terms of training, and increased diagnostic capacity, is well recognised. But this project does not have the possibility to contribute towards the cost of vaccine. It would be better in future to make sure that in addition to building diagnostic and epidemiological capacity, the provision of sufficient vaccines of good quality is assured through a combination of donor funds, government budget and farmers’ contributions. In this way the farmer beneficiaries would contribute to paying for a significant part of the cost of the vaccines. In view of the obvious financial benefit, they should be prepared to do this. f) Project priority and relevance 45. At the time it started, the PPR control project was extremely relevant and its impact on reducing mortality was clearly visible by the end of the project. It was a useful addition to the trans-border animal disease project and created synergy between the increased awareness about, diagnostic capacity for and epidemiological analysis of TADs. Unfortunately the current government budget makes no provision to continue the activities initiated by this TCP or maintain the required level of vaccination for young animals. This may lead once more to a return the old situation whereby livestock owners assume that their animals are dying of Pasteurellosis. TCP/TAJ/3002 Evaluation Summary Table for TCP projects Score 1-6

Overall relevance to country needs and priorities 6 Overall conformity to FAO priorities and comparative advantages 5 Feasibility, clarity and appropriateness of design (either at formulation or as 4 specified on project start-up) Implementation 4 Outputs and process, quality and quantity 4 Achievement and quality of Outcomes 3 Catalytic role/Sustainability 2 Follow-up (actual or potential) 3

16

4. TCP/TAJ/3101: Emergency Assistance to Raise Food Security and Reduce Livelihood Vulnerability of Very Poor Households in the Khatlon Region Budget: US$ 295,000 January 2007 to December 2008 extended to December 2009 (24 months) Status: Ongoing a) Background and relevance 46. In order for FAO to receive funding for OSRO/TAJ/605/EC ‘Enhanced Livestock Production and Pasture Rehabilitation’, an element of co-funding was required. Effectively the TCP project fulfills the role of being FAO’s co-funding for the EC project. The project was to introduce a broader sustainable livelihoods approach to rehabilitation and disaster preparedness, building on FAO’s work in other emergency situations in the region and elsewhere. The MoA’s AgroFood Centre (AFC), which had been supported by other FAO Food Security projects, was the project implementing partner. 47. The requested TCP assistance has been provided in eight rural raions in central Khatlon, namely: Farkho; Baljuvon; Dangara; Vose; Hamadani; Muminobod; Pyanj and Yavon. The project was meant to assist the GoT develop a longer-term strategy for sustainable livestock production and pasture rehabilitation. In the shorter-term, it was supposed to generate a number of technical reports which would feed directly into the country’s National Development Strategy (NDS). b) Design and implementation 48. The overall objective of the project is to improve food security and reduce livelihood vulnerability amongst poor households, in particular, women-headed households, in remote rural districts in Khatlon province by increasing the production and primary processing of livestock products, strengthening market linkages, raising household incomes and reinforcing rural communities. 49. In particular, the project is supposed to: a) introduce concepts of sustainable livestock production at the household level and pasture management within the rural communities; b) reduce seasonal nutrition dependence and increase safety and profitability of livestock products at the household level; and c) enhance human and social capital of project beneficiaries. 50. The activities planned are concentrated on 3 components: • Component 1 : Animal Husbandry Improvement and Productivity Increase • Component 2: Development of Primary Processing & Marketing • Component 3: Promotion of Safe and Nutritious Food. 51. It is implemented as an “add-on” TA component of the larger EC funded project and as such, makes use of the implementation framework of that project. Training has been contracted out to local service providers (i.e. ATAC) and follow a farmer field school (FFS) approach for milk processing groups. For the other elements (pasture management and fodder production), a more traditional approach of training and information sessions has been followed. c) Results and effects 52. The EC funded project and this TCP have effectively been managed as a single project. It had a slow start due to initial weak management, but this greatly improved since the appointment of the present international project manager and an able national assistant. The counterpart institution had largely ceased to function due to lack of budgetary provision and its capable staff had left. The recruitment of capable national staff, key to provide visiting FAO foreign experts 17 with guidance and local knowledge, was severely delayed so that the inputs of some international consultants were less effective than they might have been. 53. Mutual assistance/common interest groups (CIG) have been formed and currently groups of women are trained in the milk processing. None of these groups has yet started the processing and marketing. So it is still too early to assess results. d) Sustainability and impact 54. Before attempting to promote local agro/processing, the market should be carefully assessed. But, there is good evidence that there is a market for processed dairy products as many of the products sold in Dushanbe’s green bazaar come from up-country. The situation with meat is different. It is a highly perishable commodity, with more public health issues than dairy products and it remains to be seen whether meat processing under village conditions for public sale should be promoted. A village based CIG hardly provides a suitable basis for such an activity. 55. Care should be taken that the free distribution of livestock to poor households should always be a help and not a burden. For instance, laying hens will provide eggs straight away and so provide an immediate improvement to the nutritional status of the family and possibly an income. But, giving a poor widow expensive mutton sheep such as the Hissar breed, where the cash return will be slow and uncertain is likely to prove to be a financial burden. These sheep need to be expensively fed through the winter and will provide a cash return only when the lambs are ready to sell. If, as under, the project agreement the first two lambs must be given to another poor neighbour, this means that it will be at least two seasons before the beneficiary will see any return from these sheep which in the meanwhile must be fed and maintained. 56. A dairy cow will provide milk and possibly even a cash flow and immediate improvement to the family’s nutritional status, but will also require a substantial area of land for growing fodder to sustain it. This may be beyond the means of a poor, landless family. The envisaged model ‘group’ farming enterprises might have been the place to investigate and fine tune these interventions. But, the limited time frame of a TCP makes this difficult. 57. The pasture improvement activities are principally aimed at addressing the symptoms of a much larger problem, the root causes of which are not being addressed. There is a need for a much more comprehensive policy towards the use and management of the country’s grazing lands and this will remain difficult to implement in the absence of any legal framework relating to the rights of different groups and communities to seasonal pastures in the mountains. Until the GoT develops a comprehensive pasture management policy and strategy, it will remain difficult to encourage the formation of herding groups and communities to work together to better manage their grazing land and the communal herding and shepherding of their animals. 58. The benefits of legume cultivation in a crop rotation are hard to demonstrate in a short term project over only one or two seasons. It is questionable whether such an activity is appropriate for inclusion in a TCP unless a follow up project is guaranteed. 59. Similarly the promotion of forage seed production is important. But, it remains to be seen whether this is best done on communal plots without clear ownership and responsibility for management. As observed by the evaluation team, the fodder seed plots established under the project were seriously infested with weeds. 60. Finally, it is also hard to justify why 10% of the fodder seeds when and if produced should then be donated to the VFU for the veterinarians to sell for their profit. Before embarking on such activities, the business and marketing aspects should be studied in greater detail and with greater care than was done under this project. 18

TCP/TAJ/3101 Evaluation Summary Table for TCP projects Score 1-6

Overall relevance to country needs and priorities 5 Overall conformity to FAO priorities and comparative advantages 4 Feasibility, clarity and appropriateness of design (either at formulation or as 3 specified on project start-up) Implementation 3 Outputs and process, quality and quantity 3 Achievement and quality of Outcomes 3 Catalytic role/Sustainability 2 Follow-up (actual or potential) 2

5. TCP/TAJ/3103: Preparation of a National Forest Programme Budget: US$ 374,000 September 2007 to July 2009 extended to December 2007 (29 months) Status: Ongoing a) Background and context of intervention 61. The total area of forest in Tajikistan amounts to 1.8 million ha, all of which belongs to the state. Of this 1.79 million ha is under local forest authorities, 90,100 ha under local agricultural authorities and 9,900 ha under other authorities. Of the total, 410,000 ha fall into the category of arboreal scrub rather than tree cover and this amounts to 23% of the State Forest Reserves. Possibly an additional 100,000 ha of scattered and fragmented woodlands and arboreal scrub still survives outside state control. This means that only between 3 and 3.5 percent of Tajikistan’s land area is forested to any degree. Historically, woodlands covered much more of the country and what little remains is under constant threat from fuel wood and charcoal collection, and grazing livestock. This includes the remaining stands of alpine juniper in the Zarafshan mountains and the wild pistachio woodlands of Danghara, Pyanj and Parhar. 62. Because of the threat to Tajikistan’s limited and diminishing forest resources, it was assumed that the country should have a National Forest Programme. However, this was an initiative from FAO and interest from Tajikistan was largely absent. b) Project objectives and design 63. The objective of facilitating the involvement of local communities and other stakeholder in the management of Tajikistan’s forest resources is an admirable one if Tajikistan’s remaining forest resources are not to vanish altogether. 64. In the project document, intended Outputs include: • a National Forest Programme; • revised/new legislation on forests, wildlife management and protected areas; • strengthening of the national capacity for planning and for using participatory methods and approaches through the training of a variety of stakeholders; and • a follow-up project proposal for countrywide implementation of the National Forest programme. 19

65. There is a detailed Work Plan and a proposal for local capacity building to be assisted by visits from FAO Retiree consultants. The project was intended to be managed by a team of national consultants backstopped from FAO HQ and the sub-regional office in Ankara, Turkey. c) Project start-up and implementation 66. Tajikistan was visited twice by the then technical forest officer from FAO SEC in January/February 2008 and again in May/June 2008. He reported the lack of material progress and blamed this on changing institutions and the busy working programme of the NPD, who is also the director of the SAAS. 67. Two TCDC consultants from Uzbekistan carried out some training and facilitated workshops on Participatory Forestry approaches in August 2008. 68. As there had been little effective progress, the original work plan was rescheduled to the end of 2009. More recently it has been suggested that it be further revised until September 20010. d) Outputs, process and outcomes 69. To date, the project has achieved nothing of any substance despite being launched in September 2007. It should have concluded in July 2007. It is reported that two papers have recently been prepared, in Russian, by two national consultants. Five local consultants are at present in the process of being recruited in Tajikistan with the intention that they should prepare papers and documents on which to base a workshop in the coming autumn. e) Impact, catalytic role, sustainability and follow-up 70. To date, there has been nothing to sustain and no impact. The evaluation team conclude that after the experience of the past two years it is overly optimistic to expect anything of any real value to come out of this project. It should be noted that the technical officer in charge of backstopping the project from the sub-regional office in Ankara will leave FAO in July and it is uncertain when he might be replaced. Accordingly, there will likely be no technical support available for a proposed workshop in September/October in Dushanbe to discuss the formulation of a National Forest Programme for Tajikistan. Under the circumstances, the evaluation recommends to close the project immediately. f) Project priority and relevance 71. Valuable as Tajikistan’s remaining forests are, and important though they may be from the point of view of economic potential, the environment, biodiversity and aesthetic and amenity value, the development of a National Forest Programme is clearly not seen by the GoT of Tajikistan as a priority. TCP/TAJ/3103 Evaluation Summary Table for TCP projects Score 1-6

Overall relevance to country needs and priorities 3 Overall conformity to FAO priorities and comparative advantages 5 Feasibility, clarity and appropriateness of design (either at formulation or as 4 specified on project start-up) Implementation 1 Outputs and process, quality and quantity 1 Achievement and quality of Outcomes 1 Catalytic role/Sustainability 1 Follow-up (actual or potential) 1 20

*: 1=very poor; 2=poor; 3=inadequate; 4=adequate; 5=good; 6=excellent

6. TCP/TAJ/3104: Emergency Assistance to Tajikistan in the Aquaculture Sector, Livestock Sector and Comprehensive Assessment and Programme Development Budget: US$ 393,000 April 2008 to December 2008 extended to July 2009 (15 months) Status: Ongoing a) Background and context of intervention 72. This project was launched as the result of the combination of drought, the severe winter of 2007/2008 and the basic commodity price surge. In response to perceived needs, a number of emergency projects were funded by different donors in Tajikistan. Some of these have been implemented by FAO. 73. This project combined together three disparate activities in a single project for ease of management, as follows: I. A situation and needs assessment and programming document on the consequences of the drought/severe winter of 2007-2008 and commodity price surge and what might be done in terms of emergency assistance and longer term development. II. A livestock input component – consisting of de-worming medicine for ruminants and some minerals. The idea being that these should be added to inputs procured under other emergency livestock projects such as animals feed and fodder seeds. III. An aquaculture component under which a selection of 8 fish farms (trout and carp) which had suffered serious losses during the winter would be re-stocked and equipped and so relieve local food shortages for fish. 74. Each of these components had a different justification and none of them had anything in common apart from the fact they had been developed in response to the effects of the 2007 / 2008 winter, the drought and the price surge. There is no evidence that there was any coordination between the three components which are therefore dealt with separately. i. Assessment and Programme Development 75. The relevance of this activity was based on the logic that it was of prima facie importance to understand the nature of the humanitarian crisis facing the rural population of Tajikistan as the result of the severe winter and ongoing drought on 2007/2008 and prepare an appropriate emergency/rehabilitation/development programme in response. b) Project objectives and design 76. A competent and experienced assessment team was put together and went to work with the minimum delay in April-May 2008. They produced a thorough, detailed report and developed a programme document with recommendations for actions. c) Outputs, process and outcomes 77. The Assessment and Programme Report entitled “ Tajikistan: Reducing the Impact of Price Surge and Agricultural Rehabilitation Programme” It reviews the situation in Tajikistan and proposes recommendations on how to move emergency interventions into development. As such, it is a forward thinking document rather than one designed merely to meet the immediate needs of the emergency. This is a step in the right direction in the present context of Tajikistan and one that FAO as well as the Donors and the GoT should take seriously. 21

d) Impact, catalytic role, sustainability and follow-up 78. The ultimate results, effects, impact and sustainability of the proposals made in this document will depend on how it is followed up by actions. This remains to be seen. e) Project priority and relevance 79. The harsh winter of 2007/2008, combined with drought and the exceptionally high costs of basic food commodities on the world market including grain and flour made this assessment a justifiable priority. It was also a forward thinking piece of work looking to how Tajikistan should move away from an endless repeating round of emergency type interventions into rehabilitation and development. ii. Livestock - inputs – Emergency Procurement and Distribution of Minerals and De- worming Medicines a) Project objectives and design 80. This component involved an input procurement and distribution of minerals and de- worming medicines to supplement other emergency projects distributing animal feed and fodder seed to poor livestock owning households. 81. Minerals and vitamins are additional to animal feed: if animals are already malnourished, minerals and vitamins without additional feed do not really have a positive effect on the survival rate of animals; if concentrate was distributed this should have contained sufficient vitamins and minerals to make additional distribution not necessary. Likewise de-worming medicines unless provided as an integral part of a more comprehensive and better focused programme are not likely to be very effective. b) Outputs, process and outcomes 82. This component involved procurement and distribution of minerals and medicines to supplement other emergency projects distributing animal feed and fodder seed to poor livestock owning households. The procurement took place without exceptional difficulty and no doubt provided some help to those farmers who received it. c) Impact, catalytic role, impact, sustainability and follow-up 83. It has been difficult for the Evaluation team to make any detailed assessment of the results, effects or impact of this component of the TCP. As these were free distributions of inputs there was nothing sustainable in the project design. For this it would have been necessary to build in components to help stimulate the private commercial agricultural supply sector in the interests of sustainability. For example, the project may have included an extension and demonstration activity to show farmers how to use these minerals and vitamins, along making sure that these are available from the local input suppliers and VFUs. However, this was not done. d) Project priority and relevance 84. Useful though they may have been, the provision of these inputs cannot be seen as being a necessary part of an ‘emergency’ to prevent animals from dying. They were in any case insufficient to meet anything apart from a small percentage of the country’s livestock and can have been of little more value than a demonstration although there is no evidence that this is how they were managed. 22

iii . Aquaculture: Emergency Assistance to a Selection of Fish Farms (trout and carp) with ARF’s modification of July 11 th . a) Project objectives and design 85. This component was designed to be a procurement and delivery exercise for trout eggs and carp larvae plus fish feed, some fish cages and nets and laboratory equipment to a selection of 8 fish farms in various locations in Tajikistan. There seems little doubt that the fish farms had suffered losses as a result of the severe winter and no doubt their owners will be happy with the help they have received in restocking them. The project’s contribution to alleviating an emergency food security situation and assisting the poorest sections of the rural population is less credible. This intervention has more relevance and justification as part of a development programme aimed at encouraging farmers’ fish ponds where these are appropriate. b) Project start-up and implementation 86. From the start problems arose in procurement of the inputs which experienced delays and accidents. After long international tender procedures, an order was placed for rainbow trout eggs with a company operating out of Seattle, Washington (USA). There were problems with the air shipment and when the eggs arrived in Tajikistan, 85% were dead. Later a successful insurance claim was made, but by that time the 2008 season was over. A second order for trout eggs was placed in Denmark, which were delivered in 2009. Problems and delays were also experienced in the procurement and delivery of fish feed from Latvia. This also missed the 2008 season and had to be stored over winter at some risk of loss of quality. However, the feed is currently being used and is reported to be giving good results. There were then difficulties in sourcing carp larvae. When these were finally procured, it was in Tajikistan itself and again these were not delivered to the carp farms until 2009. 87. Laboratory equipment was procured on time and installed, but there were delays in the procurement of fish cages. In the end these had to be built locally with Russian assistance but the wrong netting was delivered and is now being replaced. c) Outputs, process and outcomes 88. This component of the project was subject to considerable delays, which meant that the inputs were not delivered in time to be useful in the immediate post-emergency period. The schedule for the evaluation meant that none of the recipient farms could be visited for this relatively minor component of FAO’s overall assistance to Tajikistan. All the beneficiary farms were located in remote areas, far from where the team had its field visits. d) Impact, catalytic role, sustainability and follow-up 89. It is too early to assess the long term sustainability or the impact of this project. However, in January 2009 another project was approved, TCP/RER/3205 “Advice to Central Asia Governments on the feasibility of commercial fish and livestock feed production”, which may be more relevant to Tajikistan’s needs and more in line with FAO’s comparative advantages. e) Project priority and relevance 90. As part of a package of agricultural and related development projects there probably is place for the development of small-scale farmer managed fish farms and this is the context into which it fits best. However, there was weak justification for the project on the grounds of alleviating food security for the poor who are the least likely section of the population to be able to afford fish such as trout or even carp. It was probably not so relevant as part of a package of ‘emergency’ interventions. 23

TCP/TAJ/3103 Evaluation Summary Table for TCP projects Score 1-6

Overall relevance to country needs and priorities i. Assessment & Programme Document 6 ii. Livestock minerals & de-worming medicines 3 iii. Inputs to Fish Farms 3 Overall conformity to FAO priorities and comparative advantages i. Assessment & Programme Documentation 6 ii. Livestock minerals & de-worming medicines 3 iii. Inputs to Fish Farms 3 Feasibility, clarity and appropriateness of design (either at formulation or as specified on project start-up)

i. Assessment & Programme Documentation 5 ii. Livestock minerals & de-worming medicines 3 iii. Inputs to Fish Farms 3

Implementation i. Assessment & Programme Documentation 5 ii. Livestock minerals & de-worming medicines 4 iii. Inputs to Fish Farms 2

Outputs and process, quality and quantity i. Assessment & Programme Documentation 5 ii. Livestock minerals & de-worming medicines 4 iii. Inputs to Fish Farms 2

Achievement and quality of Outcomes i. Assessment & Programme Documentation 5 ii. Livestock minerals & de-worming medicines 4 iii. Inputs to Fish Farms 3

Catalytic role/Sustainability i. Assessment & Programme Documentation 5 ii. Livestock minerals & de-worming medicines 1 iii. Inputs to Fish Farms 1

24

Follow-up (actual or potential) i. Assessment & Programme Documentation 5 ii. Livestock minerals & de-worming medicines 2 iii. Inputs to Fish Farms 1

*: 1=very poor; 2=poor; 3=inadequate; 4=adequate; 5=good; 6=excellent 25

ANNEX III

Impact Assessment of FAO Support to the Veterinary Field Units (VFU) in Tajikistan

Report by Olivier Cossée (July 2009)

A. INTRODUCTION 1. Livestock play a very important role for rural households in Tajikistan, as a source of food (meat, milk and eggs), fertilizer, fuel, draught power, transport and income from sale of products. Animals are also kept as a form of savings and are sold for cash as and when needed. Protecting livestock through good veterinary care is hence a way to ensure nutrition, incomes and assets. 2. The break up of the state sector after independence in 1991 drastically reduced government funding for agriculture. The State Veterinary Department (SVD, now the State Veterinary Inspectorate or SVI) ceased to provide clinical and prophylactic veterinary care. Small livestock owners, who own more than 80% of the livestock that used to belong to state and collective farms, were left without veterinary care. 3. Against this context, FAO has supported the livestock sector through several interventions. One of the most significant started in 1999, with funds from UNHCR, Norway and Sweden, and replicated an approach to the provision of private-based veterinary services that had successfully been piloted in Afghanistan. FAO introduced the concept of “Veterinary Field Units”. The programme started to train, equip and provide technical support to Tajik veterinarians to deliver basic curative services on a cost-recovery basis. 4. The programme originally focussed on the south of the country, particularly in the Khatlon region which was severely affected by the civil war. Since then, successive projects have helped expand the programme to other regions (DRD, Sugd and GBAO). The VFUs are regularly monitored by FAO and the State Veterinary Services. FAO further established zonal medicine and remedy distribution bases in order to bring the supply of veterinary drugs, vaccines and equipment closer to remote VFUs. 5. The current Swedish funded project is aimed at developing an exit strategy for the international assistance. Until now, management of all aspects of the VFU scheme has rested with FAO. Under FAO regulations for procurement and transport, FAO sourced and procured most of the medicines, vaccines and equipment the VFUs use, either on the national market or via imports. FAO employed staff to monitor and manage the bases and to run a Veterinary Medicines and Remedies Revolving Fund (VRRF) that has financed the inputs on a cost-recovery basis. The exit strategy involves the Tajik Veterinary Association (TVA), a nominally independent professional organisation set up with FAO support and taking over the procurement and distribution of veterinary drugs. The VRRF and veterinary bases have been recently transferred to the TVA.

B. PURPOSE, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT Purpose 6. As part of the FAO country evaluation in Tajikistan, it was decided to conduct an in-depth impact assessment (IA) of a number of interrelated FAO projects that have provided support to 26

“Veterinary Field Units” (VFUs). This succession of projects constitutes a programme that started in 1999 and still continues today. It is a significant component of the FAO portfolio in the country 1 and concerns one of the most important issues covered by the FAO Tajikistan Country Programme evaluation, namely the transition from emergency activities to more sophisticated development-oriented activities. The veterinary programme was also perceived as a success; therefore there was an expectation that there would be impacts that could be documented. 7. The main purpose of the IA was to provide an in-depth analysis of FAO support to the VFUs, looking at the relevance, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of the service established. Scope 8. The assessment covered the whole VFU system and its impact on beneficiary communities, including the functioning of the VFUs themselves, the support they receive from FAO, their interaction with livestock owners and the benefits accruing to them. The detailed questions investigated were developed after interviews with programme stakeholders in Tajikistan and consultations with FAO programme staff, using a “Theory of Change” (ToC) approach to map the intended impacts of the programme (Figure 1). 9. It was decided to exclude the following aspects of the programme from the analysis: − Activities of the project staff , efficiency in output production and a detailed comparison between targets and achieved results, which would be expected of a classic project evaluation. − Institutional dimensions such as the capacity of the TVA, as these questions would be better covered by the subsequent evaluation mission. However, the impact assessment asked veterinarians what they expected from the TVA and how they perceived it. − Brucellosis vaccination campaigns have been supported by another stream of projects. In practice it proved impossible to exclude them from the discussion as farmers and veterinarians rightly see all FAO activities in the veterinary sector as being interlinked. − Study tours for veterinary officials as well as the work on livestock production (experimental turkey farm and non-traditional combined feed experiments) supported by the GCP/TAJ/001/SWE project; these were perceived as peripheral to the core business of the

1 Veterinary projects including VFUs and brucellosis vaccinations constitute 33% of the whole FAO programme in the country since 2002. 27

prog Figure 1: Theory of Change for VFU programme Iss ues covered by the Impact assessment HH: Households VFU: Veterinary Field Unit MoA: Ministry of Agriculture

National economic benefits Overgrazing? Public health benefits

More food secure, healthier and richer HH

Livestock protected, in good health, productive

reform the Other vet. service whole system providers ? Tajik Vet. Association VFUs ? more capable, accessible, MoA profitable monitoring

$ supplies Veterinary bases institution building $ Veterinary Fund training TA

$ Private sector FAO Dushanbe office supplies suppliers FAO normative work at HQ

Methodology 10. In the field, the IA applied qualitative methods to collect in-depth information on the views, perceptions and experiences of the veterinarians participating in the project, as well as those not participating. Client and non-client livestock owners were also interviewed. 11. The main tools were individual and group interviews with veterinarians, managers of the veterinary bases, beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries in selected villages. This approach was chosen to: i) provide a better understanding of the complex issues and underlying factors that explain and affect impact; ii) provide a flexible approach and allow the IA framework and survey tools to be revised during the survey if necessary; and iii) ensure that the assessment could be completed within a relatively short time frame. 12. It was originally envisaged to complement this essentially qualitative methodology with a questionnaire survey to generate additional economic data. This was ruled out essentially because the results would only have been available after the main evaluation mission had completed its work. As a result, the present assessment can demonstrate the existence of an impact area and – 28 thanks to its ToC design – it can describe the practical steps through which the impact is being produced and how impact might be enhanced. However, it was not designed to measure the economic and nutritional impact of the programme through quantitative data. Sampling 13. The sample for interviews was based on “study units”, each composed of one individual VFU and the population it is supposed to serve. Non-VFU veterinarians were also interviewed and constituted the core of a non-VFU “study unit”. The plan was to cover approximately 20 study units, including 15 with a VFU and 5 without a VFU. In practice, this approach was slightly altered, as follows: a) the team visited 16 districts chosen for their geographical distribution, number of years of activity, distance from the FAO Veterinary Base, and activity level; b) in each district, the first step was to interview the head of the local Government veterinary services, then to set up a meeting with available contracted and non- contracted veterinarians. These two meetings were generally held concomitantly, with the team leader interviewing the Head Veterinarian in a separate room while the rest of the team interviewed the district veterinarians in a group format, using a pre-set checklist of issues. This had the advantage of saving time and providing a means of keeping the head veterinarian out of the group interview with veterinarians, so that he would not influence its discussion; and c) at the end of the group interview, each veterinarian (contracted and non-contracted) was asked to draw a map of his working area (most often a jamoat or part of a jamoat 2). At the same time the head veterinarian was asked to draw a map of his district. A comparison of these maps was then used to identify the areas close to the district centre and those located further away. One or two jamoats were then chosen (usually one close and one far from the district centre). In each selected jamoat , one village was selected for a field visit. This procedure allowed the team to select the areas for focus group interviews with livestock owners, rather than leave the sampling to the local veterinarians. In sampling villages for interviews with farmers, the team took great care to avoid those villages where veterinarians lived and worked. Initial interviews in such villages have shown that livestock owners are wary of not undermining the local veterinarian who often comes from the same clan or extended family as themselves) and hence provide biased answers. 14. Focus group interviews were held with female and male livestock owners in 18 villages. In each sampled village, the team split in order to conduct two or three focus group interviews in parallel: usually one with male and another one with female livestock owners. These interviews also used a preset checklist of issues. 15. It was further envisaged that the team would visit about five veterinary bases to see the store, interview the manager and review the financial accounts. In practice, new bases have recently opened in many districts, so the team could visit ten bases instead of five and interview their managers. Financial accounts were not analysed on site, as they are all compiled in the VFU database analysed in Dushanbe.

2 The jamoat refers to the third-level administrative divisions, equivalent to a sub-district. There are anywhere from two to fifteen jamoats in a district. 29

Figure 2: Districts Visited in the Impact Assessment

Lowlands and hills, high population density and easily Mountainous, accessible isolated, low population density

Counterfactual 16. The core issue of any impact assessment is: how to establish causality? The only convincing response so far has been: through an appropriate counterfactual. However, what might be the counterfactual in this case, since the project has achieved near-total national coverage? The programme covers, with various degrees of intensity and duration, 78% of all jamoats in the country. There are still jamoats without a formally contracted veterinarian or with “inactive veterinarians” but most of them are in close proximity to other jamoats which are covered by programme. Since the programme appeared prima-facie to be successful it was expected to have benefits at the district level, e.g. the development of a local market for veterinary drugs. In practice, it turned out that more private veterinarians were active than the project staff was aware of, and that a recent opening of the VRRF drugs to all TVA members (including non-contracted veterinarians) was “blurring” the impact picture at the district level. In short, many of the jamoats that the team assumed were not covered proved in reality to be covered. 17. In search of greater contrast, the team went to Gorno Badakhshan (GBAO) where the programme is quite new. However, local veterinary services in GBAO had mobilized rapidly and now provide some level of veterinary cover to entire valleys. The Tavildara district was visited last by the team, as it was the only large area where the programme had not worked during the past ten years. Two veterinarians from Tavildara had been trained but had stopped working soon afterwards. 18. Tavildara is a very remote and traditional area and hence not readily comparable to other parts of the country, the lowlands in particular. However, it provided a useful contrast because it presents today some traits of the pre-project situation as described by farmers elsewhere with respect to: disbanded veterinary offices, greater incidence of disease, the practice of slaughter and traditional veterinary medicine to control diseases. However, we cannot conclude that, had the programme not existed, the rest of the country would still be as deprived of veterinary coverage as Tavildara is today. The very remoteness of Tavildara is the main reason why the programme has not succeeded there so far. The valley is so sparsely populated that it is very difficult for a 30 veterinarian to earn a living there. More densely populated regions of the country offer better prospects for business. It is possible that, even without the FAO programme, private veterinary practices would have developed in Khatlon, DRR and Sughd as a natural response to farmers’ demands. In actual fact, the IA team met a number of non-contracted, non-governmental, fully private veterinarians in these provinces who were earning a living. The most probable hypothesis is that the FAO programme has played a valuable role to speed up a natural process of market growth. The Team 19. The IA was undertaken by a three-person team: Sediqullah Khaliqyar, Veterinarian; Malika Abdulvasieva, Gender Expert; and Olivier Cossée, Team Leader and took place between April 23 rd and May 20 th 2009. In Dushanbe, the team analyzed project reports and publications as well as the financial VFU databases, and interviewed the head of the SVI, TVA staff and project personnel. The field work covered all regions of the country and extended from April 30 th to May 16 th . 20. Mss. Anna Nilsson and Marvori Odilkhonova from SIDA kindly joined the IA team for one day and participated in its work in the Shorobad district. 21. While the IA team identified some shortcomings in terms of management or results, it must be stated that programme staff worked very hard and within very real budgetary and administrative limits to bring about the positive results described in this report. Financial resources in particular have been a constant constraint, for instance for the extension to GBAO or for the supervision of trained veterinaries.

C. FINDINGS Project Design 22. The FAO’s animal health intervention has been composed of a succession of projects which, pieced together, constitute a programme almost continuously implemented over the past ten years (a significant gap of funding happened in 2003). The programme started in 1998 when FAO fielded two international veterinary experts to Tajikistan to prepare a project document on veterinary services and potato seeds. The proposal was later included in the 1999 CAP for Tajikistan and funded by Sweden (OSRO/TAJ/901/SWE). This seminal funding was later supplemented with small left-over funds from two unrelated projects (OSRO/TAJ/001/SWE and OSRO/TAJ/002/HCR). A series of three SIDA-funded emergency projects ensued: OSRO/TAJ/101/SWE, OSRO/TAJ/202/SWE and OSRO/TAJ/302/SWE. Finally, the current project (GCP/TAJ/001/SWE) has brought to bear more resources and a longer time-frame thanks to the fact that it is a development project. In total, the resources invested by SIDA through FAO over the last ten years to support the reform of veterinary services in Tajikistan amount to an estimated $5,100,000. 23. The project documents were found to be generally well designed. For instance, the programme developed its national coverage in a progressive manner, starting in the easiest districts in Khatlon, before moving on to more remote and challenging environments (GBAO, Rasht valley). The fact that medicines and remedies have always been provided at a price and that the last project clearly sets out an exit strategy for FAO (involving the TVA) provides ample evidence that the programme was conceived with due consideration of the sustainability of the service.

31

Figure 3: Projects Funding the Animal Health P rogramme Each shape represents a project Surface area is proportional to total financial size of project Length codes for duration Colours code for donors

total $290,325 but $295,246 only $24,500 for for vet. veterinary services services and potato only $200,000 seed for vet. services

001/ 101/ 202/ GCP/TAJ/001/SWE SWE SWE 302/SWE 901/SWE SWE $1,056,662 $3,019,874 002/

total $297,885 but only $24,500 for veterinary services

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 24. The main objective of the last project (GCP/TAJ/001/SWE) is: “to increase the household food security by enhancing the productivity of family livestock whilst strengthening national private sector capacities to respond to animal health concerns”. The immediate project objectives are: − extend VFU services nationwide and enhance the range and quality of services offered; − national Tajik Professional Veterinary Association and local branches established and functioning; − Tajik VFU system should be able to sustain key activities by the end of the project; and − VFUs collaborating with the SVD (SVI) to deliver balanced public and private veterinary services. 25. Synergies between private and public veterinary services are therefore explicitly sought in the project objectives. 26. An important project design issue relates to the veterinary revolving fund. Such revolving funds are easy to set up and provide for some degree of cost-recovery. However, they are generally unsustainable because they do not control costs and leakage effectively and often charge no interest. The revolving fund may be seen as a design flaw if the sustainability of the medicine provision is considered essential to the success of the programme. Alternatively, it could be seen as an expedient, low-cost approach to provide credit to veterinarians as an interim measure, realizing that over the long term they should need less and less credit or may use more durable, specialized entities such as banks or MFIs to service their need for loans. 27. Another issue relates to the use of the term “Veterinary Field Unit”, which the IA team found misleading as it implies a unit like a business or a clinic. The reality is nothing of the sort: the “VFUs” are individual veterinarians contracted by the programme rather than physical establishments. Most of them are still on the government payroll whilst also doing private work. There is no visible “unit” on the ground other than a person and his stock of remedies. The term VFU was borrowed from an ongoing programme in Afghanistan where a few veterinarians and community animal health workers band together to establish a clinic. In the case of the FAO Tajikistan programme the term “contracted veterinarian” is the one commonly used by project 32 staff, government services and the veterinarians themselves, The term “VFU” is apparently seldom used outside FAO project documents and reports. 3 Recommendation : In future project documents and reports, the term “contracted veterinarians” should be used rather than “VFU” as it is closer to the fact.

Relevance TOR Questions: • Are the VFUs filling a critical gap with regard to the demand on veterinary services of animal holders? 28. The civil war and the collapse of the USSR and its central command economy had the following consequences: − the state veterinarians were disbanded. Most of them found other jobs or relied on their land. Many Russian and Tajik vets emigrated to Russia to find work; and − the collectives and most of the state farms were privatised. The animals were distributed to their members but without any veterinary services. 29. FAO’s veterinary projects set out to retrain, retool, finance and motivate the veterinarians and show them an alternative way of working. They have attempted to rebuild veterinary services on a private basis on a national scale and thereby answer a national problem in a relevant and practical manner. 30. The modest Artificial Insemination (AI) component is also relevant in that there is potential demand for AI in the peri-urban districts, where there is a market for milk and feed is readily available. In mountainous areas and in the extreme south of the country (along the Afghanistan border), the demand for AI exists but may be unrealistic as ecological conditions (cold in winter in the mountains; very hot in summer in the South) and animal husbandry practices are generally unfavourable to highly productive animals. 31. The transition to private services worked well generally, but has not met with the same success everywhere. Some locations have many veterinarians, others have only few and some remote areas have none. The central command system had an advantage in this respect as it was easier to dispatch government staff to work in remote areas. Besides, the state and collective farming system made it easier to treat and vaccinate animals which were concentrated in fewer farm units. It was thus easier to achieve almost total coverage. In a privatised economy the coverage is inherently more “patchy”. Training and Capacity of Contracted and Non-contracted Veterinarians TOR Questions: • Are veterinarians trained by the programme appropriately selected, trained and motivated? • Are they able to diagnose the most important diseases and perform basic veterinary acts (vaccinations, treatments and surgery)? • Once deployed, do they have access to refresher and/or on-the-job training and supervision? 32. The induction and refresher training sessions provided by the project have been much appreciated by the beneficiaries. The training was said to be much more practical than the courses offered by the formal veterinary education system (Veterinary Faculty in Dushanbe, “ Technic ” in

3 During the IA mission another mission from OIE came to study the national veterinary system and proposed another term: “ambulatory veterinarians”. “Ambulatory care” describes any medical or other care delivered on an outpatient basis. 33

Korghan Tupe). Introduction to new medicines, such as the Norbrooke anthelmintics or long- acting antibiotics (provided by the programme under the VRRF), were much appreciated, as has been the kit of instruments distributed at the end of the induction training. There is much demand for more training. 33. About 430 veterinarians and assistant veterinarians have received induction training since the start of the programme, according to project reports. This represents some 20% of the total number of trained veterinarians in Tajikistan. However, the following shortcomings were identified: − the sessions are short (10 to 15 days for an induction training) and few; − while the FAO programme staff claim that selection process is based on a comprehensive analysis of every candidate, some veterinarians met by the mission complained that they had not been selected for training in spite of their strong motivation. The application process goes through the state veterinary hierarchy, which may represent a source of bias; − many more veterinarians have been trained in “easy” places such as Khatlon than in remoter areas such as GBAO and Sughd, and it is necessary to increase training opportunities in the latter regions; − while technical issues are well covered, there has been little training in business management. This is important since the privatisation of the service requires the veterinarians to acquire new business skills; and − the timing of some sessions was inappropriate as it coincided with the busy spring season; sessions in summer are more appropriate. 4 34. There is clearly a need and demand for much more training. For instance, all TVA members now have access to new medicines supplied through the revolving fund, but without having been trained in their use, posology, etc. Another example is surgery, which was mentioned by almost every veterinarian as an area in which they need more training. This is not to say that the training offered by the programme was faulty. It has just not been possible to cover all the skills required by a veterinarian to make a living. 35. The programme has helped establish training facilities in DRR (Sharenaw) and in Sughd (Khodjan). The two other regions, GBAO and Khatlon, lack training centres which would allow the TVA to set up local training courses at less cost, without relying on other provinces. 36. Finally, supervision of veterinarians once they are contracted was found to be weak. The two FAO monitors are also employed as trainers and cannot cover the entire country regularly. To increase monitoring capacity, the last project (GCP/TAJ/001/SWE) trained and employed SVI veterinarians at central and at provincial levels to monitor VFUs. However, monitoring by SVI is mainly focused on administration and accounting rather than technical capacity. 37. The programme set up a telephone hotline in 2008 which has since been regularly used by field veterinarians to ask technical questions (see a sample in Table 1 above, which indicates some difficulty in diagnosis). This is an interesting and innovative service but it does not replace closer supervision. Contracted veterinarians are basically left to work alone with little technical monitoring or supervision of their practice.

4 Winter is theoretically suitable but logistics become harder to organize due to poor roads and basic heating facilities at the training centres. 34

Table 1: Some calls received by the veterinary hotline and their response

Question Reply Sheep are dying and I cannot differentiate pasteurilosis Submit pathological materials to National Center for Veterinary from bradsotis, what to do? Diagnosis Morbidity and mortality cases are observed in private For precise diagnosis you need to send the appropriate organs to the sheep and goats. It looks like pasteurellosis according National Center for Veterinary Diagnosis. If you suspect / are sure to clinical and pathological and anatomical signs. that the caused diseases is pasteurellosis, you need to give Norodine Where we can find vaccine against pasteurellosis and Bolus to all sheep and goats population in the area of all ages and what to do to prevent diseases and mortality? heath status (sick of healthy) according to instruction i.e. 1 bolus for 40 kg of weight for two days. You may refer for vaccine to National Zoobetsnab and veterinary drugstores in Dushanbe city. Diagnosis and treatment of fibrosis mastitis in cows During the milking clots of fibrin is extracted. Apply antibiotics in udder or Lactaclox in teats. Apply blockade according to Longvine with antibiotics. Which needle is used for the blockade according to For applying blockade according to Longvine it is needed the needle Longvine with size 10-15 sm with curved tip Which preparation is used for poisoning of dogs For poisoning of stray dogs it is possible to use Tubasid 5-6 gr and Dertil “B” 2-3 tablets inside of feeds Please explain the procedures for receiving land plots You may refer to Mr Gafurjon (base manager) and obtain detailed for constriction of private veterinary clinics? information on needed documents A following clinical signs of a disease is observed in According to the observed signs it looks like to pasteurellosis. It is jamoats Childukhtaron, Boqi Dilkusho in calves up to needed to do deferential diagnosis and send pathological materials 1,5 years: swelling in heads, low jaw, chest. Which from dead animals to the veterinary laboratory. disease it looks like? Loses in poultry population is observed. We have First of all you need to do laboratory diagnosis for defining of the applied antibiotics and vaccine strain “H” After disease and after to separate sick chicken and apply vaccine. applying of vaccine 2 more chicken died. What to do? In summer pastures cows have following clinical signs: You cannot without diagnosis of the disease to apply vaccination. swelling in heads and low jaw. Which disease is that? You need to define if the swelling in the head is firm or soft. In case May I apply vaccination against anthrax? In animals of Anthrax it is firm/hard with clear borders of swelling and the infected with pasteurellosis the spleen is increased or temperature in swelling area is high. In case of pasteurellosis the not? swelling areas is monotone and without high temperature. The spleen does not increases in case of pasteurellosis. If it is increased it caused by other microbes. Goats pox outbreak is ongoing. We have not vaccine. You need to send someone to Dushanbe for vaccines. You need to What remedies to use for treatment? separate sick goats for treatment [and] apply antibiotics. Soften the dried vesiculas in skin with oil, ointment or glycerin and treat the wounds with peroxide. Wash the nose cavity with 2% boric acid. To water sick animals with more water mixed with potassium iodide. The remaining conditional healthy animals are needed to be vaccinated with pox vaccine. Anthrax case has been registered. In 23.03.2008 all Despite vaccination status if the disease has been registered you need animals were vaccinated against this disease. Do we again to apply forced vaccination against the disease. Please do it need to revaccinate animals again? urgently. May we use the vaccine remained in vials for next day? No, the remained vaccines in vials are strictly prohibited to be used in following days. May we use joint application of Anthrax and Blackleg No, you need to apply vaccines separately. vaccines? Can we apply vaccine against FMD together with No, joint application of vaccines with antibiotic is not allowed, Niacyde? because in this case antibiotic may decrease immunology features of 35

vaccine. An outbreak of an infectious disease started among Send the collected pathological materials to the National Center for goats and 5 goats died. Changes are observed in animal Veterinary Diagnosis. For all goats ,which are conditional healthy, liver and lungs. Which disease it looks like? apply antibiotics from Tetracycline line (Alamicyne and Nitocs) Cows returned from pastures have diseases the major For more precise diagnosis you need to prepare a thin smear from sign of which is bloody urea. There are ticks in cow’s peripheric blood samples and send it to veterinary laboratory. You bodies. How to make diagnosis? need to apply for cows 3-4 gr of streptomycin and diminacyne aceturate into muscles, because the clinical signs of the disease are look like to piroplasmosis and leptospirosis.

Recommendations : • After the end of the current project (GCP/TAJ/001/SWE), FAO should mobilize additional resources to continue the training effort. • Make the selection of candidates for refresher courses more transparent, independent from the state veterinary hierarchy and based primarily on individual motivation and with preference to those working in underserved areas. • Set up a system of internships (stages) for new graduates to work with well-established veterinarians as apprentices to learn the practicalities of the work. • Training centers in all regions (GBAO, Khatlon not yet covered) could make for less costly trainings on the medium term but need initial investment in facilities. • Future FAO projects could usefully support the formal veterinary education system (Veterinary Faculty in Dushanbe, “Technic” in Korghan Tupe) to update the curriculum with more practical courses, an introduction to newer medicines and business training, with the idea to upgrade the official basic veterinary training rather than just complementing the old system with 15-day refresher courses. • Since diagnosis is an issue and it is not possible during training courses to find a diseased animal for every disease, FAO should provide the TVA with video material illustrating the most important and common diseases. Medicine and Remedies Supply TOR Questions: • Are Veterinary Bases accessible to all VFUs? • Are Veterinary Bases provided on regular basis with drugs and are the drugs always available? • Are drugs and equipment, including the original kit, of good quality and are costs transparent and affordable? • Which are the advantages and disadvantages of the veterinary. drug system established by FAO over other potential means of supply (quality, price, access)? 38. The availability of medicines did not appear as a significant issue during the IA. Veterinarians found that the FAO/TVA system provided them with medicines of good quality at a reasonable price. However, timeliness was mentioned as a small issue and some bases reported having to request medicines one or two months in advance to make sure they received their order on time for peak seasons such as spring. 39. A more important problem is that some medicines and vaccines are not available in the system, such as: 1. Multivitamins 2. Physiologic serum (useful in the treatment of blood parasites) 3. Antiseptic for primary surgical cleaning 4. Novocain 5. Medicines for tympany 36

6. Medicines for diarrhea 7. Calcium gluconate (mineral supplement) 8. Lubricant (for constipation) 9. Penicillin 10. Streptomycin 11. FMD vaccine 12. Leptospirosis vaccine 13. Bradzot (infectious enterotoxaemia) vaccine 14. Black leg vaccine (rarely available) 15. Lactoclox (for Mastitis) 40. The lack of some vaccines is noteworthy and perhaps related to the fact that many of the bases have no proper cold chain equipment and reliable refrigeration. 41. The quality of the medicines supplied by the system was found to be very good. The impact assessment team routinely verified expiration dates and found only minor infractions. However the medical instructions that come with many of the medicines supplied by the programme are in languages other than Russian. This means that most Tajik veterinarians (who are all educated in Russian) cannot read the instructions. 42. The price of drugs available from the system has also been rising due to the depreciation of the somoni vs. the US dollar. Moreover, the VRRF was transferred to the TVA in February 2009 and the TVA has had to pay import and other taxes; it must also cover the operational costs of managing the medical supply system, which was not necessarily factored in the price of medicines when FAO was running it. 43. The rapid development of a large number of “micro-bases” has been a significant development. For most of its life the programme operated eleven “macro-bases” located throughout the country 5. As some veterinarians complained that they had to travel over long distances to take medicines from these macro-bases, it was decided to bring the supply closer by opening many more small bases, if possible one in each district. 44. The project staff tried to develop priorities and criteria for establishing micro-bases. For instance there should be at least ten active veterinarians in the district. This was not difficult for most districts and was achieved by requesting that TVA members should access the fund and by persuading most government veterinarians to enlist in the TVA and start selling medicines. 45. As a consequence, 23 more bases were opened in the past year 6 and there is no doubt that they have brought supply closer to the veterinarians, particularly in mountainous areas. However, the team found that this development was rife with danger. The rapid increase in the number of bases makes control and audit much more difficult. Besides, some bases do not have enough business because they are located too close to other bases (e.g. in Sughd, Ghafurov is less than 10 km away from Khudjand). This may spread the 5% operating fees required to finance each base too thin.

5 Dangara, Dushanbe, Khorog, Khujand, Kulyob, Qurghonteppa, Panjakent, Qumsangir, Rasht, Shaartuz, and Sharinav. 6 Asht, Ayni, Baljuvon, Darvoz, Fayzobod, Ghafurov, Ghonchi, Hamadoni, Isfara, Ishkoshim, Istaravshan, Jirgatol, Konibodom, Mastchoh, Roghun, Roshtqala, Rushon, Shughnon, Spitamen, Vandj, Vose, Yovon and Zafarobod. 37

Figure 4:

'000 somoni s Amount of Medicines Distributed per District

Jan 08 - Jan 09

Districts with base Distri cts without base

- Na Pian Van Ayn Jiliku Gisr Nora Asht Ghar Kulia Othe Voss Ruda Djirgit Vahs Yava Farho Bohta Match Khoro Darvo Varzo Isphar Vakhd Rusho Ganch Babajo Khujan Rasulo Darban Dangar Murgab Beshke Kabadia Shugna Faizaba Ishkashi Shaartu Hamado Kurgan Sovetsk Darband Shuraba Baldjuva Roshtkal Khovalin Pendjike Gozimali Dushanb Chkalovs Shahrina Kairokum Kanibada Zafaraba Istravsha

Tadjikaba Kumsangh Kolhozaba Tursunzad Hodjamasto

46. The last point is illustrated by Figure 4. Many micro-bases sell less than TJS1000/month. The base manager collects less than TJS50/month to cover operational costs and his or her salary 7. Given that the task of base manager entails considerable paperwork, it is not surprising that so many base managers are considering to become private, and that at least one of them has already done so in Khujand. 47. It should be mentioned that some contractors sell project medicines to non-contractors, for the same 20% fee they are charging farmers. Some bases have also sold directly to farmers, while some contracted vets have sold medicines to non-contracted vets. Now that all TVA members have a right to the VRRF, artificial market distortions should hopefully disappear. 48. Of greater concern are the debts accumulated by the fund (Figure 5). In spite of being regularly replenished by FAO, the fund’s overall value has not grown much because, as currently managed, it is simply not sustainable. A close review of the fund accounts indicated the following: − the overall debt, which was fairly well controlled until 2006 at about TJS 100,000 (some $30,000), started to increase in 2007 when controls on maximum amounts authorized by veterinarian were relapsed, and continued to do so in 2008. As of January 2009, it amounted to TJS 215,480 ; − a very small number of heavy debtors (37 persons having accumulated more than TJS 1,000 each in debt as per end of 2008) account for TJS 80,755 of debt i.e. 37% of all veterinarians’ debt to the fund; and − the debt of the bases in Dushanbe, Kumsanghir, and Kuliab has doubled in 2008; other bases seemed to be better at controlling excessive borrowing.

7 Most of the new micro-bases pay no rent and no electricity as they are lodged by the State Veterinary Services. However some of the old bases are renting private premises and have to cover their rent, telephone and electricity costs. 38

Figure 5: Escalation of the Debt from Veterinarians to the VRRF US$ Value of remedies received by Paid by Cumulated debt veterinarians veterinarians 70,000

60,000

50,000

40,000

30,000

20,000

10,000

0 Jan-06 Apr-06 Jul-06 Oct-06 Jan-07 Apr-07 Jul-07 Oct-07 Jan-08 Apr-08 Jul-08 Oct-08 Jan-09 Apr-09

49. As a consequence of the poor management of the veterinarians’ debt, the fund may be “revolving to zero”. This is the inherent problem with revolving funds which usually need regular injections of funds to keep operating. 50. One logical solution would be to return to the type of controls that existed before 2007, i.e. fixed limits to the maximum debt a veterinarian is allowed to carry. Currently, the programme staff tends to define “bad debt” as one carried by an “inactive” veterinarian (i.e. a drop-out of the remedies provision system, someone who does not draw medicines from the VRRF anymore). However, there are quite a few users of the system who are taking more and more medicines but paying later and later. It is important to remember that this is TVA members’ money. Not many are abusing the fund in this way, but they are endangering the sustainability of a system that is important for all TVA members. 51. This being said, the IA team observed the development of private veterinary pharmacies in almost all regions of the country. These pharmacies are used by contracted veterinarians as an alternative to TVA bases for medicines not carried in the bases (e.g. serum, multivitamins as listed p. 35). The prices they use are often indexed on TVA bases’ price lists. This indicates that in places where the programme has been active for five to ten years (Khatlon, parts of DRR, Sughd), it has helped open the market for veterinary medicines. Therefore, even if the fund were to disappear tomorrow, veterinarians in these provinces would still be able to access a sustainable supply of medicines, although costs may rise and quality may not be ensured as it is today. 52. The development of the private sector has not happened yet in places where the programme has been active for less than five years, e.g. in GBAO 8. It should be mentioned that the TVA system uses the same blanket pricing scale all over the country. Therefore, the retail price does not reflect the cost of transport to remote areas such as GBAO, a cost which more accessible regions are in effect subsidizing. The prices at which the TVA system sells veterinary

8 As a result, in Badakhshan veterinarians complement the medicines offered by the TVA base with equipment and medicines found in human pharmacies. 39 medicines in GBAO are therefore “unbeatable” and may be preventing the development of the private sector there. 53. From interviews with veterinarians and private medicine suppliers in Dushanbe, it would appear that the FAO/TVA system provides about 30% of the veterinary medicine and vaccines used in country. The private sector can probably provide drugs more flexibly and sustainably than FAO or the TVA. However, the FAO-TVA system provides quality-ensured remedies and helps keep prices low. At this stage, the disappearance of the VRRF would not deprive the country of veterinary medicines, but it could result in a deterioration of the quality/cost ratio. Recommendations : • The TVA should keep providing the most essential medicines and vaccines to its members as long as it manages to keep the VRRF running; if the VRRF collapses at some point, the TVA could still consolidate one or two annual joint orders for the spring and autumn seasons, using loans from private banks to pre-finance the orders. • To ensure the longest possible operation of the VRRF, the TVA should apply more business oriented practices, including higher prices in GBAO and other remote areas to better reflect operation costs and leave more room for the private sector. • Rationalize geographic coverage: there is no need for a base in each district; bases should be established on no other consideration than the volume of business they can generate. Remote veterinarians can always organize themselves informally to jointly collect medicines from a base. • Strict limits on the maximum debt a veterinarian can carry should be re-instated. Any use of the fund not related to medicine supply (such as to pay for special events and travels) should also be forbidden. • As recommended by many supervision missions, FAO should provide the TVA with a more user-friendly accounting database to help identify debtors. This would help poorly- managed bases and improve control. • All medicines procured and sold by the programme should have instructions written in Russian. If the supplier cannot provide this, FAO or the TVA should arrange translation of instructions into Russian, print leaflets and distribute them with the medicines. Outcomes and Impacts 54. In adherence to the “Theory of Change” approach, issues to be covered in this section were related to a series of steps which the veterinarians and their clients need to take for the project to have an impact, namely: the capacity to access livestock and livestock owners (both physically and socially); the farmers’ willingness to pay for veterinary services; effective treatment and protection of animals i.e. improved animal health and production, and equitable distribution of benefits. These sets of issues are analyzed in turn below. Physical Access to Households TOR Questions: • Are VFUs culturally able to access and interact with male and female livestock holders, and are they able to access both sedentary and transhumant livestock holders? • Do the VFUs mostly visit the villages/HH they are supposed to serve, or do they predominantly wait for clients? • Can potential clients easily and rapidly access VFUs if they need them? 55. All active veterinarians travel to their clients’ farms rather than wait for clients to come their home or clinic. Few interviewed veterinarians – usually the most active vets serving periurban cattle farms – had a vehicle. The basic bicycles distributed by the project are useful, especially in lowlands. However, the only electric bicycle the team saw had broken down. This 40 model – given to the most active veterinarians to encourage them – proved too sophisticated and not appropriate for rural Tajikistan. 56. The team saw a few veterinarians who had set up their own clinic, both with or without help from the programme. Such premises have important symbolic value as a sign of the vet’s professionalism and independence from the Government. There are also benefits in terms of facilitating access to clients without bothering the veterinarian’s family all the time. Some veterinarians stated they stay in their clinic for a couple of hours in the morning in order to receive calls, and then go in their car or by bicycle to visit their clients’ farms for the rest of the day. 57. The most significant means of communication between the farmers and veterinarians is the mobile telephone. All veterinarians have one, and most of their clients also. Where there is no mobile coverage, the possibility of the vet reaching their client in time to treat problems such as tympany (bloat) that need immediate treatment is severely reduced. 58. The main factors affecting physical access are poor roads, the physical geography of such a mountainous country as Tajikistan and the severity of the weather especially in the winter. Tajikistan can be schematically divided into two parts: i) the plains (around Dushanbe, Kolyab, Kurghan Tubbe and Khujand); and ii) the mountainous areas particularly prominent in GBAO and DRR (Gharm and the Fan ranges), but also existing in Sughd and Khatlon (e.g. the Shurabad district). While the plains are easily accessible and well covered by telephone networks, a number of factors dramatically reduce physical access in mountainous areas: − poor mobile telephone coverage; − low population density and scattered villages; − bicycles are of limited use, especially for older veterinarians; − roads are often impassable in winter; − during the summer, most of the ruminants are in the highland pastures and difficult to reach, especially at short notice. 59. The last factor is not specific to mountainous areas, as seasonal grazing systems characterize animal husbandry in all of Tajikistan. Many animals even from the lowlands go to mountain ayloq (summer pastures) for three or four months in the summer, often at great distance from their home villages 9. However, transhumance is more pronounced in the mountainous areas where very few animals are kept near the valley settlements in summer. Lowland households may keep milking animals in particular near their house all year round.

9 The most common system combines local, daily trips to nearby pasture grounds in spring – whereby each household is responsible for shepherding the livestock of the entire village for one day, on a rotation basis – with nation-wide movements to highland pastures in summer – where the shepherds are permanent and receive retribution for their work. 41

Figure 6: Seasonality of Veterinary Work: Medicine Withdrawals in a Few Highland and Lowland Districts (2008) Highlands: Pendjikent Shurabad Gharm '000 Lowlands: Shaartuz Shahrinav somoni 10

8

6

4

2

0 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

60. Transhumance makes it difficult for veterinarians to reach the flocks and herds when they are away in the mountains on the spring or summer pastures. For instance, tympany (bloat) is a common problem with sheep and cows on the spring flush of grass. Few of the shepherds interviewed knew how to treat the problem with a trocard, and most would not attempt it on animals that do not belong to them. 61. As a result, veterinary services in the highlands are generally limited to treating for internal and external parasites and vaccinations twice a year, before going to and after returning from the summer pastures . This makes veterinary work in the highlands a seasonal occupation. 62. Making a veterinary programme work in such remote locations with problems of contrasting seasons and access is a challenge. However, to neglect the highlands would lay the country open to the spread of infectious diseases. The whole country sends livestock to the summer pastures of Rasht, Tavildara and other alpine valleys. Transhumant flocks often meet and mingle in highland pastures, and infectious diseases can be spread faster as a result, including across borders 10 . Moreover, the highlands depend on livestock raising to a greater extent than lowlands, and it is therefore important for the programme to try and work there from the point of view of equity. Just because it is difficult does not mean it is not worth the effort. 63. Transhumance remains the most rational and economically advantageous system to use the vast pastoral resources of the highlands during summertime. It will and should continue, and a system of veterinary care must be developed to deal with it. Recommendations : • Propose business opportunities for summers, such as beekeeping or transformation of animal products. • Develop a short, first-aid training course for shepherds on the most important diseases and simple ways to diagnose and treat them, for instance on the use of trocards for tympany.

10 Seasonal movements include cross-border ones, especially in Sughd “piedmont” towards Kyrgyzstan. However, traditional seasonal movements to Uzbekistan have stopped as the border with Tajikistan is now mined on its entire length. Livestock movements through the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border are forbidden although rumored to happen. 42

• Some veterinarians or paravets may be ready to travel to highland pastures and remain there for the entire summer if paid well enough; the TVA could try and promote a scheme whereby each summer grazing area would be served by a veterinarian or a paravet. • Do not organize training sessions for mountain veterinarians in spring and autumn, when they are busiest – summer is much more appropriate. • Resources permitting, the Brucellosis vaccination programme should be expanded to cover the whole country. Gender and social access 64. For the purpose of this impact assessment, ‘social access’ has been taken into account from the point of view of ethnicity and gender. Ethnicity was found not to be an issue, as veterinarians are almost always from the same location and population where they work. However, gender presents a more complex picture. 65. Women mainly take care of the animals that are managed close to the house. They clean the barns, feed the stock, milk and process the dairy products into butter, yogurt, “ chakar ” and “qurut ” and occasionally sell the products in local markets. Herding animals on the summer pastures is mainly a male occupation, although in some areas women go to the spring pastures and in some instances whole families of shepherds with men, women and children go together to the ayloq . 66. In so far as a family’s livestock are part of the whole household’s assets, protecting the animals health and production benefits the entire family rather than particular members of the household. However, it is possible that women are more exposed to zoonoses such as brucellosis than men because they process dairy products and care for the sick animals, and hence that the human health impact of the project is to a greater degree felt by women than by men. Unfortunately, this hypothesis could not be verified by epidemiological data due to the scarcity of such data in Tajikistan. 67. The team interviewed more than a hundred veterinarians and only found three female ones (two in Rushan, one in Khorog, now the base manager there). The profession is still a stereotyped male occupation. During academic year 2008-09, there were only 11 female students out of a total of 414 studying in the Veterinary Faculty (2.7%). Female graduates are often oriented towards laboratory work. The general perception is that this is not a woman’s job. It is not so much the physical demands of the work but more a question of social mores. A veterinarian must always be available night and day to go to a clients’ farm or house to treat animals. It would not be considered correct for a woman to go out at night to the house of a man who is not a relative. 68. Having said this, there is no problem for a male veterinarian to go to a female livestock owner’s place even in the absence of a male member of the family. Contracted veterinarians often make house calls to treat animals and also provide information about diseases and their symptoms. In this way women may gain technical knowledge as well. 11 The issue is not so much one of access to female livestock owners than one of the lack of professional opportunity and social acceptance for women to become veterinarians in Tajik society. 69. One could argue that female veterinarians would be in a better position than men to relate to women, to teach them and treat their animal. Currently, access to veterinary services is still preferably through men. Women are less likely than men to travel far from home to bring a diseased animal to a veterinarian or ask him to come to their home. When they need to call a veterinarian, women either use a mobile telephone or send a child fetch him. This may be less

11 During interviews, many women described a number of diseases in great detail and knew their scientific (Russian) names, such as Brucellosis, Anthrax, etc. 43 effective than going in person. Men probably have more access to mobile telephones. Similarly, the spring and autumn vaccination campaigns are often announced at Friday prayers in the mosque which women do not attend. Consequently, many female-headed households are less well informed than male-headed households or are informed late about such campaigns. 70. In some areas such as in Tavildara or Badakhshan, the old Soviet mind set that animal diseases should be looked after by the state or by the head of the collective farm at no charge is still common among women. However, in Khatlon and other more accessible locations where the FAO programme has been active for a longer time, this perception is fading and women generally accept that veterinary services must be paid for. 71. It should be mentioned that there are no women on the FAO veterinary programme team and the FAO national project manager considers that this work is not for women. This opinion is likely to translate into discrimination during job interviews. Recommendations : • Inform female-headed households of prevention campaigns through the Rais-e-Zanôn system. • The project and the TVA should hire more women in professional positions (veterinarians, base manager, trainers). Willingness to Pay TOR Questions: • Are services offered by the VFUs relevant to the intended beneficiaries, do they fit their needs and are they appreciated by them (e.g. balance between curative vs. preventive)? • Are services provided by the VFUs of better quality and complementary to those of existing animal health providers? • Are farmers willing to pay (in cash or in kind) for these services? Which is the effective demand? • Is there a demand for Artificial Insemination and are the VFUs logistically and technically able to provide AI? 72. After some initial resistance during the first years of the programme, most farmers are now willing to pay for veterinary services, and they usually pay in cash. Others get the service on credit and pay sometimes after several months, especially in the mountains where sales of animals are seasonal. About 10% pay in kind and some are too poor to pay. The impact assessment showed that the very poor are more likely to have their animals treated if they live in the same village as a working veterinarian, because of local social pressure and family ties. Poor households not connected to a veterinarian do not bother to ask for service. 73. It should be stressed that the pre-financing of drugs offered by the programme through the revolving fund helped veterinarians during the transition from the Soviet model to a free market economy. Had the programme not included a revolving fund applying rather lenient terms, veterinarians could not have started their private practice so rapidly and easily. 74. The programme has succeeded in creating a market for veterinary services, although it is more successful in Khatlon than in GBAO where it has not been going for as long. In GBAO, some of the interviewed male and female farmers expressed nostalgia for the old system where everything was free. In Khalon this feeling has all but disappeared. 75. The results from the “willingness to pay” survey done on brucellosis vaccination earlier in 2009 confirm the IA results (Figure 7).

44

Figure 7 Preliminary Results from the

100 brucellosis brucellosis

80

vaccination vaccination 60

Percent of people people of Percent 40

agreeing to buy buy to agreeing 20

0 0.5 1 2 Primary price offer (somoni) Source: David Ward, private communication

76. There is a demand for artificial insemination (AI), especially from peri-urban dairy farmers. The same demand is also expressed in areas where it may be unrealistic, such as mountainous areas and the extreme south of the country where the harsh conditions are not favourable for the breeding of highly productive animals which is the normal purpose for AI. 77. The impact assessment team traveled to some remote locations to observe situations where the programme has not worked or had no impact. In the case of GBAO the programme, although recently started, has rapidly covered entire valleys. However, the very isolated Tavildara valley presented an interesting case. The two veterinarians trained there by the project in 2005 were not able to get paid for their services and stopped working as veterinarians after only one year. This appears to be the only place where the project has failed to open a market for veterinary services. Recommendation : Re-launch the programme efforts in Tavildara, placing initial emphasis on improving awareness about the commercial veterinary services, e.g. testimonies from livestock owners and veterinarians from other regions.

Impact on Livestock and Households TOR Questions: • Are drugs and vaccines primarily used for their intended purposes? • Is livestock in areas covered by the programme healthier, better protected from pests and diseases, and more productive, and if so to what extent is this a result of VFUs’ work? • Do livestock owners and communities benefit from higher & more stable animal production? • Have the factors above led to better human health and nutrition? 78. The impact assessment team was consistently told by farmers that the programme has had a very positive impact on improving animal health and production. Farmers repeatedly and emphatically expressed their satisfaction and their willingness to pay for veterinary services. The programme is credited with reduced mortality and morbidity of livestock, increased production of milk and meat, and protection of livestock assets. 79. The economic impact in terms of protection of assets and dependability of income was stressed especially by the largest livestock owners. Large scale commercial animal production systems cannot perform without veterinary care. As for traditional livestock owners, they can make a living without good animal health care but their livelihood is much more secure when 45 there is a good veterinary system to protect their animals from large scale epidemics and reduce the load of parasites. 80. This came in striking contrast to the situation in Tavaldara, which was the only place visited by the IA team where the programme has not yet been successful. Interviews in Tavildara provided anecdotal evidence that the incidence of a variety of diseases is higher there than in other parts of the country. The traditional practice of slaughtering sick animals in case of infectious disease was reported to be more common in Tavidara than where the programme has been working more successfully, as in Khatlon or Sharenow. 81. Serological surveys indicate that Tavildara is the only district in DRR where the FAO efforts to vaccinate against brucellosis have not succeeded, (Figure 8), possibly because the veterinary services there are still disorganised and unmotivated 12 .

Figure 8: Comparison of Seroprevalence in 2003 and 2007 in Rasht Valley 16% 14.2% (based on both RBT and cELISA positives) 13.6% 14% 12.9% The vaccination campaigns 12% reduced prevalence everywhere 9.7% 10% except in Tavildara . 8% 7.1% 6% 5.2% 4.3% 4.7% 3.4% 3.8% 4% 2.8% 2.5% 2.2% 1.5% 2% 1.2% 0.7% 0% Rogun Jirgital Tavildara Nurek Faizobod Tajikabad Rasht Nurabad

Prevalence in 2003 Prevalence in 2007 Source: Ron Ja ckson, personal communication

82. These data indicate that the programme has made a significant contribution to a public good through more effective disease surveillance and better prevention campaigns including those funded by other donors and projects for the control of PPR and Brucellosis. These projects can now rely on an active network of local veterinarians. 83. Another crucial impact is on human health. Humans and their livestock live in close proximity in rural Tajikistan. Many animal diseases can be transmitted to humans (e.g. Brucellosis, Anthrax but also parasitizes such as Fasciolosis or Tenia), as was repeatedly stressed by respondents. By lowering the prevalence of animal diseases, the programme was said by farmers to have had a direct and beneficial impact on human health. There is also a more indirect effect on health through improved nutrition, as milk products are an important source of proteins and vitamins. 84. Even in GBAO, where the service provided by contracted veterinarians is limited, the IA found that the veterinary programme has had a significant and positive impact on people’s lives. The seasonal prophylactic campaigns before and after the summer grazing have made a significant impact on livestock health and productivity. In GBAO rural livelihoods are almost exclusively dependent on livestock.

12 The hypothesis that increased prevalence in Tavildara is due to transhumance from Khatlon to summer pastures in Tavildara appears unconvincing since such transhumance happens in other parts of Rasht valley as well. 46

85. Most interviewed livestock owners were chiefly interested in meat production that is easily marketable by walking the animals to one of the many livestock markets in the country. In contrast, milk, hides and wool are much more difficult to market due to the collapse of state-own enterprises (wool) and/or the disruption of marketing networks. 86. It is worth stressing that the impact on animal production, household incomes, nutrition and health is nation-wide, as the programme has managed to cover, in varying degrees of intensity and duration, 78% of all jamoats in the country. Recommendation : Work on traditional and industrial (private) transformation of animal products. Impact on Veterinarians 87. By all accounts, the programme is perceived as having been extremely useful in reconstructing veterinary services. When farms were privatised, the veterinarians who had enjoyed a certain status suddenly found themselves without a useful role in society. For many this was a catastrophe. The FAO’s programme has helped re-motivate many veterinarians and has introduced them to an alternative way of working. It is thus viewed as a sort of saviour or champion by an embattled profession. 88. Although the programme has had a positive impact on the incomes of many contracted veterinarians, the picture emerging from field interviews and other sources is mixed. Some veterinarians are doing much better than others, depending on their technical and social skills. Detailed monitoring of all VFUs established and supported by animal health projects since 1999 was carried out by programme staff in early 2008. It found that more than 30% of the 500 trained veterinarians were not functioning as veterinarians. Some had left the country for Russia; others had moved to different businesses and some had died. The analysis showed that most vets do not make a sufficiently good living from veterinary practice alone. Some 19% of those surveyed declared earnings above US$ 100 per month, 43% between US$ 50 and 100 per month while 38% said they earned less than US$ 50 per month. A number of reasons were proposed to explain these figures, including temporary absence of quality medicines, transport costs, poor technical knowledge of the veterinarians in some fields, and lack of promotion of their services to farmers. 89. Interviews with veterinarians conducted during the impact assessment provided slightly better figures than the earlier survey, with most interviewed veterinarians reporting incomes ranging from TJS 300 to 1000 per month (US$ 70 to 230 per month). This may still be an underestimation. Many vets will report lower incomes because they fear that the tax authorities may be informed if they state the truth. Indeed taxation was found to be an issue for private veterinarians, many of whom do not fill in their “ambulator” notebook for fear of the taxman. Equity TOR Questions: • Are programme costs and benefits more or less equitably distributed within communities and households, (e.g. without unduly favouring large livestock owners or contributing to concentration of livestock in the hands of a few owners)? 90. Large livestock owners tend to benefit more from the programme than small livestock owners. The larger owners have more animals and veterinarians are more likely to answer their calls. There is more money to be made from one single visit to a large livestock owner than from several visits to small owners. Some small and large per-iurban milk farms were visited, near Khudjand for instance. These dairy farmers were very good clients for veterinarians. 91. There are also less commercial, more traditional large livestock owners. Many of them appreciated the veterinary service on a commercial basis, while others appeared reluctant to recognize the need to vaccinate their animals or pay for veterinary services. 47

92. Small livestock owners are a “mixed bag”. Families that have access to some income, for instance remittances from Russia, do the “ peshgiri ” (prevention) i.e. vaccinations and anthelmintics to protect their meager assets and do not hesitate to call for a veterinarian if their one milk cow is sick. It must be pointed out that the price of medicines and vaccination are still low by international standards. 93. There are also poor livestock owners with very limited cash resources, who are unlikely to have access to the veterinary services, except when they are living in the same village as a contracted veterinarian. In this case Tajik culture and community social pressure helps to ensure that they receive some help even if they cannot afford to pay for it. Sustainability and Environmental Issues TORs questions: • What are the factors that tend to make a VFU weak or inactive? • Is the volume of activity generated by the VFUs sufficient for their profitability and sustainability (possibly with pluri-activity), without resorting to seasonal outmigration? • Are remittances from abroad helping family members to buy drugs and hence contributing to VFU’s profitability and sustainability? • Do benefiting livestock holders control their herd’s size so that improved health does not lead to further overgrazing? Economic Sustainability 94. The factors that make a veterinarian active or inactive were found to be based on common sense and mainly depend on the reputation and capacity of the person and his availability on short notice, just like a medical doctor has more clients if he is perceived to be effective and helpful. Being a contracted veterinarian brings an advantage in terms of access to reasonably priced, good quality medicines, but the team also met with a few non-contracted veterinarians who were making a living without the help of the programme. Overall, the IA concludes that there are good prospects for motivated veterinarians to make a sustainable living, since the private sector increasingly provides veterinary drugs. The revolving fund is no longer a pre-requisite for the profession to flourish. 95. The programme staff uses sales of medicines from the VRRF as an indicator of activity. However, many veterinarians also use private pharmacies as a source of supply or write prescriptions for their clients to buy their medicines from a pharmacy. VRRF medicine sales are therefore not a reliable indicator. Some veterinarians who totally dropped out of the VRRF system of drug provision are still active. 96. Most vets have several occupations: farmer, private veterinarian, governmental veterinarian (for mandatory vaccinations), beekeeper, etc. Such a plurality of gainful occupations is a general fact of life in Tajikistan and a natural consequence of low and uncertain incomes. It would be a mistake to insist that all veterinarians forgo their parallel activities and devote themselves entirely to their practice. This would only narrow their livelihood base and make them more vulnerable. 97. The fact that most veterinarians receive the Government stipend as well as having a private practice might appear undesirable to those who apply the ‘privatization mantra’ in an inflexible, ideological manner. However, it should be understood that in western countries private entities are commonly paid by governments to deliverer specific public services. Public-private schemes have been set up to provide veterinary services in countries with significant extensive livestock sectors such as Sweden. While there may be room for improvement on how this is done in Tajikistan, retaining veterinarians, including contracted vets on the government payroll and paying them a small stipend to perform a range of public services such as mass immunization can be justified as a form of public-private partnership. Similarly, the network of trained veterinarians 48 set up by the programme is being used by other FAO animal health projects to manage brucellosis and PPR vaccinations or the HPAI sero-surveillance. 98. The impact assessment mission met with many older veterinarians. The concern that the profession is ageing, in need of young blood and in danger of disappearing, was expressed several times. The most remote areas such as GBAO are the most at risk. Young men are reluctant to work there and few veterinary students come from these regions. The Veterinary Faculty has few “quotas” whereby a student from a particularly remote or deprived area might obtain a scholarship and enter the faculty without examination. In 2008-09 the Veterinary Faculty had a total of 414 students of which only 11 were under “quotas”, 238 under scholarships and 176 fee-paying. Institutional Sustainability 99. The main issue in terms of institutional sustainability relates to the TVA. Since February 2009, the TVA has been entrusted with all significant programme assets, from the VRRF to the veterinary bases and personnel, and the training facilities in Khudjand and Sharenaw. 100. The TVA is still very new, and it is too early to tell if it will prove sustainable. Started by a few veterinarians in 2003 in Sughd, it was revived at a national level by FAO in 2007. Many of its current members were enrolled in 2008, when the number of TVA members in a given district became the de facto determinant for a “micro-base” opening in a district 13 . Many of these new members have very little idea about what the association can do for them. The IA team got the impression that they were told to enrol by the district chief veterinarian, and agreed in order not be left out of an interesting and possibly profitable development. In some districts, drivers and compound wardens were enrolled together with veterinarians. 101. The sense of ownership is currently weak. When asked to whom the organisation belongs, few replied “to us, veterinarians”. Many members consider that the TVA is an organisation controlled by FAO and/or by the Government, and rightly so. At district level, most TVA managers are the head district doctor or his deputy. Most veterinarians, including the FAO contractors, are still on the Government payroll and therefore under the nominal authority of the district chief veterinarian, even if their stipend is a fraction of what they can earn through their private practice. 102. Thirty-five affiliated associations have been legally established at the district level. One of the reasons was to decentralize the VRRF in order to minimize the risk of it being managed entirely from Dushanbe 14 . The district chapters are composed of a small number of veterinarians, typically about a dozen. There seems to be room between the district and the national levels for the formation of regional federations of district associations in order to form a critical mass of veterinarians and business turn over to help encourage a greater sense of ownership of the TVA among veterinarians 15 . 103. The regionalization of the TVA could also lead to a better definition of roles. The national level can focus on policy issues and advocacy while the regional level could focus on social assistance and improving veterinary practices. The current TVA charter presents a long list of objectives including: support for the regulation of the sector; a forum for private-public

13 The volume of VRRF medicines sold was a criterion for opening a micro-base. When TVA members became eligible to the VRRF medicines, the more members a district had, the more likely it was to be granted a micro-base. 14 The central Dushanbe base was poorly managed for years. When all bases were audited in 2008 to prepare for the transfer of the VRRF to the TVA, the Dushanbe base could not be certified due to a lack of documentation and misappropriation by a previous base manager. At some point, the programme staff recommended to the regional bases not to send any money to Dushanbe for fear of further embezzlement. 15 To be fair, the programme has drafted a “Strategy for Decentralization of the Revolving Funds and Promotion of the Ownership of TVA by Members” which goes some way in that direction and underpins the creation of district-level associations. 49 partnership; lobbying; development of technical standards; social assistance to veterinarians facing family or health difficulties and cooperatives for medical supplies. It is not clear to the IA team that all these objectives can be usefully pursued by a professional organisation, let alone achieved by the TVA. Certainly the Government has a leading role to play in developing a regulatory framework for the profession, and while the TVA can help lobby for its members’ interests it cannot and should not be in the driving seat. 104. In the seed sector, the corresponding professional organisation (the Seed Producers Association of Tajikistan) is distinct from the forum supporting public-private negotiations and partnerships (National Seed Council). This seems to be a clearer division of responsibilities between public and private actors, namely: i) a Government defining policy and voting in regulations; ii) a professional organisation defending its members’ interests; and iii) a public- private forum to discuss policies, regulations and the likes. Environmental Sustainability 105. The IA was to test the hypothesis that by improving livestock survival, the programme could increase pressure on pastures, with possible detrimental environmental consequences. As observed by the IA team, concerns about overgrazing and over stocking where found to be overstated, for the following reasons: • 2009 has been an exceptional year in terms of rainfall and fodder production and the IA team was not able to observe much evidence of overgrazing. On the contrary, the way the upland pastures in Khatlon have responded to the spring and early summer rainfall in 2009 is testimony to their health and species diversity, which includes many grasses and forbs including wild legumes. • Fodder is a limiting factor in winter, especially in high mountainous areas such as GBAO where there are no winter grazing grounds. In GBAO villagers do not keep more animals than they can feed through the winter on the hay they make in the summer. • Summer grazing in the ayloq is not free: payments are made to a number of officials, including forest guards in the case of national land and district officials in case of communal grazing grounds. In theory at least this should contribute to limiting the size of herds. Recommendations : • FAO and the Government have been champions of the TVA and should not withdraw too fast; the TVA will have to decide by itself what the right relationship with Government entities should be, and this relationship could evolve over time. • FAO should stay on the board of the TVA to help control costs, develop better systems for auditing and accounting, support technical and business training, strengthen the association democratic life, etc. • One way to prepare for the progressive autonomy of the TVA vis à vis the Government would be to focus its role clearly on defending the interests of its members; a separate organization or body should be created to provide a public-private forum discussing regulations and laws, with the TVA as a member. • Small steps to improve local visibility and ownership of the TVA by its members could include an awareness raising campaign and the regionalization of the TVA through more independent regional federations. • The TVA requires capacity building and institutional development at the national, regional and district levels, with an emphasis on improving skills in management, including business management (accounting, cost control, procurement and stock keeping) as well as in advocacy, leadership and participatory planning and evaluation. • The TVA should carefully invest the limited funds available, through an investment plan approved by its members. 50

• There is a market for fodder and concentrate, which the TVA and its bases could try and sell; however, beware of not working only on non-traditional feed as currently envisaged: traditional hay and “combinat” may be commercially more profitable.

D. IDEAS FOR FUTURE PROGRAMMING 106. The transition to a private veterinary service being essentially and successfully completed, it is now time to support the development of profitable commercial livestock production in the interests of improving incomes and food security as well as increasing the ability of rural households to pay for effective veterinary services. Tajikistan has considerable potential, nonetheless at present, only 6% of all meat, 1.5% of milk products and 2% of eggs produced are traded 16 . Most of the wool is thrown away for lack of market. 107. In 2007, Tajikistan cow milk production was estimated at 583 thousands tons, 92.7% of which came from “population” livestock (i.e. private stocks). That same year, the country imported 3,597 tons of milk at a cost of $2.7ml to provide for the urban markets 17 . The industrial milk processing sector has developed very limited links with smallholders who form the bulk of cattle farmers in the country. 108. In the veterinary field, there is still a considerable need for more training and for updated literature. Most of the scientific and technical literature that veterinarians rely upon to refresh their skills and improve their diagnostic skills dates back to Soviet times and is out of date. FAO could usefully support the translation into Russian of more up to date veterinary literature. In terms of training, FAO may usefully continue to provide short-term topical and practical training to Tajik veterinarians. Funds permitting, FAO should also assist the Veterinary Faculty of the Tajik Agrarian University – as well as vocational training schools such as the Qurghon Teppa tekhnic – up date their curriculum with practical exercises and courses, introduction to the latest medicines, surgical procedures and public health practices, and not forgetting business training. 109. SIDA has been developing a long-term project to support the Tajik Agrarian University, including the Veterinary Faculty, but will close its operations in Tajikistan by the end of 2010. Funds permitting, FAO should try and fill the void created by SIDA’s departure. 110. The TVA is still very weak and will require organisational support for many years to come. The Association must learn to manage its funds carefully, to advertise its services and utility to its members, to organise regional chapters, etc. However, the mission does not recommend further replenishments by FAO of the VRRF, which the TVA must learn to use in a more market-oriented and sustainable way than is the case at present. 111. The mission is conscious that the revolving fund may collapse in the coming years if management is not improved. However, we believe that, even if this happens, most veterinarians will still be able to access veterinary supplies from the rapidly developing private sector. The TVA may still provide a useful service to its members by facilitating group purchase of vaccines and medicines. However, it may have to collect funds from its members in advance or secure short-term bank loans. This would best be done twice a year before the busy spring and autumn seasons. 112. The Impact Assessment did not study the policy environment in much depth. It is nevertheless striking to observe that the veterinary programme supported the transition to a market-based service in the absence of a conducive policy framework. In fact, there is no law regulating the profession of private veterinarian in Tajikistan. It looks as if FAO and the GoT

16 Willingness to pay for disease prevention: Case of brucellosis control in Khatlon Oblast of Tajikistan - V. Ahuja, R. Rajabova, D. Ward, A. McLeod, FAO, June 2009. 17 Livestock Sector Strategic Study, FAO undated. 51 opted to postpone policy change – a rather uncertain and protracted endeavour in Tajikistan 18 – until such time as it could be demonstrated that private veterinarians could make a commercial living in Tajikistan. It is worth noting that SIDA has been supporting policy development in the animal health sector, and that FAO could possibly move into this role when SIDA leaves the country by the end of 2010. Now that the privatisation of the veterinary services has proved to be a successful and viable approach, it is time to develop an appropriate legislative framework. In the absence of a clear policy on private and public delivery of veterinary services, decisions continue to be made on an ad hoc basis. Any change in SVI leadership or misunderstanding between the FAO and MoA could destroy the achievements made so far. 113. In essence, we recommend an evolution towards more long-term, developmental initiatives, which we see as possible and desirable now that the urgent need for rehabilitating veterinary services has been successfully fulfilled.

18 In the words of a programme manager: “Experiences have shown many good policy documents developed by excellent writers were archived and forgotten”. 52

ANNEX IV Terms of Reference for Country Evaluation Mission

Annex IV A Terms of Reference for Evaluation of FAO Cooperation with Tajikistan

1. Background 1. At its May 2005 session, the Programme Committee (PC) made recommendations for the work programme of the Evaluation Service for the period 2006-09. Following a suggestion made by the Committee at its September 2004 session (CL 127/12, paragraph 49), the PC recommended that FAO should undertake “an evaluation drawing conclusions on the basis of evaluations of the totality of FAO’s work in individual countries”. In response to the PC’s recommendation, FAO began carrying out evaluations of the entirety of its cooperation with individual countries. Thus far, six evaluations have been completed (Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Cambodia, Honduras, DR Congo and India). 2. The evaluations in DR Congo, Sudan and Tajikistan share some common characteristics. In all three countries, the bulk of FAO project activities are implemented by the Emergency Operations and Rehabilitation Division (TCE). These country evaluations have been requested by TCE and are funded through a Trust Fund established for evaluation of FAO’s emergency and rehabilitation-related activities. Each has had a considerable in-country personnel establishment in an Emergency Coordination Unit (ECU; in Tajikistan it is now called the Project Coordination Unit (PCU)). However, Tajikistan is different from the other countries in that it has no FAO Representative. Aside from the PCU, the FAO also has a National Correspondent, a Ministry of Agriculture employee who works part-time for FAO. Given the size of the FAO cooperation with Tajikistan, the evaluation will need to focus on the appropriateness of in-country support mechanisms as a key issue. 3. The FAO presence in Tajikistan was established through an ECU set up in 1996 in response to the complex emergency situation in the country which began in 1992 with the outbreak of civil war. A peace agreement was signed in 1997, but since then Tajikistan has continued to be the subject of a UN appeal every year. Up until about 2002, the appeals were grounded in the need for post-war rehabilitation. Appeals in recent years have been justified by natural disasters, such as the flooding that struck the country in spring/summer 2005, earthquake (2006) and the extreme cold winter of 2008. 4. The nature of the FAO activities in Tajikistan has changed over the years, from almost exclusively input distribution to more development-oriented activities such as establishment of veterinary field units, livestock and pasture rehabilitation, land reform and watershed management. One of the chief reasons for requesting the Tajikistan country evaluation was to assess the performance of FAO in this type of transition. 5. The evaluation will cover a total of 48 national and regional projects that were implemented in Tajikistan from 2004 onwards. Thirteen national projects with total budgets of some USD 17.4 million are still on-going, as are ten regional and interregional projects. Of the on-going national projects, two have budgets of over USD 2 million (a UTF World Bank funded input distribution project and SIDA-funded support to the animal health sector); five have budgets from USD 1 million to 2 million and the rest were below USD 500 000. For the regional and interregional projects, it is not possible to ascertain the total amount attributable from most of them to activities directed at Tajikistan.

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2. Purposes 6. The Evaluation will be forward-looking: it will identify areas for improvement and draw lessons to enhance the relevance and effectiveness of FAO cooperation with Tajikistan in the future. It will also assist the Government, donors and other partners in Tajikistan in better exploiting areas of comparative advantage of FAO. 7. The main purposes of the Evaluation are: a) to improve the relevance, design, implementation, results and impact of FAO cooperation with Tajikistan; b) to provide accountability to the Government of Tajikistan and to other FAO member countries about FAO performance at country level; c) to identify the factors affecting the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and impact of FAO cooperation at country level; and d) to assess FAO performance in assisting the country in its transition from emergency to development. 3. Scope 8. The major focus of the Evaluation is a determination of the effectiveness and impact of the totality of FAO cooperation in Tajikistan. It encompasses all activities in direct support to the country irrespective of source of funding during the period 2004-2008. 9. As the evaluation is intended also to serve as a key accountability tool for TCP projects, brief individual project evaluations (including comments on relevance, design, implementation, results, impact and sustainability) will be prepared for the national TCP projects implemented during the period under evaluation. 4. Evaluation Issues and Questions 10. The Evaluation will examine the key issues and questions below. During the course of the exercise, the Evaluation team should feel free to identify other issues of importance to be addressed. 5. Relevance of FAO’s Work 11. The Evaluation will advise whether the actions taken by FAO are consistent with the country’s needs. This will include the analysis of the processes used for the identification of interventions. Issues and questions to be explored will include: a) the strategy and priority setting mechanisms for FAO’s work in Tajikistan; b) types and nature of dialogue on priorities and programmes between FAO, the Government of Tajikistan and other national development actors and involvement in this of HQs and Regional offices, including who actually initiates and promotes activity/project ideas; c) modality and inclusiveness of the consultation process with intended beneficiaries; d) extent to which the activities of FAO in the past five years reflect the Organization’s priorities and comparative advantage (as defined in FAO’s Strategic Framework) and lessons learned from previous operations; e) extent to which the activities of FAO in the past five years met country development needs and requests; f) what is the acceptance of the National Medium-Term Priority Framework (NMTPF) by the Government and how is the NMTPF likely to shape FAO interventions in Tajikistan in the coming years? g) links, coherence and synergies between various FAO interventions, and between FAO activities and national planning exercises, UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and major donors’ programmes; and h) perspectives and areas of focus for future work of FAO in Tajikistan.

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6. Efficiency of FAO’s Work 12. The Evaluation will advise whether FAO’s work was carried out in an efficient and timely manner and if the Organization is adequately geared to provide timely, quality services in Tajikistan. Issues and questions to be explored will include: a) Efficiency, timeliness and quality of FAO support and service delivery, including agricultural input distributions. b) Efficiency of procurement practices in terms of minimizing cost and delivery time to beneficiaries and maximizing quality. c) Is the number, skill level and mix of international to local staff appropriate for the activities being undertaken? Are programme management systems (supervision, administration, logistic, finance) optimal for the delivery of the programme? d) Has FAO’s decentralization process affected the efficiency of its work in Tajikistan? 7. Effectiveness and Impact of FAO’s Work 13. The evaluation will analyse results and, to the extent possible, assess actual or potential impact of FAO’s work. The evaluation will assess: a) To what extent do FAO’s activities in Tajikistan contribute to the implementation of National Development Plans and MDGs in general, and MDG Goals 1 and 7 in particular? b) Extent and level of adoption and appropriation by the Government of strategies, methodologies and tools promoted by FAO in the different areas of intervention. c) Extent of the utilization, results and impact of FAO’s normative products. d) Effectiveness of FAO national and regional projects in providing assistance, developing capacities and adding value to the Government’s own programmes. e) Effectiveness and impact of activities on the intended ultimate beneficiaries, particularly in rural areas. f) Were there synergies among FAO activities in the country? g) To what extent do FAO activities in Tajikistan address, focus and have any effect and impact on cross-cutting issues such as environment, gender, participation and HIV/AIDS? h) Extent to which results of FAO activities have been adopted, mainstreamed or up- scaled by the Government. i) Extent to which FAO has engaged in effective policy dialogue with the Government. 14. An impact evaluation will be conducted to assess the work of the Veterinary Field Units. The Evaluation will refer to this report for evidence and recommendations in the area of livestock and the impact study report will be an annex to the final report. 8. Sustainability of FAO’s Work 15. The long term sustainability of results, impact and potential impact will be assessed for activities and areas of intervention, whenever feasible: a) What is the likely long-term sustainability of interventions undertaken in Tajikistan? b) Do FAO projects in the country have a clear exit strategy aiming at the sustainability of their results and impact? 9. Transition from Emergency to Development 16. A primary purpose for selecting Tajikistan is to assess how FAO has performed in a transition from activities associated with a complex emergency situation to a greater emphasis on sustainable development. While Tajikistan continues to be the subject of annual humanitarian food security appeals, with an emphasis on provision of input supplies, at the same time more FAO activities have been oriented to longer term development concerns, even if funded through

55 and implemented under the responsibility of TCE. The evaluation should address the following issues: a) To what extent has the focus on sustainable development issues in Tajikistan been driven by FAO and Government priorities, as opposed to reacting to donor interest? b) What have been the advantages and disadvantages of implementing projects through TCE as opposed to other potential Budget Holders, in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and outcomes? c) To what extent did FAO hold a common vision of the priorities in a transition and how was this reflected in the activities undertaken? 10. Performance of the FAO Office in Tajikistan 17. Tajikistan does not have an FAO country office. With the exception of some special cases (e.g. Iraq, Somalia, Saudi Arabia), the FAO portfolio in Tajikistan is the largest of any country without a fully-fledged FAOR. Nonetheless, the Tajikistan office is large (over 70 staff in total) and has several long-term international staff. Given these particular conditions, the evaluation will assess the work done in areas concerning FAO visibility and will analyse the need for a full Representation. In particular it will examine: i) the office workload on technical, managerial, operational and administrative issues; ii) the current use of the professional staff and the possibility for them to play a policy advisory role to the Government; iii) the adequacy of the office, within its current financial resources to carry out duties which are normally within the FAO Representative’s mandate, such as advocacy; iv) the adequacy of operational mechanisms and tools available to the Project Coordinator; v) how the Project Coordinator establishes priority work areas, including development of new initiatives; and vi) the adequacy of overall monitoring of FAO’s work in the country. 11. Assessment of Roles and Functions of FAO as applied in Tajikistan 18. FAO roles and functions at global level are articulated as follows: a) a knowledge organization; b) a provider of expertise and technical assistance; c) a neutral advisor and forum on policy and technical issues; d) advocacy role on areas of FAO’s mandate; and e) a development partner and fund raiser. 19. The Evaluation will assess at national and sector-specific level, FAO’s performance and comparative advantage in Tajikistan in fulfilling its perceived organizational roles. Specific questions and issues will include the following: i) extent and quality of FAO as a source of knowledge and information in its areas of work; ii) visibility and effectiveness of FAO on food security related issues; iii) awareness, knowledge and qualitative assessment of FAO as a provider of normative products and technical assistance; iv) assessment of FAO’s performance as a neutral advisor on the areas within its mandate; v) assessment of FAO’s role in enhancing technical capabilities of national organizations and in facilitating their access to national and international funding sources; and vi) assessment of FAO as a facilitator of international and regional technical and policy initiatives.

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12. Partnership Building and UN Coordination 20. The Evaluation will seek to establish whether partnership building was strategic and efficient for creating complementarities and synergy among development assistance programmes, ensuring sustainability and coherence of the FAO cooperation and enhancing resource mobilisation. Positive examples and missed opportunities should be presented to illustrate the conclusions. 21. The evaluation will assess FAO participation in the UN Country Team and the potential for shifts in emphasis and concrete actions such as UN joint or coordinated field activities at institutional level and/or district/community level, and adjustments, if any, in FAO policy, programming and operational approach. It will also examine relations with the wider donor community and influence on their priorities and modalities of action and factors affecting this. Some of the specific evaluation questions in this area will be: • To what extent does FAO participate in the UN Country Team (UNCT) and does it contribute to the implementation of UN reform at country level? • To what extent has FAO’s participation in the UNCT enhanced the impact of UN activities in the country and created opportunities for new partnerships? • What is the extent of FAO’s partnership with other development agencies in the country? 13. Methodology of the Evaluation 22. The evaluation will draw its conclusions and recommendations based on the evidence found and make its independent assessment of the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and impact of FAO cooperation with Tajikistan as a whole, in each area of focus and on key services provided by FAO, including capacity building, applying and sharing knowledge, partnership building and resource mobilization. 23. The evaluation will use a range of tools and methods, including stakeholder consultation through workshops and semi-structured interviews with check lists, desk studies and field visits. 24. The evaluation will adopt a participatory approach whenever possible, seeking and sharing opinions with stakeholders. Triangulation of information across stakeholders will be a key tool for gathering and validation of evidence. Stakeholders include: a) FAO staff in HQ, at the Regional Office for Europe in Budapest and the Sub- regional office for Central Asia in Ankara who have been involved with support to FAO activities in Tajikistan; b) FAO project staff in Tajikistan and staff of the Project Coordination Unit; c) Government staff at policy and implementation level; d) UNCT members; e) Donors; and f) NGOs and civil society organisations, and ultimate beneficiaries. 25. At the beginning of the mission, an internal briefing session will allow all team members to have access to information on FAO as a global organization, on evaluation methods and approaches and on respective tasks of team members in the mission. A briefing will also be organized by the FAO Project Coordinator, to inform team members of the overall programme of FAO in Tajikistan. 26. At the end of the mission, the team will give its preliminary overall results and recommendations in a debriefing session with the Project Coordinator, project staff, key Government personnel and interested partner representatives. This will be an occasion to obtain feedback from stakeholders on the findings and recommendations of the evaluation, although the final draft report will also be circulated for comments and suggestions. 27. The impact evaluation (IE) on the work of the Veterinary Field Units will provide information on the trends in livelihoods change of the beneficiary population, the methodology of

57 the IE on Veterinary Field Units will be included in the report. A Willingness to Pay study, to be carried out during March 2009, will constitute an important information source for the IE. 28. The following outputs will be prepared by the Evaluation Service as background material for the evaluation team and provided to them in a CD-ROM: a) a listing of FAO projects implemented in the period 2004-2008 including individual project documents and key reports; b) tables showing projects by area of focus indicating basic information on their development and/or immediate objectives, starting and end dates, budget and outcomes to the extent they are known; c) for key areas of focus, a chart showing project timelines for national projects and their relationship; d) background documentation on Tajik social, economic and legislative issues of relevance to the work of FAO; and e) other documents that may be of interest. 29. In preparation for the mission, the Project Coordination Unit in Tajikistan will assist in identifying FAO’s interlocutors and partners within and outside the Government, including civil society entities, universities etc., indicating the type and object of the relationship. 14. The Evaluation Report 30. The report will be as concise as possible, focusing on findings, conclusions and recommendations and include an executive summary. 31. The Evaluation team will decide the precise outline of its report. However, the report will include: a) the overall evaluation of FAO cooperation in Tajikistan; b) the assessment of effectiveness and impact in each area of focus; c) the assessment of the performance of the FAO Project Coordination Office; d) the overall assessment of the TCP programme including its role in the cooperation programme, based on the analysis of each national TCP project; and e) recommendations to enhance the effectiveness of collaboration between FAO and Tajikistan. The Impact Evaluation will be an Annex to the main report. 15. Composition and Profile of the Evaluation Team 32. The final evaluation will be conducted by a team of external consultants and staff members of the FAO Evaluation Service. A senior independent consultant will be the Team Leader. 33. The evaluation team will consist of 6 persons, as follows: • Evaluation Team Leader, a development specialist with considerable experience dealing with agriculture and rural development issues in the Central Asian context; • Evaluation Manager from FAO Evaluation Service, with particular responsibility for issues related to the functioning of the Project Coordination Office; • Evaluation Officer from FAO Evaluation Service, with particular responsibility for issues related to agricultural development and food security; • a gender specialist, with experience in micro-credit programmes and participatory processes; • a livestock specialist; and • an expert in land reform, land registration and land rights. 34. Specific ToR will be prepared for each team member. For the team leader, fluency in Tajik/Dari and/or Russian is essential. It is desirable for other team members.

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16. Evaluation Schedule 35. The evaluation process started in October 2008 and the final mission will take place in June-July 2009; the final report should be completed by September 2009. The process was structured in three phases. a) First phase: October 2008 - January 2009 36. The first phase was to define the scope, issues and methodology of the evaluation. It was carried out by two members of the FAO Evaluation Service. Activities included a first assembly of basic information, the planning of each step in the process, and interviews with key stakeholders in to: • take stock of FAO activities in the country since 2004; • identify key issues to be covered by the evaluation; and • identify the topic for the impact evaluation. 37. Part of the first phase was an initial mission to Tajikistan, to meet with FAO staff, Government officials and donor representatives. The main output of this phase was an Inception Report that laid the groundwork for subsequent phases of the evaluation process. b) Second phase: February-May 2009 38. This Phase includes the preparation of the ToRs for the final evaluation, the identification and recruitment of evaluation team members and the carrying out of the Impact Evaluation. c) Third Phase: June-September 2009 39. The third phase consists in organizing and conducting the final evaluation mission and preparing the final evaluation report. The field work of the mission in Tajikistan will take place from 8-29 June 2009, with the debriefing in country on or around 26 June. The final report should be circulated in draft by 31 July 2009 and finalized in September 2009.

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ANNEX IV B

Individual Terms of Reference for the Members of the Evaluation Team Introduction 1. These Terms of Reference (ToR) are an integral part of the overall ones for the Evaluation of FAO Cooperation with Tajikistan, which provides the background, objectives, scope and methodology of the evaluation. The present document details the scope of assessment for each team member. 2. The team is composed of: • Mr Anthony Fitzherbert, evaluation team leader and agriculture and rural development expert; • Mr Robert Moore, Evaluation Manager from FAO Evaluation Service, with particular responsibility for issues related to the functioning of the Project Coordination Office; • Mr Olivier Cossée, agronomist with particular responsibilities in emergencies and rehabilitation interventions and in agricultural development and food security; • Mr Anton Van Engelen, livestock specialist; • Mr Stevan Dobrilovic, expert in land reform, land registration and land rights; • Ms Nouchine Yavari d’Hellencourt, gender specialist. Common Tasks and Duties for all Team Members 3. All team members will receive mission documentation made available in a CD-ROM, including the Terms of Reference, the Inception Report and relevant information on individual projects. 4. All team members will prepare written contributions to the evaluation report according to deadlines and with form and subject matter coverage as agreed with the Team Leader. They will also be invited to review and comment on the evaluation report in its entirety before it is finalized. 5. The FAO Evaluation Service will identify the key stakeholders in Tajikistan to be met by the Evaluation team. However, team members should feel free to contact and interview additional stakeholders and informants as deemed necessary. The detailed plan of meetings will be finalized at the beginning of the mission. 6. At the end of the evaluation, all team members will be asked to fill in a questionnaire related to the management of evaluations in FAO. Responses will be treated as confidential and used to assess the procedures and methods followed during the evaluation. Evaluation Questions and Issues common to all Team Members 7. All team members will contribute as appropriate to answering questions concerning the relevance of FAO’s work in Tajikistan (section 5 of ToR), efficiency of FAO’s work (section 6), effectiveness and impact (section 7), sustainability (section 8), transition from emergency to development (section 9), performance of the FAO Project office (section 10), assessment of roles and functions (section 11) and partnership (section 12). 8. All national TCP projects will be assessed in a separate report of 2-3 pages, following the outline below: • Background and relevance • Design and implementation • Results/effects • Sustainability and impact

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9. Each project will be scored for each of the elements above on a six-point scale: 1=very poor; 2=poor; 3=inadequate; 4=adequate; 5=good; 6=excellent. Responsibility for preparation of the project assessments will be assigned to individual team members whose technical expertise most closely matches that of the project and detailed in the individual terms of reference below. Terms of Reference for the Team Leader Assignment and Deliverables 10. Under the overall guidance of the FAO Evaluation Service, the Team Leader has overall responsibility for the technical content of the evaluation including preparation of the final report and the allocation of tasks among the evaluation team members. He is the chief spokesperson for the evaluation team and will present the team’s findings at the debriefing meeting. 11. The Team Leader will also be the food security and rural development specialist of the team. In this connection, he will have primary responsibility for assessing the effectiveness and comparative advantage of FAO in its advocacy and advisory role to the Government on food security policy issues. 12. The assessment of the food security work will include the following: i) role and effect of FAO work in the area of Food Security Statistics and food security related analysis in support to the State Committee of Statistics, Goskomstat, including technical advice and capacity building; ii) effectiveness of FAO in the area of Food Security Policy and in strengthening Government’s capacity to formulate, implement and monitor food security policies in the country; and iii) relevance, effectiveness, follow-up and sustainability of activities related to forestry and watershed management and possibilities for future initiatives in integrated watershed management. 13. The Team Leader will also assume overall responsibility for answering the questions related to relevance of FAO’s work in Tajikistan (section 5 of ToR), effectiveness and impact (section 7), sustainability (section 8) and assessment of roles and functions of FAO in Tajikistan (section 11). 14. The Team Leader will prepare the reports mentioned in paragraphs 8 and 9 above for projects TCP/TAJ/2903, 3103 and 3104. 15. The assignment is expected to have a duration of 45 days, including time for report writing. The presentation of preliminary findings and conclusions will be made on 26 June 2009. The full draft evaluation report will be prepared in accordance with the schedule under section 10 below. Terms of Reference for the Evaluation Manager Assignment and Deliverables 16. The Evaluation Manager is responsible for organizing the evaluation, ensuring that the process adheres to the work schedule and the final reports meets the quality standards of FAO Evaluation Service. 17. The tasks of the Evaluation Manager include: a) support all other team members in terms of evaluation methodology, tools and methods; b) providing information and contributing to the evaluation with respect to information concerning FAO’s mandate, structure, procedures and methods; and c) contributing to the team’s work by participating in meetings, field visits, interviews.

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18. Under the overall guidance of the Team Leader, the Evaluation Manager as a team member will also assess the work of the FAO Project Office in Tajikistan and prepare that part of the evaluation report. 19. In particular, the Evaluation Manager will coordinate inputs from the team related to efficiency of FAO’s work (section 6 of ToR), transition from emergency to development (section 9), performance of the FAO office in Tajikistan (section 10) and partnership building and UN coordination (section 12). 20. He will contribute the main findings, conclusions and recommendations in this area to the debriefing session on 26 June and finalize his portion of the draft report by 14 July, following the report outline as agreed with the Team Leader. Scope of the assignment and specific evaluation questions 21. Besides the general issues noted in paragraphs 7 and 18 above, the assessment of the work of the FAO Office in Tajikistan will include the following: a) extent to which the activities of FAO in the past five years reflect the Organization’s priorities and comparative advantage (as defined in FAO’s Strategic Framework); b) how the FAO office establishes its priority work areas, including time devoted to the development of new initiatives; c) the FAO office workloads on technical, managerial, operational and administrative issues and its costs; d) the adequacy of the financial resources of the FAO Office in Tajikistan; and e) the adequacy of operational mechanisms and tools available to the FAO Project Coordinator to carry out his mandate. Terms of reference for the Agronomy Expert Assignment, Methodology and Deliverables 22. Under the overall guidance of the Team Leader, the Agronomy Expert (from the FAO Evaluation Service) will take review, analyse and report on the work done by FAO in agriculture emergency interventions, including seeds and tools distribution and locust control. 23. The tasks of the expert will include: i) review of documents and other outputs produced by FAO and others relevant to the evaluation in his subject matter area; ii) participation in all team meetings as planned in these ToR and as required by the Team Leader; iii) preparing check-lists for interviews as appropriate and consulting with the Evaluation Manager as necessary on methodological issues; iv) conducting interviews with stakeholders in the FAO Project Office in Tajikistan, other UN and bilateral agencies, the Government of Tajikistan and other institutions considered relevant; v) visiting field projects and interviewing field staff and ultimate beneficiaries, as appropriate; vi) contributing to the team’s analysis and discussion of Evaluation questions and issues common to the whole team; and vii) contributing to the findings, conclusions and recommendations to be discussed at the debriefing session on 26 June and finalizing his portion of the draft report by 10 July, following the report outline as agreed with the Team Leader. 24. Besides the general issues mentioned in paragraph 7 above, the expert will address: a) efficiency of input (seed and tools) procurement and distribution in emergency response situations, appropriateness of beneficiary selection;

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b) to the extent that it can be assessed, effects of free seed distribution on national seed production and markets; c) FAO role in strengthening national seed systems; relevance and sustainability of the interventions aimed at the improvement of national seed quality and production; d) appropriateness/effectiveness of regional seed activities in Central Asia involving Tajikistan; e) relevance and effectiveness of work conducted so far in locust control and future development in the country, including possibilities for effective cooperation in a regional initiative; and f) preparation of the reports mentioned in paragraphs 8 and 9 above for TCP/TAJ/2902 and 3101 (the latter with the gender expert). Terms of Reference for the Livestock Expert Assignment, Methodology and Deliverables 25. Under the overall guidance of the Team Leader, the Livestock Expert will review, analyse and report on the work done by FAO in the areas of animal disease control (including brucellosis, peste des petits ruminants (PPR), avian influenza, demonstration of freedom from rinderpest); Veterinary Field Units, Animal Production and Pasture Rehabilitation. 26. The tasks of the Livestock Expert will include: a) review of documents and other outputs produced by FAO and others relevant to the evaluation in his subject matter area; b) participation in all team meetings as planned in these ToR and as required by the Team Leader; c) preparing check-lists for interviews as appropriate and consulting with the Evaluation Manager as necessary on methodological issues; d) conducting interviews with stakeholders in the FAO Project Office in Tajikistan, other UN and bilateral agencies, the Government of Tajikistan and other institutions considered relevant; e) visiting field projects and interviewing field staff and ultimate beneficiaries, as appropriate; f) contributing to the team’s analysis and discussion of Evaluation questions and issues common to the whole team; and g) contributing to the findings, conclusions and recommendations to be discussed at the debriefing session on 26 June and finalizing his portion of the draft report by 10 July, following the report outline as agreed with the Team Leader. 27. The assignment will consist of 27 working days. 28. Besides the general issues mentioned in paragraph 7 above, the expert will address: a) activities related to FAO support to the VFU; supported under projects OSRO/TAJ/202/SWE, OSRO/TAJ/302/SWE and GCP/TAJ/001/SWE. In so doing, the expert will draw for evidence on the impact assessment to be carried out in April-May 2009; b) implementation, impact and sustainability of brucellosis vaccination campaigns; c) implementation arrangements, efficiency and effectiveness of activities related to prevention of avian flu; d) assistance by FAO in controlling transboundary diseases in Tajikistan and degree to which Tajikistan can participate effectively in regional animal disease control initiatives; e) relevance, comparative advantage and achievements of FAO’s work in the area of animal production, including emergency distribution of animal feed and pasture/forage improvement; f) creation of policies and strategies for development of the livestock sector; and

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g) preparation of the report mentioned in paragraphs 8 and 9 above for TCP/TAJ/3002. Terms of Reference for the Land Reform Expert Assignment, Methodology and Deliverables 29. Under the overall guidance of the Team Leader, the Land Reform Expert will review, analyse and report on the work done by FAO in the areas of Land Reform and Land Registration. 30. The tasks of the Land Reform Expert will include: a) review of documents and other outputs produced by FAO and others relevant to the evaluation in his subject matter area; b) participation in all team meetings as planned in these ToRs and as required by the Team Leader; c) preparing check-lists for interviews as appropriate and consulting with the Evaluation Manager as necessary on methodological issues; d) conducting interviews with stakeholders in the FAO Project Office in Tajikistan, other UN and bilateral agencies, the Government of Tajikistan and other institutions considered relevant; e) visiting field projects and interviewing field staff and ultimate beneficiaries, as appropriate; f) contributing to the team’s analysis and discussion of Evaluation questions and issues common to the whole team; and g) finalizing a draft report by 24 June, following the report outline and as agreed with the Team Leader. 31. The assignment will consist of 24 working days, including travel time (2-25 June 2009). Scope of the assignment and specific evaluation questions 32. The evaluation of the work on Land Reform will involve an examination of projects OSRO/TAJ/301/SWE (land reform aspects), OSRO/TAJ/402/CAN and OSRO/TAJ/602/CAN, plus other related work that may have been conducted, to assess achievements, shortcomings, FAO’s potential role in this area and charting a possible way forward, taking account of FAO’s potential comparative advantages and also its limitations. 33. The Land Reform Expert will work in close cooperation with the Gender Expert with respect to the results project OSRO/TAJ/602/CAN “Improved Food Security and Enhanced Livelihoods through Institutional and Gender-Sensitive Land Reform”, carried out by FAO Land Tenure and Management Unit. Terms of Reference for the Gender Expert Assignment, Methodology and Deliverables 34. Under the overall guidance of the Team Leader, the Gender Expert will take stock, review, analyse and prepare a report on the work done by FAO in the area of gender equality and social development. 35. The tasks of the Gender Expert will include: a) review of documents and other outputs produced by FAO and others relevant to the evaluation in his subject matter area; b) participation in all team meetings as planned in these ToR and as required by the Team Leader; c) preparing check-lists for interviews as appropriate and consulting with the Evaluation Manager as necessary on methodological issues;

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d) conducting interviews with stakeholders in the FAO Project Office in Tajikistan, other UN and bilateral agencies, the Government of Tajikistan and other institutions considered relevant; e) visiting field projects and interviewing field staff and ultimate beneficiaries, as appropriate; f) contributing to the team’s analysis and discussion of Evaluation questions and issues common to the whole team; and g) finalizing a draft report by 24 June, following the report outline and as agreed with the Team Leader. 36. The assignment will consist of 22 working days (4-25 June) including travel time. Scope of the assignment and specific evaluation questions 37. The evaluation of the work on gender will include the following products, projects, issues and questions: i) gender related work by FAO and mainstreaming of a gender equity and social development perspective in all FAO’s work in Tajikistan and scope for improving gender mainstreaming, including particularly in animal health- related work that represents a major part of the FAO portfolio; ii) sustainability of activities set up with microcredits and the appropriateness of the repayments system established; and iii) along with the Agronomy Expert, prepare the report mentioned in paragraphs 8 and 9 above for TCP/TAJ/3101. Workplan for the Evaluation Team 38. At least one week before the start of the mission, all team members will receive: • a CD-ROM with all information about the areas to be assessed, as made available by respective technical services and gathered by the FAO Evaluation Service; • the Code of Conduct and Ethical Guidelines for Evaluators, adopted by the United Nations Evaluation group and subscribed by FAO Evaluation Service (PBEE); and • the document “Principles and considerations for the respective responsibilities and working relationships of Evaluation Service Staff acting as evaluation managers and for evaluation team leaders on major evaluations, including corporate evaluations”. 39. The Team Leader, the Land Reform Expert, the Agronomy Expert, the Gender Expert and the Evaluation Manager meet in Rome for a briefing at FAO HQ on 4 and 5 June. 40. Team members that do not attend the initial briefing will receive a telephone briefing from the relevant technical officers. Most of the team will travel to Dushanbe on 7 June, arriving 8 June. The time table below is tentative at the time of writing, in relation to in-country travel details. A detailed work-schedule including meetings for each of the members will be prepared by PBEE with the FAO Project Office in Tajikistan: • 8 June (p.m.): briefing of the team by FAO Office in Tajikistan, including overview of all ongoing and pipeline field and normative activities, relations with HQ and Regional Offices, relations with Government, etc. • 9-11 June: meetings in Dushanbe with key stakeholders, either collectively or in groups; • 12-20 June: field travel in country; land reform and gender experts return to Dushanbe to prepare their reports; • 21 June: internal team de-briefing session, wherein each team member will present his/her preliminary findings and conclusions; • 23-24 June: completion of data gathering and drafting preliminary conclusions and recommendations; • 25 June: completion of assignment for land reform and gender experts; • 26 June: mission debriefing with FAO and Government;

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• 29 June: departure of remaining mission members from Dushanbe; team leader and evaluation manager visit and debrief at FAO Sub-regional Office, Ankara; • 13 July: circulation among team members of the draft final report; • 17 July: circulation to FAO stakeholders of the draft final report; • 27 July: deadline for comments by FAO on the final draft report; and • 5 August: circulation of the final report to all stakeholders.

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ANNEX V People Met by the Evaluation Team FAO HQ Rome Briefing June 3 rd /June 5 th and De-briefing July 1 st 2009

Rachel Sauvinet-Bedouin PBEE Luisa Belli PBEE Thomas Hofer Forestry Officer FOMC (Conservation and Hydrology) Ilaria Sisto Gender and Development Training Cristina Amaral TCEO Hilde Niggemann TCEO Mirela Hasibra TCEO Olivera Luketic TCEO Simone Borelli OCD – Office for Decentralised Operations (FAO Representation) Giancarlo Ferrari AGAH - Tranboundary Disease Programmes Vladimir Evtimov NRLA Land Tenure and Administration Consultasnt David Palmer NRLA Land Tenure Mika Torhonen NRLA Land Tenure Tea Dabrundashvili TCEO (Previously Land Reform – Tajikistan) Annie Monard AGPP Alberto Zezza ESAF

Tele-conference with David Sedik Senior Agricultural Policy Officer FAO Regional Office Budapest

FAO Sub-regional Office, Ankara, Turkey – Debriefing & Presentation June 29 th

Abdul Baqi Mehraban Livestock Development Officer Raymon Van Androoy Fishery Officer Muzaffer Dogru Forestry Officer Melek Cakmak Field Programme Officer Fawzi Taher Crop Protection Officer Sarina Abdysheva Investment Officer Gionanni Munoz Land and Water Officer

FAO Tajikistan

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Key FAO Project Staff

FAO Project Coordination Unit Mr. Nassim Jawad FAO Projects Coordinator Mr Shurat Igamberdyev National Programme Officer Ms Manizha Nabiva Senior Finance Officer Mr Sergei Malitsky Admin Officer

FAO National Correspondent Ms. Svetlana Balkova National Correspondent

Emergency and other Projects Mr Kurshid Kholov National Project Manager Emergency Project Manager 801/804/TCPs Mr Maruf Salomov Procurement Logistics Officer

Emergency World Bank – Seed and Fertiliser Mr Abdulsloh Rasulov National Project Manager – Emergency WB

Livestock – Animal Health Mr Karomatullo Khamroev National Project Manager Livestock Animal Health Mr Sanavbar Mirzoev Assistant National Project Manager Livestock Animal Health

Transboundary Diseases Mr Sangimurod Muratulloev National Epidemiologist

Brucellosis II Mr David Ward International Project Manager Mr Adham Boltaev National Project Manager Mr Khurshed Muhatulloev Assistant Project Manager

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Avian Influenza Mr Nadir Toshmatov National Project Manager Mr Abdukarim Muminov National Consultant Gholam Ali Kiani Animal Health Advisor Avian Flu Regional Network (visiting)

Livestock and Pasture Rehabilitation Project Mr Kuvat Bapaev International Project Manager Mr Ibrohim Ahmadov National Project Manager

Watershed Management Project: OSRO/TAJ/603/WB Mr Azamjon Ibodov National Project Manager

FAO/MoA Crop Assessment Programme Mr Safarali Naimov Head of Assessment -National Consultant Mr Sadridin Jurtaev FAO National Consultant – Crop Assessment team Danghara Mr Salahidin Muradov Chief agricultural expert Cereal Crops and statistics DoA Danghara – Crop assessment team-Danghara

National Project Managers Mr. Abdusaloh Rasulov NPM UTF/TAF/004/TAJ Mr Erkin Mahmadaliev NPM OSRO/TAJ/605/EC

Previous FAO Project National Consultants

Ex- Land Reform Projects Mr. Ismatullo Ismatulloev Monitoring Officer, Land Reform Project Mr Tojnisso Azizva Legal Advisor Land Reform Project

Ex- TCP Watershed Management Project Bodomo sub-watershed Faizabad Mr Rusikhan Kurbanov (water) State Soils Research Institute (SSRI) Mr Usman Batirov (soils) previous Faizabad Bodoma sub-watershed project. Mirzaali Azizov – chairman of village development committee Bodoma Members of Bodomo village council, CIGs, farmers and women’s groups

Representing other United Nations Agencies

Ms Wendy Fontela UN Security Adviser for Tajikistan (UNDP) Mr Mubin Rustamov UNDP Senior Programme Analyst Ms AnneMarie VanDenBerg Deputy Director WFP

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Mr Zlaan Milisic – Director – WFP Ms Viloyat Mirzoeva UNIFEM National Project Coordinator

Representing Donor Agencies

Ms Chiara Bronchi Country Manager World Bank Mr Bobojan Yatimov Senior Rural Development Specialist World Bank Mr Joji Tokeshi Deputy Country Director Asian Development Bank Ms Charlotte Adriaen Chargée d ’Affaires European Commission Mr Jean Bernard De Milito EC Delegation Ms Zulfia Davlatbekova EC Mr Adam Vineman Yao Head of Office for Centralasia, European Commission ECHO ) Ms Eva Lithman Councilor Swedish International Development Agency Ms Maria Melbing Programme Officer Sida (Swedish International Development Agency Mr Rudolf Schock, Country Director of Swiss Development Corporation Office (also chairman of the Donor Coordination Office Mr Teddy Brian USAID

Government Officials Mr Rahim Nazarov Deputy Minister of Food Crops (MoA) Mr. Kiamidin Malak Ganiev Assistant Food Crops MoA Mr Tohir Ostonaev PMU Director –OSRO/TAJ/603/WB Mr Mullojon Amirbekov, Director of State Veterinary Inspection Service MoA Ms Khairinisso Yusufi Chairperson for Committee for women and Families GoT Mr Mahmadtohir Zokirov Director Agency for Land Management Mr Nozanimov Deputy Director, Agency for Land Management, Geodesy and Cartography GoT Mr Dodarjon Zoirov Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, Head of National and Regional Programmes monitoring dept Mr Mirgand Shabozov – Chairman State Statistics Institute Mr Burat Turaev Deputy SSI. Mr Ekhtiya Ashurov Deputy director State Statistics Institute Mr Usarbek Mustafokulov Head of Locust and Dangerous Pests Monitoring Dept MoA

International Non Government Organisations (INGO) and Consultants

Mr Yodgar Faizov Aga Khan Foundation - MSDSP

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Mr Kishwar Abdulalishoev AKF MSDSP Ms Rano Mansurova – ACTED Country Director Ms Petra Geraedts Team Leader for EU TACIS / SENAS Project Madhu Sudam Paudyal International consultant plant protection officer dept of ag . Nepal working for ATAC Khulob Mr. Ghaffar Talibzada Representative of ATAC Khulob

National Non Government Organisations (NGO) and Organisations Ms Bihojal Rahimova National Women NGO “Chashmai Hayot” (Spring of Life) Mr Akromjon Kahorov Chairman of the Working Group on Land Reform

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ANNEX VI Bibliography

ACTED ‘ Strategies for Extension Services in Tajikistan, 2006-2007 Khatlon & Sughd Oblasts’ 19 April 2007, Dushanbe, Tajikistan Asia Report No. 162 Tajikistan: ‘The Road to Failure’ February 12 th 2009 Asian Development Bank – Tajikistan 2001-2006 ADB – Country Operations Business Plan Tajikistan 2008-2010 . September 2007 SDB – Performance Evaluation Report Tajikistan Emergency Flood Rehabilitation Project March 2007 ADB Resident Mission Tajikistan – Background Paper – Agriculture September 2008 ADB Country Operations Business Plan Tajikistan 2007-2009 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Tajikistan Country Profile Consultative Group (CG) Meeting Dushanbe November 2004 DFID (UK) Tajikistan Country Profile 2004 to 2007 EC/FAO Food Security Programme – Phase II ‘Food Security Information for Action’ ‘The Economic Effects of Land Reform in Tajikistan’ July 2008 EC External Relations Joint Progress Report by the Council on the implementation of the EU Central Asia Strategy 24/06/08 Economist Intelligence Unit: Tajikistan economy 2008 Encyclopaedia Britannica – Tajikistan World Data. European Union -Consilium– ‘ Strategy for a New Partnership’ Council of the EU Secretariat – EU & Central Asian Strategy. October 2007 FAO TAJIKISTAN ‘Reducing the Impact of Price Surge and Agricultural Rehabilitation Programme Appraisal Document’ April-May 2008 FAO Agriculture and Trade Situation 2002 to 2004 FAO and Soil Science Research Institute ‘Proceedings of the National Workshop on Watershed Management Investment Programme in Tajikistan’ September 2005 FAO National and Regional Strategies for Agricultural Development and Food Security Nov 2008 Munoz FAO/SEC and Kimoto FAO/TCEO FAO ‘ Brucellosis in Tajikistan Sero-prevalence survey’ R. Jackson et al May 2003 FAO ‘ Willingness to Pay for Brucellosis control Preliminary experience from Tajikistan’ D. Ward et al FAO EMPRESS programme ‘ Livestock Component Tajikistan’ J. Domenech FAO AGAH November 2008 FAO EMPRESS Programme ‘ Locust Control Medium – long term projects and emergencies’ M.Chris FAO AGPP October 2008

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Gergetown University 9 th Annual Conference of Central European Studies ‘White (Fools’) Gold The Political Economy of Cotton in Tajikistan’ Van Atta September 2008 Government of Tajikistan: Republic of Tajikstan State Committee on Statistics-Dushanbe 2003/2008 Government of Tajikistan: National Development Strategy of the Republic of Tajikistan for the Period to 2015 Government of Tajikistan Poverty Resolution Strategy of the Republic of Tajikistan for 2007- 2009 Approved by the Resolution of the GoT April 2007 No 167 Government of Tajikistan: A paper – ‘ Land Administration and Registration System in the Republic of Tajikistan ’ M. Kabirov Director of the Agency of Land Management Geodesy and Cartography the Republic of Tajikistan – Geneva Nov 19-20 2007 Government of Tajikistan: Plan of Measures of Cotton farm debt resolution in the Republic of Tajikistan for 2007-2009 Annex – approval Decree of the GoT No. 111 dated 05/03/2007 Report on the Regional Conference on MDG based NDS and PRSP 15-17 March 2007 Dushanbe IFAD US$ 12.3 million grant to Tajikistan for Khatlon Livelihoods Support January 27 th 2009- 07-13 IMF Country Report Tajikistan No 08/197 June 2008 International Federation of the Red Cross ‘Focus on Tajikistan’ Report Aptil 2009 Japan (Embassy) with Focus Humanitarian – Agreement to Reduce Risk of Communities in Tajikistan to Natural Hazards March 20 th 2009-07-13 Muminjanov – Dr Hafiz “Agriculture and Food Security in Tajikistan (Towards a Regional Program For Food Security and Agricultural Development in ECO Member Countries’ Dushanbe 2005 Odyssey Books and Guides – ‘ Tajikistan and the High Pamirs A Companion and Guide ’ R. Middleton, H. Thomas, M. Whitlock and M. Hauser 2008 OSCE Magazine – ‘ Tajik Promised Land’ July 2004 World Bank with the Swiss Cooporation Office – Agricultural Sector Review – ‘Priorities For Sustainable Growth – A Strategy for Agricultural Sector Development in Tajikistan’ 2006 Including: Tajikistan Agricultural Sector: Policy Note 1 – Increasing the Benefits of Land Reform Tajikistan Agriculture Sector Policy Note 2 ‘ Cotton Sector Reform: Increased Competition, Improved Incentives and Higher Production’ Tajikistan Agriculture Sector Policy Note 3 ‘Improving Access to Rural Finance’ Tajikistan Agricultural Sector: Policy Note 4 ‘Institutional Reform: Public versus Private Responsibilities’ World Bank Independent Evaluation Office International Development Fund Operations Evaluation Department – Republic of Tajikistan Evaluation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) Process and Arrangements under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) July 6 th 2004 World Bank with DFID (UK) et al DFID (UK) Socio Economic Atlas – Tajikistan 2005 World Bank Tajikistan Country Partnership Strategy 2006-2009 World Bank – Tajikistan Country Brief April 2009

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World Bank, FAO UNICEF et al Energy and Food Security Assessment in Rural Areas of Tajikistan April/May 2008 United Nations Framework for Development Assistance to Tajikistan 2005-2009 “Moving Mountains” - UNDP United Nations Office of the Resident Coordinator, with Ministry of Agriculture and Nature Protection Republic of Tajikistan and FAO Collaboration - National Medium Term Priority Framework 2007-2009 December 2007 UNDP – ‘Moving Mountains’ A UN Assessment of Development Challenges in Tajikistan UNDP Case Study Tajikistan: ‘Assistance to Conflict Affected Countries’ Ranjeev Pillar 2005 UNDP Regional Bureau for Europe and the CIS ‘Central Asia Risk Assessment Responding to Water Energy and Food Insecurity ’ January 2009