The Rising Cost of Currency Hedging

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The Rising Cost of Currency Hedging SPONSORREPORT SPONSORREPORT USAA Real Estate more attractive if they can absorb the drag caused by hedging 6 – Implications for US real estate markets costs and still deliver a solid return. Cross-border capital flows have played a critical role in the Investment horizon: A longer investment horizon provides flex- US commercial real estate market during the current cycle. ibility. For example, a foreign investor may opt not to hedge if they According to RCA, direct foreign capital acquisitions of US real The rising cost of currency hedging do not immediately require the cash flow from real estate and can estate peaked in 2015 at just over $90 billion, nearly double wait years, if necessary, until currency conditions are favourable to the previous all-time high in 2007. Direct international pur- When investing in US real estate, foreign investors must 2 – Hedging from a historical perspective repatriate the capital to their home country. Conversely, hedging is chases have since gradually receded from those recent highs, decide if they should hedge currency risk. In fact, a 2016 Hedging costs are expensive today, but similar conditions likely essential if the cashflow is required to meet near-term liabilities. yet still accounted for more than 10 percent of all transactions survey by INREV (European Association for Investors in have also occurred in recent history. As noted in the chart in 2017. In the near term, however, US investments may not Non-Listed Real Estate Vehicles) found approximately 71 below, hedging costs soared in 1999–2000 and 2005– US-dollar outlook: An investor’s outlook regarding the dollar be as attractive for foreign capital due to the drag on returns percent of survey participants hedge their currency risk 2006, as the Federal Reserve raised short-term rates faster can impact their decision to hedge currency risk. For instance, created by currency hedging costs. Value-add and opportunis- from cross-border investments.1 More recently, however, than most other central banks. It is worth noting that inter- an investor may opt not to hedge if they believe the dollar will tic investment may be more appealing to foreign investors, an increasingly-volatile currency environment, combined est rates, as well as commercial real estate cap rates, were continue to strengthen, relative to their home currency, during the given the potential for higher yields that can absorb the hedg- with historically-low interest rates in many countries around significantly higher during the two previously-noted periods period in which they hold their US assets. In effect, not hedging is ing drag and still deliver solid returns. Furthermore, core prices the globe (relative to the US), has caused hedging costs to than they are today. Consequently, a 200 basis point to equivalent to taking a bullish position on the dollar. could soften, given that foreign capital sources have histori- rise to abnormally-high levels. Consequently, both foreign 300 basis point hedging cost would have been more man- Home-currency volatility: A decision to hedge US real estate cally gravitated toward these assets. and domestic investors are questioning the impact hedging ageable when core real estate cap rates were around 7.5 can depend on the stability of an investor’s home currency, as Health of US Real Estate Markets costs could have on the US real estate markets. percent to 9.5 percent and 5.0 percent to 7.0 percent, as well. Currencies within developed countries tend to be more 100 This research paper will address the following questions: was the case in 1999–2000 and 2005–2006, respectively. As stable, while those of emerging markets tend to be more volatile. 90 of first quarter 2018, however, cap rates were near historic Consequently, market participants with a more volatile home cur- 80 1. Why are hedging costs so high today? 70 2. What does history tell us about the current hedging lows, around 4.8 percent, suggesting there is little room to rency are more likely to hedge investment risk. absorb high hedging expenses. Therefore, US real estate 60 conditions? Mark-to-market implications: Mark-to-market is an 50 may not be as attractive to some foreign buyers, given the 3. What is the near-term outlook for hedging costs? accounting practice which requires investors to periodically record 40 drag on returns. Transaction volume ($b) 30 4. Should foreign investors hedge at all? the value of an asset, reflecting its current market levels. While 5. How has the US-dollar trajectory impacted hedging 3 – Hedging costs outlook some countries may not adhere to this accounting practice, inves- 20 10 decisions? If the historic USD/EUR currency relationship is any indication, tors affected by this requirement may experience mark-to-market 0 6. What are the US commercial real estate implications, these cycles tend to be short-lived; however, the situation losses if they do not hedge currency risk, which could undoubtedly 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Source: Real Capital Analytics given these rising costs? may be different this time. In fact, conditions may worsen impact overall investment performance. 1 – Currency hedging costs are on the rise before they improve, given the divergence in monetary policy Ultimately, the decision to hedge currency risk associated Conclusion For foreign real estate investors looking to hedge US- of the US compared with almost the entire developed world. with US real estate is unique to each investor. Opting not In the end, commercial real estate is just one of several dollar assets, the cost of currency hedging has increased Hedging costs are indeed a direct function of the difference to hedge, however, potentially exposes the investor to vol- dollar-denominated assets that foreign investors will need tremendously. Hedging costs are now upwards of 200 to between US interest rates and the interest rates of foreign atility in the currency market. The question as to whether to decide if or how to hedge, as the same issue is appli- 300 basis points for some cross-border investors. Such a central banks, such as the ECB. The total hedging expense, an investor should hedge currency risk does not have to be cable across all major asset classes today. Foreign inves- substantial increase raises the question: Why have costs however, is also impacted by interest-rate expectations. For a binary decision either, as partial hedging may be suitable tors face similar conditions regarding US Treasury bonds, risen so high? Three main elements drive hedging costs, example, the Federal Reserve forecast currently suggests up to in some cases. In the end, an investor’s appetite for risk will corporate bonds, high-yield junk bonds, and the stock as described in the following: four rate hikes in 2018 and potentially another three increases ultimately govern the decision whether to hedge currency market. There are variations in the fundamentals that in 2019. If market participants expect US interest rates to risk from US real estate. drive returns in each asset class, but the effect on returns Short-term rate differential: The cost of hedging currency accelerate at a faster pace, while the ECB’s monetary policy caused by fluctuations in the dollar is generally the same. exposure is related to the interest-rate differential between the outlook remains flat, then hedging costs will rise accordingly 5 – Making sense of the US dollar Investors should ask themselves: Is US commercial real US and the other currency’s country or region, known as the between the US dollar and the euro. Ultimately, hedging While the dollar has recovered through much of 2018, estate still an attractive opportunity for foreign capital on a cost of carry. As highlighted in the following chart, the spread costs are a reflection of market expectations and diverging market participants remain split on its long-term trajectory. relative basis, given the current hedging costs? Some may between US one-month government bond rates versus other interest-rate policy between two currency regimes. The following highlights several critical factors that could choose to hedge (in whole or part), others may opt not to countries’ rates has widened in recent years, causing hedging influence the dollar outlook going forward: hedge at all, while some may find it impractical to invest in US costs to increase. 4 – To hedge or not to hedge Should foreign investors reconsider hedging US real estate? 1. The global economy is improving, which has the effect real estate right now. It is difficult to quantify the impact these Transaction costs: These costs vary based on the type of hedge The answer depends primarily on the investor’s risk toler- of normalizing an overpriced dollar. conditions will have on the commercial real estate market, and frequency of implementing the hedge. For example, rolling ance. The previously-mentioned INREV study suggests 29 2. The Trump administration appears to prefer a weaker but we believe it could cause a decline in cross-border capital over hedging contracts more often provides a better hedge (i.e., percent of participants do not hedge currency risk from dollar policy as a catalyst for stronger domestic exports. flows, softening in core prices, and a reduction in transaction less basis risk), but this approach also incurs higher trading costs. cross-border real estate. While it is difficult to know all the volume. Ultimately, the cost of mitigating currency risk may 3. The historically-low interest-rate environment and the prove too expensive for some foreign investors who are con- Cross-currency basis: In general, the cross-currency basis is a factors impacting this decision, the following highlights unwinding of quantitative easing have distorted tradi- sidering investing in US commercial real estate today.
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