Media History Monographs 16:4 (2013-2014) ISSN 1940-8862
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Media History Monographs 16:4 (2013-2014) ISSN 1940-8862 Hurricane Katrina: Local Radio And Community Responsibility Reginald F. Moody, PhD University of South Alabama The following paper conducts a single case analysis of how local radio in New Orleans, Louisiana, during one of the most devastating hurricanes in American history, advanced itself as one of the most aggressive, trusted and valuable members of the media community. Results of this study suggest that local radio’s aggressive efforts during Hurricane Katrina were not a quest for a public relations victory or profit, but more about the medium’s ethical and moral responsibility to community during times of crises. ©2014, Reginald F. Moody Media History Monographs 16:4 Moody Hurricane Katrina: Local Radio and Community Responsibility Generations of New Orleanians worked for 300 years to raise a great city in the often in-hospitable terrain along the banks of the Mississippi River. It took Hurricane Katrina less than six hours to put that labor of love under water, damaging 200,000 homes and killing more than 1,200 people.” Bob Marshall New Orleans Times-Picayune Sunday, May 14, 20061 The effect of Hurricane Katrina on New wood. “My hands were all cut up from Orleans, Louisiana was cataclysmic. The storm breaking through the window, and I was caused an estimated $75 billion in damages, standing on the fence. I said, ‘I’ll get on the making it the costliest hurricane in United States roof and pull you up,’ he said. And then we history. Thousands were killed. Some lost to the just went under.”4 sea, while others were lost to the swamps of WWL radio’s Dave Cohen, news director of Louisiana. that station’s all-news format, recalled the Two days after the storm washed ashore, moments after the storm’s arrival: Karen Swensen, a WWL-TV reporter, related a It was surreal, bizarre, frightening and particularly heartbreaking account: unbelievable. [W]e were getting calls A New Orleans woman waded through the from people who we feared would not be streets of the city, trying to get her husband with us much longer. It still haunts me to to Charity Hospital. Although he was already this day. It's never what I expected to do as dead, she floated his body through the a broadcaster.5 flooded streets on a door that came off their Katrina’s high winds and subsequent flood- home.2 ing caused extraordinary destruction of com- Associated Press writer Mary Foster quoted munications facilities. Almost three million one hairdresser's impression of the storm: “Oh, telephone lines were knocked down; 911-call my God, it was hell,” Kioka Williams, who had centers were put out of action, and more than to hack through the ceiling of the beauty shop one thousand cell towers were left useless. where she worked as floodwaters rose in New Without these communications systems it be- Orleans' low-lying Ninth Ward, V, said. “We came enormously difficult for victims to get were screaming, hollering, and flashing lights. It emergency information and to communicate was complete chaos.”3 with family and friends. Newspapers, radio and New Orleans Times Picayune writers Brian television stations were flooded and lost power. Thevenot, Gordon Russell, Keith Spera and Transmitting towers were blown down. Leaders Doug MacCash related 52-year-old Daniel in the industry described such conditions as the Weber's account: longest and largest outage of media facilities in a Sitting on a black barrel amid the muck and large U. S. media market. 6 stench near the St. Claude Avenue bridge, The New Orleans Times-Picayune relocated its 52-year-old Daniel Weber broke into a sob, editorial staff to Baton Rouge and Houma, his voice cracking as he recounted how he Louisiana, posting its reports on nola.com be- had watched his wife drown and spent the cause it could not print a hard copy of the next 14 hours floating in the polluted flood paper. WWL TV’s transmitter stayed in the air, waters, his only life line a piece of drift- but the station’s news operations moved to Ba- Reginald F. Moody is an associate professor in the Department of Communication at the University of South Alabama. He may be reached at [email protected]. 1 Media History Monographs 16:4 Moody ton Rouge. TV staffers from WGNO and methodology involved collecting first-person WNOL television moved to Baton Rouge, con- accounts of what happened with radio in New tributing news stories to WBRZ-TV in Baton Orleans by researching previously printed ma- Rouge. WVUE TV joined WALA, its sister TV terials, and by conducting numerous personal station in Mobile, Alabama. WDSU TV lost its interviews with those involved. Information, transmitter, but sent news staffers to Jackson, statistics, facts, figures, numbers and records Mississippi and to Orlando, Florida.7 were acquired from local and national In the midst of the chaos, however, several mainstream media coverage. Personal interviews local radio stations were able to continue broad- were conducted by the researcher with New casting; some at low power; others in a network- Orleans local radio executives, program mana- based configuration. gers, news directors, news anchors, field report- WWL radio, an all-news A.M. radio station, ers, and network personalities and local political and a long-time media tradition in the city of leaders associated with Hurricane Katrina. New Orleans, quickly returned to the air under Personal testimony was given by “first respond- generator power. The station first aired pro- ers” during congressional hearings. Those at the gramming from its downtown studios on hearings included governmental and medical Poydras Street, then from an emergency bunker professionals who were prepared, equipped and in nearby Jefferson Parish, and finally from trained for any situation, such as a terrorist at- studios in Baton Rouge.8 During it all, WWL’s tack, natural disaster or other large-scale emer- street reporters stayed behind for a historic 72 gency. days to report the devastation caused by Hurri- cane Katrina and recovery efforts. “WWL made BACKGROUND for riveting radio, and I found myself listening at Radio is a mass medium capable of easily all hours in the car late at night via WWL's delivering a message to a mass population, one booming signal,” wrote Marc Fisher in the that can be sliced up into smaller segments American Journalism Review.9 based on demographic, lifestyle and/or geograp- Other New Orleans radio stations, some hy characteristics. To this day, more than 93 smaller and less resourced, followed WWL’s percent of consumers aged 12 years and older lead, while others did not return to the air for listen to the radio each week. Radio reaches months. Those that could keep afloat extended people wherever they are: at home, at work, in radio’s lifeline to the thousands of listeners, with the car–nearly everywhere. Regardless of one’s nothing more than crank-up radios or sets pow- age, the time of day or the listening location, ered by batteries. Listeners were treated to street Americans depend on radio as a reliable media reports and statements from public officials who companion for entertainment, news, informa- were eager to utilize a communication system tion, community service and, increasingly, social that worked. When all was said and done, local networking.10 Such numbers challenge the no- radio was credited with saving thousands of tion that local terrestrial radio is a dying medi- lives. um. A good bit of research has suggested that How did local radio in New Orleans ad- radio is among the most hardy, accommodating vance itself as one of the most aggressive, and available system of communicating informa- trusted and valuable members of the media tion to the community following a major crisis.11 community before, during and after Hurricane When a community is threatened, radio char- Katrina? What do the results of this research acteristically helps to bring society together and suggest about local radio’s unique role in serving inspire community leaders and social groups to the public interest in times of crises? toil together to achieve common goals.12 Listen- The following case study focuses on the ers see radio announcers or “personalities” as characteristics, circumstances, and complexity of stars and connect with them emotionally.13 a single case–local radio’s coverage before, dur- Participants in a 1999 study conducted by ing and after Hurricane Katrina. The study’s Hindman and Coyle saw local radio coverage of 3 Media History Monographs 16:4 Moody the April, 1997 Red River Valley floods in North hometown (26 percent) or regional (35 Dakota as central in helping their communities percent), not statewide (9 percent). come together. Respondents said local radio • At least half of all survey respondents helped them feel more linked with the com- named these features of local radio as “very munities. Charley, Frances, Ivan and Jeanne, a important:” speed and reliability of emergency series of very destructive hurricanes in 2004, information, music choices, caring about caused a great deal of mayhem for people along listeners and friendly personalities. the Gulf Coast.14 Again, radio provided critical • Most (90 percent) of the residents of small information and comfort to residents during and towns and rural areas expressed the same after those storms.15 general programming preferences as residents David Bartlett’s essay “News Radio: More of larger communities, giving top preference than Masters of Disasters” most aptly describes to local news, weather and traffic,