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4Th Canadian Division Support Base Petawawa Range Standing Orders 4th Canadian Division Support Base Petawawa Range Standing Orders (Supersedes 4 CDSB Petawawa Range Standing Orders dated 2017-10-12) OPI: Range Control Officer Dated: 08 February 2019 4th Canadian Division Support Base Petawawa Range Standing Orders (Supersedes 4 CDSB Petawawa Range Standing Orders dated 2017-10-12) OPI: Range Control Officer Dated: 08 February 2019 i RECORD OF AMENDMENTS Identification of Amendment Date Entered Signature & Rank Amendment Date of # Amendment ii TABLE OF CONTENTS COVER PAGE………………………..…………………………………….…….…………………………i RECORD OF AMENDMENTS…………………………………………………………………………... ii FOREWORD………………………..………………………………………….………………………… iii TABLE OF CONTENTS………………………………………………………………….……….… iv-xiv CHAPTER 1 - GENERAL REGULATIONS SECTION 1 – INTRODUCTION General……..………………………………………………………………….………….…………... 1-1-1 Contacts.……………………………………………………………….………………….………...… 1-1-1 Training Area Map……..……………………………………………………………………………... 1-1-2 Definitions ……………………………………………….…………………………………………… 1-1-2 RTA Access and Use Policy…………………………………………….……………………………. 1-1-4 RTA Boundary Restriction on Ammunition..………………………………………………………… 1-1-4 Security Guards………………………………………………………..……………………………… 1-1-4 Daily Range Safety Orders………………………………………………….………………………… 1-1-5 Weekly Range Schedule………………………….…………………………………………………… 1-1-5 Range Control Weekly Coordination Conference………………..…………………………………… 1-1-5 CFRIS TSR Data Entry…………………………………………..…………………………………… 1-1-6 Fast Ball TSRs………………………………………………………………………………………… 1-1-7 Amendments to Authorized Bookings…………………...…………………………………………… 1-1-7 Coordination of Airspace………………………..……………………………………………………. 1-1-7 Priority for Training…………………………...……………………………………………………… 1-1-8 No Show Bookings………………………………………………………………………………….… 1-1-8 SECTION 2 - GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS Authorization to Enter the RTA…………………………...…………………………….……………. 1-2-1 Access by Privately Owned Motor Vehicles………………………………………………………….. 1-2-1 Derelict Vehicles……………………………………………………………………………………… 1-2-2 Access Points into the RTA………………………..………………………..………………………… 1-2-2 iv Crash Route…………………………………………………………………………………………… 1-2-4 Speed Limits………………………………………………………………………………………...… 1-2-4 Bridge Classifications………………………....……………………………………………….……… 1-2-4 Black Out Drive Policy…….……..…………..…………..……….…………………........………..… 1-2-4 Hatches Down Driving…………………………...…………………………………………………… 1-2-4 Vehicle Chains and Grousers…………………………………………………………………………. 1-2-5 Snow and Ice Control…………….…………………………………………………………………… 1-2-5 Flags and Barriers……………..…………………………………………………………………….… 1-2-5 Communications…….………………………………………………………………………………… 1-2-5 Emergency Telephone Communications……………………………………………………………… 1-2-8 Reporting of Accidents and Safety Violations…………………………………...…………………….1-2-8 Safety Responsibilities……………………………………………………………...………………….1-2-8 Knowledge of Orders………………………………………………………………………..…………1-2-9 Authorized Weapons and Ammunition………………………………………………………...………1-2-9 Qualification of Unit OIC Practice / Range Safety Officers………………………………………..….1-2-9 Training or Safety Violations…………………………………………………………………………1-2-10 Medical Coverage and Procedures…………………………………………………………..………. 1-2-10 Ammunition Accident or Incident…………………………………………………………...………. 1-2-11 Weapons Incident……………………………………………………………………………………. 1-2-12 Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Hazard………………………………………………………………. 1-2-12 Demolition Kits……………………………………………………………………………………… 1-2-13 Reporting of Duds…………………………………………………………………………………… 1-2-14 Reporting of Ammunition Discovered in the RTA……………………..…………………………… 1-2-14 Pyrotechnic Safety…………………………………………………………………………………… 1-2-14 Irritating Vapours and Pyrotechnics in Proximity of Aircraft……………………………………..… 1-2-15 Flight Safety Wires and Mast Antennas…………………………………………………...………… 1-2-15 Trans Canada Pipeline Right-Of-Way………………….…………………………………………… 1-2-16 Alcohol / Messes / Canteens………...………………………………………………………………. 1-2-16 v Water Points……………………………………………………………...………………………….. 1-2-16 Bivouac Sites…………………………………………………………………………………...……. 1-2-16 Troop Shelters…………………………………………………………………………………..…… 1-2-16 Cleanliness of RTA………………………………………………………………………………..… 1-2-18 Reporting of Non-Serviceable Range Equipment, Stores and Faults…………………………..…… 1-2-18 RTA Clearances…………………………………………………………………………………...… 1-2-18 Wash Racks…………………………………………………………………………………….....… 1-2- 19 Waivers……………………………………………………………………………………………… 1-2-19 SECTION 3 - RECREATIONAL USE OF THE RTA General……………………………………………………………………………………….……….. 1-3-1 Pets………………………………………………………………………………………..……………1-3-1 Hunting and Fishing………………………………………………………………………….……….. 1-3-1 Other Recreational Uses………………………………………………………………….…………… 1-3-1 4 CDSB Petawawa Shorelines………………………………………………………………...……… 1-3-2 CHAPTER 2 - RTA FIRE ORDERS General…………………………………………………………………………………………...…… 2-1-1 Reporting of Fires…………………………………………………………………………………..…. 2-1-1 Fire Weather Index (FWI)……………………………………………………………………………...2-1-1 FWI Waivers…………………………………………………………………………………….……. 2-1-3 Burn Boxes in Area 7 and 8……………………………………………………………………….….. 2-1-4 Responsibilities……………………………………………………………………………………….. 2-1-4 First Line Fire Fighting Equipment…………………………………………………………………… 2-1-6 Bonfires / Camp Fires / Man Made Fires…………………………………………………………...… 2-1-6 Regulations Specific to the PRF…………………………………………………………………….… 2-1-7 CHAPTER 3 - ENVIRONMENTAL ORDERS General………………………………………………………………………………………………... 3-1-1 Restricted Activities in Protected Areas……………………………………………………………… 3-1-1 Archaeological Site Concerns………………………………………………………………………… 3-1-2 vi Removal of Natural Resources from the RTA………………………………………………………... 3-1-2 Activities Requiring Environmental Review in the RTA….………………….…………………...…. 3-1-2 Garbage Control………………………………………………………………………………….…… 3-1-2 Field Sanitation………………………………………………………………………………….…….. 3-1-3 Tracked Vehicles, APC Dozer and Bulldozer Training………………………………………….…… 3-1-4 Noise Complaints……………………………………………………………………………………... 3-1-4 Manoeuvre Damage Control………………………………………………………………………….. 3-1-4 Training On or Near Water…………………………………………………………………………… 3-1-6 Military Field Defences and Obstacle Construction……………………………………………..…… 3-1-7 Cutting Trees, Pruning, Grubbing and Vegetation Clearing…………………………………….……. 3-1-8 Concertina Wire, Barbed Wire and Communication Wire…………………………………………… 3-1-9 Bulk Transport of Fuel……………………………………………………………………...………… 3-1-9 Storage of POL and Hazmat in the Field…………………………………………...……………….. 3-1-10 Transfers of POL and Hazmat in the Field…………………………………………...……………… 3-1-11 Disposal of Hazmat……………………………………………………………………………..…… 3-1-11 Environment Incident - Immediate Action……………………………...…………………………… 3-1-11 Wildlife Concerns……………………………………………………………………………...…….. 3-1-12 Nuisance Bears……………………………………………………………………………………..... 3-1-12 Species at Risk…………………………………………………………………………….….……… 3-1-14 Fishing and Snaring for Survival Training…………….....……..…………..……………..………… 3-1-16 CHAPTER 4 - DRY TRAINING SECTION 1 – GENERAL Keys…………………………………………………………………………………..…………….…. 4-1-1 SECTION 2 - USE OF THE PETAWAWA RESEARCH FOREST Background…………………………………………………………………………………………… 4-2-1 Restrictions……………………………………………………………………………………………. 4-2-1 Request Procedures…………………………………………………………………………………… 4-2-1 Scope of Training……………………………………………………………………………………... 4-2-1 vii Incidents………………………………………………………………………………………………. 4-2-2 SECTION 3 – MIL PARACHUTE TRAINING & DROP ZONES General …………………………………………………………………………….………………….. 4-3-1 DZ Controller Responsibilities…………………………………………………….…………………...4-3-1 Check Fire….……………………………………...……………….…………………………………. 4-3-2 Communications……………………………………………………………………....………………. 4-3-2 Traffic Control………………………………………………………………………………………… 4-3-2 POMV Access to DZ Anzio…………………………………………………………………………... 4-3-3 SECTION 4 – UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES (UAV) General ………………………………………………………………………………………………... 4-4-1 Critical Data……………………………………….…….……………………………………………. 4-4-1 Request Procedures……..…………………………………………………………………………….. 4-4-1 Procedures During UAV Training…………………………….………………………….……………4-4-2 UAV Operations over the East RTA…..……….……….……….…………….….…..…….…….……4-4-2 Civilian UAVs………………………………………………………………………………………….4-4-3 UAV Loss of Link Drill………………………………………………………………………………..4-4-3 SECTION 5 - RAPPELLING AND MOUNTAIN OPERATIONS TRAINING General ………………………………………………………………………………………………... 4-5-1 Communications………………………………………………………………………………………. 4-5-1 Tower & Rappel Site Anchor Inspections…………………………………………………….………. 4-5-1 Qualifications…………………………………………………………………………….………….... 4-5-1 Instructor Responsibilities…………………………………………………………….……………… 4-5-1 Personnel Undergoing Training…………………………………………………….………………… 4-5-2 Ground Safety…………………………………………………………………………….…………… 4-5-2 Medical…………………………………………………………………….……….…………………..4-5-2 Cease Training………………………………………………………………………………………… 4-5-3 Rappel Tower......................................................................................................................................... 4-5-3 Rappel Site……………………………………………………………………………………………. 4-5-4 viii Rock Climbing Walls…………………………………………………………………………………. 4-5-4 Field House Climbing Wall at Dundonald Hall………………………………………………………. 4-5-5 SECTION 6 - OBSTACLE COURSE General………………………………………………………………………………………………... 4-6-1 Training……………………………………………………………………………..………………….4-6-1 Inspections…………………………………………………………………………….………………. 4-6-1 Responsibilities of the Supervisor…………………………………………………….………………. 4-6-1 SECTION 7 – ORTONA URBAN OPS SITE General ……………………………………………………………………………….……………….. 4-7-1 Electrical Power…………………………………………………………………….………………… 4-7-1 Authorized Ammunition……………………………………………………………………………… 4-7-1 Sentries………………………………………………………………………………………………... 4-7-2 Rappelling………………………………………………………………………………………….....
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