The Politics of Understanding: Language As a Model of Culture

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO The Politics of Understanding: Language as a Model of Culture A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science by David Gideon Leitch Committee in charge: Professor Tracy B. Strong, Chair Professor Harvey S. Goldman, Co-Chair Professor Michael Cole Professor Gerald Doppelt Professor Fonna Forman-Barzilai Professor Alan Houston 2008 The dissertation of David Gideon Leitch is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm and electronically: Co-Chair Chair University of California, San Diego 2008 iii To Understanding iv Table of Contents Signature Page . iii Dedication . iv Table of Contents . v Acknowledgments . vii Vita ...................................... x Abstract . xi 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Introduction . 1 1.2 Value Pluralism in Contemporary Politics . 6 1.3 The Linguistic Turn in Political Theory . 10 1.4 Language Acquisition as a Model of Understanding . 14 1.5 Dissertation Outline . 17 1.6 Conclusion . 19 2 The Limits of Ignorance in Rawls and Its Implication for Liberal- ism 20 2.1 Introduction . 20 2.2 John Rawls's Liberal Justice . 26 2.3 Rawls and Rationality . 29 2.4 Moral Development in Rawls . 35 2.5 Rawls, Kohlberg, and Maturity . 42 2.6 Conclusion . 48 3 The Social Formation of Ethics in Taylor, Hegel, and Gadamer 50 3.1 Introduction . 50 3.2 Hegel and Recognition . 56 3.3 The Limits of Hermeneutics . 61 Language and Hermeneutics . 66 3.4 Conclusion . 68 4 Taylor, Language, and Judgment 71 4.1 Introduction . 71 4.2 Horizons and Frameworks . 77 v The Necessity of Frameworks . 81 Internalization . 84 4.3 Language and Communities . 89 4.4 Conclusion . 96 5 Lev Vygotsky, Language Acquisition, and the Zone of Proximal Development 99 5.1 Introduction . 99 5.2 The Higher Mental Functions . 102 5.3 Internalization . 104 5.4 The Zone of Proximal Development . 107 5.5 Linguistic Development . 109 5.6 Consciousness and Marxism . 115 5.7 Moral Development in Vygotsky . 122 5.8 Conclusion . 128 6 Revisiting Yoder and Mozert 130 6.1 Introduction . 130 6.2 The Limitations of Douglas's Dissent . 135 6.3 Re-Examining Yoder Through Taylor and Vygotsky . 140 6.4 Expert Testimony and the Problems with Translation . 145 6.5 Re-examining Mozert . 158 6.6 Conclusion . 166 7 Speaking After Little Rock 170 7.1 Introduction . 170 7.2 Judging Little Rock . 172 7.3 Judging Arendt . 187 7.4 Language in Judgment . 190 7.5 Vygotsky and Taylor on the Limits of Imagination and Literature . 201 7.6 Conclusion . 209 8 Conclusion 211 8.1 Introduction . 211 8.2 Extensions . 218 9 Appendix 221 9.1 Vygotsky's Intellectual Context and History . 221 9.2 Hegel and the German Psychological Tradition . 228 vi Acknowledgments A dissertation, such as this, which seeks to illuminate the ways in which cogni- tion is inherently social is bound to acknowledge substantial debts to those around the author. My commitment to this view extends beyond just the content of this dissertation, and into my professional life en toto. There are, therefore, a number of people I would like to acknowledge. First, and in many ways most importantly, my committee, for their (tireless!) work in guiding this project. Gerald Doppelt was one of the first professors I be- came close to at UCSD, and his encouragement, both personal and intellectual, has been a life-raft at times. Given the centrality of Vygotsky in this dissertation, I feel confident in saying that, absent Michael Cole, this dissertation could never have come together in the way it has; his seminars and simple, at times deceptively so, advice have always proved invaluable. Alan Houston's ability to locate the central conceptual errors in any piece has always astonished me, and that astonishment has been doubled given the distance between this work and his. Far from remaining a simple critic, however, he has leavened his criticisms with a warmth and personal affection that I always have appreciated. Fonna Forman- Barzilai's comments have always pushed me to acknowledge the unspoken debts this piece owes to the liberal tradition, and have illuminated the ways in which this project balances the radical and the conventional; her personal encouragement and advice have similarly helped illuminate the sometimes-darkened professional vii and personal issues a viva contempliva entails. Tracy Strong, as any advisor of his stature is wont to do, has affected this project's development in ways neither he nor I could have anticipated when I arrived in San Diego. I will always remember and appreciate the (at times heated) exchanges over topics as large as the point of political theory and as small as the placement of a single comma. Finally, Har- vey Goldman's contribution could not be overstated. Harvey has shepherded this project { and indeed my intellectual development as a whole { with a sensitivity and care beyond what one could expect from a mentor or a friend. In addition, I would like to thank the UCSD Political Theory Working Group (or, colloquially, Theory Group): Nancy Luxon, Philip Michelbach, David Selby, Antony Lyon, Andrew Poe, Christian Donath, Adam Gomez, and Ivo Gatzinski. Without you, this dissertation could never have been written. I would also like to thank Harlan Wilson, Sonia Kruks, Karen Shelby, Kelly Wurtz, Cullen Hendrix, and Eric Bakovic for their important insights both within and from outside political theory. Unsurprisingly, in a dissertation incorporating insights from developmental psychology into a model of liberal judgment, I would also like to acknowledge a debt to my parents and sister: Thomas Leitch, Lisa Elliott, and Judith Leitch. Each of you has had a profound affect on who I have become, and this dissertation be- longs as much to you as to me. Well, the mistakes, I suppose, are still my own. One of the true pleasures of my life has been the friendships that we have formed viii between us to supplement the familial love that already existed, friendships I have frequently depended on during the long, dark nights writing a dissertation entails. Finally, I would like to thank my wife, the brains of the outfit, Laura Wimberley. I don't have the words to properly express what you have meant to me, which doubles my thankfulness for our shared life, which sustains my appreciation where mediating grammar fails. Editor, confidant, and muse; my luck in having met you defies all rational explanation. You are the essential grammar of my life. ix Vita 2000 Bachelor of Arts in Politics with Honors, Oberlin College 2000 - 2008 Teaching Assistant, Department of Political Science, University of California, San Diego 2002 Master of Arts in Political Science, University of California, San Diego 2005 - 2008 Teaching Assistant, Sixth College, University of California, San Diego 2008 Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science, University of California, San Diego x ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION The Politics of Understanding: Language as a Model of Culture by David Gideon Leitch Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science University of California, San Diego, 2008 Professor Tracy B. Strong, Chair Professor Harvey S. Goldman, Co-Chair A by now widespread critique of political liberalism claims that political liberalism hides liberal preferences in seemingly-neutral policies, which undermines the legit- imacy of a political order that claims to maximize the ability of diverse citizens to co-exist. Charles Taylors call for a fusion of horizons has been one of the most important of these criticisms of Rawlsian political liberalism. In my dissertation, The Politics of Understanding: Language as a Model of Culture, I develop a positive model of cross-cultural understanding based in language acquisition. I begin with a criticism of Rawls which looks back to Amayarta Sen's social choice principles, which highlight a contradiction in Rawlss work: Rawls requires, but also disallows, the incorporation of liberal cultural assumptions to ground his xi principles of justice. The next two chapters critique Taylors call for a fusion of horizons. First, I examine Taylor's turn to Gadamer and Hegel. I argue that Taylor misappropriates Gadamer, and that Hegels historical theory has failed. Second, I look within Taylors earlier work on language and culture. Taylor here is incomplete; he cannot explain how horizons can be fused to allow members of one culture to understand another culture. The fifth chapter develops a new model of this cross-cultural understanding, indebted to Taylor, but moving beyond his limitations by looking to resources in developmental psychology, which I locate in the work of early Twentieth Century developmental psychologist Lev Vygotsky. Unlike Taylor, Vygotsky explains how acculturation and language acquisition interact and mutually reinforce. The sixth chapter develops my model of cross-cultural understanding, which provides a set of resources for local policymakers to respond to the challenges of value pluralism. In addition to revisiting Wisconsin v Yoder, I take up an example from Mozert v Hawkins County Board of Education to demonstrate the value of this new model. My final chapter explores the exchange between Hannah Arendt and Ralph Ellison over Arendt's judgment of the desegregation of public schools in Little Rock. This illuminates the connection between models of language and judgment. Neither Arendt nor Ellison articulate compelling models of language, as neither xii appreciate language's constitutive relationship to identity. xiii 1 Introduction 1.1 Introduction This dissertation starts from a contemporary political problem in American life: the ability of citizens in a liberal state to understand other citizens with, at times, radically different sets of values than themselves. This problem { value pluralism { has been addressed in a number of different ways in the theory literature.1 Against other approaches I address both below and in the following chapter, I argue that modeling different values systems as different languages, and cross-cultural under- 1[Berlin, 1991], [Kateb, 1999], [Gutmann, 1999], [Riley, 2002], [Madsen and Strong, 2003].

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