Training, morale and modern

Explanations of sustained combat capability

prof. dr. H. Strachan*

Introduction resilient must therefore be answered, famous article by Morris Janowitz at least in part, in comparative terms. and E.A. Shils,"1 and it has been ermany lost the two world pushed back in time to cover earlier , and yet its army contin- armies, including those of the French Gued fighting until the very end The Small Group theory Revolution.51 have argued elsewhere °f both. This is not to deny that there that the elevation of the section or 18 evidence of increased in Since 1945 three generic explanations group in Germany's tactics in 1918, nor is it to sustain the 'stab-in- have been adduced to explain how 1917-18 may have linked best prac- the-back' legend. But most of the dis- morale is sustained in the terrifying tice at the operational level to the ciplinary problems of that year were conditions of industrialised war. The needs of psychology, and so helped concentrated in the rear areas rather first, and dominant one, focuses on the German army to surmount the cri- than at the front.' Moreover, its per- the primacy of the small group. sis of 1917-18." formance in 1944-45 is truly astonish- ing given the fact that the probable Men, it is argued, There are, however, a number of seri- outcome of the Second , fight for their mates rather ous difficulties with the prevalence of unlike that of the First, was clear at than for their country. the small group theory. First, it makes least twelve months betbre it ended. no allowance for high casualties, par- Allied planners had confidently This theory is now almost dogma in ticularly over a short period of time. expected a breakdown in the army's the current practices of western On the eastern front between 1941 'nner cohesion in 1944.2 armies. lts intellectual origins are and 1945 the opportunities for the essentially American, and are ground- evolution of small group loyalty were The only major European army with a ed on the work of S.A. Stouffer and few.7 Even in the United States Army, comparable record is that of Britain. others, as well as of S.L.A. Marshall, the fount of the idea, small groups did out it was on the winning side in both in the Second World War.' not survive high intensity infantry *ars and its experience of Continental It was extended to the Wehrmacht in a fighting. From the four U.S. divisions warfare as a mass conscript force was Tiuch more limited, confined essen- Üally to the years 1916-18, 1940, and 1 Christoph Jahr, Gewöhnliche Soldaten. 1943-45. The French army, by con- Desertion und Deserteure im deutschen und Kellett, Combat motivation: the behavior of britischen Heer 1914-1918 (Göttingen, 1998); soldiers in (Boston, 1982), p. 97. trast, underwent a crisis in morale at 4 l Wilhelm Deist, 'Der militarische Zusam- Edward A. Sils and Morris Janowitz, he end of August 1914, was subject menbruch des Kaiserreichs: zur Realitat der 'Cohesion and disintegration in the Wehr- to widespread mutiny in the summer "Dolchstosslegende"', in Ursula Büttner (ed), macht in World War II', Public Opinion °f 1917, and folded entirely in May Das Unrechtsregime. Internationale For- Quarterly, XII (1948), pp 280-315. 1940. Both the Italian and Russian schung über den Nationalsozialismus (Ham- " John Lynn, Bayonets of the republic: motiva- armies confronted near-dissolution in burg 1986), I. tion and tactics in the army of revolutionary ! F. H. Hinsley, British intelligence in the France, 1791-4 (Urbana, 1984), pp 30-7, 163- 1917, and the Soviet army fractured Second World War: its influence on strategy 4. in 1941. The question as to why the and operations (5 vols, London, 1979-90), " Hew Strachan, 'The Morale of the German fiorale of the German army proved so II1/I, pp 64-5; 1II/2, pp 21, 24, 27, 31, 365. Army, 1917-18', in Hugh Cecil and Peter ' S.A. Stouffer and others, The American Liddle (eds), Facing Armageddon: the First Soldier (New York, 1965; Ist editon, World War Experienced (Barnsley, 1996), p. De auteur is hoogleraar moderne geschiede- Princeton, 1949), 2 vols; S.L.A. Marshall, 388. nis aan de Universiteit van Glasgow en Men against fire: the problem of battle com- ' Omer Bartov, Hitler's Army: Soldiers, Nazis, directeur van 'the Scottish Centre for War mand in future war (New York, 1966; Ist edi- and War in the Third Keich (Oxford, 1991), pp Studies'. tion 1947); tbr a corrective, see, Anthony 5, 29-45.

JRG170 10-2001 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR 543 which landed on D-Day 1944, 79 per own observations on 'men against mary-group solidarity existed', wrote cent of officers and 73 per cent of fire' point in a very different direction: one commentator, 'more than not it men became casualties within seven The first effect of fire is to dissolve served to foster and reinforce dissent weeks.8 In three months' continuous all appearance of order. Thi.s is the from the goals of organiza- fighting in the Second World War, an most shocking surprise to troops tion and to organize refusal to per- American infantry regiment could who are experiencing combat for form according to institutional reckon on the loss of its entire the first time. They cannot antici- norms'.14 strength.'' pate the speed with which their own farces become fractionalised or the extent to which the fractions will Ideological Thus the small group argument, become physically divorced from indoctrination which by definition becomes of each other as the movement is increasing importance the more sus- extended and enemy resistance Although, in this respect at least, tained and vicious the fighting, rests stiffens. there is little sign that today's profes- on a paradox: such operations erode sional armed forces in either the the very basis on which the unit's A sense of differente United States or in the United morale is said to rest. It has to absorb Finally, there is the key characteristic Kingdom have digested the potential an increased flow of replacements, of the small group: it identifies itself difficulties of the small-group thesis, many of whom do not survive long by its difference from others. In the historians of the German army have enough to become anybody's buddy, context of an army, that sense of dif- begun to do so. Both Omer Bartov and whose names and backgrounds ference can amount to a divorce from and (albeit in less extreme form) the unit's surviving members struggle the collective goals of the higher Stephen Fritz have argued that, since to recall. organisation which the group is casualty rates in the most bitter and designed to serve. The solidarity of sustained fighting of the twentieth The primacy of the small group is the small group can lead it to refuse to century, the struggle on the eastern itself a reflection of firepower's dom- fight, to disobey orders, and even to front in the Second World War, mean inance of the battlefield. The larger mutiny. Tony Ashworth's description that small group loyalty cannot bodies of eighteenth and early nine- of in 1914-18 as a 'live explain combat motivation, then teenth-century warfare, like battalions and let live system', although over- political ideology must.15 or regiments, had to disperse to drawn, makes the point: solidarity at reduce their vulnerability as targets. the front line could work to subvert According to Bartov, morale was sus- But on the twentieth-century battle- the intentions of higher command.'2 tained, and the war became bar- field, even the small group broke In Korea, the U.S. Army discovered barised and unlimited, precisely down if it had to pass through a hail that the longer a unit was in the line because each side was fully comrnit- of fire, and geography - broken 'the more intense buddy relations ted to the cause for which it was fight- ground or areas of dense housing - became': the consequence was that, ing, that of fascism or Bolshevisni. might force dispersal well before con- 'in a crisis, and if forced to make a Bartov's argument is clearly capable tact. 'The company', Marshall wrote, choice, a man would think first of his of extension beyond the eastern front, 'coming under fire, literally begins its loyalty to a buddy and second of his even if in moderated form. Politica' engagement by falling apart'.1" Thus, obligations to an organization'." ideology cements the armed forces to for all Marshall's canonisation as the However, Vietnam was the war that civilian society, and validates the high priest of the small group, his made the tension explicit: 'where pri- strains and sacrifices of the soldier- The First World War, interpreted at the time as a struggle between liberal- * Sam C. Sarkesian (ed), : ism and militarism, or Kultur against cohesion, stress, and the volanteer military " Bartov, Hitler's Army, pp 4, 106-78; Stephen civilisation, can be accommodated, at (Beverly Hills, 1980), p. 259. G. Fritz, '"We are trying (...) to change the least in part, within Bartov's thesis. '' Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: German face of the world". Ideology and motivation Ludendorff's 1917 program me °f and U.S. Army Performance 1939-1945 in the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front: the patriotic instruction is customarily (London, 1983), p. 75. view from below', Journal of Military '" S.L.A. Marshall, Men against fire: the prob- History, LX, 1996, pp 683-710. condemned as ineffective, but should lem of battle command in future war (New 16 Hew Strachan, The First World War, vol l, To now perhaps be reintegrated in the York, 1966; first published 1947), p. 129. Arms (Oxford, 2001), pp 1114-39. explanations for Germany's sustained 11 Ibid, p. 90. " S.P. Mackenzie, Politics and military morale: l! combat capability. Britain too under- Tony Ashworth, Trench Warfare 1914-1918: current affairs and citizenship education in took the political instruction of troops the Live and Let Live System (London, 1980). the British army. 1914-1950 (Oxford, 1992); " Kellett, Combat Motivation, pp 102-3, quot- David French, Raising Churchill's Army: the in 1917-18, and in the Second World s ing R. W. Little. British Army and the War against Germany, War resumed the practice precisely a 14 Sarkesian, Combat Effectiveness, 257. 1919-1945 (Oxford, 2000), pp 126, 133. an antidote to falling morale.

544 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR JRG170 10-2001 Nevertheless, ideological indoctrina- stresses negative rather than positive diers were executed bet ween 1914 tion, at least tout seul, does not seem factors. If we follow Bartov and focus and 1918, and in the aftermath of the sufficient to account tbr high morale. our attention on the eastern front in war some wondered whether this Specitïcally, Bartov's critics have 1941-45 because it is there that the comparative leniency had contributed Pointed to the fact that his sample was primary group is most obviously at a to the collapse of 1918. limited, and also skewed in favour of discount, then we should cite punish- The Italian army shows the difficulty divisions likely to show greater evi- ment as a possible explanation tbr the of generalisation: it executed more dence of Nazi commitment.1* More sustained determination to fight. The soldiers than any other army in the generally scepticism regarding the German army executed at least First World War, but at the same time role of patriotism, or commitment to a 15.000 servicemen in the Second its disintegration in the field in set of beliefs generaled from outside World War.:: The Soviet army may October 1917 was probably more the armed forces themselves, seems have executed that number at extreme than that of any other army in sufficiently great not to be easily dis- Stalingrad alone.:' The armies of pre- the war. missed. Much evidence exists to sug- industrial Europe were governed by None of the these three customary §est that German and British soldiers, the lash: systems of repression were explanations is exclusive of the other. in both world wars, regarded political more important to discipline than Moreover, however valuable compar- education with boredom at best and those of emulation. ative perspectives are, different fac- i . . 19 aeep cynicism at worst. tors operate in different armies at dif- When hè set about rebuilding the But the comparative evidence tbr ferent times in different theatres. For niorale of the British 14th Army in modern armies is not at all clear. The the historian, desertion, mutiny, 1943, Slim put what hè called its British army suffered one significant absence without leave - these all spiritual component first: 'there must mutiny in each of the world wars, but admit of particular and specific caus- be a great and noble object'. But Slim neither - at least overtly - constituted es. This, however, is not a luxury per- saw the function of ideology as the a refusal to fight: the first, at Etaples mitted to the military theorist, whose creatipn of preseverance rather than in 1917, occurred in a base training work has a predictive and normative élan/" camp, and the second, at Salerno in quality that compels him to generalise 1943, revolved around the desire to - even if hè uses history as a basis for The general consensus seems serve with 'buddiesV4 In the First doing so. Both the theorist and, per- to be that political or patriotic World War Britain executed some 346 haps even more, the historian need to instruction is important in getting men, principally tbr desertion in the reintegrate a fourth factor in account- the soldier to the front, in incul- face of the enemy; that may explain ing for morale, that of training. cating the sense of duty which why Britain had no more major catises him to volunteer or to mutiny. But in the Second World War report on mobilization, but it is at it essentially did without the death The value of training best implicit rather than explicit penalty, despite the conviction of when in the field. many generals that it was essential to Marshall's Men againstfire is not pri- sustain discipline in the field.25 marily about the dynamics of the small group. It is about the impor- Punishment The German army's readiness to dis- tance of training. As Marshall is not pense the death penalty in the Second only an important thinker but also a The third explanation tbr combat World War was a direct result of its very powerful writer, his own words fiiotivation - and last too in the fre- reluctance to do so in the First: for- are best: quency with which it is adduced - mally speaking only 46 German sol- Since more than a century ago, when the rifle bullet began its reign The essays by Jürgen Förster and Theo gerichtsbarkeit im Zweiten Weltkrieg'. in Schulte in Paul Addison and Angus Calder Hans-Jochen Vogel. Helmut Simon, and over the battlefield and soldiers (eds). Time to kill: the soldier 's experience of Adalbert Podlech (eds). Die Freiheit des became aware that the day ofclose- war in the west 1939-1945 (London, 1997). Anderen (Baden-Baden. 1981); Messer- order formations in combat was broadly speaking support Barlov's position. schmidt and Fritz Wüllner. Die Wehrmacht- forever gone, all military thinkers Por example. Mackenzie. Politics and mili- justiz im Dienst des Nationalsozialismus. tary morale, p. 109. Zerstörung einer Legende (Baden-Baden. have pondered the need of a new ~" Willjam Slim, üefeat into victory (London, 1987). discipline. It has been generally 1956), p. 182; Kellett. Combat motivation, p. 3' John Erickson. 'Red Army battlefield perfor- realized that fashioning the 327. mance 1941-45: the system and the soldier, in machine to man 's use in battle was ' Hew Strachan, 'The soldier's experience in Addison and Calder. Time to kill. p. 244. but half of the problem. The other two world wars: some historiographical com- :4 Saul David. Mutin\ at Salerno: an injustice parisons'. in Addsion and Calder. Time to kill exposed (London, 1995). half was conditioning man to the , PP 374-5. 25 French, Raising Churchill's Army, pp 138. machine. The mechanisms of the " Mant'red Messerschmidt, 'Deutsche Militar- 242-3. new warfare do not set their own

JRG170 10-2001 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR 545 efficiency rate in battle. They are something hè does not understand.'27 The image of the recruit urged by his ever at the mercy of training 'Knowledge', the motto of the Royal instructor to thrust his bayonet into a methods which will stimulate the Air Force's Parachute Training dummy, and then to twist and with- soldier to express his intelligence School runs, 'dispels fear'.28 Surprise draw it, mouthing hatred for his foe and spirit.™ can destroy collective cohesion on the the while, is reflective less of a neces- battlefield, and training is its best sary skill and more of the effort to Training, rather than battle, was the antidote. overcome one of the principal blocks dominant experience of armies in the to combat effectiveness. twentieth century. It has five funda- Different functions of training mental functions over and above that The knowledge so acquired extends Marshall's best known observation of imparting the basic grammar of in several directions. The first is was that only 25 per cent of men fire . First, it counters the familiarity with the confusion and to good purpose when in combat. His hardy perennial of life in the ranks, noise, if not the carnage, of battle conclusion was that the task of train- boredom. Secondly, it distinguishes itself: training, particularly if it ing and indoctrination was to inten- the soldier from the civilian, and so includes live-firing, can anticipate sify fire: at the rear increasing fire generales professional pride. Thirdly, some of the immediate shock of com- effect was a logistical problem, but at it can create unit cohesion. The value bat. This sort of training treats fear as the front the obstacle to be overcome of sending into action a group of a normal part of battle. Secondly, was psychological." men who have trained together, and modern can last for days on who are commanded by the officers end, respecting the limitations neither who have been responsible for that of night nor weather. Exercises can Marshall noticed that direct supervi- process, has been particularly reproduce the continuous nature of sion increased the ratio of fire. Low remarked upon in the United States - modern war. An American study in ratios of fire were therefore in part the which failed to do any such thing the Second World War concluded that consequence of dispersal on the bat- either in the Second World War or in men operated at maximum efficiency tlefield. Until the firepower revolu- the Vietnam War. Fourthly, training is between their tenth and thirtieth day tion of the last quarter of the nine- a means by which soldiers can assim- in action. Thereafter combat exhaus- teenth century - the advent of the ilate new tactical thinking to the point tion led first to over-confidence and breech-loading maga/ine-fed rifle, of where it becomes instinctive in its hyper-activity, and by the forty-fifth the machine gun, and of quick-firing application. Fifthly, and fmally, train- day to lassitude.2' - close-order drill was a ing enables soldiers to come to grips means both of inculcating group with innovative technologies and to Training creates the psychological cohesion and of providing set routines master them. capacity to elongate the peak phase for employment in combat. But with and to surmount the low points of the the arrival of the 'empty' battlei'ield The value of training is therefore later phases. It does so in part through drill became a means of basic training in large part psychological: it is the inculcation of battle drills, of set only, and preparation for combat an enabling process, a form of procedures, so that when exhaustion required instruction that was both dif- empowerment, which creates makes rational thought impossible, or ferent and more realistic. As a conse- self-confidence. when fear has taken over, individuals quence command was no longei react without thinking: 'in the process direct and immediate. 'The soldier is 'The surest cause of a feeling of inade- they regain themselves, pushing fear taught and encouraged to take cover, quacy', Shelford Bidwell wrote, 'is asideV" a situation', Shelford Bidwell noted that the soldier is being asked to do in 1973, 'in which hè may discard his Finally, training teaches men to kill. It leader, and, if skilful, avoid taking sets out to overcome the civilising part in the battle at all. It is easy to -" Marshall. Men aguinstfire. p. 22. 2' Shelford Bidwell. : a study effects of peacetime norms and to escape from the danger zone; between of men, and theories (London. defy the most obvious commandment danger and safety the combat soldier 1973), p. 130. of all. At this level, training concen- has virtually a free choice. The prob- '* Hugh McManners. The Sears of War (Lon- trates on what happens over the last lem of morale today lies in training don, 1994; first published 1993). p. 53. two hundred yards, as an attacker the soldier to select the more danger- '" Dave Grossman. On killing: the psychologi- 2 cal cast of learning to kill in war and society closes with his enemy. It results in the ous of two courses." (Boston. 1995). p. 44. obvious disjunction between combat " McManners. Sears of War, p. 124. and training in the twentieth century: The change in the requirements 01 " Marshall, Men against fire, p. 70: see also the bayonet was responsible for training was driven by social factors Roger Spilier, 'S.L.A. Marshal! and the ratio of fire'. Journal of the Roval United Services remarkably few deaths but it occupied as well as technical. Bidwell's soldier Institute. CXXXIII, 1988. no 4. pp 63-71. a central position in the acculturation was likely to come from an urban : Bidwell. Modem Warfare, p. 126. of the foot soldier. background and to be literate,

546 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR JRG170 10-2001 characteristics that were not so typical they inspired a cohort of French mili- field exercise declared that training of the soldiers of Frederick the Great. tary thinkers before the First World was only well directed if 'it does that Urbanisation made him less accus- War. Using Gustav Le Bon's crowd which war requires, and if nothing torned to the slaughtering of live- theory, Loyzeaux de Grandmaison, H. must be unlearned on the battlefield stock, and so less familiar with the Langlois and Louis de Maud'huy all that was learned on the exercise sight of blood and entrails. It meant anticipated Marshall in recognising groundsV6 Subsequent regulations that hè was relatively protected from that firing at an enemy was a psycho- may have been less determined in the vagaries of the weather and less logical problem. In Britain J.F.C. their advocacy of dispersion and in familiar with terrain and its potential- Fuller's Training soldiers for war, their recognition of fire effect, but ities. published in 1914, retlected the influ- Bernd Schuite's argument that the Finally, short-service conscription ence of the French school: German army put so much weight in Prevailed in many European armies preparing to maintain civil order that trom the Franco-Prussian war until An army, we find, is still a crowd, it undermined its tactical preparation the end of the Cold War. This meant, though a highly organized one. It is for the field seems hard to sustain.17 first, that soldiers saw themselves pri- governed by the same laws which Much of what was promulgated in niarily as civilians temporarily in uni- govern crowds, and under the stress relation to morale and cohesion, as form, and, secondly. that the time of war is ever tending to revert to well as to the role played by will and available for training was less and its crowd form. Our object in peace determination, was designed specifi- therefore the training itself needed to is so to train it that their reversion cally for operations. Helmuth von be more effective. will become extremely slow: in Moltke the younger, when hè became other words, we add to each indi- chief of the general in January Herein are the true origins of the so- vidual a quality known as 'moral', 1906, worked to make maoeuvres called 'spirit of the offensive'. Too so that, when intellect and reason more realistic, not least by excluding often presented as an irrational cult fail man is not ruled by his instincts the Kaiser from the exercise of com- assailing armies devoid of direct and sentiments alone, but by the mand. Between 1908 and 1911 experience in the years preceding the moral which has become part of his Germany spent the equivalent of 14..3 First World War, it was rather a reflec- nature.M million francs per annum on training tion that morale was of increasing and areas, whereas the French spent 'egitimate importance in the fire- Fuller, therefore, concluded that train- between three million and 4.6 million. swept battle-zone. The First World ing in peacetime must approximate as By 1912 Germany had twenty-six War itself would deepen that insight, nearly as possible to the conditions of training grounds of at least 5.625 not undemine it. The tank, the wartime. The onus was on the officer hectares each, when France had only grenade. and the flamethrower did not not to hide the terrors of the battle- seven, and the four largest ranged remove the need tbr men to cope, but, field from the soldier but to show him from 300 hectares up to 2.000.18 by increasing the pressures loaded on how they could be overcome. The them, intensified the search for pallia- problem was of course that in peace Of all the European armies confront- tives. 'we have everything save the ruling ed with the battlefield realities of the factor- the bullet'.35 revolution in firepower in 1914, the morale of the German seems to have French theory... undergone least fragmentation. The ... and German practice French army all but collapsed in the 'The aim of discipline is to make men aftermath of the battles of the fron- fight, often in spite of themselves.'" Although much pre-1914 theory was tiers between 20 and 22 August 1914. Ardant du Picq wrote those words French in origin, practice was more Joffre executed more soldiers in 1914 before the Franco-Prussian war, but developed in Germany. The 1888 than Pétain did in the aftermath of the 1917 mutinies, and hè did so for crimes that were more clearly indica- " Ardant du Picq. Etudes sur Ie combat: com- (Dusseldorf, 1977); Schulte. EuropSische tive of a flight from combat than were bat antique et combat moderne (Paris, 1903), Krise und Erster Weltkrieg. Beitrage ;.ur those of 1917: the principal offences p. 101. Militcirpolitik des Kaiserreichs 1871-1914 were abandoning one's post and self- J.F.C. Fuller. Training soldiers for war (Lon- (Frankfurt am Main. 1983), pp 295-318. don, 1914), p. 19. * Douglas Porch. The march to the Marne: the mutilation."' "Ibid. p. 112. French armv 1871-1914 (Cambridge, 1981). '' Martin Samuels. Doctrine and dogma: p. 200. The British army, which had experi- German and British infantry facties in the * Nicolas Ortenstadt, Les fusillés de la grande enced the effects of fire in the South First World War (Westport Conn., 1992). p. guerre et la mémoire collective (1914-1999) African War and which was deemed 99. (Paris. 1999). p. 14. " Bernd F. Schulte, Die deutsche Armee 1900- 1 Victor Huguet. Britain and the war: a French by many observers to be - man for 1914. Zwischen Beharren unil Verandern indictment (London. 1928). p. 3. man - the best trained in the tactics of

JRG170 10-2001 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR 547 modern war,4" suffered disproportion- hè set about rebuilding the army's emerged from the bottom up, and ately more cases of desertion and morale, and hè used training as a practices therefore varied across for- absence without leave in the winter of means to do so. He deliberately and mations. Not until June 1918 was Ivor 1914-15 than it did as a conscripted declaredly set out to recover the spir- Maxse appointed Inspector General force in 1917-18.41 At St Quentin on it of the offensive of 1914. 'In this of Training, too late to have any sig- 27 August the commanding officers war, which is apparently dominated nificant effect on the performance of of two regular battalions, both of by science and numbers', ran the the British Expeditionary Force in the them possessed of combat experience report of the l st Army on its experi- First World War. in colonial wars but neither it would ences on the Somme,'individual will- It is nonetheless clear that individual seem prepared for the confusion of Le power is nevertheless the ultimate fbrmations had benefited from realis- Cateau on 26 August, agreed to the deciding factor.'44 tic training from as early as 1916. Sir unconditional surrender of their Arthur Currie, commanding the units.42 The training schemes adopted in Canadian corps, was very impressed For the German army, the plan on preparation for the spring 1918 offen- by the French army's training for the mobilization was that the training of sives lacked any coherent system of counter-attacks at Verdun in late replacements during the war should tactics. What was done was left in the 1916. He applied similar principles, be done at home in the Ersatzheer. hands of those who were destined to including the use of live firing, in his But the lack of personnel lef t at home lead their units into action. The unify- preparations for the Canadians' and the distance from the realities of ing theme in training was the eleva- assault on Vimy ridge on 9 April the most recent combat experience tion of morale, and the emphasis was 1917. He attributed his corps' success combined to bring training closer to on the skills of the individual, on his to the 'confidence... born of good the front. The first stormtroops, creat- fitness and readiness, not on those of training'.46 ed in 1915, were essentially the advo- the group. Whether the German cates of a training system designed to army's morale did rise in March 1918 Part of the problem in assessing the instil in infantry the belief that it is contentious. role of training in raising morale is could master the conditions of indus- the virtuous circle created by the war trialized warfare. On 15 May 1916 German historians now argue that of movement and the resumption of 2 OHL ordered all armies on the soldiers went forward only the offensive. The obvious question is western front to send parties to the hccause they saw victory as the whether morale rose not because of stormtroops' founder, Rohr, for train- quickest way home. training but because of the advance ing.41 itself. Offensives poorly conducted But a number of eyewitnesses used did shatter morale in the First World Ludendorff's influence exactly the vocabulary called up by War - as the experience of the French These initiatives preceded the Ludendorff himself and spoke of the army in both August 1914 and April appointment of Hindenburg and enthusiasm of August 1914.45 1917 demonstrated. But offensives Ludendorff to the supreme command that were well conducted raised in late summer 1916. Therefore, morale, despite the fact that they Ludendorff's contribution to the British training incurred far greater casualties than training and effectiveness of the did position warfare. The argument German army from the winter of The debate about the impact of train- that the German army's morale recov- 1916-17 should not be exaggerated. ing on the British army is also con- ered in March 1918 is supported by Moreover, its significance was less tentious. Like the Germans, the the knowledge that that of the British tactical and more psychological. British established training schools army did so too in August 1918.47 Shocked by the Materialschlacht, and instructional centres close to the which hè found on the western front, front. As in the German army, these The 'Reichswehr'

" Jahr, Gewöhnliche Soldalen, pp 169-72. German guns: four years on the western front This relationship - that between train- 42 Peter T. Scott, ' Dishonoured'': the 'Colonels' 1914-1918 (London, 1973), p. 182. ing, morale and the offensive - was Surrender' at St Quentin, the retreat from 4' Bill Rawling, Surviving trench warfare: tech- Mom. August 1914 (London, 1994). nohgy and the Canadian corps, 1914-1918 one central to the Reichswehr in the 1 Samuels, Doctrine and dogma, p. 19. (Toronto, 1992), p. 130; see also pp 90, 100. 1920s. The head of the Truppenamt, 44 R.H. Lutz (ed), Documents of the German "G.D. Sheffield, 'Officer-man relations, Hans von Seeckt, is seen by contem- Revolution: Fallofthe German empire 1914- morale and discipline in the British army, porary German historians as having 1918 (Stanford, 1932), I, p. 621; for what fol- 1902-22', London University PhD, 1994, p. brought the German army to an acme lows, see Hew Strachan, 'Training, morale 90. 41 James Corum, The mots of : Hans of professionalism. He spent a third and the two world wars'. 48 n 4' Ernst Jiinger, Storm of Steel (London, 1930), von Seeckt and German military reform of his year observing training, a " pp 240, 242; Herbert Sulzbach, With the (Lawrence Kansas, 1992), pp 183-6. his conclusions to the 1924 inspec-

548 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR JRG170 10-2001 tions averred that, 'Every kind of mil- lack of equipment. When training was eral times fall asleep over my food. itary training was ultimately in vain if geared up once more, its thrust was But I feel marvellous, filled with a the improvement of the morale of the less on tactical or specialist skills than sense of joy which I can't understand troops did not keep pace with itV on its psychological dimensions. 'The after so much fear and and apprehen- Seeckt's force was a Führerarmee, a principal aim', declared OKH'S train- sion'. The aim was to put soldiers cadre for subsequent expansion. In ing directive of February 1941, 'is to under stress similar to that of a com- the short term rearmament in 1935 educate leaders and men for ruthless bat situation so that they became eased the intensity of Seeckt's train- aggression... based on confidence in already aware of their inner reserves 'ng programme and so made it more the superiority of the German soldier and of their ability to draw on them manageable. By expanding one year's against any opponent and unwavering before they confronted the reality of service to two, 'The wear and tear on faith in ultimate victory'." combat.54 the officer and non-commissioned Thus, as in 1918, the prime purpose oftïcer corps' was eased.5" But in the of training was to elevate morale. The British response to the experi- long term growth threatened dilution. Moreover, there was a further parallel ence of the First World War on com- During the course of 1939 the army with the First World War: the invasion parable lines. The 1922 committee on grew fourfold, from l. l million men of the Soviet Union confronted the shell shock attributed the incidence of to 4.5 million. A 'fifth wave' of five Wehrmacht with the need to offset psychological collapse on the battle- divisions created shortly before the quantitative inferiority with qualita- field not to any underlying medical outbreak of the Second World War tive superiority. OKH'S directive of 8 condition in the individual but to fail- included men who had completed December 1941 made clear that the ures to manage the finite stock of °nly eight weeks of training and who key attributes were not technical but courage of the generality. It con- had insufficient equipment to do spiritual: 'the inner, psychical attitude cluded: more. Some commanders wanted of each individual'. It concluded - on men returned from the front line to the subject of training - that 'the final As the production ofgood morale is war production.5I The 'phoney war' of defeat of the Russian armed forces the most important object in mili- 1939-40 was therefore a vital respite given the numerical inferiority of our tary training, (...) the best possible - an opportunity for intense training forces can only be achieved by the training should be given to every based on the experiences of the Polish superiority of our leadership and the man intended to serve as a soldier, campaign. Crucially too, only 76.938 higher fighting qualities of our and (...) by such means (...) hè will German soldiers were killed between troops'." be protected against the occurrence l September 1939 and 31 August of 'shell-shock' (...) It is recom- '940, and thus the training that was mendedalso (...) that troops should, achieved was Consolidated rather than Physical and where possible, be entered into bat- forfeited. psychological demands tle gradually, and not precipitated into the thick of war* In theory, therefore, the pattern of The training regimes were therefore short campaigns allowed the German marked by their physical and psycho- Archibald Wavell arrny intervals for the digestion of logical demands. Guy Sajer, not nec- The future field marshal, Archibald recent tactical experience. In practice, essarily a friend to the army or its Wavell, was responsible for fourteen the numbers under training were ethos, wrote that the combat course consecutive training seasons between throttled back between June 1940 and hè underwent in 1942 was 'the most 1926 and 1939. In 1933, in a lecture February 1941, and the quality that severe physical challenge I have ever on 'training for war' at the Royal was achieved was undermined by experienced. I am exhausted, and sev- United Service Institution, hè endorsed the purpose of training as psychological rather than tactical, to " Robert Citino, The path to Blitkrieg: doctrine produce 'formidable fighting men -

JRG170 10-2001 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR 549 in the hands of individual field force model for all the other divisions in the training divisions whose battle-expe- commanders." army in Britain. rienced instructors were to pass on 'practical jungle work' to recruits Lionel Wigram Soldiers were exposed to live who had completed their elementary In 1941-42 the British army confront- firing and the noise of battle; they training: 'Within a few months the ed a crisis in its morale. It had been were posted in slit trenches and quality of reinforcements reaching us defeated on the battlefield; its equip- overrun by tanks; and, more con- from these divisions (...) had corn- ment was poor; and its institutions troversially, they were taken to pletely changed, not only in skill but, seemed ill-adapted to the needs of abattoirs to get them used to the above all, in morale'.61 a citizen army in a world war. sight of blood and carnage. Desertion rates, which averaged 6.88 per 1.000 for the war as a whole, The army's psychiatrists were unhap- U.S. Army training peaked in North Africa in 1941 at py with the suggestion that the battle- 10.05 per l .000.'" Calls from senior field was like a slaughterhouse, and The United States army too had to officers for the reintroduction of the this aspect of battle drill was aban- recover its confidence in the face of death penalty were deflected by army doned. What they endorsed was the defeat at the hands of the Japanese. psychiatrists, who argued that the idea of the gradual acclimatisation of Reflecting on the lessons of Bataan in root problem was poor training.™ men to combat. In the First World the Infantry Journal in 1942, Colonel Significantly, their voices were heard. War the process had been accom- Milton A. Hill castigated the Ame- By 1942 the British army worked on plished by the journey from Britain to ricans' pre-war training as lacking in the assumption that fear was normal the rear areas of France before entry reality and in toughness. 'The soldier in soldiers, and that therefore battle to the front line; in the Second World who knows what's coming is not sur- schools should be set up as a means to War, with the British army ejected prised. He knows what to do and how help them overcome it. Exercises from Europe, the landing itself would to do it.' What Hill meant was not were carried out at a faster tempo; be under fire.w' 'highly complicated individual or they were sustained through the night The training given by battle schools small unit tactics' but 'spritual train- as wel! as by day; and they were not has been criticised by one infantry ing', lts essence was pride in over- called off or cancelled as the weather officer who served in Normandy, coming hardship, but incorporated deteriorated. Both danger and disor- Sidney Jary, as inadequate, unimagi- within battle training from the outset ganisation were injected into the con- native and dogmatic.'1' But what Jary there had to be 'something to give duct of exercises. Training itself was does not ask himself is how his pla- American fighters the desire to kill broken into a series of separate toon would have fared without such their enemies'.64 actions which could be learned by training. The two army commanders rote. The Chief of the Imperial who most inspired confidence in their In general the evolution in U.S. army General Staff, Sir John Dill, feared men, Montgomery and Slim, were training in the Second World War that tactics could become sterotyped. both persuaded of the value of train- suggests Hill's ideas were followed. But once again the priority was on the ing, of the need to continue it during a The Americans too started from the ability to cope with danger and disor- campaign, and of the link between it presumption that fear was always pre- ganisation rather than tactical flexi- and morale. Montgomery's prepara- sent and that training was its best anti- bility. tions for El Alamein bore testimony dote. to that conviction.62 In July 1941 Lionel Wigram estab- All aspects of the Army training lished a battle school for 47 Division Slim, when hè took over the shattered progam which develop effective which in January 1942 became a 14th Army in Burma, established two combat skills serve to reduce the disruptive effects offar reactions in ™ Bidwell, Modern Warfare, p. 130. combat, in so far as they provide " Ahrenfeldt, Psychiatry, pp 204-5. p. 159. soldiers with a set of habituül "'Ibid, pp 198-9, 202; Tim Harrison Place, "! Stephen Brooks (ed), Montgomery and the responses which are adaptive tn Military training in the British army, 1940-44 EighthArmy (London, 1991), pp 8^ 41-3. danger situations.a (London, 2000), pp 40-62; Tim Harrison "' Slim, Defeat into victory, p. 191. M Place. 'Lionel Wigram, battle drill and the Penguin Special, How the Jap army fights to British army in the Second World War', War (Harmondsworth, 1943), pp 92-4, 114-18. Men were taught automatically in History, VII, 2000, 442-62; French, M Stouffer, American soldier, II, p. 220. adopt certain drills which were Raising Churchill's Army, p. 136; Jeremy '" Ibid, II, p. 230; Robert A. Palmer, Bell I. designed to create self-confidence Crang, The British Army and the People's Wiley and William R. Keast, The United and to give them a plan of action to War 1939-1945 (Manchester, 2000), pp 79- States Army in World War II: Army Ground 84. I am most grateful for Dr Crang's advice Farces: the procurement and training of be carried out when in battle. By on this topic. ground combat troopa (Washington, 1948), p. February 1943 battle training " Jary quoted in McManners, Sears of War, 387. involved courses in infïltration, close

550 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR JRG170 10-2001 combat and village fighting. A year Vietnam terms it will probably be inferior to its later, 81 per cent of combat infantry General William Westmoreland opponents, and therefore it must have reported on the importance of realistic returned from Vietnam in 1968 to a qualitative advantage. The tendency battle training before going over- become the army's chief of staff. In is to see that advantage in terms of seas.66 that office hè targeted training as the equipment, a trend confirmed by 'the principal solution to the army's psy- revolution in military affairs'. Criticism chological recovery. In 1971 hè But the American army's training pro- appointed a board for dynamic train- But international arms sales can often gramme was still subject to criticism. ing, and a combat aims training board leave opponents equipped in terms Many complained that there was far was set up at Fort Benning. In 1978 a that are more similar than dissimilar: too much close-order drill. The army study on army training looked at 45 in this sense both the Falkland and the it seemed was determined to off-set brigade-sized units: its conclusions Gulf wars were symmetrical rather what it saw as the cult of individual- were sufficiently depressing, and still than asymmetrical conflicts. In 1982 ism in civilian society by the intimi- sufficiently close to those difficulties the British defeated the Argentinians dation of its recruits and their subor- identified in 1971, to ensure that they despite the distance involved, inferior dination to strict discipline. Drill did, were never released.7" numbers and comparable equipment: however, bond a unit."7 The absurdity it is hard to resist the conclusion that was that men were trained in one for- The peacetime tendency to econo- training was the key to their qualita- mation, but that that unit was then mise through cuts in training not tive edge. Moreover, as one study of broken up as its members were fed equipment was one factor. But the morale - based largely on that war - into front-line divisions as replace- principal continuity - not only with concluded: ments.68 The principle that men the war in Vietnam but also with the should be led in training by those who Second World War - was that training Soldiers are likely to find them- Would lead them in combat was bro- did not promote group cohesion. In selvex translated abruptly from the ken. And, finally, when they got into Vietnam individuals were 'trickle- routine of peacetime into the reali- action it seemed - at least on S.L.A. posted' into action, and withdrawn ties of combat. Unless they have Marshall's evidence - that Hill's sum- when their tour was up: thus the per- trained realistically, preparing mons had not been heard, for most sonnel in any one unit continuously themselves mentally as well as did not actively participate in battle. changed, and each member of the unit physically for the fight, they will had a different day when his fighting suffer severe psvchological prob- Marshall's contribution to the U.S. could be over, irrespective of whether lems.1' Army after 1945 was designed to the war carried on or not. train men to control their fear and so enable then to return fire. He was suc- This practice recognised that the indi- Peacetime training cessful. In Korea the firing ratio was vidual's stock of courage was limited 55 per cent and in Vietnam up to 95 and that the battle-hardened veteran Effective peacetime training is an Per cent.69 There was therefore a did not gain in competence through enormous challenge. William Hauser c'ear trajectory from the publication length of service. But it violated the wrote in 1980 that 'training is habitu- of Men against fire to the perfor- principle that those who fought best ation': mance of the U.S. Army in Vietnam. together were those who trained But the morale of that army col- together. Peacetime exercises, with 'unless the soldier has been 'apsed. This was not because their opportunities for individual self- drilled in his tasks to - nay, Marshall was wrong but because in promotion, and with many of their beyond - the po int of boredom, Pursuing fire effect the U.S. Army participating units not fully up to hè cannot be expected to keep had neglected other aspects of train- strength, showed related traits. Thus, fighting ( in whatever form his ing. for the Vietnam generation, the mes- particular speciality demands) sage of Marshall's Men against fire under stress of shot and shell, was not about fire effect but about confusion, uncertainty, and smal l group cohesion. the infectious fear of his 7 Stouffer. American soldier, II, p. 76; Gerald 72 P. Linderman. The world within war: comrades'. America 's combat experience in World War II The two qualities do not of course ^ (Cambridge Mass., 1997). p. 186. stand in antithesis; indeed they should But the repetition and rote inherent in * Stouffer, American soldier, II, p. 217. be complementary. Moreover, they battle drills sit uneasily with the Grossman, On killing, pp xiv-xv, 35. have in training a common denomina- recruiting and retention needs of vol- " Sarkesian, Combat effectiveness. pp 76-83. 176-81. tor. The U.S. Army today starts from untarily-enlisted professional armies. 1 McManners. Sears of war, p. 74. the same assumption as the German So too do the draconian punishments ! Sarkesian, Combat effectiveness, p. 189. in the two world wars: in manpower employed by the German army in the

JRG170 10-2001 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR 551 Second World War in training as well dier's skills endorses his actions. But they cannot simulate fear, as in action. The advent of the simulator and the exhaustion, cold and heat. Ultimately The U.S. Army in Vietnam attributed applicability of information technolo- no man knows whether hè can cope much of its malaise to the lack of an gy to the battlefield may dampen this with the noise and smell of battle until effective system of field punishment. division. Both have the advantage too hè has confronted it in reality. A pro- Men need to be hardened in peace if of generating motivation and job fessional soldier may pass his whole they are to be tough enough for war. satisfaction. They conform also with career without ever confronting it- But the very processes designed to at least one aspect of Marshall's But that does not relieve him from the achieve that cut across the integration teachings - they create the belief that need to préparé for it, nor erode the of armed forces with civilian society. desirable outcomes will follow effec- centrality of training for all hè does. Training soldiers to kill, and getting tive performance." As the United States army thinks them to realise that it is certainly about the future battlefield, it could proper and legitimate to do so, creates 7 do worse than reconsider the writings a division more complete in peace ' Paul R. Bleda and Robert H. Suizen, 'The effects of simulated infantry combat training of S.L.A. Marshall. than is likely to be the case in war - on motivation and satisfaction', Armed when the perceived need for the sol- Forces and Society, VI, 1980, pp 202-14.

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