Challenges in Armoured Warfare

For History 394 - Dr. S. Cafferky

By Steve Weatherbe

December 2005

The failure of the Allies, after their successful landing in Normandy in June,

1944, to execute a breakout as planned despite heavy superiority in men, materiel, and air support, generated “a choking pall bordering on panic” over the Allied leadership, states American historian William B. Breuer. Moreover, it almost split the Grand

Alliance of the U.S. and Great Britain “wide open”—at least at the command level of the

Allied Expeditionary Force. 1

When breakout finally occurred on the American front and the opportunity emerged for the Allies to encircle the German forces opposing them at Falaise, the fissures in their leadership were matched by quite literal gaps in the Allied line. Three

Canadian divisions played a crucial part in the Allies’ efforts both to break out in June and now to encircle in August. While 200,000 Germans surrendered by the end of

August and the same number were slain,2 anywhere from 20,000 to 50,000 escaped. 3

Because of its tardiness in closing the gap from the north, the Canadian Army has received its share of this negative attention. The Canadian Army’s official historian,

Colonel C.P. Stacey, opened the debate for Canadian historians with his Victory

Campaign , acknowledging the Canadian Army had “failed to make the most of their opportunities” and especially, “the capture of Falaise was long delayed.” He blamed

1 William B. Breuer, Death of a Nazi Army: The Falaise Pocket (Chelsea, Miss.: Scarborough House, 1990),11. 2 Carlo D’Este, Decision in Normandy: The Unwritten Story of Montgomery and the Allied Campaign (London: Collins, 1983), 517-8. D’Este puts the total captured during the Normandy phase ending August 25 at 135,000. German equipment losses included 1,300 tanks, 20,000 vehicles and 2,000 assault and field guns. Five panzer(armoured) divisions were destroyed along with 20 of infantry while six panzer divisions were “severely mauled” along with 12 infantry divisions. Much lower fatality figures for the Germans appear elsewhere. Richard Holmes, for example, says “at least 50,000” Germans died in Normandy in The D-Day Experience: From the Invasion to the Liberation of Paris , (n.p.: Imperial War Museum,n.d) ,59. 3Breuer, 294. Breuer credits German General Heinz Eberhard for the smaller number and British Field Marshal Alan Brooke for the larger.

2 officers at the regimental level “whose attitude towards training was casual and haphazard.” The Canadians “had probably not got enough out of our long training as we might have.” 4

After Stacey, the first Canadian war history to focus critically the question of performance was John English’s tellingly subtitled The Canadian Army and the

Normandy Campaign : A Study of Failure in High Command . English accepted Stacey’s complaint about training but argued that Canadian high command should take responsibility. The same group he argued was to blame for strategic and tactical failures in Normandy, indicting most of the army’s general officers except Second Canadian

Corps commander Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds. As English puts it in his conclusion, “Simonds stood alone.” 5

The latest word in the discussion is that of Terry Copp, who in his revisionist

Fields of Fire , challenged the very premises behind the debate that Allied forces were markedly inferior to their German opponents in quality and that Canadian forces, especially so. He argued that “the achievement of the Allied and especially the

Canadian armies in Normandy has been greatly underrated…The destruction of two

German armies in just 76 days was one of the most remarkable military victories of the

Second World War.” 6

4 C.P. Stacey, The Victory Campaign: North West Europe, 1944-1945 (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1962). The quotes are all from Chapter 11, 271-7,and all cited in Terry Copp. Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy (Toronto, Buffalo and London: University of Toronto, 2003), 5. 5 John A. English, The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign: A Study of Failure in High Command ( New York, Westport, Connecticut, London: Praeger, 1991), 313. 6 Terry Copp, Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy (Toronto, Buffalo and London: University of Toronto, 2003), 13. His view is remarkably close to the popular account of the Normandy campaign held by Canadian veterans of it. See, for example, Ben Dunkelman, Dual Allegiance (Toronto: Macmillan, 1976), 86-87. In this autobiographical, and somewhat hagiographical, account, Canadians held down the bulk of the best German armoured units, thus freeing the Americans to make their storied breakout under Patton.

Can the memories of the Canadians who fought in Second World War inform both the ongoing debates on Normandy and also those on the value of oral history? In addressing these questions this paper will rely on interviews conducted in the fall of

2005 by this writer with three Canadian tank commanders, two of whom served in North

West Europe beginning in June, 1944 and the third who served throughout the Sicilian and Italian campaigns, before shifting to the North West European theatre.

Oral history, historian A.J.P. Taylor has warned, can degenerate to “old men drooling over their youth” who “forget truth and manufacture myth.”7 Even oral historians such as Paul Thompson contend that their branch of history is “most useful in explaining the social structure and pattern of everyday life, least helpful in understanding a crisis.” 8 But military historian Nigel de Lee has responded that armies in battle are “mutually destructive and often careless of their records,” while many important orders are not recorded at all. Therefore, he argues, oral accounts are essential to developing a “comprehensive idea” of military operations, and sometimes are the only source explaining certain decisions or events. 9

Given that crisis is the essence of warfare, what might we hope to glean from our three tank commanders about what amounts to an extended crisis? The interview questions themselves targeted what military historians have identified as ongoing issues rather than specific events. These were leadership, training, manpower and German superiority in weaponry and performance. Were squadrons and regiments well led? Did the interview subjects find their training useful for the battles of North West Europe and

7 Quoted in English, 2. 8 Paul Thompson, The Voice of the Past: Oral History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 134. 9 Nigel de Lee, “Oral History and British Soldiers’ Experience,” in Time to Kill: The Soldiers’ Experience of War in the West , ed. Paul Addison and Angus Calder (London, Sydney and Auckland: Random House, 1997), 359-368.

Italy ? And finally, what were they able learn about dealing with better-trained, better- equipped German forces as they went along?

The leadership question especially raises ethical and legal questions for the interviewer and interviewees because all of the latter are drawn from a cohesive social group, veterans of the Second World War Canadian army, and officers, resident in or near Victoria, British Columbia in 2005. Frank comments about named superior officers might have legal implications such as those described by Valerie Yow. 10 Apart from defamation suits, there is the risk, as Maurice Punch put it, of “spoiling the field.” 11 If my subjects were critical of their leaders of other current or deceased members of the veterans’ group or their friends, not only might doors be subsequently closed to university oral history research, but bad blood could be caused amongst its members.

This writer followed Punch’s injunction to “just do it,” but in the course of interviews did not record the names of those criticised, nor pursue them. 12

The answers in the event did not always match the questions, or fit neatly into the pre-ordained categories. Notably omitted as a topic was the manpower crisis that saw, according to Copp, Canada’s three divisions in Normandy reduced in terms of their rifle companies by one third their strength by the end of the campaign. 13 The interview subjects, however, made up for this omission by responding to questions about training with comments on the manpower shortage. Questions on training also elicited predictable yet heartfelt comments on the oft-chronicled lack of preparedness and

11 Maurice Punch, “Politics and Ethics in Qualitative Research,” in Handbook of Qualitative Research, ed. Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln. (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1994),83-97, 93 . 12 Ibid., 83. 13 Terry Copp, “Battle Exhaustion and the Canadian Soldier in Normandy,” in Canadian Military History: Selected Readings, ed. Marc Milner (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1993) 240.

5 poverty of training in the Canadian Army at the outset of the Second World War. Major

General A.J. Tedlie recounted how as a newly-commissioned officer with the Royal

Montreal Regiment in 1939 he scoured Montreal pawn shops for such essential personal gear as a compass, binoculars, and a sidearm, “It was a disgrace to our country,” he said. “Had I gone on to do a Ph D [he earned a post-war MA in History], its thesis would have been ‘Canada: Always Willing, Never Ready.’” 14 Robert Rogers told of the

First Hussars’ initially preparations to go overseas with the First Canadian Division as cavalry.15

Patrick Sheppard, who joined a year later, in 1940, was sent to a centralized officer training camp in Brockville and thence to Camp Borden for armoured warfare training. 16 Both he and Rogers had low opinions of their first tank, the Canadian- designed Ram, and of their second, the more robust, but still under-gunned,Churchill, with which they were equipped in England. Before Rogers’ regiment got Churchills, they spent a year moving about southern England apparently as part of a misdirection effort to persuade German intelligence there were more troops ready for an invasion than there were. “We had rifles, some Stens and Brens [sub- and light machine guns] : we had nothing.” 17

Both Sheppard and Rogers were satisfied with their training, which taught them to fight tanks in the infantry support role, though Sheppard termed it “training for a training war, not a real war.” 18 On the other hand, Tedlie’s regiment, after training for two other roles, was converted a few months before D-Day to tanks, issued the

14 Interview with Major General A.J. Tedlie , Nov.9, 2005: hereafter, Tedlie, interview. 15 Interview with Robert Rogers, Nov. 14, 2005. 16 Interview with Patrick Sheppard, Nov.21, 2005. 17 Rogers. 18 Sheppard.

American Sherman, and given seven weeks training in the bare fundamentals of movement and shooting, but no tactics. His regiment, moreover, was disbanded so that its tanks and troops could be fed piecemeal to the British Columbia Regiment (BCR) to replace casualties. Tedlie therefore expressed a jaundiced view of training, let alone planning. “Here is one of the great problems, I found: [ I was] a quite well-trained machine gun officer and a very well-trained reconnaissance officer but I’d never been in a tank in all my life.” 19 As for the conversion, Tedlie attributed it to a last-minute realization that tank casualties expected in Normandy would require more replacements than were available.

In other words, the training problem had transformed into the manpower problem. Once ashore in France, Tedlie very quickly found himself to be one of the best-trained officers in his regiment, because two of the BCR’s three squadrons were wiped out on August 9. This stunning defeat resulted from a map-reading error by the regiment’s commander that took the unit, during a night advance, into the heart of a

German armoured concentration.

The next morning we were all in the BCR proper. The funny thing is, the tragic thing is, here I am with seven weeks training in tanks, and not in tank warfare, and here I am commanding a squadron. 20

At least he had some training: Tedlie recalled how very soon thereafter the regiment received reinforcements with none. He recalled a briefing with one new arrival that began with the newcomer asking, “Is that a Sherman

19 Tedlie, interview. 20 Tedlie, interview.

7 tank. Is that what I’m going to be in? I’ve never seen one before.” Tedlie commented: “It hit me right in the stomach.” 21

Rogers had a similar story—and reaction. His encounter came, astonishingly, just two days after D-Day. A replacement for a wounded radio operator told him he had been with a tank training unit for several years—but in charge of the officers’ mess: “I wouldn’t know what to do in a tank. Give me rifle or a Sten gun. I’ll be with the infantry.” Rogers replied: “I’m sorry. You’re all I’ve got.” He recalls now: “I was shattered. In fact I almost got cashiered because I wrote a poem to tell this story. I raised hell at brigade headquarters and I’m a lowly captain.” However, Sheppard, in

Sicily and Italy, had no such memories. The replacements were “green” –without combat experience—but trained.

All three men said they were aware in theory that German tanks were superior to theirs, but were not necessarily prepared for the reality. Rogers’ First Hussars, for example, teamed up with infantry from the Queen’s Own Regiment for their first encounter with German firepower on June 11, when they lost 80 troopers (and 105 infantrymen from the QORs) in a hastily conceived attack on a Panzer division at Le

Mesnil-Patry. “It was like shooting fish in a barrel for them…Between these villages

Jerry was dug in. Well, they just wiped out a squadron and a half…Intelligence told us who were there but they didn’t tell us the firepower and how well-entrenched and dug in.” 22

Rogers’ account shows how oral history can serve to correct or at least question the “received” version. It is, after all, as Nigel de Lee has stated, “often the only source

21 Tedlie, interview. 22 Rogers.

8 available for what happened in a fight.” 23 In this case, high command believed that the

12 SS Panzer Division was massing for an assault aimed at the invasion beaches and was therefore exposed and vulnerable. The two Canadian regiments, which had never worked together before, were suddenly “married up” and rushed into the attack over the protests of their commanding officers. And officially, the one-sided action was a success that “put a panzer division on the skids,” according to Guy Simonds. 24

However, if the 12 SS were indeed dug in, as Rogers relates, then it could not have been preparing to attack, making the whole operation a very costly and unnecessary mistake.

Even so, neither the near decimation of Rogers’ regiment on June 11 or Tedlie’s two months later left them, or, so they report, their comrades especially deterred by the evident superiority of German arms. This contrasts markedly with the attitude displayed by British tank crews and described by Max Hastings. He quotes an anonymous British tank officer describing “a sort of creeping paralysis in the armoured units because of the pervading fear of 88s, Panthers, Tigers and Panzerfausts, initiative was lost and squadron commanders tended to got to ground at the first sign of any serious opposition.” 25 (Panthers and Tigers were German tanks far heavier than the Shermans, while the Panzerfaust was the German infantryman’s highly effective, hand-held anti- tank weapon.

23 De Lee, 365. 24 Quoted in Ben Dunkelman, Dual Allegiance (Toronto: Macmillan, 1976), 79. Dunkelman, commander of the QOR’s mortar platoon, complained that the First Hussars raced into attack without bothering to co- ordinate a mortar firing program with him or even stopping to ask the Regina Rifles, who were holding down the line at that point, where the Germans might be. If Dunkelman is to be believed, the battle would have gone very differently had his mortars played more of a role. 25 Max Hastings, Overlord:D-Day and the Battle for Normandy 1944 (London, Sydney and Auckland: Pan, 1985),228-9. Chapter six, “The German Army: stemming the tide,”201-232, describes the impact of German superiority on British morale.

Both Tedlie and Rogers stated that all tank crews soon knew of the advantages of German tanks. “We were very proud of our tanks,” recalled the latter. “We were told it was state of the art equipment…It was the best we had. We learned it was no match for the Panther even, let alone the Tiger. You got hit by an 88, that was it. It would go right through. Whereas our people, the 17-pounder, would bounce off the sides of some of the 88s.” (an “88” was a German anti-aircraft and anti-tank gun with which Tigers were also equipped). Nonetheless, according to Rogers, “We were young and innocent.

Nothing could happen to us.” 26 For his part Tedlie claimed that “By the end of the war in Normandy I think we had much more confidence in our tanks than we had when we started off. Because we had been able to find techniques [such as] putting extra clumps of tracks on the sponsons [or sides] which were so vulnerable to German attack.” 27

Perhaps the passage of time has softened memory. English’s analysis of

Canadian performance in Normandy certainly concluded that Canadian armoured forces’ suffered from the same lethargy Hastings reported in their British counterparts.

“It seems incredible, in short, that the tank arm with significantly lower casualty rate often remained behind while forlorn hopes of infantry, torn by enemy and friendly fire alike, plodded ever onward.” 28

The Canadians learned other techniques in Normandy, both interview subjects reported. “Speculative shooting,” was, according to Tedlie, “a terrible waste of ammunition but rather sensible in a way.” It involved a tank unit advancing with guns blazing away at any natural or manufactured feature that might conceal German troops, tanks or guns. Tedlie mentioned that the tank units of the Polish Armoured Division

26 Rogers. 27 Tedlie, interview. 28 English, 313.

(which was part of the 2 nd Canadian Corps) would send a single tank far ahead of the rest at top speed to force the German anti-tank gunners to give away their position. This tank was called a “guinea pig.”

But the most successful weapon the Canadians possessed to knock out German tanks and anti-tank guns was the Typhoon, the rocket-armed fighter bomber flown by the Canadian and Royal Air Forces in close support of the Allied armies in Normandy.

“If you look at the stats…the number of German tanks shot up by ground versus RAF

Typhoons is the difference between chalk and cheese,” said Tedlie. 29 It was Rogers’ job, as regimental adjutant, to summon Typhoons via his brigade headquarters to a specific map reference. The First Hussars’ tanks would then fire tracer (i.e.illuminated) rounds onto the target to pinpoint it for the aircraft. 30 However, British and Canadian tactical doctrine relied essentially on artillery to displace dug-in German guns and tanks. This meant tank formations could never advance, Blitzkrieg-style, beyond the range of their own guns.

Their vulnerability, moreover, to dug-in German led Anglo-Canadian tank units to abandon their initial tactic of leading assaults. Instead, they carried the infantry as close to the objective as they could while remaining behind cover. From there they would then “shoot the infantry onto the objective,” in Tedlie’s words, meaning they would shell the objective by line-of-sight until the infantry occupied it. Thus tanks were relegated to the role of self-propelled artillery, while the self-propelled artillery, because of its wholly inadequate armour, was moved rearward to an indirect-fire role.

29 Tedlie, interview. 30 Rogers.

Tedlie was not happy with this use of armour in small-scale infantry support operations. He quoted an armoured corps adage: “If you use them one at a time, you lose them one at a time.” When asked to assess Operation Totalize, an ambitious

Canadian effort to close the ring around German forces in early August led by a tightly massed brigade of tanks, Tedlie replied circumspectly, “I do not like to say that

Canadian high command knew very little about how to operate an armoured battle.”

When this interviewer prompted him with, “But you do seem to be saying that,” he replied, “Yes.”

Pressed on the point, Tedlie said that Canadian tank doctrine perforce followed that of the British army, which put tanks largely in the infantry support role. “We were fighting in the British Army which was very pedestrian compared to the ones that were fighting on our right flank[the Americans]. And I think without being disloyal that the

Americans were just better armoured soldiers.” 31

Certainly for Tedlie, and to a lesser degree for the other two interview subjects, such questions of experience and tactics learned in action led inevitably to questions of leadership. While junior officers did not know the larger issues of the moment, they all had superiors upon whose competence to a large degree their lives depended. The common thread in all three accounts is the serious problems with the quality of leadership at the beginning of combat operations.

Tedlie, for example, when asked about the tank disadvantage, answered with an anecdote (“because I am in my anecdotage”) about how, when many of the tanks in his regiment were refitted in the midst of the Normandy campaign with 17-pounder guns

31 Tedlie, interview.

12 capable of penetrating Tiger and Panther armour, British general Brian Horrocks paid a visit. “I mean this man is a lieutenant general in the tank park with my squadron saying, ‘I realize you’ve been knocked out of action many, many times because of the tanks but now you have a gun that can penetrate German armour.’The morale of the troops just went up like that.” Significantly, said Tedlie, no Canadian generals put in an appearance.

Asked about leadership, Rogers said, “ I hesitate to speak. The CO that took us over…he wasn’t competent and had no military training at all. He was replaced in

England.” A later commander was an alcoholic. “More than once the intelligence officer and I had to literally carry him and put him to bed on the back of his tank, out stoned. I can’t say it ever affected our performance but it certainly gave us a lot to worry about.” 32 Rogers’ colonel was sacked the same day his brigade commander was removed for the same problem, after weeks of fighting in Normandy.

Rogers and Tedlie, who both commanded squadrons, both reported that the best leadership was displayed by graduates of Canada’s Royal Military College and combat- experienced officers transferred from Italy. Gradually the pre-war militia colonels and regular force majors promoted to generalship were replaced with the cream of the battle-trained newcomers and RMC graduates. Tedlie recalled with satisfaction the day

Robert Moncel took over the Fourth Armoured Brigade. “Bob knew exactly how he wanted something done and would tell us how to do it. Prior to him taking over, I hadn’t known what the hell [we were supposed to do].” 33

32 Rogers. 33 Tedlie, interview.

Tedlie also commented on the near destruction of the British Columbia

Regiment. The cause, he said, was “basically, poor map reading, reporting where you were when you weren’t. And calling for artillery support for the completely wrong place.” 34 Interestingly, in a 1979 interview Tedlie would not respond to questions about the BCR debacle. 35 As well, the regiment’s own history published in 1974, The Dukes , ignores the navigational error that led to the event. 36 N.A. Buckingham’s official history of the Fourth Canadian Armoured Brigade also glosses over the cause with

“disastrously the British Columbians outran the supporting forces and were cut off.” 37 These omissions speak to the debate over the reliability of oral history versus other forms. Paul Thompson addresses the question in The Voice of the Past by systematically exposing as groundless the relatively greater credence historians put in such other sources as autobiographies and newspapers. “Nevertheless,” he states, “just because it is printed rather than recorded on tape, many historians would feel happier citing a published authobiography than an interview.” 38 Thompson has nothing to say about regimental histories, but Tedlie himself rated “eye-witness accounts and regimental histories” as equally unreliable. 39 Tedlie’s comments, both on tape and off, often fell into that category of memory which Paul Tosh describes as “filtered through

34 Tedlie, interview. 35 University of Victoria Special Collections. Canadian Military Oral History Collections. Dr. Reginald H. Roy Collection, ID 200. Tedlie, Major General A.J. Reel 1. Side.2: hereafter, UVSC, Tedlie. 36 Douglas E. Harker, The Dukes ( Canada: The British Columbia Regiment, 1974), 238. 37 N.A. Buckingham, Europe: July, 1944-May , 1945: A Brief History of the 4 th Armoured Brigade, (Mitcham: West Brothers,n.d.), 14 38 Paul Thompson, The Voice of the Past: Oral History ( Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988 edition), 104. 39 A.J, Tedlie, “Operation Totalize” ( unpublished undergraduate essay, University of Victoria, n.d.) ,15: hereafter, Tedlie, Totalize.

14 subsequent experience,” and therefore possibly “contaminated.” 40 However, this interviewer/writer tried to distinguish between questions of memory and reflection.

Sheppard, who remained a lieutenant throughout the war, commanding a single troop of four tanks, had a different perspective on leadership. He reported being kept forever in the dark about the nature of operations. “Lack of communications. That’s one thing that was never resolved. There was a lack of communications between us and our command structure.” As a result, tank commanders were often not told where the infantry was, and Sheppard, at least, often worried about shelling his own troops.

Sheppard also expressed views on leadership that were much more personal. His general’s animus towards his colonel, he believed, resulted in his regiment ending up in action more often than others in Sicily. Sheppard also stated that the other ranks were so resentful of their officers they sometimes took advantage of combat to murder them.

“It still amazes me what happened to them. They wouldn’t say anything in the regimental history. It wasn’t battle fatigue. And they weren’t accidents.” He also saw the most close action of the three subjects, being twice blown out of his tank (and once from a truck), and fought through the battle of Ortona, Of it he said:

It was a long, stupid battle. You didn’t eat. You didn’t go to the bathroom. You were in a state of adrenaline, 90 per cent adrenaline. You were tightened up and you didn’t realize it at the time. You senses were keyed to the outmost. Because you had to be aware of everything. You didn’t know what was happening. You couldn’t sit back and plan. You had to be aware of things at the moment.” 41

40 John Tosh, The Pursuit of History: Aims, Methods and New Direction in the Study of Modern History (London: Longman, 1992),213. 41 Sheppard.

Sheppard’s memories especially provide the kind of unique perspective on events that Alessandro Portelli has said can rarely come from other historical techniques, that tell “a history of the nonhegemonic classes.”42 As the most junior of the three officers, it is no accident that his memories are the most personal and the least positive about the experience. He was also the only one of three who had not been interviewed before and his manner suggested that with some revelations he was getting

“something off his chest.” Maurice Punch writes of the “emotional catharsis” which can result from the interview process and this may have been the case here. 43

In summary, this exercise in oral history has suggested the outstanding issue for

Canadian armoured troops in Europe was not the relative superiority of German weapons that so disturbed the British. With their advantage in weight of arms and overwhelming air support, tank commanders could overcome these disadvantages.

What was harder to overcome was bad leadership and a lack of personnel. It also reveals how Canadian officers made and make sense in retrospect of combat. The evidence is that they coped well, learning how to fight the world’s best army. “I was very proud of the Fourth Armoured Division at the end of the war,” said Tedlie. “I wasn’t in the early stages.” 44 And as Nigel de Lee has pointed out and these interviews show, oral history is the best way to convey the experience of combat and likely the only way to uncover such shameful acts as dereliction of duty and “disloyalty, defiance and murderous acts upon superiors.” 45

42 Alessandro Portelli, “What Makes Oral History Different?” reprinted as “The Peculiarities of Oral History,” in History Workshop 12(1981), 72. 43 Punch, 85. 44 Tedlie, interview. 45 De Lee, 368.

Bibliography

Archival Sources

University of Victoria Special Collections. Canadian Military Oral History Collections.

Dr. Reginald H. Roy Collection, ID 200. Tedlie, Major General A.J.

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Buckingham, N.A. Europe: July, 1944-May, 1945: A Brief History of the 4 th Armoured Brigade. Mitcham: West Brothers, n.d.

Copp, Terry. Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy .Toronto, Buffalo and London: University of Toronto, 2003.

------. “Battle Exhaustion and the Canadian Soldier in Normandy,” in Canadian Military History: Selected Readings ed. by Marc Milner.Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1993, 238-249. de Lee, Nigel. “Oral History and British Soldiers’ Experience,” in Time to Kill: The Soldiers’ Experience of War in the West , ed. By Paul Addison and Angus Calder. London, Sydney and Auckland: Random House, 1997.

D’Este, Carlo. Decision in Normandy: The Unwritten Story of Montgomery and the Allied Campaign. London: Collins, 1983.

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Interviews and Unpublished Sources

Rogers,Robert. Inrerview by the author., Nov. 14, 2005.

Sheppard, Patrick. Interview with Patrick Sheppard, Nov.21, 2005.

Tedlie, Major General A.J. Interview by the author, Nov.9, 2005.

. Tedlie, A.J, “Operation Totalize.” Unpublished undergraduate essay, University of Victoria, n.d.