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The Naval Warfare Domain The Naval Warfare Domain Thomas Callender he maritime domain, in and through which 45,000 years.1 Initially, these vessels were used Toperations on and under the oceans and for coastal fishing, but as they became larger seas are conducted, presents unique challeng- and more sophisticated, people used them to es as well as advantages to maritime nations trade with other coastal civilizations. Once and military forces. The domain is generally man learned to navigate beyond sight of land subdivided into two primary categories: lit- and to harness the wind, exploration and trade toral (coastal) and open ocean (“blue-water”). routes developed across the Mediterranean The littorals are defined by relatively shallow Sea, the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean, and waters and close proximity to the coasts and the Pacific Ocean. Maritime exploration also include the territorial waters of coastal nations. led to human migration between continents Open-ocean operations, as the name suggests, and island archipelagos. are marked by waters beyond the maritime The development of larger vessels made boundaries of nations, with their extreme it possible to transport greater quantities of depths and vast spaces. commodities both faster and more cheaply While the maritime domain demands some than was possible over land routes. These common capabilities and operational concepts maritime trade routes eliminated the need to for all naval forces, littoral and blue-water en- transit through the sovereign territory of other vironments require very different forces and nations and pay often exorbitant tolls. How- warfighting strategies. The maritime domain ever, the movement of large amounts of pre- drives some common characteristics for na- cious commodities by sea soon led to the rise val vessels: relatively large size and payloads of piracy. Just as land armies arose to defend compared to land and air platforms, slow speed, national borders and trade routes, armed naval limited organic sensor range, long-range com- vessels soon arose to help protect these mari- munications requirements, and naval logistics. time trade routes. From the Ancient Egyptians In addition, the maritime domain shapes na- to the Greeks and on to the rise of the British val concepts of operations with tactics such Empire, dominant maritime trade and naval as layered defense, forward presence, and power were critical to the rise and expansion sea control. of these empires. The oceans and seas still play a vital role in Importance of the Maritime Domain the prosperity and protection of most of the Since prehistoric times, the world’s oceans world’s population. Of the world’s 195 nations, and seas have played a critical part in the devel- 147 border an ocean or sea, and 40 percent of opment of mankind and many of man’s domi- the world’s population lives within 100 kilome- nant civilizations. Evidence suggests that the ters (62 miles) of an oceanic coast.2 In addition, earliest man-made boats date back as far as maritime trade through international shipping The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military 45 lanes comprises over 90 percent of global com- shortest distance between two points on the merce.3 In a modern world that appears to be curved surface of the Earth) between Norfolk, dominated by wireless communications and Virginia, and the Strait of Gibraltar at the satellite broadcasts, 99 percent of all inter- entrance to the Mediterranean Sea is 3,326 national data (phone, texts, and Internet) is nautical miles. For a ship traveling at an aver- transported over approximately 200 undersea age speed of 12 knots—a common economi- fiber optic cables at speeds eight times faster cal speed for commercial shipping—it would than satellites.4 While typically very robust, take 11.5 days to make this transit, while a these submarine cables are susceptible to land- modern jet passenger aircraft traveling at 500 slides and other seismic events. knots would take approximately six hours and 40 minutes. Challenges and Advantages This time and distance effect requires pre- of the Maritime Environment planning or prepositioning of naval forces if a For those whose experience with the oceans nation desires a timely transoceanic response is limited to the coasts, the vastness of the to maritime crises. For the United States, this world’s oceans is difficult to convey. The five has meant development of a forward-deployed recognized oceans (Atlantic, Pacific, Arctic, blue-water Navy. Maintaining a credible deter- Indian, and Southern) cover 71 percent of rent force constantly deployed near potential the Earth’s surface with an average depth of naval adversaries enables the U.S. to respond 13,000 feet.5 The Atlantic Ocean covers “ap- rapidly to maritime security crises before they proximately 41,105,000 square miles,” and approach America’s shores. This could not be the Pacific Ocean covers “more than 60 mil- accomplished with naval forces that remain lion square miles,” or approximately 20 per- predominantly in their home ports or near cent and 46 percent, respectively, of the Earth’s territorial waters. surface.6 For comparison, the Pacific Ocean is The expanse of the oceans and the lack of larger than all of the Earth’s land masses com- landmarks once a sailor gets beyond sight of bined;7 the continental United States covers land present unique navigational challenges only 3,120,426 square miles (1.58 percent) of when traversing thousands of miles of ever- the Earth’s surface.8 changing ocean surface. The fact that the The vastness of the world’s oceans presents ocean’s surface varies from one second to the both advantages and challenges. The immense next and does not offer any geographical ref- oceanic distances and limited speed of ships erence points has led to the development of (10–15 knots on average for transoceanic trav- rather sophisticated navigation techniques el) create natural barriers of time and space. and technologies. Satellite navigation systems For example, these barriers prevented trans- such as the Global Positioning System (GPS) oceanic exploration and colonization for cen- provide a highly accurate real-time ship’s posi- turies until shipbuilding technology and sea- tion for both military and commercial vessels. faring techniques became advanced enough GPS and related technologies have afforded to withstand storms, navigate safely, and carry military naval vessels the required positioning, sufficient supplies to survive weeks or months navigation, and timing (PNT) accuracy that en- of travel. While land forces can resupply along ables use of precision-guided munitions and their route with local fresh water and food, coordinated military operations. transoceanic vessels must be self-sufficient for With the advent and subsequent prolifera- extended periods, carrying or making adequate tion of GPS-denial or degradation technolo- fresh water, food, and fuel. gies, it has become essential for modern mili- The limited speed of naval vessels limits tary vessels to have backup navigation systems their rapid responsiveness or reposition- that are resilient and reliable even in the face ing. For example, the great circle route (the of enemy actions. Celestial navigation—the 46 2018 Index of U.S. Military Strength determination of one’s position on the Earth’s of commercial shipping, thereby helping to surface based on the position of celestial bod- clarify the maritime picture. The proliferation ies, typically the sun, moon, or specific stars—is of ISR unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) is also one such technique that relies on a clear sky changing maritime surveillance by greatly in- and a highly accurate chronometer. An essen- creasing the capacity for real-time OTH ISR tial skill for sailors across the centuries, celes- and targeting information for naval platforms. tial navigation is again being taught to young Not only can long-range land-based UAVs sailors as navies recognize that they cannot provide ISR coverage hundreds of miles from rely solely on GPS. Another critical GPS-de- shore for 12 hours or more at a time, but small- nied navigation method is inertial navigation, er UAVs are being fielded that can be launched which provides the speed and position of a ship and recovered from naval platforms, providing or other platform by measuring its accelera- naval fleets with organic ISR and cueing. tion in all three dimensions. Once extremely While these systems still have gaps in cover- large and expensive, current solid-state iner- age and some require complex algorithms to tial navigation units are getting smaller and scour the vast amounts of imagery required for cheaper, enabling their use on small surface open-ocean searches, it is getting harder for a vessels and even on unmanned undersea ve- large surface naval vessel such as an aircraft hicles (UUVs). carrier to hide in the open ocean. To this end, The vast ocean expanses have also provided many modern navies are regularly practicing a measure of stealth for naval vessels, although electromagnetic emission control (EMCON) this is becoming less and less true. For years, operations as well as developing technologies most modern naval vessels relied primarily on and tactics to deny or degrade ISR satellites organic radar and electronic support measures and related platforms. (ESM) systems to locate and target adversary The ocean’s depths provide their own condi- naval vessels at over-the-horizon (OTH) rang- tion of stealth for submarines and other under- es beyond the line of sight. Maritime patrol sea platforms such as UUVs, enabling undersea craft and carrier aviation early-warning air- forces to move unseen and relatively unde- craft were able to extend the ability of these tected by adversary forces. This is because the warships to locate and engage adversaries, but environment below the ocean’s surface is dras- the ocean is a very big place, and even with ra- tically different from the world above it.
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