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CLAREMONT MENS COLLEGE EDUAIMDO MON])LANE: BIOGRAPHY OF A MOZAM~BICAN GUERRILLA LEAJ)ER A REPORT TO CAR~L U. ZACURISSON. HB.PAINTER* BY JAMS C. KELSEY roR SENIOR THESIS X190 KAY 21, 1969 .4,

PREFACE What is probably the largest war being fought in the world, after Viet Nam, is in Africa. Actually three wars, it began in Angola in 1961, Portuguese Guinea in 1963, and in 1964. It'.is the little publicized war of liberation against the last of the colonialists, the Portuguese. Fighting against -conditions of forced labor, the lack of educational opportunitiess and the administrative ineptitude and prejudice of the Portuguese, some 30,000 African guerrillas are tieing down over 120,000 Portuguese troops. -.-,.. The Portuguese, the'least progressive of*all colonialists, are struggling to maintain their hold in Africa. But is a poor and tiny country, and the support of its 120,000 troops -takes nearly 50 per cent of its budget. With the thirty-six-year dictatorship of Premier Salazar now ended, unrest is growing. Among its mostly umeducated troops morale is low. Without direct, outside aid,-the Portuguese cannot continue in Africa for long. Fox: the guerrillas, if it does not last too long, the war-may be a blessing in disguise. Unlike other African ii o nationalists who received their independence more or less peaceably, the Portuguese Africans are winning their freedom district by district. In rebel-held territory, they are re-structuring the economy, initiating health services, nationalizing the population, and developing the educational system, themselves. Hpefully, when independence comes, this groundwork will be the basis of a future stability and prosperity. The colony in which this process has gone the furthest is Mozambique; and, more than any other man, Eduardo Mondlane was responsible. Eduardo Mondlane was well-known in the United States. He had returned to Mozambique to head the rebel movement in 1963, resigning his post as professor at Syracuse University. He had turned a back-country mission-school education in N1ozambique into a B.A. from Oberlin and a Ph.D. from Northwestern. He had married an American, worked at the United Nations for five years, and taught at Syracuse. I met Eduardo Mondlane once myself last spring at UCLA. I remember him well. He was a handsome man, with a ready smile and a quick, efficient manner that was at the same time warm and friendly. He seemed insightful, confident, and highly intelligent. An incident happened that evening that, in retrospect, seems like an orien. I was with my fiance and, while we were talking with Mondlane, a couple approached and asked him about iii enterin" rebel-held territory in Mozambique. They identified themselves as Italian journalists from a certain magazine in Milan. My " w in Italy much of her life, knew the magazine and addressed them in Italian. It turned out that their Italian was not very good. They turned and left. Whether the couple were Portuguese P.I.D.E. agents, or persons who hoped to sell whatever information they could learn, the incident seemed fateful. Eduardo jond ane had no bodyguard. Everyone knew his schedule. It is not yet known whether he was murdered by the Portuguese or by dissidents within his own movement, but 'the evidence points to the Portuguese. This thesis is 'the biography of Eduardo Mondlane and the story of the wars of liberation in Portuguese-1Africa,. ivIj., .

CONTE'NTS CHAPTER, I. THE åSSASSINÅTION .... . CHAPTER II. BIRTH IN THIEBUSH ..... Cl-W, TER III. COLLEGE IN THE UNZITED STATES . CHAPTER !V. BACK TO MOZA1,1BIQU2 CHAPTE V. ONE LAST YEAlt AND2 ITS AFP2'1"ATH. SOURCES CONSULTED .. 9 *. 26 * * 38 ** 65

LIST OP MA.PS PORTUUM SE DIScOVE:2IES AND POSSESSIO ?TS ...... 1 SOUTHi AF.,LICA' S POVER PROJECTS .. .. . 76 vi

I am coal" and you wrench me brutally from ,the ground, and make me your mine ,,boss'" . V1, I am coal ' and you light me, boss to serve you eternally as a moving force. " but not eternally, boss. I am coal and I have to butn, yes and burn everything with the force of my combustion. I am coal the exploitation burns me burns me alive like tar, my brother, until I am no longer your mine, boss. . I am coal I have to burn burn everything with the fire of my combustion. Yes! I will be your coal, boss! (Grito Negro. by Craveirinha, on Hozambicans working in the South African mines) A guerrillo cultivating the soil carrying ammunition or medicine Building a hospital, a school or studying in a distant land Iy place is where FRELIMO decides The line of battle is where the Revolution takes me (Marcelino dos Santos, foreign secretary.of FRELIMO) I** -

CHAPTERl I THE ASSASSINATION Eduardo Mondlane was assassinated February 3, 1969. He had awoke early, as usual, that morning in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Since his wife was on a trip in , he took his morning swim in the bay alone. Then, after taking breakfast, Mondlane went to the office at FRELIMO headquarters. He had pulled FRELIMO (the Mozambique Liberation Front) together from sev.ral groups in 1962 to liberate his country Mozambique, the Portuguese colony.in East Africa* stretching some 1,600 miles along the coast, one of the three African colonies that Portugal tenaciously continues to hold. In four years, Mondlane had made much progress. FRULIMO had taken the two northern provinces of Mozambique with some 800,000 inhabitants-and was expanding or creating, as was usually the case, educational and'health services. Further, in the past year, the war had entered a new stage; with new weapons, FRELIMO guerrillas were successfully attacking Portuguese bases and expanding the offensive into new areas. There was much work to d6 that morning of the third. Reports were still coming in from , where four days before FRLIMO guerrillas had over-run the Portuguese

2 camp at Ntndola and destroyed two new bridges nearby.I But, by the afternoon, as things were in order, Mondlane gathered his mail and prepared to go to the home of a friend where ho could work alone. He often did that, using the homes of friends who vent away for weekends or trips.2 Lately, .he had been working regularly at the home of an American, Miss Betty King, a well-known figure in Dar and an old-time friend of Dr. Mondlane and. his wife. But, before leaving the office, while gathering his mail, Mondlane noticed a»,package fromLöndon. it was obviously a book. Mondlane was a highly educated man and had been an assistant professor. of,anthropology at Syracuse University. lie must have hoped the book would be of interest, for, early that afternoon,, soon after he reached the empty beach house and sat at 'hs desk, he opened the package and triggered the bomb inside. Eduardo Mondlane was killed instantly : - . A world-wide reaction followed Dr. Mondlane's death. Hundreds of messages of sorrow arrived at FRELI140 headquarters. The black African press hailed him as an 1Mozambique Revolution (Dar es Salaam: FRELIMO), January-February, 1969, p. 21. 2Edward Alpers, private interview at UCLA, May 8, 1969. Edward Alpers is an assistant professor of African History at UCLA. He is one of the few authorities on Mozambican precolonial history. During and after the two years, from July 1966 to February 1968, that Alpers spent in Dar teaching at the University of Tanzania, he was a close friend of Eduardo Mondlane. outstanding liberation leader; and among the messa-es of condolences were ones from Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Kenneth Kuanda of Zambia, Sekou Toure of Guinea, Gamal Nasser of the U.A.R., and heads of state of several other nations.1 A statement from the Liberation Committee of the Organization for African Unity said that Mondlane had been a victim of ,those who are confounded and irritated by the achievements of .RELIMO.2 And, at Mondlane's funeral, Nyerere told those present that "the best way of crying for him is to increase our efforts for the liberation of Africa." 3 Even the*'' Portuguese had to respect himr as a man'who was tieing down nearly 50,000 of their tröops and as a sophisticated and well- educated leader. In the United States, the State Department expressed its regrets over his assassination;4 and four members of Congress,, among, them, Senator Edward Brooke, read their condolences.into the Congressional Record.5 Meanwhile, the University of Syracuse established the Eduardo Mondlane Memorial Pund; and, at the United Nations, where he had worked for five years, memorial services were held. IUozambique Revolution (Dar es Salaam: FRELIMO), January-February, 1969, pp. 9-12. 2"Africans Condemn Mondlane Slaying, " New York Times# February 5, 1969, p. 37. 3Time, Feb. 14, 1969, p. 36. 4"Africans Conåeemn Mondlane Slaying," New York Times, February 5, 1969, p. 37. 5Amrica Today, February-March, 1969, p. 1.

I4 Eduardo Iondlane was probably the only' uerrilla leader in the world who was friendly to the United States. He had studied at Oberlin and Northwestern, had married a white American from Illinois, had worked in the-trusteeship department of the United Nations, and had taught at Syracuse. Therefore, he had many American contacts. The late Senator Robert Kennedy, commenting on the ease with which Mondlane travelled in influential circles, reportedly once said: "He could be a Kennedy." But Mondlane was not an American apologist, nor even "a pro-Western nationalist," as the New York Times called him after his death.2 Mondlane followed a strict policy of non-alliance between East and Vest, and he was constantly annoyed at his U.N. people for cutting antiAmerican material out of the New York edition of Mozambique Revolution. Mondlane, himself, felt that opportunities were more open to people in socialist countries than in Western capitalist nations, and he was publicly critical of U.S. race relations and foreign policy.4 1Newsweek, February .17, 1969, p. 61. 2"Leader of Mozambique Liberation Movement Killed by Assassin's Bomb at Cottage in Dar es Salaam," New York Times, February 4, 1969, p. 11. 3Edward Alpers, private interview at UCLA, May 8, 1969. 4Ronald H. Chilcote, private interview at UC Riverside, Nay 9, 1969. Dr. Chilcote is an assistant professor of political science at UC Riverside. He is'one of the leading authorities on the Portuguese world and knew Eduardo Mandlane personally since September, 1965.

5 However, Irondlane was a remarkablygood propagandist. le managed to receive aid from Sweden, Britian, the United States, , and India; while at the same time he received aid from , Communist China, East , and Czechoslavakia. He used to proudly explain; "I get weapons from the ]-ast and money from the West.''2 Not that Mondlane ever received money from the United States government. On the contrary, the U.S. supports its NATO ally, Portugal. But officials in the State Department seemed to feel that if there had to be a guerrilla movement in Mozam3 bique, it had best be headed by someone like Mondlane.. They did not stop him from privately raising funds in the United States. This was one of the strengths of FRELIMO, that with his "lively wit and charm and intelligence," lMondlane was able to maintain Vestern sympathy. As'Edward Alpers, a close friend of M[ondlane, said; "le knew how to present the truth in such a way that it did not offend." Eduardo Mondlane was a very unusual man. Trained to be a scholar, he was a man who had it made. "He could ILawrence Fellows, "Slaying Threatens to Divide Mozambique Rebels," New York Times, February 6, 1969, p. 4. 2Time, February 141"1969, p. 35.-: 3Stanley Neisler, "Top African Guerrilla Leader Assassinated," Los Angeles Times, February 4, 1969,,p. 5. 4 ,Edward Alpers, private interview, a'UCLA, May 8, 1969. have lived a comfortable life in the U.S'. and talked about revolution."' But, Eduardo Mondlane, the professor, left all that behind by deciding to lead a guerrilla movement. After his death, people who had known him remembered and tried to describe, in memorial statements, the kind of man he had been: "warm and confident " a "tall hefty giant of a man," but a giant with* "an open smile and bold laughter;" a, "gentle" man; a husband and a father of three children; "rational, highly intelligent, and dedicated to the cause of Mozambican liberation.," But, one characteristic that was always a part of him was that he was an intellectual. As Edward Alpers, after Mondlane's assassination, fondly remembered: "As a type, he was immediately recognizable. Mondlane was an intellectual, more, an academician."2 Indeed, Mondlane had the air of the student and the teacher. He was a curious man, who was full of life and at the same time drove himself hard. He was"'feeding" his mind in all.... that he did, whether reorganizing the economy of rebel-held territories, or designing the new educational,' system, or 1Rev. George M. Houser, the director of the American Committee on Africa, in a speech at the memorial services for Eduardo Mondlane, at the Church Center for the United Nations, February 13, 1969, p. 4. (Mimeographed.) 2Edward Alpers, private interview :at UCLA,"May 8, 1969.

.7 keeping up with the international correspondence that followed him wherever he went. But, while Mondlane loved the bookish world he had left behind in Syracuse, those who saw him as out of character as a guerrilla leader were wrong. Those who saw him as polished and Vestern, and therefore suspect in-Africa, "misread him, for he was so much at ease in all that he did for the movement." Not that he had the common touch, like Nyerere. Eduardo was more an intellectual . . . and, of course, he had the disadvantage of having had been away from his country. He wasn't a. charismatic leader of the sort with the touch to get a crowd going. But that was not essential, because he was not the head of a mass political party, but-the head of a liberation movement.2 Eduardo Mondlane was not a demagogue. He was a rational and humane man who sought the right of self-. determination for his people. He regretted the killing, but he knew there could be no other way. He resisted the pressure to make the war a racial war--his fighters attacked only Portuguese troops and armed civilians.3 This was one of his strengths in the West. He constantly stressed the point that FIXELINO was fighting the Portuguese colonial system, and not the Portuguese people. He hoped to pressure the Portuguese economy and morale,'so badly that Portugal would be forced to negotiate and to grant Mozambique independence. -bid. ,21bid. 3Newsweek, February 17, 1969, p. 62. -. Ii

LFRELIINO was so succ.essfu. at'this that Mondlane was known as "Portugral 's most vanted man*" Many felt that he was marked for deat

CHAPTER II BIRTH IN THE BUSH Eduardo M'ondlane was born sometime in June, 1920, in the Gaza district, along the Limpopo River in southern Mozambique. His father had been a tribal chief of a section of Tsonga people. When Eduardo was very young, his father died, "trying to recover the power of the traditional people." His uncle, a paramount chief, died after serving twenty-five years in a Portuguese prison for opposing the Portuguese.2 As a boy, Eduardo herded cattle and sheep, like most other young people in his community. He was raised by his older brothers and mothers. When he was ten, his genetic mother insisted that he attend a local government school, because, she argued, "the old.world of_ my father's was on the way out, and it would be wiser if I - prepared. myself for the new world."3 ISee Henri Alexandre Junod, The Life of a South African Tribe (: Macmillan, 1927. 2Ronald H. Chilcote, unpublished interview with Eduardo Mondlane in Dar es Salaam, September 25-27,1965.. (Typewritten.) 3Eduardo Mondlane, "The Struggle for Independence 7 in Mozambique" (paper presented at the "Southern Africa in &-' Transition" conference at Howard University, Washington, D.C., April 11-13, 1963), p. 15. (Mimeographed.) (Hereinafter referred to as Eduardo Mondlane, "Struggle for Independence.")

And so. at the rudimentary school in Hanjacaze in 1931, Eduardo Mondlane began to learn to read and. write and to speak Portuguese. On finishing rudimentary education in 1936, he was taken to the capital city of Lourenco Marques, where he continued his education until obtaining his primary school certificate--that was the highest educational achievement allowed an African at that time in Mozambique. But, Mondlane was not satisfied. He decided to continue his education one way or another. Me enrolled at an agricultural school for dry farming. To years later, he completed the course and returned to the Gaza area, where he taught dry farrning to the people of the Manjacaze region for two years. But, while at the agricultural school, he had learned some English privately. And, in 1944, he received a scholar4hip to .study in a high school in the northern Transvaal. In 1947, he obtained the matriculation certifica'e"of:heSouth African Joint Matriculation Board, enabling him to enter the Jan H. Hofmeyer School of Social Studies in Johannesburg in 1948. Then, soon after entering the school, the young Mondlane was offered a private scholarship, in the :social sciences at Witwatersrand University.-

However, in 1949, the South African Nationalist government, under Dr. Malan, refused to renew his permit as a foreign student, "obviously because I was a black student in a white university."' In October, 1949, when he returned to Mozambiclue, the Portuguese government had Mondlane arrested for an investigation: At that time, I had organized an African students' association which drew its membership from the few African secondary, commercial and technical school students in Mozambique. The government thought the organization was really a political group, camouflaging as a social and academic group. They arrested as many students of that organization as they could and investigated them to determine what relationship there was between my expulsion from and the activities of the organization. After three days and nights of constant questioning, in which the police covered every phase of my student life in South Africa, they drew up a report to the attorney general of the Portuguese RepubliC in .2 A few months later, the attorney general concluded that there was nothing definite enough in Mondlane's history to prefer charges,, but that Mondlane had been infected "with a Communist virus" and ,"an embryonic spirit of black nationalism" that might spread to other Africans. Therefore, the attorney general advised that Mondlane be kept under strict police surveillance and that,'"if possible, he be given a scholarship to study in Portugal;'so as, to Ibid. pp. 15-16 keep him away from the African population and to see if Ile could be "cured."' And so, in mid-1950, Mondlane sailed for Lisbon. In the autumn of that year, le registered at the Paculty of Letters at Lisbon University. "As far as I know, I was the first black Mozambican ever registered there.,,2 To be sure, Eduardo Mondlane had been fortunate. PortuZuese colonialism allowed the luxury of an education to very few Mozambicans. The Portuguese, in the fifteenth century, had gone on their mission of exploration and Christianization.of the world. -ithin a hundred years, they were a world power with an empire, stretcl ing eastward from Ceuta to Ceylon, and westward to Brazil. But, it was as if the efforts of that one glorious century had exhausted tiny Portugal, for Portuguese colonialism remained limited to a series of.scattere& forts along the coasts and the unending searchfor"gold,' and slaves. By the mid-1800's, the only large areasthey had: left were Guinea and the Cape Verdes Islands, Angola and MIozambique. These would have been lost, too,, had not the great imperialist powers referred, at the Conference Ibid p.16..d...

13 PORIUGITESS DISCOTERIES AND POSSESSIONS DJSCOVZ:Rj'ZS AND EXPAr-Isfoll

'14 K . of Berlin in 1885, to see the Portuguese'rather than any rival keep them. At that time, the-Portuguese colonial effort had amounted merely to a series of coastal settlements and internecine wars with tribes. In Mozambique, the war-like Shangana held vast areas of hinterland and sporadically attacked Portuguese settlements. *Lourenco Marques in 1864 was a shantytown of 700; and, in 1897 the entire 2 colony had fewer than 1,500 Portuguese settlers. But, spurred on by Europe'4,partitioning of Africa, and desiring to retain the last of their ancient empire, thePortuguese began pushing more energetically into the interiors. As for Mozambique, which was nearly lost to the British, the Portuguese decided to make a supreme effort to "pacify" the colony and to conquer the ShanZana. An expeditionary force of several thousand was sent to Lourenco Marques in 1895; and, in 1897, the capital of Mozambique was transferred from Mozambique Island in the extreme north 3 'to Lourenco Marques in the extreme south. Delagoa Bay, on.which the town was located, was the best natural harbor in East Africa and had been attracting much attention from 1R.R. Palmer and Joel Colton, A History of the -Modern World (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), pp. 638-42. 2Douglas L. VWleeler, "The Portuguese and Mozambique: the Past Against the Future," in Southern Africa in Transition, ed. by John A. Davis and James K. Baker (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), pp. 184-7. 3lbid., p. 185...

15 the British and the Boers. But, Portuguese efforts were too small and too late; and the Portuguese dream of joining Angola and Mozambique in a belt across southern Africa was shattered forever, as Cecil Rhodes pushed up from the Cape of Good Hope and settled Rhodesia. Nevertheless, the wars of pacification continued. Mozambique was not brought under Portuguese control until 1918. Angola was "pacified" about the same time; while, in G-iinea, Portuguese control in the interior was not established until the 1930's. The Portuguese colonies.had been run, since the sixteenth century, by a system of donatairias. Concentrating on the lucrative slave trade rather than colonization, the Portuguese established this system of "territorial proprietorships,".whereby the crown gave proprietors jurisdiction over large areas of land in exchange for defending and settling the land. But, the proprietors abused the system; and economic development did not follow. Consequently, during the time of the partitioning of Africa, the Portuguese decided to adopt an English and Dutch experiment and introduced the system of charteredcompanies. In Mozambique, the northern district of Cabo Delgado was granted to the Niassa Company in 1891 and. an area between the. Save and Zambeze rivers was handed to the . A year later, another region was given tothe Zambezia Company.1 Ronald H. Chilcote,_Portuguese Africa,. Spectrum Books (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), pp. 7-9.

16 In settling the colonies, however, the donatarias and the chartered companies showed an amazing disregard for human life; the most distinctive characteristic of both being their use of native labor. Portugal's main interests in her colonies had always been gold and slaves. But, in the early 1800's, as international opinion turned against slavery, the Narques de Sa da Bandeira was able to initiate anti-slavery legislation. Then, in 1858, during a liberal turn of the government, Portugal decreed the gradual end to slavery throughout the empire by 1878. But slavery was to remain in practice long thereafter; for, in 1875, the first Portuguese native labor code was implemented and a system of forced labor was begun. Declaring labor a "moral and legal" obligation, the Portuguese required all fit, male Africans to enter "voluntarily" into "contracts" with employers for six months a year. Malpractice and exploitation followed; and, while other colonialists were beginning to pay wages for African labor, the Portuguese seized Africans'for plantation work and continued to march them in chains to the sea for the cocoa plantations of So Tome and Principe. "Outright slavery was transformed into periodical slavery; and it is this periodical slavery, or 'contract labor,' which has continued ever since."' 1Basil Davidson, The African Awakening. (London: Jonathan Cape, 1955), p. 198. 4

17 The Portuguese regarded native labor as one of the major natural resources of their colonies: The Portuguese were willing to allow this no more than any other colonizing Power: because they were poorer, less up to date, and came themselves from a country still pre-industrial in its attitudes to work and thought, they devised means of coercion which were more primitive, more generally adopted, and perhaps more cruel than elsewhere.1 It was not that the Portuguese were the only colonialists to use forced labor; but the Portuguese, never having the resources to efficiently exploit their colonies, continued to rely upon "contract labor'" as profoundly as they had relied upon chattel slavery*. By the turn of the twentieth century, the Western world began to take note of the out-dated practices of the Portuguese. In 1906, a vell-known English journalist, Henry W. Nevinson, published A Modern. Slavery which vividly described the cruelties of Portuguese "legalized slavery."c Nevinson urged English chocolate manufacturers to boycott Sao Tome cocoa. In 1908,, William Cadbury, of the Cadbury Brothers chocolate firm, visited the colonies and in his Labour in Portuguese V0est Africa substantiated Nevinson's account. The next year, his firm began a boycott of Portuguese cocoa. Then, in 1913, Sir John Harris presented a severe condemnation of contract labor in Angola; and, in 1925, American sociologist Ilbid..

Edward Alsworth Ross submitted a report on labor abuses in Angola and Mozambique to the Temporary Slhvery Committee of the League of Nations.1 .At that same time, Portugal herself was weathering a period of great political instability. In October, 1910, the monarchy, which had ruled with an authoritarian hand for nearly eight centuries, was overthrown. In the republi-' can period from 1910 to 1926, forty-four governments rose and fell. Finally, on May 26, 1926, probably following the 2' example of Mussolini, the army established a dictatorship. Two years later, an economics professor at the University of Coimbra became the minister of finance; and, by 1932, having balanced the budget and drawn up a new constitution proclaiming Portugal the "New State" (Estado Novo), Premier Salazar was in power.. While forcing Portugal to live within its frugal means, Salazar sought to turn the attention of the tiny country toward Africa. By repeating endlessly the exploits of Portuguese explorers in the fifteenth century, he began to build dreams of Portuguese greatness. Declaring that Portugal would "fulfill its historic mission of colonization "f3 in the lands of the discoveries, he sought to inflate the Portuguese imperial mystique.'. 1Chilcote, Portuguese Africa, p., 12...... 3Ibid., p. 1. 3Ibidl., p. 16. *

19 Although they bad always paid rather absent-minded attention to the colonies, the Portuguese still had a sense of mission in Africa. Indeed, the Portuguese have been blessed with a sense of mission for*over five centuries, although their grandiose conception of themselves as a civilizing agent has been unfounded. In 1960 in Mozambique, for example, out of a population of 6.6 million, less than 2 per cent (163,000) were classified as civilized,' that is, European, Asian, or assimilated. Of these, only five thousand -ere assimilated. fricans. The policy of assimilation allows an educated African, who speaks Portuguese, divests himself of tribal customs and remains employed, tobecome "civilized" and a part of Portuguese life. However, neglecting education at home (40 per cent of the Portuguese are themselves illiterate and would not.meet the requirements for being assimilated2) and in Africa, the Portuguese failed to provide the opportunity for natives to attain these standards. Assimilation was a way of maintaining the status quo while appearing high-minded. And, as Africans began to advance anyway, Salazar began to de- emphasis the policy of assimilation. I.Ibid., p. 108. 9 2Eduardo iondlane, "Nationalism andi Development in Mozambique" (paper presented to the University of California Project "Brazil-Portuguese Africa" at UC Riverside and UCLA, February 27-8, 1968), Part I, p. 5. ( lmeograhed.)

Signing the Missionary Agreement of 1942, at the urging of white settlers who insisted that what the Africans needed was "spiritual growth" and not material improvement, Salazar handed over the education of Africans to the Catholic Church. For the government, he kept the responsibility of.educating Europeans and Asians. The Portuguese colonies remained the only African countries with no secondary schools for Africans; and, the rudimentary schools continued to reach less than 20 per cent of the school-age children.. Rudimentary education is a three year course in Portuguese and religion for natives. However, the level of education in these escolas de adaptacao is such that in 1961 only 6,000 children were able to pass the examination enabling them to enter primary school. Further, the "indigenous" child is forbidden to'enter a primary school after the age of thirteen; and,-since he may have to travel far to reach one of these "schools of adaptation," it is very often impossible to begin in time to qualify for primary school. Thus, in -1963, of the 25,742 pupils of all races in primary school in Mozambique, less than one-fifth were Africans, although indigenous Africans account for 97.5 per cent of the total population. The situation IEduardo Mondlane, "The Struggle for Independence in Mozambique," in Southern Africa in Transition, pp. 199200...... in secondary schools is even worse: there are only six secondary schools in the whole country, all fee paying and all in the major towns, and in 1962 only about 0.5 per cent of the children in secondary schools were African.1 Further, the Salazar regime has continued to exploit native labor. In Mozambique, there are now four kinds of labor: correctional labor, for th6se failing to pay the native head tax; conscripte& labor, for public works projects when insufficient volunteers are available; contract labor, required of Africans not employed for at least six months of the previous year; and voluntary labor, for workers who contract directly with their employers.2 The result and aim of this is to create'a pool' of cheap labor: the 1960 estimated figure for the-average earnings of a black African engaged in "voluntary labor" was a maximum of 5.00 escudos aday (18 cents). This compares with the minimum salary of an unqualified white of 100.000 escudos (S3.50) per day. 3 Forced cash cropping is an important part of the forced labor system. Under cash cropping, the peasants of several regions are obliged to use all or most of their land 1Mondlane, "Nationalism.and Development in Mozambique," Part II, pp. 12-13. 2Chilcote, Portunuese Africa, pp' 39-40. 3Mondlane, "Nationalism and Development in Mozambique," Part I, p. 9.

22: to cultivate a single crop, usually rice or cotton, for the export company which is given the "concession" in the area. The export company supervises the work and then has a mompoly to buy the product at prices well below world prices. For instance, in 1958, the cotton crop was bought from producers at the rate of 2.70 escudos/kg,. and was resold to the Portuguese cotton processing industry at the rate of 17.00 escudos/kg., while on the world market it would have brought 20-25 escudos/kg.I Similarly, since the signing of the 1909 TransvaalMozambique Convention and the Portuguese-South African Convention of 1928,, Portugal has agreed to send100,000 Mozambicans to work in the South African mines. In return for these Mozambican workers, South Africa has agreed to ship 47.8 per cent of its imports-exports.through Lourenco Marques. In addition, Portugal receives U.S. $6 in. gold bullion for each African worker signing the contract and receives one half of four months of each worker's wages. Not content with that, the Portuguese withhold half the wages of all Mtozambican workers for two years, after which they return the worker's wages in Portuguese currency without interest.2 llbid., Part II, p. 10.'" 2Mondlane, "The Struggle for Independence in Mozambique," p. 200.0 ';.< .

Altogether, more than 400,000 Hozambicans were working in South Africa and Rhodesia in 1960., Through tactics such as these in their colonies, the Portuguese manage to make up the deficit in their budget. Meanwhile,. although the colonies are a considerable asset to Portugal, economdic development had, until recently, failed to materialize in them. Thus, in' the, 1950's, faced with the obvious rise of nationalism in other parts of Africa, and with the legal and illegal emigration of tens of thousands of Portuguese to other European countries for better working conditions, Salazar began to encourage the emigration of white settlers to Africa. In Mozambique, a colonization program for six' thousand persons was-begun in the Limpopo - ,valley- 'two. larger projects were also begun in Angola. However, these programs were of limited success, owing to the "lack of initiative and the inexperience of the poor and badly educated Portuguese settlers" and ,the."excessive'cost of more than $10,000 to settle a single family in Africa."2 It was not until the 1960's, when faced with revolt, thatthe Portuguese encouraged large-scale investments in their colonies and that development began. But, meanwhile, Portuguese colonialism had been attracting more international attention. In 1947, Captain 1Mondlane, "Nationalism and Development in Mozambique," Part II, p. 9.2Chilcote, Portu guese Africa, pp. 8-9.

Hienrique Galvao, as an inspector of colonies and until then a loyal member of the Portuguese parliament, presented a very revealing report of conditions in the colonies. The terrible indictment was suppressed; but, Galvao, in a brave act of defiance, read it anyway to the National r Assembly. Focusing on the widespread emigration of natives from the colonies and the resultant labor shortage, he described "the physical incapacity and decadence of the people, lack of medical care, undernourishment, a declining birth rate, infant mortality, and disabilities and deaths resulting from work . . , In some ways, Galv2o concluded, the situation was worse than simple slavery: . Under slavery, after all, the native is bought as an animal: his owner prefers him to remain as, fit as a horse or an 'ox. Yet here the native is not bought: he is hired from the State, although he is called a free man. And his employer cares little if he sickens or dies, once he is working, because when he sickens or dies, his employer will simply ask foranother.2 Galv~o was later imprisoned; but., in a dramatic 3 escape, he made it to the Argentine embassy and political asylum. Meanwhile, an English journalist, Basil fDavidson, visited Angola and, in '1955, in-The' Afica Awakening'. Ibid., p. 13. " .. ... ' 2Basil Davidson, "Congo Destinies," in African Independence, ed. by Peter Judd, Laurel Books (New York: Dell, 1963), p. 103. 3Warren Rogers, Jr., The Floating Revolution (New York: McGraw Hill, 1962), pp. 22-3. repeated charges made since Nevinson's day. On the Belgian Congo side of the border, he noted the many villages of Angolans; crossing the frontier, however, he described how there were no villages, as the iVigolans had moved to avoid abor conscription. Nvo years later, arvin Harris, an anthropologist at Columbia University, visited Mozambique and in 1958 published a further critique of labor conditions there. But we are getting ahead of our narrative. Having described the colonial situation, let us return to.Mondlane at Lisbon University iDavidson, The African Aitakenina, pp. 192-3.

CHAPTER III COLLEGE IN THE UNITE]) STATES In Lisbon, in 1950, Eduardo Mondlane met other African intellectuals from the Portuguesecolonies for the first time. Among those there were several who are now leaders of the liberation movements in their colonies: A. Agostinho Neto, the physician, poet, president of the MPLA (Novirnento Ponular para a Libertagao de AnIola) Mario de Andrade, also of Angola; Amilcar Cabral' the Guinean agronomist who leads the movement in his colony; Marcelino dos Santos, rRELIMO's foreign secretary. The concern of most students in-Lisbon at that-. time was for the ordinary civil rights'of Portuguese citizens. But, this group of nationalistic Africans sought, by whatever peaceful means were iavailable, to make:the Portuguese aware of their desire for self-determination in the colonies. Neto, who was already a recognized poet, wrote sonnets clamourina for freedom for black men. Mario de Andrade wrote cultural and sociological essays on the African past. Mondlane spoke at closed meetings of students, professors, and some of the liberal Portuguese. But, as a consequence, they were constantly harassed by the P.I.D.E. 26..

Every month their rooms were ransacked by the police looking for further evidence of their political views. After one year, Mondlane felt that he could not continue studying under such conditions. He was studying in Lisbon under an American scholarship and arranged to have it transferred t.o an American university. 'le received an additional scholarship from Oberlin College and, in the late summer of 1951, left for the United States. Several of his African friends also left Lisbon at thattime, mostly for the Sorbonne." In June, 1953, Mondlane graduated from Oberlin. He continued his studies at*Northwestern University, where he received his M.A. and Ph.D. in sociology and met his future wife, the former Janet Johnson of Downer's Grove, Illinois. Then, after one year of research at Harvard University on role conflict, Mondlane became a research officer in the Department of Trusteeship of the United>Nations. At that time, the unrest' in Portugal's African colonies was coming more 'into the'open.'' Resistance to the Portuguese in Mozambique had never entirely ended: in the 1930's and 1940's, the dockworkers of Lourenco Marques organized protests and, in 1948, an uprising. IMondlane, "Struggle for Independence," p.117-18.

28 In 1956, forty-nine dockworkers were killed in a protest. In April, 1960, six hundred of the iaconde tribe were killed in Mueda for protesting the detention of their chiefs" for petitioning to establish an African association. In May, 1961, police executed six African chiefs for organizing a prot~st, and police fired upon and killed fifteen laborers in Milange for seeking pay increases.' These and similar incidents reflected the growing unrest and resentment towards continued Portuguese domination and marked the beginnings of nationalism in Mozambique. While at the United Nations, Nondlane began receiving letters, documents, and petitions from all the Portuguese colonies pleading: that the United Nations t ake action against Portugal and that he come out openly against the Portuguese. After corresponding with, several organizations, he began to receive letters asking him to join this group or that group. As an officer'of. the United Nations, he could not do that; and, as only Egypt,. Ethiopia, and Liberia were independent at that.time in Africa, he did not think he would be very effective against the Portuguese from so far away. But, working in the trusteeship- department, he IChilcote, Portuguese Afric, pp. 118-9. 2Eduardo iMondlane, "The Mozambique Liberation Front: The Crystalization of a Struggle for Freedom" (no date, but paper presented to the conference for the Heads of State of the Organization of African Unity in Addis Ababa in ,-ay, 1963), p. 7. (11imeographed.) (Hereinafter referred to as Nondlane, "Crystalization of a Struggle.")

29 knew that would reasonably soon be independent. Mondlane decided that one day he would work from there.I Meanwhile, Mondlane wrote back to the three political groups in Mozambique that had asked him to join them, that the only way he could join a political party for the independence of IIozambique was if they would promise to take immediate steps to unite with 'other Mozambican groups in forming a united front. All three groups promised that they would; and, consequently, when Tanaanyika became independent in December, 1961, Mondlane'immediately arranged to return to East Africa.. However, during that summer of 1961, while on furlough from the United Nations, 11rondlane had returned to Mozambique. It was the first time since 1950 that he had returned to his native country. Under the protection of his osition as a U.N. official, lNondlane went back to see if there were not some peaceful ways of reasoning with the Portuguese. But in his conversations with Portuguese colonial officials it became clear to him that they were not interested, that they were against independence for Africans, and that their position was unchangeable.3 During that trip, Mondlane's decision was made. On his way back to the United States, he passed through Salisbury, iMondlane, "Struggle for Independence," p. 19. 2Mondlane, "Crystalization of a Struggle," p. 7. 3Hans Dahlberg, "Mondlane: Our Chances," The New Africa, July, 1965, p. 105.

30 Southern Rhodesia, and met with several of the nationalist leaders with whom he had been in correspondence. They asked him to join them and he emphasized again the need " L for a.unified movement. On returninc to New York, Mondlane resigned his position with the United Nations, knowing that he could do no more there for the freedom of his people.2 That autumn,. he became an assistant professor of anthropology at Syracuse University and began preparing for his return to Africa.. Eduardo Mondlane returned to Bast Africa that June. In June, 1962, at Dar es Salaam in-*then independent Tanganyika, a unity conference was held for the leaders of the three Mozambican exile groups with'whom Mondlane. liad been in contact. . All three groups were loosely organized and were essentially "office organizations, as,ýMondlane later described them, with'the possible exceptionof. the- Mozambique African National Union (MÄNU). .MANU was an amalgamation of several small groups in northern Mozambique, Tanganyika, and Kenya and had Severhl members who had been active'with KANU in Kenya or TKN\J in Tanganyika.4 The other. two IMondlane, "Struggle for Independence," pp. 12-13. -Dahlberg, "Mondlane: Our Chances,"' p.105. 3Chilcote, unpublished interview with Mondlane in Dar es Salaam, September 25-27, 1965. (Typewritten.) 4Mondlane, "Struggle for Independence," p. 12. groups were: tlie UniZ-o Denocratica Naejonal de Mocambiclue (UD=ENAMO), forrned in Rhodesia by exiled nationalists working in Sa.lisbury; and the UniAo Africana de 1oýam.bicnue Idp cleite (UNA!i-), established in Ma.lawi by exiled leaders fr om the Tete region.1 At iondlane's advice anid the uraing of INeer of Tanganyika, Nkrumah of, Ghana, and nationalists f ro-,il within Moza-i.bique, theso thr.ee groups formed Ule Moza.mbique Libera.tion Front, known a s PRELIMO (P~rente deý Libertac2ýo de Moýambiclue,). It was de

32 The congress condemned Portuguese colonialism; its tactics of political, economic, social, and cultural. suppression; and the Portuguese government's refusal to seek a peaceful solution to the conflict between itself and the people of M[ozambique. A series of resolutions called for unity among all Mozambicans; thetraining of cadres and the achievement of freedom in Mozambique; the promotion of literacy campaigns; the social and cultural development of women; co-operation with the nationalist organizations in Angola, Portuguese Guinea, and Cape Verde; and the seeking of diplomatic, moral, and material help for the struggle for freedom in Mozambique.I At the conclusion' of the congress," Iondlane, who 2 had unanimously been proclaimed president, immediately left for New York to present Mozambique's case before the United Nations. With the leaders in Dar organizing things there, Mondlane returned to Syracuse to finish his contract and continued the job of publicizing tha movement and gaining sympathy and aid. Meanwhile, the situation was exploding in Portugal and.the other colonies. In 1958, General Humberto Delgado, who had been a loyal member of the Salazar party, became the ..Ibid., p. 23. Chilcote, Portuguese Africa, p. 120. 2dward Alpers, private interview at UCLA, May 8, 1969.

33 opposition candidate for president. Despite the P.I.D.E.'s brutality and the censoring of his publicity, Delgado was the first anti-Salazar candidate ever to finish the presidentiål race; and, althoujh his supporters were excluåed from the bailot counting, Delgado von 236,528 votes (in the official returns') to 758,.998 for the government candidate, Americo Tomas. Elections were henceforth banned, for the campaign had been a stunxling moral victory. and had aroused Portugal. For his popularity, the General was demoted. Fearing the P.I.D.E., he soon took'refuge in the Brazilian embassy and later escaped to Sao Paulo, only to be found dead in a Spanish field in 1965, apparently assassinated by the P.I.D.E. in an elaborate espionage trap.I Assassination is very much wit4in the style of the Gestapo-trained P.I.D.E. .eanwhile, ex-colonial officer Henrijue Galvo had also escaped to Brazil.' On January 22, 1961, he made a dramatic move against the *Salazar dictatorship: with a small band of followers,. Gålvao hiiäcked the queen. of the Portuguese luxury-liners, the Santa Maria, in :the name of General Delgado.3 "I'Murder by Blunder: The Delgado Affair," Atls September, 1966, pp. 16-17. . . . Rogers,.The Floatin. Revolution,. pp. 24-30. Chilcote, Portuguese Africa;p. 31. See Rogers, The Floatinp. Revolution.

- 34 Expecting Galvao to return to Angola, some sixty foreign journalists went to the capital, Luanda. The Santa Maria went to Recife; but the journalists reported on events when, in the early morning of February 4, 1961, the Luanda prisons were stormed to free political prisoners, such as respected doctor-poet A. Agostinho Neto. The reporters also described the indiscriminate reprisals by the Portuguese against the 'Africans of their city. These events briefly centered world attention upon the dictatorship in Portugal and the plight of its African colonies. The United Nations, condemning Portuguese reprisals, described the brutality with which the Portuguese released their built-up resentment of Africans. Following an unfounded rumor that the mourners had been attacked at the funeral of seven policemen killed in the Luanda prison attack the day before, the Portuguese "organized a massacre of the indigenous population, from which not even groups. of workers on the job in nearby industrial plants had escaped.i1 Between 200 and 300 persons were killed in that incident. Others followed in a repressive campaign of iUnited Nations, Report of the Sub-committee on the Situation in Anfola (General Assembly, Official Records: 16 th Session, New York, 1962), p. 14.

35 Ivioleixce and revenZe that le±'t large uibers of A.fricans lying dead in the streets of Luanda and spread, as the iPortuguese carried repression to areas were there a not benthe slightest' attack upon the European populati on IIn response, on I4arch 15, armed-revolt began in the northern forests of Angrola. Vithin a monthp the irebels had seized several hundred sciuare miles aud were imak,-ing direct attacks upQ31 Portuguese- military.columns. 1The Portuguese responded.with bonbs, nap .alm, and paratroopers. By June, 1,000 Portuguese aud from 10.000 to 30,000, maybe as many as 60,000,..Aricans were 2d IAf'ter many setbacks and dýivision's, by.'1968 the> Angolan guerrilla var vas oneie 'again gaining momentum.. Holden Roberto's Governo Revo1uic i on,ýri o de Anol no 1 ~Exilio. (GRÅAE) hield large -sections ofnorthern Angola; and Agostinho Netol.s Movimento, PoDular de Libertacao de Anýl (1NPLA) - had. o-2?enedl several, offensives in.-the jnorth and in'the Cabindaa region, where the U.S.-owned Gulf Oil Company is developing the vast oil reserves that promise to make Angola a major oil exporter. The IMPLA I.has also opened a major. off ensive on a 500; mile-vide front in the east.- The -have pushed 300 miles*deep.intjo2Ibid. bi this thinly populated part of Angola and are operating near the very center of the country. The strategy of the MPLA's 2,000 well-trained guerrillas, for the past two years, has been to force Portuguese troops to over-extend themselves. The strategy has begun to pay off. Although the Portuguese may have as many as 80,000 troops in this richest of their colonies, they are unable to cover such a large area. They are even unable to mount effective missions against guerrilla camps and must content themselves with flying strafing missions. Ilore importantly, as American reporter Donald Barnett writes, the I.PLA has won the allegiance of the local 2 peasantry and the two are, in effect, one. This is the most irportant characteristic of the three liberation wars in Portuguese Africa--they are all people's wars. The colony in which this process has gone the furthest is Portuguese Guinea. Under the leadership of Amilcar Cabral, the Partido Africano la Inde~endencia da Guin6 e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) has developed a notable refinement upon the Cuban 3 guerrilla model as interpreted by R6gis Debray. The PAIGC hat "prepared the peasantry for revolution before, rather 1Donald Barnett, "Angola: Report from Hanoi II," Ramparts, April, 1969, p. 49. 2Ibid., pp. 49-54. 3R1gis Debray, Revolution in the Revolution? (New York: Grove Press, 19677. -

37 than after, laurching guerrilla action. To do this, the PAIGC maintains a large "civic eucation" program, strong in ideology, to build a common loyalty among the peasant population. In addition, it claims to. have some 20,000 children in Party schools; the Portuguese, as always vague about the number of children in their schools, probably have no more than 3,000. The PAIGC also maintains a medical system, controls internal trade, and attempts to increase crop production despite Portuguese 2 air raids. By 1967, the 10,000 guerrillas of the PAIGC held half the territory in Portuguese Guinea and had ii 3 some 23,000 Portuguese troops holed up in town encampments. The Portuguese seemed unlikely to hold the small Guinean colony much longer. 1iJolm A. Marcum,' "Three Rev01utions,'i Af ri ca Re.ort (spedia1.'issue on Portuguese Africa), November, 1967, p. 18i 2 1. William Zartman,. 'iGuinea: The Qui et' War Goes on," Africa ReDort (pecial issue on Portuguese.Africa), November, 1967, p. -69. * « Ibi :. 7-, ° ", ålå 1 1 -. 1 ..1 . -. ... .

CHAPTER IV BACK TO MOZimfLIQUE In mid-May, 1963, Eduardo Mondlane returned to Africa to assume direct leadership of PRELIMO. But, first, he stopped at Addis Ababa to address the conference of the Heads of State of the Organization of African Unity. He received a warm reception and pledges of support; he returned to Dar es Salaam well-satisfied and in high spirits.I When he arrived in Dar, however, one of the problems that was to plague FRELIMO was obvious. The organization was split and in an uproar, rumors were rampant, and everyone suspected everyone else of treason. Already, FRELIMO had had such a problem with Adelino Gwambe. At the congress establishing FREELIMO, it had been decided to do away with all previously existing organizations. But when Ghambe, the former president of, U)ENANO, who by his own admission had once been a Portuguese agent, failed to be elected a member of FRELINO's central 2 committee, he left for Uganda to announce the dissolution iJanet Mondlane, "News--Dar es Salaam: FRELIMiO" (newsletter sent to friends in June, 1963), p. 1. (Mimeographed.) 2Mondlane, "Crystalization of a Struggle," p. 7. o£ PIZELIMO and call for the formation ofa nev front. His nev ori7anizationi thi U.i»a"o Democratica Nacional de Monomotap,% (UDENA M,0-blonomotopa) failed to gain support but c4used much annoyance to FULIMO.. A second schi'sm occurred while Mondlane was teaching at Syracuse. In.December, 1962t Paulo Gumane and.David Mbunda, the secretary g ener. I al and deputy secretary generalý o£ FRELE1ý10, were ex-pelled after.a series of quarrels with other members. They established ir- Cairo a nev UDE, NAMO the Uniao Dem-o-cra-ti-ca. Nacional, de MoSambigue (UDENAMO-Mo z ambique.)*« Likewise, Mathev Mmole, treasurerof* FRELIMO until his ex,)týlsion, reorganized.the In 1964, it waslearned that, a *Aumb e i: o£ the defeetions.and.expulsio" -from.the par-by had been provoked by one Leo Clinton Aldridge, Jr., who until. that time, as FIMLIMO's publicity I director,- had been known.asLeo Milas. During 1962-63, when ',londlane was at Syracuseý 14ilas had nearly grabbed control o£ the movement... Mondlan I on returning to'Dar, became suspicious- and had Milas investigated. Investigators found that Milas'had been born.in Chicago. and had received a master's degree in Romance.Languages 2 from 'Vhe University of-Southern: California-"-he hadbeeh Chilcote; Portuguese Africa, p*. .121. ?Marcum,, "Three Revolutions,*"ppý~18-19.

40 posing as a Mozambican. Dr. Ronald Chilcote confirmed this story, after having met several persons in California who had known Milas. Meanwhile, after a series of further splits and unions, the various splinter groups formed in June, 1965, in Lusaka, Zambia, the Comite Revolucionario de Mocarbinue (COREMO). Stanley Mvka, a young South African exile, who was one of those in Lusaka, looking backp described them as "irrational, young, and frustrated revolutionaries.'2 COPWM0 has remained highly critical of PRELIMO but has been of little importance otherwise, although its members claim they are organizing an urban underground. But, in May, 1963, when Eduardo Mondlane returned to Dar, FRELIMO was in an uproar. Confusion was general, and the populace and the members did not know what the party was doing. Gwambe and Gumane were issuing newsletters and trying to siphon off members. But, as Mondlane wrote to his wife that Nay: Mozambicans as & whole still trust me and trust my work . . . As you know, most people are illiterate and they are not quite sure as to what makes what run. So it's my job to try and create a picture in 1 Ronald H. Chilcote, private interview at UC Riverside, May 9, 1969. 2Stanley Mvka, .private interview at Pitzer-College, April 30, 1969. Mr. Mvka is a South African exile, studying at Occidental College. 3Marcum, "Three Revolutions," p. 20. their. iinds as to what I am doing and %,hy. Many of our detractors have tried to throv vild oats among our members . . . but, fortunately, their efforts have not succeeded.1 At the formation of FIRLIMO, some of the leaders of the pre-oxisting organizations may have hoped to use Mondlane, as he *as the best-known Mozambican i.n the world. But, on rettrning to Dar, Mondlane made it clear that he was running FRELI1-0. ionald Chileote explained: Encountering the divisions and confusion, he saw that it cculd only be one way: with him as head 9 & . Hle believed very much in discipline up and down the movement. 2 Not that Mondlane was a dictator, as Edward Alpers emphasized: I certainly.don't feel that he le( it £FPPELIM0J around by the nose . . . The decisions seem to have been made in coinr-on, but'ie was the leader and that was accepted.3 From his return, Mondlane busied himself with an endless series of meetings and discussions with the local Mozainbican populace, explaining to them his plans and gaining their c onfidence for the struggle ahead. In his IJanet Mondlane, "News-'Dar es Salaam: FIRELI,0," p. 2. 2Ronald H. Chilcote, private interview at UC Riverside, May 9, 1969. 3Edward Alpers, private interview at UCLA, May 8, 1969. free time, he searched for a house for his wife and children who arrived in July, 1963.1 Edward Alpers described the old house in the Oyster Bay section of Dar that Mondlane finally located. It was a large house, "like an Arizona ranch-house," from the colonial period, very over-grown with a white veranda and fence. "Inside? . . . books, a little furniture, and lots of floor space."2 Mondlane also continued his series of trips abroad to win aid for FRELIMO. In September,, Hondlane was in Cairo.3 From October to December, 1963, he visited the United States (to speak at the United Nations, which has since 1960 condemned Portuguese colonialism), Vest Germany (to protest Vest Germany's close military ties with Portugal),. and China.4 In March, 1964, he was in Ghana;. in April, in Algeria; and, on May Day, he was in Moscow.7 iJanet Mondlane, "News--Dar es Salaam: F LIM0," pp. 2-5. 2Edward Alpers, private interview at UCLA, May 8, 1969. 3Mozaembinue Revolution (Dar es Salaam: FRELIMO),. December, 1963, p. 7. 4Ibid., January, 1964, pp. 7-9. 5Ibid., March, 1964, p. 5., 6Ibid., May, 1964, p. 10. 7ipi7 bi *I . 7.a, * 43. Meanwhile, FRELI.IO soldiers were training in Algeria and the United Arab'Republic. On September 25, 1964, the guerrilla war was launched within Mozambique, in a series of attacks against Portuguese military posts in Cabo Delgado province. By November, the struggle was reaching the provinces of Niassa, Zambezia, and Tete. The Portuguese had under-estimated FRELIMO forces, expecting them to make frontier raids and then to retreat into neighboring countries. But, penetrating deeply into the country, FRELIMO took the Portuguese by surprise, preventing them from making an effective counter attack and enabling FRELIMO guerrillas to consolidate their position 1 2' in Niassa and Cabo Delgado provinces. Not that FRELIM0 had not warned the Portuguese that armed warfare was about to begin. That May, FRELIMO had again called upon the Portuguese people to assert their democratic traditions against the fascist Salazar regime that denies basic rights to both blacks and whites. FRELI0's "Message to the Portuguese in Mozambiclue" warned that "the Salazar goyernment does not give us any option but for an armed struggle . . ." It continued: Now, when an armed struggle is about to be launched against the Portuguese regime in Mozambique, it is important that the Portuguese people in the country hcote, Portuguese kfrica, p. 121.' Chilcoe o~us fia .11 2Mondlane, "Nationalism and Development in Mozambicue," Part III, pp. 1-2.* define their position. Our struggle is not against the Portuguese people but against the system of colonial oppression.I And so, on September 25, the guerrillas launched their co-ordinated attacks on ten military posts. By October 3, FPRjLIHO reported that twenty Portuguese soldiers had been killed in action.2 The Portuguese, however, refused to confirm any reports of disturbances in the colony. The Portuguese allow no reporters into their colonies; and, of course, all news is censored. Because of this, Western newspapers, which generally rely upon Lisbon sources, found it hard to believe that a large guerrilla war was being waged in Mozambique, when the Lisbon govern.ment denied having any trouble there. However, by July, 1965, FiRELIMO was claiming nearly 1,000 Portuguese troops dead; and the Portuguese could no longer deny that northern Mozambique was in a state of revolution. Even Lord Kilbracken, in a series of articles for the London Evening Standard, reprinted in the Rhodesian press, admitted the extent of guerrilla gains. No friend of FRELIMO, Kilbracken had been invited to Mozambique by the Portuguese; but, after ten days in the area, he reported: 1Mozambijne Revolution (Dar es Salaam: FR3LINO), May, 1964, pp. 2-3. 2Chilcote, Portuguese Africa, p. 121.

45 1,40zAw3r2up. (TANGANY1KA) Ib M"da ZAMBIA lbo o ka-GADO TETE Guf L el 0 Tot* 8tztA "ODESIA c.AZA Man >t djý a SOUTH cr óUR&t4;C>MÅ GUtS TONGA$ --Tr;bdn~* AFRICA. j

46 In three thousand terrorized square miles the Portuguese, both civil and military, are confined to five small garrisons . . . Not one white settler dares stay in the area . . . The FRELIMO are a tough and elusive enemy . at home in the jungle and bush, where they live off the country, striking silently by night, withdrawing swiftly into the dense cover if the Portuguese reply in strength.1 Meanwhile, the Portuguese responded with a scorched earth program and "cut a swathe of devastation around the rebellious area, razed villages, destroyed crops, and evacuated inhabitants."2 Thousands of refugees swarmed across the Rovuma River into Tanganyika. FRELINO soldiers, however, had strict orders not to attack Portuguese civilians and to concentrate on military targets.3 But, as the fighting continued, Portuguese atrocities continued. Reports continually came in of the torturing of prisoners, executions, and indiscriminate killings. The worst example of these was the attack upon unarmed Africans in Mueda at a village meeting in front of the Portuguese administrative headquarters in 1966. Because the village elders had.presented a list of grievances the day before, the administrator decided to make an example of Mueda. lie called the villagers to a public ceremony to announce his solutions. Then, at his signal, 1Lord Kilbracken, "Portugal Fights Bitter Var Against F1ZELIMI,". (Rhodesian) Chronicle, September 29, 1965, p. 3. 2Marcum, "Three Revolutions," p. 19. 3 Mozambique Revolution (Dar es Salaam: FRELIM[0), December, 1965-January and February, 1966, p. 11.

Portuguese troops in hiding opened fire with machineguns and grenades. The attack lasted ten minutes and killed 500 M1ozambicans. Because of these tactics,. several Portuguese soldiers deserted to FiELIM0. As one explained: I did not accept the orders I was given to burn houses, massacre the population, and destroy *crops*2 Another described how the Portuguese soldiers are told by the officers that they are fighting just a few bandits who are being helped by Russians, Chinese, Cubans, Algerians, and Tanzanians: They tell us that the difficulties of the war stem from the fact that strangers are fighting against Portugal, that they have already seen white men and that if it were only l.ozambicans they could be easily caught.3 "A comrade, who had escaped with him, described the day they received orders to go to Mueda: In Nampula everyone talked about Mueda. Every day there were soldiers coming from there, killed, wounded, and crippled. I arrived in Mueda on the 12 May 19683-Information Bulletin (Cairo: FRELIM0), June-July, 1966, pp. 3-4. 2Mondlane, "Nationalism and Development in Mozambique," Part III, p. 3. 3Mozambiique Revolution (Dar es Salaam:-FRELIHO), October-December, 1968, p. 6.

48 it was in a state of war. I didn't know whether it was against Tanzania or what. The officers said the war was against Russia.1 A fourth soldier described the low morale of the Portuguese troops. Fearful, unhappy, badly treated by the officers, and largely illiterate, they desire only to return to Portugal. Disgusted, after his company attacked a defenseless village of old People, women, and children,.he decided to run away: I know that some people will say I betrayed my country. But I did not betray her: it was me who was betrayed just as all the people of Portugal are being betrayed: because the poor people in Portugal are very badly treated. Although edited by FRELIMO, these statements probably are not exaggerated. The morale among Portuguese troops is low. They are often sent out with improper provisions; and, they much'prefer leaving their fortified positions in mechanized vehicles than on foot. There is much prejudice on the part of officers toward enlisted or conscripted men, particularly toward conscripted white Mozambicans; and, while black Mozambicans are conscripted into the army, none serve in operational zones. lIbid., p. 6. 21bid., pp. 6-9. . 3Kilbracken, "Portugal Fights Bitter Var Against FRELIMO," p. 3.

49 Further, unrest in.Portugal is growing. Despite suppression, student demonstrations continue and the democratic opposition maintains its underground. Thousands of workers emigrate across the frontier for jobs; and conscription calls rise:.in proportion to population, Portugal now has five times the number of soldiers in Africa that the United States has in Vietnam.I Because of this, and despite Portuguese atrocities, FRELINO has treated Portuguese deserters well, knowing that others may follow. But,. the guerrillas.have also granted clemency to prisoners: "For if the soldiers in Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea begin to question their presence here, and to act accordingly, as did these deserters, they might eventually:start to question their situation at home."2 As .FRELIMO emphasizes, it is the same system oppressing the Portuguese people, that exploits the Mozambican people. Although in September, 1964, FRELIMO began the guerrilla war with scarcely 250 trained and armed men, by 1967 FR3ELIMO had an army of over 8,000 well- trained 1Basil Davidson, "Africa after SalazarI" !West Africa, October 5, 1968, p. 1169. 2 Mozambique Revolution (Dar es Salaam: PRELIm0), October-December, 1968, p. 11. and equipped guerrillas.I Generally operating in small mobile units of from six to twelve men, they are adept at mining and ambushing Portuguese patrols and supply convoys. For larger operations, they group into companies and battalions. They have kept the 50,000-60,000 Portuguese troops in Mozambique mainly on the defensive and, by 1967, were beginning to attack the few bases and garrisoned towns in the north which the Portuguese still held, but rarely left, except by air. The most important refinement FRELIMO has made upon the Cuban guerrilla model of Regis Debray has been the maintainence of political supremacy over the military. To ensure this, the twelve regional commanders of FIRELIO0 are organized into a defense council, headed by the secretary of defense. -The defense council meets nearly every month and its meetings are presided over by either the president, the vice-president, the secretary of external affairs, or the secretary of defense. Then, through the secretary of defense, the council reports to the central cormmittee which meets every six months, reviews FPILIMO 2 operations, and reaches decisions by simple majority vote. 1Mondlane, "Nationalism and Development in Mozambique," Part III, p. 2. S2Narcum, "Three Revolutions," p" 19.,

51 FIZELIII0, now, effectively controls most of the two northern provinces of Niassa and Cabo Delgado, nearly a fifth of the country, where an estimated 800,000 people lived before the fighting began. In this area, FRELIMO is creating a new system of government. Probably the most important result of FRELIMO operations, as most obervers report, has been the change in the spirit Of the people.. 'No longer must they pay Portuguese taxes. No longer are they forced to laboi or grow compulsory cash crops. For the first time, they are asked to participate in administration; and they see that the Portuguese are an enemy that can be fought. The Mozambicans exhibit all the spirit and comradry of other peoples when united in a comrmon cause against an oppressor. With the withdrawal of Portuguese administrators and "concession-holding" companies, FRMLIM0 began to fashion the prototype of a new state and a new, if rudimentary, economic system. Internal and external trade have been. expanded. Agricultural production has been reorgainized on the basis of a co-operative system, with FRELIM!0 giving advice and implements. The guerrilla army plays an active part in this agricultural program; each company cultivates 1b.-.

52 some land "both in order to provide food for themselves and to set an example to the population."I In FELIIIO's agricultural program, foodcrops have been given top priority' although the production of cash crops has continued in areas where the land and labor make it impossible to grow adequate food supplies. Export figures. for 1966 were: . Cashew nuts 500 tons Sesame seed 100 tons Groundnuts -100 tons Castor oil seed 10 tons2 The fact that they can export.crops is testimony to their success; and, now, the proceeds of these crops benefit the producers, as FRELIMO barters the crop in Tanzania for much-needed clothing, soap, and salt. "The proof of the success and popularity of this reorganization is that more land is.now under cultivation, despite the threat of air raids and war conditions, than under the Portuguese. FRELIMO has also organized small-scale industries, and certain areas are now exporting surplus soap and salt IMondlane,l"Nationalism and Development in.Mozambique," Part III, p. 6. 2Ibid., Part III, p. 7.' 3 arcum, "Three Revolutions," p. 19., 4Mondlane, "Nationalism and Development-in Mozambique," Part III, p. 6. to other regions. Also, FiMLINO has been encouraging and exporting craft and ait work, in additionto agricultural products. Iore striking is the work FlELIMO has done in the fields of public health and education. When the Portuguese withdrew, they took with them whatever health and educational services had existed for a tiny percentage of the population. However, in "liberated zones," FRELIMO has established a system of "bush clinics," organized in such a way that one can be transferred from a small health center to a larger one when necessary. This way, medical aid-of some sort is available to the people of every region. -In the past two years, 100,000 people have been vaccinated against smallpox: "None of these people had been vaccinated by the Portuguese, few of them had even heard-of. vaccination or seen a medical officer of any sort."2 Local campaigns against typhoid, tetanus, and tuberculosis have 'also begun...., An unusual dimension of FRELI0's revolution has been its emphasis upon education.. Realizing the need for educated personnel,_ FIELIMO has considered education to be-of top priority from the beginning. By 1967, 100 primary schools had been started in Cabo Delgado province. These 100 schools are teaching some 10,000 children withpupil/teacher ratios of from 25:1 to 250:1. Clearly, the demand is greater lbid., Part III, p. 7. 21bid., Part III, pp. 8-9. than can be met; but the system is being steadily expanded. In 1968, new schools were opened in Niassa, where ten teachers are beginning to educate another 2,000 children. Thus,-after less than four years, FR"LIMO is educating more black Mozambicans than the Portuguese are in the entire colony. It is impressive that, while materials were donated, the personnel and organization of this primary school system and various adult literacy drives have been provided entirely by FRELIMO. Further, in 1963, a secondary school, the Mozambique Institute, was started by. Janet Iondlane in Dar es Salaam to prepare primary school graduates for universities abroad. The Institute now has fifteen teachers and 130 students; and, while in 1962, under the Portuguese, there were only fifteen black Mozambicans in institutions higher than secondary school anywhere in the world, FRELIMO has now placed 150 Mozambicans in various universities in Europe, America, Asia, and Africa.2 The Institute has also'undertaken the preparation of a primary and secondary school syllabus complete with "new math, reconstructed Mozambican history, African art, and a good dose of FRLIM4O 'civics.''3 No longer does Ibi.., Part III, pp. 7-8.-. 2Helen Kitchen, "Conversation with Eduardo Nondlane," Africa Ienort (special issue on Portuguese Africa), November, 1967, p. 50. 3Narcum, "Three Revolutions," p. 19. primary school education consist chiefly of the religion, history, and geography of Portugal. "Now the history and geography of Hozambique comes first . . * the Portuguese occupation is put in perspective," and instruction is secular "so that people of all religious beliefs can now feel free to attend."1 Probably the only cultural remnant of the Portuguese occupation is the language, for Portuguese is the language of instruction in FR3iLIMO schools.. Although most of the leaders in Dar speak English, Portuguese is the most Widely'known language; and,* as Edward Alpers explains: "It is a language with a real beauty. People who speak it like it. I know he [Eduardo ondlanej felt that way."2 Thus, in liberated territory, FRELI4O has been laying the foundations of a: modern state. It has even begun the codifying of'a new set of laws.3 When Eduardo Mondlane was asked what sort of state Mozambique would be when independent, he replied that "Mozambique will be a democratic, modern, unitary, single-party state" on the model of Tanzania. Mondlane went on: We:can't tell exactly what form the governmental system is going to take, but we do know that we do 1ondlane, "Nationalism and Development in Mozambique," Part III, p. 10. 2Edward Alpers, private interview at UCLA, May 8, 1969. 3Marcum, "Three Revolutions," p. 19.

56 not intend to be either a capitalist or:comriunist, but rather a socialist state . . The. natural resources of the coutry--the land, the minerals, and everything that God has given this country--should belong to the people, not to foreigners There is, of course, another reason we must think in terms of a socialist economy . . We Mozambicans have no capital, none whatsoever. We have no chance to inherit anything from Portugal, or to accumulate wealth on our own ... We have to start with what is available . . . the state. The state will have control'of all natural resources, and the people will invest their energies in the activities of the state. Any private interest from anywhere in the world that might wish to participatte will have to deal with the state, and the terms and conditions will be determined by negotiation. Now the third point about which we feel very strongly is the freedom of men, of individual men As they become free, therefore, they will demand to be listened to by the new government of Mozambique and they will want to have a say in determining what they want to do with themselves. In cooperation .... we will form a new economic system that will make them Cthe people] wish to participate in the construction of a new Mozambique, a new life.1* The Salazar regime has'little sympathy for such a dream. Faced with revolt in Africa, the Portuguese government has responded with a few paper reforms but, mostly, with suppression, more troops, and greatly increased defense spending. By 1965, military spending amounted to $262,500,000 or nearly .42.per cent of the national budget.2 In 1967, it was again increased to about 47 per cent of iKitchen, "Conversation with Eduardo Mondlane," p.51. 21nternational Conciliation, September, 1966, p. 77. of the budget. In addition, each year the colonies contribute a major share of their budgets for defense: Angola spent $21.9 million in 1966; Mozambique $23 million in 1967; and Portuguese Guinea $1.07 million in 1965.2 Further, the Salazar regime has pushed the draft age down to eighteen and up to forty-five; the length of service has been extended to three and, in some cases, 3 four years. Last year, the government announced that women and those unfit for service, even the "deaf and 4 blind," are to be recruited for auxiliary services., The Salazar regime, for nearly forty years, has tightly held Portugal within its grasp. To maintain order, the ascetic professor has spent on the military and police rather than on health or education. Because, until the 1960's, he allowed very few foreign investments, economic development has proceeded slowly; the Portuguese people are among the worst educated, worst paid, and worst housed in Europe. Illiteracy is at 40 per cent; per capita income is $300 per year, which is exaggerated because of IMondlane, "Nationalism and Development'in Mozambique," Part III, p. 3." 2William A. Hance, "Three Economies," Africa Report (special issue on Portuguese Africa), November, 1967, p. 24. 3Basil Davidson, "Africa after Salazar," Vest Africa, September 28, 1968, p. 1125. 4Mondlane, "Nationalism and Development in Mozambique," Part III, p. 4. the very uneven distribution of wealth. Most farm workers (45 per cent of the labor force) probably make less than $200 a year. Another characteristic of the regime has been its suppression of Portuguese cultural life. With faculty purges and the arrests of writers and artists since the 1930's, a cultural gap has been created in the intellectual elite that had once opposed the. Salazar regime. Portugal has become a police state. The.P.I.D.E. (Policia Internacional de Defesa do Estado), modeled on and trained by the German Gestapo, operates an elaborate system of informers. Along with several large paramilitary groups, it breaks up strikes and battles student demonstrators. With laws allowing detention periods* of up to nine months, with hundreds of documented cases of torture and assassination, with use of the isolated "concentration 2 camp" of Tarrafel on a Cape Verde island,. the P.I.D.E. is widely feared and is the essential basis of the Salazar regime' s strength. The main beneficiaries of the regime are, however, small group of eleven wealthy families, which, under the "corporate state" structure of Salazar's New State, control 1Chilcote, Portuguese Africa, pp. '27-29. 2Ibi d.$ p. 31.

59 the land and the few industries of Portugal. These families want no change in the dictatorial order in Portugal, and they want no change in Africa. There are good economic- reasons for these Portuguese to desire to hold on to their African colonies: the Portuguese colonies are very wealthy in natural resources. The Portuguese are too underdeveloped to efficiently exploit them, but still the colonies in small quantities export: tea, diamonds, uranium, bauxite, iron ore, manganese, coal, beryllium, sisal and coconut. Angola and Mozambique are the main money-makers, with their sugar and cotton filling Portugal's needs and half of Angola's coffee being bought by the United States. Further, all three colonies supply a market for Portugal's exports (mostly sardines, wine, and cotton goods) and, at reducedprices, provide Portugal with much-needed products, such as cotton for Op6rt6.s textile industry. Thus, the Portuguese colonies supply revenue for the government, which relies on indirect taxes for 40 per cent of its revenue, so as not to tax the wealthy.1 Further, during the early 1960's, the colonies were contributing more than 35 million pounds to the Portuguese balance of payments.2 This is no longer enough to cover the cost of maintaining bid., p. 27. Jose IIonorio Rodriques, Brazil and Africa, trans. by lichard Mazzara and Sam Iileman (Berkeley: UC Press,' 1965), p. 290.

120,000 troops in Africa; however, if the Portuguese hold out for a few more years, military expenses may be covered by the return from new foreign investments, 1 such as Gulf Oil's initial $15 million in Cabinda. Therefore, fearful of losing investors who might enable them to keep their colonies, the Portuguese reassure the world that all is under..control in Portuguese Africa. After the armed revolts began, the Portuguese announced some reforms, which have had little effect in Portuguese Africa, although they did lower tariffs between the colonies and Portugal.and'aided-the development of much-needed infrastructure services such as roads and markets. On the basis of these, the Portuguese launched a propaganda campaign with three main themes: The first of these is their historical rght: they were the first to discover Africa and after 500 years they have a right to their colonies. This is as if their "achievement, at first so'vast and ultimately so slight, were greater than that of British imperialism. " As we have seen, effective Portuguese control of their colonies dates only from the turn of the century. The second excuse for Portuguese colonialism is the myth of the unity of the empire: since 1951, the "Barnett, ' !'Angola: Report. fr6m Hanoi-II, p1 49. 2Rodriques, Brazil and Africa, p. 259.

Portuguese have called their colonies "overseas provinces," as though a title could aisguise the fact that Angola, N0-:zarbique, and Portuguese Guinea are colonies. The third theme .is that of assimilation of the iopulation: whereby the Portuguese rather successfully convince the world that they are not racially prejudiced. In fact,, the Portuguese are less prejudiced than other Europeans; their prejudice is not an emotional reaction but rather is based upon class and education. However, in the colonies, a "colonial mentality" develops: "A poor Portuguese in Portugal is a poor Portuguese; but, a poor Portuguese in Africa is white and part of the ruling class.'1 As we have seen, assimilation has affected only a tiny fraction of the African population: in 1960, some 35,000 . in Angola and some 5,000-in Mozambique.2 Along with the failure of assimilation goes the failure of miscegenation. The Portuguese say they are creating "new Brazils" in Africa; however, a patriarchal plantation system existed in Brazil that never existed in Portuguese Africa. In 1960, there were only 30,000 mestizos in Angola, and 25,000 in Mozambique.3 Unfortunatöly,notterribly interested in southern Africa, most Western newspapers and magazines accept the " IEdward Alpers, private interview at UGLA, May 8, 1969. * 2flodriques, Brazil and -Africa, p. 262.3Ibi&1.

62 Portuguese story; however, Eduardo Mondlane, because of his American background, was the man most effective at countering Portuguese propaganda. Because of this, as Stanley Mvka said: "They both feared and respected him.''I The Portuguese, however, do not rely only upon foreign investmeftts to hold their African colonies. As a member of NATO, Portugal received some $500 million worth of weapons from 1951-1961.2 This military aid continues; and, while the United States and Britian have declared officially that NATO arms will not be used in the Portuguese territories, the impossibility of inspection, plus very doubtful good faith, makes prohibition impossible. The United States finds itself in a very difficult position, for the Azores base, which handles nearly SO per cent of the U.S. military traffic to Europe, is vital to the Atlantic Alliance.3 The Portuguese, meanwhile, renew the lease, which earns them $100 million in benefits, each year with continued U.S. acquiescence in Africa as the prerequisite to renewal.4 In addition, Vest German military assistance to Portugal is growing. Along with military advisers, Vest 1Stanley Nvka, private interview at Pitzer College, April 30, 1969. 2Aondlane, "The Struggle for Independence in Mozambique," p. 278. 3New York Times, April 13, 1962, p. 17. 4Rodrigues, Brazil and Africa, p. 372.

Germany sent some 10,000 modern machineguns, an unknown number of heavy Mercedes-Benz trucks, and some sixty F86 fighter planes to Angola and Mozambique. West Germany is completing the Luftwaffe airbase at Beja, Portugal, built according to the NATO treaty provision allowing bilateral defense pacts between members. West Germany has also built an armaments factory at Bravo de Prata, where many of the small-arms for Portuguese troops are made. Portuguese-OWest German ties are not only military. After South Africa, West Germany is now Portugal's main trading partner; and, Iest German inve'stments in Portugal are rapidly increasing. Between the end of 1965 and September, 1967, West German-investments in P6rtugal increased by 96.4 per cent, from 28 million marks in 1965 to 55 million marks in 1967. The two governments have even reached an agreement on the exploitation of emigrant labor, whereby Portugal receives 80,000 escudos (approximately $23) for. every worker going to the"Federal. Republic. In'addition, the West Germans have considerable interests in Angolan and Mozambican mineral deposits. Krupp's iron ore center in Angola exports over 8 million tons of high quality iron ore each year, and Vest German firms have received Portu1Hozambinuo Revol-tion (Dar es Salaam: FELIHO), September 25, 1968, lip. -21. 2Ministerio da Razenda do Portugal, Comercio Especial: 1967 Resumo nor Palses e Territ6rios de Origem e de Consumo !Lisboa, 196)7, pp. 50-52.

64 guese permission to raine uranium and thorium deposits in Mozambique and to seårch for oil.I Thus Portugal, the poorest country in Western Europe, with a large army whose maintainence severely strains her resources and is conscripted from an oppressed and illiterate peasantry, had by 1968 still managed to hold on to her African colonies. Ilowever, domestic unrest was growing; and, all the while, people were wondering what would happen when the seventy-nine-yearold Salazar was gone. ilMozarnbipue Revolution (Dar es Salaam: FRELImo)', September 25, 1968, p. 21.

CHAPTER V ONE LAST YEAR AND ITS ÅrTEMR4ATHl The last year of Bduardo llondl ane's lire began badly. In 4arch, 1968; ,dissident Mozambicans attackedJRELIMO I's headq.uarters in Da.r es Salaam and r ore-ed the ciosing of the Mozambicjue Institute for several months. Reportedly wanting "new leaders," the .dissidents were migrant and unernployecl lakonde'*tribesmen from Cabo Delgado, led by Father Mateus-Gwengere, amilitant Cathoiic priest who had fled M.ozambique in*midl-1967.*'' Gwengere accused-Mondlane of being pro-American, of having too many' white f ri ends' a.nd a white wire.. Resisting racit.pressures, as he always. had, Maondlane ef±'ectively replied that he vanted to, '-i l l certain whites:- "not because of their race, but because thoy w.e.r.e.,he. oppressors of his peopie. However, in. Ma., diss ideunts aeaini attackedl FRELIMO headlquarters, .wounding several ofl'icers and stabbing to death Mateus M- uthemba,. a menber of FRELIM'O s, central c om-mittee. N

PFfELIMO's young, brilliant military commander, had been kidnapped in Malawi by the P.I.D.E. He escaped only to be later assassinated on a mission in Zambia. Later, SSmuel Kamk hombe, a FRELIMO deputy commander, was found 2 shot to death in Tanzania. Eduardo Mondlane began to worry. le gave his own interpretation of recent events in a letter to Edward Alpers, in March, 1968: "As we grow.more successful, the Portuguese will have to use more and more disruptive efforts'., IIondlane knew that his own death would be a very harsh and perhaps fateful blow to the movement he had been building since 1962. "There were too many things to be made secure and firm; too many incipient conflicts within this growing independence movement to be brought into the open, resolved, removed; too many questions, of international attitudes to be developed andmade. er anc m~eclear.. And, whether the disturbances in Dar had been Portuguese promoted or not, the talk of schism within FRELIMO had to be settled. Therefore, in the last twelve months of his life, Eduardo Mondlane worked for his movement, for his dream of IRonald H. Chilcote, private interview at UC Riverside, May 9, 1969. 2Time, February 14, 1969, p. 36. '3Edward Alpers, private interview at UCLA,- May 8, 1969. 4Basil Davidson, "Eduardo Mondhlane, " West Africa, February 15, 1969, p. 117. a £u-ture Mozariibique, vithý a "drive and understanding that surprisea even his friends.11 In those twelve months, he settled whatever disputýes there were; and he carried PIZELII-10 to a level ofýor-anization.that raay make it llunbeatable. no matter wliat individual l.osses it might suffer.'11 Mue h of this wor1,c.was consumiated a L triumphan-6 Second Congress, held in Julyg 1968ý vithin Mozai-abique,,.in the province *of Niassa. The Congress marked the political-military maturity of PRELIMO and .proved to be'a areat propaganda victory over the Portuguese. The divisions within.the movement were settled ås dissident 1?rovincial politicians tror-i Cabo Delgado. aired their grievances. All-was., settled p'eaceably in. f.avor of uni-Ly,.under Mondlane. The 150-odd délegates enthusiastically and unani.mously re-elected Mondlai:Le 2 ,President. Purtlilerýý 1-16ndlane save in to the demands of younger people in lower echelon positions* The.central. committee was.enlarged f rom t<ýenty-f our...Members' to fortyfour; and ereater authority andinitiative were granted to. those, in the field "within Moz . amb i que so as 'to respond more effectively to the daily reý.,lities of.guerrilla Ibid. Ibid*

68 warfare. As Basil Davidson, one of the two Western journalists permitted to attend the Congress, concluded: There is no doubt . . . about its CFrMLIMQ having come out of this well-organized congress a good deal -stronger still.1 Davidson.explainod also that the Portuguese had tried hard to kill Mondlane and his companions during the Congress; and that, somehow, on the last afternoon of the assembly, a Portuguese spotter plane managed to locate their campsit'e. The next day, Portuguese bombers obliterated the site; but Mondlane and 2 everyone else had left the night before. Because the Portuguese failed to destroy them, the Congress, held within Mozambique and settling FRELIMO's problems, was a tremendous propaganda victory over the Portuguese. Meanwhile, the guerrilla war reached new heights in. Mozambique. In the'first year, F'RELIMO guerrillas had fought mainly with whatever rifles, maachineguns~ibazogkas, and grenades they could get. In 1968, there was still a shortage of weapons; FRMLIMO now had 10,000 trained guerrillas and could only arm 8,000 of them.3 But, now, with new weapons--mortars, recoilless rifles, and light anti-aircraft artillery--the war entered a new stage.. FRELIM40 guerrillas Davidson, "Africa after Salazar," p. 1169. II 21bid.. 34iozambique Revolution (Dar es Salaam: FRELINO), September 25, 1968, p. 7. began destroying Portu

Recently, the Angolan war has taken a dramatic turn for the worse. That was before a peck-at this plum of southern Africa has in the past twelve months become a substantial bite which in turn has affected the security of the entire sub-continent . . . Angola has become the focus of the most intense guerrilla warefare southern Africa has seen to date.l Militarily, the Portuguese position was desperate. In early, 1968, the government had split on whether to abandon Portuguese Guinea,. so as to reinforce Angola and Mozambique with the troops that were holding what was left of the Guinean colony. But, the pressure by the monopolist trading company in Guinea, the Unito Fabril (the war is popularly known in Lisbon as the "company's war"), was so great that Dr. Salazar decided that the abandonment of Guinea would demoralize anti-guerrilla operations in Portugal's other African colonies.2 Then, on September 7, 1968, Dr. Salazar-suffere& a brain hemorrhage and had to be removed from power. A few days later, Narcelo Caetano was chosen premier; and, although it is doubtful that he will cause much change, it is unclear with what determination Caetano will follow Salazar's policies. Not a decision of importance has been made in Portugal without Salazar's approval since 1935. Meanwhile, for the first time in ajdecade, mass opposition Ian Robertson, "Apartheid's Empire," The'Nation, May 12, 1969, p. 599. 2Davidson, "The Portuguese Retreat," p. 1317.

71 rallies took place in Portugal. With new guerrilla attacks and Salazar's illness, the Portuguese situation was even more desperate. "As we grow more successful, the Portuguese will have to use more and more disruptive efforts,".. . Mondlane had said" ' "They both feared and respected him .... they both feared and respected him. Was this when the P.I.D.E.,-faced with the regime's fall in Africa and:unrest at. home, decided on a drastic move?. At any rate, on February 3, 1968, the big, laughing black man, the scholar turned guerrilla leadIer, received a book and a bomb;. and.Eduardo :"ondlane was dead. The assassination of. Mondlane was a serious blow to FLI-'O, how serious can only remain to be seen. He had pulled FRELIMO together from a group of dissident, quarreling factions; he had.given by his leadership a unity the Mozambican liberation movemen.t had lacked; ho had given it reason and foresiglit, difficult qualities to maintain in the heat of guerrilla war; he had emphasized New York Times, February 2,,1969, p. 24.: 2Stanley Ivka, private interview at Pitzer College, April 30, 1969. education and health services for the masses;. he had fought racism; he had built the beginnings of a modern state. But Mondlane had not worked alone. He had the help of Uria Simango, FRELIi1iO's vice-president; Marcelino dos Santos, secretary for external affairs; Jorges Rebelo, information secretary; Samora Machel., defense secretary; Louren~o Mutaca, finance secretary;. and military, com'anders such as Raimundo, Mabote, and Manganza of Delgado, Niassa, and Tete provinces.2 These men and others will continue Mondlane's work in FRELIMO and the unfolding of Ilondlane's vision for Mozambique. But, by necessity, there will be changes, different emphases, if not different goals. The Western press speculated on this as reporters predicted a serious power play within FRELIMO between Mondlane's two top lieutenants, Simango and dos Santos, who were portrayed as pro-Chinese and pro-Russian respectively. However, no powerplay has yet developed; and, according to the by-laws of FRPELIMO, Simango, as vice-president, became temporary president until party elections can be held, again within Mozambique, later this year.3 Marcum, "Three Revolutions," p. 19. Davidson, "Africa after Salazar," p. 1169. 3Mozambique Revolution (Dar es Salaam; FRELINO), January-February, 1969, p. 5.

73, The Western press, relying upon Lisbon sources, hinted that Mondlane had been pro-American and had been killed by rival leaders "who look to Communist China for inspiration." But, as Janet McLaughlin, of the American Committee on Africa said, a bom in the mail "was just not an African way of killing."2 The evidence is still circumstantial; but, it points more to the Portuguese P.I.D.E., than to Mozambicans, as the assassins. If'so, the assassination of Mondlane was the most important -in a history of killings by the P.I.D.E., that has included General Delgado and other Portuguese opposed to the dictatorship, and Jaime Sigauke and other FRELIMO leaders. During the months preceding Mondlane's assassination, one should remember several developments: there was the heightening of the war; the illness of Salazar; and, also, the tour by Americo Tomas. of the colonies and the desperate attempt by the Portuguese' to make the world believe that all was well, so as not to frighten off investors. Then, soon after Mondlane's death, there was the massive Portuguese propaganda campaign about Lazaro*Kavadame's defection to the Portuguese. The Portuguese called him a iTime, February 14, 1969, p. 35. 2janet McLaughlin, private interview in New York City, April 10, 1969. -Janet McLaughlin is with the American Committee on Africa and had known Eduardo Nondlane for several years.

74' paramount chief and a leader of the revolt. The New York Times reported that the official newspapers in Lisbon stressed that Kavadame was "the undisputed leader of the Makondes andthat his tribesmen would undoubtedly follov him, out of discipline or fear. As usual, these reports were far from reality. The Makondes have no such over-all chief, and there have been no defections. Although the sixty-two-year-old chief had once been a member of FRELIM0' s central committee, the committee had foreseen his change in allegiance and had expelled him from FRELIMO more than a year ago. Kavadame had become an associate of Father Gwengere and had then been placed under~house arrest in Tanzania, from2, whence he escapedto the Portuguese,. As Ronald Chilcote summed up: The Portuguese are very successful at buying out tribal chiefs . . . Kavadame was an individual who had been favored under the Portuguese system before. He probablywent over to the rebels onlybecause they . came to'control his area.3 The series of propaganda moves by the Portuguese, the unity within FIZELIMO following the July Congress, .New York Times, April 6, 1969, p. 13." New York D News, April 4, 1969, p. 17. 2Ne Yor Times, April 6, 1969, p. 10. 3Ronald H. Chilcote, private int'erview at UC Riverside, May 9, 1969.

75 indeed the "unemotional, cool, and planned?" way in which Mondlane was killed, make the Portuguese the most likely assassins. But, whoever killed Eduardo Mondlane has dealt FRELIHO a serious blow. How serious can not be told yet; however, the guerrilla war is entering a critical stage that could cause its explosion into alarger war. South Africa is underwriting the $550 million Cabora Bassa project in the Tete region of Mozambique. hen completed, Cabora Bassa will be the largest hydroelectric dam in Africa; and most of its power will be conveyed 800 miles to the Witwatersrand industrial complex in the Transvaal. Along the 150-mile-long artificial lake that it will create on the Zambezi River, the Portuguese are planning an industrial complex for hundreds of thousands of Portuguese immigrants. The guerrillas, however, in last year's offensive, began military operations in T'ete, xith the obvious intention of linking up with Rhodesian guerrillas across the. 2, border.2 Further, FRELIMO has vowed to halt construction on the project. IJanet McLaughlin, private interview in New York City, April 10, 1969. 2, Thomas Land, "Hydroelectric Battle Plan," The Nation, May 12, 1969, p.. 598.

76 SOUT1 -I tFI C A i$ PtYWER PIROJECTSI i. i. ] ...... -p, N.r ,,-g, zfu 05 p * ,..0* mio. EWu~fA~J~Jff/~

77 Should the Portuguese not be able to continue due to guerrilla attacks or sabotage, it is doubtful the South Africans will react calmly to a threat upon their power sources. The South Africans are already reportedly supplying "police, advisors, and helicopters to the Portuguese. They are also assisting in another power project on the Kunene River in Angola, as South Africa's power needs will doubled by the early 1970's; and, also, they are expect'ed to be the main purchasers of Cabinda oil, through a pipeline they are now building. They want the Portuguese colonies as "buffer states" and as economic dependencies. In turn, the Portuguese are now looking to the South Africans for more help; and, as Prime Minister Vorster has said: "Good friends do not need a pact . . . whatever becomes necessary will be done."1 The key to guerrilla warfare in southern Africa is Zambia. Zambia is supporting guerrillas across her borders in Mozambique, Rhodesia, and Angola. With Chinese help, Zambia is completing a railroad to Tanzania so that it will no longer have to depend upon the Benguela Railway in Angola or the Rhodesian and South African railroads for exporting her copper. 1James M. Dodson, "Dynamics of Insurgency in Mlozambique," Africa Renort (special issue on Portuguese Africa), November, 1967, p. 55. .

78, However, in recent monthas, Zambia has been suffering acts of sabotaZe on her bridges andl power lines; and, in April and I4ay of last year, and again early this year. the Portuauese, have bomabed Zambian villages. Alth oughl last year the Portuguese 'denied these'reports, tisyear's.attack.they have officially ,usini canfirmed. There have also been Portugues inients with Tanzania, from which most FRE LI MO0 supplies come. 2 In response,, Presidient Kuanda. of Zambia.has spoken of a,1tdleveloping, Vietnam.- in southern Africa-a full-scale raclial varf.are."ý But,',while the South African press and radio .canvass the possibility of air strikes a,,ainst guerrilla'traininjg bases' in Zambia, Vorster, with his usu al blunt ness, has vandKada: "Ve vill hit youback sohard you will never forget it*"3 South Africa has, -the. largest and most modern armed £orces in Mfrica.: - Althougrh the' tileý of the* war is. nov favoring the:guerrillas inMozambicjuey'Ang ola, and Portug-uese Guinea, should the 'South.Åfrican army enter on the side of the Portucyuesel:'the ,guerrýillas w6uld face nearly impossible.odds. Even with.the black 1Robertson, "IApartheid's Empire,"1 p. 600.2Dodson, lDynamics, of Insurgency in Mozambique.. '.54. Rob;ertson, Apýartheid 1s. Emoe" . 0.

79 nations of Africa fighting on their side, the guerrillas would have a very difficult time. Further, although the United States officially favors.self-determination, it is impossible to say what side the U.S. would be on with, Russian and Chinese- aided guerrillas threatening a NATO ally and millions of dollars worth of U.S. investments. Therefore, without expanded Russian or Chinese aid, the cause of liberation in Portuguese Africa could face a halt. But, the likelihood of expanded Russian aid is quite high; the Russians may move a fleet from the Mediterranean to the anyway, following the British pull-out east of Suez. Meanwhile, South Africans are already talking ominously of "secret weapons," perhaps a missile system, being established on their northern border.2 Southern Africa may unfortunately become an area of general and massively destructive warfare. The guerrillas of PRELIMO are facing their greatest challenge yet. It can onl3 be hoped that the work of Eduardo Mondlane will be completed.* But, because of the work of his last year, FRELIMO is in INoel ostert2 "High Stakes Southeast of Suez," The Reporter, March 7, 1969, p. 20. 2Robertson, "Apartheid's Empire," p. 600.,

80 a strong position. One day, despite opposition, the historical anachronism of colonialism in Africa will be ended.

SOUIRCES CONSULT .. Th'E W ITINES OF EDUARDO MONDLANE Mondlane, Eduardo. "Nemorandum to the Foreign irinisters of the Organization of African Unity, Meeting in Cairo, U.:A.R., 1964. (Mimeographed.) _ *"Mozambique." Africa in the Modern V-orld. Edited by Calvin W. Stillman. Chicago: University of Chica2o Press, 1955. ._ "Natiönalism and Development in Mozambique." .Pae'r presented to the University of California Project "Brazil-Portuguese Jkfrica" at UC Riverside and UCLA, February 27-28, 1968. (Himeographed.) "The Development of Nationalism in Mozambique." December 3, 1964. (MimeoLtraphed.) ." The Movement for Freedom in Mozambique." -Paper presented at the Nediterranean Congress for Culture, June 20-24, 1964, Palazzio Vecchio, Florence, Italy. (Mireoralhed.,) "The Mozambique Liberation Front: The Crystalization of a Struggle for Freedom." Paper presented at the conference for the Heads of State of the Organization of African Unity in Addis Ababa, May, 1963.~ (limeo raphed.) ______,,&eSt ,gle for Independence in Mozambique." Paper presented-at the "ISouthern Africa in Transition"1 Conference at Howard University, Washington, D.C., April 11-13, 1963. (Nimeographed.) * "The Struggle for Independence in Mozambique." Sonthern Africa in Transition. Edited by John A. Davis and James K. Baker. New York: Preclerick A. Praeger, 1967. Mondlane, Janet and Eduardo. "Portuguese Africa." The Educatei Africa: A Count r-bx-Countrv Survev of Educational Development in Africa. Edited by Ilelen Kitchen. Coinpiled by Ruth Sloan Associates. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962.

82 * BOOKCS Axelson, Eric Victor. Portuyal and the Scramble for Africa, 1875-1891. Johannesburg:. Witwatersrand University Press, 1967. Almeida, Antonio de. Bushmen and other Non-Bantu Peoples of An!oia. Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1965. Birmingham, David. The Portufyuese Conquest of Anola. New York: Oxford,.University Press, 1965. Boxer, C.R. Pour Centuries of Portufnuese Exnansion, 14151825: A Succinct Survey. Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1963., Race Relations in the Portuguese Colonial Empire, 1415-1825. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962. Salvador de Sa and the Strug.le for Brazil and no!a, 1602-1686. Bristol: University. of London, 1952. -Bragan a-Cunha, V. de. Revolutionary Portugal, 1910-1936. 1 London: James Clarke, 1938. Cadbury, William A. Labour in Portuguese West Africa. New York: Dutton, 1910. Chilcote, lonald H. Portuguese Africa. Spectrum Books. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1967. Davidson, Basil. "Congo Destinies." African Independence. Edited by Peter Judd. Laurel Books. New York: Dell, 1.963. _ The African Awrakenins. *London: Jonathan Cape, 1955. Debray, Rggis. Revolution in the Revolution? New York: Grove Press, 1967. Duffy, James. A guestion of Slaverv. Cambridge, Ilass.: Harvard University Press, 1967. _ Portu8al in Africa. Cambridge, tass: Harvard University Press, 1962. . . ..1: ' - ...... *.:...... ,. 1i- * , , . * ; . :.

83 Houser, George M. "Nationalist Organizations in Angola: Status of the Revolt." Southern Africa in Transition. Edited by John A. Davis and James K. Baker. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. Junod, Henri A. The Life of a South African Tribe. London: Macmillan, 1927. Livermore, H.V. A Nev History of Portugal. London:' Cambridgo.University Press, 1966. Moreira, Adriano. Portugal's Stand in Africa. Translated - by William Davis. New York: University Press, 1962. Mozambique. Lisbon: Overseas Companies of Portugal, 1958. Nevinson, Henry W. A Modern Slaveryý, New York: Schocken, 1968. .. .. Oliveira, Mauricio de. Africa de Sonho. Lisboa: Agencia Geral do Ultramar, 1932. Palmer,- R.R., and Colton, Joel. A Historv of the Modern World. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968. Pattee, Richard. Portugal°em Africa. Lisboa: Oficia Grafica, 1959. Rodriques, Jöse Honorio. Brazil and Africa. Translated by Richard Mazzara and Sam Ilileman. Berkeley: UC Press,.. 1965. Rogers,- Warren, Jr. The Floating Revolution. New York: McGraw Hill, 1962. Wheeler, Douglas L. "The Portuguese and Mozambique: The Past Against the Future." Southern Africa in Transition. Edited by John A. Davis and James K. Baker. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. MAGJAZINES African Studies Newsletter. April, 1969.Africa Today. February-March, 1969. Barnett, Donald. "Angola: Report from Hanoi II." Ramparts. April, 1969.

84 Chilcote, Ronald Cabral ." October, H. "The Political Thought of Amilcar Journal of Modern African Studies. 1968. Christian Century. Pebruary 26, 1969.' Dahlberg, Ians. "Mondlane: Our Chances." The New Africa. July, 1965. Davidson, Basil. "Africa after Salazar." West Africa. September 28, 1968; October 5, 1968. "Eluardo Mondhlane." West Africa. February 15, 1969. _ "The Portuguese Retreat." e Africa. November 9, 1968. Dodson, James. M. "Dynamics of Insugency in Mozambique." Africa Report.(special issue on Portuguese Africa).-ý November, 1967. Economist. May ;.217',1966; April 27, 1968.,1 Financial Times. Octobcr 22, 1968; October 30, 1968. Hance, William A. "Three Economies." Africa Report (special issue on Portuguese Africa). November, 1967.-'. Hughes, Glynn. "FRELIMO and the Mozambique Var of Liberation." '/ Monthl: Review. December, 1968. International Conciliation. September 1966.. Kitchen, Helen. "Conversation with Eduardo Mondlane." Africa Pepört (special issue on Portuguese Africa). November, 1967.,.. Land, Thomas. "Ilydroelectric Battle Plan." The Nation. May 12, 1969. arcum, John A. "Three Revolutions." Africa Report (special issue.on Portuguese Africa). November, 1967. Mostert, Noel. "High Stakes Southeast of Suez." The March 7, 1969. Reporter. "Murder by Blunder." stlas. September, 1966. Newsweek. February 17, 1969.

Robertson, Ian. "Apartheid's Empire." The Nation. May 12, 1969. Time. February 14, 1969. Wentzel, Volkmar. "ilogambique: Land of the Good People." National Geogranhic I aaazine. August, 1964. Zartmen, I. William. "Guinea: The Quiet Var Goes On." Africa Report (special issue on Portuguese Africa). November, -1967. NEWSPAPERS . Chronicle (Rholesia). September 29, 30, 1965. Eveninges (Newark, N.J.). August 14, 1968. Los Angeles Tim:,es. February 4, 1969.New York Daily Nes. September 22, 1968; April 4, 1969. New York Times. April 13; 1962; February 16, 18, 1968; December 22, 1968; February 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 13, 16, 1969; April 6, 1969. Rhodesian Herald. October 1, 2, 1965. DOCUMIENTS Chilcote, Ronald H. Unpublished interview with Eduardo Mondlane in Dar es Salaam, September 25-27, 1965. (Typwritten.) "Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane: June .1920-February 1969." Memorial Service, Church Center for the United Nations, February 13, 1969. (Nimeographed.) Information Bulletin (Cairo: FRELIMO). October 4, 1963; June-July, 1966.

Ministerio da Fazenda 1967 Resu-mo po2. e de Consuro. Mondlane, Janet. "New Newsletter sen (Typewritten.) 86. do Portugal. Comercio Especial: r Paises e Territorios de Orirem Lisboa, .1968. s-iDar es Salaam: FRELIMO. t to friends in June, 1963. Mozambique Revolution (Dar es'Salaam: FRELIMO). December, 1963; January, February, March, April, May, June, July, August, September, October, November, December, 1964; January, February, March, May:iJune, October-November, 1965; December,1965January and February, 1966; September 25, 1968; October-December, 1968;. January-February, 1969. United Nations. Report of the Sub-committee on'the Situation in Angola. General Assembly, Official Records: 16th Session, New York, 1962... INTERVIEWS. Edward Alpers. Private interviewat UCLA, May 8, 1969. D r. Edward Alpqrs is an assistant professor of African History at UCLA. He is one of the few authorities on Mozambican pre- .colonial history. During-and after the two years, from July 1966 to February 1968, that Alpers spent in Dar es Salaam teaching at the University of Tanzania, he was a close friend of Eduardo Mondlane. Antonio Braga. Private interview in New York City, April 10, 1969. Hr. Braga is a member of the Portuguese Consulate in New York. Ronald H. Chilcote. Private interview at UC Riverside, Iay 9, 1969. Dr. Chilcote is an assistant professor of political science at UC Riverside. He is one of the leading authorities on the Portuguese world and knew Eduardo Mondlane well since September, 1965, Martin Legassick. Private interview in Santa Barbara, April 26, 1969. Dr. Legassick is a South African exile teaching African History at UC Santa Barbara. Janet McLaughlin. Private interview in New*York City, April 10, 1969. Miss McLaughlin is with the American Committee on Africa and had known Eduardo Mondlane for several years. - II

87 PYL eke Stanley Private interv iw-at Pitzer College, April 30, 1969. Mr. h,__ is a South African exile, studying at Occidental College.