Decoding the Virtual Dragon
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Cover The virtually projected dragons, figuratively depicting the dynamic tensions and electrifying complexities of confrontation between strategy and technology, churn up a stormy ocean of theoretical concepts that stretches across a full spectrum of dimly masked actions and operations. Entwined like strands of DNA, this interlocking and encrypted relationship, coded by the Chinese approach to science and philosophy, shapes methods of engagement and manages their use of information within the multi-layered cultural mix now digitally manipulated and formed by the effects of world views. The vivid image provides an apt metaphor, both for the art of war and for information warfare, which accurately reflects this book’s decryptic focus on specific evolutions within the growing thrust and influence of Chinese thought. Decoding the Virtual Dragon Timothy L. Thomas Foreign Military Studies Office Fort Leavenworth, KS 2007 The views expressed in this document are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the US government. The author works for the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. FMSO is a component of the US Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). The office is charged with preparing studies and assessments based on the reading of foreign and domestic publications and through contacts with a network of foreign and US military and civilian security specialists. FMSO researches, writes, and publishes from unclassified sources about the military establishments, doctrines, and practices of selected foreign armed forces. It also studies a variety of civil-military and transnational security issues affecting the US and its military forces. FMSO products are prepared for the US Army and other services, the Department of Defense, as well as nonDoD organizations to include the Treasury and Justice Departments. FOREWORD This book expands upon Dragon Bytes, the author’s earlier work on Chinese information warfare (IW) activities from 1999-2003. Decoding the Virtual Dragon explains how Chinese IW concepts since 2003 fit into the strategic outlook, practices, and activities of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The book offers IW explanations directly from the pens of Chinese experts. There are few intermediate filters. In some cases direct translations of key Chinese terms are offered. The Chinese authors discuss the application or relation of IW to strategic thought, the transformation plans of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the revolution in military affairs (RMA), and the revolution in knowledge warfare and cognition. The book thus serves as a source for the fundamentals of Chinese military thought and demonstrates how IW/IO has been integrated into the art of war and strategy. China’s methodological and thought paradigms with regard to strategic IW issues are quite different from US paradigms. The PLA’s science of military strategy, for example, examines basic and applied theory as well as the objective and subjective aspects of strategy. US military strategy, on the other hand, uses a very different set of analytical tools and thought processes. It is more focused on ends, ways, and means or, more recently as US joint publications note, prudent ideas or sets of ideas. Decoding the Virtual Dragon underscores this difference in thought processes and explains how China’s strategic approach leads to different applications, methods, and conclusions with regard to IW. Decoding the Virtual Dragon is designed to update analysts about Chinese IW theory and practice. Of special interest is the Chinese focus on topics scarcely mentioned by US IW specialists such as mobilization exercises, the development of IW countermeasures, the theory of a science of information operations, the holistic and comprehensive approach to strategic issues, and a focus on preemption and IW stratagems. Both the general military reader and the Chinese security specialist will enjoy this integrated and progressive look at China’s IW development over the past several years. Karl Prinslow Director, Foreign Military Studies Office July 2007 DEDICATION This book is dedicated to my children, Sally, Michael, and Matthew; and to my wife, Christine, who reviewed the manuscript and made it much better. I thank my children for their encouragement, support, and help along the way, and I thank my wife for her patience and willingness to ask probing questions that enabled me to get at the essence of Chinese IW. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT The author used only open-source translations for the construction of this document. Since the author does not speak Chinese, he fully utilized the translation talents of the Open Source Center (formerly the Foreign Broadcast Information Service or FBIS) and other Chinese translators in order to write this book. The author is solely responsible for the selection and analysis of the material others translated. In particular, the author would like to acknowledge the support of five individuals who assisted with this project. First, and foremost, is Navy Senior Chief Bart Zobel of the Navy Reserve Navy Information Operations Command who is responsible for much of the translation support. Chief Zobel translated the entire contents of both On the Chinese Revolution in Military Affairs and An Interpretation of Network Centric Warfare. He translated nearly half of the contents of Deciphering Information Security and selected sections of Direct Information War. Without his assistance, this work would not have been possible to assemble. Second, the author would like to thank Mr. Charles A. Martinson III of Fort Leavenworth who designed the cover artwork. Mr. Martinson’s visualization of the contents of this book is unique. His creativity is truly his trademark. The author would like to thank SPC Hommy Rosado and Mr. Randy Love of the Foreign Military Studies Office. SPC Rosado is responsible for the graphic work on tables found at the end of Chapters One and Two. Mr. Love monitored commercial translations of some material used in this work. Mr. Karl Prinslow, Acting Director of FMSO, ensured that funding for the translation of all Chinese material was available. Finally, the author would like to express his thanks to the Air Force Information Center in San Antonio, Texas for providing the financial support behind the printing of this book. Without their support this work would never have reached the multitude of analysts studying this topic. INTRODUCTION Over the past several years, Chinese information warfare (IW) and information operation (IO) capabilities have become more visible and troubling. These capabilities have been used actively in a series of events aimed at a variety of countries. It is unknown exactly how many Chinese IW reconnaissance or offensive events have transpired or the actual intent of these incursions. Several episodes have leaked into the public domain. Among the most notable are: Espionage conducted against the US Department of Defense (DoD) computers, reported in Time magazine. The report concerned a Chinese cyber espionage ring that federal investigators code-named Titan Rain. Its target was DoD computers.1 Chinese attempts to blind a US satellite, reported in Defense News. The report discussed high-powered Chinese laser attacks on a US satellite.2 Chinese hacker attacks on the US Naval War College’s net capability, reported in Federal Computer Week. This attack purportedly originated from China and took systems off-line.3 The Chinese destruction of an old Chinese weather satellite with an antisatellite missile, reported on National Public Radio. The report cited a Beijing People’s University commentator. He noted that “satellite killing technology is logical in the development of missiles and an IW capability.”4 Hacker attacks against Japan or Taiwan, reported in the Japanese and Taiwanese press.5 The reports noted that these attacks were retaliations for Japan’s anti-Chinese interpretations of history and for Taiwanese claims for independence, respectively. The growing intensity of these IW attacks demands a closer look at China’s IW/IO philosophy and how it has evolved. This work attempts to accomplish that goal. Of particular interest is how IW has imbedded itself into the peacetime strategic activities of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and IW’s potential use as a preemptive strategy. Decoding the Virtual Dragon examines the views of prominent Chinese military theorists on the integration of IW/IO and strategy. It consists of an analysis of seven Chinese books and one Chinese journal article, all focused on information 1 Nathan Thornburgh, “The Invasion of the Chinese Cyberspies,” Time, 29 August 2005, downloaded from http://www.time.com on 23 January 2007. 2 Vago Muradian, “China Tried to Blind US Sats with Laser,” Defense News, 25 September 2006, p. 1. 3 Josh Rogin, “Network Attack Disables Naval War College,” Federal Computer Week, 30 November 2006, downloaded from http://www.fcw.com. 4 Anthony Kuhn, National Public Radio, 19 January 2007, interview with Beijing representative. 5 “Chinese Hackers Attack Taiwan Military Computers,” Taipei P’ing-kuo Jih-pao (Internet Version) 15 May 2006, as reported in Open Source Center report CPP20060516310002. warfare/information operations (IW/IO) related topics. Additionally, a chapter on strategy and information warfare from the author’s previous book Dragon Bytes is included. The chapter serves as a link between the old and the new on IW/IO and strategic issues. The books and