2 Interactions Between Environmental Civil Society and the State During the Ma Ying-Jeou and Tsai Ing-Wen Administrations In
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2 Interactions between Environmental Civil Society and the State during the Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen Administrations in Taiwan* Simona A. Grano Abstract This chapter deals with the political repercussions of popular discontent towards several secondary issues in Taiwan prompting a mainstream political formation like the DPP to revert to its early pro-environmental and social justice rhetoric to attract voters for the 2016 electoral tour- nament; several activists and academics that trace their origins to the social movements’ galaxy were drafted by the DPP upon winning the elections. The aim of this chapter is to verify whether four years later concrete results have been achieved or whether the activists have become quieter after joining the ruling party. This chapter consolidates research on interactions and conflicts between the state trying to exert more influence across several fields and newly emerging/well- established social movements under the Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen administrations. Keywords: strong states, civil society, environmental governance, EIA, legislative channels for popular participation, political opportunity structures * The author gratefully acknowledges the generous intellectual contribution of Professor Ho Ming-sho. Part of this article was researched while the author was based in Taipei in 2016, for a two weeks research grant sponsored from the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF), at National Taiwan University as a visiting fellow under Professor Ho’s mentorship. Chiavacci, David, Simona Grano, and Julia Obinger (eds), Civil Society and the State in Democratic East Asia: Between Entanglement and Contention in Post High Growth. Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press 2020 doi: 10.5117/ 9789463723930_ch02 34 SIMONA A. GRANO In Taiwan, as in other Asian nations, economic growth and transformation has been guided by a strong state that successfully activated and integrated private interests and citizens into national projects of ‘developmentalism’ and shared growth. As a consequence of this rapid economic development, a middle class has emerged, marked by greater claims for political participa- tion, social equality as well as greater attention for quality-of-life concerns, such as better environmental protection and sustainability. While many formerly strong states have seen a decline in their respective ability to successfully steer economic development and guarantee stable growth, several countries in East Asia have matured into fully modern societies with highly educated populations and stable work prospects. As a result, across Asia the well-established modernization model in which a strong developmental state single-handedly managed economic growth and then shared the fruits of its hard work with the population is increasingly being questioned by citizens; these, owing to new social and economic conflicts and rising social inequality, demand more political participation. In accordance with other parts of the world, these developments have created a new middle-class identity with citizens increasingly prone to voice their demands in politics by forming civil society organizations and actively participating in their countries’ political life. Likewise, more people focus on issues such as environmental protection and other quality-of-life ‘postmodern concerns,’ which shatter the previously unquestioned attempt to achieve economic growth at all costs. Since 1987, when the KMT regime lifted martial law, Taiwan has under- gone immense changes becoming a stable democracy where citizens’ claims are increasingly vocal. In the past decade, and especially during the second Ma Ying-jeou administration (2012-2016), civic mobilizations related mostly to what Taiwanese perceived as a rapid increase of cross-strait relations and closeness with the Mainland. On 16 January 2016 Taiwan held its second last round of national elections, which included both presidential and parliamentary contests,1 with the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), winning back the presidency and also the majority of the legislature. Taiwan’s third peaceful power turnover signified an important loss for the KMT, whose eight-year presidency (2008- 2016) created widespread disappointment among citizens, particularly over the closer economic and political ties with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The latest elections have presented a golden opportunity for the 1 Voters were called to directly elect their president for the sixth time since 1996. Secondly, in a separate set of ballots, the 113 seats in the Legislative Yuan were elected. INTERacTIONS BETWeeN ENVIRONMENTAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE STATE 35 DPP to ride the wave of popular discontent and turn dissatisfaction in its favour, by championing several ‘secondary’ issues such as environmental protection2 and social justice (especially popular among younger voters) that were previously advocated by smaller political formations like the Green Party of Taiwan (GPT) or by social movements. This explains why in the 2016 electoral tournament the DPP enlisted several former NGOs’ leaders, activists as well as academics with a strong environmental and social engagement that trace their origins to the social movements’ galaxy3; to name but a few: previous Green Party chairperson Chen Man-Li, also former president of the Homemakers United Foundation; Prof. Wu Kuen-Yuh of National Taiwan University, a toxicologist often invited to give his professional opinion in regards to several EIAs4 involving polluting enterprises; Prof. Tsai Pei-hui, previous Secretary General of the organization Taiwan Rural Front, involved in several ecological campaigns of the past, such as fighting Taiwan’s eighth petrochemical complex and advocating for land justice issues; Chen Chi-chung and Lawyer Chan Shun-kuei, who has lent his expertise and professional background to green activists on several occasions in the past. In the end, with the DPP’s landslide victory these individuals have indeed been elected and Lawyer Chan has been nominated Vice-Minister for the Environment (he has meanwhile stepped down in December 2018), Chen Chi-chung has first become Deputy Minister 2 The DPP had vowed to put an end to environmental deterioration since at least the 1990s with several activists joining its ranks during those years, hoping to bring about positive results and more stringent regulations (Grano 2015: 49; Ho 2005a: 412). However, after the DPP began its ascent to ‘institutionalization’ scoring more than one-third of seats in the Legislative Yuan election of 1992 it gradually assumed a more cautious approach towards environmental movements, which came to be considered as an obstacle to economic development. This turnabout angered activists who established a new political organ in 1996, the Green Party of Taiwan (GPT), with the aim of capturing the sympathies of those who felt betrayed by the DPP change of position towards environmental problems (Ho 2003: 701-706). 3 As stated by Fell the problem of the DPP attracting social activists draining social movements of their human capital is not new. Even a political formation such as the Green Party faced this problem several times since many of its members believe that there is more that they can achieve for the environment if they are elected with a better-established party, as was the case with Edgar Lin in the 1990s (Fell 2016: 74). 4 Taiwan’s EIA Act was formally enacted in 1994 modelled after the United States’ own EIA Law (Ho 2004: 238). The introduction of such a system was a direct consequence of the sociopolitical situation of the country, with bureaucrats in need of a showcase to appease popular requests for increased participation. In principle the EIA stipulates how developmental projects of a certain size should be planned and reviewed, which requirements should be met and what are the fines and punishments for violators. In reality it does not always function as it should and there has long been talk of reforming it (Grano 2015: 174-175; Ho 2004; Lai 2017). 36 SIMONA A. GRANO and then, in January 2019, Minister of Council of Agriculture while Chen, Tsai and Wu have become members of the Legislative Yuan in charge of different sectors (e.g. food safety and public health [Wu], environmental protection, ecology and renewable energies [Chen]; land-related issues [Tsai]). By following the shift of these civil society actors who have been elected with DPP, from individuals sympathetic to more visible acts of conten- tion to legislators integrated in the ranks of the ruling party, this chapter shall pinpoint the effects of this incorporation of civil society actors into governmental echelons, for the country’s environmental governance system and its efficacy. With the increased institutionalization of social activists, formally en- listed in the DPP’s ranks, environmental protesters seem to have shifted once again their modus operandi from more contentious acts, which had become quite common during the last four years of the Ma Ying-Jeou administration (2012-2016) – such as streets protests and occupation of public spaces5 – to more formal policy channels. Barely one year after the new administration had taken over, optimism for the new government inside Taiwan had already been dampened by a series of factors ranging from a persistent economic recession, job insecurity, sluggish wages and a massive decrease of tourists from the Mainland (incidentally the first thing the taxi driver complained about, as I set foot in Taipei in September 2016). At the