Sir Francis Bacon and the Geological Society of London
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Aristotle's Essentialism Revisited
University of Missouri, St. Louis IRL @ UMSL Theses Graduate Works 4-15-2013 Accommodating Species Evolution: Aristotle’s Essentialism Revisited Yin Zhang University of Missouri-St. Louis, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://irl.umsl.edu/thesis Recommended Citation Zhang, Yin, "Accommodating Species Evolution: Aristotle’s Essentialism Revisited" (2013). Theses. 192. http://irl.umsl.edu/thesis/192 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Works at IRL @ UMSL. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses by an authorized administrator of IRL @ UMSL. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Accommodating Species Evolution: Aristotle’s Essentialism Revisited by Yin Zhang B.A., Philosophy, Peking University, 2010 A Thesis Submitted to The Graduate School at the University of Missouri – St. Louis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts in Philosophy May 2013 Advisory Committee Jon D. McGinnis, Ph.D. Chairperson Andrew G. Black, Ph.D. Berit O. Brogaard, Ph.D. Zhang, Yin, UMSL, 2013, p. i PREFACE In the fall of 2008 when I was a junior at Peking University, I attended a lecture series directed by Dr. Melville Y. Stewart on science and religion. Guest lecturers Dr. Alvin Plantinga, Dr. William L. Craig and Dr. Bruce Reichenbach have influenced my thinking on the relation between evolution and faith. In the fall of 2010 when I became a one-year visiting student at Calvin College in Michigan, I took a seminar directed by Dr. Kelly J. Clark on evolution and ethics. Having thought about evolution/faith and evolution/ethics, I signed up for Dr. -
Interpreting the History of Evolutionary Biology Through a Kuhnian Prism: Sense Or Nonsense?
Interpreting the History of Evolutionary Biology through a Kuhnian Prism: Sense or Nonsense? Koen B. Tanghe Department of Philosophy and Moral Sciences, Universiteit Gent, Belgium Lieven Pauwels Department of Criminology, Criminal Law and Social Law, Universiteit Gent, Belgium Alexis De Tiège Department of Philosophy and Moral Sciences, Universiteit Gent, Belgium Johan Braeckman Department of Philosophy and Moral Sciences, Universiteit Gent, Belgium Traditionally, Thomas S. Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) is largely identified with his analysis of the structure of scientific revo- lutions. Here, we contribute to a minority tradition in the Kuhn literature by interpreting the history of evolutionary biology through the prism of the entire historical developmental model of sciences that he elaborates in The Structure. This research not only reveals a certain match between this model and the history of evolutionary biology but, more importantly, also sheds new light on several episodes in that history, and particularly on the publication of Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species (1859), the construction of the modern evolutionary synthesis, the chronic discontent with it, and the latest expression of that discon- tent, called the extended evolutionary synthesis. Lastly, we also explain why this kind of analysis hasn’t been done before. We would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their constructive review, as well as the editor Alex Levine. Perspectives on Science 2021, vol. 29, no. 1 © 2021 by The Massachusetts Institute of Technology https://doi.org/10.1162/posc_a_00359 1 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/posc_a_00359 by guest on 30 September 2021 2 Evolutionary Biology through a Kuhnian Prism 1. -
Persp V1n2 Final4pdf
MODERN SCIENCE AND THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH Brian Tonks—Department of Physics have pondered the question, “What is truth?” for many years. My I intellectual journey has convinced me that truth comes in many ways through a variety of sources. I began my schooling believing that scientists were searching for the truth, but my undergraduate training included classes in the history and philosophy of science that disillusioned me towards the scientific process. Then my service in the United States Navy showed me the practical utility of scientific principles, and my graduate studies provided real experience in how science really works. For five years I was involved in nearly all facets of the scientific process. My adult life spans the period of the Voyager missions to the outer planets, the Viking, Pathfinder, and Global Surveyor missions to Mars, and the Pioneer and Magellan missions to Venus. These missions demonstrated the power of scientific observation. Before Voyager, we knew little about the outer planets and even less about their satellites. Even in the largest ground-based telescopes, these appeared as mere pinpoints of light. Voyager revealed them as real worlds with actual, albeit bizarre, geology. Years of speculation were dispelled in a relative moment, reminding me of the Prophet Joseph Smith’s state- ment, “Could you gaze into heaven five minutes, you would know more than you would by reading all that was written on the subject” (History I have come full of the Church, 6:50). I have come full circle, believing today that science is an important source of truth. -
The Critique of the Principle of Uniformitarianism and the Analysis
The Critique ofthe Principle ofUniformitarianism and the Analysis of High School Earth Science Textbooks Ho Jang Song and Hui Soo An Department ojEarth Science Education, Seoul National University Although uniformitarianism is widely recognized as the basic principle upon which the structure of historical geology has been erected, a closer investigation on the basis of present scientific knowledge and the philosophy of science reveals some of its invalid aspects. The concept of uniformitarianism wasdeveloped in a dual concept in Lyellian days. Substantive uniformitarianism (a testable theory of geologic change postulating uniformity of rates or material conditions) is false, ambiguous and stifling to hypotheses formation. Methodological uniformitarianism (a procedural principle asserting that former changes of the Earth's surface may be explained by reference to causes now in operation) belongs to the defmition of science and is not unique to geology. Moreover, it also has some methodological defects in forming bold and novel working hypotheses. Methodological uniformitarianism today should take the form of a much older and more general scientific principle: Occam's Razor, the principle of simplicity. Accordingly, substantive uniformitarianism, an incorrect theory, should be abandoned. Methodological uniformi tarianism, now a superfluous term, should be best confined to the historical roles in geology. In this connection, the presentation of uniformitarianism in high school textbooks was analyzed. It was revealed that text books were riddled with false and misleading statements as to what uniformi tarianism means. Since uniformitarianism, as presented in many textbooks, is in direct contradiction to the philosophy of Inquiry learning, it is important to rethink the direction of uniformitarianism presentation in Earth Science curriculum development. -
Contrastive Empiricism
Elliott Sober Contrastive Empiricism I Despite what Hegel may have said, syntheses have not been very successful in philosophical theorizing. Typically, what happens when you combine a thesis and an antithesis is that you get a mishmash, or maybe just a contradiction. For example, in the philosophy of mathematics, formalism says that mathematical truths are true in virtue of the way we manipulate symbols. Mathematical Platonism, on the other hand, holds that mathematical statements are made true by abstract objects that exist outside of space and time. What would a synthesis of these positions look like? Marks on paper are one thing, Platonic forms an other. Compromise may be a good idea in politics, but it looks like a bad one in philosophy. With some trepidation, I propose in this paper to go against this sound advice. Realism and empiricism have always been contradictory tendencies in the philos ophy of science. The view I will sketch is a synthesis, which I call Contrastive Empiricism. Realism and empiricism are incompatible, so a synthesis that merely conjoined them would be a contradiction. Rather, I propose to isolate important elements in each and show that they combine harmoniously. I will leave behind what I regard as confusions and excesses. The result, I hope, will be neither con tradiction nor mishmash. II Empiricism is fundamentally a thesis about experience. It has two parts. First, there is the idea that experience is necessary. Second, there is the thesis that ex perience suffices. Necessary and sufficient for what? Usually this blank is filled in with something like: knowledge of the world outside the mind. -
Early Modern Philosophy of Technology: Bacon and Descartes
Early Modern Philosophy of Technology: Bacon and Descartes By Robert Arnăutu Submitted to Central European University Department of Philosophy In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy Supervisor: Professor Hanoch Ben-Yami CEU eTD Collection Budapest, Hungary 2013 Copyright notice I hereby declare that this dissertation contains no materials accepted for any other degrees in any other institutions of higher education. Also, I declare that this dissertation contains no material previously written and/or published by any other person, except where appropriate acknowledgement has been made in the form of bibliographic reference. Robert Arnăutu June 2013 CEU eTD Collection i Abstract The contemporary understanding of technology is indebted to Bacon and Descartes, who challenged the pre-modern conceptions regarding useful material production. Although the production of artefacts has been a constant activity of humans since the dawn of history, the Ancient world tended to disvalue it, considering it a lower endeavour that aims to satisfy ignoble material needs. Technology, according to Ancient Greek thinkers, cannot surpass nature but can only bring small improvements to it; moreover, there is a difference in kind between natural things and technological artefacts; the activity of inventing and producing useful objects is unsuited for the nobility and for free men; there is an irreducible gap between proper knowledge and the production of artefacts. This approach toward technology is completely -
1 1 Catastrophism, Uniformitarianism, and a Scientific
1 Catastrophism, Uniformitarianism, and a Scientific Realism Debate That Makes a Difference P. Kyle Stanford ([email protected]) Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science UC Irvine Abstract Some scientific realists suggest that scientific communities have improved in their ability to discover alternative theoretical possibilities and that the problem of unconceived alternatives therefore poses a less significant threat to contemporary scientific communities than it did to their historical predecessors. I first argue that the most profound and fundamental historical transformations of the scientific enterprise have actually increased rather than decreased our vulnerability to the problem. I then argue that whether we are troubled by even the prospect of increasing theoretical conservatism in science should depend on the position we occupy in the ongoing debate concerning scientific realism itself. Acknowledgements I would like to acknowledge useful discussions concerning the material in this paper with Kevin Zollman, Penelope Maddy, Jeff Barrett, Pat Forber, Peter Godfrey-Smith, Steve Shapin, Fred Kronz, John Norton, Michael Weisberg, Jane Maienschein, Julia Bursten, Carole Lee, and Arash Pessian, as well as audiences at the Durham University Conference on Unconceived Alternatives and Scientific Realism, the University of Vienna’s (Un)Conceived Alternatives Symposium, the University of Pittsburgh’s Conference on Choosing the Future of Science, Lingnan University’s ‘Science: The Real Thing?’ Conference, the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Cambridge University, the University of Vienna, the University of Pennsylvania, UC San Diego, the University of Washington, the University of Western Ontario, the Pittsburgh Center for the Philosophy of Science, Washington University in St. Louis, Bloomsburg University, Indiana University, the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, and the Australian National University. -
Preconceived Theories and the Baconian Method
William T. Lynch. Solomon's Child: Method in the Early Royal Society of London. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001. xv + 292 pp. $60.00, cloth, ISBN 978-0-8047-3291-8. Reviewed by John Henry Published on H-Albion (February, 2003) Preconceived Theories and the Baconian fellows of the Royal Society, and yet the fellows all Method professed to be following the Baconian method. Although written with some fair and real in‐ Among the usual way of dealing with such genuity, this is a deeply fawed book. It suffers seeming contradictions among the fellows is to ac‐ from the fact that the author, somewhat obvious‐ knowledge the contingencies of history, the social ly, uses a number of cases from late seventeenth- usefulness not just of knowledge but also of century English science to support a preconceived knowledge claims, and the concomitant need to theory about the methodology of Francis Bacon. dress things up in carefully chosen rhetoric. Re‐ Given the fact that one of the main strengths of cent scholarship, therefore, has shown how a par‐ the Baconian method lay in its attempt to avoid ticular version of Baconian scientific method was the distortion which inevitably follows from seek‐ used for promotional and propaganda purposes ing evidence to support preconceived theories, by the leading spokesmen for the Royal Society in this is somewhat ironic. their published works, while in their actual prac‐ In large measure the difficulties with the tice, these same fellows did things in a variety of book arise out of the author's decision to base his different ways. -
Catastrophism and Uniformitarianism: Logical Roots and Current Relevance in Geology
Downloaded from http://sp.lyellcollection.org/ by guest on September 29, 2021 Catastrophism and uniformitarianism" logical roots and current relevance in geology VICTOR R. BAKER Department of Hydrology and Water Resources, The University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721-0011, USA Abstract, Catastrophism in the Earth sciences is rooted in the view that Earth signifies its causative processes via landforms, structures and rock. Processes of types, rates and magnitudes not presently in evidence may well be signified this way. Uniformitarianism, in contrast, is a regulative stipulation motivated by the presumed necessity that science achieves logical validity in what can be said (hypothesized) about the Earth. Regulative principles, including simplicity, actualism and gradualism, are imposed a priori to insure valid inductive reasoning. This distinction lies at the heart of the catastrophist versus uniformitarian debates in the early nine- teenth century and it continues to influence portions of the current scientific program. Uniform- itarianism, as introduced by Charles Lyell in 1830, is specifically tied to an early nineteenth century view of inductive inference. Catastrophism involves a completely different form of inference in which hypotheses are generated retroductively. This latter form of logical inference remains relevant to modern science, while the outmoded notions of induction that warranted the doctrine of uniformitarianism were long ago shown to be overly restrictive in scientific practice. The latter should be relegated solely to historical interest in the progress of ideas. On 4 July 1997, the Mars Pathfinder spacecraft Antarctic ice, was interpreted as showing various made a highly successful landing in the Ares Vallis indicators of possible relic biogenic activity region of Mars. -
The New Method-2020.Pdf
The New Scientific Method Rob Iliffe Aristotelian Method • Method, or the principles of argument and demonstration, played a highly important role in Aristotelian system • Medieval scholars understood the group of demonstrative techniques in different fields the ‘Organon’ (Latin ‘Organum’) or ‘tool’. • Aristotelian arguments were not primarily directed against sceptical positions, according to which one might doubt the reliability of individual sensory or cognitive faculties. • This is because ordinary human beings were assumed to experience the world as it really was, and were not deceived by their senses. The syllogistic method • Aristotle’s account of correct inference in science involved more sophisticated versions of the syllogistic method: • All As are Bs (Major premise, e.g. ‘All men are mortal’) • All Bs are Cs (Minor premise, e.g. ‘Socrates is a man’) • Therefore all As are Cs (Conclusion: e.g. ‘Socrates is mortal’). • Science proceeds by organizing data so that the Minor premise is explained by the better known, necessarily true and more fundamental Major premise. • Scientific demonstrations were supposed to go beyond mere syllogisms, to reveal the causal structures of the world. Art and Nature • The Aristotelian system placed limits on the use of artificial devices or techniques in natural philosophy – including mathematics. • Moreover, lenses were either distorting devices, or when they worked well – such as in magnifying glasses – • they made visible objects bigger to sight, rather than revealing things that were too small to be seen with the naked eye. • God would supposedly not have made creatures too small to be seen. • Philosophers assumed that instruments were ludic (playful devices) • And that invasive experimental techniques could not provide information about ‘natural’ motions, animate or inanimate. -
Constructing Natural Historical Facts BACONIAN NATURAL HISTORY in NEWTON’S FIRST PAPER on LIGHT and COLORS
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Mon Feb 10 2014, NEWGEN 2 Constructing Natural Historical Facts BACONIAN NATURAL HISTORY IN NEWTON’S FIRST PAPER ON LIGHT AND COLORS Dana Jalobeanu* The peculiar structure of Newton’s first published paper on light and colors has been the subject of an astonishing diversity of readings: to date, scholars still do not agree as to what Newton wanted to prove in this paper or how he proved it.1 The structure of the paper is far from transparent. It consists of two very different parts: a historical account of what Newton called his “crucial experiment,” and a “doctrine of colors” consisting of thirteen propositions and an illustrative experiment. Equally debated has been the “style” of Newton’s demonstration.2 Newton begins the first part with an extensive his- torical account of how he became interested in the “celebrated phenomena of colors” and later reached one of its major results: that the shape of the spectrum refracted * Research for this paper has been supported by the grant PN-II-ID-PCE-2011-3-0719, “From Natural History to Science,” awarded by the CNCS. 1 The paper has been read, in turns, as a formal blunder of a young upstart who dared to make a clear break with the mitigated skepticism and anti-dogmatism of the Royal Society, and as a brilliant exercise of rhetoric aiming to rewrite in the “scientific style of the day” the results of six long years of optical research. The reason for the exercise of rhetoric has also been the subject of fierce debates. -
Hutton's Uniformitarianism
BYU Studies Quarterly Volume 23 Issue 1 Article 4 1-1-1983 Hutton's Uniformitarianism Jess R. Bushman Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq Recommended Citation Bushman, Jess R. (1983) "Hutton's Uniformitarianism," BYU Studies Quarterly: Vol. 23 : Iss. 1 , Article 4. Available at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol23/iss1/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at BYU ScholarsArchive. It has been accepted for inclusion in BYU Studies Quarterly by an authorized editor of BYU ScholarsArchive. For more information, please contact [email protected], [email protected]. Bushman: Hutton's Uniformitarianism huttonssuttonsHuttons uniformitarianism jess R bushman uniformitarianism or cause and effect is a very important and basic concept in geology the heart of the concept is that there is order and regularity in the operation or functioning of natural laws this consistency is what gives significance to cause and effect pat- terns what we see happening today helps us to identify the results of natural processes which were active millions of years ago we observe ripple marks being formed by wave action on beaches today when we see similar ripple marks in ancient sandstone we use cause and effect or uniformitarianism to suggest that the ripple marked sandstones were once part of an ancient beach the geologist as he studies natural processes at work and sees how long it takes to produce soil from solid rock or for a glacier to carve a U shaped valley is convinced