Educated Youth Precarity and Protests in the Oromia Region, Ethiopia
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Children's Geographies ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cchg20 Lost futures? Educated youth precarity and protests in the Oromia region, Ethiopia Tatek Abebe To cite this article: Tatek Abebe (2020) Lost futures? Educated youth precarity and protests in the Oromia region, Ethiopia, Children's Geographies, 18:6, 584-600, DOI: 10.1080/14733285.2020.1789560 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/14733285.2020.1789560 © 2020 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group Published online: 03 Jul 2020. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 2668 View related articles View Crossmark data Citing articles: 4 View citing articles Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=cchg20 CHILDREN’S GEOGRAPHIES 2020, VOL. 18, NO. 6, 584–600 https://doi.org/10.1080/14733285.2020.1789560 Lost futures? Educated youth precarity and protests in the Oromia region, Ethiopia Tatek Abebe Department of Education and Lifelong Learning, Norwegian University of Science and Technology NTNU, Trondheim, Norway ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork, this article explores the connections Received 5 October 2019 between young people’s livelihoods, education and visions of the future Accepted 16 June 2020 in Ethiopia. It engages with educated youth’s narratives of precarity, KEYWORDS dispossession, and ‘intimate exclusions,’ discussing how development Youth protests; waithood; has impacted rural livelihoods. Educated youth protests in the Oromia land-grabbing; educated region reveal how shortages of farmland and education play crucial unemployment; rural futures; roles in the conflict about sovereignty and development. Qeerroo Ethiopia (Oromo youth) are particularly active in the protests because they are excluded from a rural future through land grabbing and population growth as well as from a modernist development future that unequally distributes the fruits of economic growth. By politicizing educated unemployment and landlessness and connecting them to neoliberal capitalism, this article analyses the intentions of the Ethiopian state to ‘save’ its youth through economic development while youths claim to ‘lose’ their futures to generate grassroots politics. The article also draws analytical attention to why there is a need to rethink concepts like development, waithood, and rural futures. 1. Introduction Oromia belongs to us. We were born, grew up, had children, died and buried here. We have nowhere else to go and we will never leave. Woyane’s oppression [referring to the ruling elite led by Tigray People Liberation Front of northern Ethiopia], the barrels of their guns, their bullets, imprisonment and death will never weaken our struggle. We will never rest until we retaliate for murder of our youth, our students, for murder of Laggasa Wagi [commander of Oromo Liberation Army]. If we fail to do this, let the bones of our martyrs become thorns on our body. Let the blood of our children flood us. We take this oath in the name of the blood and bones of our youth, our children, our students; the blood of our teachers, our doctors, our farmers; the blood of Laggasa Wagi, Eebisa Adunya [a young musician who was allegedly murdered for playing ‘political’ songs]. We solemnly swear to stand with qeerroo with all our possessions, energy, and weapons. We will take down Woyane’s statues and replace them with statues of our children, our fighters, our students, and our teachers. (fieldnote, April 2017) Thousands of youths chanted this after the funeral of two young men who were killed during a pro- test in Oromia Regional State, Ethiopia. These protestors are not only at the heart of the struggle for regime change but – when seen in connection with land grabbing and educated unemployment that this article engages with – their stories also displace dominant narratives of national development. The excerpt demonstrates interconnected processes of displacement, death, imprisonment, CONTACT Tatek Abebe [email protected] © 2020 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way. CHILDREN’S GEOGRAPHIES 585 oppression as well as lack of political freedom and democracy. It also demonstrates criticism on the government’s policy on land, which is a key source of contestation among youths. The right to retain agricultural land has been at the core of the widespread youth protests in the Oromia region – the most populous federal region accounting for about one-third of Ethiopia’s 105 million inhabitants (Aynalem Adugna 2017). Qeerroo, an Oromo term that means ‘youth,’ engage in ongoing activism for social and political justice. Qeerroo also means ‘populace for change,’ a grassroots organization for ‘revolution from within.’ The Oromia protestors are largely educated youth with rural backgrounds. They are known as ‘qubee generation’ (dhaloota qubee) because they are the first generation to have had sub- stantial access to university education after having been schooled using the vernacular qubee (the written language of Oromo people), which was introduced into formal education in 1992. The term qubee generation is common in protest songs, but it has also permeated mainstream political discourses. Many youth protestors identify themselves to be part of the qubee generation. Contrary to other uprisings (e.g. the Arab Spring in North Africa), a unique feature of the ‘Ethiopian spring’ is that it stemmed from the countryside where the question of land has never been more crucial. Qeer- roo movement initially occurred in rural localities of the Oromia region and gradually spread throughout the country, where young Ethiopians protested consistently between 2015 and 2018. These ‘years of protests’ led the Ethiopian government to declare two states of emergencies, followed by resignation of the prime minister. Commentators on Ethiopian politics suggest that the youth revolution – despite the risk it holds for further conflict – may be transformational (Lefort 2016a). In this article, I explore the connections between educated youth protests, land and the ‘future’ in the Oromia region, Ethiopia. Drawing on youth’s diverse experiences of ‘waithood’ (Honwana 2013), I explore how forces of history and political economy – linked to land grabbing and educated unem- ployment – heighten young people’s experiences of uncertain futures. I examine youth’s struggle to retain agricultural land against the backdrop of educated unemployment in which alternative futures are either untenable or fading away. I argue that waithood endured by Oromo youth is predicated on, and entwines with, uneven geographies of development that engenders precarious life for them. By politicizing educated unemployment and landlessness and connecting them to neoliberal capitalism, I discuss how the intention of Ethiopian state to ‘save ’ its youth through economic development may have failed, and how youth themselves claim to ‘lose’ their futures to generate new state politics. Fur- thermore, I also argue that whereas lack of jobs and dispossession of rural land heighten Oromo youth’s sense of displacement from the future, their experiences of waiting are far from unitary. 2. Research context and approach 2.1. Questions of land in the Oromia region Oromia Regional State is the largest of Ethiopia’s nine federal regions. Its inhabitants – ethnic Oromo people – account for 35% of the country’s population (Aynalem Adugna 2017). Oromo people inhabit lands surrounding Addis Ababa and west, central, and south Ethiopia. Mass protests in the region broke out after primary school students in Ginchii town (60 kms west of Addis Ababa) contested the Addis Ababa Integrated Development Plan. They believed this plan for the expansion of the city endangers peasants’ livelihoods. They also contested that, as a federal state, Oromia regional state should be autonomous to administer its land without heavy-handed interference of the central government. Due to its proximity to Addis Ababa, land in Oromia region is, ‘a fresh pie, and everybody wants a piece’ (youth participant). Land grabbing by the government has been rampant in Oromia zones adjacent to Addis Ababa. Because of rapid urbanization, there has been a continuous encroachment of the city boundary over Oromia region where land for establishment of industrial parks and real-estate development targeting middle-class residents are in high demand. Both local and international investors participate in large-scale land grab deals. Leasing rural land to attract foreign direct investment and for commercial farming also comes at the expense of peasant 586 T. ABEBE agriculture (Lavers 2012; The Oakland Institute 2016). Youth contest such revanchist policy as well as the legal mechanisms designed to back a capitalist system of accumulation by displacing peasants (see Harvey 2004). They claim that due to agri-investments, small-scale agriculture – the basic means of subsistence for rural communities – suffers. The process of dispossession of land has also ‘created the conditions for a workforce dependent upon the sale of their labour power in return for a wage in the market’ (Bakker, 2007: 544). In addition to land rights, the youth protests are related to broader questions of corruption, inequality, lack of political freedom as well as the right to self-rule (Merera Gudina 2016). In the past decade, there have been growing tensions between Oromia regional state and the federal gov- ernment over the right to Addis Ababa city. Although the administrative seat for Oromia Regional State is presently Addis Ababa, which is also the federal capital; its seat was relocated to the town of Adama in 2007. This decision was seen as an act of denying Oromo people’s right to their city (see Section 4.2).