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NORTH KOREA CHRONOLOGY 2004 Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project Social Science Research Council

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NORTH KOREA CHRONOLOGY 2004 Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project Social Science Research Council NORTH KOREA CHRONOLOGY 2004 Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project Social Science Research Council 1/1/04 Gary Samore: “In the case of North Korea the Libya model is unrealistic. It is not plausible that the North Korean regime, given their perception of the world, will give up their missiles, chemical, biological and nuclear programs in exchange for better relations. They view them as essential for their survivability. The best you can do is to achieve limits.” (Michael R. Gordon, “Giving Up Those Weapons: After Libya, Who Is Next?” New York Times, January 1, 2004, p. A-10) 1/2/04 North Korea has agreed to allow a U.S. delegation to visit its nuclear complex at Yongbyon next week ahead of likely negotiations with its neighbors and the United States. The delegation would be the first to see the site since North Korea expelled foreign weapons inspectors a year ago. Members of the U.S. delegation say it includes Sig Hecker, director from 1985 to 1997 of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, which produced the first U.S. nuclear bomb and still constructs weapons. Hecker has been told he can visit Yongbyon, where the North Koreans restarted a reactor last year and may have reprocessed used fuel to make plutonium for a half-dozen bombs. (Barbara Slavin, “North Korea Oks U.S. Visit to Complex,” USA Today, Janaury 2, 2004) President Bush read article. “I didn’t authorize this,” he told NSA Condoleezza Rice. “Shut it down.” Rice called SecState Powell, who called Senator Joseph Biden (D-DL) to pass along the message. But in a later call to Biden, Powell said he told the White House he didn’t have the authority to block the trip, but the White wanted it shut down. “Are you, sir, saying that it would be unhelpful for them to go,” asked Biden. “No, I can’t say that. I’m just telling you what I’m told to communicate,” replied Powell. “Fine,” said Biden. “They’ll go.” (Chinoy, Meltdown, p. 198) 1/6-10/04 Sig Hecker, John Lewis and Jack Pritchard in Yongbyon: “This is not a U.S. government-sponsored trip, said someone involved in the planning. “The U.S. government has no say. Nor were they asked to say yes or no to the trip itself.” J. Adam Ereli, DOS spokesman: “There’s a limit to what I can say, simply because it’s not our 1 deal. … Any efforts that complicate prospects or undertakings to reconvene the six- party talks and to achieve forward movement in dismantling North Korea’s nuclear program aren’t helpful.” Keith Luse and Frank Jannuzi go at same time. (Steven R. Weisman, “Private Group Prepares Visit to North Korea,” New York Times, January 3, 2004, p. A-1) “When a US congressional delegation's visit to North Korea was proposed in October last year, the North Korean side had prepared to show on the spot, through an inspection of Yongbyon nuclear facilities in accordance with the delegation's wish, the finished reprocessing process of nuclear fuel rods and how the plutonium acquired from this process was being used. Although the congressional delegation's visit to North Korea was cancelled due to White House opposition, the deferred inspection of Yongbyon nuclear facilities is expected to take place during the current visit by nuclear experts.” Chosun Sinbo (Tokyo) “U.S. Delegation of Nuclear Experts Visits the DPRK,” January 8, 2004) D.P.R.K. FoMin spokesman characterized the visit as “an opportunity to confirm the reality and ensure transparency. … The United States compelled the DPRK to build [a] nuclear deterrent. We showed this to Lewis and his party this time.” (KCNA, "Spokesman for the D.P.R.K. FM on U.S. Professor's Visit to Yongbyon Nuclear Facility," January 10, 2004) Told “at Yongbyon you will see the importance of a freeze,” they were shown the reactor in operation and the cooling pond empty of spent nuclear fuel. Hecker was handed two glass jars of what his hosts said was plutonium. First Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye-gwan categorically denied it had a program to make highly enriched uranium, however. The D.P.R.K. “has nothing to do with any HEU program,” he said. “We have no program, no facilities you are talking about, or scientists trained for this purpose.” (Keith Luse and Frank Jannuzi, "North Korea: Status Report on Nuclear Program, Humanitarian Issues, and Economic Reforms," A Staff Trip Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 108th Cong., 2nd Sess., February 23, 2004) He expressed willingness to explain any "data" on enrichment that the United States presented, a stance the North reaffirmed in talks with China. Pritchard briefing on nine hours with Kim Gye-gwan: “First of all was a flat denial that they ever had a program, don’t have a program, and then said that’s a topic they certainly were willing to talk about once the United States sat down with them. But he went further in his denial in terms of the clarity of it, saying that not only do we not have any program; we have no equipment and we don’t have any scientists, we never had scientists trained in that area, we rely on the natural uranium and the plutonium program that they have.” On the freeze, “Vice Minister Kim’s point in this was we recognize this not the endgame, but quite clearly there has to be some initial steps.” “You may recall through press reporting over the past year that the North Koreans have consistently in advance told the United States, and then later publicly, what they intended to do with their nuclear facilities at Yongbyon. To begin with, they were going to ask the I.A.E.A. inspectors to leave. They were going to unseal the seals, remove the cameras, restart the reactor, remove the spent fuel rods, reprocess them. At one point they came back and said, we initially intended to reprocess the spent fuel rods for safety reasons, but now, because of the hostile U.S. policy, we are going to do that to extract plutonium to make a nuclear deterrent.” “We went to the spent fuel pond storage facility. This is where the 8,017 or so spent fuel rods had been canned and safeguarded by the I.A.E.A. until a year ago in December. … The spent fuel storage pond was empty. There are no spent fuel rods there. … The canisters were empty.” “They did make a comment … saying in the case of Libya and 2 Iran, both initially said, no, we don’t have a WMD program, and the U.S. said, yes, you do. And he said in this case we’re saying, yes, we do have a WMD program; the United States is saying, no, you don’t” [Laughter] “China had set a goal for the second meeting of reaching an agreed statement on the North Korea nuclear problem. … In the end, the United States and North Korea could not find a set of words that would overcome their profound substantive differences and corrosive mutual mistrust. So China signaled a couple of weeks ago that the talks could proceed even if a statement was not possible at this time.” North says they already have a security alliance with Russia and China: “There is, however, a tactical element here where the North Koreans, in preparation for eventual discussions with the United States, are increasing the value of the freeze that they have put out there, and at the same time attempting to decrease the value of what the United States is potentially prepared to offer in terms of a multilateral security guarantee.” “Time is not on the U.S. side,” he quotes Kim Gae- gwan as saying. “The lapse of time will result in the quantitative and qualitative increase in our nuclear deterrent.” Kim also said, “How is that we can prove that we don’t something we don’t have?” (Transcript, “The North Korea Deadlock: A Report from the Region,” Brookings Institution, January 15, 2004) Hecker testimony: “We confirmed that the 5 MWe reactor is operating now. … “We drove past the 50 MWe reactor site twice. We confirmed there is no construction activity at this site. There were no construction cranes on site. The reactor building looks in a terrible state of repair. The concrete building structure shows cracks. The steel exhaust tower was heavily corroded, as was other steel equipment at the site. The building was not closed up and resembled a deserted structure. … We immediately confirmed the fact that all fuel rods were no longer in the pool because many of the canisters were missing and many were open. … When I expressed concern that some of the canisters were still closed, they took the extraordinary step of allowing me to pick one at random [all done under water in the pool] to demonstrate that there were no fuel rods remaining even in the closed canisters. …Although we could not see the plutonium glove box operations, they took the extraordinary step of showing us the ‘product’ from what they claimed to be their most recent reprocessing campaign. In a conference room following the tour, they brought a metal case that contained a wooden box with a glass jar they said contained 150 grams of plutonium oxalate powder and a glass jar they said contained 200 grams of plutonium metal for us to inspect. The glass jars were fitted with a screw- on metal lid and were tightly taped with transparent tape.
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