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Previous Relations Between U.S. and Iran Affect Them Today Previous Relations Between U.S. and Iran Affect Them Today Luisa Delos Reyes California State University Maritime Academy Previous Relations Between U.S. and Iran Affect Them Today Abstract As many are aware, the United States and Iran have not had the best relations starting all the way back in 1945 and even today in 2017. Unless a person lived through the era while all of the attacks between the U.S. and Iran, no one really understands the reason behind their animosity towards each other. It is believed that both countries are at fault for the strong tensions due to actions that were done and comments that were made. These two countries did not always have poor relations, but decisions that were made has obviously affected those relations drastically. This thesis will allow for readers to live through history and give them an idea on how much interactions between the U.S. and Iran were affected. This is not meant for the reader to determine who is in the right and who is at fault, instead, this thesis will give the reader a better understanding as to why these countries do not get along. Aside from the background between the U.S. and Iran, this thesis will also cover possible solutions, as well as what the future may look like if these countries do not make peace, and it does not look good. 2 Previous Relations Between U.S. and Iran Affect Them Today Introduction The United States and Iran have had a very inconsistent relationship where they have gone from potential allies to enemies. These two countries have not always had negative interactions between each other; however, the U.S. today describes Iran to be their bitterest enemy. They have worked alongside the other, not necessarily because they wanted to, because they felt that there were situations where they would complement each other to achieve a specific plan. On the other hand, there have been even more events where the two countries battled against each other, which negatively affected all types of relations. Since World War II, the relations between the U.S. and Iran have increased, but as time went on, the trust between the other decreased. There were too many events that occurred that could have begun this strong tension: U.S. overthrowing Iran's Prime Minister, Mohammed Mossadegh; the Cold War; Iranian hostage crisis; Iran-Contra affair; or one country attacking the other. It is hard to determine what really drew the line between these two countries starting from around 1946 all the way up until today in 2017. Background The purpose of this topic is to analyze how the relations between the U.S. and Iran have gotten to where they are today. There seems to be a lot of tension built up among these two countries, but not a specific reason as to why there is. Looking back on previous interactions, it will give a better idea as to why there is absolutely no trust between the U.S. and Iran. With their current interactions today, it is possible to determine whether their relations will improve or get worse. 3 Previous Relations Between U.S. and Iran Affect Them Today The Wars World War II In the early years of World War II, Iran was working with Germany by exporting grains to the Axis power while receiving technicians in return. In 1941, Iran was invaded by the British and the Soviet Union, both allies of the United States, with their focus on oil and a more convenient route to ship war materials to the USSR (History Staff, 2009). Iran signed the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance with Britain and the Soviets in 1943 agreeing that the Allies would protect Iranian economy from the effects of the war, as well as exiting out of Iranian territory by March 1946. The Soviets, instead, decided to move towards north Iran in Azerbaijan with the intent to create a permanent direct access to the Persian Gulf, which went against the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance. Not only did the Soviet Union violate the 1943 treaty, but it also violated the Russo-Persian Treaty of Friendship, which promised that the Soviet would not interfere in the internal affairs of Iran (Wolfe, 2011). The Friendship Treaty was signed in 1921 by the representatives of Iran and the Soviet Russia with the purpose to prevent White Russian counter- revolutionary forces from attacking the Soviets from Iranian territory (Mehdiyoun, 2000). With the Soviets not leaving northern Iran, believing that they were entitled to oil-drilling rights, both countries came to an agreement that Iran would supply them with an oil concession if the Soviets left their territory by April 1946. The Soviet Union refusing to withdraw from the country created issues with Turkey: "Meanwhile, it demanded disputed territories on the Soviet- Turkish border and pressed for partial control over the Turkish Straits" (Immerman & Goedde, 2013, P. 248). In response, Great Britain informed the U.S. of the Soviets' actions, which is when the U.S. began to provide Iran with aid and advice assisting in Iran's decision of backing out of their agreement with the Soviet Union. The U.S. were not pleased with the Soviets due to the 4 Previous Relations Between U.S. and Iran Affect Them Today possible risk of Iran assuming that the U.S. was involved in this decision, and creating more problems. After the Soviets realized that the U.S. was supporting Iran, the Soviet Union made the decision not to have their armed forces re-enter Iran with the fear that they would be targeted by the U.S. and Great Britain (History Staff, 2009). The Cold War With the U.S. and Soviet Union ending on bad terms at the end of World War II, that negative tension carried over in 1947, the beginning of the Cold War. During the first few years of the Cold War, Iran unanimously voting to nationalize the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), hoping to use that profit to develop their country (CBS News, 2010). British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, was not happy when Mossadegh, Iran's first elected Prime Minister, nationalized their oil since Great Britain was originally in control of Iran's oil. The U.S. tried remaining neutral with both Iran and Great Britain, but even the Truman administration agreed that nationalizing the oil company was causing more issues. Although President Truman did not want conflicts with both countries, he still refused to help the British overturn the Oil Nationalization Act, but that all changed when President Eisenhower came into office (Mardi, 2008). President Eisenhower agreed that this decision was not fair to Great Britain since a large share of Iran's operations was given to American oil companies when the U.S. was already receiving shares from Saudi oil companies. It was hard for the U.S. to keep these neutral interactions between Iran and Great Britain because, although the U.S. was benefiting from Iran's policy, the British were furious about the results (Immerman & Goedde, 2013). That is when the U.S. decided that Iran nationalizing their oil company should not be authorized. 5 Previous Relations Between U.S. and Iran Affect Them Today Changes in Power Pahlavi in, Mossadegh out Iran began to change their views towards the U.S. starting in 1951 after interfering with Iran's policy, but it was not until 1953 that Iran realized that the U.S. could no longer be trusted at all. In response to Mossadegh nationalizing Iran's oil company, the U.S. and Britain worked together by using the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Britain's M16 to plot ways to get Mossadegh overthrown as Iran's Prime Minister, and replaced by Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who supported Western interests. The reason behind the coup was designed "to get rid of a nationalist figure who insisted that oil should be nationalised" (Dehghan & Norton-Taylor, 2013, P. 1). The replacement led to Mossadegh being sentenced to jail and later to house arrest while Pahlavi remained Prime Minister up until the Islamic Revolution in 1979. The nationalization of Iranian oil companies continued to be in effect, however, the only difference was that foreign oil companies were given the permission to control and market Iran's oil company (Immerman & Goedde, 2013). As a result of the 1953 coup, the Iranian government lost their trust in the U.S. which led to the 1979 Islamic Revolution. After the U.S. and Iran had a falling out in 1953, these two countries eventually found their way working together. In 1957, the Iranian nuclear program was created with the help of the United States. The U.S. assisted Iran with this nuclear program by providing them with its first research reactor - "A nuclear reactor, a 5-megawatt nuclear reactor that is still functioning and still operational in Tehran" (Inskeep, 2015, P. ). This decision was made by President Eisenhower as a part of his Atoms for Peace program, which was meant to provide countries with their own nuclear technologies, anticipating that these would not be used for anything 6 Previous Relations Between U.S. and Iran Affect Them Today military related. The difference between Iran and the other countries that had a nuclear program created is that Iran had the funds and expertise to expand their program. The Shah's government took full advantage of this opportunity and sent Iranian students to attend Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) to study nuclear engineering (Inskeep, 2015).
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