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Role Mana of Cog Ageme Gnition Ent Sys N in a F Stem Future Naval C Combat

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Role Mana of Cog Ageme Gnition Ent Sys N in a F Stem Future Naval C Combat CAN UNCLASSIFIED Role of cognition in a future naval combat management system Dr. Anthony M. Ponsford Prepared by: Anthony M. Ponsford, Consultant, c/o Breckenhill, Inc., 305 Breckenridge Cres., Ottawa ON K2W 1J3 PSPC Contract Number: W7714-4501667362 Technical Authority: Peter Moo Contractor's date of publication: March 2018 Defence Research and Development Canada Contract Report DRDC-RDDC-2018-C070 September 2018 CAN UNCLASSIFIED CAN UNCLASSIFIED IMPORTANT INFORMATIVE STATEMENTS This document was reviewed for Controlled Goods by Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) using the Schedule to the Defence Production Act. Disclaimer: This document is not published by the Editorial Office of Defence Research and Development Canada, an agency of the Department of National Defence of Canada but is to be catalogued in the Canadian Defence Information System (CANDIS), the national repository for Defence S&T documents. Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada (Department of National Defence) makes no representations or warranties, expressed or implied, of any kind whatsoever, and assumes no liability for the accuracy, reliability, completeness, currency or usefulness of any information, product, process or material included in this document. Nothing in this document should be interpreted as an endorsement for the specific use of any tool, technique or process examined in it. Any reliance on, or use of, any information, product, process or material included in this document is at the sole risk of the person so using it or relying on it. Canada does not assume any liability in respect of any damages or losses arising out of or in connection with the use of, or reliance on, any information, product, process or material included in this document. Template in use: Feb21 CR EL1 Advanced Template_EN 2018-02_20-v3_WW.DOTM © Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada (Department of National Defence), 2018 © Sa Majesté la Reine en droit du Canada (Ministère de la Défense nationale), 2018 CAN UNCLASSIFIED Abstract This report provides a non-technical introduction to Naval Combat Management Systems (NCMS) and concludes with the proposal for a Holistic-NCMS designed to meet the future requirements of the Royal Canadian Navy. NCMS is a cognitive aid that naval forces use to manage their resources. The NCMS connects the sensor suite to the weapon systems via the Command and Control (C2) system. The C2 system ingests and processes sensor data to supports operator cognitive tasks including planning, re-planning, sense-making and situational assessment. The core functions of the NCMS are to observe, analyze and take action. The NCMS supports objective reasoning to facilitate a commander to take subjective actions. The overall objective is to gain a competitive advantage over an adversary. That is, to enable a commander to take the best action given their current understanding of the situation. The NCMS manages conventional systems, semi-autonomous and fully autonomous systems. The NCMS is required to function as a standalone entity and work within a collaborative network of coalition forces. The sensor and weapons suites are mature technologies and no significant innovation is expected to occur in the near future. Therefore, advances in the performance of NCMS will be gained primarily by processing data from existing systems and utilizing this data in such a way that the resulting product is greater than just the sum-of-the-parts. The report proposes a new Holistic-NCMS that is based on a system-of-systems approach to sensor resource management. This approach utilizes recent advances in networking and computational intelligence. This report discusses the emergence of cognitive computing as the enabling technology. Cognitive computing can be used within the sensor suite to optimize performance based on the known environment, current threat and historical data. The Sensor Resource Manager (SRM) uses data from across the sensor suite as well as external sources to achieve this goal. Cognitive computing also plays a critical role in the C2 system where it has the capability of exploiting big- data to enhance timely informed decision support, planning and engagement The proposed SRM dynamically allocates resources and tasking across sensor suite. The SRM adds placidity to the system such that in the event of sensor failure, the system optimally reallocates resources and tasking to fill the void. The Holistic-NCMS incorporates real-time simulation and modelling of an adversary’s kill-chain during an evolving engagement to highlight weaknesses and strengths that can be exploited or avoided. Similar modelling is also be applied to the host vessel’s kill-chain to highlight own weaknesses and strengths during an evolving mission. i The report includes a section on recommended future R&D that has been compiled using input from both NCMS suppliers as well as researchers in the area of cognitive computing and cognition, big-data, decision support, sensor resource management, and real-time simulation and modelling. ii Table of contents Abstract ………………………………………………………………………………………….i Table of contents ............................................................................................................................ iii List of figures ............................................................................................................................... viii List of tables .................................................................................................................................... x Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................................ xi 1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 1 1.1 Historical Overview ....................................................................................................... 1 1.2 Report Structure............................................................................................................. 2 2 Introduction to the Naval Combat Management System .......................................................... 4 2.1 Royal Canadian Navy Mission ...................................................................................... 4 2.2 Asymmetric Threats ...................................................................................................... 5 2.2.1 Military use of asymmetric tactics ....................................................................... 5 2.2.2 Insurgent use of asymmetric tactics ..................................................................... 5 2.2.3 Piracy and Organized Crime - use of asymmetric tactics ................................... 6 2.2.4 Cyber asymmetric threat ...................................................................................... 7 2.2.5 GPS Spoofing – an asymmetric threat ................................................................. 7 2.2.6 Implications for a tailored RCN Naval Combat Management System ................ 7 2.3 Kill Chain Models ......................................................................................................... 8 2.3.1 F2T2EA Kill-Chain Model .................................................................................. 8 2.3.2 F5 Kill-Chain Model ............................................................................................ 9 2.3.3 Cyber Kill-Chain model .................................................................................... 10 2.4 The role of the NCMS in completing the Kill Chain................................................... 11 2.5 Command and Control System of the NCMS ............................................................. 12 2.5.1 All Domain Situational Awareness .................................................................... 12 2.5.2 Intelligence ........................................................................................................ 13 2.5.3 Planning and Decision Making .......................................................................... 14 2.5.4 Decision Support System ................................................................................... 16 2.6 Cognition ..................................................................................................................... 17 2.6.1 Perception-Action Cycle .................................................................................... 18 iii 2.6.2 Big Data ............................................................................................................. 20 2.7 Transforming Information to Knowledge .................................................................... 21 2.7.1 High and Low Level Information Fusion .......................................................... 22 2.8 Computer Processes for Generating Actionable Intelligence from Big-Data .............. 22 2.8.1 Cloud Computing ............................................................................................... 23 2.8.2 Predictive Analytics ........................................................................................... 24 2.8.3 Machine Learning .............................................................................................. 25 2.8.4 Machine Intelligence, Artificial Intelligence and Computational Intelligence .. 26 2.8.5 Cognitive Computing ......................................................................................... 27 2.9 Summary ....................................................................................................................
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