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UNITED KINGDOM Terence Taylor TERRORISM COMES IN MANY different forms. Britain’s experience of terrorism has been mainly domestic and overseas terrorism asso- ciated with independence movements in the dying days of empire. In view of this experience, this essay focuses mainly on “Irish ter- rorism,” although it does address the British approach to, and ex- perience with, modern international terrorism and seeks to con- trast the two in an analysis of the lessons that can be learned. The experience of independence-related terrorism is largely ignored. NATIONAL STRUCTURES Legislation and Definitions Britain’s counterterrorism legislation has evolved in response to the perceived threat of terrorism, as seen in the context of pre- vailing views on how acts of terrorism should be considered and the existing governmental structures used for dealing with those types of acts. The principal perceived threat was Irish Republicanism. 187 188 Indeed, it was only in the wake of the 1974 Birmingham bombing • that the Prevention of Terrorism Act was drafted to supplement the COMBATING 1920 Emergency Powers Act (Northern Ireland). Later international TERRORISM terrorism was added to the list of perceived threats, but until 2000 (non-Irish) domestic terrorism was specifically excluded. Thus, ter- rorism was defined as either Irish or international terrorism. The law allowed for no other domestic terrorism. The prevailing view at the time of the 1974 Prevention of Terror- ism Act was that terrorism is a criminal, not a political, act. This view persisted until 2001. The principal governmental structures for dealing with criminal acts are the United Kingdom’s fifty or so police forces and the criminal justice system. Until July 2000, the principal legislative measures governing ter- rorism in Britain were the following. The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act (PTA) of 1989 (c. 4), applicable only in Great Britain The Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act (EPA) of 1996 (c. 22), applicable only in Northern Ireland (amended in 1998) Sections 1–4 of the Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act (CJT & CA) of 1998 (c. 40) In addition, the government had recourse to the Emergency Powers Act of 1920 to provide the authorities with “such power and duties as His Majesty may deem necessary for the preservation of peace, for securing and regulating the supply and distribution of food, water, fuel or light, and other necessities, for maintaining the means of transit or locomotion, and for any other purposes essen- tial to the public safety and life of the community.”1 This legislative slate provided various means to prevent terror- ism and investigate and prosecute acts of terrorism. Essentially, these measures fell into three categories. Power for the home secretary to proscribe terrorist organizations and the definition of various offenses connected with such organizations (e.g., membership in and fund-raising for the organization) The creation of specific offenses connected with terrorism, such as fund-raising or training in the use of firearms for a terrorist act Police powers to prevent and investigate terrorist acts, such as pow- 189 ers of investigation, arrest, stop and search, and detention United The definition of terrorism applied was “the use of violence for Kingdom political ends, and includes any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear,”2 but it was applied only to Irish and international terrorism. A notable feature of Britain’s terrorism legislation prior to 2000 was that it was all temporary. This was because it evolved in re- sponse to Irish terrorism and later to international terrorism, both of which were originally viewed as transient problems. Further- more, the powers created under terrorist legislation were similar to those envisaged under the Emergency Powers Act of 1920. Any powers granted under this act were temporary in order to ensure that they would not become regularized and hence infringe upon basic civil rights. Powers granted under the Emergency Powers Act had to be reviewed by Parliament within five days of proclamation and renewed each month, specifically to protect against abuse and extension of emergency powers. As a natural extension of these civil rights protection concerns, Britain’s counterterrorist laws had to be renewed on an annual basis. There was a substantive change in the situation when the Ter- rorism Act of 2000 was passed by Parliament on July 10. This act ad- dressed the omission of non-Irish domestic terrorism from the ear- lier legislation and made most of its provisions permanent. The main provisions are as follows. The act represents permanent nationwide antiterrorist legislation (to replace the existing separate, temporary legislation for Northern Ireland and Great Britain). The definition of terrorism will for the first time apply to so-called do- mestic terrorism as well as international terrorism and terrorism connected with the affairs of Northern Ireland. The police will retain the powers that they have under the current legislation to stop and search and take other actions to combat terrorism and will have strengthened powers to tackle terrorist financing and seek forfeiture of terrorist assets. A judge (rather than a minister) will consider police applications for extensions of detention under the terrorist power of arrest. 190 The act includes additional temporary measures that apply to • Northern Ireland only. COMBATING TERRORISM The act replaces the PTA and the EPA and will be reviewed on an an- nual basis. The British government intended for the act to be fully implemented early in 2001. However, the Northern Ireland provi- sions—extending the life of the EPA for a limited period—went into effect immediately. The 1996 EPA would otherwise have repealed it- self on August 24, 2000. Organizations and Responsibilities In the United Kingdom, the home secretary is responsible for all se- curity and counterterrorism issues. While the Foreign and Com- monwealth Office (FCO) leads in negotiating international treaties dealing with terrorism, the passage of enabling legislation and the implementation of these treaties within the United Kingdom are ul- timately the responsibility of the home secretary. Likewise, there is partial devolution of police powers in that both Scotland and North- ern Ireland have independent police forces but they are subordi- nate to the home secretary on terrorism policy. Within the Home Office, responsibility for terrorism policy falls under the Organized and International Crime Directorate. Within this directorate is the Terrorism Protection Unit (TPU), which is it- self split into different sections dealing with, inter alia, Irish terror- ism, international terrorism, contingency planning, and domestic terrorism (issues such as animal rights activists). In line with Britain’s consideration of terrorism as a criminal act, responsibility on the ground for responding to a terrorist act within the United Kingdom falls to the chief constable of the relevant fifty or so police authorities. The police may then call in whatever additional resources they deem necessary, be it fire department, ambulance, hospital, local and national government, intelligence, scientific, or military. However, any decision to launch an assault against terror- ists requires ministerial approval. Consequently, for any protracted terrorist incident a Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) is estab- lished and acts as the crisis management center. COBR comprises relevant ministers and senior officials. Its link to the scene of the crime is the government liaison officer (GLO), a senior Home Office 191 civil servant, who is sent to the scene of the incident. The GLO takes a team with him or her, comprising (if it is an incident of interna- United tional terrorism) an official from the FCO, a Security Service officer, Kingdom and a press officer, who in turn will cooperate with the police spokesperson dealing with the incident and the Home Office director of public relations, who will be located with the home secretary in the COBR. Any request for military assistance, be it for an assault or, say, to call on the government’s expertise in chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons, passes from the police through the GLO. COUNTERTERRORISM MEASURES Deterrence Knowing the terrorist’s mind can greatly assist in the development of counterterrorism measures. A domestic political terrorist orga- nization cannot afford to alienate the citizens whose sympathies it is trying to win, as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) found when it kidnapped and killed William Best in Derry in May 1972.3 In its later years, the IRA consequently was forced to focus more of its attacks on military, political, and economic targets and take measures to limit collateral civilian damage (e.g., telephone warnings with iden- tifying passwords to alert the authorities that the call was gen- uine).4 Foreign religious or ideological terrorists are unlikely to be so constrained vis-à-vis the citizenry of the country attacked, but they also have their target audiences to consider. In short, terrorists are not irrational: they aim to maximize at- tention to their cause. While some will see value in the martyrdom associated with suicide attacks, for the most part terrorists, while going for the prestige target, will opt for targets that are less well protected. By increasing preparedness, responding rapidly, and vig- orously prosecuting those who perpetrate terrorism, the United Kingdom hopes