Paris Conference on Orthodoxy

THIS IS A DRAFT PREPARED FOR THE PARIS CONFERENCE ON ORTHODOXY. IT IS INTENDED ONLY FOR CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS. Religious Zionism and Secular Judaism in Israeli Society Charles S. Liebman The Religio-Political Culture The boundaries distinguishing religious-Zionism and ultra- Orthodoxy (the haredi world) are increasingly blurred. One can still distinguish the two broad communities, each, the haredi in particular, composed of a number of sub-communities. The two broad communities remain distinct in dress, styles of life, nominal attitudes toward Zionism and the sanctity of the state, and attitudes, for the time being at least, toward secular education. But the basic ideological divisions have, in my opinion, narrowed so considerably that one is justified in describing a unified religious camp within Israeli society. The distinguishing marks which have disappeared are: 1. The haredi once conceived of themselves as outsiders in Israeli society, concerned only with the defense of their own interests. Haredim no longer see themselves in this manner. In fact, provocative acts such as burning the Israeli flag or throwing stones at police standing at attention on Israel's Memorial Day, signal how much a part of Israeli society these radicals are. The excuse that, "the flag of Israel is not our flag" is lame. The flag of Israel was not chosen at random. Statements by Aryeh Deri, echoed by other haredim that they -1- intend to impose their view on the entire country signals a major shift in ideology. Haredim are no longer content to protect what they have. They now seek, like religious-Zionists, to transform the society in their image. On the other hand, representative statements of the West Bank settlers during the Rabin administration and the behavior of many of them suggest how alienated they, too, feel from the agencies of the state and how little authority the law carries in their eyes. 2. Among the distinguishing marks of the haredi interpretation of Judaism were as follows: Judaism is to be understood primarily as an halakhic system comprised of beliefs and norms that pervade all aspects of public as well as private life. Rabbis who are learned in sacred text are the arbiters of this system and they are, therefore, the final arbiters of all matters of any importance in public or private life. This world view has been internalized by leaders of religious-Zionist community as well. With the exception of a few intellectuals who demur from this position on a principled basis, the rank and file of religious Zionists who act without consulting rabbincal leaders do so out of a sense of their own weakness and experience guilt for succumbing to the temptations of modernity. The culture of this religio-political society is expressed primarily in classical rabbinic texts and homiletical material -2- transmitted in lectures, in print, on video and diskette. The political religious culture is projected through an independent press, radio programs, art, periodicals and books including works of fiction, poetry, children's stories and of course, an extensive formal and informal educational network. It is fairly self-contained though it is clearly subject, especially at its periphery, to the influence of other cultures. What is most significant is that its audience is increasingly drawn from both haredi as well as religious-Zionist. The recently innaugurated radio station intended for religious-Zionist as well as haredi listeners is a good example. The question is whether these developments are inherent in the nature of religious-Zionism. If so, the development or the behavior of religious-Zionism until 1967 requires explanation. Alternately, one may argue that the development of religious- Zionism since 1967 is the result of the peculiar circumstances in which religious-Zionism found itself as a consequence of the victories of the Six Day War and the political processes induced by the events that followed that War. I believe that the former is the case. The "holy revolt" of Hapoel Hamizrachi, the early ideology of the religious kibbutz movement, the dovish leadership of Moshe Haim Shapiro in the years preceding the Six Day War, were, in my opinion, deviations from the logic of relgious Orthodoxy. If religious-Zionism was to -3- be faithful to religious Orthodoxy, its present path became inevitable. Orthodox Jews share the belief that God revealed himself and continues to reveal hmself -- not only in sacred text but in the course of history and in events which we experience. It follows, therefore, that both history and the events we experience teach us something about what God wants of us. God's will is to be found, among other places, in our world. Anyone familiar with the Bible will recognize the roots of this tradition. But it has a logically compelling quality as well. The alternative is to conclude that the course of human history is contrary to God's will or that God is indifferent to what happens in human history. Consequently, Orthodox Jews, like all religiously serious people will at least consider and assess events to look for signs from God. Within the Jewish tradition, these signs can only be decoded within the context of the textual tradition and by those who are learned in sacred text. Secular Jewishness in Israeli Society It is awkward, in Hebrew, to distinguish between secular Judaism (Yahadut hilonit)and secular Jewishness (Yehdiyut hilonit), a term which is rarely invoked. Whereas secular Judaism may be an oxymoron, secular Jewishness is not. In the early Zionist period, to be secular meant to be non-religious, perhaps even anti-religious. However, within the context of Zionism and -4- the yishuv it was taken for granted that when one described oneself as a secularist or one's ideology as secularist, one meant Jewishly secular; i.e. that one was a part of Jewish history, knowledgeable about Jewish traditions, dedicated to the needs of the Jewish people. This is no longer the case. Secularism or the secular camp of Israeli Jews is really divided into two parts. They overlap one another but analytically, they are distinguishable. Consumerist-Post-Modernist Culture One form of secularism prevalent in Israeli Jewish society is the consumerist hedonistic western post-modernist culture which is basically indifferent to and at some levels hostile to the Jewish tradition. At the private level, its extreme adherents are those who eschew any observance of traditional Jewish ritual and custom. Its political extreme is represented by post-Zionism, opposition to the notion of Israel as a Jewish state. The extremists are a distinct minority, but in broader terms hedonistic consumerism is a style of life and thought which attracts many if not most Israelis. Post-Zionists are not necessarily party to the consumerist-hedonistic orientations which increasingly characterize western and Israeli society. The connection between them is that the consumerist-post-modernist culture focuses upon the individual and denies the authority of the larger collective. It thereby provides a foundation upon -5- which post-Zionist arguments appear credible and even attractive. If individuals are all that count, and national identity no longer carries any authority, then the post-Zionist demand that Israel be "a state for all its citizens" rather than a "Jewish state" is perfectly just. Almost all areas of Israeli life are affected by contemporary patterns of western consumerism and by its emphasis on the individual and individual fulfillment rather than on the larger society. In addition, a growing number of Israelis are ignorant of the components of the Jewish tradition. In many respects, therefore, one identifies this culture by what it doesn't contain (elements of the Jewish tradition) as by what it does contain. Consumerist post-modernism is the characteristic expression of much, probably most of Israeli literature and television including that which is locally produced. In its hostility rather than simply indifference to Judaism it is most wide spread in the Israeli theater and it is often encountered among the academic elite. I think it is very important to distinguish between the self-conscious effort on the part of a cultural and political elite to disassociate themselves, Israeli culture and Israeli public policy from any special tie to Judaism, Jewish history or the Jewish people on the one hand, and a broader Israeli public, who is concerned with satisfying its private needs and -6- increasingly indifferent to Judaism or Jewish history. To the first group, democratic liberalism is a banner under which they seek to free Israeli society from the constraints of the Jewish tradition. Their political slogan is to transform Israel into "a state for all its citizens", a battle cry through which they hope to reform public policy by dejudaizing the state. This program only appeals to a small number of Israelis but many more adopt these notions by default. This is especially true of those who are convinced that this may be the only alternative to the religio-political culture described above. Consequently, it is in the interests of the elite of this Jewishly neutral culture to stress the idea that there is a culture war between secular and religious and that the only alternative to the religious culture is a Jewishly neutral secular one. Their strategy is to pose the values of the secular, humane liberal democratic culture against the values of Judaism, which is described as anti-democratic and anti-humane. Post-Zionism and the celebration of post-modern western consumerism merge in an important article by Gideon Samet, an editorial writer for Ha'Aretz. I find the article especially important not only because of its ideological stance but also because of the self-confidence which it reflects. Post-modern culture is, in many respects, an incoherent culture.

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