A Different Kind of Ignorance Self-Deception as Flight from Self-Knowledge A Different Kind of Ignorance Self-Deception as Flight from Self-Knowledge Elinor Hållén Dissertation presented at Uppsala University to be publicly examined in Geijersalen, building 6, Engelska Parken, Humanistiskt Centrum, Uppsala, Saturday, May 14, 2011 at 13:15 for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. The examination will be conducted in Swedish. Abstract Hållén, E. 2011. A Different Kind of Ignorance: Self-Deception as Flight from Self- Knowledge. Department of Philosophy. 198 pp. Uppsala. ISBN 978-91-506-2206-5 In this dissertation I direct critique at a conception of self-deception prevalent in analytical philosophy, where self-deception is seen as a rational form of irrationality in which the self-deceiver strategically deceives himself on the basis of having judged that this is the best thing to do or, in order to achieve something advantageous. In Chapter One, I criticize the conception of self-deception as analogous to deceiving someone else, the so-called “standard approach to self-deception”. The account under investigation is Donald Davidson’s. I criticize Davidson’s outline of self-deception as involving contradictory beliefs, and his portrayal of self-deception as a rational and strategic action. I trace the assumptions involved in Davidson’s account back to his account of radical interpretation and argue that the problems and paradoxes that Davidson discusses are not inherent in self-deception as such but are problems arising in and out of his account. In Chapter Two, I present Sebastian Gardner’s account of self- deception. Gardner is concerned with distinguishing self-deception as a form of “ordinary” irrationality that shares the structure of normal, rational thinking and action in being manipulation of beliefs from forms of irrationality treated by psychoanalysis. I object to the way in which Gardner makes this distinction and further argue that Gardner is mistaken in finding support in Freud for his claim that self-deception involves preference. In Chapter Three, I present a different understanding of self- deception. I discuss self-deception in the context of Sigmund Freud’s writings on illusion, delusion, different kinds of knowledge, etc., and propose a view of self- deception where it is not seen as a lie to oneself but rather as motivated lack of self- knowledge and as a flight from anxiety. In Chapter Four, I discuss some problems inherent in the three accounts under investigation, for example, problems arising because first-person awareness is conflated with knowledge of objects. Keywords: self-deception, self-knowledge, anxiety, rationality, intentionality, psychoanalysis, Freud, Davidson, Gardner, Lear. Elinor Hållén, Department of Philosophy, Box 627, Uppsala University, SE-751 26 Uppsala, Sweden. © Elinor Hållén 2011 ISBN 978-91-506-2206-5 urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-150701 (http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-150701) Printed in Sweden by Edita Västra Aros, a climate neutral company, Västerås 2011 Contents Acknowledgements .......................................................................................... 7 Introduction – Views and Conceptions of Self-Deception ................................. 9 Donald Davidson – The Paradoxical Nature of Self-Deception ....................... 19 Self-Deception in The Context of Radical Interpretation ...................................... 21 The Paradox of Irrationality .................................................................................. 24 Self-Deception as Paradox ..................................................................................... 31 Self-Deception, Intention and Evidence ................................................................ 36 Self-Deception as Incoherency of Beliefs ................................................................ 40 Anscombe and Intentional Action ......................................................................... 43 Self-Deception Imbued with Presumptions of Rationality ..................................... 47 The Divided Mind ................................................................................................ 52 Sebastian Gardner – Self-Deception in Relation to Psychoanalysis .................. 63 Gardner’s Project in Short ..................................................................................... 65 Self-Deception ....................................................................................................... 69 Anna Karenina’s Self-Deception ............................................................................ 72 Ordinary Irrationality vs. Irrationality Treated by Psychoanalysis .......................... 75 Ambivalence and Preference .................................................................................. 81 Conflict and Awareness of Conflict ....................................................................... 86 Burial of Belief vs. Repression ................................................................................ 87 Self-Knowledge and Realization ............................................................................. 89 Human Beings as Rational Unities and Borderline Cases ....................................... 94 Intention in Action ................................................................................................ 97 Sigmund Freud – Self-Deception as Flight from Anxiety .............................. 101 Introduction and Outline .................................................................................... 103 Two Conceptions of Self-Deception .................................................................... 104 Illusion and Self-Understanding .......................................................................... 107 Pathology and the Normal ................................................................................... 110 Defensive Reactions ............................................................................................. 112 Flights from Anxiety ............................................................................................ 124 What is an Unconscious Intention? ..................................................................... 128 Idea versus Belief ................................................................................................. 140 Does Self-Deception Involve Intention? .............................................................. 149 Self-Deception in the Light of Unconscious Intention ......................................... 153 The Ego Organization and Exclusion .................................................................. 156 Discussion of Occurrences of ‘Self-Deception’ in SE ........................................... 162 Is One Always Unconscious of that about which One Deceives Oneself? ............. 173 Self-Deception as a Moral Concept ..................................................................... 177 Concluding Remarks & Summary ................................................................ 179 Remarks on Guiding Assumptions and Aims ....................................................... 181 Self-Knowledge and Morality .............................................................................. 183 Short Summary ................................................................................................... 189 Bibliography ................................................................................................ 191 Appendix ..................................................................................................... 195 Acknowledgements First and foremost, I want to thank those who planted the seed of philosophical interest and questioning in me in the first place. They came to be my supervisors, Sharon Rider and Sören Stenlund. As an undergraduate student I found their teachings greatly inspiring and I read and re-read Stenlunds essays on philosophy since reading them brought light to various philosophical problems with which I found myself confronted. To me, both are exemplary in only doing philosophy that really matters to them, in writing simply and clearly with the question in focus and, in so doing, avoiding to devote time to pseudo- problems. Through this work I have learned how difficult that is, but also how rewarding. I want to especially thank Rider for the early talks during which we worked out the topic for my thesis more carefully and for her hard work during these last months in helping me to articulate my thoughts better in correcting my English. Pär Segerdahl and Mats Persson also contributed to plant that seed and helping it thrive. I am very thankful to Niklas Forsberg for taking upon himself the task of acting as opponent at my final seminar. His careful comments have been very helpful in completing my thesis. I want to thank all the participants in the seminar in theoretical philosophy for inspiring discussions and support, special thanks to Tove Österman, Niklas Forsberg, Gisela Bengtsson, Simo Säätelä and Ulrika Björk, for philosophical camaraderie and friendship. I also want to thank the faculty and its staff for helpful assistance, in particular I would like to thank Rysiek Sliwinsky for so generously and hearthwarmingly helping us all with all kinds of matters. I am thankful for having had the chance to take part in several workshops, conferances and courses arranged by the Nordic Network for Wittgenstein Research. I am fortunate to have had the opportunity to spend six months