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The Paris Terrorist Attacks: Implications for First Responders

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The Paris Terrorist Attacks: Implications for First Responders Official Journal of the Australian Tactical Medical Association ATMA Expert Opinion Series The Paris Terrorist Attacks: Implications for First Responders John Moloney1, Drew Morgan2 1. Professor, Monash University, Victoria, Australia. 2. Superintendent, Victoria Police, Melbourne, Australia Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors. They do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of the author's employers, affiliations or its members. Introduction make no implication of failure by any of the responding organisations but are in The Australian Tactical Medical recognition of the dynamic space in which Association (ATMA) recognised the need they occur. The events will be chosen as for a readily available, open source of they highlight a significant change in knowledge in the areas of high threat and terrorist strategies and tactics or other austere medicine. The Journal of High unique circumstances. Threat and Austere Medicine (JHTAM) was created to contribute to this, as a source of The opportunity to learn from the response relevant information. As such, the Journal to previous incidents should not be ignored has commenced an irregular series, and identified lessons from this series will attempting to identify key pieces of provide a knowledge base that forms a knowledge which should be more readily basis for capability development. available to tactical medical responders. The Incident Utilising an analysis of previous events, these pieces of knowledge will include On Friday, November 13th, 2015 ISIS innovative responses or applications of inspired terrorists launched a sophisticated existing responses, identification of and highly choreographed attack on changes in the threat environment (as multiple sites in Paris. The meticulous evidenced by the attempted actions of the timing of the attacks has been compared to perpetrators) and ‘opportunities for the precision of a pyrotechnical display. improvement’. The sophistication of the attack was unprecedented in attacks against civilian This information will be from open sources, populations, involving ten active terrorists will not focus on intelligence matters nor and eight sites. The final death toll was investigation, except when these may be 130, with over 400 injured and 100 relevant to the timely tactical medicine considered seriously injured (Brisard response. We recognise that these were all 2015). dynamic events where there were significant difficulties in forming a complete Chronology coherent perspective which would stand up to the rigours of a post-event analysis. Prelude There may have been incomplete October: Salah Abdeslam bought ten information, inadequate or inaccurate battery-operated detonators at a fireworks communication of information or a failure to store in Saint-Ouen-l'Aumône, north of understand the importance of parts of the Paris, after asking repeatedly about their large amount of data flowing around an reliability. He produced a licence as proof incident response. As such, these articles of identity. (Mulholland, 2015) Journal of High Threat and Austere Medicine: www.JHTAM.org Article published online: 2019 Page 1 Official Journal of the Australian Tactical Medical Association ATMA Expert Opinion Series 12th November: Terrorists arrive in Paris in was the detonation of a suicide vest by three rental cars. Ibrahim Abdeslam, seriously injuring a waitress, but killing only himself. At this 13th November: Three terrorists are driven time, he still had 5 AK47 magazines to the Stade de France by Salah Abdeslam. available. These sites are about 2 At 2120, after failing to gain entrance to the kilometres to the southeast of Bataclan Stade de France, a terrorist detonated his Hall. During subsequent police raids, a suicide vest, killing himself and a member video of the café shooting was found. of the public. The device was composed of Also, at 2140, three armed men with triacetone triperoxide (TATP), with military type weapons entered the Bataclan batteries and shrapnel (bolts, nails, etc.). Concert Hall, firing into the crowd. There This was followed, shortly after and in close are some reports of ‘grenades’, but these proximity, by two further apparent suicide are inconsistent. The event was a concert bombings, at 2130 and 2153. by an American band ‘Eagles of Death Approximately 72,000 people, including Metal’. There were approximately 1500 President Hollande, were attending an people present. international soccer match at the stadium. This venue appears to have been the At approximately 2147, 2 local police primary target of the plot. The soccer game officers responded to the Bataclan. One continued until its conclusion, which was fired his weapon, hitting Foued Mohamed- then followed by an orderly evacuation. Aggad in the chest, detonating his suicide The president had been removed earlier. vest. At about this time, the shooting The orderly crowd movement may have ceased. The two remaining terrorist had thwarted a component of the terrorist plans, already taken some of the concert goers’ as did their inability to gain entrance to the hostage on an upper floor and were stadium. shooting into the hall as well as into an alley beside the hall, into which many were At 2125 there were multiple people shot attempting to escape. and injured in two restaurants – Le Carillon and Le Petit Cambodge - near the corner of At 2215, the BRI (Brigade de Recherche et Rue Albert and Bichat, followed shortly d’Intervention) and RAID (Recherche, after, at 2132, by a similar event at nearby Assistance, Intervention, Dissuasion) Rue de la Fontaine-au-Roi; La Café Bonne arrived at the Bataclan and at 0020 they Bière and La Casa Nostra. These sites are entered the building. Following an approximately 2 km north of Bataclan Hall. interaction with the law enforcement, one suicide vest worn by one of the remaining At 2136 there were further shootings at two terrorist was detonated, the other was Rue de Charonne, and an explosion at shot by police. (Pfeifer) Boulevade Voltaire at 2140. The explosion Journal of High Threat and Austere Medicine: www.JHTAM.org Article published online: 2019 Page 2 Official Journal of the Australian Tactical Medical Association ATMA Expert Opinion Series Figure 1: Multisite Plan for Terrorist Attacks (Carli, 2017) Terrorist Cells nearby Croix de Chavaux station. He returned to the area of the Bataclan, with Stade de France – Black Renaut Clio analysis of his mobile phone signals 1.) Salah Abdeslam – arrested. placing him in the vicinity of the attacks 2.) Bilal Hadfi – deceased at scene. between 2220 and 0028. Crouching in a 3.) Ahmad al Mohammed – deceased doorway, there are suggestions that he at scene. was monitoring and controlling the plot, and 4.) M al Mahmod – deceased at scene even giving direct orders and instructions to the team inside the Bataclan. Earlier phone Bataclan – Black Volkswagen Polo records showed Abaaoud had similarly controlled Bilal Hadfi, one of the suicide 5.) Ismael Mostefai – deceased at bombers at the Stade de France. The scene. French prosecutor believes that Abaaoud 6.) Samy Amimour – deceased at was also involved in a plot to attack a scene. commercial centre and a police station 7.) Foued Mohamed-Aggad – near La Defence on the 14th or 15th of deceased at scene. November. It is unclear whether he was Mobile Team – Black Seat Leon wearing a suicide vest, nor how he left the area of the Bataclan. He was killed in a 8.) Brahim Abdeslam – deceased at police raid on November 19th (Van Vlierden scene. 2015). 9.) Chakib Akrouh- deceased during subsequent police raid. Salah Abdeslam, the brother of Ibrahim, is 10.) Abdelhamid Abaaoud - deceased reported to have driven the terrorists to the during subsequent police raid. Stade, in a rented black Renault Clio. Following this, he was known to have been Abdelhamid Abaaoud, who had previously involved with the shootings at La Casa appeared in ISIS videos, is thought to have Nostra, having been seen there on CCTV. been the mastermind of the attack and to Leaving this scene and wearing a suicide have been present during the café vest he abandoned his car at Place Albert shootings. His fingerprints were found on Kahn. His apparent target had been one of three AK47s found in the black Seat Brasserie Barbes, in the Montmartre area. Leon used in the attacks and abandoned in His suicide vest, without its detonator, was Montreuil. He was seen on CCTV entering found in a bin in Mountrouge. He Journal of High Threat and Austere Medicine: www.JHTAM.org Article published online: 2019 Page 3 Official Journal of the Australian Tactical Medical Association ATMA Expert Opinion Series abandoned that part of the plan, and made (Stratfor). Emergency responders may his way back to Belgium, where he was encounter terrorists whilst the ‘suicide’ arrested in March 2016 (Counter terrorist is actively withdrawing from Extremism Project). the event. Again, there is a need to maintain situational awareness from the It is not uncommon for siblings, or other time of dispatch. close relatives, to be involved in terrorist plots. Siblings have been involved in It appears that the goal of the terrorists at September 11, Charlie Hebdo, Boston and Stade-de-Paris was for one to enter the Brussels attacks. It decreases the risk of stadium and to then detonate his device. interdiction by intelligence agencies The fleeing crowd would then be rushing monitoring electronic communication. It towards the two terrorists outside the probably decreases the withdrawal from stadium, who could then activate their the plan once it has commenced (Hafez devices. Emergency response agencies 2016). are aware of the second device, placed in a position where these agencies will either Implications for Tactical Medical stage or respond to an event. There have Planning and Response been instances where there has been a These were complex and coordinated test of this strategy, where a ‘small’ event attacks. Some of the terrorists remained at is initiated to ascertain the emergency one site (Stade-de-Paris and Bataclan Hall) responder’s response (Washington Times, whilst the others were mobile, moving from 2017).
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