Refugees Versus Terrorists by Marco Funk and Roderick Parkes
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
6 2016 S ipa NY/SIPA Refugees versus terrorists by Marco Funk and Roderick Parkes Syrian passports found near the bodies of two of one of the Stade de France attackers, was a French the perpetrators of the Paris terrorist attacks in national who lived in Belgium. The authorities November 2015 led to speculation that terrorists knew that he had gone to Syria to join ISIL but were infiltrating refugee flows to the EU. The idea failed to detect his return. must be taken seriously, and reflects valid con- cerns about how well refugees are being identified While most of the perpetrators were thus European, at the EU’s external borders. But the problem is the attacks do raise concerns about the possible a far broader one, and also involves EU citizens infiltration of refugee flows by foreign terrorists. travelling to Syria and returning to carry out ter- Two of the Stade de France attackers were carry- rorist attacks. ing Syrian passports. One of these documents was damaged beyond recognition, and the other has Parisian profiles subsequently turned out to be falsified (an almost identical fake passport was found with a refugee at A look at the profiles of the Paris attackers and a Serbian reception centre just after the attacks), their accomplices reveals a group of individu- but the fingerprints and photos of the attackers do als with roots in Europe, many of whom had clearly match those taken at a refugee registration travelled to the Middle East as ‘foreign fighters’. centre in Greece last October. Abdelhamid Abaaoud, the suspected mastermind of the attacks, was a case in point. The 28-year- A backchannel for terrorists? old Belgian national of Moroccan origin grew up in the Brussels neighbourhood of Molenbeek. He The refugee flows present foreign terrorists with is believed to have joined the Islamic State of Iraq a potential new mode of entry to the European and the Levant (ISIL) in 2013 and spent time in Union from ISIL-controlled areas in the Middle Syria. East. The central Mediterranean route from Libya, for instance, provides direct access to the heart of Similarly, all three of the Bataclan concert hall the Schengen area: once they have gained entry to attackers, Omar Ismail Mostefai (29), Samy Italy, refugees are likely only to encounter border Amimour (28) and Foued Mohammed Aggad (23), patrols which may delay but seldom prevent their were born and raised in France. As to Ibrahim onward movement. The eastern Mediterranean Abdeslam, the 31-year-old French national who route up through Turkey to Greece has the ad- detonated a suicide vest outside a restaurant: he vantage of being largely land-based, meaning that had travelled to Turkey in 2015 intending to reach those taking it can avoid seasonal holdups caused Syria, before being turned back. Bilal Hadfi (20), by adverse weather conditions. European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) January 2016 1 However, both routes would have considerable considers the refugees to be traitors. However, drawbacks from the perspective of a foreign ter- reports from Libya and West Africa suggest that rorist organisation. The central Mediterranean Islamist groups there have developed an interest crossing remains costly and dangerous, as it in- in maintaining their smooth flow into Europe. volves braving a long stretch of sea and increas- These jihadist groups – being criminal organisa- ingly hostile conditions in Libya. Currently, this tions, involved in the smuggling business – see route is mainly taken by sub-Saharan Africans the refugee flows as a cash cow. who have few other options. As for the refugees arriving through the eastern Mediterranean, they A risk of self-radicalisation? are entering Greece, outside the main body of the Schengen area. Onward travel from there re- Not all terrorist attacks in the EU will be carried mains difficult. out in such a coordinated manner as those of last November. In January 2016, for instance, a man Given these obstacles, it is unlikely that foreign of Moroccan origin who had previously stayed terrorists could use these two routes as a reli- at a refugee camp in Germany was shot dead by able path into the Schengen area – hence the police in Paris while carrying out what appeared predominance of European citizens, with rights to be an uncoordinated attack. This raises a final of free movement, amongst the Paris attackers. eventuality – the spectre that refugees could act These European foreign fighters may, of course, as lone wolves, and that the EU is permitting en- have their own reasons to infiltrate refugee flows try to large numbers of foreigners who may har- – for instance, if they know they are under sur- bour resentments against the West and become veillance. But that does not mean they will find more radical over time. the refugee route either efficient or feasible. The routes require time, money and stamina, as well As predominantly young, male and Muslim, the as (often multiple) registration procedures. refugees – and migrants – from the Middle East do broadly fit the profile of those most suscepti- Is ISIL ‘weaponising’ refugees? ble to radicalisation, and allusions have already been made to the 2004 Madrid commuter train ISIL may have a broader political interest in us- bombings, which were largely carried out by ing refugees even if the success rates are not high. first generation immigrants from North African The fundamental objective of its terrorism in the countries, some of whom were already radical- West is less to disable strategic targets or kill ised before their arrival in Europe. Westerners per se, than to provoke certain po- litical and social reactions. One means of achiev- That said, it seems reasonable to assume that ing this is to stoke fears about Muslim refugees most refugees will have been set on the exact among European citizens. If registered refugees reverse trajectory by their experiences in Syria were to carry out attacks in Europe, ISIL would or Iraq. Moreover, it is not newcomers but sec- achieve this goal. Indeed, the mere suspicion ond- and third-generation immigrants who seem that two newly-registered refugees carried out most prone to radicalisation. the November Paris attacks proved to be socially divisive. This highlights once again the sheer heterogenei- ty of the behaviour of refugees and migrants, and But there are reasons for caution here, too. ISIL the difficulty both for ISIL in harnessing it and for can achieve much the same effect by spreading EU states in legislating for it. For instance, some simple misinformation, and has indeed sought to refugees will commit violent and criminal acts misrepresent the refugees to European publics. in Europe, but for reasons other than terrorism: In a January 2015 interview, for example, an ISIL these are young men, fleeing warzones, with a operative claimed that some 4,000 fighters had deep distrust of the state, and encountering new been sent to Europe via Turkey – an improbably cultural norms for the first time. Meanwhile, a high figure. There has also been speculation that small number of European foreign fighters, disil- the Syrian passports found with the two Stade de lusioned by their experiences in Syria, may par- France attackers were planted. ticipate in official counter-radicalisation efforts. It is worth mentioning, too, that ISIL may de- Marco Funk is an Executive Research velop a deeper ambivalence towards the refu- Assistant and Roderick Parkes a Senior gees which could prevent it instrumentalising Analyst at the EUISS. them as terrorists. ISIL certainly resents the fact that so many people are leaving ‘its’ lands, and European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) January 2016 2 © EU Institute for Security Studies, 2016. | QN-AL-16-006-2A-N | ISBN 978-92-9198-380-3 | ISSN 2315-1129 | doi:10.2815/469903.