Paris Attacks: Updated Assessment

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Paris Attacks: Updated Assessment Paris Attacks: Updated Assessment (Updated as of 3 December, 2015) Intelligent Security Solutions Limited www.issrisk.com © ISS Risk 2015 Page | 0 Overview The ability for ISIS to effectively deliver its agenda of terror and to affect an ever evolving threat on an incrreasingly global scale has been clearly demonstrated through the Paris attacks of November 2015. Intelligent Security Solutions (ISS Risk) has for some time focused on the threat presented by ISIS (and other Islamic extremist groups) to various sovereign and commercial concerns across Eurasia, with a specific focus on not only ISIS‟ motivations and actions to date, but more importantly a focus on how the threat is being shaped and how it will be driven and manifested in the coming 12-18 months. As detailed in this report, and in several other engagements for a growing number of clients in Asia and Europe, ISS Risk has looked to present clients with the benefits of our threat trajectory assessments at local, provincial, sovereign and transnational levels. Indeed, owing to our proven ability to make the correct initial assessment through the effective extrapolation or interpolation of trends in ISIS activities, we are uniquely positioned to see what are the „new denominators‟ to their activities and therein recognise factors rightly as fixed not emergent or irrelevant. As shown with the Paris attacks the absence of coherent and rooted answers to core security questions, such as how did they perform such a complex attack? why and how was this achieved? will they strike again? how under- prepared are the security services in Europe? is this the beginning of an orchestrated campaign? etc… have been as near shocking as the events themselves. For ISS Risk the critical deliverable is to ensure the specific needs of our client are serviced effectively and in full. Given the very high security walls around what is being found in the trans-national investigations so far, both our aforementioned existing knowledge of ISIS‟ modus operandi and most current driving forces to its actions, and our connections within the intelligence communities in Europe have proven seminal. This report examines the answers to the critical questions of what is known about the attackers and the terrorist cell so far? How did the terrorists enter Europe, and move undetected? What do the combat indicators from the Paris attack reveal of ISIS‟ wider intentions towards high profile cities in Europe going into Christmas 2015 and in 2016? How will further escalation most probably manifest itself, and are attacks of such size likely again? Who will perpetrate these attacks, and how effectively can security services respond to contain threats from ISIS‟ existing operatives and cells already in Europe? © ISS Risk 2015 Page | 1 Intelligent Security Solutions Limited Frontier & Emerging Markets Analysis Paris Attacks: Updated Assessment The world was shocked by a series of bombings, suicide explosions and shootings which took place in Paris overnight on 13-14 November, killing 132 people and injuring more than 300 others. It was a meticulously planned and coordinated attack on 8 targets involving at least 9 attackers targeting the Bataclan Concert Hall during a rock concert, the Stade de France during an international soccer game and 5 different bars and restaurants in central Paris. A total of 89 people were killed in the concert hall, one was killed near the stadium and the remaining victims were killed during attacks on the bars and restaurants. Six of the attackers died by exploding their suicide vests, the seventh shot by the security services, with the remaining two perpetrators remaining at large as at the time of the release of this report. The security forces were able to bring the situation in Paris under control at around 12.20 AM (local time) on 14 November. The terrorist group Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) later claimed responsibility for the attack as retaliation against French airstrikes in Syria and Iraq, and for the French policies against Muslims worldwide. On 18 November, French security forces launched a major security operation at an apartment in St-Denis, north of Paris city centre, targeting Abdelhamid Abaaoud, the suspected mastermind of the 13 November attacks. Three people were killed in the raid – including Abaaoud and his cousin Hasna Aiboulachen. Second round of attacks were imminent Immediately following the St-Denis raid, investigators revealed that the killed terrorists were in the final stage of preparing and carrying out „imminent‟ attacks at Charles de Gaulle airport and the Quatre Temps shopping centre in La Defense, west of Paris. A few days later, confidential statements from witnesses of the Paris attacks were leaked to the French media, which indicated that Abaaoud had approached his cousin Hasna asking her to hide him while he prepared for further attacks. Abaaoud had reportedly told Hasna that he had planned imminent attacks that would do far greater damages in Jewish majority districts of Paris, as well as against public transport systems and schools. Abaaoud also boasted how he slipped into Europe with Syrian refugees and remained undetected prior to the 13 November attacks. Timeline of attacks The attacks were carried out by three teams, with each team comprising of three members. We have colour coded the different teams in three colours – green, pink and red and plotted © ISS Risk 2015 Page | 2 Intelligent Security Solutions Limited Frontier & Emerging Markets Analysis their targets and timeline of attacks in the map below. As evident from the map, the green and pink teams initiated their attacks almost simultaneously, while the red team commenced their operation 29 minutes after the first incident was reported. The attacks were planned and coordinated to create multiple pockets of chaos within the target geography, so as to overwhelm the security forces and maximise civilian casualties. From the perspective of the terrorists and as later demonstrated from the number of fatalities, the Bataclan Concert Hall was the prized catch – a location where they were expecting to find a large number of unarmed civilians cramped in a confined space with limited exit options. In other words, the maximum number of people could be killed in that concert hall target. It is our assessment that the green and pink attacks were diversions, aimed at providing sufficient time to the red team to attain vantage points inside the concert hall and to kill as many people as possible before the security forces arrived. In line with this logic, it is most likely that the three most competent operatives from the nine attackers were selected to carry out the attacks in Bataclan. What is known about the attackers and the cell so far? The identities of the following attackers/conspirators have been identified so far: 1. Ibrahim Abdeslam – suicide bomber: Ibrahim Abdeslam was a suicide bomber who blew himself up outside the Comptoir Voltaire restaurant in Paris. He rented one of the principal operational vehicles of the terrorist cell, a Seat Leon car, which was found abandoned in a Paris suburb with Kalashnikov rifles inside. He was a Belgian national, a former resident of the Molenbeek district of Brussels, who had spent time in Syria. © ISS Risk 2015 Page | 3 Intelligent Security Solutions Limited Frontier & Emerging Markets Analysis Investigations have revealed he had possible links with the Verviers terrorist cell in Belgium, which was destroyed by police raids in January 2015. 2. Salah Abdeslam – on the run: An international arrest warrant has been issued for Salah Abdeslam - a Belgian national who rented a black VW Polo in Belgium which was found abandoned near the Bataclan concert hall. He is the brother of Ibrahim Abdeslam and is also suspected of having spent time in Syria. He was stopped near the Belgian border on 14 November morning in a grey VW golf also carrying two suspected accomplices, but was not arrested at that time. 3. Omar Ismail Mostefai – suicide bomber: Aged 29, was one of the three men who blew himself up in the Bataclan concert hall. He was a French national of Algerian origins and had trained with ISIS in Syria in 2014. 4. Bilal Hadfi – suicide bomber: Hadfi blew himself up outside gate H of the Stade de France. He was a French national, who lived in Belgian and is believed to have fought with ISIS in Syria. 5. Ahmad al Mohammad – suicide bomber: A Syrian passport holder, he died in the suicide attack near the Stade de France. 6. Sami Aminour – suicide bomber: A French national who blew himself up at the Bataclan concert hall. He was charged in a 2012 terrorism investigation by the French authorities and was placed under judicial supervision. Authorities lost track of him, and following the discovery that he had travelled to Syria, an international arrest warrant was issued against him. 7. Abdelhamid Abaaoud – attack mastermind: A Belgian national, he is believed to be the mastermind of the Paris attacks. He joined ISIS in Syria and was an active member in its propaganda division. Abaaoud was also involved in the planning of the Thalys train attack in France in August 2015. 8. Hasna Aiboulachen – female terrorist: A French national of Moroccan origins and the cousin of Abdelhamid Abaaoud. She died during the St-Denis police raid. 9. Four unidentified terrorist – three dead, one remains a fugitive: The identity of four terrorists remains uncertain. Two of them were killed during the Paris attacks and one was killed during the St-Denis police raid. The fourth one is believed to have participated in the Paris attacks and has since evaded arrest. Unconfirmed comments from an anonymous French senator suggest that two of these unidentified terrorists had fake Turkish passports. 10.
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