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Judicial Review, Constitutional Interpretation, and the Democratic Dilemma: Proposing a “Controlled Activism” Alternative Martin H
Florida Law Review Volume 64 | Issue 6 Article 1 1-27-2013 Judicial Review, Constitutional Interpretation, and the Democratic Dilemma: Proposing a “Controlled Activism” Alternative Martin H. Redish Matthew .B Arnould Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr Part of the Constitutional Law Commons Recommended Citation Martin H. Redish and Matthew B. Arnould, Judicial Review, Constitutional Interpretation, and the Democratic Dilemma: Proposing a “Controlled Activism” Alternative, 64 Fla. L. Rev. 1485 (2012). Available at: http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol64/iss6/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized administrator of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Redish and Arnould: Judicial Review, Constitutional Interpretation, and the Democrati Florida Law Review Founded 1948 Formerly University of Florida Law Review VOLUME 64 DECEMBER 2012 NUMBER 6 DUNWODY DISTINGUISHED LECTURE IN LAW JUDICIAL REVIEW, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, AND THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA: PROPOSING A “CONTROLLED ACTIVISM” ALTERNATIVE Martin H. Redish & Matthew B. Arnould Abstract No problem generates more debate among constitutional scholars than how to approach constitutional interpretation. This Article critiques two representative theories (or families of theories), originalism and nontextualism, and offers a principled alternative, which we call “controlled activism.” -
Statutory Interpretation and the Plain Meaning Rule Charles A
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by University of Kentucky Kentucky Law Journal Volume 37 | Issue 1 Article 5 1948 Statutory Interpretation and the Plain Meaning Rule Charles A. Sither Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj Part of the Legislation Commons Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you. Recommended Citation Sither, Charles A. (1948) "Statutory Interpretation and the Plain Meaning Rule," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 37 : Iss. 1 , Article 5. Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol37/iss1/5 This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact [email protected]. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION ANID THE PLAIN -MEANING RULE It cannot be disputed that statutory law is increasing, and as a natural result the approach of the courts to the problem of interpretation is becoming more important each day It isob- vious that the difficulties of lawyer and layman alike, m under- standing and complying with statutes which affect their prob- lems and activities, are and will be increasingly aggravated unless the courts arrive at some consistent and uniform method of statutory interpretation. At the timS of the enactment of any statute, the legislature has available an unlimited reservoir of words and phrases cap- able of expressing in plain, everyday language any purpose or intent'it may have in mind relative to the subject matter. -
Textualist Canons: Cabining Rules Or Predilective Tools Stephen M
Campbell Law Review Volume 33 Article 3 Issue 1 Fall 2010 2010 Textualist Canons: Cabining Rules or Predilective Tools Stephen M. Durden Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr Part of the Constitutional Law Commons Recommended Citation Stephen M. Durden, Textualist Canons: Cabining Rules or Predilective Tools, 33 Campbell L. Rev. 115 (2010). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Campbell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law. Durden: Textualist Canons: Cabining Rules or Predilective Tools Textualist Canons: Cabining Rules or Predilective Tools STEPHEN M. DURDEN* INTRODUCTION Justice Scalia proclaims homage to the "dead" Constitution.' Justice Brennan honors the "living" Constitution.2 Others believe in "a partially living and partially dead Constitution."' But, whichever moniker se- lected, constitutional analysis remains (to the interpreter) personal; however, personal does not necessarily mean irrational or even singular (i.e., that no one else agrees with the interpretation). Rather, personal means that no matter how narrow the interpretational method, an inter- preter of the Constitution inevitably makes personal choices when using any interpretational method - choices not required by, or perhaps even inconsistent with, the chosen interpretational method. * Professor of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law. I can never thank my family and friends enough. 1. See generally Sanford Levinson, Our Schizoid Approach to the United States Con- stitution: Competing Narrative of Constitutional Dynamism and Stasis, 84 IND. L.J. 1337, 1346 (2009) (describing Antonin Scalia as "the proud devotee of a 'dead' Constitution"); Reva B. -
But That Is Absurd!: Why Specific Absurdity Undermines Textualism Linda D
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Brooklyn Law School: BrooklynWorks Brooklyn Law Review Volume 76 Issue 3 SYMPOSIUM: Article 2 Statutory Interpretation: How Much Work Does Language Do? 2011 But That Is Absurd!: Why Specific Absurdity Undermines Textualism Linda D. Jellum Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr Recommended Citation Linda D. Jellum, But That Is Absurd!: Why Specific bA surdity Undermines Textualism, 76 Brook. L. Rev. (2011). Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol76/iss3/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law Review by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks. But That Is Absurd! WHY SPECIFIC ABSURDITY UNDERMINES TEXTUALISM* Linda D. Jellum† INTRODUCTION With 2010 being the twenty-fifth year since Justice Scalia joined the Supreme Court and revived textualism,1 I could not resist exploring and critiquing the absurdity doctrine,2 a doctrine used by Justice Scalia and other * © 2011 Linda D. Jellum. All rights reserved. † Associate Professor of Law, Mercer University School of Law. I would like to thank Lawrence Solan, Rebecca Kysar, and the Brooklyn Law Review for inviting me to contribute to this symposium. I would also like to thank Shelia Scheuerman, Charleston Law School, and the participants in Southeastern Law Scholars Conference for offering me an opportunity to present this article while it was still a work in progress. Finally, David Ritchie and Suzianne Painter-Thorne provided valuable suggestions. -
ED377845.Pdf
DOCUMENT RESUME ED 377 845 IR 055 272 AUTHOR Nichols, Margaret Irby TITLE Handbook of Reference Sources and Services for Small and Medium-sized Libraries. Second Edition. INSTITUTION Texas State Library, Austin. Dept. of Library Development. PUB DATE 94 NOTE 211p.; For an earlier edition, see ED 293 563. PUB TYPE Guides Non-Classroom Use (055) Reference Materials Bibliographies (131) EDRS PRICE MF01/PC09 Plus Postage. DESCRIPTORS Annotated Bibliographies; Information Sources; Librarians; *Library Collection Development; Library Material Selection; Library Planning; *Reference Materials; *Reference Services; Resource Materials; *Selection Tools; User Needs (Information) IDENTIFIERS Adult Services (Libraries) ABSTRACT The primary objective of this guide is to help librarians select adult services reference tools which cover many different topics, with special emphasis on recent social and technological changes. Arrangement is topical, with particular attention given to the following topics: AIDS, abortion, the environment, economic problems, the crisis in public education, ethnic minorities, women, and area studies. Databases and CD-ROMs are emphasized; hard copy and electronic versions of reference works are listed, if both formz.ts are available. Section 1, "Reference Sources," is a bibliography that lists 678 annotated items plus 208 additional sources in notes, which appear after relevant entries or subsections. The notes list supplemental titles on subjects in high demand; suggest less expensive titles serving the same purpose; identify works on related topics; or provide additional information about the subject area. A buying guide appears at the end of each chapter, suggesting when and in which order to purchase materials. Section 2, "Reference Services," consists of ten essays that focus on planning and managing reference services, and on situations and problems frequently encountered by reference librarians, each followed by titles for further reading. -
Literally Interpreting the Law- a Appraisal of the Literal Rule Of
LITERALLY INTERPRETING THE LAW- A APPRAISAL OF THE LITERAL RULE OF INTERPRETATION IN INDIA 1 Alekhya Reddy. T Literal rule of interpretation is one of the oldest methods of interpretation adopted by the judiciary. This article focuses on the rules to be kept in mind while using it. Further the position of this rule in the present times has been discussed. INTRODUCTION A "Statute" is the will of the Sovereign Legislature according to which the Governments function. The executive must act and the Judiciary in the course of Administration of Justice must apply the law as laid down by the said legislative will. Very often occasions will arise where the courts will be called upon to interpret the words, phrases and expressions used in the statute. In the course of such Interpretation, the Courts have, over the centuries, laid down certain guidelines which have come to be known as "Rules of Interpretation of Statutes" .More often than not the Statutes contain "Statement of Objects and Reasons" and also a "Preamble" both of which provide guidelines for Interpreting the true meaning of the words and expressions used in the Statute. Judges have to interpret statutes and apply them. The judges frequently use this phrase true meaning or literal or plain meaning. Literal Interpretation of a statute is finding out the true sense by making the statute its own expositor. If the true sense can thus be discovered. There is no resort to construction. It is beyond question, the duty of courts, in construing statutes, to give effect to the intent of law making power, and seek for that intent in every legitimate way, but first of all the words and language employed. -
Two Kinds of Plain Meaning
Georgetown University Law Center Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 2011 Two Kinds of Plain Meaning Victoria Nourse Georgetown Law Center, [email protected] Georgetown Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 12-095 This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/991 http://ssrn.com/abstract=2109764 76 Brook. L. Rev. 997-1005 (2011) This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, and the Legislation Commons Two Kinds of Plain Meaning Victoria F. Nourset Is plain meaning so plain? This is not meant to be a philosophical question, but one deserving serious legal analysis. The plain-meaning rule claims to provide certainty and narrow statutes' domains. As a relative claim, comparing plain meaning with purposivism, I agree. But I do not agree that plain-meaning analysis is as easy as its proponents suggest. In this piece, I tease out two very different ideas of plain meaning-ordinary I popular meaning and expansive I legalist meaning-suggesting that doctrinal analysis requires more than plain-meaning simpliciter. Perhaps more importantly, I argue that plain meaning, as legalist meaning, can quite easily expand a statute's scope, relative to a baseline of ordinary meaning or the status quo ex ante. In 1987, Justice Scalia gave an extremely influential set of lectures' in which he set forth a doctrine of statutory interpretation known as the new textualism. -
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Contents Notes on Contributors xiii Introduction 1 Part I Formal Fallacies 35 Propositional Logic 37 1 Affirming a Disjunct 39 Jason Iuliano 2 Affirming the Consequent 42 Brett Gaul 3 Denying the Antecedent 46 Brett Gaul Categorical Logic 49 4 Exclusive Premises 51 Charlene Elsby 5 Four Terms 55 Charlene Elsby 6 Illicit Major and Minor Terms 60 Charlene Elsby 7 Undistributed Middle 63 CharleneCOPYRIGHTED Elsby MATERIAL Part II Informal Fallacies 67 Fallacies of Relevance 69 8 Ad Hominem: Bias 71 George Wrisley 0003392582.INDD 5 7/26/2018 9:46:56 AM vi Contents 9 Ad Hominem: Circumstantial 77 George Wrisley 10 Ad Hominem: Direct 83 George Wrisley 11 Ad Hominem: Tu Quoque 88 George Wrisley 12 Adverse Consequences 94 David Vander Laan 13 Appeal to Emotion: Force or Fear 98 George Wrisley 14 Appeal to Emotion: Pity 102 George Wrisley 15 Appeal to Ignorance 106 Benjamin W. McCraw 16 Appeal to the People 112 Benjamin W. McCraw 17 Appeal to Personal Incredulity 115 Tuomas W. Manninen 18 Appeal to Ridicule 118 Gregory L. Bock 19 Appeal to Tradition 121 Nicolas Michaud 20 Argument from Fallacy 125 Christian Cotton 21 Availability Error 128 David Kyle Johnson 22 Base Rate 133 Tuomas W. Manninen 23 Burden of Proof 137 Andrew Russo 24 Countless Counterfeits 140 David Kyle Johnson 25 Diminished Responsibility 145 Tuomas W. Manninen 0003392582.INDD 6 7/26/2018 9:46:56 AM Contents vii 26 Essentializing 149 Jack Bowen 27 Galileo Gambit 152 David Kyle Johnson 28 Gambler’s Fallacy 157 Grant Sterling 29 Genetic Fallacy 160 Frank Scalambrino 30 Historian’s Fallacy 163 Heather Rivera 31 Homunculus 165 Kimberly Baltzer‐Jaray 32 Inappropriate Appeal to Authority 168 Nicolas Michaud 33 Irrelevant Conclusion 172 Steven Barbone 34 Kettle Logic 174 Andy Wible 35 Line Drawing 177 Alexander E. -
Analyzing Meaning an Introduction to Semantics and Pragmatics
Analyzing meaning An introduction to semantics and pragmatics Paul R. Kroeger language Textbooks in Language Sciences 5 science press Textbooks in Language Sciences Editors: Stefan Müller, Martin Haspelmath Editorial Board: Claude Hagège, Marianne Mithun, Anatol Stefanowitsch, Foong Ha Yap In this series: 1. Müller, Stefan. Grammatical theory: From transformational grammar to constraint-based approaches. 2. Schäfer, Roland. Einführung in die grammatische Beschreibung des Deutschen. 3. Freitas, Maria João & Ana Lúcia Santos (eds.). Aquisição de língua materna e não materna: Questões gerais e dados do português. 4. Roussarie, Laurent. Sémantique formelle : Introduction à la grammaire de Montague. 5. Kroeger, Paul. Analyzing meaning: An introduction to semantics and pragmatics. ISSN: 2364-6209 Analyzing meaning An introduction to semantics and pragmatics Paul R. Kroeger language science press Paul R. Kroeger. 2018. Analyzing meaning: An introduction to semantics and pragmatics (Textbooks in Language Sciences 5). Berlin: Language Science Press. This title can be downloaded at: http://langsci-press.org/catalog/144 © 2018, Paul R. Kroeger Published under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Licence (CC BY 4.0): http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ISBN: 978-3-96110-034-7 (Digital) 978-3-96110-035-4 (Hardcover) 978-3-96110-067-5 (Softcover) ISSN: 2364-6209 DOI:10.5281/zenodo.1164112 Source code available from www.github.com/langsci/144 Collaborative reading: paperhive.org/documents/remote?type=langsci&id=144 Cover and concept of design: -
Text and Talk Professional Contexts
ASSOCIATIONSUEDOISE DE LINGUISTIQUE APPLIQUEE (ASLA) The Swedish Association of Applied Linguistics Text and Talk • ID Professional Contexts Selected Papers from the International Conference "Discourse and the Professions" Uppsala, 26-29 August, 1992 Edited by Britt-Louise Gunnarsson ASLA Per Linell Bengt Nordberg ASLA:s skriftserie 6 ASSOCIATION SUEDOISE DE LINGUISTIQUE APPLIQUEE (ASLA) The Swedish Association of Applied Linguistics Text and Talk in Prof essional Contexts Selected Papers from the lnternational Conference "Discourse and the Professions" Uppsala, 26-29 August, 1992 Edited by Britt-Louise Gunnarsson Per Linell Bengt Nordberg ASSOCIATION SUEDOISE DE LINGUISTIQUE APPLIQUEE (ASLA) The Swedish Association of Applied Linguistics ASLA is part of the international organisation AILA, which has members in more than thirty countries all over the world. The main aim of the association is to promote and disseminate information about linguistic research relating to practical language problems in society. ASLA's activities areas follows: - arranging conferences, symposia and seminars, - publishing a newsletter for its members, - publishing symposium proceedings and other material, - distributing information and published material from AILA, - taking part in AILA's scientific commissions, committees and conferences. The newsletter "ASLA Information" is sent out three times a year. It gives details of literature, conferences etc. One issue a year also contains a section presenting ongoing research and developments in applied linguistics. A yearly symposium is arranged, with a theme which is of interest to researchers and practitioners. The proceedings of these autumn symposia are published in ASLA's publication series. The books in this series are yearbooks and they are distributed free of charge to ASLA members. -
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9781405152785_4_001.qxd 20/08/2009 04:57PM Page 3 Chapter 1 Defining Political Correctness Preamble and Rationale: Words and Ideas, Norms and Values Political correctness became part of the modern lexicon and, many would say, part of the modern mind-set, as a consequence of the wide-ranging public debate which started on campuses in the United States from the late 1980s. Since nearly 50 percent of Americans go to college, the impact of the controversy was widespread. It was out of this ferment that most of the new vocabulary was generated or became current. However, political correctness is not one thing and does not have a simple history. As a concept it predates the debate and is a complex, discontinuous, and pro- tean phenomenon which has changed radically, even over the past two decades. During just that time it has ramified from its initial concerns with education and the curriculum into numerous agendas, reforms, and issues concerning race, culture, gender, disability, the environment, and animal rights. Linguistically it started as a basically idealistic, decent-minded, but slightly Puritanical intervention to sanitize the language by suppressing some of its uglier prejudicial features, thereby undoing some past injustices or “leveling the playing fields” with the hope of improving social relations. It is now increasingly evident in two opposing ways. The first is the expanding currencyCOPYRIGHTED of various key words (to MATERIALbe listed shortly), some of a programmatic nature, such as diversity, organic, and multiculturalism. Contrariwise, it has also manifested itself in speech codes which suppress prejudicial language, disguising or avoiding certain old and new taboo topics. -
Plain Meaning Rule William Baude
University of Chicago Law School Chicago Unbound Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers Working Papers 2016 The N( ot So) Plain Meaning Rule William Baude Ryan D. Doerfler Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/ public_law_and_legal_theory Part of the Law Commons Chicago Unbound includes both works in progress and final versions of articles. Please be aware that a more recent version of this article may be available on Chicago Unbound, SSRN or elsewhere. Recommended Citation William Baude & Ryan D. Doerfler, "The N( ot So) Plain Meaning Rule," University of Chicago Public Law & Legal Theory Paper Series, No. 590 (2016). This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Working Papers at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series Research Paper No. #16-21 The (Not So) Plain Meaning Rule William Baude UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO Ryan David Doerfler UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA This paper can be downloaded without charge from the Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper collection: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2805431. The (Not So) Plain Meaning Rule William Baude & Ryan Doerfler* 84 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) I. The Plain Meaning Rule ........................................................ 2 II. The Puzzle .............................................................................