M 54- Master of Arts in International Relations
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HEARTS AND MINDS: THE POPULATION-CENTRIC APPROACH TO COUNTERINSURGENCY A thesis submitted to the faculty of San Francisco State University A5 In partial fulfillment of 3 G The requirements for The Degree Ao\b Xfc -M 54- Master of Arts In International Relations by Radu George Mihalache San Francisco, California May 2016 CERTIFICATION OF APPROVAL I certify that I have read HEARTS AND MINDS: THE POPULATION-CENTRIC APPROACH TO COUNTERINSURGENCY by Radu George Mihalache, and that in my opinion this work meets the criteria for approving a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree: Master of Arts in International Relations at San Francisco State University. Andr Professor of International Relations HEARTS AND MINDS: THE POPULATION-CENTRIC APPROACH TO COUNTERINSURGENCY Radu George Mihalache San Francisco, California 2016 The ‘hearts and minds’ counterinsurgency doctrine has emerged as the model for American warfare in the future. The current narrative is that General David Petraeus, armed with this new doctrine, was able to turn the failing Iraq war around, and provide the country with the overall stability needed for peace and security. The purpose o f this thesis is to examine the war in Iraq and demonstrate that the precipitous drop in violence experienced in 2007 was not a direct result o f the implementation o f the ‘hearts and minds’ doctrine. Using accounts from individuals who have been involved in the war, this thesis argues that the precipitous drop in violence by late summer 2007 in Iraq was the result of the interaction between the A1 Anbar Awakening, the cessation of sectarian cleansing and the surge. These findings are important because they show that the ‘hearts and minds’ approach to counterinsurgency is not the as effective as commonly thought. Wars o f nation building cannot be won simply with the application of the right counterinsurgency doctrine. If policy makers in Washington, D.C. believe the simplistic idea that the United States can just intervene militarily and rebuild entire countries if the doctrine is right, then the United States will be set on a path o f perpetual war. *esentation o f the content o f this thesis. Date ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to my advisors, Dr. Scott Siegel and Dr. Andrew Hanami, whose support, guidance and expertise contributed greatly to the writing of this thesis. I would also like to thank Dr. Sanjoy Banerjee for encouraging me to pursue my research topic and for helping me choose a research method. Lastly, I would like to thank my parents, Maria and Radu Mihalache for the emotional support they provided me with throughout the Summer and Fall of 2015. Radu George Mihalache TABLE OF CONTENTS List of Acronyms........................................................................................................ vi Chapter I: Introduction..................................................................................................1 • Introduction...................................................................................................... 1 Chapter II: Theory And Principles Of Warfare......................................................... 4 • Insurgency and Counterinsurgency................................................................4 • Insurgency Defined......................................................................................... 4 • Counterinsurgency Defined..........................................................................10 • Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Theory................................................ 25 • Insurgency Theorists..................................................................................... 25 • Counterinsurgency Theorists........................................................................31 Chapter III: Counterinsurgency Operations In Iraq.................................................47 • Introduction....................................................................................................47 • Overview........................................................................................................ 51 • Factors Associated with the Decrease in Violence in Iraq in 2007...........59 • Sectarian Cleansing....................................................................................... 59 • The Anbar Awakening.................................................................................. 62 • The Surge....................................................................................................... 68 Chapter IV: Conclusion.............................................................................................70 • Conclusion..................................................................................................... 70 References................................................................................................................... 77 v LIST OF ACRONYMS ADRP...................................................... Army Doctrine Reference Publication AQI.........................................................A1 Qaeda in Iraq COIN....................................................... Counterinsurgency IS............................................................. The Islamic State ISIL.........................................................The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant ISIS......................................................... The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria JP............................................................. Joint Publication NATO..................................................... The North Atlantic Treaty Organization US ...........................................................The United States 1 Chapter I Introduction “Insurgencies are easy to make and hard to stop. Only a few ingredients need to combine to create an insurgency; like oxygen and fire, they're very common and mix all too often. The recipe is, simply, a legitimate grievance against a state, a state that refuses to compromise, a quorum of angry people, and access to weapons.” -Richard Engel The phase ‘hearts and minds’ is normally associated with a softer approach to counterinsurgency operations. The proponents of this concept argue that victory over the enemy can be achieved not by the application of superior firepower against insurgents, but by the use of minimum force in order to win the support of the population. This approach is contrasted with the use of conventional warfare techniques against enemy forces, which deliver death and destruction on a massive scale.1 Traditionally seen as an activity that is secondary to conventional warfare, counterinsurgency has emerged in 2007 as the model for American warfare in the future after its initiation by President George W. Bush in Washington, D.C. and its subsequent application in Iraq by General 1 The enemy-centric approach to counterinsurgency and the population-centric approach to counterinsurgency are discussed in the United States Counterinsurgency Guide on page 14: “As noted, there are two basic approaches to COIN strategy: The enemy-centric approach conceptualizes COIN as a contest with an organized enemy, and focuses COIN activity on the insurgent organizations. This approach emphasizes defeat of the enemy as its primary task and other activities as supporting efforts. There are many variants within this approach, including ‘soft’ vs. ‘hard,’ direct vs. indirect, violent vs. non-violent, and decapitation vs. marginalization strategies. This approach can be summarized as ‘first defeat the enemy, and all else will follow.’ The population-centric approach shifts the focus of COIN from defeating the insurgent organization to maintaining or recovering the support of the population. While direct military action against the insurgent organization will definitely be required, it is not the main effort; this approach assumes that the center of gravity is the government’s relationship with and support among the population. It can be summarized as ‘first protect and support the population, and all else will follow.” 2 David Petraeus. The ‘hearts and minds’ approach, or the population-centric approach to counterinsurgency as it is formally known, has received a great deal of attention, enjoying the intellectual support of many counterinsurgency theorists and practitioners. The narrative among United States policy makers is that General David Petraeus, armed only with this new counterinsurgency doctrine and five extra surge brigades, was able to turn the failing war around in 2007, lower the levels of violence and thus provide Iraq with the overall stability needed for peace and security. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the war in Iraq and demonstrate that the precipitous drop in violence by late summer 2007 was not due to the implementation of the ‘hearts and minds’ campaign by General Petraeus. Using a combination of accounts from individuals who ether have been involved in the war as combatants, or have studied the war, the thesis will show that the decrease in violence in Iraq stemmed from the decision by Shia militia leaders to stop the sectarian cleansing against Sunni civilians together with the inception and spread of the Anbar Awakening movement. The decision by American leaders to recruit and pay small segments of Sunni insurgent leaders to fight A1 Qaeda in Iraq and the fact that Baghdad had become a sectarian enclave, with a Shia- dominated majority and small enclaves of Sunnis, also helped decrease the