HEARTS AND MINDS: THE POPULATION-CENTRIC APPROACH TO COUNTERINSURGENCY

A thesis submitted to the faculty of San Francisco State University A5 In partial fulfillment of 3 G The requirements for The Degree Ao\b Xfc -M 54- Master of Arts In International Relations

by

Radu George Mihalache

San Francisco, California

May 2016 CERTIFICATION OF APPROVAL

I certify that I have read HEARTS AND MINDS: THE POPULATION-CENTRIC

APPROACH TO COUNTERINSURGENCY by Radu George Mihalache, and that in my opinion this work meets the criteria for approving a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree: Master of Arts in International Relations at San

Francisco State University.

Andr Professor of International Relations HEARTS AND MINDS: THE POPULATION-CENTRIC APPROACH TO COUNTERINSURGENCY

Radu George Mihalache San Francisco, California 2016

The ‘hearts and minds’ counterinsurgency doctrine has emerged as the model for

American warfare in the future. The current narrative is that General David Petraeus,

armed with this new doctrine, was able to turn the failing Iraq war around, and provide the country with the overall stability needed for peace and security. The purpose o f this thesis is to examine the war in Iraq and demonstrate that the precipitous drop in violence experienced in 2007 was not a direct result o f the implementation o f the ‘hearts and minds’ doctrine. Using accounts from individuals who have been involved in the war, this thesis argues that the precipitous drop in violence by late summer 2007 in Iraq was the result of the interaction between the A1 Anbar Awakening, the cessation of sectarian cleansing and the surge. These findings are important because they show that the ‘hearts and minds’ approach to counterinsurgency is not the as effective as commonly thought. Wars o f nation building cannot be won simply with the application of the right counterinsurgency doctrine. If policy makers in Washington, D.C. believe the simplistic idea that the United States can just intervene militarily and rebuild entire countries if the doctrine is right, then the United States will be set on a path o f perpetual war.

*esentation o f the content o f this thesis.

Date ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to my advisors, Dr.

Scott Siegel and Dr. Andrew Hanami, whose support, guidance and expertise contributed greatly to the writing of this thesis. I would also like to thank Dr. Sanjoy Banerjee for encouraging me to pursue my research topic and for helping me choose a research method. Lastly, I would like to thank my parents, Maria and Radu Mihalache for the emotional support they provided me with throughout the Summer and Fall of 2015.

Radu George Mihalache TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Acronyms...... vi

Chapter I: Introduction...... 1

• Introduction...... 1

Chapter II: Theory And Principles Of Warfare...... 4

• Insurgency and Counterinsurgency...... 4 • Insurgency Defined...... 4 • Counterinsurgency Defined...... 10 • Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Theory...... 25 • Insurgency Theorists...... 25 • Counterinsurgency Theorists...... 31

Chapter III: Counterinsurgency Operations In Iraq...... 47

• Introduction...... 47 • Overview...... 51 • Factors Associated with the Decrease in Violence in Iraq in 2007...... 59 • Sectarian Cleansing...... 59 • The Anbar Awakening...... 62 • The Surge...... 68

Chapter IV: Conclusion...... 70

• Conclusion...... 70

References...... 77

v LIST OF ACRONYMS

ADRP...... Army Doctrine Reference Publication

AQI...... A1 Qaeda in Iraq

COIN...... Counterinsurgency

IS...... The Islamic State

ISIL...... The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

ISIS...... The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

JP...... Joint Publication

NATO...... The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

US ...... The United States 1

Chapter I

Introduction

“Insurgencies are easy to make and hard to stop. Only a few ingredients need to combine to create an insurgency; like oxygen and fire, they're very common and mix all too often. The recipe is, simply, a legitimate grievance against a state, a state that refuses to compromise, a quorum of angry people, and access to weapons.”

-Richard Engel

The phase ‘hearts and minds’ is normally associated with a softer approach to counterinsurgency operations. The proponents of this concept argue that victory over the enemy can be achieved not by the application of superior firepower against insurgents, but by the use of minimum force in order to win the support of the population. This approach is contrasted with the use of conventional warfare techniques against enemy forces, which deliver death and destruction on a massive scale.1 Traditionally seen as an activity that is secondary to conventional warfare, counterinsurgency has emerged in

2007 as the model for American warfare in the future after its initiation by President

George W. Bush in Washington, D.C. and its subsequent application in Iraq by General

1 The enemy-centric approach to counterinsurgency and the population-centric approach to counterinsurgency are discussed in the United States Counterinsurgency Guide on page 14: “As noted, there are two basic approaches to COIN strategy: The enemy-centric approach conceptualizes COIN as a contest with an organized enemy, and focuses COIN activity on the insurgent organizations. This approach emphasizes defeat of the enemy as its primary task and other activities as supporting efforts. There are many variants within this approach, including ‘soft’ vs. ‘hard,’ direct vs. indirect, violent vs. non-violent, and decapitation vs. marginalization strategies. This approach can be summarized as ‘first defeat the enemy, and all else will follow.’ The population-centric approach shifts the focus of COIN from defeating the insurgent organization to maintaining or recovering the support of the population. While direct military action against the insurgent organization will definitely be required, it is not the main effort; this approach assumes that the center of gravity is the government’s relationship with and support among the population. It can be summarized as ‘first protect and support the population, and all else will follow.” 2

David Petraeus. The ‘hearts and minds’ approach, or the population-centric approach to counterinsurgency as it is formally known, has received a great deal of attention, enjoying the intellectual support of many counterinsurgency theorists and practitioners. The narrative among United States policy makers is that General David Petraeus, armed only with this new counterinsurgency doctrine and five extra surge brigades, was able to turn the failing war around in 2007, lower the levels of violence and thus provide Iraq with the overall stability needed for peace and security.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the war in Iraq and demonstrate that the precipitous drop in violence by late summer 2007 was not due to the implementation of the ‘hearts and minds’ campaign by General Petraeus. Using a combination of accounts from individuals who ether have been involved in the war as combatants, or have studied the war, the thesis will show that the decrease in violence in Iraq stemmed from the decision by Shia militia leaders to stop the sectarian cleansing against Sunni civilians together with the inception and spread of the Anbar Awakening movement. The decision by American leaders to recruit and pay small segments of Sunni insurgent leaders to fight

A1 Qaeda in Iraq and the fact that Baghdad had become a sectarian enclave, with a Shia- dominated majority and small enclaves of Sunnis, also helped decrease the level of violence. Finally, the employment of five surge brigades helped bring down the number of Iraqi and coalition casualties by killing members of A1 Qaeda in Iraq.

2 David Kilcullen, “The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One”, Oxford University Press, (2009): 116-117. 3

These findings are important because they show that the ‘hearts and minds’ approach to counterinsurgency is not the as effective as commonly thought. Wars of nation building cannot be won simply with the application of the right counterinsurgency doctrine by the right general. If policy makers believe the simplistic idea that the United

States can just intervene militarily and rebuild entire countries if the doctrine is right and the right general is put in place, then the United States will be set on a path of perpetual war.

To better understand the effects of the counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq, this thesis proceeds in five chapters. Chapter one introduces the concept of counterinsurgency, the research goal, the findings and the thesis overview. Chapter two reviews both classical and modern war theorists and defines the concepts of insurgency and counterinsurgency. Chapter three reviews and analyzes the counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq. It introduces the critical factors that were at play in Iraq in 2007, namely the sectarian cleansing, the Anbar Awakening movement and the surge, discusses the effects of the interaction between them and explains why they were responsible for the decrease in violence. The last chapter summarizes the findings and discusses recommendations for the future. 4

Chapter II

Theory and Principles of Warfare

“The art of war is of vital importance to the state. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected.” -Sun Tzu, The Art o f War

Insurgency and Counterinsurgency

Insurgency Defined

The insurgency is the most common and widespread form of military conflict at the present time.3 Despite it being considered an unconventional or irregular form of warfare by various military establishments, the insurgency has been the most widespread form of warfare to date, occurring in some form or another in all conflicts throughout history and affecting almost all societies. One of the earliest examples of insurgent fighting was the

Fabian Strategy employed by the dictator of the Roman Republic Quintus Fabius

Maximus Verrucosus against general Hannibal during the Second Punic War.4 Fabius

avoided set piece battles and frontal assaults against the more powerful Hannibal, preferring wearing his forces down through a war of attrition. The Peninsular War of

1812 offers another example of insurgent warfare. Using a guerilla war of ambushes and

raids, Spanish partisans frequently harassed, isolated or overwhelmed French Army

forces, which resulted in the ultimate defeat of the Grande Armee. The term “guerilla”,

used in its modem context, was first introduced during this conflict. Asymmetric warfare

3 David Kilcullen, “Counterinsurgency”, Oxford University Press, USA, (2010): IX. 4 The Second Punic War took place in Southern Italy and lasted between 218 and 202 BC. 5

tactics were used by the forces of the Afrikaner Republics against the British Army during the Second Boer War and by the Irish Republican Army during the Irish War of

Independence, both with successful results.5 What makes insurgencies irregular or unconventional is not the fact that they are somehow uncommon, but the fact that they do not abide by the rules and conventions governing warfare that have been set in place by nation-states and their armed forces.6 Since playing by these rules would favor nation­

states, non-state armed forces are most likely to employ this form of warfare in order to achieve their goals because they lack the resources that governments have and cannot engage the armed forces of those governments in head to head combat.

There are several definitions of insurgency. Some of them focus on the role of guerrilla tactics. James Fearon and David Laitin characterize an insurgency as “a technology of military conflict characterized by small, lightly armed bands, practicing

guerilla warfare from rural base areas.”7 Ivan Arreguin-Toft offers a more nuanced

approach and states that: “Guerrilla warfare strategy is the organization of a portion of

society for the purpose of imposing costs on an adversary using armed forces trained to

avoid direct confrontation.”8

The definitions above focus on the efforts of the counterinsurgents to avoid direct

confrontation with the counterinsurgent forces and to rely on guerilla tactics, such as

5 The Second Boer War lasted between 1899 and 1902; The Irish War of Independence lasted between 1919 and 1921. 6 Ibid., X. 7 James Fearon and David Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," American Political Science Review, 97, no. 01, (2003): 75-90, 75. 8 Ivan Arreguin-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict." International Security 26, no. 1,(2001): 93-128, 103-104. 6

ambushes, raids, sabotages, hit-and-run attacks and feints. These guerrilla tactics are not sufficient enough to characterize an insurgency. What is needed is “the seizure of political power by the use of armed force.”9

John Shy and Thomas Collier posit that there are crucial differences between guerrilla warfare and insurgent or revolutionary warfare: “there is persistent confusion between revolutionary war and guerilla warfare.”10 The confusion is understandable, because revolutionary war includes guerrilla warfare. But the guerrilla tactics of hit-and- run, avoiding pitched battles, eluding enemy pursuit... are simply one means of carrying on revolutionary war. Others range from nonviolent political mobilization, legal political action, strikes, agitation, and terrorism, to large-scale battles and conventional military operations. Guerrilla operations, in turn, may have no revolutionary aim... vital to any definition of revolutionary war, however, is the existence of a revolutionary objective; the specific means to be employed are a secondary matter.”

Erin Simpson offers three criteria that define insurgency and separate it from guerilla warfare: the “violent, armed opposition to a state (or occupying power) for the purpose of establishing control over the central government, or seceding and controlling the new secessionist government”, the “avoidance of direct combat with government forces; reliance on traditional ‘guerrilla tactics’ including terrorism” and the “existence of a parallel or prior political organization that channels military results into political

9 John Shy and Thomas Collier, "Revolutionary War”, Makers of Modem Strategy (1986): 815-861, 817. 10 Ibid. 11 7

victories.” These criteria are important in the study of insurgency and counterinsurgency because they allow the researcher to distinguish between guerilla wars, terror campaigns and insurgencies.

A comprehensive definition of insurgency is offered in the United States

Army/Marine Counterinsurgency Guide. The manual defines an insurgency as “the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of

1 O a region”. In other words, an insurgency is an organized political and military activity directed against a recognized political and administrative authority that is perpetrated by non-belligerent individuals or groups, with the end-goal being to weaken the legitimacy and control of that authority, while increasing the control of the insurgents. It can be regarded as a political battle fought between two or more factions for the purpose of ensuring the widest dissemination of political manifestos.

The drive behind the insurgent movements of the 20th century differs from that of the insurgent movements of the 21st century. During the 20th century, the ideological motivation for insurgents was nationalism, Marxism, and/or religion. The leaders of the insurgent movements were intellectuals who were often removed from the people that the inspired.14 The insurgencies of the 21st century are usually conducted by more than one group and have more than one political aim. More often, there are a myriad of players,

12 Erin Marie Simpson, “The Perils of Third-Party Counterinsurgency Campaigns”, Harvard University, (2010): 16. 13 John A. Nagl, James F. Amos, Sarah Sewall, and David H. Petraeus, “The US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual”, no. 3-24, University of Chicago Press, (2008): 6. 14 Ibid. 8

each of them having their own political agenda and end goal. Their success or failure depends on many factors, most important of which is the ability to manipulate and exploit the needs of the local population.

In order for insurgencies to work, their members must build networks within the country where they intend to conduct operations, as well as outside that country. They need weapons, supplies, caches, safe heaven and transit, supporters, recruits and access to intelligence on the adversary.15 The United States Counterinsurgency Guide states that the position of insurgents within the insurgent group is determined by several factors, including: “the level of respect and trust they hold within a community”, “their reputation established through previous insurgent actions”, “their degree of motivation, ideological or otherwise”, “their perceived loyalty to other network members”, “their level of expertise in a particular field”, “their access to resources, human or otherwise” and “the degree of risk they are prepared to accept.”16

The insurgent networks usually involve a core comprised of a small number of highly skilled individuals who provide operational and logistical support for the operational cells within the movement through the use of people such as couriers or smugglers. The otherwise impeccable operational security employed by the insurgent networks becomes vulnerable to exploitation when the command and control elements of the insurgent forces communicate with the operational cells.

15 Ibid,. 7 16 US Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, "US Government Counterinsurgency Guide", Washington, DC: US Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, (2009): 7. 9

Insurgents cannot effectively conduct operations without the support of the local population. In order to gain the support of the population, insurgents employ a political strategy involving a combination of persuasion, subversion and coercion.17 According to the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide, propaganda, a key element of persuasion, “is used at the local, national and often international levels to influence perceptions of potential supporters, opinion leaders, and opponents in the favor of the insurgents; promoting the insurgent’s cause and diminishing the government’s resolve.”18

Subversion is used in to penetrate, undermine, manipulate or disrupt government institutions in order to diminish the efficiency of the government institutions.19 Perhaps the most effective political strategy employed by the insurgent forces is coercion, which is used to intimidate government employees or collaborators and force them to take the side of the insurgents.

Insurgents know that they are no match for the government forces when it comes to military capacity, so they use guerrilla tactics, such as sabotage, assassinations, ambushes, raids and improvised explosive devices in order to provoke the government and to inflict as much damage as possible. The end goal is to discredit, weaken or paralyze the government forces. They also intimidate members of the government in order to dissuade them to take measures against insurgent combatants. When government forces do react, the insurgents usually reduce their activity and hide among sympathetic

17 “US Government Counterinsurgency Guide”, 9. 18 Ibid. 19 10

population groups.20 This is done in order to exhaust their opponents and prolong the conflict.

Counterinsurgency Defined

In order to fight insurgencies, various tactics have been developed and employed by governments. These tactics can be grouped under the umbrella term

‘counterinsurgency’. In the U.S. Army/Marine Counterinsurgency Field Manual, the

United States Department of Defense defines counterinsurgency as “‘comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes.”21 This definition is broad, and does not define the civilian and military efforts. Nevertheless, it is important because it acknowledges that there is a need for a unity of effort between civilian and military forces in combatting insurgent forces.

Unlike in conventional military engagements, where the focus is solely on the enemy, in counterinsurgency, the focus shifts onto the population as well. The measures that the states take in order to defeat insurgencies are a combination of military, political, economic, psychological or informational procedures.22 Paul Dixon defines counterinsurgency as having the following three characteristics: “a war waged by governments against a non-state actor”, “the aim of insurgents is to remove the

20 Ibid., 10 21 U.S. Army, "The US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual." US Army Field Manual 3- 24 (2007): 1-2. 22 Kilcullen, “Counterinsurgency”, 1. 11

government or an occupation” and “counter-insurgency may be distinguished from counterterrorism by the substantial popular support for insurgents.”23

The aim of counterinsurgency operations is to reestablish the legitimacy of the recognized government and to reduce and eliminate the influence of the insurgent groups.

In a counterinsurgency environment, governments must learn to adapt their actions to the environment, otherwise they risk alienating the population and losing power. At heart, counterinsurgency is “an adaptation battle: a struggle to rapidly develop and learn new techniques and apply them in a fast-moving, high-threat environment, bringing them to bear before the enemy can evolve in response, and rapidly changing them as the environment shifts.”24 Counterinsurgency tactics must be detailed enough to cover a myriad of environments. Their application must be fluid and evolving and must match the fast changing environment.

The way in which states view and deal with counterinsurgency depends largely on the type and character of the government involved. When authoritarian governments are faced with an insurgency, they are inclined to respond in a very brutal fashion, enacting ruthless martial law policies. The members of these governments can afford to disregard the basic human rights of the citizens they claim to represent because of the very nature of the system they operate in. These individuals did not rise to power as a result of free elections and do not have to answer to the population for their actions. Because their very

23 Paul Dixon, "‘Hearts and minds’? British Counter-insurgency from Malaya to Iraq." The Journal of Strategic Studies 32, no. 3 (2009): 353-381, 356. 24 Kilcullen, “Counterinsurgency”, 2. 12

survival depends on silencing all dissenting voices and because their populations are virtually powerless to shop them, oppressive governments will tend to ignore the law when dealing with insurgencies. The Syrian government is a good example of this practice. When faced with an uprising in the city of Hama in 1982, Syria’s then president Hafez al-Assad massacred an estimated 10,000 to 25,000 people.26 His successor, Bashar al-Assad, when faced with a similar uprising, killed an estimated

210,000 people between 15 March 2011 and 15 January 2015.27 28

Another example of how ruthless dictatorships deal with insurgencies is that of former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein and his actions towards the Kurdish minorities in

Iraq. Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons against Kurdish civilians in the village of

Halabja in 1988, following the liberation of the city by Kurdish peshmerga guerrillas in the final phase of the war between Iraq and Iran. 90 It is estimated • that 5,000 people died as a direct result of the chemical attack on 16 March 1988 and more than 7,000 people suffered long term illness as a result of the exposure to nerve agents such as Tabun, Sarin,

VX and mustard gas following the same attack.30

25 Patrick Seale and Hafiz Assad, “Assad, the Struggle for the Middle East”, University of California Press, (1989): 323-333. 26 Robin B. Wright, “Dreams and Shadows: The Future of the Middle East”, Penguin, (2008): 243-244. 27 Diaa Hadid, "Syrian Rebels and Government Reach Truce in Besieged Area", (January 15, 2015), accessed September 2, 2015, http://www.hufflngtonpost.com/2015/01/15/syria-rebel-truce n_6478226.html. 28 This estimate has been put out by the United Nations on 15 January 2015. Since this conflict is ongoing, it is estimated that this figure will rise dramatically in the following months. 29 “1988: Thousands die in Halabja gas attack", (n.d,), accessed September 2, 2015, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/16/newsid_4304000/4304853.stm 30 Hiwa Osman, "Iraqi Kurds Recall Chemical Attack", (March 17, 2002), accessed September 2, 2015, http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/middle_east/1877161.stm. 13

When liberal or democratic governments are forced to deal with insurgent elements, their approach is far different from that of oppressive governments. These governments tend to operate within the law, focusing primarily on policing and restrained military operations taking place under temporary emergency regulations. This happens because of the fact that the members of these governments draw their power from the populations they represent and have to be accountable for their actions to those populations when elections take place. In liberal societies, unpopular actions result in the loss of power and illegal actions result in loss of freedom.

The classical example of how liberal-democrat governments deal with insurgent elements is the British counterinsurgency effort in Northern Ireland during the period of about thirty years of violence between Northern Ireland’s Roman Catholic population and the Protestant community.31 Although thousands of people lost their lives during this conflict, the British counterinsurgency actions were not characterized by indiscriminate

and senseless violence, and took place largely within the framework of emergency law.

Although some constitutional rights were suspended for the most of the duration of the

conflict, the application of emergency regulations was selective and affected only the part

of the population in Northern Ireland that was active in the dispute.

Governments, whether liberal or autocratic, also tend to deal with

counterinsurgencies that happen domestically differently than when they deal with

insurgencies that happen outside their country’s borders, whether it is in one of that

31 This period of conflict took place between 1968 and 1998 and is commonly known as “The Troubles”. 14

state’s colonies, or in another country. States that fight insurgencies overseas are less successful than states that fight insurgencies on their own territories: “while many third- party states enjoy significant resource advantages over their indigenous counterparts, they are very rarely able to translate that material superiority into political victories counterinsurgency campaigns.”32

There are several reasons why states find it so difficult to conduct counterinsurgency operations outside the borders of their own countries. The first reason has to do with operating within unfamiliar environments. Understanding another country’s culture and being able to operate with the purpose of creating friendships and building alliances is very difficult, even for trained individuals. When referring to the unfamiliar aspect of expeditionary counterinsurgency operations, Kilcullen states: “Quite apart from the logistical and political challenges of expeditionary warfare, or the adaptation challenge for soldiers suddenly engaged in unfamiliar policing tasks, the sheer difficulty in understanding such an alien environment, and convincing enough locals to support the effort, poses immense problems - even before adding any organized opposition into the mix.”33 The discomfort created by operating in unfamiliar situations can be mitigated by teaching counterinsurgents how to operate in cross-cultural settings.

The second reason has to do with post conflict power composition.

Counterinsurgents rarely leave forces behind after the end of a conflict, because these forces are no longer needed. Most often, these forces are sent back to their countries of

32 Simpson, “The Perils of Third-Party Counterinsurgency Campaigns”, (2010): iii. 33 Kilcullen, “Counterinsurgency”, 11. 15

origin, or they are deployed to other conflict areas. This fact turns the counterinsurgent forces into an unreliable post conflict ally to the host government.34 Insurgent forces can sign power-sharing agreements and wait for the expeditionary counterinsurgent force to leave. Once the host government loses its powerful ally, the insurgent forces can take advantage of this situation and stage devastating comebacks. This is evident in Iraq in

2014 and 2015, where different insurgent forces, chief among them being ISIS, were able to rise up and take control of territories inhabited by more than 10 million people after the

• • • • • departure of the American main expeditionary forces in December 2011.

The third and final reason why states find it difficult to conduct counterinsurgency operations outside their territory is that in the country where the counterinsurgency effort takes place there are two or more governments at play. The first government is the government of the host nation, government against which the actions of the insurgent forces are directed; the other governments are the foreign governments providing support.

All these governments may not have the same views on how to deal with insurgent forces.

If a more liberal government tries to provide support to a more authoritarian government, the post conflict visions of the liberal state may be at odds with the views of the authoritarian government. In terms of consent, counterinsurgency campaigns could be conducted with full consent, partial consent, or with no consent at all, in the cases where

34 Ibid.,12. 35 Stephanie Nebehay, "Islamic State-controlled Parts of Syria, Iraq Largely out of Reach: Red Cross” (March 13,2015), accessed September 3,2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/13/us-mideast-crisis-syria-icrc-idUSKBN0M921N20150313. 16

the host government is non-existent. It is possible that this incompatibility of characters has lead to the problems that the governments of the United States and Great Britain faced when dealing with the insurgent forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Counterinsurgency requires a solid understanding of the insurgent tactics, techniques, procedures and goals along with an in-depth understanding of the cultural, economic, security, social and political conditions. Insurgents should be marginalized, contained or destroyed through a mix of military combat and non-combat operations, intelligence, police methods, negotiation and diplomacy coupled with the strengthening of the rule of law, political reform and conducting effective economic development. If counterinsurgency is to be effective, it requires a balance between destructive measures,

such as the physical destruction of insurgent assets and the killing of the insurgents themselves, and constructive measures, such as the building of an effective government.

When it comes to counterinsurgency strategy, there are two main schools of thought. The enemy-centric approach focuses on defeating the insurgent organizations as the main line of effort; other efforts are seen only as efforts supporting the defeat of the enemy. It is the belief of the proponents of this approach that if the insurgents are

surrounded and defeated, then the population that sympathizes with them will abandon their cause and support the government. To them, killing the enemy is the only way to

achieve victory. The other approach is the population-centric approach. This approach to

36 “US Government Counterinsurgency Guide”, 13. 37 Ibid., 14. 17

counterinsurgency shifts focus from the insurgents themselves onto the population.38 The main goal of this approach is to achieve control and to defeat the insurgency by shifting the support of the population from the insurgents onto the government. The main tool of achieving government legitimacy in the population-centric approach is no longer conventional warfare; here diplomacy, intelligence, non-combat military operations combined with efficient policing operations are the main tools. Winning the hearts and minds of the population insures victory over the insurgents. This theory calls for defeating the enemy indirectly.

Counterinsurgency campaigns are rarely purely enemy-centric or population- centric. Most often, they employ combinations of elements of both approaches “with the relative balance changing over time”.3 Whatever the method chosen, success in counterinsurgency operations is achieved when a set of conditions are met. The U.S.

Government Counterinsurgency Guide states these conditions: “the affected government is seen as legitimate, controlling social, political, economic and security institutions that meet the population’s needs, including adequate mechanisms to address the grievances that may have fueled support of the insurgency”, “the insurgent movements and their leaders are co-opted, marginalized, or separated from the population” and “armed insurgent forces have dissolved or been demobilized, and/or reintegrated into the political, economic, and social structures of the country.”40

38 “US Government Counterinsurgency Guide”, 4. 39 Ibid., 15. 40 Ibid., 16. 18

Theoretical Foundations of Warfare

In order to understand insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, a solid background on the theoretical foundations of war is needed. Without having a deep understanding of how war was understood and theorized by scholars and practitioners before the emergence of asymmetric warfare, some of the nuances that contemporary insurgency and counterinsurgency theories exhibit might be harder to comprehend. Three military theorists have set the theoretical foundations upon which all insurgency and counterinsurgency theories are built: Sun Tzu was the first theorist to describe the principles of warfare, Antoine-Henri Jomini established a framework for Western war structure and Carl Von Clausewitz developed a psychological system focusing exclusively on war.

The tradition of thought regarding war began more than twenty five hundred years ago, when the Chinese general Sun Tzu wrote his masterpiece on military strategy and tactics, called “The Art of War”.41 Sun Tzu’s military philosophy was centered on indirectness and gradualism. Although the concepts of insurgency and counterinsurgency had not been invented at that time, Sun Tzu was able to capture their essence.42 His work

gave special importance to the need for speed, surprise, deception, flexibility and

effective intelligence. He discussed the need for concerted action between military and

41 The name Sun Tzu is an honorific, which means Master Sun. Sun Tzu’s birth name was Sun Wu. 42 Spencer C. Tucker, ed. “Encyclopedia of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: A New Era of Modem Warfare”, ABC-CLIO, (2013): 545. 19

political leaders, direct and indirect attacks as well as the importance of spying as a means of gathering intelligence on the enemy.43

Sun Tzu posited that armed conflict was the last option available to decision makers and it was only to be implemented after the political process was unsuccessful. In fact, attacking the enemy was one of the least important principles of “supreme importance.”44 Achieving victory through attacking the enemy’s strategy and disrupting its alliances through indirect methods was the preferred principle. Only after the exhaustion of all other means was armed force to be applied, and even then the objective was not to be “the annihilation of the enemy’s army, the destruction of his cities, and the wastage of his countryside.”45 Military power was to be applied so that victory could be achieved as quickly as possible and with the smallest number of lost lives on both sides.

46 Sun Tzu looked at his enemy’s capabilities and strengths and divided them into five distinct categories: morale and generalship (the human aspect), terrain and weather (the physical aspect) and doctrine.47 War was avoided unless his army demonstrated that it was superior to the enemy’s army in all five categories.48 Finally, Sun Tzu looked at the role that population played during war and posited that governments need the support of the population if they want to be successful in combat. Although he did not refer to

43 Ibid. 44 Sun Tzu, “The Art of War”, Oxford University Press, (1963): 77. 45 Ibid., 40. 46 Ibid., 39. 47 Ibid., 40. 48 Nathan R. Springer, “Stabilizing the Debate Between Population-Centric and Enemy-Centric Counterinsurgency: Success Demands a Balanced Approach”, no. ATZL-SWV-GDP, Army Command And General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, KS, (2011): 10. 20

governments’ fights against insurgent forces when he discussed popular support, his assessment can be easily applied to fighting an insurgency. Sun Tzu’s main legacy to insurgency theory was his philosophy of indirectness and gradualism. When it comes to counterinsurgency theory, Sun Tzu’s emphasis on civil-military relations, his employment of non-lethal operations during war and conflict resolution through negotiation can be applied with success in counterinsurgency conflicts today.

Baron Antoine-Henri de Jomini’s contribution to the understanding of war in general and insurgency and counterinsurgency operations in particular stems from his approach to the study of war. Jomini was a Swiss officer who served in both the French and the Russian armies between 1798 and 1829.49 He surpassed Carl von Clausewitz in appeal and acceptance for the most part of the Nineteenth Century. His theories on warfare were taught at the United States Military Academy at West Point and were applied during the American Civil War and the Crimean War. The historian John Shy believes that Jomini “deserves the dubious title of founder of modem strategy.”50 Jomini took a different approach to warfare than Clausewitz and defined warfare not as art, but as science, which can be studied and taught in military school. To Jomini, war was an experiment with results derived from empirical ways. He drew on his experience in the

French army to compile the first systematic treaty on military strategy, titled “The Art Of

49 Antoine-Henri Jomini lived between 6 March 1779 and 24 March 1869. 50 John Shy, “Jomini.” ‘Makers of Modem Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age’ ”, Princeton University Press, (1986): 144. 21

War”.51 This treaty is considered to be the basis for the Western framework for warfare.

In the treaty, Jomini simplifies the waging of war into six basic principles: statesmanship in its relation to war, strategy, grand tactics, logistics, engineering and minor tactics.52 He posits that these six tenets are universal to all armed conflicts, and that they remain fixed in the face of modem improvements to weaponry, communications and transportation.

Jomini describes the modem concept of insurgency “through the lens of his time as an internal uprising of the population because of —political or religious sectarianism.”53 In the opening statement of Article IX, titled “Civil Wars, and Wars of

Religion”, Jomini states: “intestine wars, when not connected with a foreign quarrel, are generally the result of a conflict of opinions, of political or religious sectarianism.”54

When discussing the options that governments have when dealing with internal uprisings,

Jomini posits: “Governments may in good faith intervene to prevent the spreading of a political disease whose principles threaten social order; and, although these fears are generally exaggerated and are often mere pretexts, it is possible that a state may believe its own institutions menaced.”55 Threats to the legitimacy of the government, whether religious or political in nature, are considered a form of warfare and are to be taken seriously if the government wants to survive. Jomini’s contribution to the field of

51 For an in depth study of Jomini, see Antoine Henri Jomini, "Precis de l’Art de la Guerre: Des Principals Combinaisons de la Strategic, de la Grande Tactique et de la Politique Militaire." (1838). 52 Henry Jomini, “The Art of War”, accessed September 8,2015, http://www.gutenberg.org/files/13549/13549-h/13549-h.htm. 53 Springer, “Stabilizing the Debate”, 11. 54 Henri Jomini, “The Art of War”, accessed September 8, 2015, http://www.gutenberg.org/files/13549/13549-h/l 3549-h.htm. 55 Ibid. 22

asymmetric warfare is in counterinsurgency theory. Jomini favored simplicity and clarity

and was a proponent of innovation when it comes to military doctrine. Successful

counterinsurgency campaigns, Jomini argued, must exhibit organizational clarity and

doctrinal evolution. Forces with organizational cultures that rely on attrition-based

doctrines must be reorganized around flexibility and change.

The third author that has influenced insurgency and counterinsurgency theory is

Carl Von Clausewitz. His description of the theories and principles of war has constituted the backbone for most Western armed forces.56 Many of the strategic, operational and tactical principles and theories of war developed by Clausewitz have been applied by

Western and U.S. militaries against insurgent uprisings with excellent results.

Clausewitz was a Prussian military thinker who served in both the Prussian and

Russian armies between 1792 and 1831.57 He is widely acknowledged to be one of the

most important classical military strategists in history. His most notable book, “On War”,

is one of the most important treaties on the philosophy of war that emerged from the

Western world. Military thinkers of the Enlightenment period, including Jomini, believed

that the study of warfare should be dictated by reason and that a rigid set of principles for

the conduct of war should be formulated.58 Clausewitz pushed back against these ideas

and argued that human affairs in general and warfare in particular did not belong to the

56 For an in-depth study of Clausewitz, see Carl von Clausewitz and Wilhelm von Scherff, “Vom Kriege: Hinterlassenes Werk des Generals Carl von Clausewitz”, vol. 1. R. Wilhelmi, (1883). "On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret.” (1976). 57 Carl von Clausewitz lived between 1 June 1780 and 16 November 1831. 58 The Age of Enlightenment or the Age of Reason is an era that lasted from the 1620s until the 1780s and took place in Western Europe. 23

realm of science and therefore could not be quantified into mathematical rules: “In short,

absolute, so-called mathematical, fact there’s never find a firm basis in military calculations. From the very start, there is an interplay of possibilities, probabilities, good

luck and bad that weaves its way throughout the length and breadth of the tapestry. In the whole range of human activities, work most closely resembles a game of cards.”59 60

Clausewitz developed the concept of military genius whose competence in the

execution of military operations is paramount. He argued for the free operation of genius,

when conducting warfare: “Given the nature of the subject, we must remind ourselves that it is simply not possible to construct a model for the art of war that can serve as a

scaffolding on which the commander can rely for support at anytime.” 61

Clausewitz studied the emerging phenomenon of modem insurgency that emerged

in Europe in the 19th century. He understood that successful insurgencies needed space,

time and places of refuge in order to grow and increase in strength. He further understood

that, if left unchecked, insurgencies had the power to overthrow the state itself. Whether

states fight other states, or whether they fight radical elements within them, they must all

apply enough force to eliminate the threat. This amount of force should not exceed the

level that is sufficient for the achievement of this political purpose.

59 The Romantic period was a movement that originated in Europe and lasted between 1780 and 1830. 60 Carl von Clausewitz, “On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret” (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1984) (1976): 86. 61 Ibid., 136. 62 Ibid., 585. 24

Sun Tzu, Jomini and Clausewitz provided major contributions to the understanding of warfare. Sun Tzu believed that the best way of achieving victory was not to fight at all, but to use diplomacy, propaganda and spies. He thought of war as a predictable event and believed that if a commander’s orders were followed by his troops, then that commander would be victorious. Jomini believed that war was an art and focused the operational mechanisms of military administration. His approach to warfare was highly didactic and prescriptive in nature and emphasized achieving victory through the application of superior power at the decisive point. Clausewitz believed that war was just a continuation of state politics, with other means. Whether the state is engaged in war against another state, or it faces an insurgency from the part of the population, it has to apply measures to answer the threat and to win the conflict. Although the three strategists’ perspectives on warfare were shaped through diverse experiences, all three recognized that war and politics are inseparable. They discussed the concepts of popular uprising, insurrection and insurgency, and identified the conditions that enabled their success. They understood the importance of population support in any conflict and viewed the threat of internal uprising as a form of warfare. These contributions to warfare theory constitute a solid prism to understand insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. 25

Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Theory

Insurgency Theorists

Insurgencies have played an important role in nation building since the founding of organized political communities. For a long period of time, the insurgents’ ability to achieve results has been minimal, “because the techniques they can exploit today were then irrelevant to the historical situation.” To be more specific, “until now, the popular majorities, the laboring, unspecialized masses of pre-industrial societies, were able to exert very little political or economical leverage.”64 During the middle ages, populations lacked the ability to influence the political and economic environment in which they lived because they lived too close to the level of bare subsistence to make their voices heard. If these populations “starved, or rebelled and were slaughtered, there was no one to care, no economically or politically potent class to whom it would make the slightest difference”65

In essence, the only social class that suffered as a result of the rebellion of the proletariat was the proletariat.

Successful insurgencies originated not from the proletariat, but from the internal struggles for power of the bourgeoisie.66 Internal struggles of the elites resulted in the change of regime in favor of the most powerful factions. Insurgent actions increased gradually as a result of colonialism and of the race for territorial and economical

63 Robert Taber, “War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare”, Potomac Books, Inc., (2002): 13. 64 Ibid. 65 Ibid., 14. 66 Aaron M. Young Sr., and David H. Gray. "Insurgency, Guerilla Warfare and Terrorism: Conflict and its Application for the Future." Global Security Studies 2, no. 4 (2011): 67. 26

superiority brought on by Western Europe. Many of the aspects that insurgencies need to exist in the modem area were introduced by the need of Western European countries to increase their economic possessions through military and political seizures. Seeking freedom from oppression, post colonial insurgents “demanded the right to the self- determination free from foreign intervention, especially from what is often viewed as puppet regimes, or regimes set up and funded by colonial powers, acting as a tool for continued foreign benefit.”67 During the 18th century, a new form of fighting emerged as a result of the violence between powers. Named “la petite guerre” by the French, and later

“guerilla” by the Spanish, this new form of warfare was made possible by the rising lethality of existing weaponry. The employment of this new warfare technique became so successful at producing political change that, by the early 20th century, guerilla warfare became the preferred method of inception revolution against corrupt regimes worldwide by insurgents such as Mao Zedong and Vo Nguyen Giap.

Mao Zedong is responsible for setting the stage for modem guerilla action.68 He was the founding father of the People’s Republic of China and governed it as chairman of the Communist Party from 21 September 1949 until his death on 9 September1976. In his most famous book, titled “On Guerilla Warfare”, Mao pleaded the case for the use of

67 Young and Gray, “Insurgency, Guerilla Warfare and Terrorism”, 67. 68 Mao Zedong (also transliterated as Mao Tse-Tung) lived between 26 December 1893 and 9 September 1976. 27

insurgent tactics to win the war against the larger and more conventional army of Japan in the Second Sino-Japanese War.69 70

Mao’s Theory of People’s War, which is what Mao called insurgency, was made up of three distinct phases. Phase one was the organization and preparation phase. In this phase insurgents were responsible for building operational cells, recruiting members and supporters, distributing propaganda, creating front groups, infiltrating governmental and non-governmental organizations and attacking governmental institutions. The main purpose of this phase was for the counterinsurgents to win the support of the local population. The second phase was the terrorism and guerilla warfare phase. It consisted of terrorist attacks, guerilla raids, kidnappings, ambushes and acts of sabotage and subversion. The main goal of this phase was to weaken the government’s military and civilian institutions. A weak government, unable to offer protection and services to the population was a target for insurgents, who could move in and gain legitimacy by offering what the government could not. Phase three was the conventional warfare face.

Here, regular army tactics were used in order to capture key terrain and infrastructure.

The main goal of insurgents in this phase was to capture political and geographic objectives and to take control of the country. Mao’s doctrine allowed for these three phases to be employed out of sequence; they were to be adapted to the enemy’s activities, tactics and overall strategy.

69 For an in-depth study of Mao, see MaoTse-Tung and Zedong Mao, "On Guerrilla Warfare”, University of Illinois Press, (1961). 70 The Second Sino-Japanese War lasted between 7 July 1937 and 9 September 1945. 28

Mao understood that the support of the local population was critical to the overall success of the insurgent movement. He concluded: “a primary feature of guerrilla operations is their dependence upon the people themselves to organize battalions and 71 other units. Insurgent fighters had a duty to make the population aware of their goals and to try to mobilize it around a political objective: “the political goal must be clearly and precisely indicated to inhabitants of guerrilla zones and their national consciousness awakened.”72 Insurgency, as understood by Mao, was more than a military endeavor. His theory on insurgency was a mix of political, social, psychological and military modules, all working in unison for the greater purpose of achieving victory.

H'X • Another brilliant insurgent was Vo Nguyen Giap. His views on insurgency were heavily influenced by Sun Tzu and Mao Zedong. Just like Mao, Giap understood the importance of mobilizing the local population and gathering its political and economic support in order to gain victory. Achieving the rank of General in the Vietnam People’s army, Giap played a crucial role in defeating first the French colonial forces and then the

American armed forces so that he may establish a unified country, free of Western influence and domination.75 76 In order to achieve his goal of a unified Vietnam, Giap

71 Mao Zedong and Samuel B. Griffith, “Mao Tse-Tung on Guerrilla Warfare”, New York: Praeger, (1961): 51. 72 Ibid., 89. 73 Vo Nguyen Giap lived between 25 August 1911 and 4 October 2013. 74 Robert John O'Neill, “General Giap: Politician and Strategist”, New York: Praeger Publishers, (1969): 23. 75 The French were expelled from Vietnam in 1954 and the Americans were forced to withdraw their troops from Vietnam in 1975. 76 For an in-depth study of Giap, see Vo Nguyen Giap, “Military Art of People's War”, vol. 193, NYU Press, (1970). 29

employed a myriad of techniques, ranging from raids, terrorist attacks, acts of sabotage and espionage to regular combat missions. He used peasant women to carry concealed weapons and ammunition and children to pass along intelligence about enemy troop moments. He was quoted saying: “All citizens are soldiers. All villages and wards are fortresses, and our entire country is a vast battlefield on which the enemy is besieged, attacked and defeated.”77

Giap understood that, in order to win the war against his enemy, he had to engage in operations meant to lure it into expanding vast amounts of energy in useless pursuits of his troops. He wrote: “The enemy may outnumber you ten to one strategically, but if you compel him to disperse his forces widely, you may outnumber him ten to one locally wherever you choose to attack him.”78 Fighting a long war of attrition was another way of ensuring success. When talking about the United States government involvement in

Vietnam, Giap was quoted saying that “The United States imperialists want to fight quickly. To fight a protracted war is a big defeat for them. Their morale is lower than grass. ... National liberation wars must allow some time — a long time. ... The

Americans didn’t understand that we had soldiers everywhere and that it was very hard to surprise us.”79 In the end, Giap outlasted his foes. The French could no longer fight him

77 Vo Nguyen Giap quoted in Bart Barnes, “Military Leader Vo Nguyen Giap Defeated French, U.S. Forces in Vietnam Conflicts”, (October 4,2013), accessed September 13, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/obituaries/military-leader-vo-nguyen-giap-defeated-french-us- forces-in-vietnam-conflicts/2013/10/04/897ffff2-c5da-11 df-94e 1 -c5afa35a9e59_story.html 78 Ibid. 30

in South East Asia and were defeated in 1954, and the Americans left Vietnam in 1975, after suffering more that 58,000 casualties.

Mao Zedong and Vo Nguyen Giap were more than military strategists, they were visionaries. They were able to understand the theoretical foundations of war put forth by

Sun Tzu, Jomini and Clausewitz and employ them to achieve their military and political objectives. Both understood that victory rested in the ability to maintain the support of the population. They used propaganda on their own people to manipulate masses and fighting units in order to build up support in rural areas, and employed coercive methods to maintain compliance only when necessary. They used subversion and proselytizing on the enemy military to encourage defection and lower morale, and propaganda on the enemy population to sow dissent, defeatism and disloyalty.

Mao and Giap also understood the limitations of their tactics and only engaged the enemy in asymmetric warfare, choosing the time and the place of the battle. They used terrorist attacks, kidnappings, sabotage and ambushes to force the enemy into surrendering. They maintained the tactical initiative at all times and did not lose sight of their political objectives in the pursuit of victory. The tactics developed by Mao and Giap constitute the key features of insurgent warfare. Their study is important because counterinsurgency warfare cannot be developed without a clear understanding of the phenomenon of insurgency. 31

Counterinsurgency Theorists

Few nations have had as much experience in dealing with insurgents as Great

Britain. 80 Originating • • • with • the overseas trading • posts and possessions that England established between the 16th and 18th centuries, at the height of its power, the British

Empire covered one fifth of the world’s population and controlled over 458 million people.81 Beginning with the American Revolutionary War and ending with the war in

Afghanistan, British forces have been involved in counterinsurgency operations in almost all parts of the globe. Between 1945 and 2011 alone, the British have conducted campaigns in Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, Aden, Palestine, Greece, Oman, Northern Ireland,

Afghanistan and Iraq. Even though not all British counterinsurgency operations have ended in victory, it is safe to say that the British are the best at conducting countennsurgency campaigns. 82

Drawing on the lessons gained from Britain’s success in Malaya, the British Army developed a less coercive approach to counterinsurgency operations. This approach, called “hearts and minds” is made up of four interrelated requirements. The first requirement for a successful counterinsurgency victory is the determination of the political elite to defeat the insurgents. Military aims must be subservient to political requirements if victory is to be achieved. The second requirement stresses the importance

80 Mike Jackson, “British counter-insurgency." The Journal of Strategic Studies 32, no. 3 (2009): 347-351. 81 Angus Maddison, "The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective”, Paris: Development Centre of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, (2001): 282. 82 David A. Charters, “The Development of British Counter-Insurgency Intelligence”, Journal of Conflict Studies, accessed September 14, 2015, https://joumals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/JCS/article/view/15233/19650 32

of winning the hearts and minds of the affected population. The government must gain the support of the population through social activates and civil projects and prevent the population from helping the insurgents. The third requirement for a successful

counterinsurgency has to do with the use of police. According to British doctrine, police must be used in fighting insurgents, and not the army, because it is more sensitive to local

opinion, it is more effective at gathering intelligence and it is better trained for conducting peacekeeping operations. Police forces operate in areas for longer periods of time and the relationships that they built with the local communities are more stable and more conducive to winning the support of the people living there. The final requirement

stipulates that the counterinsurgency effort must be coordinated on all fronts. No single program can succeed in fighting insurgents; it is only the combination of all programs

(social, political, economic and military) that can succeed in the end. The British

counterinsurgency theory has been developed drawing partially on the writings of Sir

Robert Thompson and Sir Frank Kitson.

One of the foremost British thinkers and practitioners of counterinsurgency was Sir

Robert Thompson. A field officer in the British Army, Thompson served in the Burma

Campaign during World War II and in the Malayan Emergency. He also served as

head of the British Advisory Mission to Vietnam, advising both the United States military

and the South Vietnamese government. His ideas on counterinsurgency grew out of his

83 Sir Robert Grainger Ker Thompson lived between 1916 and 1992. 84 The Burma Campaign took place in the South-Eastern Theater of World War II and lasted between January 1942 and July 1945. It was fought between the forces of the British Empire and China against the forces of the Empire of Japan, The Indian National Army and Thailand. 33

experience as an officer in Malaya in the 1950s and in Vietnam in the 1960s, and culminated with the writing of the book “Defeating Communist Insurgency”.85 In the book, Thompson offers a compelling explanation of insurgencies and discusses the role that the Soviet Union and The People’s Republic of China had in promoting them.86 He outlines the requirements for successful counterinsurgency, requirements known as the five principles: the “government must have a clear political aim; to establish and maintain a free, independent and united country which is politically and economically stable and viable”, the “government must function in accordance with the law”, “the government must have an overall plan”, “the government must give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the guerillas” and “in the guerilla phase of an insurgency, a government must secure its base areas first.” 87 He also discussed the importance of relying on the police instead of the military and the necessity of operating in small and flexible units, which were most effective in bringing the fight to the insurgents.• 88

Thompson later reformulated these five principles in terms of six essential factors that were important in articulating the response of government and security forces against

Maoist insurgencies in Malaya and the Philippines: the recognition that political action designed to prevent the insurgents from getting popular support should take priority over purely military action, the requirement for complete civil-military cooperation, the need

85 For an in depth study of Thompson, see Robert Grainger Ker Thompson, “Defeating Communist Insurgency: the Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam”, no. 10. FA Praeger, (1966). 86 Robert Thompson, “Defeating Communist Insurgency”, St Petersburg, PL: Hailer Publishing, (2005): 21. 87 Ibid., 50-52, 55, 57. 88 Ian Frederick William Beckett, “Modem Insurgencies and Counter-insurgencies: Guerrillas and Their Opponents Since 1750”, London: Rutledge, (2011): 107. 34

for coordination of intelligence, the separation of the insurgent from the population through the winning of hearts and minds, the appropriate use of military force to support pacification, and lasting political reform to prevent the recurrence of insurgency.89

Although the same principles have been applied by other countries in different situations, it is Thompson who recognized the fact that counterinsurgency tactics need to be tailored to the environment.

Another contributor to the British counterinsurgency doctrine is Sir Frank Kitson.

Serving as an officer in the British Army between 1946 and 1985, Kitson rose to the rank of general.90 During his tenure as army officer, Kitson was involved in conflicts in Kenya,

Malaya, Oman and Cyprus. His theories on counterinsurgency operations grew out of his involvement with these wars and were described in the book called “Low Intensity

Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping”. The book was quite controversial when it came out. In it, Kitson argued that the British army had been trained to conduct conventional warfare, yet all the wars it took part in since the end of World

War II were low intensity conflicts.92 He recommended that counterinsurgency training should be given more weight and that the responsibility for gathering intelligence should be placed on the army, rather than on the police.

89 Ibid. 90 General Sir Frank Edward Kitson was bom on 15 December 1926. 91 For an in depth of Kitson, see Frank Kitson, “Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peace­ keeping”, Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, (1971). 92 J.E. Peterson, "The Experience of British Counter-Insurgency Campaigns and Implications for Iraq." (August 1,2009), accessed September 16,2015, http://www.jepeterson.net/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/apbn-009_british_counter- insurgency_campaigns_and_iraq.pdf. 35

“Bunch of Five” was Kitson’s second book on counterinsurgency.93 The book describes Kitson’s involvement in the wars and serves as the historical background that is needed in order to understand the counterinsurgency doctrine put forth in “Low Intensity

Operations”. In the book, Kitson argued that four critical areas needed to be addressed when planning for counterinsurgency operations. Kitson writes: “the first requirement for a workable campaign is good coordinating machinery.”94 Next, “establishing the sort of political atmosphere within which the government measures can be introduced with the maximum likelihood of success.”95 Once measures such as security initiatives, infrastructure, or economic development have been implemented, intelligence is the next thing commanders need to focus on.

When referring to intelligence and intelligence organizations, Kitson states: “the intelligence organization must enlarge itself rapidly, must decentralize in order to give security force commanders at every level access to it, and must change its methods of working so as to produce the different sort of information that operational forces need.”96

The final critical area in Kitson’s framework concerns the law. While operating outside the law is not an option for liberal governments, changing it on order to minimize insurgent advantages and to aid the counterinsurgency effort is encouraged.97 “It is therefore perfectly normal for governments not only to introduce Emergency Regulations

93 For an in depth study of Kitson, see Frank Kitson, "Bunch of Five”, London: Faber & Faber (1977) 94 Frank Kitson, “Bunch of Five”, London: Faber & Faber, (1977): 284. 95 Ibid., 286. 96 Ibid., 287-288. 97 Springer, “Stabilizing the Debate”, 22. 36

as an insurgency progresses, but also to counter advantages which the insurgents may

QO m derive from.” Kitson understood that the war against an insurgent force could not be fought using conventional tactics. In order to win the war against insurgent forces, commanders are required to use special tactics, techniques and procedures.

Just like the British, The French have had a lot of experience dealing with insurgencies, especially since the end of World War II. The French colonial empire encompassed various mandate territories, protectorates and overseas colonies ruled over by France, and lasted from 1534 until its official disestablishment in 1980. At the beginning of the 20th century, the French empire became the second largest colonial empire in the world, behind only the British Empire. At its peak, the French controlled over five million square miles of land and more than one hundred million people. France emerged from World War II a weak colonial power. Sensing this weakness, anti colonial movements began to emerge in the colonies and started challenging the French authority.

The disastrous military campaigns in Vietnam and Algeria sounded the end of the French colonial period." These two campaigns provided theorists and practitioners such as David

Galula and Roger Trinquier with a model on counterinsurgency warfare.

The French counterinsurgency doctrine rests on five interconnected strategies: quadrillage, ratissage, regroupement, recruitement, and tache d ’huille. Quadrillage

(gridding) denotes a method of dividing a territory to be pacified into grids or squares, each of them with its own garrison of troops responsible for suppressing insurgent

98 Kitson, “Bunch of Five”, 289. 99 The French suffered debilitating losses at the hands of the Vietnamese in 1955 and the Algerians in 1962. 37

activity. Once the gridding has been accomplished, the tactics of ratissage (raking), consisting of cordoning and combing, are used for the purpose of finding and engaging the insurgent forces. In order to promote the conduct of ratissage operations, areas suspected of collaboration between the population and insurgent forces are declared forbidden, and all the suspected inhabitants are evacuated into large camps de regroupement (regroupement camps). This serves to cut the insurgents from local support and to separate the remaining population from influence. Once these areas are cleared, and the insurgents have been flushed out, the recruitement phase begins. Local leaders and police officers are recruited and employed. Once this happens, the counterinsurgency force moves on, like a tache d ’huille (oil spot) diffusing outward.

The first person that was influential in developing the French theory and practice of counterinsurgency warfare was David Galula. A military officer and scholar, Galula gained his insights into counterinsurgency warfare while serving in the French Army between 1939 and 1962.100 He was involved in World War II, the Algerian War and

Greek Civil War.101 Galula described his experiences in these conflicts in the book titled

“Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice”, which was published in 1964.

Based on these experiences, Galula was able to synthesize four general laws that could be applied to counterinsurgency warfare. According to the first law, “the support of the

100 David Galula lived between 1919 and 1967. 101 World War II lasted between 1 Septemberl939 until 12 September 1945. The Algerian War lasted from 1 November 1954 until 19 March 1962. The Greek Civil War lasted between 30 March 1946 and 16 October 2949. 102 For an in depth study of Galula, see David Galula, “Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory And Practice”, Greenwood Publishing Group, (2006), and David Galula, “Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958”, Vol. 478, Rand Corporation, (2002). 38

population is as necessary for the counterinsurgent as for the insurgent.”103 Galula acknowledged that it was impossible to prevent guerilla units from taking roots in an area without the cooperation of the local population. “The population, therefore, becomes the objective for the counterinsurgent as it was for its enemy.”104 The population holds the key to the success or failure of the counterinsurgency campaign and the counterinsurgent must take the fight to the level of the population if victory has to be achieved.

According to the second law, “support is gained through an active minority.”

Galula divided the population into three categories, depending on the degree of cooperation with the counterinsurgent: “in any situation, whatever the cause, there will be an active minority for the cause, a neutral majority, and an active minority against the cause.”106 The counterinsurgent’s mission is to use the favorable minority in order to recruit the neutral majority and to neutralize the hostile minority. In order to achieve this goal, the counterinsurgent must show that his or her cause is superior to that of the insurgent. The third law states: “support from the population is conditional.”107 Galula posits that the minority that favors the counterinsurgent cannot emerge if it feels that it is threatened by the insurgent and will not emerge unless “the counterinsurgent has the will, the means, and the ability to win.“108 The counterinsurgent needs a position of strength in

103 David Galula, “Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice”, Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, (1964): 55, accessed September 22,2015, http://louisville.edu/armyrotc/files/Galula%20David%20-%20Counterinsurgency%20Warfare.pdf 104 Ibid. 105 Ibid., 56. 106 Ibid. 107 Ibid., 57. 108 Ibid., 58. 39

order to enter into negotiations and for that he needs a convincing success as early in the campaign as possible.109 This position of strength is reached by the counterinsurgent, according to Galula, “when his power is embodied in a political organization issuing from, and firmly supported by, the population.”110 According to the fourth law, the

“intensity of efforts and vastness of means are essential.”111 What this means is that the government must be perceived by the population as the only choice, and to do that, it must invest heavily in social, civic and economic programs. The government must use all available resources in order to drive out the insurgent force.

Galula translated these four laws into a general strategy of the counterinsurgency.

The step-by-step procedure to establish order in a selected area consists of eight steps:

“concentrate enough armed forces to destroy or to expel the main body of armed insurgents”, “detach for the area sufficient troops to oppose an insurgents comeback in strength, install these troops in the hamlets, villages, and towns where the population lives”, “establish contact with the population, control its movements in order to cut off its links with the guerrillas”, ’’destroy the local insurgent political organization”, “set up, by means of elections, new provisional local authorities”, “test these authorities by assigning them various concrete tasks.; replace the softs and the incompetents, give full support to the active leaders”, “organize self-defense units”, “group and educate the leaders in a

109 Ibid. ’Ibid. 111 Ibid. 40

national political movement” and “win over or suppress the last insurgent remnants.”112

This framework should not be applied rigidly to all cases, Galula argues. Some steps in this framework must be applied sequentially; some can be skipped, while others are unnecessary in areas that are controlled by government forces.

The second influential figure in understanding insurgencies and counterinsurgencies is Roger Trinquier. He served as an officer in the French Army between 1931 and 1961 and was involved in World War II, the First Indochina War, the Algerian War and the

Katanga rebellion.113 114 In his most famous book, published in 1964 and titled “Modem

Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency”, Trinquier described a new style of warfare, called modem warfare, which was an “interlocking system of actions - political, economic, psychological, military - which aims at the overthrow of the established authority in a country and its replacement by another regime.115 He was highly critical of the army’s unwillingness to adapt to this new brand of warfare: “We still persist in studying the type of warfare that no longer exists and we shall never fight again. The result of this shortcoming is that the army is not prepared to confront an adversary employing arms and methods the army itself ignores. It has no chance of winning.”116 In order for the army to become victorious, it needed to adapt.

112 Ibid., 59. 113 The First Indochina War lasted between 19 December 1946 and 1 August 1954. 114 For an in depth study of Trinquier, see Roger Trinquier, “Modem Warfare: a French View of Counterinsurgency”, Greenwood Publishing Group, (2006), and Roger Trinquier, “Les Maquis d'Indochine: 1952-1954”, Editions Albatros, (1976). 115 Roger Trinquier, “Modem Warfare: a French View of Counterinsurgency”, Greenwood Publishing Group, (2006): 5. 116 Ibid., 3. 41

Trinquier proposed new strategies, such as the establishment of self-defense forces recruited from the local population, territorial reclamation, and the use of specialized commando units or psychological operations. The most original contribution to the field of counterinsurgency operations, however, was the use of torture. Although never mentioned by name, Trinquier believed that torture was a necessary tool in the pursuit of victory. His intelligence-centric approach to counterinsurgency called for the use of force in order to convince the terrorists to divulge information: “no lawyer is present for such an interrogation. If the prisoner gives the information requested, the examination is quickly terminated; in not, specialists must force his secret from him.”117 Trinquier had very specific criteria for the use of torture: the interrogators could only ask questions relating to the terrorist’s organization and, once the information was obtained, the torture had to stop. Trinquier understood that counterinsurgency campaigns require a combined approach from the part of both military and civilian forces, from the highest level of decision-making to the least important person involved.

The United States is arguably the best at conducting counterinsurgency operations.118 The United States military has reached this high level of expertise as a result of its involvement in a myriad of conflicts, in which it used both insurgency and counterinsurgency tactics. During the Revolutionary War, the American colonies“

117 Ibid., 19. 118 Michael O'Hanlon, "America's History of Counterinsurgency", (June 1, 2009), accessed September 1, 2015, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2009/6/counterinsurgency- ohanlon/06_counterinsurgency ohanlon.pdf. 42

utilized harassment techniques, camouflaging of combatants among civilian populations and within complex terrain, and a strategy of patience rather than pursuit of classic battlefield victory at most times” in order to drive British forces out. 119 During the Indian

Wars, the wars in the Philippines, Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States military developed and used counterinsurgency techniques to achieve victories that would not have been possible using conventional tactics.120 121

The American counterinsurgency doctrine is comprised of five components. The first component is the information component. Information constitutes the base for all other components and provides “the linkages that allow discrete functional elements to cooperate as an integral whole.”122 On this base lay the security, political and economic components. The security component “encompasses the maintenance of laws, human rights, freedom to conduct economic activity, public safety and health.”123 The political component provides “a framework of political reconciliation, genuine reform, popular mobilization and governmental capacity-building around which all other programs and activities are organized.” 124 The economic and developmental component includes immediate humanitarian relief and the provision of essential services, as well as longer- term programs to develop the infrastructure and capacity for legitimate agricultural,

119 Ibid. 120 The American Revolutionary War lasted from 19 April 1775 until 3 September 1783. 121 The American Indian Wars lasted intermittently between 1622 and 1924. The Philippine American War lasted from 2 June 1899 until 4 July 1902. The Vietnam War lasted from 1965 (when regular combat units were deployed) until 30 April 1975. The war in Iraq lasted from 20 March 2003 until 18 December 2011. The war in Afghanistan lasted from 7 October 2001 until 28 December 2014. 122 “US Government Counterinsurgency Guide”, 17. 123 Ibid. 43

industrial, educational, medical, commercial and government activities.”125 The last component of the counterinsurgency strategy is control. Here, the security, political and economic components combine with the information component “to enable the affected government to control its environment, such that the population will, in the long run, support it rather than the insurgents.”126

The first theorist that was influential in developing the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy discussed above is John McCuen.127 McCuen served honorably for twenty eight years in the United States Army before retiring in 1976 with the rank of colonel. His book, “The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War: The Strategy of Counter-Insurgency”, published in 1966, is considered to be essential reading for all scholars who want to understand counterinsurgency. 128 In the book, McCuen aims to “develop a set of guiding principles which can be used to understand and conduct this new type of warfare.”129 The book proposes a fourfold approach to counter an insurgency. The first thing that commanders must do is to identify which of the four stages of insurgency they are fighting.130 He states: “inherent in this process is early recognition of the nature of the revolutionary threat and application of a maximum psycho-politico-military effort in time

125 Ibid. 126 Ibid. 127 John Joachim McCuen lived between 30 March 1926 and 18 July 2010. 128 For an in depth study of McCuen, see John J. McCuen, “The art of Counter-revolutionary War: the Strategy of Counter-insurgency”, Stackpole Books, (1966) and John J. McCuen, "Hybrid Wars." Military Review 88, No. 2, (2008). 129 John J. McCuen, “The Art of Counter-revolutionary War: The Strategy Of Counter-insurgency”, Stackpole Books, (1972): 19. 130 McCuen identifies four stages of insurgency: organization, terrorism, guerilla warfare and mobile warfare. 44

to seize the initiative.”• • • • 1^1 Then the counterinsurgents must secure their bases of operation and at the same time deny the insurgents the use of their shelters and sanctuaries. Next, counterinsurgents must work towards reversing the insurgents’ gains in all areas of the contested territory. Finally, given the fact that the best chance of victory that insurgents have is to prolong the conflict, the governments engaged in counterinsurgency operations must be able to flood the contested areas with social, economic, civic and political programs for a period of time long enough to assure victory. This is “the vital first step in the governing power4 s strategy to thwart revolutionary attempts to control the population.”132 In McCuen’s opinion, “half-measures lead only to protracted, costly defeats.”133 A total commitment is required from the part of the government if victory is to be attained.

The scholar that is most influential in developing the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy is David Kilcullen. After serving in the Australian Army for twenty two years,

Kilcullen retired in 2007 with the rank of lieutenant colonel.134 His career in the United

States of America includes positions in the Department of State, as the chief strategist in the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism and in the Department of Defense as the senior counterinsurgency advisor on the personal staff of General David Petraeus. He also served as the special advisor for Counterinsurgency for Secretary of State

131 McCuen, “The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War”, 324. 132 Ibid., 25. 133 Ibid., 330. 134 Although David Kilcullen was bom in Australia and served in the Australian Army, it was in the United States of America where he authored his two most influential books, “The Accidental Guerilla” and “Counterinsurgency” and co-authored “The United States Army Field Manual 3-24”, titled “Counterinsurgency”. 45

Condoleezza Rice and as counterinsurgency adviser to NATO and the International

Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.135 Throughout his career, Kilcullen was involved in conflicts in East Timor, Cyprus, Bougainville, Iraq and Afghanistan.

The main thesis that Kilcullen puts forth in his first book, “The Accidental

Guerilla”, is that counterinsurgency must “focus on the population, seeking to protect it from harm by- or interaction with - the insurgent, competing with the insurgent for influence and control at the grassroots level.”136 This is based on the assumption that

“insurgency is a mass social phenomenon, that the enemy rides and manipulates a social wave consisting of genuine popular grievances, and that dealing with this broader social and political dynamic, while gaining time for targeted reforms to work by applying a series of tailored, full-spectrum security measures, is the most promising path to

1 ^ ultimately resolve the problem.” Kilcullen believes that the best approach to fighting an insurgency is for the insurgent force to concentrate all its efforts on the population, which is seen as the key to achieving victory.

At the center of the book lies Kilcullen’s identification of the accidental guerilla syndrome, which consists of four phases: infection, contagion, intervention and rejection.

At first, transnational extremists take advantage of the lack of governance in an area and begin establishing themselves by infecting it through the use of propaganda and violence.

135 David Kilcullen worked for the United States Department of State in 2005 and 2006. He worked for the United States Department of Defense and for Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice between 2007 and 2008. He served as counterinsurgency adviser to NATO and the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan from 2009 to 2010. 136 David Kilcullen, “The Accidental Guerrilla”, xv. 137 Ibid. 46

Contagion occurs when insurgents begin spreading violence and instability into the broader society. This is “the critical stage in the process, since without it the terrorist presence in a given area would be unlikely to attract international attention or to present a threat to the world community at large, hence the next state (intervention) would not occur.” 138 This process provokes an intervention from the local government or from the international forces present in the area. The locals are faced with the decision of whom to support. Most likely, the local population will chose to support the insurgents because they often represent the most familiar face: “as soon as the foreigners or infidels appear in the area, by comparison the terrorists are able to paint themselves as relative locals and opportunistically draw on local loyalties for support.” Once the locals decide that they will support the insurgents, they will reject the authority of the local government and become what Kilcullen calls accidental guerillas. Violence will increase and people who never thought they would join the ranks of the insurgency will take up arms and fight on the same side as the insurgents, not because they embrace their ideology, but because they want to get rid of outside interference.

138 Kilcullen, “The Accidental Guerilla”, 113. 139 Ibid.,38. 47

Chapter III

Counterinsurgency Operations In Iraq

“The premise of our strategy is that securing the Iraqi population is the foundation for all other progress. For Iraqis to bridge sectarian divides, they need to feel safe in their homes and neighborhoods. For lasting reconciliation to take root, Iraqis must feel confident that they do not need sectarian gangs for security. The goal of the surge is to provide that security and to help prepare Iraqi forces to maintain it...our success in meeting these objectives now allows us to begin bringing some of our troops home.”

-George W. Bush

Introduction

In this chapter I argue that the precipitous drop in violence by late summer 2007 in

Iraq was not due to the implementation of the ‘hearts and minds’ campaign, as public opinion suggests. I posit that the drop in violence was due to a more complex set of reasons: the decision by Shia militia leaders to stop the sectarian cleansing against Sunni civilians and the spread of the Anbar Awakening, which was an alliance of 30 Sunni tribes in the Anbar Province against A1 Qaeda in Iraq.140 The co-opting of small segments of Sunni insurgent leaders by the American forces and the fact that Baghdad had become a sectarian enclave, with a Shia-dominated majority and small enclaves of Sunnis, also helped decrease the level of violence. The last factor that helped bring down the violence was the use of the extra five surge brigades to reduce A1 Qaeda members by killing or capturing them.

140 See, for example, John A. McCary, "The Anbar Awakening: An Alliance of Incentives." The Washington Quarterly 32, no. 1, (2009): 43-59, Austin Long, "The Anbar Awakening." Survival 50, No. 2, (2008): 67-94, and Richard H. Schultz, and Andrea J. Dew, “Insurgents, Terrorists, And Militias: The Warriors Of Contemporary Combat”, Columbia University Press, (2013). 48

I further argue that the best explanation for the decrease in violence in Iraq in

2007 is the interaction between the surge and the Awakening, with added benefits

provided by the end of sectarian violence. The surge and the Awakening were each

necessary for the other to succeed and it was precisely their combined effect that caused

the death toll to go down. On its own, the surge could not have lowered the violence

because it was too small to be useful. Even when combined with the new

counterinsurgency tactics, it was not large enough to be effective. The addition of 30,000

troops in Iraq represented a troop density of around 15 counterinsurgents per 1000 Iraqis.

In South Vietnam, where the same tactics were employed, having over 100

counterinsurgents per 1000 people was still not enough to win the hearts and minds of the

people.141 The surge was necessary for the Awakening to succeed because it provided the

protection that the Awakening needed in order to spread as far and as fast as it did.

Without the Awakening, the surge would have made a provisional improvement to Iraq’s

security, but it would not have defeated the insurgency, which would have returned to the

battlefield after the departure of the surge brigades in July 2008.142 ‘Hearts and minds’,

the doctrinal element that accompanied the surge, was necessary for the establishment of trust between the coalition forces and various factions within the Iraqi society. It was this

141 For an in-depth study on how troop density affects counterinsurgency operations, see Jeffrey A. Friedman, "Manpower and Counterinsurgency: Empirical Foundations for Theory and Doctrine." Security Studies 20, no. 4, (2011): 556-591. 142 The Surge was meant to be a temporary increase in troop numbers in Iraq and was only approved for one year. 49

trust that ultimately prompted the cooperation against A1 Qaeda in Iraq.143 This new approach, which consisted of dispersion of coalition troops into smaller combat outposts, meant that the Anbar Awakening was protected from A1 Qaeda in Iraq. Under this protection, its members were able to expand their operations across the country in less that one year. The doctrinal element of the surge was thus also necessary, because it provided protection and support for the Anbar Awakening movement. The Awakening was not enough to account for the decrease in violence on its own either. Without the help of the coalition, it would have probably disintegrated itself, just like the previous four attempts. The Awakening was necessary for the surge to succeed because it changed the troop density in favor of the counterinsurgency.144

The effects of the Awakening on the lowering of the violence are threefold. First, it changed the status of Sunni insurgents from enemies to friends of the coalition. This had a weakening effect on the enemy. Second, it increased the combat effectiveness of the coalition forces by providing it with actionable intelligence on A1 Qaeda in Iraq members.

Being former insurgents themselves, the Sons of Iraq knew the identities of A1 Qaeda in

Iraq members, they knew how A1 Qaeda in Iraq operated and where its members took shelter. The coalition was able to learn the identities of A1 Qaeda in Iraq members, how

A1 Qaeda in Iraq was structured, where the safe houses were, where the improvised explosive devices were being manufactured and where they were being stored. All this

143 Stephen Biddle, Jeffrey A. Friedman, and Jacob N. Shapiro, "Testing the Surge: Why Did Violence Decline in Iraq in 2007?”, International Security 37, no. 1, (2012): 26. 144 Friedman, ’’Manpower and Counterinsurgency”, 580. 50

resulted in the death of many first and second tier A1 Qaeda in Iraq members and the weakening of the organizational effectiveness. Third, the power and influence that the

Sunnis gained as a result of their alliance with the coalition forces lead the Shia militias to cease their operations.145 These Shia militias were originally formed to protect Shia civilians from attacks from the Sunni population, but they evolved into predatory organizations once they realized that they could exploit the population that they protected.

As the Sons of Iraq began fighting A1 Qaeda in Iraq, the threat from the Sunnis petered out, which meant that the need for the Sunni militias diminished. Also, the coalition forces, now freed from fighting the Sunnis, were able to target the Shia militias in larger numbers and decimate them. The decline in need for protection, combined with growing disaffection for the predatory tactics of the Shia militiamen meant that the Shia leadership was unable to recruit new people. The Shia militias’ ability to fight decreased to such an extent that Moqtada A1 Sadr directed his organization to stand down in August 2007. This further contributed to the reduction in violence.

The above findings are based on firsthand accounts of events from officers and advisors that have fought in the war, as well as from secondhand accounts from authors that have done research on the war.146 These accounts are supplemented by data on war casualties found online. The Iraq Body Count Database maintains the largest database of violent civilian and combatant deaths that is available to the public. According to the

145 Biddle et al., “Testing the Surge”, 11. 146 A firsthand account of an event is based on an author’s personal experience, while a secondhand account of an event is based on an author’s research of an event. 51

website, the data is drawn from crosschecked media reports, official figures or records, non-governmental organizations, hospitals and morgues. It is based on a number of

40,897 entries, ranging from 20 March 2003 until 13 August 2014. The iCasualties database contains data on casualties incurred by the Multinational Force in Iraq using press releases from the United States Department of Defense, the United States Central

Command and the British Ministry of Defense, as well as information from news releases.

Overview

Journalist and Pulitzer Prize winner Thomas Ricks argued that the United States

Army had turned itself around in 2007.147 Ricks’ statement represents the basic synopsis of the American counterinsurgency narrative, namely that of the U.S. military employing the wrong counterinsurgency tactics and losing the war, but then miraculously changing the tactics under new leadership and going on to be highly successful. The counterinsurgency narrative about Iraq traces its roots back to the counterinsurgency narrative that emerged after the United States of America lost the war in Vietnam.

According to that narrative, General William Westmoreland could have won the war had he employed the right counterinsurgency doctrine, by focusing on winning the hearts and minds of the local Vietnamese population. After the Tet Offensive of 1968, the

“American army had become too firepower-intensive and had lost sight of the key to

147 Thomas E. Ricks, “The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008”, Penguin, 2009. 52

victory: winning the hearts and minds of the South Vietnamese people by better methods of counterinsurgency”148 The idea of a better counterinsurgency method began to circulate among high-ranking officers just as the troops began to withdraw from Vietnam.

According to this idea, the war in Vietnam could have been won by pacifying the countryside and gaining the support of the Vietnamese population. General Creighton

Abrams took command from General William Westmoreland and managed to cause a reversal in the direction of the war towards the South by 1972, but by that time Vietnam had been lost by the politicians in Washington, D.C. when they refused to continue supporting America’s South Vietnamese allies.149

The three elements of the better counterinsurgency narrative, namely the failed general who does not understand counterinsurgency, the savior general who takes over and manages to turn the tide of the war towards victory and the employment of the right tactics, began to coalesce into what was later called the “hearts and minds” doctrine.150

This doctrine became so widely accepted after the end of the war in Vietnam, that policymakers and military leaders convinced themselves that conventional warfare was dead and that counterinsurgency was the way of future engagements. Lieutenant General

William Caldwell IV argued that “ the future is not one of major battles and engagements fought by armies on battlefields devoid of population: instead, the course of conflict will

148 Gian Gentile, “Wrong Turn: America’s Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency”, The New Press, (2013): 17. 149 Ibid. 150 For an in-depth view on the Vietnam better war thesis, see Lewis Sorley, “Westmoreland: The General Who Lost Vietnam”, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2011. 53

be decided by forces operating among the people of the world.”151

If one examines historical records about the war in Vietnam, one cannot find any evidence to support the better counterinsurgency doctrine under General Abrams. Just like General Westmoreland, General Abrams relied on massive firepower in order to force the North Vietnamese Army and their Viet Cong partners to stop their aggression to weirds South Vietnam. Although he shifted the operational framework for the US Army to include pacification programs, recorded conversations between General Abrams and his staff show that Abrams was not interested in winning the hearts and minds of South

Vietnamese citizens through pacification, or through any other means.152 The change occurred under General Abrams was “evolutionary rather than revolutionary.”153 The

United States lost the war in Vietnam not because of the improper application of counterinsurgency strategy, but because it failed at strategy and policy; decision makers in the United States should have recognized the fact the American people were not willing to pay the moral and material price of the war.154

After the end of the war in Vietnam, the U.S. Army began to circulate a narrative aimed at rehabilitating its reputation, which had been tarnished by the loss of the conflict.

Through hundreds of interviews with officers who served with General Abrams in

151 William B. Caldwell, IV, and Steven M. Leonard, “Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations: Upshifting the Engine of Change,” Military Review, 88 (July/August 2008), 6. 152 To see the transcripts of weekly discussions between General Abrams and his staff, see Lewis Sorley, ed., "Vietnam Chronicles: The Abrams Tapes, 1968-1972”. Texas Tech University Press, 2004. 153 Charles B. McDonald cited in Gentile, “Wrong Turn: America’s Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency”, 18. 154 Gentile, “Wrong Turn: America’s Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency”, 18. 54

Vietnam, the army sought to tell the story of General Abrams, who took command of the

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam when the war effort was at an impasse after the

Tet Offensive, and who managed to win the war on the ground through excellent leadership. The narrative portrayed the war as won by the army, but then lost in Congress and on campus colleges. This narrative was successful, in that it introduced the idea that wars against insurgents cannot be won searching and destroying the enemy, but by protecting and helping the local population. This idea would come to fruition in 2007, with the introduction of General Petraeus’ ‘hearts and minds’ counterinsurgency strategy.

In the 1980s, the U.S. Army shifted its doctrinal focus exclusively towards conventional warfare, as it prepared itself for a war against the Soviet Union. This doctrinal shift began to worry high-ranking members of the Department of Defense who believed that the U.S. Army was making the same mistake then as it did in Vietnam, by focusing on building a firepower-intense force, rather than concentrating on irregular warfare techniques. Future conflicts, these defense analysts argued, were to be fought between asymmetric forces, and counterinsurgency was the most suited approach to achieve victory. General John R. Galvin argued in 1986 that the intellectual climate within the army was such that the army was in a “comfortable” zone, focusing entirely on conventional warfare and that it needed to escape and focus on the way wars were going to be fought in the future, against irregular forces and for the loyalty of the populations.155

In the 1990’s, the counterinsurgency narrative started to become more and more

155 John R. Galvin, “Uncomfortable Wars: Toward A New Paradigm”, Army War College Carlisle Barracks PA, 1986. 55

accepted among the defense thinkers in the Department of Defense. While serving as a military history professor at West Point, H. R. McMaster argued that the war in Vietnam was lost because American leaders, such as President Lyndon Johnson, Secretary of

Defense Robert McNamara and the Joint Chefs of Staff prevented the “hearts and minds” strategy from emerging by lying about the war effort.156 McMaster further argued that

American leaders failed to provide a successful plan to pacify the Viet Cong insurgency and to decisively defeat North Vietnam’s armed forces.157 Building on these ideas, Lewis

Sorley argued for the counterinsurgency narrative in Vietnam, positing that General

Abrams reoriented the tactics towards counterinsurgency “within fifteen minutes” of

1 SR being in charge and proceeded to win the war in the South. Two decades of thinking about counterinsurgency culminated in the early 2000s with the Petraeus doctrine.

Arguing that the war in Vietnam “would have been much better with tactics that fell under the heading of counterinsurgency”, and not the search and destroy tactics that were used, General Petraeus summed up the now fully matured counterinsurgency narrative: wars against insurgent forces can only be won if the right counterinsurgency methods are used by the right general.159

Heavily influenced by this narrative, the young lieutenants of the Vietnam War were now ready to apply its tenets to a new war, as general officers. The opportunity

156 Gentile, “Wrong Turn: America’s Deadly Embrace Of Counterinsurgency”, 20. 157 Herbert R. McMaster, “Dereliction Of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, And The Lies That Led To Vietnam”, Perennial, 1998. 158 Lewis Sorley, “A Better War: The Unexamined Victories And Final Tragedy Of America’s Last Years In Vietnam”, New York: Harcourt Brace, (1999): 17,217. 159 Paula Broadwell And Vernon Loeb, “All In: The Education Of General David Petraeus”, Penguin, (2012): 69. 56

came on 20 March 2003, with the initiation of the ‘shock and awe’ bombing campaign against the Iraqi military. Between January 2004 and September 2007, the number of civilian casualties soared dramatically, from 610 deaths occurring in January 2004 to a peak of 3298 deaths occurring in July 2006. The number of U.S. casualties increased as well, from 20 deaths occurring in February 2004 to an all-time high of 126 deaths occurring in May 2007. Worried that the overall number of deaths would spiral out of control and that the United States would lose control of the situation on the ground,

President George W. Bush decided early in 2007 to change the way in which combat operations would be conducted in Iraq, from an enemy-based approach to a population-based approach. The reason for this was the loss of confidence in General

George Casey and his strategy according to which “Iraqis should stop the sectarian violence while the Americans remained on the sidelines.”160 Perceiving General Casey’s strategy as “maybe a slow failure”, President Bush decided to change it in favor of a new one.161 Introduced under the working title ‘The New Way Forward’, this new strategy consisted of the deployment to Iraq of an additional 30,000 combat troops, as well as of the extension of the combat tours of most of the troops already in the country in order to provide security for the city of Baghdad and for the Anbar Province.

President George W. Bush replaced General George Casey with General David

Petraeus, and directed the new commander to change the existing emphasis on large bases

160 Gentile, “Wrong Turn: America’s Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency”, 109. 161 George W. Bush cited in Gentile, “Wrong Turn: America’s Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency”, 102. 57

and mounted patrols to an emphasis on smaller bases, dismounted patrols and direct contact between coalition forces and the Iraqi population. General Petraeus introduced the new changes as a part of a new approach to counterinsurgency, called ‘hearts and minds’, because he believed that the Iraqi population held the key to stopping the violence. If the hearts and minds of the population could be won over, Petraeus argued, then the insurgents would have nowhere to hide and, without any support from the local population, they would be neutralized.162 After General Petraeus took charge of the

Multinational Force-Iraq and began implementing ‘hearts and minds’ counterinsurgency, the number of combat casualties increased sharply to some the highest numbers seen in the conflict. Then something happened. The number of U.S. casualties dropped significantly, from 126 deaths occurring in May to just 23 deaths occurring in December.

The number of civilian casualties dropped as well, from 1667 deaths occurring in March to 586 deaths occurring in December. Between June 2008 to June 2011 U.S. deaths decreased by 85 percent and civilian deaths decreased by 90 percent as compared to the

2004 to mid 2007 period.163 164

This decrease in violence was attributed specifically to General Petraeus and to his new tactics. Petraeus was held as the savior who turned the war around during the 2007 surge by enacting a new doctrine in counterinsurgency warfare. In January 2008, Major

162 For a detailed description of the surge thesis, see Kimberly Kagan, “The Surge: a Military History”, Encounter Books, (2009). 163 For a detailed account of the number of deaths, visit the Iraq Body Count database, https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/ (Accessed on 29 September 2015). 164 To see the number of US troops killed in Iraq between 2003 and 2015, visit http://icasualties.org/Iraq/ByMonth.aspx (Accessed on 29 September 2015). 58

Chris Rogers argued that his unit and the army had “learned from their successes and failures” to correctly apply ‘hearts and minds’.165 General Raymond T. Odiemo, Petraeus’ successor as commander of Multinational Force-Iraq, stated that “we changed our tactics, techniques and procedures to protect the Iraqi population”, and defined the surge as the key development that lead to the drop in violence.166 He stated in 2009 that “the truth is that the improvement in security and stability is the result of a number of factors, and what Coalition troops did throughout 2007 ranks as the most significant”.167 Senator John

McCain too believed that the surge was a victory. In 2014 he famously argued: “We had it won, thanks to the surge. It was won. The victory was there. All we needed was a force behind to provide support, not to engage in combat, but to supply support, logistics, intelligence.” President George W. Bush was so impressed by the results of the surge that he said that the surge was “a complete reversal” of strategy from what was previously there.169

The media too, fell in line with this narrative and promoted General Petraeus and his new army. Reporter Greg Jaffe and correspondent David Cloud compared the pre­ surge army with the “army that Petraeus had forged” and deemed it ineffective,

165 Chris Rogers cited in Gentile, “Wrong Turn: America’s Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency”, 90. 166 Raymond Odiemo cited in Gentile, “Wrong Turn: America’s Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency”, 98. 167 Ibid., 98-99. 168 John McCain cited in “@This Hour with Berman and Michaela”, (September 11th, 2014), accessed on December 1,2015, http://transcripts.cnn.eom/TRANSCRIPTS/1409/l l/ath.01.html 169 George W. Bush, “Decision Points”, Deluxe eBook Edition, Crown/Archetype, (2010): 365. 59

unsuccessful and “hidebound.”170 Author Mark Bowden crowned General Petraeus “King

David” and named him “the professor of war.”171 David Kilcullen believed that Petraeus’

‘hearts and minds’ strategy “turned around a war that many believed had already been lost.”172 These opinions fed into the counterinsurgency narrative of the enlightened general, who is able to turn a failed war around and achieve victory through the proper application of counterinsurgency tactics.

Factors Contributing to the Decrease in Violence in Iraq in 2007

Sectarian Cleansing

The first explanation for the reduction in killings in Iraq in 2007 is the fact that sectarian cleansing, which had been going on since the beginning of the war, ran its course by mid 2007.173 The prewar disposition of the Iraqi population meant that Sunni and Shia Iraqis were sharing space in the same neighborhoods. This intermingling of populations made it easy for the sectarian killing phenomenon to spark at the beginning of the war. Violence remained high as the groups fought for control and only decreased when the neighborhoods became unmixed due to the elimination of the weaker side.174

Once the resulting neighborhoods became homogenous, violence decreased.

The best illustration of this phenomenon is the capital city of Baghdad. In

170 Greg Jaffe and David Cloud in “The Fourth Star” cited in Gentile, “Wrong Turn: America’s Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency”, 91. 171 Mark Bowden. "The Professor of War." (May 1, 2010), accessed 29 November 2015, http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2010/05/petraeus-201005. 172 Kilcullen, “The Accidental Guerilla”, 116-117. 173 Biddle et al., "Testing the Surge”, 13. 174 Ibid., 14. 60

February 2006, A1 Qaeda in Iraq bombed the Shia A1 Askariyya Mosque in Samarra. The result was an increase in violence throughout the country and especially in Baghdad, where Shia fighters started the process of removing Sunnis from the city’s mixed neighborhoods. Before the bombing of the mosque, Shia militias had targeted only those

Sunnis who had supported the Saddam Hussein regime, or were supporting A1 Qaeda in

Iraq. After the bombing of mosque, however, the practice of targeted assassinations stopped and indiscriminate assassinations began. At first, Shia militias used religious pretexts to kill Sunnis, but later the sheer number of killings proved that anybody belonging to the Sunni sect was a target. Abu Kemael, the leader of a Shia operations cell, stated: “It was very simple, we were ethnically cleansing. Anyone Sunni was guilty. If you were called Omar, Uthman, Zayed, Sufian, or something like that, then you would be killed. These are Sunni names and you are killed according to identity...The Mahdi Army is supposed to kill only Baathists, Takfiris, those who cooperate with the occupation, and the occupation troops...It does not always happen like that though, and can turn into a mafia gang.”175

This escalation of violence allowed the militia groups to penetrate neighborhoods that had previously been inaccessible to them. Cooperation with the militias ranged from

“keeping quiet about the group’s activities and not reporting militants to the U.S. forces to

actively providing cover, money, or weapons, or even taking arms and fighting alongside

175 Abu Kemael cited in Ches Thurber, "From Coexistence to Cleansing: The Rise of Sectarian Violence in Baghdad, 2003-2007", (Spring 2011), accessed November 24, 2015, http://fletcher.tufts.edU/Al-Nakhlah/~/media/CFlF854CD30D469FA90502B027B078EC.pdf. 61

the militia in defense of the neighborhood.”176 Moqtada al-Sadr, the leader of one of the most powerful Shia militias operating in Baghdad used the Mahdi Army to conduct cross­ city cleansing operations from Baghdad’s Sadr City into the mixed neighborhoods of

Washash, Shula and Hurriyah. This effort was highly sophisticated in its approach. One of its members stated that the Mahdi Army “presents itself as protector of Shiites and recruits local residents to assist in this task. In so doing, if you gain support from people who possess considerable information - one where the Sunnis and [Shia] are, on who backs and who opposes the Sadrists and so forth.”177 These cleansing efforts succeeded, and by October 2006, much of Northern Baghdad was free of Sunni inhabitants. Once this was accomplished, the Mahdi Army began operations in the South of the city, in the

Sunni neighborhood of Mansour, and South East, in the mostly Sunni district of Al-

Karkh. Once there, Sadr’s Army moved to the Sunni neighborhoods of Al-Adel and

Ghazaliyah. Areas with large Shia numbers, such as Abu T’Shir, Bayaa and Jihad, were also targeted and cleared.178

The fierce sectarian violence that took place in 2005 and 2006 between the Sunnis and the Shia, combined with physical separation using concrete walls started in early

2006 by the U.S. military, resulted in 2007 in the separation of the city into distinct sectarian districts. Once the separation into districts was accomplished, violence in

176 Ches Thurber, "From Coexistence to Cleansing: The Rise of Sectarian Violence in Baghdad, 2003- 2007", (Spring 2011), accessed November 24, 2015, http://fletcher.tufts.edU/Al-Nakhlah/~/media/CFlF854CD30D469FA90502B027B078EC.pdf. 177 ibid. 178 Biddle et al., “Testing the Surge”, 17. 62

Baghdad began to decrease, but not because of the introduction of the ‘heart and minds’ approach, but because “there was no one left to kill.”179 180 In-fighting amongst the Shia population also stopped in 2007. By August of that year, the two of the deadliest Sunni insurgent groups, the Mahdi Army and the Badr Brigade, were engaged in ferocious fighting against each other in the holly city of Karbala. The fighting came to an end when the leader of the Mahdi Army, Moqtada Al-Sadr, called for a ceasefire and instructed

Mahdi Army members to stop fighting.181 This cease-fire coincided with the effects of the

A1 Anbar Awakening• and resulted in • reducing • the overall violence. • 189 1 Q ' l

The Anbar Awakening

The second explanation for the reduction in killings in Iraq in 2007 is the abandonment of A1 Qaeda in Iraq by Sunni insurgents in return for a paycheck from the

U.S. military and the promise of a ceasefire. The Awakening of the Sunni tribes in Anbar

Province had started approximately two years before the introduction of the ‘hearts and minds’ campaign. In 2003, Sunni Iraqis began allowing members of A1 Qaeda to operate in Iraq due to the shared hate towards both Shia Iraqis and the U.S. lead occupation. Soon

179 Patrick Cockbum, "Who is Whose Enemy.” London Review of Books, March 6 (2008), 14. Quoted in Stephen Biddle, Jeffrey A. Friedman, and Jacob N. Shapiro. "Testing the Surge: Why Did Violence Decline in Iraq in 2007?." International Security 37, no. 1 (2012): 7-40, 13. 180 To see a month-by-month progression of Iraqi deaths, visit the Iraq Body Count database, https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/ (Accessed on 29 September 2015). 181 Yousif Bassil and Karadsheh Jomana, "A1 Sadr Calls For Calm After Shiite Militias Clash In Karbala, Iraq", (August 29, 2007), accessed October 3, 2015, http://edition.cnn.eom/2007/WORLD/meast/08/28/iraq.main/index.html#cnnSTCText 182 Gentile, “Wrong Turn: America’s Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency”, 89. 183 For a detailed account on Moqtada A1 Sadr, see Patrick Cockbum, “Muqtada: Muqtada al-Sadr, the Shia Revival, and the Struggle for Iraq”, Simon and Schuster, (2008). 63

after it was given permission to operate in Iraq, A1 Qaeda In Iraq began to interfere with the traditional way of life of the Iraqi people.

First, A1 Qaeda in Iraq leadership began to marry its members into influential Iraqi families and assimilate into the Iraqi society. This practice, although allowed by Islam, was prohibited by Iraqi tribal customs, according to which women should only marry

• 184 • • • within the local tribe. Second, A1 Qaeda in Iraq decided to begin regulating and profiting from the lucrative criminal rackets that the Sunni Iraqis were involved in. Third,

A1 Qaeda in Iraq started to impose its fundamentalist political and social programs on the citizens of the A1 Anbar Province.185 When Sunni Iraqis began to push back, A1 Qaeda in

Iraq responded by terrorizing and intimidating the very people it claimed to represent. In the fall of 2006, a few months after the A1 Askariyya Mosque bombing, a group of Sunni

Sheiks in Ramadi realized that A1 Qaeda in Iraq wanted to turn the country into an

Islamic state, rejected the presence of A1 Qaeda in Iraq and began cooperating with the

United States to get rid of religious fanatics from their neighborhoods.

Coalition force commanders had the ability to recognize this rift and the foresight to act on it on the ground. Instead of fighting them, the U.S. Army began paying each

Sunni insurgent the sum of $300 per month to fight against members of A1 Qaeda in Iraq.

184 Hussein D. Hassan, "Iraq: Tribal Structure, Social, and Political Activities”, Library Of Congress Washington DC Congressional Research Service, (2007): 3. 185 David Hastings Dunn and Andrew Futter, "Short-Term Tactical Gains and Long-Term Strategic Problems: The Paradox of the US Troop Surge in Iraq”, Defense Studies 10, no. 01-02 (2010): 195-214, 198. 186 David McCormack, "Understanding the Anbar Awakening", (December 22, 2010), accessed September 30,2015, http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/understanding-anbar-awakening_524770.html. 64

These Sunni insurgents held different motivations for taking up arms than A1 Qaeda in

Iraq members. While their fight against coalition forces was motivated by the desire to free their homeland from foreign influence, A1 Qaeda In Iraq members, many of whom were not Iraqi citizens, were motivated by the desire to proclaim Iraq a caliphate and govern it using Sharia Law. By April 2008, more than 91,000 Sunni volunteers, dubbed

“Sons of Iraq” were on the payroll of the United States Government and operated in two thirds of the country’s provinces. The Sunnis entered into an alliance with the United

States because they had little choice. They were losing the civil war against the majority

Shia population and they were being targeted as insurgents by the coalition forces.

Although the United States was successful at coopting the Sunni Iraqis this time, there is evidence that between 2004 and 2006, the United States made at least four unsuccessful attempts to enter into an alliance with the Sunnis.

The first unsuccessful attempt at building an alliance happened in 2004 and involved the Albu Nimr tribe. In early 2004, members of the tribe contacted the U.S. military with the intention of building an alliance and fighting together against A1 Qaeda.

In exchange for protection, funding and weapons, the Albu Nimr tribe was ready to allow some of its members to assume duties as civil defense and police forces. Because the U.S. military had to focus its efforts on conducting combat operations in Fallujah, it lacked the

187 Greg Bruno, "The Role of the "Sons of Iraq" in Improving Security", (April 28, 2008), accessed September 30, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/28/AR2008042801120.html 188 The Albu Nimr tribe is a Sunni Arab tribe comprised of around then thousand members who live in Ramadi in the Anbar Province, Iraq. 65

manpower to protect the tribesmen elsewhere. Ground commanders believed that troops would be better used fighting insurgents, and only provided one twelve-soldier Special

Forces detachment to help with security.189 In mid 2004, when coalition forces asked the tribesmen to provide assistance in fighting A1 Qaeda in Iraq in Fallujah, A1 Qaeda in Iraq began targeted attacks against the Albu Nimr tribe. The U.S. military’s inability to protect to protect the tribe from A1 Qaeda in Iraq’s counterattacks resulted in tensions and ultimately ended in the dissolution of the alliance.190

The second time the United States failed at securing an alliance in Iraq was in the spring of 2005. After they became disaffected with A1 Qaeda in Iraq’s intimidation and interference with local smuggling routes, Albu Nimr tribesmen living in the city of Hit allied themselves with Sunni Iraqis from the Albu Mahal tribe from the city of A1 Qaim to form the resistance movement against A1 Qaeda in Iraq, called the ‘Hamza Brigade’.

After A1 Qaeda in Iraq began targeting and killing Hamza Brigade members, the brigade leadership asked the United States to provide protection. The U.S. military failed at protecting the members of the brigade, which resulted in its dissolution in the month of

September after having been driven out of A1 Qaim.191 192

The third unsuccessful attempt at building an alliance was in the fall of 2005 when the Desert Protectors, a militia under the control of the U.S. Special Forces Command

1RQ Biddle et al., “Testing the Surge”, 19. 190 Ibid. 191 Ibid. 192 James A. Russell, “Innovation, Transformation, and War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005- 2007”, Stanford University Press, (2011): 60. 66

fighting as part of Operation Steel Curtain in A1 Qaim, attempted to ally themselves with the U.S. military. Originally formed by the U.S. Special Forces, the Desert Protectors were used for the purpose of training local Sunni recruits and routing them into the Iraqi police and military. When the U.S. military asked the Desert Protectors to cease their activities as home defense forces and agree to redeploy to other areas in support of coalition forces, around one third of the members resigned, which lead to the dissolution of the alliance.193194

The last failed attempt at securing an alliance with the Sunni population in Iraq happened in late 2005. On November 28th, 2005, Sheikh Nasser al-Fahadawi and

Muhammad Mahmud Latif al-Fahadawi, the leaders of the Anbar People’s Council, decided to stop providing support for A1 Qaeda in Iraq and to support the coalition forces instead. The council directed its members to stop their insurgent activities and to join the police force to provide local security. The coalition leaders accepted the alliance but failed to provide protection for the Council’s leadership. After two months of A1 Qaeda in

Iraq counterattacks, almost half of its founding members were killed and the Council had to disband. 195196

193 Operation Steel Curtain was a military operation executed by coalition forces in Iraq in November 2005 for the purpose of cutting the flow of foreign fighters crossing the border into Iraq and joining the insurgency. It was part of the larger operation called ‘Operation Sayeed’, which was enacted to prevent A1 Qaeda In Iraq from operating in the Euphrates River Valley and in the A1 Anbar Province. 194 Biddle et al., “Testing the Surge”, 20. 195 Ibid. 196 Hala Jaber, "Sunni Leader Killed for Joining Ceasefire Talks”, (February 5, 2006), accessed October 2, 2015, http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/world_news/article204068.ece. 67

The U.S. Army’s attempts to forge an alliance with the Sunnis failed because coalition forces had been instructed to pursue a ‘search and kill’ counterinsurgency strategy, which meant that the protection of the population was eschewed.197

In 2006, the U.S. military gained enough trust in the Sunnis to provide them with protection during the early phases of the Awakening. The narrative is that the change in priority from killing the insurgents to protecting the population drove the violence down.

This narrative is wrong. The change in tactics had little effect on the violence. It was the effects of the Awakening that helped drive down the violence, and not the change to the

‘hearts and minds’ strategy. First, Sunni insurgent attacks against American and coalition forces suddenly ceased, which drove down the number of casualties. Next, U.S. commanders were able to use the intelligence provided by their new Sunni allies in order to direct the newly arrived combat surge brigades to hunt down and kill A1 Qaeda in Iraq members. This reduction in A1 Qaeda in Iraq membership resulted in less attacks against

Iraqi civilians and American forces, which, in turn, lead to a decrease in violence. The surge helped bring down the violence by killing A1 Qaeda in Iraq members, not by

• 10X patrolling Iraqi neighborhoods and gaining the trust of the Iraqi population.

197 Dunn and Futter, "Short-Term Tactical Gains and Long-Term Strategic Problems”, 199. 198 Gentile, “Wrong Turn: America’s Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency”, 88. 68

The Surge

The third explanation for the decrease in violence in Iraq is represented by the increase in the number of U.S. troops in 2007, known as the surge. By the end of 2006, coalition leaders began to feel political pressure from Washington to get their troops out of Iraq. President George W. Bush realized that the status quo was not working and started looking for a new strategy that would cure the insurgency problem and promote the development of security and political progress in Iraq. The progress that President

Bush envisioned was intended to provide the Iraqi security forces with more time to increase their own security capacities. The overall objective of the surge was first to solve

Iraq’s political problems by instituting a working system of government, and then to create the environment for coalition troops to pull out of Iraq.

Because it was created outside the U.S. military hierarchy, the idea of the surge was not welcomed by the Joint Chefs of Staff, who wanted to maintain the pre-surge number of troops. Top military commanders believed that the deployment of five extra brigades to Iraq would put tremendous stress on a military that had already been stretched too thin and the extra 30,000 troops would have little effect on the overall counterinsurgency effort.199 The idea itself was based on two precedents. In the 1950s, the

British operating in Malaya and the French operating in Algeria, after having established patrol bases and combat outposts in territories controlled by insurgents, became very successful at providing security and increasing the overall level of protection for the

199 Dunn and Futter, "Short-Term Tactical Gains and Long-Term Strategic Problems”, 200. 69

population.200 The surge consisted of the deployment of five U.S. Army infantry brigades between January 2007 and May 2007, and was meant to be a temporary measure. These extra surge brigades were meant to conduct operations in Anbar, Babil, Baghdad, Basra,

Dhiqar, Diyala, Salah-al-din and Ta’amim for one year, after which they were to return home. As part of the strategy, 4,000 Marines stationed in the A1 Anbar Province had their tours extended. 901 As the surge brigades began operations in Iraq, the level of violence rose sharply and with it, the number of U.S. deaths. Between April and August 2007 the number of coalition casualties spiked to an average of 118 deaths per month from the previous three-month average of 84. It was only in September that the number of deaths began to decrease. 909 As the number of deaths decreased, civilian security increased. As a consequence, in 2008 Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki felt strong enough to take action against the Mahdi Army operating in the south, take control away from it and return it to the provincial government. These actions triggered a lowering of the violence, just as

• 90^ coalition troops began withdrawing.

200 David Romano, Brian Calfano, and Robert Phelps. "Successful and Less Successful Interventions: Stabilizing Iraq and Afghanistan", International Studies Perspectives, (2013): 3. 201Ibid. 202 To see the number of US troops killed in Iraq in 2007, visit http://icasualties.org/Iraq/ByMonth.aspx (Accessed on 29 September 2015). 203 Dunn and Futter, "Short-Term Tactical Gains and Long-Term Strategic Problems”, 201. 70

Chapter IV

Conclusion

“The new strategy is COIN, to use the inevitable acronym. Counterinsurgency. The notion seems to be that we must win the "hearts and minds" of the population, but the very presence of an occupation army whose history, culture and traditions are literally and figuratively on the other side of the world puts that goal out of reach.”

-Nick Mills

An overall decrease in the level of violence occurred in Iraq between June 2007 and the first part of 2009. The surge program, initiated by President George W. Bush in

January of 2007 and implemented by General David Petraeus later that year, was seen as the catalyst that kick-started the stabilization of the country. The doctrinal element that accompanied the surge was the surge was ‘hearts and minds’, an approach to counterinsurgency that called for commanders to shift their focus from destroying the enemy to protecting the population. Even though there were numerous other variables at play, the surge and the ‘hearts and minds’ strategy were seen as the only two factors responsible for success in Iraq.204 They allowed for the transfer of power from coalition forces to the Iraqi Government and paved the way for the withdrawal of troops at the end o f2011.

The fact that Iraq became more stable and secure after the introduction of the surge and after the implementation of the ‘hearts and minds’ approach is unquestionable.

Streets were no longer empty at dusk, stores reopened and stayed open until after dark

204 Biddle et al., “Testing the Surge”, 7. 71

and restaurants began to receive more and more customers. By January 2009, the Iraqi government deemed the country safe enough to hold provincial elections.205 The surge and the change in counterinsurgency tactics that happened in 2007 are undoubtedly part of the reason behind Iraq’s stabilization.

A closer examination of the conflict has revealed that several other factors were at play in Iraq, factors without which the surge and the accompanying change in tactics would not have been possible. The most important factor that caused the increase in security in 2007 was the dismantling of the alliance between Al Qaeda in Iraq and the tribal Sunni insurgents and the subsequent Awakening. This factor, combined with the ability of coalition commanders to provide protection for the former Sunni insurgents, provided the basis for stability. These advancements provided the ‘hearts and minds’ doctrine and the accompanying yearlong increase in troops with the political and strategic traction that it needed in order to work.

The ‘hearts and minds’ doctrine initiated by President George W. Bush and implemented by General David Petraeus was therefore one of many developments that worked towards the reduction of violence in 2007 and the subsequent period of relative security and stability. It is responsible for achieving the short-term tactical goal of civic security, which created the basis for the withdrawal of coalition troops a few years later, and not for the long-term strategic goal of achieving political security, which would have

205 For a detailed look at the Provincial Council Elections, visit http://fas.org/irp/dni/osc/iraq-elections.pdf (Accessed on October 13,2015). 20 Dunn and Futter, "Short-Term Tactical Gains and Long-Term Strategic Problems”, 196. 72

created the basis for durable stability. This doctrine was necessary for the decrease in violence to happen, but because it was not sufficient, its application to future conflicts cannot be expected to produce the same results, at least not in a sectarian environment such as the one found in Iraq.

Several recommendations arise from the findings of this thesis. In terms of military doctrine, the emphasis that the ‘hearts and minds’ doctrine puts on governance and economic development needs to be reevaluated. The current narrative is that if counterinsurgents apply the principle of superior governance in any environment, the population will support the host government and reject the insurgents. In Iraq, no evidence supports the claim that the alliance between the Sunni population and the coalition forces happened because of promises of economic development or better government services. The hearts and minds of the Iraqis may have been won, but this happened because of coalition protection and firepower, not because of large-scale government services or economic development.

United States decision makers need to be able to develop a strategy that is comprehensive enough for military commanders to implement in future conflicts and flexible enough for those commanders to modify as the conflicts progress. For more than three years the United States lacked a strategy that addressed the complex realities of counterinsurgency operations, and throughout the conflict, commanders were slow to

207 Ibid., 197. 208 Biddle et al, “Testing the Surge”, 38. 73

comprehend and adapt to the changes in tactics employed by the insurgents.209

Planning for this strategy must include input from all departments within the U.S.

Government. The authority for assigning areas of responsibility and for assessing the plans for operations of various departments should reside in within one government office. The individual tasked with running this office should have the authority over all aspects of the operation within the United States, as well as within the country where the

U.S. is conducting counterinsurgency operations. Host-nation governance support following the end of a regime must be a top priority for this office. Civilian advisors and military civil affairs teams should be trained and stand ready to deploy on a short notice following the collapse of a regime to prevent insurgents from producing damage to the country. Funding for the establishment of new governments, the development of their military forces and for the reconstruction of the infrastructure must flexible enough to allow for local contingencies.210 The overall purpose of this new office is to create unity of effort within the government of the United States and prevent government bodies from

• 911 working inefficiently.

An effort should be made to build coalitions with other countries. One unified theory on counterinsurgency warfare should be developed in partnership with NATO

209 Bruce Pimie and Edward O'Connell, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2006)”, vol. 2, Rand Corporation, (2008): 92. 210 Ibid., 94. 211 Ibid., 93. 74

allies and capabilities to jointly implement it in future conflicts should be developed.212

Furthermore, irregular warfare in general and counterinsurgency warfare in particular

should be given its rightful place alongside conventional, force-on-force warfare, and

should be taught extensively in centers of military education.213 Intelligence should be jointly collected and shared among all partners, including members of the host

government. The ability to understand the host nation language, culture and customs and translate it into actionable intelligence must be given top priority.

In counterinsurgency operations, the success of U.S. forces depends on the success of indigenous forces. Partnership between U.S. military forces and host nation military forces should be encouraged and facilitated. Conventional units from the two nations

should go beyond conducting combined operations on the battlefield and associate off the battlefield as well. U.S. Special Forces Units should be used to train both the indigenous

Special Forces Units and the indigenous conventional units. Conventional force commanders should receive training on how to properly employ

Special Forces Units in instances where these irregular warfare forces are tasked with assisting with operations. These commanders must understand special operations warfare and be able to integrate it into conventional warfare operations.214

In terms of scholarship, in depth research on the causes and consequences of

212 For a comprehensive look at how the British conducted counterinsurgency operations in Malaya, Northern Ireland, Iraq and Afghanistan, see Paul Dixon, "‘Hearts and minds’? British counter-insurgency from Malaya to Iraq." The Journal of Strategic Studies 32, no. 3, (2009): 353-381. To learn more about French counterinsurgency methods, see Roger Trinquier, “Modem Warfare: a French View of counterinsurgency”, Greenwood Publishing Group, (2006). 213 Pimie et al., “Counterinsurgency in Iraq”, 95. 2,4 Ibid., 95-96. 75

military alliances in sectarian environments has not been attempted by a large number of scholars.215 In Iraq, the partnership between the Sunni population and coalition forces was one of the critical factors that lead to stabilization, yet what caused it and how it will shape the future of both Iraq and the region has largely remained untouched by academia.

Further academic research on the subject of military alliances in sectarian environments will have a significant impact on how counterinsurgency is understood and implemented by decision makers and practitioners. The case of the Iraq war advances the need for theoretical improvements in the study of counterinsurgency operations, especially from the point of view of a guest government conducting operations on behalf of a host government.

Another area for future development is security dilemma theory applied to ethnic conflicts. The ethnic unmixing of populations for defensive purposes is the main cause of violence during sectarian conflicts. Although the separation of intermingled segments of population can settle security dilemmas, what happened in Baghdad between 2006 and

2007 shows that violence was used by the Shia population not only to unmix some neighborhoods, but also to gain control of others. A clear understanding of the mechanisms of ethnic unmixing of populations for both defensive and offensive purposes would help policymakers better understand ethnic conflicts.

Theoretical progress on defining and explaining the criteria for success and failure in counterinsurgency must also be made. The existing body of literature dealing with civil

215 Biddle et al., “Testing the Surge”, 39. 76

conflicts is vast, but it does not focus in the doctrinal variations that were experienced in

Iraq between 2003 and 2011. The war in Iraq offers adequate variance on the enemy centric approach and on the population centric approach that theories of favorable and unfavorable outcomes can be built. Theoretical progress on the area of counterinsurgency operations can be of significant value and make a real difference for the field of • * 9 1 international policy.

216 Ibid., 40. 77

References

Arreguin-Toft, Ivan. "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict." International Security 26, no. 1, (2001): 93-128.

Beckett, Ian Frederick William. “Modem Insurgencies and Counter-insurgencies: Guerrillas and Their Opponents Since 1750”. London: Rutledge, 2011.

Biddle, Stephen, Jeffrey A. Friedman, and Jacob N. Shapiro. "Testing the Surge: Why Did Violence Decline in Iraq in 2007?.", International Security 37, no. 1, (2012): 7-40.

Broadwell, Paula, and Vernon Loeb. “All In: The Education Of General David Petraeus”. Penguin, 2012.

Bush, George W. “Decision Points”, Deluxe eBook Edition. Crown/Archetype, 2010.

Caldwell, William B., and Steven M. Leonard. "Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations: Upshifting the Engine of Change." Military Review 88, no. 4, 2008.

Clausewitz, Carl von. “On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret” (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1984) (1976).

Cockbum, Patrick. “Muqtada: Muqtada al-Sadr, the Shia Revival, and the Struggle for Iraq”, Simon and Schuster, 2008.

Dixon, Paul. "‘Hearts and minds’? British Counter-insurgency from Malaya to Iraq." The Journal of Strategic Studies 32, no. 3 (2009): 353-381.

Dunn, David Hastings and Andrew Futter. "Short-Term Tactical Gains and Long-Term Strategic Problems: The Paradox of the US Troop Surge in Iraq." Defense Studies 10, no. 01-02 (2010): 195-214.

Fearon, James D., and David Laitin. "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," American Political Science Review 97, no. 01, (2003): 75-90.

Friedman, Jeffrey A. "Manpower and counterinsurgency: Empirical foundations for Theory and Doctrine." Security Studies 20, no. 4, (2011): 556-591.

Galula, David. “Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory And Practice”. Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006. 78

Galula, David. “Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958”, Vol. 478. Rand Corporation, 2002.

Galvin, John R. “Uncomfortable Wars: Toward A New Paradigm”. Army War College Carlisle Barracks PA, 1986.

Gentile, Gian. “Wrong Turn: America’s Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency”. The New Press, 2013.

Giap, Vo Nguyen. “Military Art of People's War”, Vol. 193. NYU Press, 1970.

Hassan, Hussein D. "Iraq: Tribal Structure, Social, and Political Activities". Library Of Congress Washington Dc Congressional Research Service, 2007.

Jackson, Mike. “British Counter-insurgency." The Journal of Strategic Studies 32, no. 3 (2009): 347-351.

Jomini, Henri. "Precis de l’Art de la Guerre: Des Principales Combinaisons de la Strategic, de la Grande Tactique et de la Politique Militaire.’’, 1838.

Kagan, Kimberly. “The Surge: a Military History”, Encounter Books, 2009.

Kilcullen, David. “The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One”. Oxford University Press, 2009.

Kilcullen, David. “Counterinsurgency”. Oxford University Press, USA, 2010.

Kilcullen, David. “Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla”. Oxford University Press, 2013.

Kitson, Frank. “Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peace-keeping”. Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1971.

Kitson, Frank. "Bunch of Five”. London: Faber & Faber, 1972.

Long, Austin. "The Anbar Awakening." Survival 50, no. 2, (2008): 67-94.

Maddison, Angus. "The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective”. Paris: Development Centre of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2001.

McCary, John A. "The Anbar Awakening: An Alliance of Incentives." The Washington Quarterly 32, no. 1, (2009): 43-59. 79

McCuen, John J. “The Art of Counter-revolutionary War: The Strategy Of Counter­ insurgency”. Stackpole Books, 1972.

McCuen, John J. "Hybrid Wars." Military Review 88, no. 2, (2008): 107.

McMaster, Herbert R. “Dereliction Of Duty: Johnson, Mcnamara, The Joint Chiefs Of Staff, And The Lies That Led To Vietnam”. Perennial, 1998.

Nagl, John A, James F. Amos, Sarah Sewall, and David H. Petraeus. “The US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual” No. 3-24. University of Chicago Press, 2008.

O'Neill, Robert John. “General Giap: Politician and Strategist”. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969.

Pimie, Bruce and Edward O'Connell. “Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2006)”. Vol. 2. Rand Corporation, 2008.

Romano, David, Brian Calfano, and Robert Phelps. "Successful and Less Successful Interventions: Stabilizing Iraq and Afghanistan". International Studies Perspectives, 2013.

Ricks, Thomas E. “The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008”. Penguin, 2009.

Russell, James A. “Innovation, Transformation, and War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005- 2007”. Stanford University Press, 2011.

Schultz, Richard H. and Andrea J. Dew, “Insurgents, Terrorists, And Militias: The Warriors Of Contemporary Combat”. Columbia University Press, 2013.

Seale, Patrick and Hafiz Assad. “Assad, the Struggle for the Middle East”. University of California Press, (1989): 323-333.

Shy, John. “Jomini. ‘Makers of Modem Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age’ ”. Princeton University Press, (1986): 143-185.

Shy, John, and Thomas W. Collier. "Revolutionary War." Makers of Modem Strategy (1986): 815-861. 80

Simpson, Erin Marie.“ The Perils of Third-Party Counterinsurgency Campaigns”. Harvard University, 2010.

Sorley, Lewis, ed. “Vietnam Chronicles: The Abrams Tapes, 1968-1972”. Texas Tech University Press, 2004.

Sorley, Lewis. “A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy Of America’s Last Years in Vietnam”. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1999.

Sorley, Lewis. “Westmoreland: The General Who Lost Vietnam”. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2011.

Springer, Nathaniel R. “Stabilizing the Debate Between Population-Centric and Enemy- Centric Counterinsurgency: Success Demands a Balanced Approach”. No. ATZL-SWV- GDP. Army Command And General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2011.

Sun Tzu, “The Art of War”, Oxford University Press, 1963.

Taber, Robert. “War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare”. Potomac Books, Inc., 2002.

Thompson, Robert Grainger Ker. “Defeating Communist Insurgency: the Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam”. No. 10. FA Praeger, 1966.

Trinquier, Roger. “Modem Warfare: a French View of Counterinsurgency”. Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006.

Tucker, Spencer C. ed. “Encyclopedia of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: A New Era of Modem Warfare”. ABC-CLIO, 2013.

Tse-Tung, Mao and Zedong Mao. "On Guerrilla Warfare”, University of Illinois Press, 1961.

U.S. Army. "The US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual." US Army Field Manual 3-24, 2007.

US Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative. "US Government Counterinsurgency Guide". Washington, DC: US Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, 2009.

Wright, Robin B. “Dreams and Shadows: The Future of the Middle East”. Penguin, 2008. 81

Young Sr, Aaron M., and David H. Gray. "Insurgency, Guerilla Warfare and Terrorism: Conflict and its Application for the Future." Global Security Studies 2, no. 4, 2011.