Magda Mtchedlidze

Ioane Petritsi

Philosophic thought developed in in direct connection with theological thought and in the bosom of theological thought. After Christianity was established in Georgia, hexaemeral works of cosmological and anthropological content as well as patristic texts of dogmatico-polemical content that cover issues of God's monism and triadism. We also have Christian ethic didaskalia. Although philosophic passages can be seen in works of various literary genres from early periods, special attention seems to have been given only in a later period to reflection on proper and philosophic thinking, works on logic, popularisation of Classical philosophy in the Georgian language, philosophic compendia. Ephrem Mtsire's of Areopagitic works (with an introduction and comments) and the philosophic chapters of Fountain of Knowledge by John of Damascus (omitted in an earlier Georgian translation of the work) were made in the 11th century. In the introduction to his own translation, Ephrem described in a picturesque manner relations between philosophy and theology. He said that philosophy as a thorny fence protected the fruit of vine - theology, which made them absolutely indispensable for each other, as they complemented each other (John of Damascus 1976: 67). Comprehensive interest in philosophy finally ended in the use of The Elements of Theology by pagan philosopher Diadochus as a school manual by Ioane Petritsi.

We do not know much about the personality of Ioane Petritsi. His name, Petritsi, shows that his activities were linked, at least for some period, to Petritsoni, a Georgian monastery that was founded near the modern town of Plovdiv in in 1083 by Gregorios Pakurianos, who was a person promoted at the Byzantine court. According to the postscript to a manuscript of a later period, Ioane Petritsi worked in Georgia at the founded by David IV the Builder in 1114. Gelati was well-known for its educational and literary activities. Given the nature of Petritsi's interests in Classical sources, he is regarded as a disciple of the school of philosophy founded in the second half of the 11th century by . Petritsi attended the school at the time when John Italos was the hypatus. Given this, he is believed to be a figure, who worked on the turn of the 11th and 12th centuries. However, some think that he worked on the turn of the 12th and 13th centuries. It is noteworthy that the most ancient manuscript comprising his works is of the 13th century.1

In addition to translating works of various genres (of which De Natura Hominis by Nemesius of Emesa is particularly interesting as a philosophic work), Ioane Petritsi wrote original comments on The Elements of Theology by Proclus Diadochus, a work Petritsi translated, presenting his own vision of in comments. In manuscripts, this work is appended with a treatise on the theology of psalms, in which the author makes an attempt to compare and combine Biblical-Christian and Hellenic thinking. 2

Neoplatonist philosopher Proclus Diadochus made an important contribution to the development of , but open appraisal of his works started in the 11th century, when the interest in Ancient thinking and Neoplatonist philosophy in particular acquired essentially new features in the circles of Byzantine intellectuals. Ioane Petritsi's systemic exegetic comments on The Elements of Theology by Proclus (as well as the aforementioned treatise) and the nature of philosophic thinking that can be found in it belongs precisely to the Byzantine trend of thinking well known for its novelties. The positive explanation written by the Georgian philosopher in the 12th century can be described as distinguished, as no such Byzantine work has been found up to now. It is quite possible that it is a course of lectures that was used to teach Proclus in Byzantine schools, particularly if we take into account that polemic explanation of The Elements of Theology also written in the 12th century by Nicholas the Bishop of Methone aimed at showing that the teaching of Proclus was incompatible with Christianity and protecting from blasphemous heresy people who deemed it expedient to attentively study this work by a pagan philosopher (Nicholas of Methone 1984: 1, 1-2, 12).

1 About Ioane Petritsi, see Marr 1909, Kekelidze 1980, Tevzadze 1996, Melikishvili 1999, Chelidze 1994-1995, Alexidze 2008, Gigineishvili 2007, Iremadze 2005, and others. 2 See the edition of the texts of the comments and epilogue (Ioane Petritsi 1937) and (Pantskhava- Tevzadze 1984; Melikishvili 1999; Alexidze-Bergemann 2009; Gigineishvili 2014).

Petritsi's work meant for students formally belongs to the genre of exegetic commentary, i.e. to the pedagogical and scholarly research , the inherited from Hellenism and developed. The genre exposes the content of a text, paraphrases, explains or interprets it, narrates the history of problems related to the text, focuses on the forms of expression and methodology, analyses nuances of the terminology used, and so forth. According to the rules of the genre, in the introduction, Petritsi speaks about the aims of the work, issues discussed, the identity of the author, the Neoplatonic ontology and theory of cognition, and special terminology. At the same time, Petritsi's comments reflect the system of reading, commenting, and teaching works elaborated in the Byzantine school of philosophy in the late 11th century. In this regard, the first thing to be mentioned is the direct presentation of Neoplatonic thinking to students, as well as recognition of the importance of 's logical works in studying Platonic philosophy like Neoplatonists did, and so forth. It is particularly important to mention those explanations by Michael Psellos, where he does not argue with Ancient authors, but tries to familiarise us with and explain to us his visions even in cases he considers the visions unacceptable to Christianity. This means that Psellos shows scientific interest in philosophic conceptions and not only attempts to find ideas acceptable to Christianity in Hellenic philosophy. The same can be said about Italos. They describe as "divine", Aristotle as "marvellous", and Neoplatonists as "great". The same epithets regarding the same philosophers can be found with Petritsi.

However, in accordance with the nature of exegetic comments, Proclus' works, in particular his comments on Plato's dialogues (these comments were also written for lectures to be delivered at schools), are the main examples of Petritsi's explanations both in form and in principle. It is first and foremost necessary to mention that Petritsi remained loyal to the principles Proclus declared, the principle of explaining Plato through Plato, which is the application of Aristarchus' well-known principle of "explaining Homer through Homer" to the philosophy of Plato (Saffrey, Westerink) (Proclus 1968: 132), although the principle of clarifying an author through the author proper can also be found in Biblical exegetics.

It can be concluded on the basis of his works that "explaining Proclus through Proclus" means the following for Ioane Petritsi: First, familiarising with and clarifying Proclus' conception through other works he wrote; and second, communicating Proclus' theology by means of Proclus' methods. Proclus said that Plato is conveying his theology either symbolically or through images or dialectically, Plat. Theol. I, 4 (Proclus 1968: 18-24). He uses this as a basis for his methods of explaining Plato's theology. In particular, he said: "We prefer whatever is obvious, clearly formulated, and simple; we convey whatever is expressed through symbols through clear teachings; if images are used (di jeijkovnwn), we point to their patterns; if something is conveyed in a categorical manner (ajpofantikwvteron), we discuss his reasons: as regards demonstrations (di j ajpodeiv- xewn), we research them and explain the nature (trovpo~) of the truth that can be found in them, making them clear for listeners. If something is enigmatic, we try to clarify them through Plato's works, not through external hypotheses; and if something is clear for listeners, we discuss its conformity with things. This clarifies the one and perfect kind (ei\do~) of Platonic theology and the truth expressed in all of his divine ideas...", Plat. Theol. I, 2 (Proclus 1968: 9, 20-10, 10).

Given this, in order to clarify the nature of the truth of "theological elements" expressed in the apodictic form, in the introduction to his comments, Petritsi familiarised readers with Proclus' aims and methods, noting that this was the "discovery of the One with the laws of syllogism" (Petritsi 1937: 3, 5-7). Correspondingly, he started the explanations of Chapter 1 of the work with clarifying the essence of the syllogism law (Petritsi 1937: 10, 13-11, 10) (Further in concrete passages of the work, he regularly focused on the methods of substantiation used by Proclus). At the same time, in his explanations, Petritsi familiarised readers with all forms of speaking about the divine (based on images and symbols, and inspired by God) in order to give them knowledge of the "kind of theological vision" (Petritsi 1937: 3, 3- 5) in general. He thus presented all that made the basis of the reasoning of Proclus conveyed in the dialectic form.

It is well known that unlike mythology, which is an example of thinking by means of images, philosophy as a science is an example of thinking by concepts, although images are not alien to it, which is particularly true of Classical philosophy and Medieval theological philosophy. Dialogues by Plato as well as works by brilliant representatives of Patristics are distinguished not only by their ideas, but also by

their subtle artistic form, and therefore they are parts of both philosophy and theology and history of literature. On the one hand, Platonism aspires to allegorically interpret mythology and translate mythological images into philosophic concepts, but on the other, like mytho-poetry, it deliberately produces myths as a method of conveying its own philosophic visions (for example, well-known myths about demiurge, cave, and so forth can be described as such). Platonism also uses figures of speech not only for rhetorical purposes (it is known that all genres of ancient literature resorted to rhetoric and literary presentation of views), but also for purely didactic purposes of making deep thoughts easier to understand. This is first and foremost done when describing the invisible other world (that has a particularly divine status in Neoplatonism), which becomes possible only by using analogies and the language of metaphors. Christianity pays even more attention to the difficulties of speaking about God, i.e. defining infinity and describing it with a finite language. It is easier to imagine how difficult it is to give a name to supernatural reality, if we realise that the terminology linked to our mind and how it functions is essentially also metaphoric: Theory, vision, idea, sight, insight, view are linked, etymologically, to perception through eyes; perception, itself, in the sense of "understanding" as well as reception or comprehension are linked to touching; some Georgian words such as gagoneba, gageba, shesmena initially linked to hearing, mean also "understanding", and so forth.

It is clear that studies of the forms of expression are important for understanding the essence of a teaching. As Classical thinking, Neoplatonism regards cosmos as eternal just like its formal and material causes. Correspondingly, the production of a diversified world from the supreme One and the shaping of the matter is a natural and eternal process. According to Christian vision, the world, its matter and form, was created by God at a certain moment, so their further existence is fully dependent on His will. This difference gives rise to theological, cosmological, and anthropological differences between the two world visions. It is interesting to know how an analysis of Ioane Petritsi's philosophic language can help to better understand his vision of Proclus' Neoplatonism and whether his interpretations are influenced to a certain extent by Christianity.

In his Elements of Theology, Proclus starts reasoning from the supreme One. However, it is clear that, on the contrary, human beings practically start perceiving the world from the visible cosmos and the reflection of its variety, reaching the one universal principle by means of abstraction when searching for causes. Interestingly, in the introduction to his comments, Petritsi presents Neoplatonist ontology according to stages of cognition, where every higher level is more divine than the previous one: Above Soul, there is Intellect; above Intellect, there is the true Being; above the true Being, there are supreme divine Numbers; above the Numbers, there are first Limit and first Infinity; and above all these, there is the unknowable One, the Good, who we refer to as father for the sake of honour (Petritsi 1937: 7, 27-8, 10).

Cosmos is a Greek word and means order, good form or structure, decoration. Pythagoras was the first to use this word to denote world-order, i. e. universe. Later, it came to denote the Earth, i.e. a place populated by humans. Universe in ancient Hellenic thinking was also to pān (a Whole, allness, universum), i.e. the unity of everything that the celestial sphere encompasses. Therefore, Greeks used the word uranos (heaven) to denote not only the uttermost sphere of immovable stars (nor only the upper part of cosmos situated above the moon and reaching the sphere of immovable stars), but it also denoted the universe like the terms cosmos and to pān. As regards Platonism, beyond the visible, sensible, material world that is in constant process of coming-to-be and formation, it views an intelligible world of eternal, unchangeable Forms. The relations between the two worlds are those between a model and its image: the existence of forms-ideas in the Intellect is the condition for the existence of material objects of the same form in the visible world. Neoplatonism recognises three divine principles of cosmos: One, Intellect, Soul (for their part, each of them is subject to further differentiation). The One is the first principle of everything that exists both in that world and material reality, as anything that exists is definitely one; the Intellect that encompasses ideas-forms is the principle, because anything that exists has his form and reason; and the soul is the principle that brings things into being and gives them life; it transfers the intellectual forms into matter and maintains them, being a principle connecting the invisible and visible universes.

In Proclus’ Elements of Theology, devoted to these divine origins, the term to pān is not used in the meaning of cosmos and the term uranos is not used at all. However, in order to familiarise readers with

Greek cosmological intuitions, Petritsi often uses allness and heaven in his comments. As regards matter, Petritsi familiarises readers with the teaching about four elements that are not at all mentioned in The Elements of Theology (only non-existent is discussed in it). In addition to familiarising readers with images and myths created in Platonic literature and focusing on specific cosmic realities, which Proclus used for presenting the universal order and hierarchy of principles (for example, the comments comprise a long treatise-like reasoning about time and movement); in addition, Petritsi tried to find Georgian equivalents to every Greek term and to convey a maximum of the meaning of Greek words. For example, he translated cosmos not as sopeli ("a place populated by humans") as was the practice in the Georgian tradition of translating, but as namki or aghmkuli, which means "embellished, ornamented". In addition to emphasising in this manner the Greek cosmic intuition, namely viewing the universe as beautiful (which is also Biblical-Christian intuition), the terminology he invented and used in the Georgian text can be perceived as figurative speech.

Perception of the universe as order and beauty determines the perception of the cosmic genesis as art: In Timaeus by Plato, God-Demiurge creates cosmos in such a manner as to arrange and to form material substratum according to eternal patterns of intellect. In Neoplatonism, the world of the intellect is eternal, but its existence is dependent on the first cause, the One, its multiplicity of forms being a result of the extension of the One. Since the generation is, at the same time, the creation of form for Neoplatonists, both fatherhood and creation denote being the cause in the process of stage-by-stage origination of the multitude of entities.

Petritsi calls the cause producing entities creator, best of artificers, skilful, and creative rule. Correspondingly, he refers to the whole of the visible world as well as to the intelligible world (in other words, intelligible heavens, intelligible cosmos) or their individual realities as to knitting (in case of that intelligible world also as intelligible knitting), composition that was embellished, woven, knitted, spun, composed, carpentered, turned into music by the creator.

Being a piece of art, cosmos has to be similar to and imitate its pattern, as it is a reflection and image of the divine exemplar. The same is true of every individual level of the universe that unfolded stage by stage from the One regarding the previous level. Petritsi describes connections between them straight to the point as connections between model and sculpture (in other words, pattern and its reflection, image) or stamp and imprint. It is clear that what is closer to the One, is more similar to it and the similarity diminishes with every following level (for example, the true Being is an exemplar for the following levels and the image of the supreme One, and intelligible Beings are its images, and so forth) (Petritsi 1937: 70, 33-71, 1). This means that in the hierarchy of Being, there are declining values of images, images of images, phantoms (idols), phantoms of phantoms, and so forth. Eternal beings (including the everlasting celestial sphere and stars) have the status of an image and phantoms are temporal, passing things.

Platonism deems it possible to speak about the invisible world, which is accessible only through reasoning, by using names of visible and sensible things of this world, but, strictly speaking, it is impossible to say anything about the supreme One that is beyond everything and absolutely unknowable. As regards its name, Petritsi said that "it was our desire that according to what comes after it, we might dare to give it names and call it One as the unifying principle of every chain of beings, Good as the producer of the flower of beings (i.e. the true Being or the proper forms-ideas of all things), and Father as the cause of existence of things" (Petritsi 1937: 62, 6-9). Therefore, imitating one implies first and foremost becoming similar to its virtues that are linked to unity, goodness, and the ability to give birth. However, we should keep in mind that strictly speaking, we cannot use these names regarding it, neither can we apply the terms "cause", "first", or "principle" to it. Thus, when we speak about the genesis of the varied universe from the supreme One, both fatherhood and creation are equally important metaphors for Neoplatonism.

For Neoplatonism, one of the most essential metaphors linked to origination is flow, effluence (emanation): The universe of descending steps and spheres flows out of the One. There are other metaphors linked to flow: source, fount, spring, stream. The One is referred to as "the first source of Beings" (Petritsi 1937: 36, 10).Wherever it directs its streams, it makes those, who receive them to be one and good (Petritsi 1937: 35, 21). The Good as the first source is the root of and cause for the flow of things; it is the fount from which they spring; it is like the cause of a stream (Petritsi 1937: 43, 32-44, 1).

Other beings as its images imitate it: For example, soul is the source and fount of life (Petritsi 1937: 51, 14). Those on the top of the chain of beings (for example, intellect that is on top of intellects) are sources of all fabrics subordinated to them and they make them good, as they are closest to the One. (Petritsi 1937: 95, 20-23).

Reasoning about the One, Petritsi particularly often refers to mathematical images, giving examples from arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music. The supreme One encompasses everything, but nothing can encompass it as a whole, which can be compared with one as a number: One can exist without other numbers, but the latter cannot exist without one (Petritsi 1937: 16, 22-30). In addition to the fact that any number consists of unities, each number - two, five, ten, and so forth - creates one genus (Petritsi 1937: 19, 16, 24, 14-4). One that becomes one can clearly be seen also in musical compositions, because no matter how a voice is made or what sound an instrument may issue, it will immediately fall into the genus of compassion, ardour, and so forth (Petritsi 1937: 22, 16-27).

As we move away from the One, the analogy of numbers also helps us to perceive the fact of complication of the structure of entities: The true Being is the first that was composed of simple numbers having the likness to the One. The essence of the Intellect is more complicated, followed by that of the Soul, and then by that of the body of cosmos. Numbers under 10 should be regarded as the images of the true Being and we refer to them as images of one, referring to numbers above 10 as images of images and composed of the composed (Petritsi 1937: 29, 32-20).

The metaphor of Seed is also linked to the One. For example, in order to clarify the assumption that "every manifold remains within one as within its cause"(Petritsi 1937: 13, 30-14, 9), Petritsi uses such a comparison: "When you see numbers in the One, do not assume that their identities are mixed and merged, but assume that they are differentiated without being divided and have their own dispositions without merging with each other, but in a unitary mode. If you wish, we can explain according to the following images, too: It is like seeds comprising everything in advance - heart, liver, brain, limbs, bones, blood vessels, fingernails, hair, but without merging them or like grain, say that of wheat, comprising stem, ear, thorn, cane, all these are in a unitary mode, but not unified; they are unmixed and not merged" (Petritsi 1937: 13, 33-14, 9).

The seeds of the superior of the superiors are in every essence and they are their own One and centre, God, who is within them and they aspire to it for the sake of their existence and good, because both the unification and the good imply obtaining existence and maintaining the existence; decay is the result of one's own evil (Petritsi 1937: 84, 15-17; 102, 28-33; 103, 32-104, 1). An essence becomes perfect and participates in immortality by reverting to the best within itself (Petritsi 1937: 103, 26-31).

Sphericity, circularity are regarded as perfection in Ancient aesthetic and thinking. Circle is a symbol of eternity (uniform movement of the sky is circular and it is unified, uninterrupted, and everlasting). Neoplatonism links sphericity to the aspiration of the universe back to its cause (ukuisperebs - goes back spherically, as Petritsi said). It is this eternal and simultaneous outflow and backflow (procession and reversion) that is a condition for the unity of the universe and, at the same time, the maintenance of its existence: "Every procession and becoming good and aspiration back to it" is due to the supreme cause "in order to make uninterrupted and infinite the source, where beings flow out from and where they revert again" (Petritsi 1937: 91, 12-14).

The metaphor of light that is accompanied by metaphors such as sun, shine, beam, disk and aureola, and day is linked to the notions of the cause for the existence of all things, the One and the Good. Existence is understood as a result of shining and irradiating, and genesis as appearance (let us recall how the light of a luminary that starts shining in darkness makes things visible). That is why manifesting, making daylight, to bring out into the light belong to the category of terms denoting generation (such as giving substance to something, procreating, producing) with Petritsi. The supreme cause gives to inferiors the force for being causes, i. e. to create, generate, and produce (Petritsi 1937: 122, 26-123, 2). The same idea expressed in a more figurative manner sounds as follows: "The Good is higher of all things being in the light of the One; it is the source of the suns that have the likeness to the One and the Good" (Petritsi 1937: 96, 25-26). Light as a substantiating source is linked to form. According to Petritsi, "The shining of the forms in bodies are defined as aporria (effluence, emanation) and the light of aureola" by Platonists (Petritsi 1937:

100, 10); "The knit of every essence is equally produced by the first cause and they receive good in accordance with their illumination" (Petritsi 1937: 56, 28-29).

In order to describe the supreme Good, Platonism resorts to the method of analogy: What the sun is for this universe, the idea (or Form) of the Good is for the intelligible realm (cf. Plat. Resp., VI , 507b–509c) and, in general, for everything that exists (comparing the Supreme Cause with the sun is common also in Patristics). According to Petritsi's explanations, the sun - Apollo - is believed to be the image of the supreme cause of the Beings, as it is due to the movement of the sun that everything exists in this sensible World. It is also due to the sun of the unities that everything that is originated and "every knitting of superior powers" exist. Like the sun is above the originated entities and does not mix and change with them, the One does not multiply with the entities and does not mix with nature, remaining above everything (Petritsi 1937: 39, 14-23).

True existence, whose principle is the true Being (the first of beings, as the supreme One is beyond being), is a feature of the realm of the intellect, i.e. the universe of ideas. It is in this sphere that we speak about beauty in the proper sense of the word, because it is related to the composed being. Referring to Socrates, Petritsi reasons as follows: "The beauty of the compositions of the true Being is not surprising, as the One united and harmonised it os aristotechnis theos as "the best of artificers", because every order is part of a universal order and every beauty is only similar to it as an image or as a phantom, as only an imprint of the beauties of the true Being, because it is the first being, composed by what is beyond being" (Petritsi 1937: 87, 14-23).

It is noteworthy that the term oJ ajristotevcnh~ qeov~ cannot be seen either in Plato or in the comments of Proclus. We familiarised ourselves with it in Patristic texts. Thus, Petritsi emphasises the creativity of the supreme cause, which can be regarded as an instance of influence of Christian world view.

As consistent with beauty, the appearance of ideas in the realm of the intellect is metaphorically called composing music (musikeloba) and sprouting up (tsarmobutkoeba), and idea as a perfect manifestation of one's own essence is compared to flower: "In this whole cosmos (aghnamki) of intelligible and intellective beings, activity is unmoved and identical and, correspondingly, it never ages, it is always young, always flowers, always Asphodelus, as there neither time governs nor is there any trace of a movement" (Petritsi 1937: 71, 1-4). Referring to Socrates again, Petritsi speaks about the amazing beauty of the world of ideas: "He also says in Phaedrus and I would like to say it in Attican: ti ton onton Ariston i ton noumenon kalliston? He introduces his theory as a question: “What is the best of the existent and the most beautiful of the intelligible?” He is so amazed and seems to be startled by the supreme beauties of the first composition, where the best of artificers made the first flower of harmony and the first musical composition to begin bringing out into the light intelligible forms, that is to revert to the object it desires, i.e. to the supreme One and the first Good" (Petritsi 1937: 34, 10-19).

Gods known since the Classical period that served as symbols of specific ideas for Neoplatonists appear in the realm of intellect in Petritsi's comments. For example, Cronos is a symbol of the reason that contains ideas (an interpretation of the well-known myth of Cronos, who devoured his children) and Zeus is a symbol of the universal soul that brings the ideas-formes of the intellect out in the perceivable world (according to the myth, Zeus confronts the father and forces him to give back the devoured children). Interpretations of myths often rely on etymologising of gods' names: "Cronos is the plenitude of reason or satiety, as all that is sated is full; dia is the same as Zeus: dia means by, as everything comes from it, Zeus means boiling and the procession of life3, and Rhea the mother of feminine force. These three appear in the intellectual cosmos (aghmkuli) after all the intelligibles and intellectives" (Petritsi 1937: 70, 28-33).

Interestingly, Petritsi not only conveys reflections of etymologies characteristic of Platonism (also uranos - looking upwards, etc.), but resorts to this method himself, using Georgian material. He translated the Greek word ajnateivnesqai (upward tension) as extending themselves toward the day spring

3 In Greek, kovro~ means satiety, zei`n boiling, and diva by.

(tsiskari: literally, "gates of the sky") and clarifies what he said on the basis of the etymology of the Georgian word: "When Proclus mentions upward tension (aghtsiskreba), he means the day, where the light is not originated by the sun that illuminates the sensibles, also he does not mean the heaven and sun of the Soul, nor of the intellect, that is the true cosmos (namki) and the true Being, but he means the One and the first Good, that is the sun of the day of Unities and Gods, which every desire aspires to reach and where all desires merge and where everything that looks upwards is going to rise! It is the origin of all day springs and the origin of every day! Thus, the language correctly named it as tsiskari, gates of the sky, because every light opens from the sky. Therefore, the original heaven is where the original light is" (Petritsi 1937: 63, 11-21).

In addition to familiarising readers with Neoplatonist symbolism, Petritsi used images of gods as metaphors (the situation is similar to John Italos). For example, clarifying a passage from The Elements of Theology that was "difficult to understand" (as Petritsi himself noted), he said: "With the assistance of the first Athena, we should excite Hermes that is within us to obtain promithia by aid of Christ" (Petritsi 1937: 51, 9-11). Pagan philosophers regarded gods also as symbols of human faculties. With Petritsi, Athena figuratively means reason (first Athena was the defender of the purity of ideas with Proclus), Hermes means inward logos (cf. Italos 68: 185), who hermeneutic skills depend on, and promētheia is understood as foresight. Given the nature of his work, Petritsi often mentions Hermes as the ability to view the supreme universe, which, at the same time, implies the ability of understanding of Proclus' text about this universe, in other words, hermeneutic skills (Petritsi 1937: 94, 8-11; 183, 22-24 et al).

The third divine source (after the One and the intellect), the soul, connects the intelligible cosmos with this world. By its essence, it belongs to the eternal universe, but its actions are carried out in this temporal cosmos. The Soul transfers eternal ideas-forms from the realm of intellect into matter, which is precisely the process of the genesis of this universe and time: " The power of the logos will beautify wherever it is sown; it will embellish with art the unembellished matter and as a good God, will put into shape with knowledge the mix woven of the four elements. A wise man said that the creator of everything sent down essential logos that is the Soul in order to embellish and adorn the form of the world" (Petritsi 1937: 93, 25-32). "Wherever the extremity of the flows of the Soul spreads, it makes it lively and moving. It is self- moving, because it does not receive life from anyone, as it is not accidence for it, but it is its nature. Like shining is the nature of light, life is the nature of the Soul" (Petritsi 1937: 47, 17-22).

To express soul's reversion back to intellect, Petritsi also uses the Platonic metaphor of wings, which we encounter also with all Neoplatonists: The vision of rational soul is winged, but when it is separated from intellect and descends to the world of change, it is like having wings dropped.

Like Neoplatonists, Petritsi views separation of the Soul from the intellect as the apostasy of Zeus from his father Cronos (Petritsi 1937: 70, 21-27). However, the use of Biblical images when clarifying Platonic concepts is particularly interesting. For example, the soul is referred to as Adam in one case, when Petritsi speaks about its procession from the realm of the intellect, which is presented as Adam's moving away from God (Petritsi 1937: 205, 12-206, 15). In another case, the recollection (anamnesis) of the ideas of the realm of the intellect by the soul is described as Adam's return to Eden (Petritsi 1937: 17: 52, 16-23). It is noteworthy that for the first time, we encounter Adam in a similar context first with Philo (in particular, Adam corresponds to human reason and Eva to feeling) and then with Origen and Fathers. However, unlike them, what Petritsi explains is not the Holy Scripture, but Neoplatonic concepts, using for the sake of clarity a Biblical image that has already been interpreted in a certain way (to be more precise, when we speak about a similarity, we mean the use of a method and a concrete image, not complete sameness of interpretations).

Petritsi describes the being of individual soul in a body also by referring to the Biblical image of Adam:"This means that when soul Adam became without intellect, he took and put on this body. He seemingly joined the ochima (vehicle) of the soul, which came to life through him and the garment, a tunic of skin, became as one having life in itself. Here is what Moses said: 'He put on a garment of skin' (Gen. 3, 21). And when he started purifying, i.e. coming in touch with intellect and God, he got rid of the material tunic, which silliness put on him, and ascended to his Father" (Petritsi 1937: 205, 12-19) (Cf. Porph. Abst.2.46).

Thus, the procession of the soul from eternity is a movement that produces this universe. However, since the connection with matter is a demotion for the soul, it strives to return to the intellect. The procession- emanation from the cause and reversion take place at once. Reversion is represented as the return of the lower to the higher by force of Eros, love. "The reason for the reversion to the origin is love (trpialeba), because it is due to love that the entity strives back (ukuetrpis) towards the ornaments of beauty of the superior entities" (Petritsi 1937: 82, 36-83, 2). Soul's reversion to its eternal model is the reason of the movement of the universe: The journey and course of the heaven is infinite, because its beloved is infinite (Petritsi 1937: 45, 23-24).

For Plato, Eros is the striving of soul to obtain the good, which implies first and foremost the desire of eternal existence, immortality. A mortal can obtain immortality by means of giving birth, leaving his descendants or by means of spiritual pregnancy, leaving fruits of his creation. Both births are motivated by the beauty, which is the most impressive of the ideas-forms of the intelligible universe that inspires the soul to strive for eternity. It can be said that Aristotle moved Plato's conception to cosmic dimensions by comparing to a subject of love the prime mover of the universe, who causes everything to move in order to achieve it , being unmoved itself (Arist. Met. 12, 7, 1072a 25). However, the term Eros is found only once in this context with Aristotle. He conveys Plato's metaphor of love by terms denoting aspiration, desire (o[rexi~, e[fesi~). In Neoplatonism, the aspiration of all things towards the supreme cause is a condition of the maintenance of their unity, existence, essence, and the perfection of their ideas- forms: "They preserve their structure by returning back and desiring again," Petritsi explained (Petritsi 1937: 89, 33).

It is noteworthy that the term Eros is not at all used in The Elements of Theology, but taking into account the importance of the notion in Proclus' philosophy, Petritsi pays a lot of attention to the Neoplatonic concept of Eros. He paraphrases the content of the terms denoting striving and desire (ojrevgesqai, ejfivesqai) in accordance with the Neoplatonic erotic terminology. Petritsi develops Proclus' assumption that every being aspires to the Good (the supreme principle of the universe) on the basis of the Neoplatonic understanding of Plato's Eros: "No matter what essence you name, all of them aspire for and desire it. And every subject that is wanted and desired differs from those, who want and desire, as all of those, who want and desire, follow what they want and desire and every lover follows the beloved as those, who are beyond them and superior to them ... And they follow them not to evict them, but in order to join them and be well with their Good, as every lover follows his beloved to become good from him" (Petritsi 1937: 33, 7-22).

On the one hand, Petritsi focuses on essence's love of its own cause out of the desire to exist, because if it does not love the reason for its existence, it follows that it does not want to exist (Petritsi 1937: 81, 32- 33). If it remains in its cause and proceeds from it, it will revert to its producer, because there is no one, who would not love the cause of its existence (Petritsi 1937: 88, 20-23). As the creator knitted it, it responds with love to the knitter (Petritsi 1937: 94, 2). However, on the other hand, Petritsi describes the lover in its aspiration towards the beloved, as "abstracted from his own essence and become one that wholly belongs to the object of his love, as if it renounced his own being" (Petritsi 1937: 33, 25-27). Loving his own cause, the essence renounces itself, but by doing so, it aspires towards itself again, but the better one, ideal. Ultimately, it aspires to unite with supreme Good. Referring to Platonic texts, Petritsi explains that when the being loves what is beyond being, it first makes the round of everything it has within itself, i. e. the forms of the beings, in order to find the being and cause existing within it, the One; in other words, the soul first coincides with the whole multitude of beings and then it renounces them and takes off even his own essence; it embraces first the god and the One that is within it, and then, through it, the ineffable sun of the Unities, and being in ecstasy, reaches after it" (Petritsi 1937: 49, 19-35).

As we can see, aspiration towards and love of the One is presented in the shape of ecstasy here. Speaking about aspiration towards Divinity, Plato and Platonists (particularly Proclus, who was a theurge himself) often resorted to images and notions of mysteries, so Petritsi clarified these forms of expression for readers in this and other cases too. It is interesting that the image of Apollo is linked to the creativity (as noted above, Apollo is the name of the sun as a creator of sublunary realities, because everything is generated during his movement, so it represents the supreme One) and the image of Dionysus is linked to the ecstatic aspiration towards union with God.

According to Petritsi's explanations, every entity imitates its intelligible model, and being unable to take possession of it, it aspires amazed towards it and seems to divine it, stripping bare of and throwing away their features, becoming completely directed towards the supra-eternal Good (Petritsi 1937: 84, 23-28). Everything loves the Good and flows back to it renouncing their own wishes and even their own essence, like being in Bacchic frenzy, and becoming one by the One and becoming good by the Good. (Petritsi 1937: 44, 2-6).The visible cosmos, too, motivated by the One and the Good existing within it, follows that One and Good, moving eternally like being in Bacchic frenzy by nectars (Petritsi 1937: 45, 17-21). However, the supreme is unattainable. As Plato said, a celestial body created according to the intelligible model was made drunk by the soul of the universe and "enslaved it to constantly follow the unknown and the sun of unities belonging to everything" (Petritsi 1937: 47, 33-48, 3).

To better show the features of Petritsi's manner of commenting, namely his thinking and expressing peculiarities, we will quote a rather long passage from his explanations concerning the incognisability of the object of supreme love, i.e. the supreme cause of the universe. Referring to Socrates, Petritsi explains that the One of Neoplatonists makes all to love it and gives to all of those, who love it and aspire to it its own features, setting for them the objective of capturing and participating in it, makes the entities drunk with nectar, and strengthens their acmes with ambrosia (cf. Plat. Phaedr. 247 c-e). It is not completely unparticipated, preventing the interested from losing hope and renouncing their desire, but it does not allow to perceive its ineffable supraessence and superiority in order not to make available its speciality that is without any specialities, because it is a feature of soul and intellect, that having perceived the object they were after and having captured it by reason, as if they have overcome it, they try to perceive something else (cf. Plat. Symp. 210b).Therefore, this supreme Good gives its special feature to lover and renovates his desire, but as the latter directs his reason, the former becomes unknowable again, like one theologian said: "God forces me to be a midwife, but hinders childbirth" (cf. Plat. Theaetetus, 150c, and Procl. Theol. Plat., I, 23, 105). So he says that every midwife calls on what should be born to be born, adding that she was kept away from birth. The problem is that every birth means the emergence of what was born, like reason gives birth to what was within reason and soul gives birth to what was within soul. However, the vision of that One, the sun, is not such, because what has become reason and what has become being want to emerge, but are unable to do so (cf. Theol. Plat., I, 22, 103-104). It is amazing that it does not allow the lover to abate the need of giving birth, because unappeased desire acts as a midwife. "And he is again unable to give birth to anything intelligible, so he gives over again to contemplation (cf. Plot. Enn., III, 5, 3), and thirst adds to thirst, suffering accompanies pleasure (cf. Enn., V, 5, 12) and desire adds to desire"(Petritsi 1937: 34, 19-35, 14).

It is clear that the text discussed is about the idea of absolute transcendence of the supreme cause, the One, the Good, that is unknowable in itself and ineffable, which Neoplatonists constantly repeated. Petritsi describes in a picturesque manner how soul aspires to make the idea of the One and the Good perceptible by reason and, correspondingly, give birth to it, but fails to achieve the goal. However, this text can also be remindful of the theory of epektasis by Gregory of Nyssa, who implied humans' eternal and endless progress in perceiving God. The fact that in his comments, Petritsi emphasises the inaccessibility of the Supreme cause (though he explains that for Neoplatonists soul can get in touch with the One in an erotic ecstasy) may be due to the influence of Christianity.

Thus, we can see that Petritsi, who had a good knowledge of Ancient philosophy and especially Proclus' philosophic system, had mastered not only problems of world vision of the teaching of Platonists, but also their language and their methods of research and teaching. It is noteworthy that his work is an interesting combination of traditions of Hellenistic philosophic comments and the hermeneutic experience of Christian exegetes.

In conclusion, it is necessary to note that the influence of Ioane Petrits's thinking and language and the philosophic tropology presented in the comments on Proclus is visible in the secular literature of his times and later eras.

References:

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