ZIMNEWS September 2013
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
Zimbabwe Is Open for Business
ZIMBABWE IS OPEN FOR BUSINESS An Economic Appraisal of the ‘New Dispensation’ Dale Doré May 2018 CONTENTS 1. INTRODUCTION 2. THE ECONOMIC MELTDOWN 2.1 The Road to Ruin 2.2 The Cost of Displacement 2.3 The Collapse of Production 2.4 How Markets Work 2.5 The State-controlled Economy 2.6 Command Agriculture 3.7 The Economy 3. ZIMBABWE IS OPEN FOR BUSINESS 3.1 Operation Restore Legacy 3.2 Guidelines and Opportunities 4. BUSINESS AS USUAL 4.1 Actions speak louder than words 4.2 Governance and institutions 4.3 The New Economic Order 4.4 Political Capital 4.5 Sound Economic Principles 4.6 Protection of Investment and Property 4.7 Property Rights and the Rule of Law 4.8 Being Zimbabwean 5. CONCLUDING REMARKS REFERENCES 1. INTRODUCTION The gist of the Government’s Investment Guidelines and Opportunities in Zimbabwe1 can be summed up by the title of the first chapter: “Towards a New Economic Order: Investment Policy Statement and Action Plan of the Government of Zimbabwe.” The guidelines promise investors an economic reform agenda based on a sound market economy in order to build a competitive private sector. The main policy thrusts also include the payment of compensation to commercial farmers, whose land was seized; a commitment to repay the government’s domestic and foreign debts; and respecting international obligations under Bilateral Investment Protection and Promotion Agreements (BIPPAs). Corruption, it avers, will be dealt with severely. These issues clearly illustrate that the economic fortunes of nations not only depend on the application of sound economic principles and public financial management; they are also inseparable from matters of politics and governance. -
A Comparative Study of Zimbabwe and South Africa
FACEBOOK, YOUTH AND POLITICAL ACTION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ZIMBABWE AND SOUTH AFRICA A thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY of SCHOOL OF JOURNALISM AND MEDIA STUDIES, RHODES UNIVERSITY by Admire Mare September 2015 ABSTRACT This comparative multi-sited study examines how, why and when politically engaged youths in distinctive national and social movement contexts use Facebook to facilitate political activism. As part of the research objectives, this study is concerned with investigating how and why youth activists in Zimbabwe and South Africa use the popular corporate social network site for political purposes. The study explores the discursive interactions and micro- politics of participation which plays out on selected Facebook groups and pages. It also examines the extent to which the selected Facebook pages and groups can be considered as alternative spaces for political activism. It also documents and analyses the various kinds of political discourses (described here as digital hidden transcripts) which are circulated by Zimbabwean and South African youth activists on Facebook fan pages and groups. Methodologically, this study adopts a predominantly qualitative research design although it also draws on quantitative data in terms of levels of interaction on Facebook groups and pages. Consequently, this study engages in data triangulation which allows me to make sense of how and why politically engaged youths from a range of six social movements in Zimbabwe and South Africa use Facebook for political action. In terms of data collection techniques, the study deploys social media ethnography (online participant observation), qualitative content analysis and in-depth interviews. -
B COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 314/2004 of 19 February 2004 Concerning Certain Restrictive Measures in Respect of Zimbabwe
2004R0314 — EN — 03.03.2010 — 010.001 — 1 This document is meant purely as a documentation tool and the institutions do not assume any liability for its contents ►B COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 314/2004 of 19 February 2004 concerning certain restrictive measures in respect of Zimbabwe (OJ L 55, 24.2.2004, p. 1) Amended by: Official Journal No page date ►M1 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1488/2004 of 20 August 2004 L 273 12 21.8.2004 ►M2 Commission Regulation (EC) No 898/2005 of 15 June 2005 L 153 9 16.6.2005 ►M3 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1272/2005 of 1 August 2005 L 201 40 2.8.2005 ►M4 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1367/2005 of 19 August 2005 L 216 6 20.8.2005 ►M5 Council Regulation (EC) No 1791/2006 of 20 November 2006 L 363 1 20.12.2006 ►M6 Commission Regulation (EC) No 236/2007 of 2 March 2007 L 66 14 6.3.2007 ►M7 Commission Regulation (EC) No 412/2007 of 16 April 2007 L 101 6 18.4.2007 ►M8 Commission Regulation (EC) No 777/2007 of 2 July 2007 L 173 3 3.7.2007 ►M9 Commission Regulation (EC) No 702/2008 of 23 July 2008 L 195 19 24.7.2008 ►M10 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1226/2008 of 8 December 2008 L 331 11 10.12.2008 ►M11 Commission Regulation (EC) No 77/2009 of 26 January 2009 L 23 5 27.1.2009 ►M12 Commission Regulation (EU) No 173/2010 of 25 February 2010 L 51 13 2.3.2010 Corrected by: ►C1 Corrigendum, OJ L 46, 17.2.2009, p. -
Rundbrief 64
Vereinigung Schweiz-Zimbabwe Swiss-Zimbabwean Friendship Association Rundbrief / Newsletter Nr. 64, Nov. 2014 Editorial dass die reich vorhandenen Rohstoffe nicht zur Ent- wicklung Afrikas genutzt werden, sondern nach wie vor Präsident Mugabe hat alle überrascht. Nachdem er bis nur den Ausländern Vorteile bringen. Erstaunlicherwei- jetzt trotz seiner 90 Jahre innerhalb der Regierungspar- se war kaum eine kritische Stimme zu hören, die die tei Zanu-PF keine Nachfolge aufgebaut hatte, zauberte private Aneignung der Reichtümer (beispielsweise der er plötzlich seine mutmassliche Nachfolgerin aus dem Marange-Diamanten) durch die eigene Elite anklagte – Nichts: Seine Frau Grace. Grace, bis jetzt politisch nicht vielleicht, weil nur VertreterInnen der Elite anwesend in Erscheinung getreten, wurde plötzlich gegen alle Re- waren? geln Präsidentin der Frauenliga. Und nicht genug damit: Im Oktober erklärte Grace, sie fühle sich reif für die Prä- Der vorliegende Rundbrief vertieft unter anderem diese sidentschaft. Was wie eine Operette tönt, ist aber Reali- Themen. tät. Wie gehen gestandene Parteiaktivisten und das Mi- Gertrud Baud, Mitglied des Vorstandes litär mit dieser neuen Lage um? In Zimbabwes Verfassung ist ein Grundrechtskatalog enthalten. Leider hält sich aber Regierung und Verwal- Der wundersame Aufstieg von tung (noch) nicht daran. Es gibt nach wie vor willkürli- Grace Mugabe che Schikanen und Verhaftungen von AktivistInnen der Zivilgesellschaft (beispielsweise von Woza) oder unan- Ruth Weiss gekündigte Zerstörungen von Kiosken (beispielsweise durch den Harare City Council). Die AktivistInnen las- Viele Probleme, wenige Lösungen sen sich nicht entmutigen und ziehen die Verantwortli- chen gestützt auf die verfassungsmässigen Rechte vor Nichts ist so in der Republik von Zimbabwe, wie es sein Gericht. Eine Sisyphusarbeit? sollte: Unternehmen schliessen, allein im August 623. -
Sapes Trust and Ned Conference Report
REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON: “ZIMBABWE GOING FORWARD: CONSOLIDATING THE DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS AND REINFORCING RE-ENGAGEMENT WITH THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY” SOUTHERN AFRICA POLITICAL ECONOMY SERIES (SAPES) TRUST AND NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY (NED) 5TH AND 6TH MAY 2014 – RAINBOW TOWERS 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS Acronyms 3 Background 4 Conference Objectives 5 Opening Remarks 5 Official Opening 7 DAY ONE: Enabling EnvironMent: Consolidating Constitutional ReforMs and Strengthening National Institutions Session I: Consolidating Constitutional Reforms 11 Session II: Strengthening National Institutions 22 Session III: The Role of Civil Society: From Advocacy to Engagement 25 Session IV: Examining the Role of the Media in a Democracy 28 Session V: Reinforcing Zimbabwe’s Democratization Process: A Dialogue to Reinforce Engagement 30 DAY TWO: An Agenda for EconoMic Recovery Session VI: Restoring the Social Contract 34 Session VII: An Agenda for Economic Recovery 37 Session VIII: Reviving Zimbabwe’s Productive Sectors 41 Session IX: Mobilizing Foreign Direct Investment: Transcending the Sanctions Regime 44 Closing Remarks 46 Policy Recommendations 47 Conclusion and Way Forward 50 2 ACRONYMS BOTs Build-Operate-Transfers CCZ Crisis Coalition of Zimbabwe CIMA Centre for International Media Assistance CIPE Centre for International Private Enterprise CSOs Civil Society Organisations EU European Union FDI Foreign Direct Investment GDP Gross Domestic Product GPA Global Political Agreement GNU Government of National Unity IMF International Monetary -
Appointment of Cabinet Ministers His Excellency the President, Comrade E
Appointment of Cabinet Ministers His Excellency the President, Comrade E. D. Mnangagwa, has, in terms of Section 104 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, Amendment No. 20 of 2013, appointed Cabinet Ministers, Ministers of State and Deputy Ministers as follows: A. Cabinet Ministers 1. Finance and Economic Development Hon. Professor Mthuli Ncube 2. Defence and War Veterans Hon Oppah Zvipange Muchinguri-Kashiri 3. Local Government, Public Works and National Housing Hon. July G. Moyo 4. Foreign Affairs and International Trade Hon. Sibusiso B. Moyo 5. Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare Hon. Sekesai Nzenza 6. Industry and Commerce Hon. Mangaliso Ndlovu 7. Home Affairs and Cultural Heritage Hon. Cain Mathema 8. Higher and Tertiary Education, Science and Technology Hon. Professor Amon Murwira 9. Primary and Secondary Education Hon. Professor Paul Mavima 10. Lands, Agriculture, Water, Climate and Rural Resettlement Hon. Chief Air Marshal P. Shiri 11. Mines and Mining Development Hon. Winston Chitando 12. Energy and Power Development Hon. Joram M. Gumbo 13. Transport and Infrastructural Development Hon. Joel Biggie Matiza 14. Information, Publicity and Broadcasting Services Hon. Monica Mutsvangwa 15. Information Communication Technology and Courier Services Hon. Kazembe Kazembe 16. Environment, Tourism and Hospitality Industry Hon. Prisca Mupfumira 17. Youth, Sport, Arts and Recreation Hon. Kirsty Coventry 18. Health and Child Care Hon. Dr Obediah Moyo 19. Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs Hon. Ziyambi Ziyambi 20. Women Affairs, Community, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Hon. Sithembiso G. G. Nyoni B. Ministers of State for the Provinces 1. Harare ….. 2. Bulawayo Hon. Judith Ncube 3. Mashonaland West Hon. Mary Mliswa 4. -
B COUNCIL COMMON POSITION 2004/161/CFSP of 19 February 2004 Renewing Restrictive Measures Against Zimbabwe (OJ L 50, 20.2.200
2004E0161 — EN — 25.02.2010 — 003.001 — 1 This document is meant purely as a documentation tool and the institutions do not assume any liability for its contents ►B COUNCIL COMMON POSITION 2004/161/CFSP of 19 February 2004 renewing restrictive measures against Zimbabwe (OJ L 50, 20.2.2004, p. 66) Amended by: Official Journal No page date ►M1 Council Decision 2005/444/CFSP of 13 June 2005 L 153 37 16.6.2005 ►M2 Council Decision 2005/592/CFSP of 29 July 2005 L 200 98 30.7.2005 ►M3 Council Common Position 2007/120/CFSP of 19 February 2007 L 51 25 20.2.2007 ►M4 Council Decision 2007/235/CFSP of 16 April 2007 L 101 14 18.4.2007 ►M5 Council Decision 2007/455/CFSP of 25 June 2007 L 172 89 30.6.2007 ►M6 Council Decision 2008/605/CFSP of 22 July 2008 L 194 34 23.7.2008 ►M7 Council Common Position 2008/632/CFSP of 31 July 2008 L 205 53 1.8.2008 ►M8 Council Decision 2008/922/CFSP of 8 December 2008 L 331 22 10.12.2008 ►M9 Council Common Position 2009/68/CFSP of 26 January 2009 L 23 43 27.1.2009 ►M10 Council Decision 2010/92/CFSP of 15 February 2010 L 41 6 16.2.2010 ►M11 Council Decision 2010/121/CFSP of 25 February 2010 L 49 30 26.2.2010 2004E0161 — EN — 25.02.2010 — 003.001 — 2 ▼B COUNCIL COMMON POSITION 2004/161/CFSP of 19 February 2004 renewing restrictive measures against Zimbabwe THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 15 thereof, Whereas: (1) Pursuant to Common Position 2002/145/CFSP (1) the Council imposed a prohibition on the supply of arms and related materiel, on the provision of related technical training or assistance and on the supply of equipment that might be used for internal repression to Zimbabwe. -
What Happened in Parliament? an Analysis of the Participation of Mps 2012 to 2013
What happened in Parliament? An analysis of the participation of MPs 2012 to 2013 Rumbidzai Dube, Senior Researcher November 2013 1. Executive Summary This report is the last of a three part series of thematic reports analysing the performance of the Seventh Parliament in the last year of its tenure. While the previous two reports assessed the aspects of the Seventh Parliament to do with attendance and gender; this last offering looks specifically at the achievements of Parliament , with particular regard to issues such as Bills passed, debates undertaken and legislative performance in general. The report notes, among other things, that: • The levels of participation and debate among Parliamentarians were generally low, with some members spending the entire year without contributing anything to pertinent discussions; • Although most ministers impressively managed to participate in either House of Assembly or Senate sessions, at least two-thirds of the ZANU PF ministers never participated in either the House of Assembly or Senate sessions, a worrying trend considering that they have held ministerial positions for longer; • Question and Answer sessions – an important process in Parliament- were characterised by poor attendance by Ministers. Some Ministers tactfully side-stepped important questions. Some members addressed questions to the wrong Ministries. In some instances, procedural considerations in the conduct of the business of Parliament resulted in some questions remaining unanswered up to the end of the Seventh Parliament; • The -
1 Daily Media Monitoring Report Issue 11: 16 June 2018
Daily Media Monitoring Report Issue 11: 16 June 2018 Table of Contents 1.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 2 1.2 Key Events ......................................................................................................... 2 1.3 Media Monitored .................................................................................................... 3 Methodology ................................................................................................................ 3 2.0 Did the media represent political parties in a fair and balanced manner? ............. 3 2.1 Space and time dedicated to political parties in private and public media ........ 3 2.2 Space and time dedicated to political actors in private and public media ......... 5 2.3 Tone of coverage for political parties ................................................................. 6 2.4 Gender representation in election programmes ................................................ 7 2.5 Youth representation in election programmes ................................................... 8 2.6 Time dedicated to political players in the different programme types in broadcast media ...................................................................................................... 8 3.0 Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 10 The media have an ethical obligation to be impartial in their coverage of electoral 1 -
Restrictive Measures and Zimbabwe: Political Implications, Economic Impact and a Way Forward
Restrictive Measures and Zimbabwe: Political Implications, Economic Impact and a Way Forward Primary Researchers: Bryan M. Sims Sydney Masamvu Secondary Researcher: Havi Mirell Contents Executive Summary…………………………………………………………………………………….……2 Research Question…………………………………………………………………………………………..3 Background…………………………………………………………………………………………………...3 Definitions of Sanctions and Restrictive Measures……………………………………………………....5 Zimbabwe Restrictive Measures……………………………………………………………………………5 The 2000, 2002 and 2005 Elections and the International Response………………………………….7 The 2008 Elections……………………………………………………………………………………..……8 The Government of National Unity…………………………………………………………………………9 Targeted Restricted Measures Eight Years On………………………………………………………….10 The Impact of Restrictive Measures………………………………………………………………………11 Effects of Restrictive Measures on the Zimbabwean Economy…………..…………………………...16 Direct and Indirect Impact of Restrictive Measures on Zimbabweans………………………………..21 Opportunity Costs of Restrictive Measures………………………………………………………………22 The Role of the Region and International Community………………………………………………….23 The Commonwealth………………………………………………………………………………24 South Africa and the Region……………………………………………………………………..24 Moving Forward and Possible Consequences…………………………………………………………..27 Option 1: Maintain the Status Quo…..………………………………………………………….28 Option 2: An Unconditional Removal of Restrictive Measures ……………………………...28 Option 3: The Calibrated Removal of Restrictive Measures……………………..…………..29 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………...………………………34 -
Zimbabwe 2020 Human Rights Report
ZIMBABWE 2020 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Zimbabwe is constitutionally a republic. The country elected Emmerson Mnangagwa president for a five-year term in 2018 in general elections. Despite incremental improvements from past elections, domestic and international observers noted serious concerns and called for further reforms necessary to meet regional and international standards for democratic elections. Numerous factors contributed to a flawed overall election process, including: the Zimbabwe Election Commission’s lack of independence; heavily biased state media favoring the ruling party; voter intimidation; unconstitutional influence of tribal leaders; disenfranchisement of alien and diaspora voters; failure to provide a preliminary voters roll in electronic format; politicization of food aid; security services’ excessive use of force; and lack of precision and transparency around the release of election results. The election resulted in the formation of a government led by the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front Party with a supermajority in the National Assembly but not in the Senate. The Zimbabwe Republic Police maintain internal security. The Department of Immigration and police, both under the Ministry of Home Affairs, are primarily responsible for migration and border enforcement. Although police are officially under the authority of the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Office of the President directed some police roles and missions in response to civil unrest. The military is responsible for external security but also has some domestic security responsibilities. The Zimbabwe National Army and Air Force constitute the Zimbabwe Defense Forces and report to the minister of defense. The Central Intelligence Organization, under the Office of the President, engages in both internal and external security matters. -
Souhrnná Terirotální Informace Zimbabwe
SOUHRNNÁ TERITORIÁLNÍ INFORMACE Zimbabwe Souhrnná teritoriální informace Zimbabwe Zpracováno a aktualizováno zastupitelským úřadem ČR v Harare (Zimbabwe) ke dni 31. 8. 2016 17:13 Seznam kapitol souhrnné teritoriální informace: 1. Základní charakteristika teritoria, ekonomický přehled (s.2) 2. Zahraniční obchod a investice (s.15) 3. Vztahy země s EU (s.19) 4. Obchodní a ekonomická spolupráce s ČR (s.21) 5. Mapa oborových příležitostí - perspektivní položky českého exportu (s.23) 6. Základní podmínky pro uplatnění českého zboží na trhu (s.25) 7. Kontakty (s.34) 1/36 http://www.businessinfo.cz/zimbabwe © Zastupitelský úřad ČR v Harare (Zimbabwe) SOUHRNNÁ TERITORIÁLNÍ INFORMACE Zimbabwe 1. Základní charakteristika teritoria, ekonomický přehled 2 Zimbabwe je suchozemským státem bez přímého přístupu k moři. Rozloha je 390 580 km . Nejdelší hranici má Zimbabwe se svým východním sousedem Mosambikem (1231 km), dále sousedí se Zambií (797 km), Botswanou (813 km) a JAR (225 km). Státní zřízení: Zimbabwe je unitární republikou praktikující prezidentský systém moci s existencí více politických stran. Ve skutečnosti je moc soustředěna v rukou úzké skupiny kolem prezidenta. Prezident je hlavou státu a zároveň předsedá vládě, která je odpovědná Sněmovně (House of Assembly). Pravomoci prezidenta jsou rozsáhlé, byť nová ústava z roku 2013 přináší několik omezení. Zákonodárná moc je ústavou svěřena dvoukomorovému parlamentu, který se skládá ze Senátu a Sněmovny (House of Assembly). Senát má celkem 80 křesel (60 volených, 16 nominovaných regionálními radami, 2 vyhrazená tradičním vládcům, 2 postiženým), Sněmovna (House of Assembly) má celkem 270 poslanců, z toho 210 poslanců je voleno v jednomandátových volebních obvodech na základě většinového systému a 60 žen voleno na základě poměrného systému (6 žen za každou provincii).