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Transient Underdetermination and Values in Science Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 44 (2013) 124–133 Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect Studies in History and Philosophy of Science journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/shpsa State of the field: Transient underdetermination and values in science Justin Biddle School of Public Policy, Georgia Institute of Technology, 685 Cherry Street, Atlanta, GA 30332, USA article info abstract Article history: This paper examines the state of the field of ‘‘science and values’’—particularly regarding the implications Received 30 September 2011 of the thesis of transient underdetermination for the ideal of value-free science, or what I call the ‘‘ideal of Received in revised form 1 July 2012 epistemic purity.’’ I do this by discussing some of the main arguments in the literature, both for and Available online 22 November 2012 against the ideal. I examine a preliminary argument from transient underdetermination against the ideal of epistemic purity, and I discuss two different formulations of an objection to this argument—an objec- Keywords: tion that requires the strict separation of the epistemic from the practical. A secondary aim of the paper is Transient underdetermination to suggest some future directions for the field, one of which is to replace the vocabulary of values that is Science and values often employed in the literature with a more precise one. Ó 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. When citing this paper, please use the full journal title Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 1. Introduction This shift in the agenda of the philosophy of science community should be welcomed for a number of reasons—not the least of In the first half of the twentieth century, the philosophy of sci- which is that it has the potential to lead to a better philosophy of ence community in Europe and North America thought very deeply science. Science is an activity that takes place in real social, politi- about the interactions between science and society. Topics such as cal, cultural, and economic contexts, and it both shapes, and is the influence of values in scientific reasoning and the place of sci- shaped by, these contexts. Recognition of this basic fact raises ence in a democratic society were at the center of the philosophical questions that philosophers of science have often neglected, such agenda. By around the middle of the century, however, the agenda as how science should impact public policy making (Kitcher, had changed dramatically, the result of which was a significant de- 2011), and it has the potential to lead to a reconceptualization of cline in social and political engagement (Howard, 2003; Reisch, the nature of science itself. Such a reconceptualization could have 2005). Philosophers of science during this period, for example, rec- implications for philosophy of science more broadly, including de- ognized that science is in fact a social and value-laden enterprise, bates over realism and anti-realism, confirmation, and explanation but they banished such considerations from the context of justifi- (e.g., Longino, 2002). cation to the context of discovery; as such, they were thought to be This paper examines the state of the field of ‘‘science and val- a matter for sociologists and psychologists, not for philosophers ues’’—and in particular, of the status of the ideal of value-free sci- (e.g., Popper, 1959 [1934]; Reichenbach, 1938). Fortunately, the ence, or what I call the ‘‘ideal of epistemic purity.’’ Since the middle pendulum has shifted once again; the turn of the century has wit- of the twentieth century, the standard view among philosophers of nessed a renewed engagement with social and political concerns. science has been that certain aspects of scientific research can and Led by feminist philosophers of science concerned with the influ- should be value free—or, more specifically, free from all ‘‘non-epi- ence of sexist presuppositions on the content of science and with stemic,’’ or ‘‘contextual’’ factors, such as moral and political val- the role that science sometimes plays in reinforcing gender stereo- ues.1 Some contextual factors, of course, appropriately influence types (e.g., Longino, 1990; Nelson, 1990; Okruhlik, 1994), philoso- certain aspects of scientific research; moral and political consider- phers are once again examining the role of values in science and, ations rightly influence the choices of problems to address, the deci- more generally, of science in society. sions of how research should be applied, and the setting of E-mail address: [email protected] 1 In this paper, ‘‘contextual factors’’ refer to any factor that is traditionally regarded as non-epistemic—that is, any factor that falls outside of the domain of logic, evidence, and epistemic values. For a discussion of epistemic values, see Kuhn (1977), McMullin (1983), and Laudan (1984). 0039-3681/$ - see front matter Ó 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2012.09.003 J. Biddle / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 44 (2013) 124–133 125 constraints on experimental practices. The traditional view, how- dom. The end of the paper draws upon a neglected essay by Otto ever, maintains that contextual factors can and should be excluded Neurath in order to illustrate one way the terminology of values from the ‘‘internal’’ workings of science—i.e., the epistemic appraisal might be re-examined. of theories, models, and hypotheses.2 More specifically, this view maintains that (1) the proper application of scientific methods will, 2. Underdetermination: Transient, permanent, and global as a matter of fact, always screen out all contextual factors, and (2) scientists ought to apply scientific methods properly, thereby One of the goals that Kitcher sets for himself in the first part of screening out all contextual factors (cf. Ruphy, 2006, p. 190). This Science, Truth, and Democracy is to defend the ideal of epistemic traditional view is often referred to as the ‘‘ideal of value-free sci- purity, or what he calls the ‘‘ideal of objectivity.’’ To do so, he ence;’’ for reasons that I will discuss later, I will refer to it as the identifies three different formulations of the thesis of underdeter- ‘‘ideal of epistemic purity.’’ mination—transient, permanent, and global—and argues that, of While a variety of different arguments have been put forward those formulations that are plausible, none poses a difficulty for against the ideal, the most common, and most influential, is the the ideal of objectivity. As he defines it, the thesis of transient 3 argument from underdetermination. One version of this argument underdetermination states that some theories are underdeter- begins by stating that all theories (or hypotheses, models, etc.) are mined by logic and the currently available evidence. The the- 4 underdetermined by logic and all possible evidence; this leaves a sis of permanent underdetermination states that some theories gap between logic and evidence, on the one hand, and theory choice, are underdetermined by logic and all possible evidence, or at on the other, which is inevitably filled by contextual factors. As is least all evidence to which scientists will ever have access. apparent, this argument depends upon a very strong version of the Finally, the thesis of global underdetermination states that all underdetermination thesis (following Kitcher (2001), let us call it theories are permanently underdetermined (Kitcher, 2001, the thesis of global underdetermination); not surprisingly, the stan- pp. 30, 31). dard response to this argument is to question this version of the the- He acknowledges that much cutting-edge research is tran- sis—a strategy employed by Laudan and Leplin (1991), Norton siently underdetermined, in that we do not have sufficient evi- (2008), Kitcher (2001), and others. While there is a large and impor- dence available to affirm the truth of one particular theory or tant literature on the thesis of global underdetermination, I will not hypothesis. Yet he dismisses this type of underdetermination discuss it here. immediately, asserting without argument that it is ‘‘familiar and The reason for this is the possibility that a weaker version of the unthreatening’’ (2001, p. 30). Critics of his conception of objectiv- underdetermination thesis—the thesis of transient underdetermin- ity, he maintains, must argue for a stronger thesis, the thesis of glo- ation—suffices to undermine the ideal of epistemic purity (e.g., bal underdetermination: Howard, 2009; Nelson, 1990; Potter, 1997; Rolin, 2002; Wray, 1999). This thesis states merely that some theories, hypotheses, The underdetermination thesis obtains its bite when permanent and models are underdetermined by logic and the currently avail- underdetermination is taken to be rampant. The global under- able evidence. This thesis, moreover, is undoubtedly true. The pri- determination thesis, which contends that all (or virtually all) mary purpose of this paper is to examine the implications of the instances of what scientists treat as transient underdetermina- thesis for the ideal of epistemic purity by reviewing some of the tion are, when properly understood, examples of permanent most important arguments in the literature. In Section 2, I discuss underdetermination, poses a genuine threat to the ideal of a prominent defense of the ideal of epistemic purity by Philip objectivity (2001, p. 31). Kitcher (2001), and in Section 3, I examine an argument against The first step of Kitcher’s defense of the ideal of objectivity, the ideal by Heather Douglas. Following this, I discuss two different thus, is to dismiss the relevance of transient underdetermination. formulations of an objection to this argument, one by Richard Kitcher is hardly alone in making this move; those who defend Jeffrey (Section 4.1) and the other by Sandra Mitchell (Section 4.2). the ideal of epistemic purity by criticizing the thesis of underdeter- In examining this debate, I will highlight the price that one must mination focus almost exclusively on the global version of this the- pay in order to maintain the ideal of epistemic purity in light of sis.
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