URBAN TRANSPORT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:

THE PESEROS OF MEXICO CITY

by

MICHAEL WALTER ROSCHLAU

B.A., University of Toronto, 1979

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF

THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS

in

THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

Department of Geography

We accept this thesis as conforming

to the required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

May 1981

(c) Michael'Walter Roschlau, 1981 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.

Department of Geography

The University of British Columbia 2075 Wesbrook Place Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5

Date • 25 April 1981 - ii -

ABSTRACT

The most serious problems of urban transport in developing countries involve traffic congestion, insufficient space for pedestrians and other non-motorised modes, poor public transit service, the increasing attract• iveness of the automobile due to rising incomes, and the chronic lack of financial resources required to make a concerted problem-solving effort.

Many of the solutions suggested by planners and consultants from developed countries are both expensive and require a substantial time investment before the benefits can be realised. Others are politically unfeasible or not well-suited to the needs of the city in less developed countries.

An indigenous response.to the inadequate provision of urban trans• port in developing countries is the establishment of intermediate forms of public transport, such as jitneys or fixed-route shared taxis. These are able to provide levels of speed, comfort and convenience comparable to those of travel by private car, at considerably lower cost. Jitneys are relatively energy-efficient and consume much less road space per passenger than do private automobiles.

The jitney originally developed in North America during the First

World War, largely as a response to inadequate public transit service, but virtually disappeared again within a few years since the street railway operators were able to have legislation passed that made jitney operation

uneconomic. In Third World cities, jitneys developed independently, and

have enjoyed great success, in part due to a much greater demand for

public transport and to fewer restrictive regulations. - iii -

Mexico City is one of the largest urban areas in the developing countries and has a public transport system that includes a very extensive network of jitney services, several different classes of motor buses, trolley coaches, trams, four separate types of taxi services as well as a fast and efficient Metro system. These various elements of public transport are very interdependent and complementary, making remarkably good use of the available road space.

A detailed examination of the jitney system in Mexico City, its regulation, organisation and economics was undertaken through personal observation and discussions as well as using an intensive survey of both jitney drivers and passengers. This has revealed that the jitneys are of great value, providing fast, frequent, comfortable and convenient public transportation which serves as a genuine alternative to private cars.

The flexible nature of the jitneys makes them very demand-responsive and thereby efficient providers of urban transport. The jitneys employ a large number of people and are a profitable enterprise, contributing positively to the urban economy of Mexico City. - iv -

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Tables vi

List of Illustrations vii

Acknowledgements viii

Prologue ix

Chapter One INTRODUCTION 1

Chapter Two URBAN TRANSPORT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 9

I - The Basic Problems 10 a) Congestion 10 b) Non-motorised Modes 15 c) Public Transit 17 d) The Automobile 22

II - General Solutions 26 a) Congestion Pricing 26 b) Rail Rapid Transit 28 c) Intermediate Public Transport 30 d) Land-use Planning 33

III - Selected Examples 34 a) Calcutta 34 b) Caracas 37 c) Bogota 40

IV - Summary 43

Chapter Three DEVELOPMENT OF THE JITNEY 45

I - Evolution of the Jitney 49 a) The Jitney Era of 1914 49 b) The Demise of the Jitney 54 c) Atlantic City & San Francisco 56

II - The Jitney in Developing Countries 61 a) General Characteristics 61 b) Por Puestos of Caracas 67 c) Jeepneys of Manila 69

III - Summary 73 - v -

Chapter Four TRANSPORT IN MEXICO CITY 76

I - Historical Development 82

II - Contemporary Situation 91 a) Trams and Trolley Coaches 92 b) Metro 95 c) Motor Buses 101 d) Taxis 106

III - Overview 109

Chapter Five THE PESEROS OF MEXICO CITY 113

I - Service and Operation 117 a) Route Coverage 117 b) Operational Characteristics 120 c) Service Characteristics 131

II - Administration and Organisation 136

III - Pesevo Economics 137 a) Costs and Revenue 137 b) Future Prospects 142

IV - Socio-Economic Analysis 145 a) Drivers 148 b) Passengers 156

Chapter Six SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 176

Footnotes 181

Glossary 183

Bibliography 184

Appendix 1 192

Appendix 2 193 - VI -

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 Transport Data for Selected Cities 12 Table 2 Distribution of Vehicles in Selected Cities 13 Table 3 Traffic Speeds in City Centres 14 Table 4 Walking and Motorised Transport in Selected Cities 16 Table 5 Financial Position of Public Transport Systems 18 Table 6 Comparison of Private and Public Bus Operations in Bangkok 21 Table 7 Characteristics of Urban Travel by Different Modes 23 Table 8 Energy Consumption of Different Urban Transport Modes 24 Table 9 Prerequisite Conditions for Rapid Transit '29 Table 10 Motor Gasoline Prices and Taxes in Selected Third World Cities 38 Table 11 Travel Patterns by Income Groups in Bogota" & Hong Kong 42 Table 12 General Characteristics of Para-transit Modes 48 Table 13 Economics of Jitney Operation in 1915 53 Table 14 Characteristics of Atlantic City and San Francisco Jitney Systems 58 Table 15 Estimated Operating Expenses of Atlantic City Jitneys 60 Table 16 Characteristics of Major Third World Jitney Systems 63 Table 17 Vehicle Cost and Operating Parameters 66 Table 18 Daily Trips Generated by Dwelling Unit in Caracas According to Automobile Ownership 70 Table 19 Manila Bus and Jeepney Costs 72 Table 20 Population of Mexico City 78 Table 21 Comparison of Fares on Public Transport Modes in Mexico City 97 Table 22 Mexico City Transport Demand 104 Table 23 Inventory Of Taxi Services in Mexico City 108 Table 24 Motor Vehicle Registration in the Distvito Federal' 110 Table 25 Modal Comparison of Public Transit Services in Mexico City 111 Table 26 Characteristics of Authorised Pesevo Routes 121 Table 27 Characteristics of Tolerated Pesevo Routes 122 Table 28 Criteria for Evaluating Pesevo Service Characteristics 126 Table 29 Vehicle Comparison of Headway and Demand Levels 129 Table 30 Time and Fare Comparisons, Mexico City 133 Table 31 Sample Modal Choices for a Trip from La Villa to Pedregal with Time and Cost Comparisons 134 Table 32 Pesevo Operating Costs 138 Table 33 Route 26 Fare Structure 140 Table 34 Results of Driver Interviews 149 Table 35 Fare Structures on Routes Studied 154 -vii -

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure 1 Full Cost Comparisons of Inner-city Modes: Base Hour 65 Figure 2 Full Cost Comparisons of Inner-city Modes: Peak Hour 65 Figure 3 Change in the Rate of Bus and Pov Puesto Trip Production due to Automobile Ownership Increase 70 Figure 4 Population of Mexico City 78 Figure 5 Map of Original Street Railway Lines in Mexico City 84 Figure 6 Map of Mule-tram Lines in 1880 86 Figure 7 Map of Major Urban Thoroughfares 94 Figure 8 Map of Ejes Viales (New Arterial Roads) 96 Figure 9 Cross Section of Mexican Eje Vial 97 Figure 10 Current and Proposed Trolley Coach Network, Mexico City 98 Figure 11 Map of Metro and Tram Lines 100 Figure 12 Map of Current and Planned Metro Lines 102 Figure 13 Ridership of Mexico City Metro 103 Figure 14 Modal Split of Transport Demand in Mexico City 105 Figure 15 Map of Current Motor Bus Lines, Mexico City 107 Figure 16 Map of Original Pesevo Routes 115 Figure 17 Map of Pesevo Route Coverage 118 Figure 18 Map of Major Pesevo Services 124 Figure 19 Demand Threshold and Headway of Pesevo Services 128 Figure 20 Plot of Average Fare vs. Route Length 130 Figure 21 Map of Route 26, Main Branch, and Fare Structure 140 Figure 22 Plot of Route Length vs. Revenue/kilometre 141 Figure 23 Pesevos as a Transport Firm 143 Figure 24 Map of Pesevo Routes Chosen for the Study 147 Figure 25 Aggregate Results of Passenger Survey 157 Figure 26 Passenger Survey Results - Trip Purpose 161 Figure 27 Passenger Survey Results - Occupation of Riders 162 Figure 28 Passenger Survey Results - Age of Respondents 164 Figure 29 Passenger Survey Results - Sex of Respondents 164 Figure 30 Passenger Survey Results - Frequency of Pesevo Use 165 Figure 31 Passenger Survey Results - Modal Transfer for Completion of Trip 165 Figure 32 Passenger Survey Results - Passenger Acceptance of Vans 167 Figure 33 Passenger Survey Results - Deficiencies of Pesevos 168 Figure 34 Passenger Survey Results - Automobile Ownership 171 Figure 35 Passenger Survey Results - Reasons for Choosing the Pesevo 173 Figure 36 1 Passenger Survey Results - Alternate Mode Choice • 174 - vi i i -

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many people have assisted in many ways during the preparations, fieldwork, background research and completion of this study. In Mexico

City, thanks go to officials of the Direocidn General de.Polioia y

Trdnsito, the Sistema de Transportes Electrioos, the Sistema de Transporte

Coleotivo, and especially to Hugo Gonzalez Jimenez, of the Comisidn de

V-ialidad y Transporte Urbano. The help of Dr. Jorge Padua, Centro de

Estudios Sooioldgicos, El Colegio de Mexico, and the faithful participa• tion of Agustin Guzman Pe>ez, President of pesero Route 29, his family, colleagues and.drivers is greatly appreciated. Heliodoro Manzano Mendez deserves a particular mention of appreciation for his undying moral support and helpful comments.

In Vancouver, the ongoing comments of Drs. Ken Denike and Setty

Pendakur, as well as background material supplied by Wally Atkinson, N.D.

Lea & Associates, Transportation Consultants, were very useful. Finally, special debts of appreciation are owed to Dr. Alf Siemens and to Dr. Terry

McGee, my adviser, for their continuing inspiration and invaluable guidance throughout the study. PROLOGUE

Carlos gets up at six o'clock every morning and is out of the

house by 6:30. It's a ten-minute walk down to the main street, through

the early morning mist and smog. The industrial plants to the north

have been going strong for half an hour already, their plumes of exhaust

merging with the haze floating over the city. Sleek jets roar overhead

in their final descent to the nearby international airport. Vendors on

the street are selling soft drinks and coffee, as well as taoos and tortas. He buys a couple and bolts them down. Carlos knows that the taoos sold in the streets are not sanitary and can contribute to all

kinds of intestinal diseases, but when there's no time to have a bite of

breakfast in the morning, well, those vendors do a booming business.

Carlos lives in the Colonia Aragon, some six or seven kilometres

northeast of the Zocalo, Mexico City's central square. He rents a small

room in his father's house, attends classes at the university, and has ambitions of one day becoming a journalist. Even though his father did

not approve of Carlos going to college, he has since resigned himself to

carry on his printing business without his son's support. So Carlos must work hard every evening at a job he is proud to have, stocking shelves

and cleaning up at a supermarket in Polanco, a few kilometres northwest

of Chapultepee.

Travelling back and forth between these places is an ordeal in

itself, however, because Mexico City is a very large place and Carlos competes against about ten million other people every day, who are also - X -

trying to get to work or school, desperate to keep their heads above water financially or, if really ambitious, to elevate their social status somewhat. Carlos has determination in this respect, and is the first of his family to complete secondary school.

The university campus is a long way from his home. He could move into a place that's closer, but he likes living at home with his family since the rent is cheap and all his friends are there, plus there's always a meal waiting when he gets home from work late at night. Carlos has been thinking of saving up to buy a car, but they're too expensive and he doesn't savour the idea of having to drive in that mad traffic.

His sister's friend offered him an old car a few months ago, but there just isn't any safe place to put it.

The buses cost two pesos, but that isn't cheap when it takes four of them to get to school. They're always full anyhow, and it would take another fifteen minutes to walk back to the terminal, the only place where seats are still available. But even that isn't worthwhile because there are additional costs. The organ grinder makes his living at the bus terminals, as does the motley group of street musicians, singers and amputees that makes it on the buses to beg and steal on the way to the

Metro Station.

The trolley coaches are cheaper, but they're so slow and unreliable

that it isn't even worth waiting. Invariably, within about ten minutes of standing on the curb, a -pesevo with a vacant seat comes by, and Carlos

takes it. He has learned to look for the drivers holding their hand out the window and indicating with their fingers that there is still room in - xi -

the car. He now has a seat, doesn't have to be afraid of pickpockets and he'll be at the Metro station in no time. Sure, it costs three times the bus fare, but who wants to spend all day just travelling around in crowded, smelly buses?

The next step is for Carlos to try and get himself into the Metro train. It usually isn't too bad, since he's only two stops from the end of the line, but a seat is a luxury that's never to be had. Once down• town, Carlos rolls out of the train at Pino Suarez, moving along with the seething mass of humanity to transfer to a southbound train for

Taxquena. It's a reasonably long way from the one platform to the other, but the Metro, once on board, is the fastest and most economical way of getting about. From Taxquena it's a choice of a fifteen-minute, six-peso ride on a pesevo, or a half hour for two pesos on a bus. Depending on the time and on how much money he has in his pocket, Carlos makes a decision. More often than not, he chooses the pesevo, because otherwise he wouldn't make it for the first class.

This is how Carlos spends the first two hours of every day, and his case is far from being atypical. Some day, perhaps, he'll own a car, but in the meantime Carlos relies on the pesevos. Without them he would never make it from school to work in time to start his job, and given the choice that he has, Carlos feels it's worth the extra expense. CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION - 2 -

Every year until the close of the 1970-85 period, a population estimated at 8,766,000 persons will be incorporated into the cities of Latin America. Every year between 1985 and the year 2000, a population estimated at 11 million to 12 million per• sons will be absorbed into these same cities and into other new cities that may be built. This accelerated urban growth is due to the persistence of a high rate of natural population increase and to migrations from rural areas to the main metro• politan areas and medium-sized cities. (Preface to Hardoy, 1975, p. vii).

As an increasingly large proportion of the world's population is living in cities and, more recently in urban agglomerations, so more and more of man's problems are found in these areas. This has particularly been the case in developing countries, where the extremely rapid rate of population growth, coupled with a shortage of financial and technical resources as well as the political will to meet the increasing require• ments of urban expansion, has resulted in serious problems with respect to housing, employment and transportation.

At the same time, however, this growth has helped to alleviate a growing surplus of rural labour which is being displaced by the increasing capitalisation and mechanisation of agriculture. The cities have in fact shown themselves capable of absorbing much larger amounts of additional labour than would have been expected several decades ago, or than is reflected in most statistical data on employment in Third World cities.

Admittedly this labour has a very low productivity by Western standards, but it nevertheless provides a level of satisfaction, a standard of living and a contribution to society that is generally higher than in the case of either marginal rural labour or gross unemployment (World

Bank, 1975). - 3 -

In spite of the large volumes of rural-urban migration, a positive net growth in the rural population of developing countries is still expected. The ability of rural areas to provide increased employment seems highly doubtful, however, since pressure on land is already severe, and expansion of cultivable areas is becoming increasingly difficult.

Problems such as expanding deserts, soil erosion and deteriorating soil fertility as well as greater mechanisation of agriculture do not provide an optimistic outlook for employment away from the cities. Urban develop• ment will therefore have to play a very important role in continuing to absorb a large part of the overall rise in population.

The role played by transportation in providing the mobility and accessibility to keep the urban economy functioning is a paramount one.

The efficiency of an urban transport system is a substantial indicator of the productivity and livability of a city (World Bank, 1975). While urban transport serves the city by enabling people to travel between different parts of the urban structure, it is too often taken for granted, not only by its users, but by city governments and urban planners as well.

The importance of transportation must be sufficiently recognised by those in charge of planning urban development to assure a continuity between sheer growth in transport demand and the provision of an adequate infra• structure to' cater to these needs.

The circulatory system of the human body can serve as a fitting analogy. Blood vessels supply the body's organs with their vital require• ments and dispose of their wastes; without them the body cannot function.

As the body grows in its formative years, so the veins and arteries - 4 -

expand to accommodate a larger flow. If they become clogged or congested, the normal operation of the body's functions is impeded and efficiency declines rapidly. Similarly, as the morphology of a city is composed primarily of buildings and transport (the latter occupying some 30 to 40 per cent of land in the city centre), the activities of the city cannot exist independently of the transport facilities connecting them. "The physical structure of the city, its size and spread, its way of life and character are all dependent on the nature and quality of the transporta• tion system" (Thomson, 1977, p. 16). If the main transport routes in a city become clogged or congested, mobility within the city is reduced, placing greater strains on the urban economy as congestion increases.

The rapid growth of cities in the Third World has had its greatest impact on urban transport in the largest cities. Here, the average length of intraurban trips is much greater than in smaller cities, thus requiring extensive motorised transportation systems to^permit the move• ment of people and goods between various locations. Whereas in a small city virtually every point can be reached on foot or by bicycle within reasonable time, large cities depend to a much greater extent on motorised modes, which permit higher average speeds. As a result, congestion and pollution as well as the effects of an energy shortage have taken on much more serious and widespread proportions than in smaller cities

(Linn, 1979).

The major arteries of many large Third World cities have, in fact, reached levels of congestion that severely restrict movement, largely as a result of an extremely rapid rise in automobile ownership. This - 5 -

increase, due in large part to rising per-capita incomes, is also causing a substantial growth in energy consumption, in pollution levels within

the urban area, and in the consumption of valuable land, especially in

the inner city. Furthermore, as traffic congestion increases, speeds decrease, and the amount of time consumed for transport purposes takes

up a larger and larger part of the day. This is remarkably the case in

Latin American cities, where a greater use of motorised transport has

evolved, resulting from higher levels of economic development than are

found in most Third World countries.

The evolution of a literature dealing with the problems of urban

transportation in developing countries is relatively recent, and neces•

sarily interdisciplinary in nature. The majority of this material has originated in fields such as engineering, urban planning, commerce and

economics; very few geographers have concerned themselves with these

questions. Since transportation is a measure of the relations between

areas, be they continents of the world, cities within a region, or

neighbourhoods of a city, it is without doubt an essential part of the

study of geography (Ullman, 1954). In spite of the definite emergence

of a "developmental" or "Third World" geography, frequently concerned with problems of urbanisation and urban development, this subfield has

rarely crossed paths with the branch of geography associated with urban

transportation1. Thus, geographers who are interested in the problems

of urban transport in the developing countries have found it necessary

to look to other disciplines for what little literature has been

produced. - 6 -

One of the main reasons for the lack of research has been the scarcity of readily available data. While some statistics are usually available for the well-organised and publicly owned transport operations, the most difficult to obtain concerns those transport services operated by private enterprise. Among these, it is the intermediate forms of urban public transport, such as jitneys and shared taxis, that have been least extensively researched (Fouracre, 1977). This is in spite of the definite potential and widespread success that jitneys have in the cities of developing countries, for "jitneys are among the more promising forms of future passenger transport" (Bendixson, 1974, p. 197).

It is in this context that the present study attempts to make a small step towards filling the gap in the literature on urban transport in developing countries and in particular the role of jitneys in such settings. The objective of the study is therefore to examine the oper• ational characteristics of a jitney system in one rapidly-growing Latin

American city. Mexico City is ideal for this purpose, being the largest urban area in the region, and possessing a public transport system that includes a very extensive network of jitney routes, about which there is very little information. In the process, it is intended to shed some light on the economic and operational characteristics of the service as well as on the relationships that exist between the service and both its drivers and its users.

In order to provide an appropriate background, an overview of the basic problems of urban transport in developing countries is presented in

Chapter Two, attempting to explain their existence as well as their nearly - 7 -

intractable nature. A series of commonly proposed remedies is discussed, with an evaluation of their strengths and weaknesses. Illustrative examples are drawn from several Third World cities, providing some

insights into how urban areas with different levels of affluence have

coped with their transport problems. A reasonable cross-section of

conditions that prevail in the developing countries is thereby provided.

Chapter Three reviews the origin and history of the jitney as a

form of urban transportation, and subsequently examines its role in

contemporary cities, particularly in the context of developing countries.

The first part of the chapter therefore looks at the rise and fall of the

jitney era in the United States, as well as outlining the two remaining

jitney operations in North America. The second part of the chapter

examines the general characteristics of jitneys in developing countries,

with examples from two of the world's largest jitney systems.

The fourth chapter serves as an introduction to the Mexican

situation. The evolution of the urban transport network in Mexico City

is traced through history from the early horsecars and trams to the

modern, high-speed subway. Current conditions are described, including

a summary of the characteristics of each mode of urban transport, in an

attempt to provide a base, from which the contributions of the jitney

system can be appreciated.

The actual study of the Mexico City jitneys is set forth in

Chapter Five. Here, a detailed analysis of the many aspects of their

operation and service is undertaken. Governmental regulation, industry

organisation and the economics of operation are examined. The results - 8 -

of passenger and driver interviews are interpreted, and an outline is provided for future research. 9

CHAPTER TWO

URBAN TRANSPORT

IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES - 10 -

Problems of urban transportation are not new in the world. In the first century A.D. the municipal government of Rome was obliged to relieve congestion in its streets by restricting vehicular traffic (with the exception of chariots and state vehicles) to the night hours. Rome was then She only true "big" city in the Western world, however, and for many centuries thereafter its transportation problem remained the exception rather than the rule. It was not until the process of indus• trialization was well under way in the 19th century that vehi• cular traffic began to present serious problems in cities... Not only are there now more big cities; some of them are tending to consolidate into huge megalopolitan networks, further compounding the comparatively elementary difficulties that faced the Romans. ...There is in fact no isolated "transportation problem" in the modern metropolis; there are problems of the spatial organ• ization of human activities, the adaptability of existing facilities and investments, and the needs and aspirations of the people in moving themselves and their goods. (Dyckman, 1965, p. 133).

Although each individual city has its own particular transport problems relating to topography, morphology, historical evolution, econo• mic base as well as other greatly variable factors, there are several general problems of urban transport that arise again and again from one city to another. It is these problems that this chapter serves to intro• duce, discuss and attempt to explain.

Since it is in the large cities of developing countries that the problems of urban transport are most serious, discussion in this chapter will limit itself to those Third World cities with more than 500,000

inhabitants.

I THE BASIC PROBLEMS

a) Congestion

Probably the gravest problem of urban transport in the contemporary

Third World city is traffic congestion. Yet this phenomenon is by no - 11 -

means peculiar to developing countries, but exists on an equivalent or even greater scale in Western cities. In spite of the fact that, for their size, cities of the developing world have the lowest levels of private automobile ownership (levels of motorisation are significantly lower than in developed countries - see Tables 1 & 2), congestion seems to be much more apparent. The reasons for this are that transport infra• structures in Third World cities have usually not been constructed on the same scale (proportion of surface area devoted to transport is less than in cities of the developed countries), urban populations are rising at a faster rate, a greater mix of different modes of traffic exists, and automobiles are operating in an urban structure which was often neither designed nor modified for them.

In many cases, conditions have deteriorated to the point at which

the functions performed by additional vehicles are outweighed by the overall speed reductions that they cause, due to the extra space consumed.

Although there are no reliable ways of measuring or comparing traffic

congestion other than as a reduction in average speeds, it seems that

there is a common tendency for peak-hour traffic speeds in central areas

to settle at around 12 to 16 km/h (Thomson, 1977; World Bank, 1975 -

see Table 3). This seems to be the lowest speed that motorists are

prepared to tolerate. In many cities (e.g. Mexico City, Lagos, Sao Paulo,

Bangkok), peak traffic volumes extend with little variation over periods

in excess of 12 hours per day. As congestion increases, the disincentive

to making road journeys becomes stronger, and the growth in the volume

of traffic tends to decline. In a way, then, congestion can operate as

an automatic regulator to the flow of traffic in a city, but the speeds - 12 -

TABLE 1

TRANSPORT DATA FOR SELECTED CITIES (in order of per-capita income)

CITY Popu• Per . Autos Rate MODAL SPLIT OF M0T0RISED TRIPS lation capita per. of (per cent) (those under• in income• 1000 auto lined are used (US$) people growth Auto Bus Other All Public. as examples in 1970 (1970) .(1970) 1960-70 Public Autos Section III of (106) Trans• this chapter)- (%) port

Buenos Aires 8.4 1800 73.9 12.1a 17 60 23h 72.5 6.8 Caracas 2.3 1600 91.0 8.3 46 35 19e 54.4 18.3 Mexico City 8.6 1275 78.3 10.5 19 65 16e 81.0 9.0 Singapore 2.1 1100 73.0 6.7 24 43 33g 67.3 24.9 Beirut 0.6 1000 153.0 9.1 60 10 30 i 47.3 33.3 Teheran 3.6 950 44.4 15.4a 37 42 21i 63.0 21.0 Hong Kong 3.4 850 26.2 7.1 22 55 23d 78.3 7.7 Casablanca 1.5 820 72.9 6.1a - - - - - Istanbul 2.8 810 21.0 12.2 57 28 15f 43.3c - Sao Paulo 8.4 785 62.3 - 26 60 14f 73.7 8.4 Boqota 2.6 760 22.0 - 17 71 12h 83.3 12.6 Dar es Salaam 0.4 710 33.0 - 7 40 53f 17.7c - Kinshasa 1.1 660 - - 33 58 9i 23.6c - Kuala Lumpur 0.8 660 51.9 11.3 47 35 18i 39.8 5.1 Lusaka 0.2 660 45.7 - 66 7 27h - - Lagos 1.4 555 22.8 15.5 12 - 88d - - Bangkok 3.1 525 49.7 12.0 29 59 12i 66.0 7.0 Abidjan 0.4 500 75.5 12.7a 40 47 13m - - Tunis 0.7 500 57.6 6.0 15 75 10k - - Nairobi 0.6 495 52.7 6.8a 72 28 - i - - Seoul 5.5 440 6.3 22.0 8 89 3i 95.2 ; i 21.0 San Jose" 0.4 430 47.9 10.9 23 74 3m - - Bombay 5.8 390 13.5 8.2 11 41 48g 89.3 9.3 Karachi 3.5 360 10.4 0.6a 16 63 21i - - Djakarta 4.3 325 18.0 8.8 29 49 22j - - Calcutta 7.4 270 13.0 7.2 8 34 58e 90.4 4.9 Madras 3.4 180 7.9 5.8 b 54 46j 56.0 5.0

Tokyo 14.9 2775 83.3 16.0 35 8 57g _ _ London 10.5 2550 222.0 5.2 59 24 17j - - Paris 8.4 3530 248.0 6.5 36 21 43d - - Washington 0.9 5390 316.0 2.0 68 32 - i - -

a - For the country and d - Data for 1965. i - Data for 1970. not the city. e - Data for 1966. j - Data for 1971. b - Included in "other". f - Data for 1967. k - Data for 1972. c - Excludes trips by g - Data for 1968. m - Data for 1973. public motorcar. h - Data for 1969.

(Sources: World Bank, 1975, pp. 68-69; and Owen, 1973, Annex Table No. 9) - 13 -

TABLE 2

DISTRIBUTION OF VEHICLES IN SELECTED CITIES (in percentages)

Two- Vehicles Motor wheeled Commercial on City Year Cars Buses vehicles* vehicles register

Bangkok 1970 54.9 1.4 26.7 17.0 100.0 Singapore 1971 51.9 0.9 35.0 12.2 100.0 Hong Kong 1971 67.0 5.1 10.7 17.2 100.0 Seoul 1970 56.8 7.8 1.5 33.9 100.0 Kuala Lumpur 1970 43.8 0.8 44.8 10.6 100.0 Djakarta 1969 39.2 2.3 49.2 9.3 100.0 Taipei 1969 20.1 0.5 74.3 5.1 100.0 Bombay 1969 65.3 1.1 15.0 18.6 100.0 Istanbul 1970 56.3 2.8 6.3 34.6 100.0 Teheran 1971 71.6 1.5 16.7 10.2 100.0 Caracas 1970 71.7 0.4 7.9 20.0 100.0 Bogota 1969 49.2 2.7 0.0 48.1 100.0 Lima 1970 66.5 4.6 9.9 19.0 100.0 Sao Paulo 1967 84.8 1.7 - 13.5 100.0 Mexico City 1971 83.0 1.4 6.0 9.6 100.0 Buenos Aires 1969 73.8 1.6 - 24.6 100.0 Casablanca 1970 40.3 0.2 45.5 14.0 100.0 Lagos 1969 59.0 2.4 17.9 20.7 100.0 Nairobi 1965 52.6 1.4 7.1 38.9 100.0 Dar es Salaam 1971 58.6 - 11.0 30.4+ 100.0

* - includes only motorised two-wheel vehicles. + - includes buses.

(Source: Owen, 1973, Appendix Table 4)

Due to the variety of sources, differences of definition and general weaknesses of collection, the data in Tables 1 and 2, though indicating orders of magnitude, have only limited comparability. - 14 -

TABLE 3

TRAFFIC SPEEDS IN CITY CENTRES

Car City centre traffic speeds Ownership (km/h) Year (103) Peak hour Off-peak times

Calcutta 1971 120 11-16 19 Manila 1968 278 11 - Singapore 1972 154 21 - Bogota 1969 56 - 19* Lagos 1972 55 10-13 - Mexico City 1975 929 - 12*

New York 1970 4,019 16 26 London 1971 1,600 21 20 Paris 1970 1,500 17 -

* - /All-day average. (Source: Thomson, 1977, p. 22)

which must be reached for this deterrent to be effective are usually lower than is considered to be acceptable. Traffic management agencies are thus pressured to increase road capacity in order to relieve the congestion. It must be realised, however, that there is a large and growing latent demand, consisting of trips that have been abandoned or shifted to less convenient times or routes due to acute congestion. As a result, additional traffic is generated very rapidly whenever increased capacity is provided. Traffic data can not reveal the dimensions of this latent demand, which undoubtedly exists on a larger scale in developing countries, mainly due to more severe congestion and a proportionately smaller road infrastructure. Due to this latent demand, the possibilities of reducing congestion are very limited, particularly as far as road expansion is concerned.

It is difficult to determine the exact effect that congestion has on a*city's inhabitants. Travel difficulties or costs may prevent or - 15 -

deter them from obtaining the work they want, from going to school, from shopping where they choose and from participating in the social and cultural activities that they like. Are people prevented from reaching the activities they want? To what extent can they live in the area they wish, subject of course to what they can afford? These questions are difficult to answer, particularly in a quantitative way. It is neverthe• less evident that congestion increases vehicle operating costs and thus the expense of transportation; it increases the time required, the dis• comfort involved and the pollution of the urban environment.

b) Non-motorised Modes

A problem rarely considered by planners, particularly when road expansion is taking place, is the lack of infrastructural facilities for

non-motorised traffic, especially pedestrians and bicyclists. Most alterations that are designed to improve a road for motor traffic are almost certain to make it worse for pedestrians: corners are shaved from

intersections; roads are widened and sidewalks narrowed; restrictions are

placed on pedestrian crossings; barriers are erected; time allowed for

pedestrians at traffic signals is reduced to a minimum; and in some

cities vehicle parking on the sidewalks is permitted. At the same time,

the overflow of pedestrians onto roads, such as occurs regularly in

Calcutta and many Third World cities, is viewed as a hindrance to motor

traffic, but results from inadequate sidewalk facilities. These problems

are especially evident in Third World cities, where fewer people can

afford motorised transport, and are forced to walk progressively longer

distances. For example, two thirds of all trips made in Kinshasa and - 16 -

TABLE 4

WALKING AND MOTORISED TRANSPORT IN SELECTED CITIES (1968-1972) (in percentages)

Public Private City Walking Transport Transport Total

Dar es Salaam 67 6 27 100 Kinshasa 63 9 28 100 Taipei 48 38 14 100 Nairobi 46 17 37 100 Singapore 39* 24 37 100 Seoul 27 67 6 100 Beirut 28 34 38 100

* - Walk and bicycle trips. (Sources: Bovy, 1975; and Jouzy & Nakkash, 1974)

Dar es Salaam are made on foot (World Bank, 1975); one third of all vehicles entering the central area of Madras are bicycles; and 46 per cent of all trips in Nairobi are made on foot (Mogridge, 1975 ' - see

Table 4).

The importance of non-motorised urban transport is particularly significant with respect to the growing numbers of low income residents engaged in what have been labelled "informal sector" activities. These include enterprises such as street vending and cottage industries, which are not part of any firm-based economy. Many of these activities are carried out in the home, or within a short distance of the home. Shanty- towns or squatter settlements occupying land illegally are often instru• mental in facilitating the location of homes close to informal employment, frequently consisting of various forms of hawking and peddling. The people engaged in these activities usually depend heavily on the availability of shelter in close proximity to income opportunities. - 17 -

It is likely that a close relationship exists between the proportion of urban trips made on foot and the proportion of the population engaged in informal sector activities.

Government policy plays a major role in influencing the mobility as well as the overall welfare of the poor. Eradicating shantytowns that have grown close to central business districts and forcing the inhabitants to move to the outskirts divorces them from their livelihood. In extreme cases, "people...sleep in the downtown streets of Karachi, Calcutta and other cities of South Asia...not because they cannot find shacks on the periphery, but because they cannot afford the cost in money or time for daily travel to their homes. Many have dwellings on the city outskirts and visit their families once a week" (Grimes, 1976, p. 27; quoted in

Linn, 1979, p. 180). Urban transport policies such as the banning of beeaks, or trishaws, in Djakarta can also substantially reduce mobility as well as employment opportunities (Linn, 1979).

In spite of the importance and predominance of non-motorised modes of urban transport in developing countries, they are rarely considered by planners in the same context as automobiles and roads. The vast majority of urban transportation analyses has been based on engineering concepts and models attaching importance only to motorised journeys. Data on the contribution of non-motorised modes to the overall urban transport picture are rare and difficult to find.

c) Public Transit

Public transit2 systems in most Western cities are heavily subsi•

dised by various levels of government, and it is an accepted fact in the - 18 -

TABLE 5

FINANCIAL POSITION OF PUBLIC TRANSPORT SYSTEMS

Financial Result City Date Organisation (fe 106) Notes

Boston 1970-1 M.B.T.A. - 20 Property tax subsidy Chicago 1970-4 C.T.A. - 20 State grant awarded Copenhagen 1971 K.S. - 4 Subsidy from power rev. Hamburg 1967-9 H.V.B. loss Grants for capital exp. London 1973 L.T. - 8 Capital debt write-off New York 1970 N.Y.C.T.A. - 33 Loss due to subway New York 1970 L.I.R.R. - 16 Cap. & operating subsidy Paris 1973 R.A.T.P. -104 Pays heavy taxes San Francisco 1971 M.U.N.I. - 8 Federal capital grants Sydney 1970 B.T.D. - 4 Grants from government Tokyo 1969 T.R.T.A. - 3 Govt, loans and grants Toronto 1971 T.T.C. - 1 Municipally subsidised

Bogota" 1969 23 bus cos. surplus Must be profitable Calcutta 1966-7 C.S.T.C. + 0.2 Buses; heavily taxed Calcutta 1966 C.T.C. n.a. Trams; heavily taxed Hong Kong 1971 Private cos. surplus All privately owned Karachi 1970 K.O.S. - 1.2 Normally covers costs Lagos L.C.T.D. surplus Covers costs; pays taxes Manila Private cos. surplus Must be profitable Singapore Private cos. surplus Profitable Teheran T.B.C. - 3 May not raise fares

(Source: Thomson, 1977, p. 40)

developed countries that public transport is unable to meet its costs

(see Table 5). This is particularly true where car ownership is highest.

Subsidies are justified on the basis that public transport allows urban

land to be devoted to more productive uses than moving automobiles, and

provides considerable overall savings as compared to financing more

expensive modes (Thomson, 1977). The difficulty for transit services to

make ends meet stems largely from the facilities and infrastructure

required to serve peak-hour demand. A great inefficiency results from - 19 -

maintaining costly equipment and employing expensive labour to operate a service that is used for an average of only 25 to 30 hours per week.

Yet in the developing countries, many urban transport systems are required to meet expenses or even operate with a profit and pay taxes

(see Table 5). This is possible because of the low labour costs involved, increased efficiency due to competition between private operators and high load factors. In many cities (e.g. Bogota", Mexico City, Hong Kong) a large mid-day peak exists, allowing full service to remain in operation for practically all daylight hours. In most cases, however, fares are fixed by regulatory agencies and may not be raised, causing a great financial strain on the operator and resulting in poor maintenance and old, obsolete equipment. Capital for expansion and vehicle replacement is rarely available. The result is that large proportions (one third is not uncommon) of bus fleets are often immobilised and capacity is insuf• ficient, causing great overcrowding during peak periods. Traffic con• gestion on roads reduces efficiency by limiting speeds of operation; and frequent bus breakdowns, due to maintenance neglect and unavailability of spare parts, simply aggravate the congestion.

Buses typically account for two thirds of all motorised trips in

Third World cities, and in some cities 80 per cent (see Table 1). Yet service is frequently not available to squatter settlements, which are often located on the outskirts. This only tends to aggravate income maldistribution by precluding participation of squatters in many employ• ment opportunities. Subsidies for public transport could allow service improvements, but even a small subsidy per passenger is very expensive.

In addition, care must be taken to avoid financial irresponsibility, - 20 -

which often follows the introduction of subsidisation formulas.

Squatter settlements are makeshift areas of substantial new population growth, usually lacking in essential services. Due to their illegal nature, bus service is often not provided to the squatters when• ever public agencies are involved, either as direct operators or through subsidisation. Where private operators exist, it is these that serve the squatter settlements. It has been shown that in those Third World cities where public and private organisations both operate bus services at the same fare, private operators provide equivalent if not superior services without subsidy and public operators require massive subsidisa• tion3 (Feibel & Walters, 1980). Table 6 illustrates the relative effi• ciency with which private operators provide bus service in Bangkok. Much of the inefficiencies of public operators are due to diseconomies of scale such as large managerial and administrative staffs as well as fare leakage (pilferage) and general inefficiency of operation encouraged by the availability of subsidies. Criticisms that are often made against private bus operators in developing countries include a lack of insurance, participation in black market activities, low wages with no job security, poor driving habits and poor equipment maintenance. However some of these are clearly not generally true, and others can be equally strongly applied to many public operators. Most arguments suggesting that levels of service deteriorate when privately-owned buses operate have in fact been discredited by empirical evidence (Feibel & Walters, 1980).

In several Third World cities, intermediate forms of public transport (jitneys, minibuses, fixed-route shared taxis, etc.) have filled the gap between poor bus service and the high cost of automobile - 21 -

TABLE 6

COMPARISON OF PRIVATE AND PUBLIC BUS OPERATIONS IN BANGKOK, 1979

Private Bus Public Bus (BMTA)

Fleet Size approx. 10^000 buses; approx. 4,000 buses; average 21 seats; average 33 seats; = 210,000 seats = 132,000 seats

Ridership* 1% of vehicle-trips; 4% of vehicle-trips; 8% of person-trips; 56% of person-trips; peak load factor = 100% peak load factor = 150%

Fare One Baht One Baht

Operational no effective regulation, approx. 220 km/day Features direct competition

Staffing 2 on board 2-3 on board; approx. 6 employees per bus

Profitabijity profit making revenue covers 72% of cost - 352m Baht subsidy

* - According to 1978 cordon count (estimates). This must under- represent the private buses, since more of these operate than the larger public ones. (Source: Feibel & Walters, 1980, p. 14)

ownership. These facilitate a better tailoring of speed, comfort and

fares to income levels, taking some of the pressure off the overcrowded,

inefficient bus service and providing a competitive alternative to the

private car. Unfortunately, most cities have powerful regulations

prohibiting or severely restricting such operations, ostensibly to

protect the public transport (bus and tram) operators from undue compe•

tition. These intermediate services are much more in evidence in the

cities of developing countries, due to the wide gap between service

levels and to somewhat less stringent regulations. - 22 -

d) The Automobile

Many of the problems outlined above are either resultant from or exacerbated by the extravagant use of road space per passenger of private cars (see Table 7), imposing heavy costs on other road users that are not adequately reflected in the user charges. Although levels of private automobile ownership are still relatively low in the cities of the developing world, they are rising rapidly (frequently many times faster than already high rates of city population growth - see Table 1). This is particularly evident in Latin American cities, due to higher incomes and a burgeoning middle-income group.

Table 8 illustrates that private automobiles are also by far the least energy-efficient of all conventional forms of urban transport.

Not only do they consume more energy per passenger, but they also create more pollution and use up more space. The average car is in motion only a very small percentage of the time and needs several times its actual size in parking and storage facilities, at the beginning and end of each journey. Parking difficulties are greatest in the central city, where the largest numbers of cars accumulate and the least amount of space is available.

Clearly the economics of private automobile ownership have not been equitably worked out. The problems created by extensive automobile use have a cost which needs to be paid somewhere. Licence fees, road taxes, fuel taxes and parking charges are examples of ways of making the user pay, but it is often still the non-motorist that suffers in the end, as a result of reduced pedestrian facilities, congestion, accidents and - 23 -

TABLE 7

CHARACTERISTICS OF URBAN TRAVEL BY DIFFERENT MODES

(Number of passengers Persons per Total costs Veh. oper. Right-of-way in parentheses) foot-width per person cost/person capital cost per hour* (US t/km) (US

Footway, 1.2 m wide 1,100 negligible 0.0 2 Bicycle track, 1.2 m 450 0.3 0.0 50

Urban street, 7.2 m wide Car & driver 29 10.9 8.1 120 Speed Taxi (4) 120 2.8 2.1 120 15 km/h Minibus (10) 150 1.8 1.2 120 Bus (30) 300 1.3 1.1 120

Urban street 13.3 m wide - Car & driver 55 10.7 9.1 120 Speed Taxi (4) 220 2.7 2.4 120 25 km/h Minibus (10) 280 1.8 1.5 120 Bus (30) 550 1.4 1.2 120

Metro/Subway (22,500 1,700a 2.4b 0.4 4,400 per hour)

* - /Assumes that minibus occupies 2 passenger car units; bus 3; and taxi 1. t - Includes depreciation and interest charges. Taxis are assumed to cost the same as cars, plus 70C/hour wages. Speed reduction from 25 to 15 km/h is assumed to raise operating costs by 12% for cars & taxis, 15% for minibuses, and 20% for buses. + - 2,000 hours/year utilisation; infinite life; 12% per year interest, a - Based on overall average loadings of Mexico City Metro of 62 persons per car. These are not maximum capacity, which can be in excess of 60,000 passengers per hour in crush conditions, b - Metro track is assumed to cost US$ 5,000,000 per lane-km, as in Mexico City.

(Source: World Bank, 1975, pp. 74-75) - 24 -

TABLE 8

ENERGY CONSUMPTION OF DIFFERENT URBAN TRANSPORT MODES (Litres per 100 passenger-kilometres)

Bicycle or pedestrian 0.3 Electric bicycle 0.7 Jitney van - 7 pass. 0.8 Suburban bus 1.1 Peak-hour subway 2.2 Small car - 4 passengers 2.8 Peak-hour city bus 3.0 Small car - 2 passengers 4.7 Off-peak subway 4.7 Off-peak city bus 7.0 Most cars - 2 passengers 9.4 Large car - 2 passengers 14.1 Large car - 1 passenger 28.6

(Source: Bendixson, 1974, p. 34)

environmental deterioration. In essence, the use of roads is virtually

free, since there is no accepted way of directly charging for the use of

costly urban roads, apart from tolls, which are seldom applied. If road

users could be charged as are rail users, for example, and if vehicle

owners had to pay compensation for the environmental nuisance they create, or loss of amenity they inflict on others, the situation would be entirely different.

These pricing deficiencies apply to all cities, of course, and

they are neither the fault of incompetent governments nor are they

peculiar to cities in developing countries. There are very few cities

in the capitalist world where the development of private transport has

been held at a very low level, and cities in developing countries are most

severely affected since those pricing mechanisms that have been success• fully developed are not applied. For example, some cities (such as - 25 -

Istanbul, Lagos, Karachi, Calcutta, Manila) make no charge for parking at all. Others (such as Hong Kong) don't rely heavily on revenues to curb demand, and enforcement is often difficult due to a lack of financial resources.

High import duties on cars as well as other controls restricting automobile ownership can be very effective in limiting the expansion of private urban transport. This has been implemented in most cities under socialist governments, as well as in such countries as Burma and Colombia

(Thomson, 1977), Unfortunately, however, most governments regard the general desire for car ownership as irresistible, and are under strong pressure from car owners, usually the most influential members of society.

In countries such as Argentina, Brasil, Mexico and Venezuela, which have already developed a substantial domestic automobile industry, there is an even stronger lobby favouring increased automobile use. Jobs, investments and political parties depend on the success of local industry, even if it is largely foreign-owned.

There are other solutions, however, to the problems of providing urban transport in developing countries, including congestion pricing, rail rapid transit, intermediate modes of public transport, and land-use planning. These and other commonly proposed alternatives, their strong points as well as their drawbacks are discussed in the following section. - 26 -

II GENERAL SOLUTIONS

a) Congestion Pricing

In those cities where traffic volume is great enough that each additional vehicle interferes significantly with the functioning of others, an improvement in efficiency could be made by making each vehicle bear the costs that its addition to the road imposes on the others. This practice is generally referred to as congestion pricing and is meant to eliminate all those trips whose value to persons making them is less than the value of the delays and extra operating expenses caused to others. Also included could be an element compensating for inconveniences to non-road users, such as noise, pollution and environ• mental degradation. Receipts could be used to subsidise public transit or to provide other social services.

The political, technical and logistical difficulties of implement•

ing and enforcing congestion pricing are clearly great, indeed often

insuperable. As a result, very few urban areas anywhere in the world have managed to put even a modest form of congestion pricing into practice.

It is interesting to note, however, that various estimates have indicated

that vehicles should typically pay at least one dollar per day; most often

several times this amount (World Bank, 1975). These calculations are

based on the cost per vehicle of expanding capacity enough to give relief,

and even this is hard to justify, given the tremendous latent demand

existing in most Third World cities. A second-best solution is simply

the imposition of higher general taxes or quotas on car ownership.

Several studies have shown that congestion and parking charges can reduce - 27 -

traffic flows by about one fifth, but since automobile ownership is frequently growing at 10 to 20 per cent per year (see Table 2, p. 13) with rising incomes, these can only be temporary measures (World Bank,

1975).

A very notable example of a comprehensive and effective urban transport policy that includes a successful form of congestion pricing has been implemented in Singapore. The main components of the policy are

(i) a recently introduced programme to alleviate congestion in the central city by combining an area licensing scheme for private cars with gradu• ated parking fees1*; (ii) control over motor vehicle ownership and use through various tax measures; (iii) an improved public transit system, based mainly on buses; and (iv) various traffic management improvements.

The significant impacts that this policy (in particular the area licensing scheme) has had include increased traffic speeds for all motorised traffic in the city centre; a major shift from the use of single-occupant cars to buses and carpools; as well as reduced pollution levels. Unfortunately, however, area licensing was only implemented during the morning peak period (7:30 - 10:15 a.m.), and has had little effect on traffic volumes in the afternoon or during the evening peak (Watson & Holland, 1978).

It must also be borne in mind that Singapore is a city state with a strong metropolitan government, a highly qualified staff and popular support for

combating issues such as rising congestion and environmental deterioration.

Logistically, the pre-existence of an effective vehicle registration and

licensing system was crucial to the success of the programme, as was a

plan that incorporated both a simplicity of regulation and flexibility in

implementation (Watson & Holland, 1978). The Singapore example is never- - 28 -

theless worth careful study, and can serve as a model for other Third

World cities, whose governments are able to clearly commit themselves to the enforcement of such a scheme.

b) Rail Rapid Transit

Any kind of restraint on the use of private automobiles can of course have little effect on acute traffic congestion unless alternative capacity is provided for those who are displaced. One of the most frequently proposed ways of providing this alternative capacity is the construction of high-speed, hig+i-capacity rail rapid transit (a subway or "metro"). Such systems may, in the largest Third World cities, be the most economical way of expanding transport capacity, but they have many problems and drawbacks that are especially salient in the context of developing countries. The capital cost for subway systems is very high, usually in the range of $10 to 20 million per kilometre (World Bank,

1975; Owen, 1973), placing them well beyond the reach of most Third World governments. Even when loans are available, rapid transit tends to con• tribute little to local employment since it is not labour intensive, relying mainly on high-technology components that need to be imported from the developed nations. Construction periods are long and are prone

to delays. Even once the system is in operation, maintenance costs are

high and most patrons still require bus or other feeder services at the

end(s) of their journeys, which continues to subject them to surface

traffic. The majority of subway patrons tend to be former bus passengers,

but the marginal amount of space vacated by buses will, without stringent

controls, rapidly be absorbed by more cars, thereby perpetuating the

congestion problem. - 29 -

TABLE 9

PREREQUISITE CONDITIONS FOR RAPID TRANSIT

Desired Minimum Primary Determinants Magnitude Magnitude

Urban area population 2,000,000 1,000,000 City centre population 700,000 500,000 City centre density (pop./km2) 8,400 6,000 CBD employment 100,000 70,000 CBD daily destinations/km2 180,000 90,000 Peak-hour persons leaving CBD 100,000 70,000

(Source: ,Owen, 1973, p. 59)

A very large initial demand is required for subway construction, due to the very high minimum capacity of metros, necessitating high density urban development and high traffic volumes in a well-defined corridor5 (see Table 9). A substantial off-peak volume is also desirable to help offset the costs of peak requirements. As a result, if mass transit is to be economically viable, it will result in load factors great enough to substantially reduce its attractiveness to the private car traveller. Rapid transit trains that are filled to crush capacity, for instance, will not provide a level of comfort sufficiently attractive to induce motorists to abandon the use of private automobiles. This is illustrated by the case of Mexico City, whose subway system was operating at full capacity throughout the day within five years of completion

(Alegria, 1975).

Although subways reduce traffic interference and ensure a certain degree of essential service by allowing public transit to proceed un• impeded, they are very inflexible and tend to promote the continuing concentration of economic activity. Unless massive operating subsidies - 30 -

are provided, not only to defray the original capital costs, but also to help pay for daily operating and maintenance expenses, trip costs for subway passengers will be well beyond the ability of the poor to pay.

An oft-proposed alternative to rail rapid transit is the construc• tion of exclusive rights-of-way for buses, which are cheaper and more flexible, but use much more surface area than subways. It has been shown that doubling the entire existing fleet of intraurban buses in developing countries (from 135,000 to 270,000) would cost no more than eight subway systems comparable to the Metro in Mexico City. The additional buses would be able to carry 135 million riders per day (assuming all are operating and carrying 1,000 passengers per day each), compared to a total capacity of 10 million passengers for the eight subway systems combined (Owen, 1973). None of these "mass transit" solutions can be expected to offer a suitable alternative to private car travel because they provide neither the speed (when origin-to-destination linked trips are considered), nor the comfort or convenience that make the car so popular amongst those who can afford it.

c) Intermediate Public Transport

The only form of public transport able to compete with the private car on these terms is the jitney, a taxi or van carrying anywhere from six to 15 people and operating on fixed routes at fares somewhat higher than those charged for bus and subway travel. Jitneys are able to operate at speeds comparable to those of the private car, since stops are only required for boarding when seats are available, and on request for alighting. A large bus takes much longer and does not guarantee a - 31 -

seat for all passengers. A jitney service can be started almost without delay, after relaxation of any legislation restricting such operations in favour of high-capacity transit. The jitneys are also flexible and cater precisely to consumer demand. By providing better service than normal buses at costs appreciably below those of the car, jitneys have become very successful in many Third World cities. They have low overheads and can provide jobs for a large number of semi-skilled people at wage rates below those of bus and subway employees, all of these factors adding to their popularity in many cities of the developing world (Bendixson, 1974)

As an example, in preparation for the introduction of an area road pricing scheme in Kuala Lumpur, a fleet of 400-450 16-passenger minibuses was introduced in 1975, in the expectation that some motorists would be lured out of their cars by better bus service. The flat fare on the owner-operated minibuses was M$0.40, compared to an average M$0.21 on the large, 50-seat buses. Although accounting for only 17 per cent of total bus capacity after introduction, the minibuses carried 30-35 per cent of the passenger trips and 50 per cent of the passenger kilometres.

This was due to the fact that the average trip length on the minibuses is more than double that by regular bus, resulting from the flat fare policy, which as a rule discourages short trips (Walters, 1979). Consi• dering the fact that the fleet of large.buses was reduced by 20 per cent resulting from the competition, this represents an overall increase of 50 per cent in the passenger kilometres of all buses, showing that overall ridership was considerably above previous levels. Patrons had not just shifted from one type of bus to another, but new riders had come from elsewhere. Following the introduction of the minibuses, bus transport - 32 -

capacity was expanded, service speed improved (as minibuses don't stop as often), service frequency increased and congestion reduced by inducing existing and potential motorists to forego their private car trips.

Even with assumptions that are substantially less favourable towards the minibuses and with considerably higher estimates of both financial and social costs, White (1981) concludes that a net benefit still results from the minibuses. They have other advantages in that they are labour intensive, providing more "productive" jobs in the private sector than the regular bus system. This employment is non- unionised, and an outlet is provided for entrepreneurship on a small scale. Capital and ownership are thus spread throughout the population rather than being concentrated in a few hands. Furthermore, it has been shown that the value of the benefits was US$ 10-million annually, or almost one per cent of per-capita income, and these benefits were not accrued due to special circumstances existing in Kuala Lumpur. "One may expect that similar acts of deregulation in other cities may produce benefits of a similar or even greater magnitude" (Walters, 1979, p. 38).

But large-scale jitney operations are still rare, existing in only a few cities of the developing countries, where they account for 20 per cent of all motorised trips (see Table 1, p. 12). Studies of Teheran's

2,000 jitneys have shown that the daily work performed by the city's

160,000 private cars could be accommodated by as few as 10,000 jitneys

(assuming 100 passengers per jitney per day) (Owen, 1973). Even if jitneys were substituted for only one third or one half of the private cars, a more realistic alternative, savings in resources and reduced congestion would •sti-TT be enormous. Thus, it seems, if an improved and - 33 -

widened array of public transportation services is promoted in conjunction with limitations on the use of cars, a serious attack on the problems of

urban transport in developing countries could be launched.

d) Land-use Planning

The real solution to the problems of urban transport, according to many planners and urbanists, is a non-transportation solution. Current

policies of urban planning are based largely on the assumption that existing traffic flows are rational. Less transport-intensive urban

patterns - locating homes closer to places of work and assuring prox•

imity of residential areas to the daily needs of the household - could substantially reduce the need for mobility within the city. Experience

has shown, however, that no planned communities have really achieved a

good balance between housing and employment; and most have done little or nothing to accommodate low-income families (Owen, 1972). In addition,

it must be realised that highly transport-dependent urban patterns have evolved as a result of the availability of a relatively very inexpensive and abundant form of personal transport: the automobile. As long as the automobile remains an affordable item, it will be very difficult to substantially alter urban form. When the operation of cars becomes pro• hibitively expensive, an increased reliance on public modes of transport will inevitably follow, eventually causing changes in urban form that adapt to an altered lifestyle. Further discussion of the relationship between urban form and transport planning will not be provided here, as this is considered to be beyond the scope of this study. - 34 -

III SELECTED EXAMPLES

A closer examination of the transport facilities of three Third

World cities - Calcutta, Caracas and Bogota - will serve to illustrate many of the problems outlined above as well as the ways in which these

cities have coped with progressively deteriorating conditions. Calcutta

represents one of the poorest cities in the world, with the vast majority

of its population relying on non-motorised transport. Caracas serves as an example of a relatively affluent Third World city, struggling to alleviate traffic congestion by building a delay-ridden subway system.

Finally, Bogota exemplifies a city in which a highly efficient bus system

is able to move the majority of the population, automobile ownership and per-capita income both being considerably lower than in Caracas (see

Table 1, p. 12).

a) Calcutta

Without doubt one of the poorest cities of the world, Calcutta has been described as having the worst overcrowding of buses, trams and streets anywhere, together with the lowest average speeds (Thomson, 1977).

The majority of the population lives in conditions of poverty and cannot afford any form of motorised transport - even the cheapest buses are beyond their budgets. Very little data exist on the actual volume of pedestrian traffic, but surveys in the heaviest transit corridors indicate that 35 to 50 per cent of person-movements are on foot6. Recognising the widespread availability of non-motorised vehicles and the importance of walking as a transport mode, it is striking how little attention has been given to facilities for bicycles and pedestrians in Calcutta. Due to - 35 -

their low speed and high flexibility of movement, pedestrians and bicycles require little in terms of infrastructures, capital expenditures, operating and maintenance costs (Bovy, 1975; Hirst, 1974). It is this simplicity that contributes the most to a general disregard for.this type of trans• portation in the face of the major technological, political and financial requirements of motorised modes. "Pedestrian movement efficiency and flexibility is, in a way, a handicap for this type of transport, since it allows faster, heavier and bigger transport technologies to dominate and get an overwhelming share of space in rights-of-way, leaving marginal left-over space for slower pedestrian and other non-motorised transport"

(Bovy, 1975, p. 6). Governments, it seems, generally tend to opt for more visible types of accomplishments such as freeways or mass transit projects than simpler and less prestigious bicycle or pedestrian improve• ment schemes.

Although studies have been carried out and recommendations issued for a rapid transit network in Calcutta, the more traditional forms of mass transit (trams and buses) have been operating very inefficiently.

Ridership on the Calcutta Tramways (a publicly owned body) had constantly been declining during the 1960s, due mainly to progressively poorer service with aging, badly maintained equipment. Derailments, for example, increased from 207 in 1959 to 513 in 1965 and 2,403 in 1969; overhead wire breakages also increased from 86 to 479 per annum in those ten years, although the average number of cars on the road per day decreased from 415 to 338 (Haider, 1977). Operational subsidies are being provided, but no money is available for capital investments. - 36 -

Until 1960, when all bus services in Calcutta were municipalised, most operations were privately owned and profitable. The new state-owned corporation expanded service and enlarged its fleet from 813 buses in

1961 to 1,324 in 1972 (Haider, 1977). Yet the average number of buses

on the road and the average number of passengers carried (both per day

and per bus) were steadily declining (average number of buses on the road was 615 in 1961 and 471 in 1972; average daily riders decreased from 1.3 million to 741,000 in the same period). Due to insufficient acquisition

of buses for replacement of aging ones, the city's transport services

deteriorated to a deplorable level. Only during its first year of opera•

tion did the Corporation's revenue cover expenses, with deficits growing

to 56.9 million Rupees in 1972. The State Government was forced in 1967

to reverse its previous move of nationalisation, and induced a large

number of private operators to re-enter the market (Haider, 1977). By

1978 about two thirds of the buses in Calcutta were once again in private

hands, operating profitably and contributing to a slight overall improve•

ment in efficiency (Feibel & Walters, 1980). The private buses in Calcutta

are "more evenly spaced, marginally more comfortable and less subject to

breakdown, and have 'better general appearance and performance' than

publicly owned buses" (Thomas, 1977, p. 19; quoted in Feibel & Walters,

1980, p. 12).

Since over 90 per cent of all motorised trips in Calcutta are made

by public transit (buses, trams, taxis, commuter railways), the automobile

has not (yet) caused substantial congestion. Rather, the cause has been

the great mixture of different modes of traffic on the streets. Bicycles,

rickshaws, animal- and hand-drawn carts share the same roadways with - 37 -

autos, buses, trams and commercial vehicles. The result is a confused mass of fast, slow and parked vehicles and, often, accidents. Beyond

that, pedestrian traffic usually overflows into the streets in overcrowded areas. What seems to be needed in Calcutta is a separation of motorised and animate traffic; in particular, better facilities for pedestrians.

The provision of such amenities would be far less expensive than a large- scale rapid transit network, the affordability of which must be seriously questioned when the majority of the population is unable to afford the cost of old, overcrowded buses.

b) Caracas

By way of contrast, Caracas is one of the wealthiest Third World cities (see Table 1, p. 12). Forty-six per cent of motorised trips in

1966 were made by private car, 35 per cent by bus and 19 per cent by pov puesto (jitney) and taxi. The only data relating to pedestrians suggest that these account for about 23 per cent of all trips7. The private car has assumed a predominant role in Caracas, due to the city's overall affluence as well as to one of the lowest retail prices of petrol in the world (see Table 10). But tremendous levels of traffic congestion have held the growth of traffic in check, with an increasing proportion of travellers being accommodated by a fleet of about 6,000 12 to 15-pas- senger vans operating on fixed routes. Although these pov puestos origi• nated as a response to very poor bus service, which has since improved, they have an accepted "status" level and are used by many people who refuse to ride the cheaper but slower and less comfortable buses (Kudlick,

1969). - 38-

TABLE 10

MOTOR GASOLINE PRICES AND TAXES IN SELECTED THIRD WORLD CITIES (US <£/litre for regular grade in 1971-72)

City Retail Price Local Tax

Caracas 2.4 0.2 Lima 2.4 n.a. Bogota 4.5 2.1 Mexico City 6.8 n.a. Teheran 8.9 n.a. Buenos Aires 9.2 5.3 Bangkok 9.3 4.3 Istanbul 11.0 n.a. Lagos 11.5 5.5 Seoul 11.7 6.5 Sao Paulo 11.8 4.7 Cairo 12.4 6.2 Dar es Salaam 13.4 6.5 Hong Kong 13.7 7.2 Nairobi 14.6 6.4 Casablanca 15.2 10.0 Singapore 15.6 9.9 Kuala Lumpur 16.1 10.1 Kampala 16.2 7.0 Bombay 19.7 15.3 Calcutta 20.2 15.7

Those cities underlined are used as examples in Section III of this chapter.

(Source: Owen, 1973, Appendix Table 12) - 39 -

The increasing congestion of traffic on the streets of Caracas led in the early sixties to proposals for the construction of a rapid transit network, to which the city's urban patterns are rather well suited, and the case of Caracas illustrates many of the problems associated with rail rapid transit. The final design for the first line was begun in April

1968, but actual construction did not get underway until about ten years later, with completion expected late in the 1980s. With the doubling of the city's population from 1971 to 1990, total motorised trips are expected to increase from 2.5 million to 6.4 million per day, half of whom are expected to use public transit, and the other half cars. There• fore, the Caracas Metro is said to be obsolete even before the first train operates. Most of the subway passengers will still rely partly on trans• fers to and from buses and pov puestos, so that the number of transit riders on surface streets will actually be two million more in 1990 than in 1971. These riders will have to contend with more than three times as many private cars, so that, although the Metro will accommodate more travel, congestion is expected to be worse than ever (Owen, 1972).

It is quite evident that the expansion of the pov puesto system is the one event that has allowed the city to remain mobile in the face of rising incomes, a rapidly growing population as well as continual delays in the subway construction schedule. "The success of the subway, therefore, will depend on improved bus [and pov puesto] transport and on measures to restrict automobiles to the extent necessary to enable the feeder...system to operate" (Owen, 1973, p. 64). It has been suggested that if such restrictions are politically feasible in conjunction with the subway, a more economical alternative may have been to restrict car use - 40 -

without a subway. With a much more efficient bus network that could operate on exclusive rights-of-way together with the por puestos , fares could be considerably lower than for the subway without the massive capital

investment. During peak hours (which may well include the mid-day period), automobiles could be confined to areas outside the centre and prohibited from the main east-west thoroughfare (Owen, 1973).

c) Bogota

In between the extremes of Calcutta and Caracas is Bogota, with a

1980 population of about 4.5 million and a per-capita income in 1970 of

US$ 760. Car ownership has traditionally been very low in Bogota, due in great part to Colombia having one of the highest import duties on auto• mobiles anywhere in the Third World (350% of purchase price - World Bank,

1975). This, together with the fact that most trips involve fairly long distances, has made the majority of residents dependent on buses (account•

ing for over 70% of all motorised trips).

Bogota has one of the largest bus fleets in the world, with 5,700 vehicles on 180 routes (UITP, 1975). There are 23 companies, all but one privately owned. The one operator owned by city council is neither dominant nor highly protected, owning less than five per cent of the entire city fleet. Although only one company is permitted to operate on any particular route, they share the same roads for much of their extent and there is great competition, especially in the city centre. Due to the flat fare and to the fact that drivers are paid a commission, short- distance riders are a lucrative business. The result is that there is a very even flow of bus service, as drivers try hard to avoid bunching. - 41 -

Passengers are usually picked up anywhere, not just at designated stops, and drivers sometimes deviate from the fixed routes to satisfy some local demand (Thomson, 1977).

Six minibus companies operate under similar arrangements, providing a faster and more comfortable service at slightly higher fares. In the early 1960s, the many small operators with one or two vehicles were forced to reorganise themselves, as licences would not be renewed to firms with less than 80 buses. Large co-operatives were formed to comply with the new regulation, but most buses still belong to individual owners who either drive themselves or appoint a driver (Thomson, 1977). This arrange• ment accounts for the high degree of efficiency and success of the bus operations in Bogota.

Traffic figures collected in Bogota serve well to illustrate the effect of incomes on urban travel modes. Table 11 shows that 55 per cent of all those trips taken by the poorest residents were on foot, 40 per cent by bus and only five per cent by taxi. Nobody used a car. Most middle-income families were able to afford the bus fare, 70 per cent taking advantage of the good service being offered. In the high-income group, however, 80 per cent travelled in automobiles and only 10 per cent used the buses (Owen, 1973). This type of travel pattern is typical of most cities in the developing countries, but statistics are very difficult to find, particularly when pedestrians are to be included.

Bogota is also considering the construction of a subway to alleviate the pressure on central roads. A lively political debate has ensued, largely resulting from a careful transport study carried out in 1974, - 42 -

TABLE 11

TRAVEL PATTERNS BY INCOME GROUPS

IN BOGOTA: Per cent of home-based trips, 1969

Income Group Walk Bus Taxi Car Total

Low 55 40 5 0 100 Medium 5 70 15 10 100 High 0 10 10 80 100

IN HONG KONG: Per cent of motorised trips, 1966

Monthly Income Public Private Total (HK $) Transport Taxi Car

0 - 300 88.4 5.6 6.0 100,0 1,001 - 1,500 67.6 9.7 22.7 100.0 2,001 - 3,000 37.3 9.9 52.8 100.0. > 5,000 14.9 12.8 72.3 100.0

(Source: Owen, 1973, p. 12)

which concluded that a subway would not be the most appropriate way to solve Bogota's transport problems (Linn, 1979). The city could perhaps benefit more by restricting auto traffic in order to provide exclusive rights-of-way for buses, thus enhancing an already effective surface public transit system. At the same time, an expansion of the minibus services into an extensive jitney operation could reduce the effect of rising numbers of cars on the circulation of traffic, particularly on the main arteries and within the central city. -43 -

IV SUMMARY

The problems of urban transportation in developing countries are characterised by several major difficulties: an intractable dilemma of acute traffic congestion in the most heavily travelled areas; the incom• patibility of pedestrian and motorised modes, competing for the same high-value urban land; the necessity for public transit to retain low fares in the face of rising operating costs; and, most important of all, the lack of financial resources needed to take any serious action towards solving or eliminating these difficulties.

Traffic congestion is a problem in almost all cities, but is considerably more severe in the developing countries. This is due to extremely high rates of population growth and urbanisation, together with an urban morphology that has not been designed to accommodate large num• bers of private automobiles. Congestion is exacerbated by the interference of pedestrians and motor vehicles, this being particularly objectionable when road facilities are expanded at the former's expense. A consideration for the needs of non-motorised traffic is imperative in Third World cities, since a large proportion of the population must travel outside the scope of motorised transport, simply due to poverty. Although public transit is heavily used, its capacity in most Third World cities is insufficient.

Rarely does any system operate profitably under public ownership, or when subsidised. Fares must be kept very low to make the service affordable to its users, and as a result service deteriorates, as does the quality of equipment used. - 44 -

Subways are a much-heralded solution to urban traffic problems, yet they are fraught with drawbacks. Their inflexibility, once completed, makes a decision irreversible. Their capital cost is prohibitive; they are very prone to delays; and they tend to shift traffic from space- efficient buses rather than from the private automobile. In order to coerce the car traveller away from his inefficient mode, a combination of serious congestion pricing programmes and a competitive intermediate form of public transport (such as an extensive jitney service - providing levels of speed, comfort and convenience comparable to those of the private car) must be provided. In this context, Singapore's scheme to limit auto• mobile use in the central city has led to a dramatic reduction in car traffic there, and a switch to public transport modes.

As far as patterns of urban morphology are concerned, it is argued that land-use planning in large Third World cities will, judging by past experience, not reduce man's dependence on urban transportation. It was the mobility facilitated by the car that shaped the expansion of cities, and it will take a radical change in the economics of automobile use to alter patterns of land-use towards less transport-dependent urban forms.

What is needed, it seems, is a solution individually tailored to the requirements and conditions of each particular city, comprising some form of congestion pricing closely linked to significantly improved public transport facilities that are not only financially affordable, but that simultaneously direct the improvements towards that sector of the urban population that is most in need. 45

CHAPTER THREE

DEVELOPMENT OF THE JITNEY - 46 -

Due to the very rapid increase in the urban population of develop• ing countries during the last few decades, as well as to the limited financial resources available for investment in urban facilities, some formidable transport problems have developed in the large Third World cities. A latent demand exists for public transport from poor members of society who currently walk or use a bicycle, as well as for automobile travel from those who presently use public transport. Any increase in real income levels has the effect of at least partially revealing this demand, and it follows that the urban public transport sector of most developing countries is a growing industry (Fouracre, 1977). In order to cater to the wide range of demands for transportation in the Third World city, it is an industry comprising more than just the conventional buses, trams and trains of developed cities. Intermediate forms of public transport have been devised that perform a substantial role within the urban transport sector. Such a system is usually composed of individually- controlled vehicles with a passenger capacity in between that of a taxi and a bus, able to have flexible routes and schedules without entirely sacrificing the efficiencies of large-scale operations: in short, jitneys.

"Jitney" is a rarely used word in the contemporary English vocab• ulary. Yet there is no other expression, with the possible exception of

"para-transit", which can convey the same meaning. Para-transit is a term that was first used in 1972 by the Urban Mass Transportation Admini• stration (UMTA) and the Federal Highway Administration of the United

States, referring to a wide array of urban passenger transport modes that can provide levels of service in between those of the private car and - 47 -

those of conventional public transit systems. Included are services such as car rentals, conventional taxicabs, dial-a-bus or dial-a-ride services, shared taxis, jitneys, carpools and specialised subscription bus and van services designed for commuters who have agreed to use them on a regular

basis (Kirby, 1976a). Para-transit has become a frequently used term amongst North American transportation planners and experts, and the general service characteristics of the various different modes of para-transit are summarised on Table 12.

Just as light rail transit (LRT)8 is a relatively recently coined expression denoting a somewhat modernised streetcar or tram service, so para-transit is little more than a fashionable term for what are essen• tially modified jitney and taxi services. While the new vocabulary may seem more acceptable to the North American urbanite of the 1970s and 1980s, the transport technology concerned dates back 60 to 100 years9. It is proven, well-established and reliable, and can therefore be implemented without long trial and testing periods.

In spite of the general nature of the term para-transit, when referring to North America or Europe it is most commonly used in associ• ation with dial-a-bus type services. In reference to developing countries, however, para-transit usually connotes some form of jitney service, and it is here that the main interest of this study lies. For these purposes, a jitney may be defined as a vehicle having between five and 15 seats that travels on fixed routes. A customer desiring service must walk to the route and hail a vehicle, or wait at commonly recognised boarding points.

Often, sign language is used between the customer and driver to indicate their destinations or number of seats available. Sometimes the jitneys - 48 -

TABLE 12

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF PARA-TRANSIT MODES

Para-transit Modes

Private Car Dial - Car Sub. Conven. Criteria Taxi Jitney Auto Rental a-ride Pool Bus Transit

Route: Direct (D); D D D I I I I I or Indirect (I)

Door to Door Service: Yes (Y); Y M Y Y N Y M N No (N); Maybe (M)

Ride shared (S); P P P S S S S S or personal (P)

Routes fixed (F); semi-fixed (S); V V V V F S S F or variable (V)

Access determined by prior arrange• ment (A); fixed H schedule (F); U U T H A A F telephone (T); T street hailing (H); or at user's discretion (U)

Parking required: Y Y N N N Y N N Yes (Y); No (N)

Convenient for luggage: Yes (Y); Y Y Y M M M M N No (N); Maybe (M)

(Source: Kirby et al., 1974, p. 9) - 49 -

can deviate a specified distance away from the route to drop off a passen• ger on request. The vehicles are usually four-door sedans or some form of van or microbus.

I EVOLUTION OF THE JITNEY

a) The Jitney Era of 1914

"Jitney", during the years preceding World War I, was a nickname

in the United States for the nickel, or five-cent coin. Later, the name was transferred to the original shared taxis that began operating in

American cities during the second half of 1914 (Bendixson, 1974). The

first jitney is said to have operated on the first of July, 1914, when

L.P. Draper of Los Angeles picked up a passenger in his Model "T" Ford,

drove him a short distance, and accepted a nickel as payment (Eckert &

Hilton, 1972). Later that year, during the depression following the onset

of World War I, high rates of unemployment sent many people searching for

jobs. Since the ordinances of Los Angeles permitted jitney operation,

provided only that the driver hold a valid chauffeur's licence, this was

an attractive source of alternative employment. By December 1914, the

movement had spread to San Francisco, and early in 1915 most cities with

mild climates in the American west and southwest had jitneys in operation.

As winter drew to a close, jitneys appeared in cities with more severe

climates, and the movement had literally swept the United States in a

period under ten months. An estimated number of 62,000 jitneys are said

to have been operating in cities throughout the country by mid-1915

(Eckert & Hilton, 1972). - 50 -

At this time, public transport in North America was monopolised by electric streetcar operators, whose rights to exclusive operation were protected by franchises. Fares were usually a flat five cents, regardless of distance, and transfers between lines were free. As a result, passen• gers riding shorter distances were in effect subsidising the longer- distance riders. Municipal governments were reasonably content with this arrangement since home-to-work distances could be increased, and therefore a broader and less concentrated urban area was possible. In 1906, electric street railways accounted for some 90 per cent of urban trips, and became the principal force in shaping the form of North American cities (Eckert

& Hilton, 1972).

The jitneys usually picked up passengers at streetcar stops, where a captive market was sure to be available, and transported them along the tram lines. Jitneys were most attractive to short-distance passengers, mainly because no transfers were issued, and partly because of the higher speeds offered. The tram operators understandably became concerned, as their most lucrative patrons were being "stolen" away. These short- distance riders accounted for a rapid turnover of passengers in the jitneys, counteracting the disadvantage they suffered in terms of labour costs.

It is interesting to note, however, that the jitneys' gross revenue was uniformly in excess of the streetcars' loss in revenue, suggesting that many of the jitney trips would otherwise have been made by taxi or on foot (Eckert & Hilton, 1972).

Unlike the streetcars, the jitneys were not tied to the rails or to franchise restrictions, so the breakdown of a single vehicle would not affect the continuation of regular service. Jitney drivers were able to - 51 -

deviate from their usual routes in order to deliver passengers directly to their destinations, usually for an additional fare. Some drivers used their vehicles for jitney service during peak periods, and as taxis at other times, while many of the operators worked only on a part-time basis. Some would drive as jitneys for an hour or two before and after work; others would work evenings only. One physician in Houston was reported to have owned a car in order to make night calls, allowing his teenage son to operate it as a jitney during the day. In June of 1915 the average number of jitneys in operation for the full day in Memphis was 90, yet 142 operated during the evening rush hour. Of the 714 active jitneys in Houston during February 1915, 62 per cent made only one or two round trips per day (Eckert & Hilton, 1972). It is therefore evident that the jitney was a form of public transport with the ability to be both directly and immediately responsive to varying levels of demand.

It did not take long for the jitneys' presence to be felt on the balance sheets of the street railway companies. By December 1914, Los

Angeles Railways were losing $600 per day in revenue and had found it necessary to lay off 84 motormen and conductors, and to withdraw 21 cars from service on six lines (Eckert & Hilton, 1972). The jitneys provided far more jobs than were being eliminated by the tram operators, however, and their net effect on the economies of the cities in which they ran was in most cases decidedly positive. Nevertheless, it was not difficult for the street railways to demonstrate that the jitneys were threatening them with immediate or potential ruin. The Seattle Electric Company, for example, estimated it was losing $2,450 per day in revenue to the jitneys, and the Puget Sound Traction, Light and Power Company anticipated 20.7 million fewer fares in 1915 than in 1914 (Eckert & Hilton, 1972). - 52 -

From a preliminary overview of the costs and revenues of jitney operation (see Table 13), it seems that they were uneconomic for the owner. Expenditures exceeded revenues, and this was sufficient to con• vince streetcar operators early in 1915 that jitneys were a phenomenon that would not be able to survive for long. Closer examination of the figures in Table 13 indicates, however, that the fixed costs included have likely been overestimated. For the part-time jitney operators, their fixed costs would be reduced by a considerable amount, since these drivers would already have owned a car and borne most of these expenses regardless of the fact that the car was being used for jitney operations.

Since virtually all jitney drivers owned their own vehicles, fixed costs such as superintendence, management, cleaning and housing of the vehicle could be performed by the driver himself, and therefore eliminated from the calculations. Interest and depreciation seem to have been overesti• mated, since the jitneyman's trade journal in April 1915 advised its readers to allocate $100 per year for depreciation. One could also rent a vehicle for jitney service for about $15 per month ($180 per year), so a figure of $140 annually for interest and depreciation seems reasonable

(Eckert & Hilton, 1972). By reducing the driver's wage to $300 per year, total daily costs come to $7.95, making the operation economically viable.

There would doubtless have been other ways for the jitneymen to reduce costs and increase their earnings, such as reducing the variable costs of operation. The development of specialised vehicles for jitney service also reduced depreciation costs, serving to contradict the predictions of the tram operators. - 53 -

TABLE 13

ECONOMICS OF JITNEY OPERATION IN 1915

(Estimates prepared by the Bureau of Fare Research, American Electric Railway Association)

Revenue: - $8.00 per day, based on 8 one-way fares per round trip @$0.05 each; 20 round trips per day over a 4-kilometre route.

Expenditures: - $10.60 per day, composed of:

- Variable Costs (fuel, oil, etc.) = 3.6 cents/km, or $5.80 for 20 round trips over a 4-km route.

- Fixed Costs = $750,000 per year, consisting of: a) Insurance - $200.00 b) Cleaning, Inspection & Housing of Vehicle - $100.00 c) Superintendence & Management - $195.00 d) Interest & Depreciation on Vehicle - $250.00 e) Registration & Licence Fees - $5.00 f) Wages of Driver - $700.00

Total Annual Costs - $1,450.00 (Assuming 300 operating days per year, this converts to $4.80 per day.

Revised Expenditures:

- $7.95 per day. After subtracting fixed costs (b) and (c), reducing (d) to $140.00, and reducing (f) to $300.00.

(Source: Eckert & Hilton, 1972, pp. 300-302) - 54 -

b) The Demise of the Jitney

It did not take long for the street railways to realise that the jitneys were indeed more sound economically than they had estimated. In addition, there was no economic expansion in sight that would attract people away from jitney driving and into better jobs, so rather than trying to compete with the jitneys, the streetcar operators sought govern• ment protection. This would mean that within a relatively short period of time, the jitney industry would crumble almost as fast as it had deve• loped. The street railways were also able to produce statistics showing that the jitneys caused an increase in traffic accidents in almost every city in which they operated. The rapid entry and exit of jitney operators made organisation of the industry for political purposes very difficult, immediately placing them in a weak position (Eckert & Hilton, 1972).

Anti-jitney legislation was soon in force throughout the United

States. The ordinances passed were meant to eliminate one or more of the jitney's comparative advantages over the tram by raising the cost of operation to levels excluding new entries into the industry. Existing jitneys would have the choice of operating at a loss or withdrawing their service. The legislation generally required franchises for jitney opera• tion, a licence tax intended to recover the costs of wear and tear on the streets, and the posting of bonds ranging from $1,000 to $11,000 per vehicle. The combined costs of licensing and bonding ranged from $150 per year in California to $300 per year in Texas and Washington state.

The tax alone was effective in eliminating all part-time jitney drivers, since it amounted to between 70 and 135 days of earnings (Eckert & Hilton,

1972). - 55 -

In Winnipeg, the municipal government passed a by-law in 1918 setting a prohibitively high minimum fare of 25 cents per person for jitneys, making it impossible for them to compete with the streetcars

(Frankena, 1979). Other restrictions included a minimum number of hours per day during which each jitney must be in service, rigidly fixed routes and schedules for each vehicle, and the exclusion of jitneys from high- density downtown areas or from the routes served by trams. A further regulation enforced speed limits for jitneys and set a limit on the number of passengers they were permitted to carry. Finally, residency and literacy requirements for drivers further impeded the operation of jitneys

(Eckert & Hilton, 1972).

By the end of 1915, only 18 months after the first jitneys had appeared in Los Angeles, legislation favourable to the trams had passed in 125 of the 175 cities where jitneys operated, and most other major municipalities followed soon afterwards. In some cases, the ordinances hostile to jitneys were eventually settled by plebiscites or referenda, the jitneys usually meeting with defeat. In Los Angeles, for example, when voters were required to decide on an anti-jitney law, the local rail• ways declared a "general holiday", enabling 1,400 of their employees to take others to the polls in automobiles. Although many relatively strong ordinances were later repealed in favour of more moderate ones, the regu• lations designed to decimate the jitney were wholly successful. From the estimated peak of 62,000 vehicles in 1915, 39,000 were operating in

January 1916, and only 5,879 remained in October 1918. By the early 1920s the jitney had virtually disappeared (Eckert & Hilton, 1972). Nevertheless, the benefits that the tram operators had gained from their victory was to be short-lived. They had won a battle, but were soon to lose the war. - 56 -

Over the next forty years, the streetcar was replaced almost completely by conversions to bus operation, due in large part to the latter's lower fixed costs and greater flexibility. Absolute passenger counts of the street railways began to decline in 1924, and buses were well suited to declining demand conditions as automobile use increased.

As the auto slowly changed the urban form of the North American city from what the streetcars had created to a new pattern of greater diffusion, public transit systems became less and less economic until, by the 1950s, the majority could no longer be operated by the private sector.. The decimation of the jitneys also permitted the cartelisation of taxicabs, the only legal alternative to the private car that is able to provide ori gi n-to-des tina ti on servi ce.

The legislation that virtually eliminated the jitneys from operation resulted not only in a strong incentive for private automobile use, but also in a low rate of car utilisation. "Both the investment in autos and vehicle counts on the roads [particularly during rush hours] are greatly in excess of what they would be if jitneys had not been prohibited"

(Eckert & Hilton, 1972, p. 324).

c) Atlantic City and San Francisco

Atlantic City and San Francisco,are the only North American cities that still have formal jitney services of significant size, and in both cases the service is provided by an operator specifically licensed for the purpose. The persistence of jitney operations in these cities was due to the existence of less severe regulations than in other places. In San

Francisco, regulations were relaxed in 1917, while in Atlantic City the - 57 -

competition provided by the jitneys was considered sufficiently weak and fragmented that elimination was not necessary. Furthermore, there was considerable political support for the jitneys in Atlantic City, based on the tourist trade generating a substantial demand. A 1939 resolution to ban the jitneys in San Francisco was defeated by 71 per cent to 29 per cent, followed by another unsuccessful attempt at elimination in 1950

(Kemp, 1974). It seems, therefore, that jitneys are certainly not unpopu• lar among the general public.

The two jitney systems are comparable in size, each operating between 100 and 200 vehicles, and about 1,000 vehicle-hours per day (see

Table 14). In Atlantic City jitneys operate along a linear route of 6.8 kilometres in length, mainly along Pacific Avenue, a central artery relying primarily on the tourist trade for its livelihood. In San Francisco, one main 15-kilometre route along Mission Street from the Ferry Building down• town to the city limits near Daly City accounts for 97 per cent of the service. Mission Street is a heavily congested thoroughfare, passing through the centre of the low- and middle-income Spanish-speaking Mission

District (Kemp, 1974).

In both cities the jitneys are owner-operated. Boarding and un• loading stops are designated, but drivers will stop elsewhere on request.

Service is provided 24 hours per day, seven days a week, and there are no set schedules. The frequency of service in Atlantic City is controlled by fixing the maximum number of vehicles permitted in service at any one time (35 in the early morning and late evening; 65 during the day; 70 in the evening; and six during the night). More and less remunerative shifts are shared equally, and drivers may decide whether or not to work, within - 58 -

TABLE 14

CHARACTERISTICS OF ATLANTIC CITY AND SAN FRANCISCO JITNEY SYSTEMS (1972T

City Atlantic City San Francisco

GENERAL DATA:

No. of vehicles 150 120

Route length 6.8 km 15.3 km

Vehicle capacity 10 12

Average headway 57" morning/79" evening 27-75 seconds

Avge. ridership* 51,794 person-trips/day 31,312 person-trips/day

Veh-hours/day* 1,150 1,080

Veh-km/day* 34,710 during peak 33,016

Avge. productivity* 45 person-trips/veh-hour 29 person-trips/veh-hour

Fare 30 cents 20 or 30 cents

COSTS & REVENUE :

Amortised vehicle $1,255 per year $1,255 per year costs $1,57 per hour $0.40 per hour

Non-capital costs $1,765 per year $5,366 per year (excl. labour) $2.20 per hour $1.72 per hour

Total costs $3,020/year; $3.77/hour $6,621/year; $2.12/hour

Revenue per $0.30; $10,500 per year, $0.29; $27,506 per year passenger trip $13.13 per hour $8.38 per hour

Profit per $0,214; $7,480 per year $0,203; $19,628/year passenger trip $9.36 per hour $6.26 per hour

Calculated on the basis Estimated on the basis of 45 person-trips per . " of 103 vehicles/day, veh-hour; 141 vehicles/ each carrying 304 pas• day, each working eight sengers/day over a * hours/day, 100 days/year period of 10 hours, & (800 hours per year). working 6 days/week (3,120 hours per year).

Sources: Kemp (1974), pp. 242-255; Lea (1974), pp. 38, 43. - 59 -

their allotted time periods. In San Francisco, each driver may work up to ten hours per day, whenever he wants, but this time limit is not strictly enforced. Each driver may not work between 9:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. on one weekday each week, however, and despatchers are employed to enforce this as well as ensuring the departure of one vehicle from each terminus every 3% minutes during these hours (Kemp, 1974).

On both systems, bunching of vehicles is common. In San Francisco it is due mainly to traffic congestion, and in Atlantic City to deliberate skip-stop operation (Kemp, 1974). This is a procedure whereby two vehi• cles leave the terminus together, stopping for passenger pick-up only at alternate stops, This facilitates a substantial-reduction in running time as well as a faster trip for the passengers. Although headways are reduced, they seem to remain at acceptable levels, and the skip-stop operation allows drivers to increase their revenue over a fixed period of time.

As some of the Atlantic City jitney operators work only during the tourist season (June to September), when demand is greatest, some San

Francisco drivers work only during rush hours, maintaining another job during the day. The Atlantic City jitneys do not compete with other forms of public transit and operate at the same fare as city buses. On Mission

Street in San Francisco there is competition with diesel and trolley buses as well as with the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) subway. The jitneys charge 20 cents for short rides and 30 cents for longer ones, while the other modes charge a flat 25 cents10. As opposed to the other modes, jitney drivers make change, all passengers are guaranteed a seat, and smoking is permitted (Kemp, 1974). - 60 -

TABLE 15

ESTIMATED OPERATING EXPENSES OF AN ATLANTIC CITY JITNEY - 1972

Item of expenditure and Mean Cost assumptions for estimation per vehicle ($) per veh-km ($)

- Fuel Assume average of 25,000 km/year @25 1/100km = 6,250 litres, @ 6.7 (J/1 470 1.9 (net price after profit & state tax rebate).

- Maintenance Estimated annual cost/vehicle from garage data. Owner- 600 2.4 maintenance would reduce this cost.

- City & state licences 110 0.4

- Share of association costs 100 0.4

- Liability insurance 485 1.9

TOTAL OF ABOVE 1,765 1.7

- Annualized vehicle/cost (depreciation) $7,000 1,255 5.0 amortised' over 7 years at 6% interest.

GRAND TOTAL 3,020 12.1

(Source: Kemp, 1974, p. 248)

Table 15 summarises the estimated costs of operating an Atlantic

City jitney in 1972, totalling $3,020 per year. According to Kemp (1974),

Atlantic City jitneys make an average of 3,570 one-way runs per year carrying an average of ten passengers per trip. At 30 cents per person,

gross annual receipts would be $10,500 per vehicle, resulting in a net

income of $7,480 per year for the owner-operator. This compares favour• ably with the $8,500 1972 wage rate of New Jersey city bus drivers, who - 61 -

work much longer hours (2,000 hours per year versus 800 for jitney drivers), but have a steady income without capital risk (Kemp, 1974).

While the San Francisco jitney drivers earn a substantially lower hourly amount than their Atlantic City counterparts ($6.26 versus $9.35), their annual net income is substantially higher ($19,628 versus $7,480), since they work almost four times the number of hours (3,120 vs. 800 hours per year). The San Francisco Municipal Railway (MUNI) continues to com• plain of potential revenue that is lost to jitneys, the latest available figure being $225,000 per year (Kemp, 1974). This compares with annual revenues of over $3 million for the 120 jitneys, indicating that their contribution to the economy is certainly a positive one, and that over 90 per cent of their income is in excess of MUNI's alleged losses. This also goes a long way in showing that many of the jitney passengers would not otherwise be public transit riders.

II THE JITNEY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

a) General Characteristics

Whereas the jitney largely disappeared in the United States due to political opposition from public transit interests, in most cities of the developing world where jitneys operate today, they do so in conjunction with bus, subway and taxi services. Although restrictive regulations do exist in Third World cities, rarely are they as severe as the remnants of anti-jitney legislation in North America. Although jitneys in developing countries do compete with other forms of public transport, they usually perform more of a complementary service rather than a strictly competitive - 62 -

one. Their success is due mainly to their ability to provide better service than normal buses at costs appreciably below those of the private car.

Jitneys are able to operate at much higher speeds than buses, since their lower carrying capacity means far fewer stops are required.

The versatile nature of a jitney service means it can be started without delay, and its flexibility assures a high degree of demand-responsiveness.

Without doubt, jitneys are also a vast source of employment, and large numbers of people depend on them for their livelihood.

Very large jitney systems are relatively rare, however, operating only in a few cities, such as Caracas, Manila, Istanbul, Teheran and

Mexico City. Some general data concerning major jitney operations in various cities of the developing countries are presented in Table 16.

Unfortunately, wherever successful jitney services exist, they are criti• cised by other road users. Automobile drivers blame them for congestion and accidents, while bus companies and taxi operators complain about com• petition, arguing that jitneys tend to "skim the cream" from the most lucrative routes operated by conventional transit companies. This argu• ment is valid in the sense that the jitneys might be prejudicial to bus systems on certain routes, but an appropriate pricing of the two modes should be able to significantly reduce the problem (Couture, 1978).

Furthermore, in the larger Third World cities, where mass transit systems are rarely able to cope adequately with peak demand, a jitney service that relieves some of the peak traffic can be very useful. A further objection to extensive jitney use is the need for terminal space in crowded central-city areas, but nevertheless, jitneys still use far less - 63 -

TABLE 16

CHARACTERISTICS OF MAJOR THIRD WORLD JITNEY SYSTEMS

City Name of Number of Seats/ Average Costs/veh- Service vehicles vehicle Fare ($) km ($)

Hong Kong public light bus 4,308 8-14 0.23 n.a. Teheran shared taxi 12,000 5 n.a. n.a. Istanbul dolmus 13,000 5-7 variable n.a. Mexico City pesero 17,318 6-10 0.37 0.21 San Juan publico 2,000 6-9 variable n.a. Manila jeepney 14,917 8-14 0.04/km r .a. Lagos kai-kai 2,300 10 variable n .a. Port of Spain route taxi 6,000 5 0.20 0.22 Beirut service car 2,000 5 0.10 0.05 Caracas por puesto 10,035 5-15 0.17 0.06

City Avge. daily Avge . trip Avge. ride Avge. hours Data ridership length (km) time (min) of oper/year date

Hong Kong 1,202,000 9 .2 n.a. n.a. 1975 Teheran n.a. n .a. n.a. n.a. 1970 Istanbul 1,336,000 n .a. n.a. n.a. 1970 Mexico City 1,946,000 5 .8 14 4,380 1980 San Juan 150,000 19 .3 30 n.a. 1976 Manila 1,300,000 n .a. n.a. 2,738 1970 Lagos 400,000 n .a. n.a. 4,182 1974 Port of Spain 120,000 n .a. n.a. 2,433 1975 Beirut 170,000 5 .5 17 3,744 1970 Caracas 513,000 8 .0 26 2,702 1975

Sources: Lea (1974) , Lea (197.5b) , Lea (1977a) , Kemp (1974) , Jouzy & Nakkash (1974), Orer et al. (1979).

terminal space than private automobiles require for parking.

Owen's study of Teheran's jitneys points out very clearly the

importance of realising that the jitney can make a very large contri•

bution to urban transport as a whole, but in order for it to perform

its most useful role, its adversary must be the private car and not

other forms of public transit. Jitney service "is likely to appeal - 64 -

particularly to the dissatisfied bus passenger who is tempted to desert the bus for an automobile. It is, thus, potentially of great value in communities with a large and growing car-owning population" (Roth, 1973, p. 28).

Data presented in Table 7 (p. 23) show that the costs per person of jitney operation are only slightly higher than for a large city bus, yet much lower than for a private automobile. The jitneys are shown to be able to transport five times as many persons per foot-width of road per hour as cars, assuming that they occupy double the road space. This, however, is not usually the case, as most jitneys occupy only marginally more road space than cars.

As is shown in Figure 1, jitneys are the lowest cost mode for travel within the central city during the base hour (for the parameter values assumed in Table 17). The jitney auto is most economic at higher volumes. In comparison, the jitney van has higher vehicle-kilometre costs and higher seating capacity but lower supplier costs than the jitney auto.

It appears that the conventional bus is the highest cost mode except for very high levels of patronage and the lowest time value. During the peak period (Figure 2), the jitney van again appears to dominate. The conven• tional bus has the lowest full costs only at high densities and low time values, with the highest full costs for low densities, regardless of time value. The additional efficiency in street capacity utilisation of the conventional bus is not sufficient to overcome its cost disadvantage, except at quite high passenger densities (in excess of 250 passengers per vehicle per hour) (Boyd et al., 1978). It seems, therefore, that the ideal vehicle for this service would be a jitney van with a seating capa- - 65 -

FIGURE 1

FULL COST COMPARISON OF INNER-CITY MODES: BASE HOUR

Passengers per hour in both directions

FIGURE 2

FULL COST COMPARISON OF INNER-CITY MODES: PEAK HOUR

0 100 200 Passengers per hour in both directions - 66 -

TABLE 1-7

VEHICLE COST AND OPERATING PARAMETERS

(Estimated 1980 Costs in 1972 US Dollars)

Avge. Seated Vehicle Veh. & Misc. Total Veh. Cost Speed Vehicle Oper. Cost Capital Cost Veh. Cost ($/seat- (km/h) Capacity ($/km) ($/km) ($/km) km)

Base-hour in ner-city ' circulati on:

Jitney auto 32 5 0.188 0.019 0.207 0.041 Jitney van 31 8 0.198 0.028 0.226 0.028 Minibus 27 19 0.338 0.019 0.357 0.019 Conven. Bus 24 50 0.458 0.038 0.496 0.010

Peak-hour in ner-cit> ' circulati on:

Jitney auto 27 5 0.206 0.022 0.228 0.046 Jitney van 26 8 0.218 0.033 0.251 0.031 Minibus 23 19 0.495 0.113 0.608 0.032 Conven. Bus 19 50 0.699 0.275 0.974 0.019

(Source:. Boyd et al., 1978, p. 4)

city of about 12 passengers, such as the por puestos in Caracas.

Part of the comparatively low cost of jitneys is due to the sub•

stantially lower capital investment per passenger-place required. For

example, the cost per seat during the late 1970s for a 10-12 passenger

van was US$666; for a 6-passenger automobile $840; and for a large bus

including standing space $1,300. This advantage of the smaller vehicles

is primarily due to their mass production, since most of the productivity

gains during the last 50 years have resulted from economies of scale and

line techniques. Buses, however, are produced in batches by a low-volume

process (Walters, 1979).

Table 8 (page 24) illustrates that a jitney van carrying seven

passengers is one of the most energy-efficient of all urban transport - 67 -

modes. The electric bicycle is the only motorised vehicle with a higher energy efficiency. Finally, it must be emphasised that jitneys can more easily be produced by already established domestic automobile industries

(such as in Argentina, Brasil, Mexico and Venezuela) than can buses or other public transit vehicles, and thus either add an additional multipli to the economy or compensate for a loss of production due to the implemen tation of congestion pricing or other measures of automobile restraint.

Generally speaking,

intermediate forms of public transport often have considerable advantages over private cars, in terms of efficient use of road space. They also have certain advantages over conventional forms of public transport - they require little management, they offer a very flexible service, they are generally more labour-intensive and the vehicles themselves can be more easily manufactured and repaired with local materials and skills. (McNeill, 1978, p. 41).

b) Por Puestos of Caracas

One of the most affluent Third World cities, Caracas had a per- capita income of $1,600 in 1970. Almost half of all motorised trips in

1960 were made by private automobile, one third by bus and the remainder by por puesto (jitney) and taxi (World Bank, 1975). As a result of the city's wealth, private cars have come to occupy a very prominent role in

Caracas, also in part due to one of the world's lowest retail prices of gasoline (Owen, 1973). The resulting traffic congestion has been the limiting force, however, that has prevented further growth in volumes of traffic.

The origin of the por puestos was primarily as a response to an intolerably poor bus service, which has since been considerably improved. - 68 -

Over the years, the por puestos have gained a significant share of the

urban transport market and are patronised by a large number of people

who simply will not use the somewhat less expensive, but much slower,

more crowded and therefore less comfortable motor buses (Kudlick, 1969).

Por puestos made their appearance sometime after 1948, and until recently

consisted of owner-operated six-passenger sedans. During the 1970s, an

increasing number of the sedans were being replaced by 12 to 15-passenger

vans, and, by 1975, 17 per cent of the legal por puestos were vans (Lea,

1977a). In addition to the regular por puesto services, it has been

estimated that about 4,700 illegal vehicles are in operation, including

about half of the city's taxicabs operating as pirate por puestos during

peak periods.

The fares of the por puestos are generally double the corresponding

bus fare, this relationship playing a significant role in determining the

patronage that each mode attracts. Average por puesto speeds are almost

identical to the average speeds of private cars. The time lost by por puestos "during passenger boarding and alighting is compensated for by

more aggressive driving habits and a tendency to take greater chances to

save time than are risked by the drivers of private automobiles" (Kudlick,

1969, p. 5).

The frequency of por puesto service varies from 200 to 800 vehicles

per hour at different locations, and it was found that the effective

service frequency (including only those vehicles with one or more seats

available) on 70 per cent of the lines is at least 20 vehicles per hour.

Headways of por puestos with vacant seats thus range from three minutes

down to 36 seconds over 70 per cent of the system during peak periods - 69 -

(Kudlick, 1969). They operate on most routes from 6:30 a.m. until mid• night, and those running on the main trunk lines provide limited service on a 24-hour basis. Although por puestos normally follow their designated fixed routes, they are able to use alternate streets to avoid traffic congestion, especially when all seats are taken.

According to Kudlick (1969), most of the persons making por puesto trips are from families who do not own automobiles. It is interesting to note, however, that as the rate of bus use per family falls sharply when auto ownership increases, por puesto use is not as sensitive (see Table

18 and Figure 3). "The cause for this is probably that as family income rises, people are more willing and able to pay the costs involved in return for greater speed and comfort. Por puesto passengers come from a broader variety of educational and income levels, in contrast with much of the bus system patronage that is made up of lower income families"

(Kudlick, 1969, p. 6).

The continued expansion of the por puesto system over the last twenty years seems to be the most important factor in facilitating con• tinued mobility in a city where rising incomes and a rapidly growing population are causing traffic problems of an increasingly formidable nature.

c) Jeepneys of Manila

Jeepneys originated in Manila after World War II, when all former public transport systems in the Philippines had been destroyed. Many used army jeeps were available, however, and these were converted into public conveyances by installing roofs and upholstered seats. Although - 70 -

TABLE 18

DAILY TRIPS GENERATED BY DWELLING UNIT IN CARACAS ACCORDING TO AUTOMOBILE OWNERSHIP

Type of Trip Number of Automobiles per Dwelling Unit 0 1 2 3 or more

Auto driver 0.13 4.48 9.60 15.35 Auto passenger 0.48 2.65 5.08 8.50 Bus passenger 3.84 1.54 0.90 0.56 Por puesto passenger 1.71 1.24 1.05 1.11 Other 0.37 1.00 0.50 1.75

Totals 6.53 10.91 17.13 27.27

(Source: Kudlick,. 1969, p. 5)

FIGURE 3

CHANGE IN THE RATE OF BUS AND POR PUESTO TRIP PRODUCTION DUE TO AUTOMOBILE OWNERSHIP INCREASE

1°° \,

Por puesto passenger Rate of trip generation as a per cent of that for fami lies without a car

Bus passenger

1 2

No. of cars per dwelling unit

(Data frcm Table 19) - 71 -

originally an improvisation, the jeepneys became permanent since the

supply of transportation services could not keep pace with the demand

(Grava, 1972).

Most jeepneys have a seating capacity of 10 to 14 passengers and the minimum fare is 20 centavos (about three cents, U.S.) for five kilo• metres, plus five centavos for each additional kilometre. It is estimated that 40 per cent of all motorised trips are made in jeepneys, which com• pete directly with buses and taxis (Pendakur & Riguera, 1976). The fare is identical to that of the buses, and the jeepneys do not seem to have a higher social status, although they are recognised as being the faster mode. The total driving time of the jeepneys for any given trip is not significantly less than that of private cars or taxis. Although it is obvious that a fully loaded bus is able to carry more people per lane of road than any other vehicle, "the jeepney provides a more rapid, flexible and personalised service, and it can more easily negotiate the narrow streets of central Manila" (Grava, 1972, p. 476). Furthermore, as illus• trated by Table 19, the low capitalisation of the jeepney operation actually allows costs per kilometre of these vehicles to undercut bus costs.

The jeepney industry has become very important to the economy of

Manila, employing in 1975 an estimated 45,000 drivers, 6,000 to 7,000 owners, 1,000 mechanics and several hundred people in manufacturing con• cerns. In total, the industry directly affects the livelihood of nearly

350,000 residents. The average jeepney driver earns twice the minimum wage, and usually rents his vehicle from an owner for a fixed amount per shift (Pendakur & Riguera, 1976). - 72 -

TABLE 19

MANILA BUS AND JEEPNEY COSTS (1976 US cents)

Cost/km Cost/seat-km Cost Item Bus Jeepney Bus Jeepney

Depreciation 4.6a 0.47 0.079 0.034a Interest 3.0 0.34 0.052 0.024 Maintenance 4.2b 0.53 0.072 0.038 Ti res 1.3 0.296 0.022 0.021 Fuel 3.4 2.78 0.059 0.199 Oil 0.24 0.106 0.004 0.008 Wages 6.0 cd 2.11 0.103 0.151 Management 0.27 0.005 TOTAL 23.01 6.63 0.396 07475

TOTAL excluding 17.01 4.52 0.293 0.323 wages

Total Operating Costs 15.12 5.826 0.261 0.416 (Fuel Tax) 10^4) (TJ06T (0.006) (0.076) Adjustments (Factor (3.08) (0.124) cost of fuel) (1.73) (0.053) TOTAL excluding wages (after adjustment to 16.67 0.247 exclude fuel tax) 3.46 0.287

(Source:.:. Walters, 1979, p. 43)

* - Bus: 58 seats; Jeepney: 14 seats.

a - Depreciation estimates are based on a capital cost of US$ 30,666 for a 55-seat bus with an expected 10-year life. The jeepney costs US$ 2,972 for a 14-seat vehicle lasting on average 7.5 years. Buses average 75,000 km/year; jeepneys 80,000 km/year. It is worth noting that the capital cost per seat-km of a bus is about 2h times that of a jeepney (75% of depreciation cost is treated as dependent on the distance travelled, with the remaining 25% determined by time in use).

b - Maintenance costs for the two vehicle types are proportionate: 300 hours of labour time, and parts cost estimated at 10% of vehicle cost.

c - Wage costs of jeepneys and buses differ in wage rates paid and size of crew employed. A bus operates with a driver (@ 5 pesos/ hour) and a conductor (@ 4 pesos/hour). Jeepneys employ only a driver (@2% pesos/hour).

d - Licence and insurance costs are not included. - 73 -

The jeepneys represent a mode of urban transport that has responded

in a very unique fashion to the local traffic and demand patterns. While

the jeepneys suffer from traffic congestion, they clearly are not the

cause of it, although they are subject to continuous criticism. The

critics are not the riding public, but the owners of private cars, who

claim that if jeepney passengers would ride buses, there would be less

congestion (Grava, 1972). While this may be true, the same argument can

be applied with much greater force against the motorists themselves.

Attempts to eliminate the jeepneys have stemmed from such protests

by automobile users, as well as from a desire to make public transport in

Manila conform more closely to the standards of the Western world. These

have been countered by pleas both from those dependent on the jeepneys

for their income as well as from the jeepney passengers themselves. It

has often been claimed that the substitution of one bus for every four

jeepneys would substantially reduce traffic congestion, but it would

also substantially reduce employment levels. Finally, it has not been

ascertained how many displaced jeepney passengers would indeed use a

replacement bus service as opposed to private automobiles. This is an

important issue which needs to be taken into consideration when evaluating

the strengths and weaknesses of any jitney operation, particularly in

Third World cities where income levels are rising and private automobile

ownership is increasing much faster than overall population growth.

Ill SUMMARY

The jitney originally developed in the United States after the outbreak of World War I, largely as a response by unemployed men to a - 74 -

demand created by inadequate streetcar service. With the automobile

gaining in popularity, this new mode of urban transport was readily

accepted by the travelling public. The street railways, whose business

the jitneys were usurping, did not respond by improving their service,

but, because they could not compete with the jitneys, fought to have

legislation passed that would eliminate the newcomers from the streets

as fast as they had grown popular.

The tram operators did not anticipate the decline in popularity

that their own services were to suffer due to the advent of the automobile

and the motor bus, however, and streetcars had by the 1950s disappeared

from the streets of most North American cities. By way of contrast, trams

have operated in only very few Third World cities, while jitneys are

operating successfully in many of these cities alongside both privately

and publicly owned bus services. The jitneys' success in developing

countries is due primarily to the wide gap between affordable levels of

public transit services and to less stringent regulations regarding the

operation of a jitney service.

Jitneys provide levels of speed, comfort and convenience comparable

to those of the private car at considerably lower cost to the user. They are relatively energy-efficient and consume much less road space as well

as parking and storage space per passenger than do private automobiles.

By judiciously setting jitney fares at levels above those of buses, a clientele can be attracted that would otherwise be more inclined to use

(or purchase) a private car than to take a bus. Therefore, other public

transit operators need not lose business or profitability on account of jitneys. - 75 -

The importance of jitneys is demonstrated by the fact that they already account for a high proportion of motorised trips in many Third

World cities. They are criticised for being major contributors to traffic congestion and for providing poor service to passengers. The contrary viewpoint is that jitneys need to be freed from congestion created by private cars, and the role of intermediate public transport can be designed to complement rather than compete with conventional public transport.

Restrictive legislation akin to that of most North American cities does exist in many urban areas of the Third World, although usually it is less severe. Such laws may be intended to protect existing bus and tram services, but their main effect is to eliminate a genuine rival to the private car. 76

CHAPTER FOUR

TRANSPORT IN MEXICO CITY11 - 77 -

Mexico City, surprisingly enough, is one of the least studied of the world's great metropolises. (Garza & Schteingart, 1978, p. 51).

The origins of an urban centre on the site of Mexico City date to the year 1345, when the Aztecs founded the political, religious and com• mercial centre of their empire, Tenochtitlan. The Spanish conquistadores almost completely destroyed the Aztec capital in the early 16th century, but many of the new administrative buildings that Hernan Cortez had con• structed were laid out around the Zocalo, and occupied the same position as the Aztec royal buildings (Harris, 1971).

Mexico City flourished as the centrepiece of the Spanish colonial empire, and by the 19th century had become the largest city in the

Western Hemisphere. In spite of its importance as the economic and political capital of the country, Mexico City was not able to achieve a position of national demographic pre-eminence until the late 19th century.

At the turn of the 20th century, Mexico City was 3.4 times larger than

Guadalajara, the next largest city (Unikel, 1978). It was only at this time that capitalism became the dominant economic system in Mexico, and after the revolution of 1910, industrialisation began. With a population of 344,000 in 1900, Mexico City started to grow at a rate three times the national average, attesting to a strong inward migration. Due to a fur•

ther strengthening of this process, the city attained an annual growth

rate of five per cent in the late 1920s, a figure which has been matched or surpassed every year until the late 1970s. In 1930, the city reached a size of one million, with population almost doubling every decade. By

1980, the city contained 13.8 million people and was among the three

largest cities of the world (see Table 20 and Figure 4). - 78 -

FIGURE 4

POPULATION OF MEXICO CITY

Population (millions)

16 i

0 H • i '1 i 1 1 • 1 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980

(Data from Table 20)

. TABLE 20

POPULATION OF MEXICO CITY (in thousands)

Distrito Estado de Growth Rate Year Total Federal Mexico (%/year)

1940 1,448 _ 1,448 _ 1950 2,861 11 2,872 6.3 1960 4,677 233 4,910 5.5 1970 6,643 1,712 8,355 5.7 1975 8,400 3,100 11,500 5.6 1980 9,168 4,200 13,853 4.0 1985* 10,600 5,600 16,200 3.6 1990* 11,700 8,356 20,789 3.2

* - Estimates (from Unikel, 1978, and other sources) - 79 -

The demographic predominance of Mexico City in the nation is thus a relatively recent phenomenon. Industrial development and foreign investment became increasingly concentrated in the capital, and the federal government's presence stimulated a further polarisation of growth, centred on Mexico City. In 1970, 37.4 per cent of the Mexican Gross

Internal Product was produced by the capital, containing 18.2 per cent of the nation's inhabitants. Nearly half of all non-agricultural activities by value are concentrated in Mexico City, due primarily to the economies of locating in the geographical centre of the country's market, and in the spot with the greatest accessibility, infrastructure development and available services. With the highest per-capita incomes in the country,

Mexico City's demand for manufactured goods far outweighs its demographic importance, accounting for 51 per cent of the nation's total demand for industrial goods and 42.5 per cent of of the demand for durable consumer products (Unikel, 1978).

The site of Mexico City is located in the large Valley of Mexico, open only to the north and southeast. Expansion of the city is therefore

limited by mountain ranges on the other sides, as well as by the remains

of Lake Texcoco on the northeast. Although the morphology of the city was originally modelled after Tenochtitlan, changes during the early 20th

century resulted in a strong spatial segregation by social class, with

the newly urbanised zones to the north and east settled by the lower-

income groups and the wealthy accommodated by new neighbourhoods to the

west. Changes in land use patterns in the central city resulted in the the displacement.of large numbers of middle-income residents, who moved to the western and southern periphery of the city. Migrants arriving - 80 -

from the countryside were subsequently absorbed by the central area, where they took up residence in the old, deteriorated buildings which had been abandoned by the elite (Garza & Schteingart, 1978).

Until 1930, Mexico City had been characterised by the effects of the sociological processes of concentration and centralisation, fostering the development of a single central business district in the city. From

1930 to 1950, the process of convergence intensified, stimulated by the formation of the federal institutions that play a leading role in the socio-economic and political development of the country. Nevertheless members of the middle- and upper-income groups had already been moving, albeit on a relatively small scale, to settle on the southwestern out• skirts of the urban area (Unikel, 1975b).

The geographic area occupied by the city expanded rapidly since

1940, spilling out over the northern confines of the Distrito Federal in the early 1950s and absorbing large amounts of new land in the State of

Mexico. Between 1940 and 1950, in spite of the increasing concentration of economic activity, the first signs of commercial decentralisation towards the south of Mexico City became apparent. The demand for land increased sharply, and coupled with a scarcity of available space, resulted in a spectacular increase in central land values. More people were concentrated in the central area, bringing more vehicles and exacer• bating the difficulties of moving between the central district and the rest of the urban area. Although Mexico City's inhabitants are compara• tively highly dependent on mass transit, the new middle- and high-income residential areas away from the centre have a much lower density, and reflect the increasing importance of the automobile. Generally rising - 81 -

incomes of an increasing number of city dwellers have allowed a higher average number of cars per family. This, together with the construction and expansion of many roads to the outlying areas of the city, improved accessiblity and availability of land on the outskirts, and finally the withdrawal of the elite from the city centre, has led to a distinct diffusion and spreading out of population, activities and lifestyles.

The interaction of economic, social and ecological advantages, generally of the outlying areas, and the disadvantages of others, has resulted in a radical transformation of the urban area within a relatively short period of time,(Unikel, 1975b). The process of deglomeration has advanced and important subcentres have developed, but at the same time traffic congestion has steadily deteriorated, resulting from the relative scarcity of parking spaces for an increasing number of cars in the central area, many of which belong to Mexico City residents who are tending to

live further and further away from their place of work.

Traffic congestion can be measured by the overall average speeds of 12 km/h in 1975, low compared to other cities (see Table 3, page 14).

As a result, Mexico City is one of the world's most polluted cities, with an estimated 4,600 tons of carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxide, hydrocarbons and other contaminants emitted daily, about 60 per cent of which is due

to the use of motor vehicles. This is aggravated by the fact that at an

altitude of 2,400 metres, the low air pressure and oxygen content of

Mexico City's environment does not allow petroleum to undergo complete

combustion. Consequently, exhaust gases contain a much higher proportion

of carbon monoxide than at lower elevations (Gierloff-Emden, 1970). - 82 -

The lack of a clear conception of the interrelationships between urbanisation and economic development as well as a failure to consider the effects of government policies of rural-urban migration have resulted in an inability to curb urban growth in Mexico City.

In Mexico there are currently more than 20 federal government agencies whose principal objective is the planning of urban development. In addition, the Department of the Federal Dis• trict...has five different offices charged with city planning. Considering that one of the professed goals of the federal government is to achieve industrial decentralisation and thereby reduce wide disparities in regional development, it is striking that none of these agencies has developed a compre• hensive urban development plan to curb the growth of the urban area of Mexico City. (Garza & Schteingart, 1978, p. 81).

If the current trend persists, and all indications suggest that it will, Mexico City will continue to grow rapidly through the end of the

20th century, bringing to reality predictions that Mexico City's population in the year 2000 will approach 30 million people.

I HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

Tenochtitlan, the Aztec predecessor of Mexico City, was built on the western shallows of Lake Texcoco, with an abundance of waterways traversing the built-up area, much like modern-day Venice. The residents of Tenochtitlan had not been accustomed to animals being used for trans• portation in their urban environment, for all movement was carried out by human power. On the many lagoons and canals, thousands of canoes trans• ported goods and people, while in the streets the pedestrian was king.

Only upon arrival of the Spaniards in the 16th century were horses, sedan chairs and mule-carriages introduced, which resulted in substantial modifications to the physical characteristics of the city streets. - 83 -

Nevertheless, water transport continued to remain important to Mexico

City, and the number of canoes in use in the city fluctuated between

100,000 and 200,000 during the first century of Iberian occupation.'

Even in the 17th century, 70 to 150 canoes were entering the city on a daily basis (Sierra, 1976). As Spanish influence increased, however, so the number of canoes in use dwindled, but in spite of their decline, the canoes had for many years represented the mainstay of transport in the capital of the Aztec kingdom and also served to symbolise the supremacy and development of the whole empire.

It did not take long for the invention of the railway to reach

Mexico, for in 1821 the first Mexican interurban railway line was built.

It wasn't until 1852, however, that the first rights to build an urban or sub-urban line were awarded, to Jose Gomez de Cortina, for operation from Mexico City to Tlalpan by way of Tacubaya, Mixcoac, Coyoacan and

San Angel. The first mule-trams appeared here, between Mexico and Tacu• baya, in 1856, but were for private use only.. Public service began the following year on another line, north from the city to La Villa de

Guadalupe. In 1858 service was opened to Tacubaya, horse-drawn from the city centre as far as Bucareli and steam powered from there to Tacubaya.

The.outer portions of both lines were providing what was essentially a suburban rail service, with direct through operation to the Zocalo (see

Figure 5).

Various firms and individuals had applied for permission to build urban tram lines, and in April of 1865, Luis Binel was granted the autho• rity to construct a railway from Mexico City to Cuautitlan, by way of - 84 -

FIGURE 5

MAP OF ORIGINAL STREET RAILWAY LINES IN MEXICO CITY

/ i.

Limit of D.F. Animal powered section Steam powered section 2 4 6 8 IC i 1 1 i i i kilometres - 85 -

San Cosme, Popotla, Tacuba and Tlalnepantla. Simultaneously, Carlos

Arnaux was permitted to establish railways in the streets of Mexico

(Sierra, 1976). The urban service was to be powered by horses or mules

and under no circumstances by steam power. Traction had to be limited

to animate sources, due to the excessive noise and danger created by steam

engines in the city streets.

Expansion of lines continued until, in 1874, it was necessary to

assign a particular colour to each line for ease of identification.

Ridership was steadily increasing, from 1.67 million in 1869, to 2.19

million in 1873, and 2.89 million in 1877 (Sierra, 1976). In 1878 another

line was opened from Mexico to San Lazaro and La Piedad, while the tram

services were slowly being consolidated into two main companies. The

major one of these, the Compania de Ferroearriles y Tranvias del Distrito

Federal, obtained a concession for 99 years, and by 1880 had 97 kilometres

of routes from the central area to La Villa de Guadalupe, Chapultepec,

Mixcoac, San Angel, San Antonio, Tlalpan, Tacuba, Azcapotzalco and La

Piedad, with 126 passenger cars. The other company, Tranvias oon Corres- pondeneia, with 17 kilometres of line, 16 cars and carrying an average of

75,000 passengers per month, had only recently been created. Service was

provided from the downtown to Morelos, La Teja and Buenavista (see Figure

6).

The last two decades of the 19th century were the most important

in leading up to the changeover from horse and mule power to electric

operation. In February 1891, the Compania de Ferroearriles y Tranvias del D.F. was authorised to adopt electric traction, and the wheels of

electrification were set in motion. The conditions under which this - 86 -

FIGURE :;6

MAP OF MULE-TRAM LINES IN 1880

SAN ANGEL

•TLALPAN Mule-tram lines Ring Roads Limit of D.F. - 87 -

conversion was permitted were strict, however. A maximum speed of 10 km/h was enforced; cars were always to be kept in top condition; and the conductors were required to carry a bugle at all times, the use of which was mandatory upon entering a plaza or an intersection. Electric trac• tion had considerable advantages, however, including a higher average operating speed, improved frequency of service as well as a cleaner streetscape.

In 1896 all lines of the Compania de Ferroearriles y Tranvias del

Distrito Federal were transferred to an American firm, the Compania de

Ferroearriles del D.F. de Mexico, S.A. Two years later, this firm toge• ther with the Tranvias con Correspondencia became part of the British- owned Mexico Electric Tramway Company, under whose auspices the first electric trams entered service in 1900. Not without co-incidence, the first two lines to see electrification were also the first to have had mule-tram service over 40 years earlier, from the Zocalo to Tacubaya and

Guadalupe (see Figure 5, page 84). It took seven minutes to get from

Indianilla to Chapultepec, and another six to Tacubaya, all at the speed of 10 km/h. This speed restriction was necessary due to the chaos caused by the mixture of carriages, wagons, horses, mules and other vehicles occupying the streets and creating serious traffic flow problems (STE,

1978).

As early as 1905 a group of gentlemen had presented proposals for the construction of a high-speed electric railway, underground within the city of Mexico and elevated outside the centre, going to Azcapotzalco,

San Angel and Tlalpan. The project did not come to fruition, however, because the federal government had not been provided with sufficient - 88 -

information to properly evaluate its costs and benefits as well as the impact of such a large-scale undertaking on the city as a whole. The citizens of Mexico would have to wait another 60 years until the dream of a subway was realised.

In 1907 the Mexico Electric Tramway Company was absorbed by a

Canadian firm, the Compania de Tranvias de Mexico, under whose adminis• tration the urban tram network was expanded to its greatest extent. The traditional and continuing foreign ownership of the tram system was at cross purposes, however, to the burgeoning reformist sentiment leading up to the Mexican revolution of 1910-11. The tram workers were increasingly pushed towards radical work stoppages and strikes, in an attempt to extract improved conditions out of the relationship with their "feudal", aristocratic management. During 1911, at the height of revolutionary fervour, the workers succeeded in obtaining trade unions for each depart• ment of the company, a breakthrough which calmed down the labour hostili• ties for several years.

Already in 1913 it had been proclaimed with great alarm that traffic congestion in the city was reaching problem proportions, and all attempts that were made to alleviate the congestion had been fruitless.

At the same time, a study was begun to evaluate the feasibility of an electric interurban rail link from Mexico City to Cuernavaca (70 kilo• metres to the south). The move originated from the Compania de Tranvias de Mexico, under the same Canadian ownership as the Mexican Light and

Power Company, who concluded that the distance could be traversed in 90 minutes and would in effect transform Cuernavaca into a suburb of the capital. (Sierra, 1976). Labour relations had again begun to deteriorate - 89 -

until a major strike ensued in October 1914, which lasted for six weeks,

until settled by a mediator, and resulted in across-the-board wage in•

creases of 25 per cent.

In 1928 the development of the tram system had reached its peak, with about 330 kilometres of track, 371 motor cars and 42 trailers (Sierra,

1976). Until this time, Trust International, the Toronto-based parent of

the Mexican firms, was preoccupied with constantly improving and expanding

the tram network, especially since it was consuming the electrical energy

produced by the same company. The fixed price of the power for tramway

use was 2% centavos per kilowatt. As industries began to develop more

rapidly, however, Trust began to sell its power for industrial purposes

at 16 centavos/kW, resulting in drastic efforts to reduce tram consump•

tion of power in order to sell the limited supply at higher rates.

Although the last mule-tram finally ran in 1932, between Mexico and

Iztacalco, no expansion or service improvements took place after this

time and, while the population of Mexico City was growing, tram services

were being curtailed. As an example of the deterioration of the system,

617 trams were running in 1910 and only 319 remained in 1941.

The employees were well aware of the sad state of affairs and of

the company's subversive actions undermining the trams. Repairs in the

order of 3.2 million pesos were required, and with World War II draining

the country's resources, the workers went on strike again. During the

first ten days of the paralysis, the crowding of riders on the bus lines

caused 20 per cent of the buses to be removed from service due to mecha•

nical breakdowns. After a month, the entire bus system was out of com•

mission due to the great strain on capacity and lack of spare parts. - 90 -

This left the city virtually without public transport until the government stepped in to settle the strike and also get the buses rolling again. As a result, in 1943 the government began to subsidise the tramways company for an amount equivalent to federal and local taxes, all of which was destined exclusively for the conservation and improvement of the track and equipment.

During the following two years, the federal government on two separate occasions expropriated the property and possessions of the

Company, as well as its rights to operation, in order to settle a strike, each time restoring things to their former order several months later.

The employees wanted the administration and foreign ownership replaced once and for all, and continued to advertise as well as possible the fact that the Company did not have the capacity to efficiently provide service and maintain its equipment.

In 1947 the federal government purchased, for the private companies,

30 additional trams along with 20 trolley coaches, and the latter were first introduced in 1951. In October of the subsequent year, the Distrito

Federal finally took the long-awaited step of nationalising the tram com• panies, in the process acquiring all the property, possessions and rights of the Compama de Ferroearriles del Distrito Federal, S.A. , the Compania de Tranvias de Mexico and the Compafita L-imitida- de Tranvias ElSotrioos de

Mexico. The end result was the creation of a federal body, the Sistema de Transportes Eleotrioos (STE), which acts as the overall authority for

the operation and administration of tram1 and trolley bus services in

Mexico City. - 91 -

The preceding section vividly illustrates the deteriorating

conditions of public transport in Mexico City, exemplified by the refusal

of the tram company to improve and expand service as well as the labour

problems and inability of bus services to cope with demand when the tram

system was shut down. Together, these factors created a tremendous

feeling of exasperation amongst the population of Mexico City. A new and

better solution was needed; something that could begin immediately, for

the travelling public was not willing to wait any longer for promises to

be realised.

The answer to the public's plea was the commencement of jitney

service in certain key corridors in 1952. The jitneys were an immediate

success and have thrived ever since this time. In the following section,

an overview of the very diverse array of public transport services in

Mexico City is provided, outlining the contemporary setting in which the

jitneys operate.

II CONTEMPORARY SITUATION

Uncontrolled urban growth and development, the concentration of

activities in one zone as well as a lack of forward planning all contri•

buted to the creation of a limitless demand for transport services. As a

response to this demand, services emerged, without planning, striving to

satisfy the-demand in those areas showing' a potential for high profit earnings. As a result, the major part of public transport in Mexico City

has fallen in the hands of the private sector. A certain amount of in•

efficiency and insufficiency has resulted from the profit motive, due to

a lack of overall planning and co-ordination between the various sub- - 92 -

systems, but competition between modes and between individual operators on each line has resulted in a service far superior and more flexible than was previously possible.

Competition [in the bus industry] gives rise to a contin• uous and urgent seeking of new techniques and new arrangements for giving the public what they are willing to pay for. It is the dynamic process set in operation by the search for profit that gives rise to the singular success of competition. (Walters, 1979, p. 4).

Furthermore, the bus and jitney operations that evolved in the 1950s have always been self-financing enterprises, while wherever public ownership has been involved in urban transport, deficits have been the rule. These losses have resulted less from the nature of the electric modes of opera• tion they use than simply due to the public ownership, a higher ratio of employees to passengers, considerably lower fares as well as readily available government subsidies.

a) Trams and Trolley Coaches

It was with considerable reluctance that the government began operating transport services, for these had always been the domain of the private sector. If, however, the private firms were no longer willing or able to fulfill their obligations to provide an essential public service, action had to be taken. In 1954, two years after the takeover, 94 almost- new, modern P.C.C.-type streetcars were purchased second-hand from the

United States, and these entered service on the 0breg6n-Bucareli and

Obregon-Insurgentes lines. Fifty more trolley coaches were also acquired.

In 1955 alone, 25 million pesos in capital were invested in the STE. New maintenance and storage facilities were built at Tetepilco in 1956, and - 93 -

183 P.C.C. cars were purchased, as well as 117 trolley coaches. Yet, in spite of all this investment, no real expansion and very little in service improvements actually took place, virtually all the new vehicles being needed to replace antiquated, obsolescent equipment inherited from the private companies.

Several studies again indicated the urgent need for an underground rail system, but governments balked at the cost as well as at the engin• eering miracle needed for such a facility in a very unstable subsoil, composed of about 80 per cent water (Alegria, 1975). In the late 1950s, all older non-P.C.C. trams were retired, additional trolley coaches added, and research undertaken on how to successfully build a rapid transit net• work. By 1965, many Mexican as well as foreign studies indicated that it would indeed be feasible to build a subway or elevated rail system, and construction work was soon to proceed.

The Metro, however, was largely responsible for the eventual deci• mation of Mexico City's tram system. With considerable funding diverted from the STE to the newly-created Sistema de Transporte Coleetivo (STC), a separate governmental unit in charge of operating the new Metro, and

requirements for the STE to abandon all routes roughly paralleling Metro

lines, pervasive change was imminent. Furthermore, several key tram

lines were expropriated for Metro right-of-way construction, in total

causing four major routes to be abandoned in favour of the Metro: La

Villa-Mixcoac; Centro-Taxqueha; Obregon-Bucareli; and Azcapotzalco-

Colegio Militar.

The STE's restored trams were still carrying about 300,000 pas•

sengers per day in 1975, and the trolley buses carried daily loads of - 94 -

FIGURE 7

MAP OF MAJOR URBAN THOROUGHFARES

\ i \. / 1 N

kilometres - 95 -

about 400,000. The final blow to the tram system came in 1979, however, when 90 per cent of the remaining system was abandoned in favour of a new revitalised network of some 35 arterial roads (Ejes Viales , or liter• ally "Road Axes"), meant to greatly improve urban traffic flow during the

1980s (see Figure 8). These arterial roads have been designed with a provision for trolley bus operation on reserved lanes as well as contra• flow bus lanes on those roads that only have one-way auto traffic (Figure

9). In this way, the master plan envisions an expansion of the trolley bus network to over 50 lines using 3,400 vehicles by the mid-1980s (see

Figure 10). Such a programme goes a long way towards reducing noise and pollution levels in the urban area by eliminating the need for further additions to the motor bus fleet and simultaneously ensuring that the STE will still have an important role to play in providing low-cost pollution- free surface transport in the future. Without any profit-making goals, the STE is dedicated to serving the public in whatever manner prescribed by federal government policy. It provides the lowest-cost form of public transport available in Mexico City (see Table 21), and therefore requires considerable subsidies from the Distrito Federal.

b) Metro

The Mexico City Metro is the third rubber-tired subway system in

the world (after Paris and Montreal), and the second underground rapid

transit network to be constructed in Latin America (Buenos Aires has the

first). Both the technology and 80 per cent of the funds needed to build

the Mexico City Metro came from the French government. Construction

commenced in June of 1967 and the first line opened less than 30 months - 96 -

FIGURE 8

MAP OF "EJES VIALES" (New Arterial Roads)

"Ejes Viales" Urban Motorways Limit of D.F. kilometres - 97 -

TABLE 21

COMPARISON OF FARES ON PUBLIC TRANSPORT MODES IN MEXICO CITY - 1980

Operator Avge single fare per trip Financial in pesos in $ (1980) Status

Tram or Heavily S.T.E. 0.60 0.03 Trolley Bus subsidised

Heavily Metro S.T.C. 1.00 0.05 subsidised

Metrobus Private 1.50 0.08 Profitable

Ballena and Private 2.00 0.10 Profitable Delfth Buses

Suburban Private 3.00 0.15 Profitable Buses

Peseros Private 7.30 0.37 Profitable

FIGURE 9

CROSS SECTION OF MEXICAN "EJE VIAL"

(Arterial Road with Contra-flow Lane for Trolley Coach) - 98 -

FIGURE 10

CURRENT AND PROPOSED TROLLEY -BUS NETWORK MEXICO CITY -'1980

'i

: STA. CRUZ •: MEYEHUALCO

UNIDAD INDEPENDENCIA

Current System Proposed Expansion Metro Lines Ring Roads 4 6 8 10 Limit of D.F. _i i i i kilometres - 99 -

later. The problem of high water content in the soil was tackled by setting up magnetic fields to induce the movement of water away from the projected routes, and stations had to be counterbalanced by buildings of a definite height and weight to prevent them from sinking in the watery soil (Alegria, 1975).

The type of technology used, rubber-tired on a concrete guideway, rather than steel wheel on steel rail, was chosen primarily because of the attractive financial package with which it was offered. Although average speeds of the rubber-tired trains are somewhat higher and noise levels are 25 per cent below those of conventional trains, initial con• struction costs as well as maintenance required are much greater. The subsidy needed to maintain current fares is 25 per cent higher with the rubber-tired system than it would otherwise have been (Jimenez Amador,

1978). Thus, continued expansion of the system using the more expensive technology seems as though it deserves additional examination in terms of the long run costs and benefits of tripling the size of the network over the next ten years. In view of the considerable potential savings of changing to conventional technology, such a decision could indeed contribute towards maintaining a lower fare for the travelling public.

The first Metro line followed an east-west alignment from Zaragoza to Chapultepec, later to be extended west a further 3.5 kilometres to the

Western Intercity Bus Terminal at Observatorio Station (see map on Figure

11). The second line, opened in its entirety in 1970, stretches from the

Southern Intercity Bus Terminal at Taxquena north to the Zocalo, and then west to Tacuba. The southern half of this line runs on the surface, in the median strip of the Calzada de Tlalpan. The two remaining tram lines - 100 -

FIGURE 11

MAP OF METRO AND TRAM LINES 1980 ^. /' • / v /' '} / (

0 2 4 6 8 10 l i i i i i kilometres

ZARAGOZA

-Metro lines .Tram lines TLALPAN Ring Roads XOCHIMILCO Limit of D.F. - 101 -

connect with the Metro at Taxquena and provide frequent service to the districts of Tlalpan and Xochimilco. The third line bisects the city in a north-south direction from Lindavista to Coyoacan, and a future south• erly extension of this route is to serve the Ciudad Universitaria (CU.

- main university campus). Three additional lines are presently under construction, scheduled for completion in 1981, and plans call for 11 subway lines to be operational by 1990 (shown on Figure 12), a total of

158 kilometres of route12.

Figure 13 indicates the steady growth, not only in total ridership, but also in ridership per kilometre of line, that the Mexico City Metro has experienced during the 1970s. The reason for this is that very few route extensions took place between 1972 and 1980, and those that did were very short in length. When the three lines presently under construc• tion are opened, a particularly great increase in ridership can be expec• ted. As a result, the Metro is expected to account for 19 per cent of

Mexico City's transport demand by 1985, up from 13 per cent in 1980

(Table 22).

c) Motor Buses

Together with the development of Mexico City's tram network during the first quarter of the 20th century, the first gasoline-powered buses began to appear. A version of the Model "T" Ford, these vehicles had an enlarged wooden body and a seating capacity of six passengers. Although in Mexico they are considered the ancestors of today's diesel buses, their size could in fact point towards their designation as jitneys rather than buses. But the relatively wel1-organised operation on established - 102 -

FIGURE 12

MAP OF CURRENT AND PLANNED METRO LINES

• *"! /' ( /' \ / i

i /

-•Metro lines planned for 1990 -Lines under construction -Current Metro lines -Ring Roads 0 2 4 6 8 10 -Limit of D.F. 1 1 1 1 1 1 kilometres - 103 -

FIGURE 13

RIDERSHIP OF MEXICO CITY METRO

a) Daily Ridership b) Ridership per km of Line

Avge. No. of Millions of 22]

1972 1974 1976. 1978 1980 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980

(Data from STC)

routes that did not compete openly with tram lines distinguishes them

from the early jitneys in Los Angeles and other North American cities.

They were in fact the predecessors of the Chato, Trompudo and Copeton of

the 1930s, 40s and 50s.

The motor bus did not play a significant role in the movement of

people in Mexico City, however, until the late 1950s and early sixties,

when the Panordmicos and Convencionales were introduced as the standard

Mexican urban bus designs. Although the motor bus has come to account

for the lion's share of transport demand (as shown on Table 22 and Figure - 104 -

TABLE 22

MEXICO'"CITY •TRANSPORT.: DEMAND

1 9.7 5 19 7 8 19 8 0 1985

Million Mil 1 ion Mil 1 ion Person-trips Person-trips Person-trips /o /o 7/o per day 7 per day 7 per day 7

Automobile 2.9 20 4.0 23 5.6 27 20

Total Public Transit 11.8 80 13.7 77 15.5 73 80

Motor Bus 6.5 44 7.2 41 7.5 36 27 Metro 1.7 12 2.3 13 2.8 13 19 Tram & Trolley Bus 0.8 5 0.8 4 0.7 3 24 Pesero 0.9 6 1.3 7 2.0 9 5 Taxi & other 1.9 13 2.1 12 2.5 12 5

TOTAL 14.7 100 17.7 100 21.1 100 100

1985 figures are COVITUR target' level's. (Data from COVITUR, STE, STC & DGPT)

14), due primarily to its relatively high capacity per vehicle and flexi•

bility to serve many different parts of the city, it suffers tremendously

from traffic congestion and consequently has very low average speeds.

Since the buses are all privately owned and operated, and the drivers are

paid at least in part on commission, they are usually driven quite aggres•

sively in an attempt to complete the trip as fast as possible. This helps

to speed up bus travel somewhat, but also introduces a certain element of

insecurity or danger for the passengers. Most bothersome of all to the

passengers, however, may be the presence of hawkers, pedlars and enter•

tainers on the buses, who try to make a living by promoting their services.

Along with them, there are the pickpockets and thieves, who are inevitably

found on crowded buses from time to time.

The motor bus services are divided into several classes. The

remaining Convencionales and Panordmioos are considered to be part of an - 105 -

FIGURE 14

MODAL SPLIT OF TRANSPORT DEMAND IN MEXICO CITY

a) Per Cent of b) Actual Demand Total Demand 10 20

TAXI & 1 Mill ions OTHER 12 of trips per day 18 1 PESERO 9 J TRAM & TROLLEY BUS 3

; METROi 13

BUS 36

** _ Tram & Trolley Bus

IA U T Oil 27

1 1 1 1 1975 1980 1975 - 106 -

inferior second class, although these models are rapidly being phased out. Usually in very poor physical condition, these buses are yellow or cream in colour, and their manufacture dates to the early 1960s. The actual second class buses are the Metrobus and Ballena types, painted blue and, as with the inferior second class types, allowing standees to crush capacity. The first class vehicles, the Delfines, have more seating capacity and standees are officially prohibited. Approximately half of the entire urban bus fleet is composed of Delfines, which are painted white, with a red or green stripe along the side. In spite of original intentions, latent demand has forced Delfin drivers to accept standees almost to crush capacity, the crowding controlled only by the limited standing room on board. Thus the seating configuration makes the Delfines more comfortable than the second class buses, although people continue to crowd on, due to a simple lack of overall public transport capacity. As is shown on Figure 15, bus service is available in almost every area of the city, usually both first and second class.

d) Taxis

The third member of the urban public transport network is the taxi, consisting of a great variety of different kinds of services. Histori• cally, the original libve taxis as well as the fortingo represented the first generation of for-hire vehicles. Motorised versions of these horse- drawn conveyances were the aocodrilo, cotorra- and coral, which were even• tually replaced by the amarillos and colorados of today, these names re• ferring to the colours (yellow and red respectively) of the vehicles.

The minitaxi, also a libre by definition, is the newest response to a - 107 -

FIGURE 15 -

MAP OF CURRENT MOTOR BUS LINES MEXICO CITY - 1980

P ? \ E 8J 10-I kilometres

W-~E

CIUD/AD NEZ7AHUALC6YOTL

Ring Roads Limit of D.F. Metro Lines Motor Bus Routes - 108 -

TABLE 23

INVENTORY OF TAXI SERVICES IN MEXICO CITY 1980

Official Turismo Radio Si tio Libre Colecti vo Name Taxi Taxi

Colour Ivory w. Ivory with Ivory w. Ivory with various Scheme red band yellow band red band green band

Type of cater to stand cruising radio fixed-route Service tourists taxi taxi despatch shared taxi

Approx. no. of vehicles 300 18,000 21,000 10,500 17,000 (1980)

(Data from DGPT) Total No. - 66,800

demand for speed and economy in a rapidly growing metropolis that is

becoming increasingly congested.

An inventory of Mexico City's taxi services is presented on Table

23. The sitio taxis, each vehicle assigned to a designated stand, must

report every hour to their respective control bases, where passengers may

board the vehicles, or telephone orders are delivered by a despatcher.

Between reporting times most sitio taxis operate illegally, negotiating

fares hailed on the street. Radio taxis have two-way radios in their

vehicles and receive direct orders from a centrally located radio des•

patcher. These taxis charge a premium fare for their rapid and exclusive

service, and are also not unknown to accept fares from the street. Libre

taxis, the most numerous of all, are completely on their own and make a

living from cruising the streets for passengers. Many of these are Volks• wagen "Beetles", which have been dubbed minitaxis, and they generally charge lower fares than the sitio or radio taxis. Turismo taxis are very - 109 -

limited in number and operate from stands located at exclusive hotels.

Most drivers of these vehicles have a limited competence in English and

charge higher fares than any other type of taxi service.

The pesevos or peso taxis, as they were originally called, are jitneys operating on fixed routes with fixed fare schedules. They are officially called aoleotivos and carry up to six passengers at one time, although this varies depending on the type of vehicle used. Regulation of the pesevo service is considerably less severe than in the case of

urban buses, and therefore the levels of service, fares and actual routes operated can be much more demand-responsive. Entertainment is often pro• vided in the vehicles in the form of music from a radio or tape player and, if the driver smokes, smoking among the passengers is' usually also per• mitted. Fares are paid at any time during a passenger's journey, without the driver asking for them. As with all public transport in Mexico City, pesevo drivers make change and the passengers pay a new fare whenever they board another vehicle. Only the Metro offers free transfers from one line to another. The pesevo drivers are constantly keeping track of the number of vacant seats and have their eyes on the curb, looking for individuals or groups of prospective passengers. The drivers indicate the number of seats still available in the pesevo by holding that number of fingers out of the window. It is therefore easy for people on the sidewalk to recog• nise a pesevo with vacant seats.

Ill OVERVIEW

According to Unikel (1972), outward expansion of the urbanised area of Mexico City has been facilitated partly by a continual expansion - 110 -

TABLE 24

MOTOR VEHICLE REGISTRATION IN THE DISTRITO FEDERAL

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 % rise Vehicle Type estimate estimate 1960-80

Private Auto 165,200 283,000 568,281 929,000 1,774,000 974 Bus 6,300 7,500 10,382 12,000 15,000 138 Taxi 16,100 19,200 21,334 24,000 37,000 130 Truck 37,700 53,700 76,500 76,000 82,000 118 Motorcycle 3,000 5,000 10,000 20,000 25,000 733 TOTAL 228,300 368,400 686,497 1,061,000 1,933,000 746

Vehs/100 pop. 46.5 56.9 80.1 94.7 138.1 197 Persons/veh. 21.5 17.6 12.5 10.6 7.2

(Source of data - COVTTUR)

of transportation and communication systems, thus making large tracts of

additional land accessible. This has permitted large numbers of people

to live further and further away from the city centre without substantially

increasing travel time from place of residence to place of work.

Table 20 (page 78) summarises the growth of the population of

Mexico City during the last 40 years, which is shown graphically on Figure

4. A minimum growth rate of 5.4 per cent is predicted on an annual basis

for the population of the metropolitan area, and there is no reason to

suppose that, in the short term at least, the growth rate of transport

demand will diminish. This indicates an annual growth in transport demand

of 800,000 trips per day (C0VITUR, 1978).

As the population of the city has grown, so has the registration

of motor vehicles, but at a much greater rate. It can be seen on Table

24 that the number of persons per vehicle has constantly declined, from

21.5 in 1960, to 12.5 in 1970, to 7.2 in 1980, a figure which is surpri- - Ill -

TABLE 25

MODAL COMPARISON OF PUBLIC TRANSIT SERVICES IN MEXICO CITY 1980

Motor Trolley Characteristic Trams Metro Taxis Peseros Buses Coaches

Daily Ridership 7.5 0.6 0.1 2.8 1.5 2.0 (millions)

No. of Routes 765 17 2 3 - 66

Approx. No. of 8,000 750 50 900 37,000 17,300 Vehicles

Daily kms/veh. 200 274 174 286 450 350 operated

Average speed 14.2 13.5 23.5 33.3 23.8 (km/h) 26.8

Avge. vehicle 30.8 42.0 58.8 85.1 1.8 4.5 occupancy (persons)

(Data from COVTTUR, STE, STC & DGPT)

singly low by developing country standards. The great majority of this

increase in vehicles can be attributed to the growth in private automo•

bile ownership which, in itself, accounts for 94 per cent of the growth

in motor vehicle registrations during this period. The number of private

cars has increased by close to 1,000 per cent in these two decades, a

figure considerably higher than for any other vehicle type. Facilitating

this increase in car ownership has been a rising level of average income

and standard of living.

From the fast and efficient Metro system, through trams (or LRT)

and trolley buses as well as several different classes of motor buses,

to jitneys and four separate types of taxi service, Mexico City has what - 112 -

by any yardstick could be called a very diverse array of public transport

services (see summary on Table 25). This not only gives the ciudadano a

very wide choice according to time, preference and affordability, but also

strikes a balance that, under the conditions, makes remarkably good use of

available road space. The various elements of public transport in Mexico

City are so interdependent that they complement each other very well, and

could scarcely function without one another. The Metro, for instance,

relies on buses and jitneys as feeders, since it can only reach the most

heavily travelled corridors of the urban area. The buses and jitneys, on

the other hand, depend on the Metro to move a volume that for them is

impossible, at a speed that levels of street traffic would never allow.

The buses rely on jitneys to prevent any more serious overcrowding during

peak periods, and the taxis depend on the other, collective modes to

operate efficiently and to absorb as much of the increase in latent demand

as possible, so as to prevent further exacerbation of traffic congestion.

An understanding of this interdependence between the components of

the urban public transport network and the ways in which they function is

an important first step towards comprehending the role played by the pesevos in the environment of contemporary Mexico City. From this point,

a more detailed examination of the intricate workings of the pesevo system

can proceed. 115

CHAPTER FIVE

THE PESEROS OF MEXICO CITY11 - 114 -

Although Model "T" Fords with modified bodies provided a service

with some of the characteristics of jitneys as early as the 1920s, genuine

jitneys did not make their first appearance in Mexico City until the early

1950s. Responding to a demand for improved public transportation, the

first routes operated along Calzada de Tlalpan between the city centre

(Zocalo) and Tlalpan, as well as along most of Paseo de la Reforma, north•

east from Chapultepec towards La Villa. This service was provided by

regular libve (cruising) taxis, many of which would switch to jitney oper•

ation at times of sufficient demand. Due to their favourably high speed

of operation and willingness to allow passengers to board and alight wherever they wished, the jitneys rapidly became popular among the travel•

ling public. The jitneys charged a flat fare of one peso per passenger,

and therefore popularly became known as -pesevos.

Since the pesevos were providing a much needed service, especially

with respect to the latent demand, there was no great pressure to penalise

taxi drivers for following fixed routes and taking up to five or six pas•

sengers. Disciplinary action would have been difficult during the early years in any event, since the patrons would almost always have been in

agreement to "sharing" the regular taxi fare by each contributing a peso

coin. Furthermore, none of the pesevos was permanently committed to

jitney operation, and they could always switch back to providing regular

"cruising taxi" service, for which they were legally licensed.

Pesevo operation was next extended to serve Avenida de la Revolucidn

and Division del Norte, south from Chapultepec, and routes were started

between the Zocalo and Chapultepec, as well as between the Zocalo and La

Villa along Calzada de Guadalupe, as shown in Figure 16. It is estimated " - 115 -

FIGURE 16

MAP OF ORIGINAL PESERO ROUTES

TLALP7AN "Limit of D.F. Ring Roads Original Pesero Routes _l L J I kilometres - 116 -

that in the late 1950s, approximately one third of the city's 6,850 taxis were at times providing a jitney service.

Over the years, the peseros became more and more established as a public transit mode in their own right, and more taxi licences were issued in recognition of this fact, to make up for the loss of those taxis oper• ating as peseros. In 1962, ten years after the first jitneys began to ply the streets of Mexico City, the first pesero organisation was formed, the

Central de Choferes, serving to unite pesero drivers and owners in their position as providers of what was officially an illegal service. This organisation was superseded in 1968 by the much stronger Coaliaion de

Agrupaeiones de Taxistas del Distrito Federal, which continues to represent the pesero drivers today.

Government agencies were always very lenient in tolerating the peseros, since these vehicles are indeed providing a necessary service for which there is a genuine demand. Thus, allowing the peseros to operate is in fact within the government's best interest, in that it somewhat lessens their own responsibility for improving the supply of public trans• port, or for finding new solutions to the urban transport problems. The entire pesero industry remained unregulated, however, until July of 1973, when the first legal rights, regulations and by-laws were established, originally on a provisional and experimental basis. From the legal point of view, the jitney operation was not a public service, but due to its persistent provision and apparent necessity, some definite regulation, and thereby recognition, was required. Certain routes were therefore authorised and fares set, which then became official. The great demand for pesero service as well as the character of its operation nevertheless - 117 -

meant that many -pesevos would continue to operate outside of the legal

framework, due simply to a continuous service expansion that is far more

rapid than, the ability of the authorities to legalise the new entries.

The constantly changing, almost anarchic nature of the pesevos

makes them very difficult to control or regulate, but it is this very

adaptability that is the key to their great success. Since the pesevos

are the most flexible of all the fixed-route modes of public transit,

they are the first to change and adapt whenever a shift in the demand

pattern occurs. Thus, when a new subway line or an extension is opened;

when a tram line is discontinued; when the alignment of a bus route is

changed; when a new industrial plant is opened; when people move into a

new residential subdivision; or when another shantytown springs up, the pesevos are there to offer their service.

I SERVICE AND OPERATION

a) Route Coverage

From COVITUR studies it has been determined that 300 metres is the

range of distance that people are willing to traverse on foot to reach a pesevo route. Figure 17 shows the spatial coverage of the Mexico City pesevo system, including 300 metres walking distance on either side of any

major street on which pesevos operate. Although overall coverage is far

from uniform, it does seem adequate, since most of the areas where no

service is provided are isolated due to the absence of satisfactory road

access. - 118 -

FIGURE 17

MAP OF PESERO ROUTE COVERAGE 1978 ^.

* - CENTRAL Area

(Source: COvTTUR)

Limited Access Roads

WMM Route Coverage (300 m. walking distance) - 119 -

The greatest concentration of pesevo service is understandably in the central area (within the Circuito Interior - Figure 17), a region consisting primarily of middle-income residential, commercial, and to a lesser extent, low-income residential land use. The very high density of pesevo routes here is due to this being the major employment centre, con• taining the largest poles of attraction in the entire Distvito Federal.

Included are many diverse educational institutions and recreational areas.

In spite of the fact that the pesevos are affected as much by traffic flow problems in the downtown as any other surface mode, their overall speed advantage in other parts of the city means that they are perceived to be faster in the city centre as well. The combination of this perception and the intense congestion in this area has made the pesevos especially popular in the central zone. In addition to those routes having termini in the central area, others pass through on their way from one outlying area to another, as for example, the route linking Ciudad Universitaria (CU) with

Instituto Politecnico Nacional (IPN). Overall, approximately 45 per cent of the pesevo routes pass through or into the central area, making this the most densely served district of the city.

Mexico City's western and northern areas (Figure 17) have the highest density of coverage outside of the Circuito Interior. The first of the two is composed of medium- to high-income residential land use, with a lesser amount of lower-income housing, plus the large open park areas of Chapultepec and Pedregal. The latter district, however, has a completely heterogeneous land use, with large amounts of industry, low-

income housing as well as medium- to high-income residential areas. - 120 -

The eastern and southeastern zones have the lowest density of

pesevo routes. The eastern area has adequate coverage, except for Ciudad

Nezahualcoyotl, an area of very high density low-income housing, where it

seems that incomes are insufficient to allow people the luxury of pesevo

travel. In the southeast, coverage is scant, due primarily to a low pop•

ulation density which is concentrated in nuclei such as Xochimilco, Tlahuac

and Milpa Alta, isolated from each other by large tracts of land. Gene•

rally, however, service in this area is sufficient in extent, the routes

converging on the seats of the Delegaciones, where the most common land

use is higher density low-income housing. There is little local employ•

ment here, giving rise to a demand for transport to other parts of the

metropolitan area.

The spatial service characteristics of pesevo operation give the

impression that route coverage is greater around specific employment

generators and poles of attraction, as well as when middle- to high-

income residential land use predominates. Areas of high density low-

income housing do not seem to generate sufficient demand for intensive pesevo service.

b) Operational Characteristics

There are officially two types of pesevo operation: the autovlzados

(authorised routes) and the tolevados (tolerated routes). In March of

1980 the authorised system consisted of 7,571 vehicles operating on 34

different routes (see Table 26). The tolerated system included 3,074

vehicles operating on 32 routes (Table 27). All of these vehicles have a

special licence plate which allows them to provide a public service. The - 121 -

TABLE 26

CHARACTERISTICS OF AUTHORISED PESERO ROUTES 1980

Number of No. of legal Number of No. of passengers Route No. Branches Vehicles Amparados carried per day (piratas) (legal vehs. only)

1 28 1,210 0 168,778 2 9 908 0 116,130 3 10 472 0 46,679 4 3 110 202 11,000 5 3 82 0 8,385 6 5 329 438 16,208 7 4 120 (10) 20,040 8 4 65 0 2,880 9 9 308 237 16,908 10 4 130 15 24,260 11 9 153 0 17,303 12 11 320 0 25,888 13 6 105 0 25,896 14 7 420 87 90,200 15 4 71 0 6,058 16 2 73 (40) 8,760 17 3 282 0 54,144 18 6 125 0 8,250 19 3 123 337 23,032 20 5 250 0 35,050 21 1 96 0 5,760 22 2 76 0 5,448 23 4 33 40 5,940 24 7 120 0 30,840 25 6 205 0 22,800 26 6 235 0 16,400 27 6 340 81 47,440 28 3 220 (35) 51,600 29 4 130 0 15,350 30 1 35 0 5,355 31 0 0 (33) 0 32 3 46 513 4,140 33 5 145 297 69,479 66 5 234 29,000

TOTAL 188 7,571 2,232 1,035,401

(Data from DGPT) - 122 -

TABLE 27

CHARACTERISTICS OF TOLERATED PESERO ROUTES ism

Number of No. of legal Number of No. of passengers Route No. Branches Vehicles Amparados carried per day (piratas) (incl. amparados)

1 6 279 234 73,050 2 3 489 122 54,040 3 1 70 71 15,792 4 4 209 169 58,608 5 1 52 0 14,976 6 1 30 81 10,800 7 1 140 0 16,800 8 1 141 89 29,458 9 1 75 0 18,900 10 1 31 33 12,096 11 100 270 46,200 12 1 54 19 3,960 13 1 140 0 11,760 14 1 156 175 25,740 15 1 90 3 19,392 16 1 70 94 26,880 17 1 40 81 12,000 18 1 28 63 11,232 19 1 50 432 93,240 20 1 70 488 36,288 21 1 47 432 (10) 84,448 22 1 40 283 42,750 23 1 38 2 3,600 24 1 35 259 31,792 25 1 98 3 19,392 26 1 3 459 73,968 27 67 112 9,840 28 1 120 270 20,480 29 1 50 0 7,200 30 1 20 0 1,200 31 1 34 54 7,400 32 1 200 0 17,600

TOTAL 44 3,074 4,298 910,882

GRAND* 232 10,645 6,530 (143) 1,946,283 TOTAL

* - Authorised and Tolerated Routes. ( Data from DGPT ) - 123 -

autovizados are painted ivory with a green stripe along each side of the vehicle, while the tolevados carry a solid yellow colour. In addition to these there are 6,530 ampavados, or illegal but protected vehicles, pro• viding service on the same 66 routes. These are indistinguishable from the "official" vehicles, except for the fact that they lack the public service licence plate, instead having a private licence. Finally, 143 pirate peseros, or piratas , also operate on certain routes. These are neither protected nor tolerated by the authorities, but continue to exist because of the insufficient supply of service, particularly during the peak periods. There are thus 17,318 vehicles in total, providing pesevo service in Mexico City on 66 routes, which in turn are composed of a total of 232 branches.

Officially known as sevvicios coleet-ivos de vuta con itinevavio fijo, each pesevo route consists of one or more branches (vamales), most of which can be considered routes in themselves. Many of the pesevo routes act as feeder services to the various subway lines, with several routes terminating at virtually each subway station. Others operate to important trip generating centres throughout the metropolitan area as well as to the downtown. Some of the routes serve areas without any other form of public transport, while others operate in some of the city's busiest corridors (see Figure 18). It must be emphasised, therefore, that the pesevo system as a whole is very diverse, with the characteristics of the routes varying considerably from one to the next. Some of the important criteria affecting the nature of the routes, for example, are the type of neighbourhood served, density of activity within the corridor traversed, adequacy of terminal facilities, class of service (authorised or tolerated) and frequency of service provided. - 124 -

FIGURE 18

MAP OF MAJOR PESERO SERVICES 1980 - 125 -

The pesevos generally provide a service from 5:30 or 6:00 a.m. until 10:00 or 11:00 p.m., with several routes operating until 2:00 or

3:00 at night. A very limited 24-hour service is provided on some of the most heavily travelled routes. Frequency of service varies considerably from route to route and throughout the day, with headways ranging from one minute to seven minutes on almost all routes. A very small minority of routes has a low demand at certain times of day, thus operating with headways ranging between eight and 15 minutes, but these are negligible within the scope of the entire system. An important feature of pesevo operation is the provision of service at night, since all other forms of public transit cease operation between midnight and 5:00 a.m.

The operation of pesevo service generally does not follow any accepted schedule, and only 31 per cent of the routes have advertised hours of service. Vehicles simply depart from the terminals as they arrive, depending on demand. During peak periods, passengers often queue for several minutes, waiting for the next vehicle to arrive. Similarly during slack periods, the pesevos line up, waiting for enough passengers to fill the car before departing. Most of the authorised routes have a despatcher on duty at the main terminal(s), who makes notes regarding the vehicles in operation, and also acts as a barker, vocally advertising the service to the public. Furthermore, the despatchers are meant to assure regular headways, to prevent overcrowding and to keep the drivers satis• fied by ensuring equal loadings for each vehicle.

Ridership is a function of both vehicle capacity and acceptable headways, and it is generally considered to be good when it exceeds 70 passengers per hour (Table 28), a value that in most cases is considerably - 126 -

TABLE 28

CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING PESERO SERVICE CHARACTERISTICS

GOOD SATISFACTORY POOR

1. RELIABILITY one vehicle. : one vehicle ' one vehicle a) Service every 1 to 4 every 5 or 6 •' every 6 or more

Frequency minutes minutes '•• minutes 1Q 1 0 b) Passenger replacement of full on departure vehicles leaving Turnover at least 2 & repl. of 1 pass, terminals full; passengers en route OR not no replacement per trip full on departure & no replacement 50 15 35

c) Hours of 6 am - 11 pm, 7 am - 10 pm, anything less Service Mon-Sat, with Mon-Sat, with than at left reduced Sunday reduced Sunday service service 65 30 5

2. COMFORT 5 passengers 6 passengers more than 6 or less passengers 78 20 2

3. SPEED >20 km/h 17-20 km/h <17 km/h 80 15 5

4. RIDERSHIP a) En -route . 7-8 pass./l-way 5-6 pass./l-way no turnover OR trip including trip including if veh. is not turnover turnover filled to capa• city at at least one stage per 1-way trip 40 58

b) At - 5 or 6 passen• 4 passengers less than 4 Terminal gers/vehicle per vehicle passengers per

vehicle 1Q 65 25

5. DEMAND >70 pass./hour 50-70 pass./hour <50 pass./hour 90 5 5

Numbers in italics indicate (Data from COVTTUR) percentage of pesero routes falling into the category. - 127 -

surpassed. The peseros seem to have a demand threshold of about 50 to 70 passengers per hour, below which frequency of service warranted in order to fill the vehicles drops to below five or six minutes (see Figure 19 &

Table 29).

Each of the actual routes is autonomously administered, having its own director, president, secretary, treasurer and delegate to the regulating authority, the Direecion General de Volieia y Trdnsito (DGPT).

This authority has the power to regulate the authorised routes and vehicles in operation as well as to set fares and determine other conditions of operation. Even amongst the authorised peseros, the fares stipulated by the DGPT are not respected, and the pesero drivers are sometimes said to be at liberty to charge whatever they like. The route associations usually have official tariffs, however, which the drivers are required to respect, although they are most often higher than the legal fares as sti• pulated by the DGPT. Since the peseros have a regular clientele, the the fares are fixed and known by the users, preventing the drivers from overcharging. The fare levels are not enforced by the DGPT, and the route associations' tariffs are regulated by supply and demand. Were the DGPT to enforce the implementation of the legal tariff, many pesero operations would cease to remain profitable enterprises and much unnecessary unrest would result, an undesirable event which the authorities feel can be avoided. Figure 20 shows that in spite of the lack of overall control, the average fares are related to the length of the routes, although not as well as should theoretically be the case (r2 = 0.4).

The fares authorised by the Distrito Federal, according to Agree• ment 96, 1st July 1979, are 1.80 pesos per kilometre plus 4.00 pesos for - 128 -

FIGURE 19

DEMAND THRESHOLD AND HEADWAY OF PESERO SERVICES

Demand

(Passengers per hour)

Headway (minutes) (Data from COVITUR surveys) - 129

TABLE 29 VEHICLE COMPARISON OF HEADWAY AND DEMAND LEVELS

4-D00R SEDAN VOLKSWAGEN COMBI (5 passengers) (8 passengers) Demand Vehicles Headway Vehicles Headway psgrs./hr. -per hour (mins.) per hour (mins.)

20: :15 2.5: : :;24 30 x6: = 10 3.S: :16 40 >:8: : 8 5.0-:: ::12 6.3:;: :10 7.5:;: •: 8 1W 14 8.8; :: 7 80 16 90 18 100 20 110 22 13.8 4 120 24 15.0 4 130 26 16.3 4 140 28 17.5 3 150 30 18.8 3 160 32 20.0 3 170 34 21.3 3 180 36 22.5 3 190 38 23.8 3 200 40 25.0 2 210 42 26.3 2 220 44 27.5 2 230 46 28.8 2 240 48 30.0 2 250 50 31.3 2 260 52 32.5 2 270 54 33.8 2 280 56 35.0 2 290 58 36.3 2 300 60 37.5 2 >310- :62:::x:x:x:x: 58" xX: 38.8 2 •:320: :64x^x':x:x":x 56" W 40.0 2 : : : : : S330; :66:xxxx: 54"x~:x' 41.3 >:340: :68::::::Xx?x": 53":x::: 42.5 : :350i 70;:;:;:;:;:;:i:;:;>51"x: : : 43.8 :i:360: :7ZW^^ 50"x"xi: 45.0 !::370: \74^£t> 49"W 46.3 :>380: •76^>><><:< 47"M 47.5 x390: :78x: :x: : : : : 46":!::::: 48.8 :80:::::::::: : :::: : 45"::::: x 50.0

(Source: COVTTUR)

Demand Threshold i| Inadequate Headways

Acceptable Headways - 130 -

FIGURE 20

PLOT OF AVERAGE FARE vs. ROUTE LENGTH

Route length (km) r = 0.632 22

r2 = 0.40

20

18 H

16 A

14 H

12

10

8H

1 -i • i 1 1 1 1 1 1 i 1 1 -i 1—-—i ) 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16

Fare (pesos) (Data from COVITUR) - 131 -

each trip between five and ten kilometres in length, resulting in a fare of 22 pesos for a 10-km trip, divided by the five-passenger authorised capacity of one vehicle. Thus the legal fare for a 10-km trip is 4.40 pesos. In actual fact, however, the average fare in November 1979 was

0.79 pesos per passenger-kilometre, varying between 0.42 and 2.34 pesos from route to route. The average fare per 10-km trip was thus 7.90 pesos, almost double the legal tariff.

According to DGPT figures released in March of 1980, a total of

1,035,401 passengers use the autorizados'on an average day, and an average of 910,282 passengers per day are transported on the tolerados (Tables 26

& 27, pages 121 & 122). Thus on each day almost two million people ride the 10,645 officially sanctioned vehicles plus the 4,298 amparados on tolerated routes, a figure representing almost 13 per cent of public transit trips in Mexico City. No ridership statistics are available for the amparados operating on authorised routes. A programme is presently being implemented to "authorise" the tolerados, creating one system of

66 routes, on which all vehicles must bear the same ivory and green colours as well as a clear identification of the route to which they belong.

c) Service Characteristics

Reliability of service is dependent on the three factors shown on

Table 28 (page 126): frequency of service (headway); availability of space en route (turnover) and hours of service. In most cases, hours of service and frequency are very good, but availability of seats away from the terminals is usually poor, since many vehicles leave the endpoints - 132 -

filled to capacity, with few, if any, passengers alighting en route.

This casts a shadow of doubt on the validity of the 300-metre range employed in Figure 17 (page 118), since at some points there will be . no empty seats, although a potential demand may exist. Unfortunately it is very difficult to identify such locations, and this drawback must simply be taken into consideration when interpreting the spatial coverage of pesevo service.

In order for the pesevo to maintain its position in the urban transport network, its average speeds must be higher than those of urban buses operating on the same street. Indeed they invariably are. The evaluation of pesevo operating speeds, however, depends on various factors, such as level of service, road capacity, variations between existing speeds of autos and buses, delays caused by traffic lights and overall road con• ditions. The average speed of urban motor buses is 14 km/h, while for pesevos it is 27 km/h, almost twice as fast. Using these figures, if a person needs to travel ten kilometres between home and work, it would take

43 minutes by bus versus 22 minutes by pesevo. Thus, by using the pesevo, one can theoretically save more than 40 minutes of travelling time per day. Due to the fact that many people prefer to pay a higher fare by riding pesevos in order to save time over buses and trolley coaches, it seems that the economic loss in terms of man-hours invested in travelling by bus is greater than the extra money expended to travel by pesevo.

Examples of time and fare comparisons for different trips in both peak and off-peak hours using various route and mode combinations on Tables 30 and 31 show the speed advantage of the pesevo, and also the variety of possibilities available to suit the requirements of different people. - 133 -

TABLE 30

TIME AND FARE COMPARISONS MEXICO CITY - 1980

a) LA VILLA - CHAPULTEPEC

Mode Route . Period Time Fare of day. Required (pesos)

Bus Direct off-peak 50 mins. 1.50

.Bus & "Metro via Hidalgo off-peak 45 mins. 2.50

Pesero '-"& Metro via Hidalgo off-peak 30 mins. 7.00

Pesero " Direct off-peak 25 mins. 10.00

Bus Direct peak 90 mins. 1.50

Bus & Metro via Hidalgo peak 65 mins. 2.50

Pesero &' Metro via Hidalgo peak 45 mins. 7.00

Pesero Direct peak 40 mins. 10.00

b) IZAZAGA (Centre) - SAN ANGEL

Mode Route Period Time Fare of day Required (pesos)

Metro & Trolley via Taxquena off-peak 60 mins. 1.60

Metro & Bus via Taxquena off-peak 50 mins. 3.00

Metro & Pesero via Taxquena off-peak 40 mins. 8.00

Pesero Direct off-peak 20 mins. 12.00

Metro & Trolley via Taxquena peak 65 mins. 1.60

Metro & Bus via Taxquena peak 70 mins. 3.00

Metro & Pesero via Taxquena peak 45 mins. 8.00

Pesero Direct peak 35 mins. 12.00 - 134 -

TABLE 31

SAMPLE MODAL CHOICES FOR A TRIP FROM LA VILLA TO PEDREGAL WITH TIME AND COST COMPARISONS 1980

Leg of trip Mode Cost Time required (pesos) (Hours & mins.)

1. La Villa - Chapultepec pesero 10.00 0:30 Chapultepec - San Angel pesero 9.00 0:30 San Angel - Pedregal pesero 8.00 0:10 transfer time 0:10 27.00 1:20

2. La Villa - Izazaga motorbus 2.00 0:40 Izazaga - San Angel pesero 12.00 0:25 San Angel - Pedregal pesero 8.00 0:10 transfer time 0:10 22.00 1:25

3. La Villa - Izazaga motorbus 2.00 0:40 Izazaga - San Angel pesero 12.00 0:25 San Angel - Pedregal motorbus 2.00 0:20 transfer time 0:15 16.00 1:40

4. La Villa - Zocalo motorbus 2.00 0:35 Zocalo - Taxquena metro 1.00 0:25 Taxquena - San Angel motorbus 2.00 0:25 San Angel - Pedregal pesero 8.00 0:10 transfer time 0:20 13.00 1:55

5. La Villa - Zocalo motorbus 2.00 0:35 Zocalo - Taxquena metro 1.00 0:25 Taxquena - San Angel trolley 0.60 0:35 San Angel - Pedregal motorbus 2.00 0:20 transfer time 0:25 5.60 2:20

6. La Villa - Chapultepec motorbus 1.50 0:55 Chapultepec - San Angel motorbus 1.50 0:50 San Angel - Pedregal motorbus 2.00 0:25 transfer time 0:25 5.00 2:30 - 135 -

The average operating speed of pesevos ranges from 12 km/h to 50 km/h, depending on the route, direction of travel and time of day. Since very few people get on or off, the delays that are experienced by the vehicles are due primarily to the physical characteristics of the roads on which they operate, rather than to inherent aspects of pesevo operation.

Traffic congestion and obligatory stops (usually traffic lights) are the main causes.

Unlike other Third World jitney systems, such as in Caracas or

Manila, Mexico City's pesevo drivers do not seem to be much more aggres• sive or apt to take greater chances than the average motorist. This is likely to be due mainly to the fact that the speed of pesevo service is scarcely affected by the boarding or alighting of passengers, since the majority ride from terminal to terminal. Frequency of service remains sufficient in most cases, though, that those prospective patrons who do board en route are rarely left standing on the curb for unreasonable lengths of time.

Passenger comfort, another important criterion in identifying a strong position for jitneys in the urban public transport network of

Mexico City, depends on the number of people carried per vehicle, as well as on the physical condition and age of the vehicles (see Table 28, page

126). Cleanliness of the interiors is usually well maintained, while mechanical maintenance is more often than not deficient. Passenger com• fort is severely reduced when more than six passengers are carried simul• taneously, as is sometimes, but not often, the case. If five years is considered the useful lifespan of a pesevo, then 71 per cent of the sample of 63 vehicles has reached or exceeded this age, thus making repair and - 136 -

operating costs considerably more expensive than for newer vehicles.

The two front seats of the -pesevos, next to the driver, are the most desirable and usually the first to be occupied. This is due to the better view afforded by the front windshield, and to a somewhat higher level of comfort, since only three people can occupy the front seat

(driver, plus two passengers), while the rear seat is used for four- abreast passenger accommodation.

II ADMINISTRATION AND ORGANISATION

At the present time there is no organisational structure to co• ordinate operation, administration and planning of pesevo service, and many vehicles are owner-operated. Administration.is of a haphazard fashion, and planning is virtually non-existent. The organisation that does exist is in the form of route associations, to which the various owners belong. Each of these associations has an elected delegate with the following responsibilities: i) to represent the route members in dealings with the DGPT, and to

secure the authorisation for route changes. ii) to settle claims resulting from accidents. iii) to organise the allocation of vehicles on the route branches. iv) to distribute the weekly route cards {aavtulina or tavjeton),

which permit a vehicle to operate on the route; and to collect

dues from the owners, and provide for insurance and legal services. v) to administer general route expenses, such as those related to

offices, management and despatcher's fees.

vi) to make sure that service is properly provided through the presence - 137 -

of despatchers at the terminals, especially during peak periods.

Maintenance of the vehicles is of an erratic nature, not following any recognised timetable, which usually means corrective rather than pre• ventive servicing. This results in many breakdowns and consequent service disruptions. Only the larger fleet owner's and big route organisations have maintenance garages (36% of the autorizados and 20% of the tolerados) which are for their exclusive use. Each of the authorised routes has an established business address (though not necessarily a telephone) and maintains administrative offices, while only 30 per cent of the tolerated routes have such facilities. The largest routes also have permanent stocks of repair parts available to members at a discount (tires, oil, filters, etc.), as well as a subsidised dental service for members and their families.

Ill PESERO ECONOMICS

a) Costs and Revenue

In order to examine the economics of pesero operation, full data on costs and revenue are required. Following is a breakdown of the compo• nents of the costs involved:

Fixed costs - Amortisation or depreciation on vehicles under five years of age (one fifth or 20% of cost of vehicle per year until such age is reached), plus interest. - Administration and operator's wages; included only when vehicles are part of a fleet. - Insurance premiums, taxes for licence and inspection.

Variable costs - Fuel, oil, tires, repairs and washing.

Total, not including administration and operator's wages is 1.86 pesos per kilometre (see Table 32). - 138 -

TABLE 32

PESERO OPERATING COSTS

(Pesos per kilometre) (1978-80)

Average New New FIXED COSTS Sedan Sedan Combi

220,000.00 Vehicle Purchase Price 220,000.00 230,000.00 x 0.29* (pesos)

Amortisation 0.10 0.36 0.38 Interest over 5 Years 0.18 1.08 1.13 Administration 0.67 0.67 0.67 Accidents 0.10 0.10 0.11 Licence & Taxes 0.00 0.02 0.02

Sub Total 1.05 2.23 2.31

Driver's Wages 1.70 1.70 1.70

TOTAL - Fixed Costs 2.75 3.93 4.01

VARIABLE COSTS

Fuel 0.56 0.56 0.40 Lubricants 0.10 0.10 0.08 Tires & Tubes 0.23 0.23 0.23 Minor Repairs 0.29 0.10 0.10 Major Repairs 0.30 0.33 0.33

TOTAL - Variable Costs 1.48 1.32 1.14

TOTAL, not including Administration or 1.86 2.88 2.78 Driver's Wages

GRAND TOTAL 4.23 5.25 5.15

* - Proportion of vehicles less than 5 years old.

(Data from COVITUR and route associations ) - 139 -

Revenue is dependent entirely on fares, which vary considerably from route to route. On short routes* single fixed fares are usually charged, and on longer ones, if there is an exchange of passengers at points between the terminals, graduated fares are charged (e.g. on Table

33 and Figure 21). In these cases, fares are set by the route association, and if passengers are carried to or from points not specified on the tariff, drivers may charge at their discretion, especially since no re• ceipts or tickets are issued. Overall fares vary from 0.45 to 2.34 pesos per kilometre, and revenues are calculated by multiplying the average fare by the average number of passenger boardings, divided by the length of the route. The resultant average revenue per kilometre is 4.71 pesos.

In order to take into account the time lost for repairs and accidents

(average = 20% per day; i.e. availability of 80%), this average revenue must be multiplied by 0.8, lowering the value to 3.77 pesos.

From the examination of data from COVITUR, it seems that revenue per kilometre is higher on those routes whose trip length is relatively short and on those where there is a higher turnover of passengers per trip. This is discredited, however, since the coefficient of correlation between route length and revenue/km is an insignificant 0.296 (Figure 22).

The correlation between passenger turnover and revenue is even poorer.'

Although the maximum number of passengers officially permitted in one pesero at any one time is five, the norm is four in the back and two in the front for a total of six. On certain routes, on occasion, seven passengers are carried in addition to the driver. In this case, comfort for the riders is considerably reduced. The vehicles themselves have an average age of 6.4 years, and their physical condition is quite variable. - 140 -

TABLE 33

ROUTE 26 FARE STRUCTURE 1980

From IZAZAGA to J.T. CUELLAR • 6 From XOCHIMILCO to HUIPULCO 6 XOLA 7 CALZ. DEL HUESO 7 AVENIDA 9 8 CLASA 8 ERMITA 9 XOTEPINGO 9 XOTEPINGO 10 TAXQUENA 10 CALZ. DEL HUESO 11 GRAL. ANAYA 11 HUIPULCO 12 AVENIDA 9 12 PERIFLtRICO 13 XOLA 13 XOCHIMILCO 14 IZAZAGA . 14

One Peso surcharge between 9:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.

FIGURE 21

MAP OF ROUTE 26, MAIN BRANCH AND FARE STRUCTURE 1980

Total route length - 21.1 km - 141

FIGURE 22

PLOT OF ROUTE LENGTH vs. REVENUE/KM

10

8

Revenue

Pesos/km) g

-r- 4 ~"6 8 10 12 14~ 16 18 ~20~ ~22

Route Length

(Source: COVITUR)

On average, however, both their physical state and cleanliness are con•

siderably superior to that of most urban buses.

Many of the pesero routes (branches) have demand levels exceeding

the present capacity of sedan-type vehicles, resulting in overcrowding,

queuing of passengers at terminals, and overall loss of comfort and con•

venience to patrons. For some time, owners and operators of the peseros

have been urging for permission to introduce vans with a higher seating

capacity, since these have a much greater revenue-earning capability.

Several different models were examined by COVITUR, and the Volkswagen

Combi selected, due to its low initial cost, immediate availability and

local manufacture. These are officially permitted to carry eight passen- - 142 -

gers, but in practice ten are usually taken, depending on the seating configuration. Demand levels on each route should, of course, be the final determinant of the type and size of vehicle used. An indicator of the appropriate levels is outlined on Table 29 (page 129).

The Combis are considered a great success from the point of view of the route associations and authorities, but many owners and drivers are expressing concern over the quality of the Combi as a vehicle. Con• sidering the loads carried, the Combi is a less powerful and less durable vehicle with a shorter life span than the average four-door sedan pre• viously in use. The Combi nevertheless has a better fuel economy and superior space utilisation, so it is a trade-off, with each vehicle having its advantages as well as its drawbacks.

b) Future Prospects

COVITUR has recently been monitoring pesevo operations in order to find ways of improving the quality and efficiency of service. Their recommendations for the improvement of operations include: (i) The inte• gration of the autovizados and tolevados, streamlining the service into one entity that can be tailored to fit in with other modes, having reached a level of importance sufficient to warrant such action; (ii) The consoli• dation and adminstration of the human, material and financial resources involved into one or more transport firms, co-ordinating all functions and creating a base for service improvement and recovery of capital investment.

In spite of existing deficiencies, the productivity of pesevos is consi• dered sufficient to justify the creation of such firms (see Figure 23);

(iii) Terminal facilities should be removed from the actual streets and - 143 -

FIGURE 23

PESEROS AS A TRANSPORT FIRM

Passenger Transport PRODUCTION Service Regulation FUNCTION Supervision of Standards Terminal Operation

Procurement, Organisation & Administration of: - Material Resources INTEGRATION - Power and Land FUNCTION - Human Resources - Financial Resources FUNCTIONS - Information CONTROL - Evaluation FUNCTION - Decision-making - Quality Control of Service

- Co-ordination of Service PLANNING according to Master Plan FUNCTION - Execution of Planning and Technical Innovations

USER - Maximum Service Quality PESEROS BENEFITS at Minimum Price AS A i ITRANSPORTI - Provision of Material EMPLOYEE FIRM Requirements due to BENEFITS Adequate Remuneration HOBJECTIVES

- Recovery of Resources - Generation of Savings INVESTMENT - Availability of Savings BENEFITS for Re-investment

- Operation TECHNICAL - Maintenance MANAGEMENT

- Administration ADMINISTRATIVE - Finance MANAGEMENT - Control MANAGEMENT

- Dissemination of Info. GENERAL - Planning and Development MANAGEMENT - Public Relations - Employee Relations

(Source: COVITUR) - 144 -

be given off-road space; (iv) Fares should be indexed according to route

length and level of demand, and receipts or tickets should be issued; (v)

No branch of any route should exceed 13 kilometres in length, suburban

routes excepted, in order to minimise delays; (vi) A maximum vehicle age

of five years should be imposed, thus ensuring maximum efficiency of

operation, minimum number of breakdowns, and optimal conditions for the

users; (vii) Route terminals should have permanent structures and ameni•

ties such as an inspector's booth, proper electric lighting, a clock,

protection against rain, public washrooms, and a visible display of

schedules, hours of service and fares; (viii) Preventive maintenance

should be carried out during night shifts, thus making a maximum number of vehicles available during the day. Exclusive maintenance garages,

storage lots and fuelling stations should be provided for each "firm";

(ix) Terminal-to-terminal express services should operate on exclusive

one-way and contra-flow bus lanes to speed up service. On those routes with a high load factor, four-door sedans should be replaced with micro-

buses or vans. With ten passengers instead of six, these would permit a

65 per cent improvement in revenue at the same fare levels. Express

services, as a pilot project, are proposed on the following routes:

Chapultepee - La Villa (5 minute frequency), General Anaya - Santo Domingo

(5 minute frequency), Chapultepec - San Angel (4 minute frequency), and

Xochimilco - Izazaga (4 minute frequency). On those routes where demand warrants, intermediate stops should be designated and remain at fixed and

known locations; (x) Finally, the pesero system must be compatible with other public transport modes. Rather than being competitive, they should complement each other by serving certain identifiable markets, resulting

in the best possible choice of benefits for the user and for an overall efficient system. - 145 -

The majority of these recommendations seems reasonable and desirable, except for the implementation of fixed, inflexible stopping locations, which removes one of the advantages of pesero operation, the convenience of being able to board and alight anywhere. The provision of washrooms and a clock at terminals seems to be a luxury unwarranted by the type of operation, as rest rooms are not even provided in most Metro stations,. The issuance of tickets may also be difficult to introduce, as an infinite variety of these would be needed, due to the different routes and fare levels involved. Finally, the creation of the aforementioned

"firms" must be done with extreme care, so as not to undermine the incen• tive for drivers to own their own cars. Such a move could easily result in the loss of many of the financial savings currently being enjoyed by the peseros, with consequent higher fares, poorer service quality and response to demand changes, reduction in competitiveness and eventual necessity for subsidies.

In conclusion, the pesero has been identified as a necessary form of public transport, satisfying a specific demand of a certain population group, and serving as an auxiliary to the other forms of public transit.

It also serves an important purpose in areas which lack any other form of public transport. The pesero is furthermore able to link origins and destinations in the most direct way, due to its low capacity, resulting in fewer stops and consequently higher average speeds.

IV SOCIO-ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

In order to investigate more specifically the characteristics of the population to which the peseros cater, several passenger interviews - 146-

were undertaken on four pre-selected routes. Simultaneously, drivers on

three of these routes were also interviewed, for the purpose of determining

details about the operations as well as about the operators themselves.

The four routes were selected in such a way as to represent each

of the major characteristics of the pesero system as a whole. Although

all four of the routes connect with at least one subway station, two are

specifically feeders to Taxquefia, the southernmost terminus of the Metro

system, from distinctly identifiable residential areas. One of these is

an autorizado (Route 29), and the second a tolerado (Route 31). Both of

the other two routes are considerably longer (see Figure 24). One (Route

1) terminates in the downtown area and operates directly to the south-

suburban nucleus of San Angel. This is a node of great importance to the

transport network as a whole, linking residential areas in the southwestern

suburbs with the central city and in general with the industrial and other

employment centres of the metropolis.

The last route, and perhaps the most important, due to the volume

of riders it carries, was also one of the first to commence operation

almost 30 years ago. Running along most of the length of Paseo de la

Reforma, one of Mexico City's busiest traffic arteries, this branch con•

nects Chapultepec, one of the city's most important transport nodes, with

La Villa de Guadalupe, gateway to the northern suburbs. Chapultepec is a

busy terminal, located over the Metro station of the same name. There are

innumerable transfer possibilities to diverse bus, trolley coach and other pesero routes, as well as to the subway. The movement of people and traf•

fic is very great, the terminal being surrounded by commercial and recre•

ational land uses. The other terminal of this route is at La Villa de - 147 -

FIGURE 24

MAP OF PESERO ROUTES CHOSEN FOR THE STUDY

/• V. Authorised Routes: / I. \ 1 San Angel-Izazaga (Centro) 1 Route / Route 2 La Villa-Chapultepec / Route 29 Taxqueha-Ruiz Cortines / 1 c. Tolerated Route: ]

V Route 31 Taxquena-Unidad Fovissste -V

N i

W—E

Ring Roads Limit of D.F. Metro Lines Pesero Routes 4 6 8 10 and .Terminals kilometres - 148 -

Guadalupe in the northeast of the metropolitan area, adjacent to the

Basilica de Guadalupe, Mexico's holiest Roman Catholic shrine. The

dominant land use there is middle-income residential, with certain com•

mercial and industrial areas nearby. Population density is very high and

there is a considerable availability of employment. This route has a

higher than average exchange of passengers along its length (60%), since

it crosses areas with high employment as well as a major subway transfer

point, the Hidalgo Station. As a result, 15 per cent of the delays ex•

perienced are due to the boarding and alighting of passengers, 40 per cent

to traffic lights, and 45 per cent to congestion. The number of passengers

able to board en route depends, of course, on the destinations of those

passengers boarding at the terminals.

a) Drivers

Based on the driver interviews undertaken on routes 1, 29 and 31,

the first two being autovizados and the third a tolerado, many interesting

facts about pesero drivers and the characteristics of these routes have

been revealed (see Table 34). The interviews were undertaken orally on

an individual basis, using the questions shown in Appendix 2.

(i) Economics: The average daily earnings of the 63 drivers interviewed

is 339 pesos, with little difference from route to route. It must be

noted, however, that in each case, those drivers who own their vehicles

have considerably higher earnings than those who rent or lease the pesero

from someone else. The number of hours worked per week varies considerably

from below 30 (part-time drivers) to over 100, depending on the commitment

of the drivers to their work. There are, for example, students who live - 149 -

TABLE 34

RESULTS OF DRIVER INTERVIEWS

A A T Item Average Route 1 Route 29 Route 31

Daily earnings* 339 330 372 317 Hourly earnings* 36 39 37 31 Per cent owners 38 23 20 71 Gross daily revenue* 752 843 823 589 Daily expenses *+ 414 504 462 273 Age of veh. (years) 6 5 5 9 % with other income 8 0 10 14 Hours/week worked 69.2 60. 8 72. 7 74. 0 Pass.'/hour carried 12.3 9. 4 16. 9 11. 0 % in favour of Combi 52 64 55 38 No. of dependants 4.9 4. 8 5. 0 4. 8 Years at same job 5.6 6. 1 5. 9 4. 9 % who like job 75 90 65 67 % <20 years of age 8 14 5 5 % 20-29 years old 35 32 25 48 % 30-45 years old 43 45 55 29 % >45 years of age 14 9 . 15 19 No. of respondents 63 22 20 21 Date of survey 23.7. 80 10.7. 80 10.7. 80

SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OWNERS AND DRIVERS

Item ROUT E 1 ROUT E 29 ROUT E 31 Renter Owner Renter Owner Renter Owner

Daily earnings* 275 520 344 482 281 331 Hourly earnings* 34 59 36 44 24 34 Gross daily revenue* 813 940 684 552 Daily expenses *+ 530 420 493 337 403 221 Hours/week worked 86.5 68.9 Years at same job 5.7 7.6 4.6 11.0 2.8 5.8 No. of respondents 17 5 16 4 6 15

* - in pesos A - Autorlzado T - Tolerado

+ - Daily expenses include: For owners - Amortisation (if vehicle purchased in last 5 years = purchase price divided by 1,826) & Interest; Tires; Lubrication; Oil Change; Other maintenance; Gasoline; Oil; Wash; Window Card. For renters- Daily rental; Replacement of flat tires; Gasoline; Oil; Wash; Window Card. - 150 -

at home with their parents and drive a pesero one or two days per week to to earn extra money, but these are relatively rare. A more indicative measure of earnings is the average income per hour, which is 36 pesos

($1.80), compared to the hourly wage of a federally-employed tram or trolley bus driver of 34.70 pesos ($1.74). The latter are salaried em• ployees, being paid at competitive rates, thus indicating that the pesero drivers.are able to earn a reasonable living from their work. Due to the fact that they work an average of ten hours per day, which is more than the trolley drivers, they are able to take home a considerably higher daily amount. In addition, the pesero drivers do not have to comply with schedules and can therefore take a rest at any time; nor do they have the responsibility for large numbers of people. The money they earn is also received on the spot and there is no need to wait for weekly pay packets.

In return, however, they have no guaranteed income, and their earnings depend on number of passengers carried (speed of operation), which is greatly affected by unforseeable events such as inclement weather, traffic jams and mechanical breakdowns. If business is slow, a pesero driver may have to wait in line for 30 minutes at a. terminal, during which time he has no income.

Although average income is very similar over, the three routes studied, the earnings of those drivers who own their pesero are consider• ably higher (22% for Route 29; 29% for Route 31; and 42% for Route 1).

This is understandably due to the economics of doing one's own repair and maintenance work, and not having to pay the owner's profit through the rental or leasing agreement. Owner-operators are overwhelmingly in the minority on the two authorised routes (20%), while over 70 per cent of ' the tolerated vehicles are owned by their drivers. This seems to indicate - 151 -

a preponderance of free enterprise business on the less permanent, less well-established tolerados, and a greater percentage of fleet ownership and lease-rental arrangements on the more organised autorizados.

Revenue averages at 752 pesos per day, although it is considerably

higher on the authorised routes (823 pesos on Route 29, and 843 pesos on

Route 1) and much lower on the tolerated route (589 pesos). This is due

to the more established clientele in the former, which have permanent

route terminals, while the latter has no formal facilities. On the tole•

rated route, the cars simply queue on the street, well outside of the

actual transfer areas of the Taxquena Metro Station. Patrons therefore

must walk through the crowded pesero and bus loading platforms, onto Calle

Cerro de Jesus, a 300-metre walk past noisy and dirty bus traffic as well

as a variety of pedlars and hawkers. The remaining sidewalk is about one

half metre in width, and there are no signs indicating the location where

the peseros depart, although it is only during the evening peak hour that

passengers must wait for a car to arrive. Once the tolerados and autori•

zados are merged into one system, it is likely that revenues of the former

will rise, according to the extent of improvements implemented.

Expenses, averaging at 414 pesos daily, are highest on Route 1

(504 pesos), due primarily to the length of the route and to the high

degree of administrative and organisational expenses involved. For the

tolerados, expenses are much lower (273 pesos per day). It is likely

that this is due partly to the fully depreciated state of almost all the

vehicles, as well as to the relative lack of administrative costs, and

the preponderance of owner-operators, who do their own work. - 152 -

Costs are calculated in two ways. For the drivers who do not own their car, the major cost is the daily rent, varying between 200 and 500 pesos, depending on the type and age of the car, as well as on the par• ticular agreement between owner and driver. Other costs, variable in nature, are for gasoline, oil and car wash. The drivers are also required to replace flat tires that occur while they are driving, an additional expense that is incurred once or twice per week. For the owner-operators, costs include depreciation of the vehicle (original cost amortised over a five-year period), interest, gasoline, oil, tires, maintenance (oil and filter changes, lubrication, etc.), repairs, insurance and administrative costs. The last item is paid weekly in exchange for the window card that each owner must buy in order to operate his vehicle on the route. In exchange, he becomes a member of the route association and may take advan• tage of its services. On some routes, the drivers are also required to pay the dispatcher one or two pesos every time they leave the terminal, since despatchers are not always remunerated by the association.

The average age of the vehicles on the two authorised routes is five years, and nine years on the tolerated route. This is a reflection of both the lower revenues on the latter and the limited capital available to the more recently established and "higher-risk" members of the toler• ated routes.

(ii) Operation: .According to the interviews, the average number of hours worked per week is 69, lowest on Route 1, which has the highest average revenues and is easily the busiest of the three. It takes longer to earn the same amount on the other routes, especially on 31, where hourly earnings are lowest (31 pesos). Most drivers work six or seven days per - 153 -

week; 10 to 12 hours per day. There are usually two shifts, unless the owner-operator prefers not to lease his car to another driver for half the day. The average driver carries .12 passengers per hour, this being dependent on route length and demand. Route 29, with a high demand, carries the heaviest load per vehicle, since it is short and drivers can usually complete 1% or two round trips per hour. On Route 31 {tolerado), it doesn't take much longer, except that, due to the relatively low demand, drivers must often wait in line up to 30 minutes at the terminal. Route 1, being much longer, is much more time-consuming, and drivers are hard pressed to complete one round trip in the space of an hour, averaging 9.4 passengers per hour. Fares on Route 1 are, of course, proportionally higher, making up for the difference in route length (see Table 35).

Overall, about half of the drivers favoured replacing the vehicle they were driving with a Volkswagen Combi van, and half were opposed.

None of the drivers interviewed had ever driven a Combi, yet the vans were in use on the two authorised routes, and thus the drivers were fami• liar with the Combi's characteristics. On these two routes, 55 to 65 per cent would have liked to switch to a Combi, because of the greater capa• city and thus higher revenues. Those that were opposed cited lack of power (weak engine), durability and reliability in comparison with the

American four-door sedans they were presently driving. Only 38 per cent of the tolerado drivers favoured the Combi, this low figure due primarily to the low demand on the route that would not warrant a higher-capacity vehicle, but also partly to simple non-familiarity. Many drivers stressed that if an American-designed van with two outward-opening doors were made available (such as the vans operating in por puesto service in Caracas), they would prefer that to the sedans. - 154 -

TABLE 35

FARE STRUCTURES ON ROUTES STUDIED 1980

Route Type of Fare Explanation Fare

I Stage Izazaga - J.T. Cuellar 6 pesos Izazaga - Xola 7 pesos Izazaga - Avenida 9 8 pesos Izazaga - Ermita 9 pesos Izazaga - Division del Norte 10 pesos Izazaga - Carrillo Puerto 11 pesos Izazaga - San Angel 12 pesos

2 Zone La Villa - Metro Hidalgo 6 pesos La Villa - anywhere between Hidalgo & Chapultepee 9 pesos La Villa - Chapultepee 10 pesos Chapultepee - Hidalgo 6 pesos

29 Zone Taxquena - Ruiz Cortines 6 pesos Taxquena - Ajusco 7 pesos

31 Flat Taxquena - Fovissste 5 pesos

Surcharge of 1 peso on all routes between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.

(iii) Socio-economic: All 63 of the drivers interviewed were male, and

only eight per cent have additional income from other sources. Most of

these were concentrated on the tolerated route, where the organisation is much less formal, and revenues as well as earnings are lowest. On Route

1, the most highly organised, none of the drivers had any other income.

The average pesero driver has a moderately sized family, with five dependants to support, and has worked as a pesero driver for 5% years.

The owner-operators consistently have been driving longer than those who only rent a pesero. This is to be expected, since a certain amount of experience as well as capital is required to purchase a vehicle and be responsible for its upkeep and operation. As an example of the capital investment involved, it is not unusual for 200,000 pesos ($10,000) to be - 155 -

paid for a two year-old used car of American design and medium size (e.g.

4-door Dodge Dart or Ford Maverick). Three quarters of the drivers con• sider their work desirable and enjoy it. The advantages are freedom of working hours, the driver is his own boss and there is usually time to rest at the end of the line, compared to a regular taxi driver, who is always on the go and must take his passengers where they want to go, plus haggle over fares. Furthermore, regular taxi drivers are on their own when they have a breakdown or an accident, while pesevo drivers generally help each other, and the route associations will back up a driver in the case of accidents, insurance claims and lawsuits. Pesevo drivers do not have the danger of passengers leaving without paying, or of assaults or robberies, since there are usually witnesses in the car. Finally, they need not be familiar with a large extent of the very complex road network of Mexico City, as do taxi drivers. Those drivers who do not like their work do so because it offers no opportunity for advancement, and they are there only while searching for a better job, either because they had in• vested in a vehicle and are financially "locked in", or because they are students in need of money to finance an education.

There is a very even spread of ages among the drivers, with eight per cent under 20 years of age, 35 per cent between 20 and 29, 43 per cent between 30 and 45, and 14 per cent over 45 years of age. On the tolevado

(Route 31), several drivers complained of excessive competition, due to the tolerated status of the route and consequent low ridership, while on both other routes, most thought there was insufficient capacity and hadn't a word to say about competition. The camaraderie and morale of the drivers is, in general, very high. They are most often very courteous and obliging - 156 -

towards the passengers, friendly and helpful to fellow drivers, often

jokingly sarcastic and teasing each other.

b) Passengers

The results of the passenger survey, perhaps the most important

part of the study, are presented in aggregate form in Figure 25. Since

the surveys were carried out inside the actual vehicles while in motion,

it was important that the questions be designed for easy and fast inter•

pretation by the respondents. They were ..printed on heavy card stock to

facilitate easier marking of choices under crowded conditions and without

a proper writing surface (see Appendix 1). A box containing soft-lead

pencils was taped to the back of the front seat as well as on the glove

compartment. Drivers agreed to politely offer each passenger a question•

naire, and envelopes were provided, again attached to the interior of the

car next to the pencils, into which completed questionnaires could be

deposited. This system worked well, except in the event that passengers

had insufficient time in which to complete the questionnaire before alighting. In these cases, as well as when responses had been spoilt, or when passengers refused to co-operate, the results were discarded. The questions chosen were meant to reveal as much as possible about the users' perceptions of the -pesero system, about their reasons for using this mode of transport, and about their own socio-economic conditions.

One of the most uniform characteristics of most urban transport systems is their role in acting mainly as a commuter service. In Mexico

City, however, custom dictates a long break from work for dinner {almuerzo) in the early afternoon, resulting in the existence of three rush hours

(7-10 a.m.; 2-4 p.m.; and 6-10 p.m.). Many people return home for their - 157 -

FIGURE 25

AGGREGATE RESULTS OF PASSENGER SURVEY

Trip Purpose Occupation % of Riders

60

50 50

40 40

30 30

20 20

10 10

0 CD co 1 S- +-> S- 1 S- o c •a CD c: CL) CJ S- ai i CO "O S- o —, o •r- c S- o sz CJ CD CD s- CD to O) CD O- ro u •r- +-> • r- T3 CO cu CD £= S- x: o CL S- CD H-> o 4- s- o 4- c: (O • r- +-> OO s- cc rO 4- o +-> o • i— • r- E 4-> o LJJ O 2 00 n: s L a R e Sh o Bu s

Number of Respondents:

Rte. 1 - 256 Age of Sex of Rte. 2 - 320 Respondents Respondents Rte. 29 - 195 (years) % % Rte. 31 - 208 Total 979 60 60 % %

50 50 Dates & Times 50 50 of Survey:

40 40 40 40 Rte. 1 - 23. 7 80 0800-1900 30 30 Rte. 2 - 22. 7 80 30 30 0730-1930 Rte. 29-16. 7 80 20 20 20 20 0800-1800 Rte. 31 - 15. 7 80 10 10 10 10 0800-1800

0 0 UD LO Ln LO m 0 CD t-H CM co V I I I A ro (O CD CD <£> E t-H CM CO CD - 158 -

FIGURE 25 (continued) % Modal Transfer 80 for Completion % of Trip

70 Passenger 70 Acceptance 60 of Vans 60

50 50

40 40

30 30

20 20

10 10

0 0 i- T3 to 3 CU cu CO 00 >- i—i > O rO Q_ 4- CL o

Frequency of Pesero Major Deficiencies of Use (times per week)' Pesero Operation

%

50 %

40 40

30 30

20 20

10 10

0 0 o LO LO 4-> c to I—1 i—1 LO i—1 C •I— o CU 1 1 1 A cu >> to i— «r— to •o •r- CM CO i—1 'r— +-> cu •— to 4-> cu 1 CJ s~ I—4 O •i— i— 3 cu • (— r— o Qi •r— U CJ M- 1— "O o o cu sz H- re • r- o cz • r— o •r- +-> 14- CL JZ o • r- o o CJ o ro cu o _C o cu +-> • r— to C_) > +-> CU > il- > s- CU - 159 -

FIGURE 25 (continued)

Automobi le Alternate Mode Choice Ownership % % 60

50 50 50

40 40 40

30 30 30

20 20 20

10 10 10

0 CO o •i— CD >> •l-> CL S 3 S- X +-> o CD -C o •1— >- 0 co +J i— O c S- CD h- > i— ra +J =3: o o S- S- CJ 1— Woul d mak e Reason for Choosing Reason for Choosing Pesero Instead of Pesero Instead of % Bus or Subway Taxi or Private Car

80

70

60 %

50 50

40 40

30 30

20 20

10 10

0 •a +-> CD >> s- 0 +-> S- CD s- O 4-> QJ co O CO CD o c CD o 4- E CD Q. 4— CD 4- +-> CJ co E 'i— ca o -a o CO CD S- CJ CL) ra C Cu Conv e - 160 -

main meal around 2:00 or 3:00 p.m., working again in the afternoon from

3:00 or 4:00 until 7:00 or 8:00 in the evening. Although this afternoon peak is not nearly as great as the evening one, it is without question a definite peak, meaning that a high level of service frequency can and must be maintained virtually throughout the day. This results in a higher vehicle utilisation than would be found in most North American cities. Thus, trips to and from home for dinner, or to and from a rest• aurant, would also be considered "work" trips.

As expected, the majority of pesero passengers, in all cases, are travelling to and from work (also see Figure 25). Route 2, which operates through the highest density employment area in the entire city, unsur• prisingly has the highest percentage of work trips (74%), followed by ten per cent running errands. These are likely people doing business or per• sonal transactions of some type during the dinner break (Figure 26). The percentage of work trips is much lower on the two feeder routes in the south, where a higher proportion of the ridership consists of students going to or from school or university. On Route 29, for example, 35 per cent of the riders surveyed were students and 17 per cent of the trips were school-related, both values being approximately double those on the

two trunk routes (see also Figure 27). Factors causing this are likely

twofold: the relative proximity of these two southern residential areas

to the main university campus (Ciudad Universitaria, or CU); as well as

the more homogeneous nature of the ridership, in that almost everyone who

rides these routes lives in the residential areas that they serve.

Students aside, the majority of working people on the peseros are office

employees in businesses of various sorts, as opposed to labourers (blue-

collar workers), who account for only nine per cent of the passengers on - 161 -

FIGURE 26

PASSENGER SURVEY RESULTS - TRIP PURPOSE

Recreation & Errands Entertainment Other

% % %

10 10 10 10

0 0 0 0 1 2 29 31 1 2 29 31 1 2 29 31

Route Route Route - 162 -

FIGURE 27

PASSENGER SURVEY RESULTS - OCCUPATION OF RIDERS

Office Worker Student Labourer % 60

10

1 2 29 31 12 29 31 12 29 31

Route Route Route

Housewife Businessman R e t i red

% % % % 10 10 10 10

0 0 0 0 1 2 29 31 1 2 29 31 12 29 31

Route Route Route

Other

% %

10 10

0 0 12 29 31

Route - 163 -

average. The surprisingly high percentage of students seems to indicate

that they can afford pesero travel, and prefer a mode where a seat is

guaranteed (making it possible for them to read en route) and which saves

a considerable amount of time. Tuition fees at Mexican universities are

not low by any standards, meaning that most of such students probably

come from families with an above-average income. Frequent mentions of

occupations in the "other" category (altogether comprising 6% of the

sample) were lawyer, nurse, secretary, teacher and journalist, these

people refusing to classify themselves as office employees. The age

distribution of passengers is very similar on all four routes (Figure 28),

the majority being between 16 and 25 years of age, reflecting the student

element as well as the young employee, followed by the 26-35 year bracket,

the bulk of which would be working in offices. Very near half of the

respondents were men and the other half women, with a marginally higher

percentage of men. Route 1 (Izazaga - San Angel) had the most uneven

split (59% vs. 41% in favour of men), for which no explanation can be

proposed (see Figure 29).

Most of the pesero passengers are frequent riders, as 70 per cent

of them use a pesero between six and 15 times per week, this preventing

drivers from overcharging, since most people know what the regular fares

are (Figure 30). Only about seven per cent of the passengers use the peseros once a week or less, indicating a high percentage of regular

riders, who are apparently satisfied with the service.

Only one third of the people surveyed were able to complete their

journey on the pesero, the majority transferring to another mode somewhere

along the line (Figure 31). On the two feeder routes in the south, this - 164 -

FIGURE 28

PASSENGER SURVEY RESULTS - AGE OF RESPONDENTS

(years)

<15 16 - 25 26 - 35 36 - 45 >45

60 60

50 50

40 40

30

20 % %

10 10 10

0 0 0 1 2 29 31 1 2 29 31 1 2 29 31 1 2 29 31 1 2 29 31

Route Route . Route Route Route

FIGURE 29

PASSENGER SURVEY RESULTS - SEX OF RESPONDENTS

Male F e m a 1 e

0 1 2 29 31 0

Route - 165 -

FIGURE 30

PASSENGER SURVEY RESULTS - FREQUENCY OF PESERO USE

(times per week)

<1 2 - 5 10 11 - 15 >15

% %

10 10

0 1 2 29 31 1 2 29 31 1 2 29 31 1 2 29 31 1 2 29 31

Route Route Route Route Route

FIGURE 31

PASSENGER SURVEY RESULTS - MODAL TRANSFER FOR COMPLETION OF TRIP

10

0 12 29 31 1 2 29 31

Route Route - 166 -

phenomenon is even stronger, 71 and 73 per cent of the passengers trans•

ferring to the subway or to a bus at Taxquena terminal. On Route 2

(Reforma), the number of passengers only using the pesero is highest,

reaching 38 per cent.' Even here, many people transfer to the subway at

Hidalgo or Chapultepec, or to buses at La Villa or Chapultepec. The

overall high degree of movement between modes therefore underlines the

strong interdependence and complementarity between the various public

transport services in Mexico City. As a result, people are able to mix

modes in order to strike the best compromise to fit their budget and daily

schedule.

In order to test the public's reaction to vans replacing cars in pesero service, the passengers were asked whether they would travel on

new Combis if these were to replace the sedans (Figure 32). Invariably

about 80 per cent responded in favour of the vans, the reason being that

these would increase capacity and comfort by providing considerably more

head and leg room, and shortening waiting times during peak periods. By

sitting higher up it is also easier to see outside and know when to get

off than in a sedan, and it seems that in general the public is happy

with the Combis.

Only 11 per cent of the pesero patrons felt that the service was

without major deficiencies (Figure 25, page 158). On all four routes,

about half of the people claimed that there are not enough peseros, the

well-known problem of insufficient capacity, which causes people to wait

in line during peak periods. This leads to the second most frequent

complaint, that of overcrowding. On average, 30 per cent of the passen•

gers identified this as a major deficiency, except on Route 2 (Reforma), - 167 -

FIGURE 32

PASSENGER SURVEY RESULTS - PASSENGER ACCEPTANCE OF VANS

In Favour 0, Opposed

Route Route

where 41 per cent thought the vehicles are too crowded (see Figure 33).

It is also here that the highest proportion of patrons were dissatisfied with the number of vehicles in service (capacity). It is recognised

that, of the three authorised routes, this is the only one that has not

introduced any Combis into service. Thus this route suffers one of the most severe shortages of capacity of all pesero routes in the city.

Discussions with Route 2 association president revealed that he refuses

to allow any vans or microbuses onto the route.until such time as the

government will permit a more reliable vehicle than the Combi to be used.

A "Dodge Maxivan" or "Ford Econoline" would be considered ideal, but the

Combi is simply not enough value for the capital investment since, under

the pressure of pesero operation, it requires too many repairs and spare - 168 -

FIGURE 33

PASSENGER SURVEY RESULTS - DEFICIENCIES OF PESEROS

Not Enough Vehicles Vehicles in Vehicles too Full Poor Condition

Route Route Route

Vehicles No Major too Old Deficiencies

Route Route Route - 169 -

parts too frequently.

Route 2 has other problems that lead to insufficient capacity.

In order to save time, peseros northbound from Reforma are permitted to

short turn at the point on Calzada de Guadalupe where the last northbound

passenger alights. This results in many of the cars never reaching La

Villa and consequent long waits for patrons there. During the morning

rush hour, anywhere from 40 to 80 passengers can be seen waiting in line

at La Villa terminal (from 8:00 until 10:30 a.m.). People don't abandon

the queue, however, even when having to wait up to 30 minutes, because

the alternatives to waiting for a pesero are even less attractive. It is more comfortable to wait for one half hour on the sidewalk than to stand

for that time in a bus which is bursting at the seams, to get jostled and

to risk having pockets picked, especially when it's just as fast to wait,

since the pesero will catch up to a bus that has departed 20 or 30 minutes

earlier. Taxis are no solution either, because it can easily take just

as long to find one that will agree to the fare, and haggling with the

drivers is not the most pleasant occupation in which to engage every morning. Having found a taxi, the ride is not likely to be any faster

than the pesero, at several times the cost. So pesero patrons have

realised that they are using the most convenient form of transport for

their requirements and pocketbooks; so much so that people who realise

the shortage of capacity will board northbound peseros within a kilometre or so of La Villa in order to be guaranteed a place for the ride back south. An extra fare is charged for this practice, but the passengers often prefer the premium over waiting a long time in frustration. - 170 -

The fact that peseros arrive at the terminal with passengers

already aboard makes it all the more difficult for the crowd in line to

find space, as fewer than six seats will be available. The short turning

operation, although creating serious problems at the terminal, does gene•

rate a much-needed capacity along Calzada de los Misterios for people who would otherwise not be served, if all cars were to come from La Villa with a full load. The problem is therefore an intractable one, the only

solution being to introduce larger or more vehicles; or both. The drivers

of course prefer to cut the trip short, since they earn the same revenue and save a certain amount of time as well as fuel.

Between 15 and 20 per cent of the riders on the three authorised routes feel that the physical condition of the vehicles is poor and/or that they are too old (Figure 33). In other words, 80 to 85 per cent are satisfied with the vehicles in which they ride. On the tolerated route, however, 22 per cent feel the vehicles are too old, and 30 per cent identified poor condition as a major deficiency. This is another result which helps to show that the tolerados are vehicles which are not only older than the autorizados, but actually in considerably poorer condition.

This supports the government action to amalgamate the two types of service, or to "authorise" the tolerados, for this would likely cause the type of vehicles used as well as their age to improve substantially.

Another question determined whether the passengers riding the peseros owned cars, or had a car in the family. Results indicated that about half (47%) had cars and half (53%) did not. The highest car owner• ship was on Route 2 (Chapultepec - La Villa), with 53 per cent, a route which serves a larger higher-income population than do the others, where - 171 -

FIGURE 34

PASSENGER SURVEY RESULTS - AUTOMOBILE OWNERSHIP

No Car in At least one Car Family in Family

60 % 50 50

40 40

30 30

20 20

10 10

0 0 1 2 29 31 1 2 29 31 Route Route

car ownership is 41, 48 and 43 per cent on routes 1, 29 and 31 respectively.

(Figure 34). Overall, this reflects an above average car ownership, as current figures indicate an average of eight persons per private car (or seven persons per vehicle) in Mexico City (see Table 24, page 110).

Perhaps the most important information of all, however, concerns the types of benefits that people derive from using the pesevos as an urban transportation mode. These were revealed by asking the passengers why they chose to use the pesero instead of other modes, and the most conclusive result was that the pesevos are faster than buses (and possibly also the Metro) and cheaper than taxis or than driving one's own car

(Figure 25, page 159). An average of about 80 per cent use the pesevo because of its high relative speed, 17 and 16 per cent respectively also selecting comfort and convenience as important factors in attracting them - 172 -

to the service. Half of the respondents thought peseros to be attractive

because they are cheaper than taxis, and 27 per cent because no parking

is required, as it is when one drives oneself. The poor quality of the

vehicles used on the tolerated route is again in evidence here, where only 13 per cent of the riders chose the tolerados because of comfort,

compared to an average of 18 per cent on the autorisados (Figure 35).

Safety from pickpockets and other dangers on buses and subway trains is another factor attracting people to the peseros, 12 per cent having iden•

tified this as a reason.

In order to determine the people's choices and preferences, they were asked which mode of transportation they would select, were peseros not to exist. The overwhelming choice was the bus, which almost 60 per cent said they would take (Figure 36). This was particularly the case on the two southern feeder routes, where there is virtually no other choice of public transport except the bus (66% on Route 29, and 78% on Route 31; about 50% on routes 1 and 2). On the two trunk routes, 26 and 20 per cent respectively identified the Metro as their alternate choice, while

15 to 20 per cent chose taxis. Taxis are more popular here, due partly to the slightly higher average income of these people, but mainly to the greater availability of taxis in these corridors. On an overall basis,

21 per cent chose a less energy- and space-efficient mode (taxi or private car), more than sufficient to make the peseros a space-saving attribute of the city's transport system. If those 21 per cent were to ride taxis or drive cars as indicated, the vehicles required would very likely consume more road space than all of the peseros do now (which also carry the other 79 per cent of the people as well). Such an assertion, although far from being unconditionally proven, is important in determining the - 173 -

FIGURE 35

PASSENGER SURVEY RESULTS - REASONS FOR CHOOSING THE PESERO

Speed % (A) Instead of Bus or Subway 80 80

70 70

60 60

50 50

Comfort Convenience Safety 40 40

30 30 % % %

20 20 20 i—i 20 20

10 10 10 [ 10 10

0 0 0 0 0 1 2 29 31 1 2 29 31 1 2 29 31 1 2 29 31

Route Route Route Route

(B) Instead of Taxi or Private Car

Low Cost No Need for Parking

. • 1 2 29 31 1 229 31

Route Route - 174 -

FIGURE 36

PASSENGER SURVEY RESULTS - ALTERNATE MODE CHOICE

Bus Subway . Taxi

Route Route Route

Would not Private Auto Trolley Coach make Trip

% % % 10 10 10 10 E us 0 0 0 1 2 29 31 1 2 29 31 1 2 29 31

Route Route Route - 175 -

utility and contribution of the peseros as a transport mode to the city

as a whole.

Further research is needed in this direction in order to determine

more conclusively how effectively the peseros can limit future increases

in traffic congestion, reduce pollution levels and prevent further in•

creases in the amount of central city land devoted to transport. A pre•

liminary hypothesis for this could be that, by reducing the need for

private cars and taxis in the central area, the peseros do indeed liberate more road and parking space than they, themselves, consume. A formula

could be developed to estimate the net number of vehicles per hour of

traffic eliminated. Data requirements for such a calculation are exten• sive, and in addition to information presented in this study would include

the average number of peseros in service per hour; time required for both automobile and taxi journeys replacing a pesero trip; time required for parking private cars; as well as the number of vehicle-units occupied by

the average parked car. This would be a first step towards the complica•

ted but highly valuable procedure of undertaking a full cost-benefit analysis of the social advantages and disadvantages of pesero operation.

By virtue of their existence, the peseros of Mexico City are able to offer the population a transportation service that is considerably faster and also more comfortable and convenient that any other form of mass transit, at a cost substantially below that of riding in taxis or driving a car. The peseros provide a rational answer to the traffic problems of one of the world's largest cities, allowing people to travel through the urban area at reasonably acceptable speeds, for a premium price; a set of conditions and benefits which almost two million people per day use to their advantage. 176

CHAPTER SIX

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS - 177 -

Through rapid population growth and the need for urban mobility, the large cities of the developing world are experiencing an increasing difficulty in satisfying the transportation requirements of their inha• bitants. One response to the problems of urban transport that is unique to the developing countries is the evolution of intermediate forms of public transport, such as jitneys and fixed-route shared taxis. In an attempt to analyse the contribution and utility of jitneys in the Third

World urban environment, this study has focused on the role of such services in one of the world's largest and fastest-growing cities.

With a 1980 population of almost 14 million, Mexico City undeniably has some of the most formidable transportation problems of any city.

Although the majority of the 21 million motorised intracity trips that are made in Mexico City each day are by diesel bus, almost ten per cent are by pesero, the Mexican jitney. While ten per cent does not seem high, only when one realises that this involves two million trips each day, on over 17,000 vehicles, can the magnitude of the role of the peseros be fully appreciated.

Although every effort has been made in this study to select the four routes for analysis in a way that best represents the entire system, a sample of more than only these four branches out of a total of 232

(and a passenger sample of 0.05%) is needed in order to make statistically valid inferences regarding the entire system. A much larger and more varied sample could therefore provide substantially more useful and meaningful results. - 178 -

This study has brought to light a wealth of information and

insights regarding urban public transport in Mexico City, and in parti•

cular concerning the system of peseros. In summary, it has been ascer•

tained that these fixed-route shared taxis make several very important

contributions to urban transport in Mexico City:

(a) The peseros make available, to those people who do not use cars,

a level of speed in travelling through the city, that is otherwise not

available to public transport riders. Although, on average, they are not

as fast as the subway, they are able to serve a much larger area of the

city directly, since a demand of only 50 to 70 passengers per hour is

required for a five-minute service frequency. In fact, the peseros are

able to provide frequent service in areas where demand levels are insuf•

ficient for reliable bus service.

(b) In Mexico City, a metropolis with a rapidly growing car-owning

population, the pesevo is of great value, since it appeals in particular

to dissatisfied bus passengers who are tempted to desert public transit

in favour of the private automobile. As congestion increases, so does

travel time, and as bus passengers see more of their day consumed in

transit, they search for a faster way of travelling through the urban

environment. The peseros are an ideal answer, for they are readily available, provide a frequent and fast service and do not cost as much as a taxi. Furthermore, they eliminate the frustrations of searching for parking spaces for private cars.

(c) The extremely high latent demand in Mexico City means that, far from competing with one another, the various mass transit modes are unable to cope with the ever-increasing demands for their services.

In such an environment, the peseros perform a service in relieving some - 179 -

of the excess demand, particularly during the peak periods.

(d) One fifth of pesero passengers indicate that, were peseros not to

exist, they would ride taxis or drive cars. Assuming that each of these

people would occupy a car or taxi alone, an additional 400,000 trips

would be made daily. The vehicles required for this would very likely

consume more road space than all 17,000 peseros presently do. This is

without providing for the other 1.6 million daily pesero passengers, who

would choose to ride buses or the Metro. Such calculations are very im•

portant in determining the utility and contribution of jitneys to the

city's transport system. Much additional research and model-building is

needed in this line of investigation, however, in order to statistically

determine the degree to which peseros do in fact make a positive contri•

bution to the reduction of space consumed by transportation in Mexico City.

Social cost-benefit analysis provides a framework that is well-suited to

evaluating far more fully the net value of a jitney service.

(e) Due to their great flexibility and ability to adapt rapidly to

changes in the .demand pattern, both in volume, over time and over space,

the peseros are the most demand-responsive mode of public transport

available in Mexico City. Service can start without administrative red

tape and without the resultant delays. The peseros provide service to

certain areas that have no other form of public transport and are avail•

able on a 24-hour basis in some corridors. In these cases, they are the

sole providers of dependable transportation.

(f) The peseros provide jobs for a large number of semi-skilled people.

It is estimated that about 45,000 people are directly employed by the pesero industry, indirectly sustaining the livelihood of some 250,000

persons. Furthermore, the peseros can more easily be produced by already - 180 -

established domestic automobile industries than buses or subway technology.

(g) The peseros are a profit-making enterprise. As a private venture, they require little management and no government subsidies. This con• trasts most favourably with the traditionally debt-ridden nature of publicly-owned mass transit services in Mexico City, such as the Metro and trolley buses.

The peseros are recognised by Mexico City transport planners as well as regulating authorities as an important and necessary service.

Yet, in order to ensure continued success, it is essential that the con• tributions outlined above be safeguarded. It is these attributes that have made the pesero the successful member of the urban transport network that it has become, and any policy or proposal that in any way jeopardises any one of these contributions is in danger of undermining the pesero's role in providing an efficient and useful service. In this context, the creation of transport firms to operate the pesero system threatens to seriously reduce the economic viability by introducing substantial administrative and management costs of a bureaucratic nature that are actually not needed.

Nevertheless, the realisation by the government that the pesero system needs to be supported rather than eliminated is an important step towards ensuring the continued prosperity of the peseros within the niche that they have created for themselves as providers of a useful public transit service. - 181 -

FOOTNOTES:

1. A substantial amount of work has, however, been undertaken in an attempt to analyse the contribution of interurban transportation networks to economic development in Third World countries. Examples of this work are Taaffe et al (1963), Harrison Church (1949), Gauthier (1968), Smith & Hay (1969) and Stanley (1971).

2. The term "public transport" or "public transit" includes all modes of collective transport that are available to the public, although the undertakings concerned may be, and often are, privately operated.

3. There are of course exceptions. The public transport facilities in Bombay as well as the city bus company in Djakarta appear, for instance, to be well run (Linn, 1979).

4. A special licence is required for certain categories of vehicles to be driven into a defined restricted zone during a specified time period. The number of cars entering the Singapore Restricted Zone during the hours of restriction (7:30 - 10:15 a.m.) fell by 73 per cent. The proportion of these cars qualifying as car pools by carrying four or more occupants rose from less than 10 per cent to 44 per cent. The volume of cars entering during the half hour before 7:30 a.m. rose by 23 per cent, as many people started their trips earlier to avoid paying the fee. Traffic volumes in the evening peak fell by only 2 or 3 per cent. Overall speeds in the Restricted Zone during the morning peak increased by about 20 per cent from 28 to 33 km/h (Watson & Holland, 1978).

5. Prerequisites for economically justified rapid transit systems include a population of 2 million, a density of 8,400 persons per km2, employment of 100,000 people in the central business district, and 100,000 people moving across the boundaries of the CBD during the peak periods. The following cities in developing countries would qualify under these criteria: Istanbul, Caracas, Bangkok, Manila, Bogota, Lima, Santiago, Singapore, Teheran, Karachi, Delhi, Seoul, Cairo, Djakarta, Rio de Janeiro, Calcutta, Bombay, Sao Paulo, Buenos Aires, Mexico City and Saigon (Owen, 1973).

6. According to data presented by Haider (1977), 10,650 inbound pedestrians cross the Howrah Bridge during the morning peak hour, com• pared with 11,400 bus passengers and 8,284 tram patrons. According to Table 1, about 90 per cent of all motorised trips are made by public transit; thus it is estimated that 47 per cent of all inbound travellers during the morning peak hour are pedestrians. Similarly, 8,925 pedestri• ans enter the CBD on B.B. Ganguli Street during the morning peak hour, compared with 7,182 tram passengers and 2,035 bus riders. It is estima• ted that 37 per cent of travellers on this route are pedestrians. Since these are the heaviest transit corridors, it can be expected that pedes• trian volumes are proportionally higher elsewhere. - 182 -

7. Based on data presented by Padron and Braswell (1969), approxi• mately 800,000 walk trips are made each working day in Caracas, compared to 2.7 million motorised trips. It can therefore be estimated that 23 per cent of the total number of trips are made by pedestrians.

8. LRT generally refers to modern tram systems, able to operate on streets or on private right-of-way, either above or below ground.

9. Dr. Ernst Werner von Siemens built the first successful generator- powered electric railway in 1879 and the first commercial electric line in 1881; Charles J. van Depoele installed the world's first completely electrified street railway system in 1886; and Franklin J. Sprague pio• neered the first wholly successful tram installation of any consequence in 1888.

10. The bus fare in San Francisco was raised to 50 cents in April of 1980. How the jitneys have responded to this was unclear at the time of wri ti ng.

11. The evidence in Chapters 4 and 5 comes from many sources. Much of this is based on unpublished material and from direct enquiry or observa• tion of the systems in practice.

12. Moscow, with the world's largest subway network, had 165 kilometres of route in 1975, a figure that Muscovites plan to double by the year 2000. - 183 -

GLOSSARY

Araarillo Literally "yellow"; a type of taxi, identified by its colour. Amparado Illegal but protected jitney, operating with private licence. Autorizado Legal, authorised jitney with public service licence. Ballena Literally "whale"; a type of Mexican diesel bus. Calle Road or Street. Calzada Highway or Boulevard. Chato Literally "flat-nosed"; a type of bus used in Mexico City during the 1940s. Ciudadano ' City resident. Cocodrilo Literally "crocodile"; a type of taxi in Mexico City. Colorado Literally "red in colour"; a type of taxi. Copeton Literally "snobbish"; a type of bus used in Mexico City during the 1930s. Coral Type of taxi in Mexico City. Cotorra Literally "parrot", or "chatterbox"; type of taxi in Mexico City. COVTTUR Comision de Vialidad y Transporte Urbano; government agency responsible for transport planning in Mexico City. Delegaci6n Spatial ac3mnistrative unit within the Distrito Federal. Delfin Literally "dolphin"; a type of Mexican diesel bus. DGPT Direeeion General de Poliaia y Trdnsito; the Mexico City police department, also the general regulating authority for the pesero system. Distrito Federal Federal District; federally governed central area of Mexico City. Estado de Mexico The State of Mexico, territory immediately surrounding the Distrito Federal. Fortingo Nickname for a type of taxi in Mexico City. Pesero Mexican jitney, or fixed-route shared -taxi. Pirata Pirate jitney; illegal vehicle operating as a pesero. STC Sistema de Transporte Coleotivo; overall authority for the operation of the Mexico City Metro (subway system). STE Sistema de Transportes Eleetrieos; overall authority for the operation of trams and trolley buses in Mexico City. Tolerado Tolerated but unauthorised jitney with public licence. Trompudo Literally "heavy-weight"; a type of bus used in Mexico City during the 1940s. Z6calo Central square in downtown Mexico City. - 184 -

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APPENDIX 1

Example of the passenger questionnaire used in the survey

ESTE CUESTIONARIO ES PARTE DE UNA INVESTrGACION UNIVERS IT ARIA PARA DETERMINAR ALGUNAS CARACTERIST1CAS DEL SISTEMA DE PESEROS MEXICAN OS

1. lCu6\ M el objeto de Ml vioje hey? (.Mwquc con utu x soUnatfc uru roputeu ) • Trabojo- O Eicuela • De Compras • R«Cfeoci6n,Diverti6n O Tramites • Otro (escribe por favor)

2. 0* ne existir servido de peteros, tcomo haria Ud. est* via|e? D No lo haria O 1° haria en Metro Q to haria en trolebus • Lo haria en camion • Lo haria en taxi • Lo haria en carro privado

3. (Per que utilize Ud. ei fervido de pesetas? (marque con una X tantas respuestas como Ud. quiera). A) En Ivgar de camion, trelebut o Metre? Q Ma* conveniente Q Mas confortoble • Mas r6pido • Mas seguro • Otro /escriba por favor). Bl En lugar de lead e cam privado? O Mas barato Q No se necesita estacionamiento O Otro (escriba por favor).

4. tin HI a»a , tienen automivil? • Si •No A la vuelta por favor. 5. £Cuanta> veces viaia Ud. en pe<«ro eada Mmana? (escriba por favor). 6. El peiero, (es el unlco modo de transport* que Ud. necesite para este vtaje? • Si • No 7. En tu opln)6n, (cudles son las defidendas prindpalet de lo» peseros? (marque con una X tantas respuestas como Ud. quiera). O No tienen deficiencies • Vehiculos demasiado viejos Q No hay bastantes peseros Q Vehiculos eston en condici6n mala. • Eston demasiado Itenos Q Otras (escriba por favor) _ 8. (Viajaria Ud. en micrebuses nuevos (tipo VW Combi, por ejemplo, con 10 asientos) si estot swstituyen a ios present*! carres (con 6 asientos) ? Q Si Q No °. Su sexo: Q Masculino • Femenino 10. Su edad: • 15 anos o menos • 16-25 onos • 26-35 anos • 36-45 anos • mfis de 45 anos 11. Su ocupadan: (marque con X solament* una respuetta) • Comerciante • Empleado • Obrero • Estudiante • Jubilado Q Ama de Casa • Otro (escriba por favor) - 193 -

APPENDIX 2

Example of the driver questionnaire used in the survey

CUE3TI01NARI0 DE 0PERAD0BE3

iTiene Ud. su propio pesero? • Si • KO

iCuanto son los ingresos diarios? iCuanto paga Dd. cada dia para rents del pesero? 8

iCufinto paga Ud. cada dia para: &Cu&nto paga Ud. cada dia para: Gasolina 8 Aceite 8 Gasolina 8 Aceite 8

Llantas 8 Mantenimiento - Otros gastos

cada ano para: iCuanto son los ingresos que cobra Adminlstraci6n 8 Ud. en un dia normal? 8 Otros gastos

Costo original del vehiculo, „ Ano del y fecha de la compra .. , vehiculo.

2. iPara cuantas boras maneja Ud. un pesero en una semana normal?

3. £En que coloni8 de la Ciudad habita Ud.?

4. iCuantas dependientes sustenta Ud.?

5- iTiene Ud. otro empleo, o ingreso de otras fuentes? Q Si Q Ho 6. iCu&ntas pasajeros transports Ud. en una bora normal?

iCuales cree Ud. son las deficiencias principales de los peseros? Q Vehiculos demasiado viejos Q No hay bastante capacidad Q Demasiada competencia | | Mantenimiento malo • Otras

8. iPavoreceria Ud. el reemplazo de los presentes carros (con 6 asientos) por microbuses nuevos (tipo VW Combi, por ejemplo, con 10 asientos)?

9. iPara cuantos anos ba Ud. mane,)ado un pesero?

10. iConsidera Ud. e'ste un trabajo deseable? Q Si • No 11. Su sexo: | \ Masculino ( ) geminino

12. Su edad: [_J menos de 20 anos Q 20 - 29 anos Q 30 - 45 anos | | mas de 4-5 anos