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Taliban That They Cannot Win on the Battlefield

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Taliban That They Cannot Win on the Battlefield Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan December 2017 Report to Congress In Accordance With Section 1225 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (P.L. 113-291), as amended. The estimated cost of this report for the Department of Defense is approximately $195,000 for the Fiscal Years 2017-2018. This includes $184,000 in expenses and $11,000 in DoD labor. Generated on Dec 1, 2017 RefID: 6-1C74FA8 This page left intentionally blank This report is submitted in accordance with Section 1225 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 (P.L. 113-291), as amended by Sections 1213 and 1531 of the NDAA for FY 2016 (P.L. 114-92) and Sections 1215 and 1521 of the NDAA for FY 2017 (P.L. 114-328). It includes a description of the strategy of the United States for enhancing security and stability in Afghanistan, a current and anticipated threat assessment, and a description and assessment of the size, structure, strategy, budget, and financing of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. This report also includes a description of the new South Asia Strategy, announced on August 21, 2017, during the reporting period. This report was prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State and is the fifth in a series of reports required semi-annually through calendar year 2019. The NDAA for FY 2018, which is pending approval, includes an amendment in Section 1215 that would extend the semi-annual reporting requirement through calendar year 2020. This report describes efforts to enhance security and stability in Afghanistan from June 1, 2017, through November 30, 2017. This report complements other reports and information about Afghanistan provided to Congress and is not intended to be the single source of all information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its coalition partners, or Afghanistan. A classified annex accompanies this report. The next report will include an analysis of efforts to enhance security and stability in Afghanistan from December 1, 2017, through May 31, 2018. TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary ........................................................................................................................ 1 Section 1 – Strategy and Objectives ............................................................................................... 3 1.1 U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan ................................................................................................. 3 1.2 U.S. Objectives in Afghanistan ............................................................................................. 4 1.3 U.S. Counterterrorism Mission ............................................................................................. 5 1.4 NATO-led Resolute Support Mission ................................................................................... 7 1.5 Indicators of Effectiveness .................................................................................................. 14 Section 2 – Threat Assessment ..................................................................................................... 18 2.1 Importance of Afghanistan-Pakistan Relations ................................................................... 18 2.2 Current Security Conditions ................................................................................................ 19 2.3 Anticipated Security Conditions ......................................................................................... 29 Section 3 – Overview of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces ............................... 30 3.1 Strategy ................................................................................................................................ 30 3.2 Budget ................................................................................................................................. 33 3.3 Force Size and Structure ..................................................................................................... 35 3.4 Capabilities .......................................................................................................................... 38 3.5 Assessment .......................................................................................................................... 44 Section 4 – Ministry of Defense and Afghan National Army ...................................................... 46 4.1 Ministry of Defense ............................................................................................................. 46 4.2 Afghan National Army ........................................................................................................ 59 Section 5 – Ministry of Interior and Afghan National Police ....................................................... 79 5.1 Ministry of Interior .............................................................................................................. 79 5.2 Afghan National Police ....................................................................................................... 90 Section 6 – Financing the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces ................................... 98 6.1 Holding the Afghan Ministries Accountable ...................................................................... 98 6.2 U.S. Contributions ............................................................................................................... 99 6.3 International Contributions ................................................................................................. 99 6.4 Afghan Government Contributions ................................................................................... 100 Annex A – Indicators of Effectiveness for the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior ..................................................................................................................................................... 103 Annex B – Acronyms.................................................................................................................. 107 I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY On August 21, 2017, President Trump announced a new regional U.S. strategy for South Asia. This strategy is a clear signal of U.S. resolve and a break with the previous Administration’s focus on a timeline for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan. The purpose of the U.S. campaign from 2001 to the present has been to prevent future attacks on the U.S. and its Allies homelands; we will not accept the use of South Asia as a sanctuary for terrorist activity and planning. To accomplish this objective, we have sought to stabilize Afghanistan. The goal is a stable, independent Afghanistan at peace with its neighbors. The U.S. will accomplish this by assisting the Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) in their fight against the insurgents. The new strategy does not mean a return to U.S.- led combat operations; instead the key to success lies in improving ANDSF capabilities. We will continue to work by, with, and through the ANDSF to help them defeat their enemies. The objective of the campaign is to convince the Taliban that they cannot win on the battlefield. The war will end in a comprehensive, Afghan-led political settlement that will include all parties, including the Taliban. We have a willing and able partner in President Ghani. In conjunction with the new U.S. strategy, he launched with the U.S. Embassy Kabul and U.S. Forces in Afghanistan (USFOR-A), a process to create and monitor reforms in four priority sectors: governance, economic development, security, and the peace process. Under the terms of this Kabul Compact, President Ghani appointed new, acting Ministers of Defense and Interior with mandates to improve ANDSF effectiveness and reduce corruption. He also issued a decree creating an honorable mechanism for aging generals and senior officers to retire and clears the way for merit-based promotions. President Ghani’s personal and sustained commitment to reform across the four priority sectors is a major step forward in the campaign to improve the legitimacy of Afghanistan. The ANDSF have already met the severe test of the last three years in which they have had lead responsibility for security. President Ghani’s reforms will further buttress the ANDSF. In early 2017, President Ghani announced a long-term plan called the ANDSF Roadmap1 to seize the initiative in the fight against insurgent and terrorist forces, further professionalize the ANDSF, modify the ANDSF force structure, and compel the Taliban to seek reconciliation. During this reporting period, U.S., coalition, and Afghan efforts focused on the four ANDSF Roadmap priorities: doubling the size and capabilities of the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF); expanding and modernizing the Afghan Air Force (AAF); improving leadership development; and countering corruption. Under the new South Asia Strategy, we have deployed modest numbers of additional U.S. forces which will support the train, advise, and assist (TAA) and counterterrorism (CT) missions. USFOR-A currently maintains approximately 14,000 uniformed personnel in Afghanistan, an increase of approximately 3,000 during the reporting period. 1 The “ANDSF Roadmap” focuses on strengthening the Afghan Special Security Forces and aviation forces; improving leadership; increasing unity of effort between the Ministries of Defense (MoD) and
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