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Npr 3.1: Political Aspects of Kazakhstan's Nuclear Report POLITICAL ASPECTS OF KAZAKHSTAN’S NUCLEAR POLICIES by Murat Laumulin Murat Laumulin is Chief Researcher at the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of Kazakhstan. He formerly served in the Foreign Ministry of Kazakhstan. Portions of this paper were presented at the conference on “The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program: Donor and Recipient Country Perspectives,” Monterey, California, August 20-22, 1995. This report was translated from Russian by Alexandre Mikhailiants, with assistance from James Clay Moltz and Michael Lysobey. uclear issues in Kazakhstan continue to attract OPERATION SAPPHIRE the attention of the public, experts, and politi- Ncians. Fortunately, today this attention comes The most convincing proof of the changing nature of without the hysteria that had surrounded the problem of Kazakhstan’s nuclear policy towards a more pro-active the former Soviet nuclear weapons left on Kazakhstani direction was Operation Sapphire. Like a bolt of light- soil. There has also been a shift of emphasis. This is a ning, it unexpectedly illuminated for a moment the com- sign of the times, of changes that have accompanied the plex system of political, economic, and possibly mili- “maturing” of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy. The evolving tary interests surrounding the nuclear complex in nature of Kazakhstan’s nuclear policy—from a passive to Kazakhstan. As we know, on December 23, 1994, White an active stage—lies at the root of this process.1 This change House Press Secretary Dee Dee Meyers announced that would have been impossible without the creation of the the United States and Republic of Kazakhstan had suc- legal basis provided by the ratification of the Non-Pro- cessfully completed the transfer of nuclear materials liferation Treaty (NPT), as well as without the greater for safe storage in the United States. But the history of experience the country has gained in international poli- Operation Sapphire was already at least a year old.2 tics and economics. As far as the fate of the Soviet mis- Kazakhstan’s accession to the NPT and introduction of siles in the republic goes, the government maintained the criteria of the International Atomic Energy Agency throughout 1994 that the decision was already a fait (IAEA) in December 1993 made the presence of these accompli and, accordingly, attempted to project this im- materials in the republic inappropriate. In early 1994, pression on public opinion. This report examines the the government of Kazakhstan asked the United States recent history of nuclear developments in Kazakhstan, to help solve the problem of about 600 kilograms (kg) the nature of the current national debate on various is- of highly-enriched uranium that had been stored at the sues, and the problems facing implementation of govern- enrichment facility of the Ulbinsk metallurgical plant ment policies, including those associate with the Nunn- in East Kazakhstan Oblast since the Soviet period. Lugar program. On November 24, 1994, Deputy Prime Minister of 84 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1995 Report Kazakhstan Vitaly Mette and Foreign Minister nuclear nonproliferation.” Washington thus needed Op- Kasymzhomart Tokayev confirmed this information in eration Sapphire to demonstrate to the world American a press conference. The ministers drew public atten- determination to combat the nuclear threat, as well as tion to the following details: the highly-enriched mate- to strengthen the image of the administration domesti- rial had been located at the Ulbinsk plant since at least cally. We can only guess how useful these materials 1976, where it was being stored mostly in composite will be for American nuclear scientists and the military materials, part of it in a semi-processed form. The in determining the source of possible earlier diversions Kazakh side also noted that the existence of the deal from former Soviet nuclear facilities. with the United States was not a secret from Russia; For Kazakhstan, Operation Sapphire had two sides: Moscow, however, had refused to purchase the mate- economic and political. As far as the economic side of rial, using the excuse that it was “nuclear waste.” the deal, we may say it was relatively small. The exact Later, one of the high-ranking Kazakh officials in- sum of the deal is being kept in secret, but it is esti- volved admitted that the specific details on Operation mated at between $15 to $30 million.3 This money, how- Sapphire were conceived and executed in an atmosphere ever, will be used for specific purposes. These funds of high secrecy. In spite of the fact that the operation will be used to ship U.S. equipment necessary to im- was accompanied by multiple negotiations, expert ex- prove the environmental situation in the East Kazakhstan changes, and trips that involved many ministries, most Oblast, particularly in the territories around the ura- of the participants knew only about their part of the nium enrichment facilities. The Kazakhstani side was operation. All information was held in secret until the also pursuing political goals—trying to prove that the plane carrying the cargo landed in the United States. Republic of Kazakhstan is a dedicated proponent of the This, as well as the fact that the exact value of the deal nuclear nonproliferation regime and to elevate its coop- is still undisclosed, indicates that the two main players— eration with the United States to a new level. The cura- the United States and Kazakhstan—had been trying to tor of Kazakhstan’s nuclear industry, Minister of Sci- leave Russia as uninformed as possible. Obviously, Rus- ence and New Technologies Vladimir Shkolnik, summed sia, as the legal successor of the Soviet Union in the up the essence of the event in a January 1995 press nuclear sphere (and therefore responsible for these ma- interview. He emphasized that the operation was not a terials), should have possessed full information about random, one-time occurrence. Rather, it is part of a the Ulbinsk uranium. Russian specialists, however, broader Kazakhstani policy, which is being pursued on maintained that there should not have been that much multiple levels. As far as Russia goes, its losses are uranium there. According to the Russian Ministry of evident in politics, propaganda, and, perhaps, in the Atomic Energy (MINATOM), there should have been military-technological field. only 167 kg of beryllium alloy and 27.5 kg of U235 dioxide in powder form. Furthermore, this material was COMPETING POLITICAL INTERESTS not believed to capable of producing a nuclear device. The United States, however, acquired 558 kg of U235 in The active phase that Kazakhstan’s nuclear policy is Operation Sapphire, enough to produce 20 to 50 bombs. currently undergoing suggests the existence of different Most likely, Moscow was simply trying to save face in sides and interests groups, each of which is interested a situation that it did not control. Yet, if the people in in certain outcomes. Their voices are now distinctly Moscow did possess sufficient information but refused heard in three main arenas where stormy discussions to acquire these highly-enriched materials, this is a matter around nuclear issues are unfolding: among political of a serious concern, for it puts into question Russia’s groupings from the former parliament (which was dis- capability to perform its obligations to the international solved by the president in March 1995), within the nonproliferation regime. scientific-industrial complex, and among government Naturally, each party to the operation tried to gain ministries (including defense, foreign policy, and finan- maximum advantage from the events, each pursuing its cial circles). own goals. The United States, according to Defense In 1994, different viewpoints crystallized in Secretary William Perry, made an outstanding contri- Kazakhstan’s Parliament regarding two major issues—the bution to saving mankind from nuclear disaster; Presi- Semipalatinsk nuclear test site and the ratification of dent Clinton called it “a historic step in the field of the agreement between Kazakhstan and Russia regard- The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1995 85 Report ing the strategic nuclear forces temporarily located on a few other unexploded warheads in the silos of the test the territory of Republic of Kazakhstan. This happened site. If this turns out to be true, this will turn into a real at the session of the Supreme Soviet of Kazakhstan on “bomb” in the hands of the nationalists. Apparently, the November 9, 1994. Two parties formed among the leg- weakest spot of the legislators was and still is their lack islators, one of which was lobbying for the governmen- of complete and full information. tal measures already proposed on these issues, while the other one, which we may tentatively characterize as KAZAKHSTAN’S NUCLEAR BUREAUCRACY “nationalists,” mounted an active attack on these poli- AND ITS PLANS cies. In this struggle, the nationalists demanded a radical The people associated with the interests of the widening of the borders of the geographical zone im- scientific-industrial complex possess the most complete plied under the term “Semipalatinsk nuclear test site.” information. They are also connected with the govern- Furthermore, some deputies drew the attention of their ment through their high-ranking representatives (heads colleagues to the fact that similar test sites at Naryn and of ministries, agencies, and centers), who, in spite of Azgyr are not receiving similar kinds of environmental their status as senior governmental bureaucrats, directly protection or medical programs. On the same day, the represent the interests of the scientific-industrial com- nationalist deputies attacked Kazakhstan’s deputy min- plex. These are pragmatists and intellectuals, who are ister of defense,4 who had been the leading government attempting to preserve the scientific potential of spokesman in advancing the following concept for the Kazakhstan, despite the general economic decline, po- Agreement on Strategic Nuclear Forces with Russia: 1) litical intrigues, and the struggle of interests around the that the agreement would provide military security to Soviet nuclear legacy.
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