Korean-African American Conflicts and Koreans' Reactive Solidarity in New York and Los Angeles
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Korean-African American Conflicts and Koreans’ Reactive Solidarity in New York and Los Angeles Chapter 8 of Caught in the Middle: Korean Communities in New York and Los Angeles by Pyong Gap Min (University of California Press, 1996), the Winner of Two National Book Awards 1 INTRODUCTION Members of an ethnic group tend to join ranks in internal solidarity when they encounter threats from the outside world. Several groups have posed threats to Korean merchants, the most serious undoubtedly being the danger of physical violence, murder, arson, boycott, and looting in Black neighborhoods. Therefore, Korean-African American conflicts have more strongly fostered Korean internal solidarity than have any other type of business-related intergroup conflict. Korean merchants in Black neighborhoods have established local business associations to try collectively to solve problems with Black customers and residents. Black boycotts of Korean stores in New York and other cities and the destruction of Korean stores during the Los Angeles riots have threatened Korean immigrants’ economic survival itself. Thus, these hostile actions have led not only Korean ghetto merchants but also other Korean immigrants to be concerned about their common fate and marginal status in this country. This chapter focuses on how Koreans’ ethnic solidarity has been affected by the 1990-91 Brooklyn boycott of two Korean stores and the victimization of Korean merchants during the riots. In addition, it will examine Koreans’ responses to Ice Cube’s “Black Korea.” ICE CUBE’S “BLACK KOREA” AND KOREANS’ RESPONSES At the end of October 1991, Ice Cube, a Los Angeles-based Black rap singer, released a new album entitled Death Certificate. “Black Korea,” a controversial song included in this album, reflects African Americans’ hostility toward and violence against Koreans in such phrases as “they make a nigger mad enough to cause a little ruckus” and “pay respect to the black fist or 2 we’ll burn/ your store right down to a crisp.” In his interview with the Los Angeles Times, Ice Cube stated that the song reflected African Americans’ and Koreans’ mutual hatred rather than his own contempt for Koreans (Hunt 1991). Naturally, Koreans were seriously concerned about the negative impact of this song on Koreans’ image and Korean-African American relations. Since the song included many incendiary phrases, they worried it would encourage Black youngsters to use violence and arson against Korean merchants. As soon as the album was released, Korean community leaders in Los Angeles and New York had a series of meetings to discuss what measures to take to protest it. Both the Korean Embassy in Washington and the Korean Consulate General in Los Angeles were gravely concerned about its possible negative impact (KCDNY, November 9, 1991). Interestingly, the album also included a song, “No Vaseline,” that encouraged the murder of Jerry Heller, Ice Cube’s Jewish former manager. For this reason, the Simon Wiesenthal Center, a Jewish human rights organization, called on four national record chains to stop selling Death Certificate (Philips 1991). Korean community leaders in Los Angeles, led by the Korean Consulate General, tried with no success to stop the distribution of the album by pressuring the record company, Priority Records. The St. Ides Beer Company, which used Ice Cube in their commercials, partly depended on Korean grocery and liquor retailers to distribute their merchandise. The Korean- American Grocers Association of Southern California threatened to boycott the company if it did not stop using Ice Cube as a model (KTLA, November 20, 1991). When there was no positive response, KAGROSC began a boycott. The boycott prompted the company to run an advertisement in Korean dailies in Los Angeles, emphasizing their difficulty in influencing Ice Cube and asking Korean grocers to stop the boycott. However, the National Korean-American 3 Grocers Association, which has its office in Orange County, influenced other local KAGROs, including KAGRO New York, to increase the pressure on the St. Ides Beer Company, using the boycott as a lever for negotiation (SGT, November 14, 1991). The grocers’ boycott inflicted severe monetary damages on the beer company; the former president of KAGROLA told me that the company lost approximately $7 million from seven days of Koreans’ boycotts. On the seventh day, the company acceded, firing Ice Cube as a model. They also asked him to make a formal apology to the Korean community. Under pressure from the St. Ides Beer Company, Ice Cube apologized to Korean merchant leaders in Los Angeles for his inflammatory lyrics in April 1992, just prior to the eruption of the Los Angeles riots (S. Kim 1992a). Ice Cube arranged meetings with the president of the National Korean-American Grocers Association (Yang Il Kim) and the president of KAGROLA (David Kim), in which he told them, “I respect Korean Americans. It was directed at a few stores where I and my friends have had actual problems” (S. Kim 1992a). He later sent copies of a letter of apology to the Korean community and to members of the media. Though Korean merchants failed to stop the sale of the album, by pressuring their supplier they at least succeeded in making the singer formally apologize. EFFECTS OF THE 1990 BROOKLYN BOYCOTT The positive effects of business-related conflicts with the Black community on Korean solidarity were well exemplified in Koreans’ reactions to a Black boycott against two Korean produce stores in Brooklyn in 1990-91. It started approximately one year after another Black boycott, led by the same activists, had successfully forced a Korean store in Brooklyn to close. Korean 4 business and community leaders agreed that if the two boycotted stores were allowed to be coerced into closing, another Korean store would soon be targeted. Therefore, they made all efforts to support the two produce stores financially until the boycotters retreated. In the early stage of the boycott, the Korean Produce Association of New York and the Flatbush Korean Merchants Association raised funds, mostly from their members, to help their fellow store owners. The Korean Association of New York and other business associations quickly followed them. Later, the Korean ethnic media joined the fund-raising and buy- merchandise campaigns, using inflammatory advertisements and articles. For example, the Sae Gae Times, a New York-based Korean daily, aggressively campaigned to help the two Korean stores in an editorial (SGT, May 25, 1990): “To counteract the increasingly violent picketers effectively, we Koreans should visit the two victimized stores in long lines and buy fruits and vegetables. The two Church Avenue Korean stores have now become shrines where we Koreans should visit to learn about the sufferings of racial prejudice. We should offer sympathy to our compatriots by participating in the buy-merchandise campaign. All Korean ethnic organizations and individuals should share the sufferings and agony by participating in the buy-merchandise campaign.” Many Korean ethnic churches, too, raised funds from their members for the two stores. Moreover, Koreans in other communities, both individually and as a group, contributed money to these merchants, who were seen as victims of Black racism against Koreans. Approximately $150,000 was raised during the first year of the boycott, providing each boycotted store owner with about $7,000 per month. Though the sales volume of each store was reduced to almost nothing during that year, each was able to stay open, mainly because of the community contributions. 5 The two store owners received not only financial but also strong moral support from Koreans all over the country throughout the boycott period. They confessed to me that they wanted to close their stores to end the “ordeal” as quickly as possible, but that they could not because of community pressure and support. One of the two boycotted stores was closed for two weeks in August 1990 for repair work. The Korean Association of New York, the Korean Produce Association of New York, and many other Korean community and business leaders pressured the owner to reopen (KCDNY, August 1, 1990). The two store owners received many letters from Koreans, including second-generation Korean elementary school children, encouraging them not to give up their stores. They were interviewed by the ethnic media numerous times and invited to give talks at many important ethnic meetings. Even the Korean Lions Club in Los Angeles invited one of the store owners for an interview (SGT, August 17, 1990). In an interview with the Korean ethnic media in Los Angeles, Bong Jae Jang promised that he would never close his store. Suddenly, the two store owners became heroes in the Korean community. A number of Korean churches demonstrated their support by taking their church members to shop at the stores on Sundays. Several Korean greengrocers in Brooklyn took turns working at the stores at night to encourage the dejected store owners, who faced defiant picketers for many days. One Korean lawyer volunteered to provide free legal services for them for a $6 million lawsuit against the picketer who beat the wife of Man Ho Park, one of the boycotted store owners (SGT, May 24, 1990). Koreans also tried to use political means to terminate the boycott. Thus the boycott heightened Koreans’ political consciousness and helped to improve their political skills. Korean community and business leaders visited the Brooklyn borough president, the New York City mayor, the New York state legislature, and even the U.S. president and pressured them to take 6 effective measures to break the boycott. In particular, Korean community leaders asked Mayor David Dinkins to enforce the court order that picketers stay fifty feet away from the stores. Under heavy pressure by politicians and the media to act quickly to end the boycott, Mayor Dinkins gave a special televised address on May 12, 1990.