Land, Industrial Policy and Earth Systems Governance in Sub

Land, Industrial Policy and Earth Systems Governance in sub•Saharan Africa: The Relationship between Land Tenure and Foreign Investment Strategy in Uganda and Tanzania

Mark Purdon Department of Political Science Université de Montréal Email: [email protected]

—Paper Presented at the 2016 Nairobi Conference on Earth System Governance—

Nairobi, 7-9 December 2016 ABSTRACT

Changes in land tenure and agriculture sectors in East Asia are often credited with laying the foundations for successful industrialization there. What are the opportunities for such development in sub•Saharan Africa? This paper contributes to discussion about earth systems governance and industrial policy in the sub•Saharan Africa by demonstrating how land tenure and foreign investment strategy interact to shape the outcomes of foreign investment projects involving land. It is based on extensive field investigation of large•scale forestry and bioenergy projects in Uganda and Tanzania (including 300 household surveys) in conjunction with key stakeholder interviews and review of relevant legal/policy frameworks. Results demonstrate that land tenure and foreign investment strategy can be effectively combined to boost smallholder incomes, spur domestic investment and allow the state to retain strategic control. While projects in Uganda were more modest in size than those in Tanzania, the risks involved in Uganda's projects were more equitably distributed between investors and smallholders. In Uganda, smallholders were able to secure considerable economic benefits from projects because their Uganda's land tenure system recognizes individual land rights. At the same time, the selectivity of the Uganda Investment Agency and Uganda's foreign investment regime placed important restrictions on foreign investment, effectively putting a brake on large•scale land acquisitions. Institutions in Uganda promote domestic investors in the forest and bioenergy sectors. In contrast, the institutional framework in Tanzania for rural development places the burden of risk on villagers themselves through a collective land tenure system in combination with an aggressive foreign investment regime that does relatively little to spur domestic investment. The land tenure system in Tanzania does not allow villagers to engage directly with foreign investors to realize the economic potential of their land, but instead requires that they first transfer it to the central government who then leases it out to investors. This offloads project risks onto villagers who only receive compensation for their lands and not payment that reflects its true market value. At the same time, the Tanzanian investment regime is highly liberalized with the result being that it has created few incentives for domestic investors to become meaningfully involved in forestry or bioenergy. Overall, these findings suggest that there are ways that the African state can combine liberal economic reforms with its developmental aspirations. Implications of these findings for the debate on elements of earth system governance such as international free trade and environmental regimes are considered.

INTRODUCTION

This paper contributes to discussion about industrial policy in sub-Saharan Africa by seeking to determine effective domestic institutions for the promotion sustainable forest and bioenergy industries. The forest and bioenergy sectors hold some of the most potential for economic development in sub-Saharan Africa, though concerns about land grabs and biodiversity conservation colour debates. Rural areas also remain home to the majority of the world’s poor and marginalized and are linked to the urbanization of poverty in sub-Saharan Africa through rural out-migration (Millennium Project, 2005: 16-17; Mwabu and Thorbecke, 2004; Ravallion et al., 2007). A robust and sustainable rural development strategy also lays the foundation for industrialization and human development (Kay, 2002; 2009). Indeed, sustainability plays an increasingly greater role in development policy. Tanzania and Uganda claim to aspire to sustainability in some form in their key strategic development plans—whether sustainable development, sustainable industrial development, sustainable human development or sustainable growth and shared benefits (MFEA, 2010: 27; MoFPED, 2010: 41; MTTI, 2008: 25; Planning Commission, 1995:3; VPO, 2005: 26). Many of the projects investigated here were related to international climate policy, particularly offsetting under the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol (Purdon, 2015b).

The paper is unique for three reasons. First, too much of the literature on sustainable development remains at the level of assessment—an ex-ante effort to identify conditions that should lead to sustainable outcomes prior to an intervention (Raggamby et al., 2012: 214-215). There is little actual evaluation of projects or policies operating under the banner of sustainable development to determine if outcomes achieved are in fact sustainable. I address this gap by investigating the socioeconomic impact of six investment projects in the forest and bioenergy sectors—many but not all being international carbon finance projects—using methods of comparative policy evaluation. Second, the paper accommodates different perspectives on “sustainability,” which continues to remain a problematic term (Bernstein, 2001: 62-131; Lélé, 1991; Ott et al., 2011). I argue that evaluation of investment projects in the forest and bioenergy sectors depends on what definition of sustainability is used—strong or weak sustainability (see Neumayer, 2003)—which I discuss in more detail below. Considering findings from both perspectives allows clearer understanding of what is at stake.

But aside from empirics, the paper’s contribution is to explain sustainability outcomes through the political economy of the state. My findings suggest that as a broad process involving many factors, the prospect of unsustainability cannot be entirely eliminated in the forest and bioenergy sectors but its risk mitigated through better institutional design. My results indicate that weak sustainability in forest and bioenergy sectors is best promoted by a coherent set of rules for land tenure and investment that offers opportunities for smallholders to engage directly with international markets at minimal risk—embracing key elements of liberalism—but also creates incentives for domestic investors through a selective foreign investment regime—embracing elements of developmentalism. Following Ban (2012), I describe this as “liberal developmentalism”, which was a hallmark of Uganda’s institutions in contrast to Tanzania’s more “developmentalist” approach, where the state’s role was more heavy-handed. But land tenure also plays an important role in shaping risks of land scarcity and food insecurity. I argue that the risk that land comes to represent an element of critical natural capital (CNC) is due to the stability and clarity of boundaries between state lands and those of society. Tanzania’s land tenure system maintains a relatively clear distinction between state and village lands, despite clear signs that the state has sought to open up village lands to foreign investment. Uganda’s history of state collapse reverberates into the present day, with local communities having long settled on state lands which leads to conflict when these lands are opened up for investment. Prospects of reforming institutions to better accommodate strong and weak sustainability appear more promising in Uganda, where solutions are already manifest, while in Tanzania it would require opening some fundament issues of state-society relations. As such, the paper makes a

contribution to both comparative political economy but also emerging comparative approaches to earth systems governance (Cao et al., 2014; Desai, 2002; Harrison and Sundstrom, 2007; McBeath and Rosenberg, 2006; Purdon, 2015a; Steinberg and VanDeveer, 2012). THEORY

The Role of the State in Economic Development

Because neoliberalism has been dominant in the practice of international development and liberal environmentalism in the practice of sustainable development (see Bernstein, 2001), the role of the state has not given the attention it deserved. However, particularly since the 2008 financial crisis, there has been a shift in thinking about the role of the state in economic development (Ban, 2012; Khan, 2010; Khan and Jomo, 1999; Khan and Christiansen, 2011; Schmidt, 2009; Stiglitz and Lin, 2013; Stiglitz et al., 2013; Wade, 2009). Common to this new thinking is a definition of economic development that stresses the need to build a country’s productive capacities in contrast to neoliberalism’s focus on markets. For example, Lin and Monga (2013) argue that “[s]ustained economic growth is a process of constant industrial and technological upgrading, associated with parallel and consistent social and institutional changes that guarantee shared prosperity” (p. 20), while Khan (2011) defines development as “transforming production structures and achieving an endogenous technological capacity” (p.6). Within this community, debate turns on how best to harness the state towards the process of economic development: should states design industrial policy to conform with their current comparative advantage, a comparative advantage following strategy, or should a state seek to defy its current economic endowments to build a competitive advantage in specific sector, a comparative advantage defying strategy (Lin and Chang, 2009)? Inspired by Ban (2012), I refer to the former as liberal developmentalism and the latter as developmentalism.

It is beyond the scope of this article to argue whether liberal developmentalism or more classical developmentalism is appropriate for economic growth. Rather, I observe that these two different economic ideas lead the state to allocate its capacities differently across economic sectors. By switching the focus from the state as a whole to its involvement in certain sectors, considerable analytical space is made available for an effective developmental role for the state in sub-Saharan Africa despite generally being of lower state capacity compared to East Asia. It is unlikely that the development state model can be easily transferred to sub-Saharan Africa. Domestically, the glue which makes a developmental state feasible is a strong sense of national identity and purpose (see Taylor, 2002; Woo-Cumings, 1999). Lacking a strong national identity, neopatrimonial politics are relatively more pronounced in sub-Saharan Africa (Bratton and van de Walle, 1994; van de Walle, 2001). Similarly, the international conditions for a developmental state also do not present themselves. As discussed by Pempel (1999), the East Asian economies emblematic of the developmental state had exceptionally close links to the United States, which saw the economic development of the region vital to its broader security interests after WWII (see also Wade 2009: 353). Nonetheless, the idea of a developmental state has proven attractive, if imperfect, in sub-Saharan Africa and the former Soviet Union (ECA, 2011; Edigheji, 2010; Fritz, 2007; Stoner- Weiss, 2006).

Political Economy of Tanzania and Uganda

The political economy of Tanzania can be best described as one of classic developmentalism. Tanzania has a history of socialism which goes back to the moment of its independence, most famously embodied as Ujamaa (Hydén, 1980; McHenry, 1979; Schneider, 2007). Tanzania’s Nyerere resisted conditionality with the result being that structural adjustment was not really initiated until after he stepped down from

power in 1985 (Amani et al., 2007: 211). Skepticism about a free-market economy endures to the present day and a sentiment of “economic nationalism” permeates the country’s political culture (Therkildsen and Bourgouin, 2012). In a recent assessment, international observers concluded that: Despite an official government commitment to liberal market policies and foreign investment, within the state administration and the ruling party on different levels, as well as in wide sections of the society, there is obviously a growing hostility toward foreign business due to the perceived “sellout” of Tanzanian enterprises, in the form of privatization and foreign investment (BTI, 2012).

Overall, despite Tanzania’s political stability, there is an emerging consensus that the country lacks resolve to assertively promote economic growth (Cooksey and Kelsall, 2011; Green, 2011; Therkildsen and Bourgouin, 2012).

Uganda was amongst the first countries in sub-Saharan Africa to embrace structural adjustment reforms in the 1980s (Kiiza et al., 2007; Melo et al., 2012). Williams (2009) describes four distinct phases in the development of Uganda’s economic policy since Museveni took power in 1986: pre-reform (1986-1990), the technocratic era (1990-1995), the poverty reduction period (1995-2002) and a shift to economic growth from 2002 onwards (p. 3-4). The most important of these was the period 1990-1995, when the government took decisive neoliberal reforms, becoming the “darling” of the donor community (Whitworth, 2009). However, the period from 2002 onwards—the period relevant to the investment projects investigated—has been described as one where the state has taken “a somewhat more interventionist stance” in the economy in an effort to promote competitiveness in the export sector and promote private sector growth (Whitworth and Williamson, 2009: 29). I describe this shift as a move from neoliberalism to liberal developmentalism. Recent trends towards increasing neo-patrimonialism in Uganda bring the country’s economic performance into question (Barkan, 2011; Barkan et al., 2004; de Vibe, 2012). Barkan (2011) warns of “inflationary patronage” described as “the need for ever-increasing amounts of money to maintain oneself in power and increasing levels of corruption to provide the required funds” (p.11). Nonetheless, during the implementation period of carbon finance projects investigated here, the political economic conditions were still progressive.

Institutional Capacity for Sustainable Industrial Policy in the Forest and Bioenergy Sectors

Institutional capacity as used here reflects the ability of a country’s legal framework to set out a system of incentives and constraints—carrots and sticks—to direct a wide number of actors towards the achievement of the state’s development objectives. Certainly, some institutional frameworks will permit states to reach such objectives in a more efficient manner than others. In the context of investment projects in the forest and bioenergy sectors, I argue that the land tenure and foreign investment regime are a state’s most important institutions.

Land Tenure

Land tenure structures fundamental relationships between the state, society and market in sub-Saharan Africa (Boone, 2007). Activities such as agriculture and tree-crop farming are better governed as individual private goods because the costs of the enforcement of property rights is low relative to the benefits of private ownership (Otsuka and Place, 2001: 18). There are convincing arguments that increasing population triggers innovations such as more individualized land tenure in order to provide security for land improvements (Boserup, 1965; Kabubo-Mariara, 2007). Evidence of (albeit informal) individual land rights and land markets is ubiquitous in Africa (Besley, 1995; Chimhowu and Woodhouse, 2006; Daley, 2005; Platteau, 1996). The appropriateness of individual land tenure for agriculture and tree-crop farming contrasts with common property systems for common pool resources

such as forests and fisheries. The gist of the common property resource literature is that because common property resources cannot be restricted to individuals or effectively managed by the state, they are best managed under a group property or “community-based” management scheme (Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom et al., 1999; Ostrom et al., 2002). Distinguishing between natural resources which are better managed as private resources or common property resources has a clouded history. While there are many cases of privatization leading to divestiture of rural poor of common property resources (Polanyi, 2001 [1944]), the enthusiasm for common property resources has also lent itself to romantic notions of communal life in peasant societies (Chimhowu and Woodhouse, 2006; Popkin, 1979: 1-31).1

Another school of thought, while accepting the evolution towards individual property rights, cautions against the formalization of individual land rights through law. Instead, informal land markets, it is argued, should be left in the informal sector because their formal privatization only favours elites and facilitates land grabs (Lastarria-Cornhiel, 1997; Platteau, 1996; Toulmin et al., 2002). Unruh (2008) has extended this argument towards international foreign investment projects in the forestry sector, urging that “the poor often need to be protected from governments, and yet governments will be responsible for law-making, guaranteeing rights, and titling programs” (Unruh, 2008: 702). However, a land tenure system need not be formalized. A system that recognizes customary land tenure and protects the land rights of indigenous landholders can still be conducive to sustainable development.

Investment Regime

I argue that, with regard to sustainable rural development, investment regimes vary in how they allocate risks between rural villagers, government as well as domestic and foreign investors. A foreign investment regime is more propitious to sustainable forestry and bioenergy projects when it creates incentives for domestic investors and thus avoids the risks inherent in large-scale international land transactions. Such conditions are not met by an excessively liberalized investment regime, but a more developmental one that seeks to strategically promote foreign investments in specific sectors where domestic resources are lacking.

Apart from the recent literature on “land grabs” (Anseeuw et al., 2011; Arrighi et al., 2010; Cotula and Vermeulen, 2011; Zoomers, 2011), there is little published on the relationship between land tenure and investment regimes. The mainstream response to the surge in international investments in land in sub- Saharan Africa has been to institutionalize a set of international rights and best-practice principles—both for forest carbon finance (Baker & McKenzie, 2009: 43-44; CCBA, 2008; Costenbader, 2011: 15-79;

1 One pertinent example of such an experiment regarding land comes from the failure of Ujamaa villagization in Tanzania. As Hydén observes: “Ujamaa was a principle traditionally practiced only within each household...It did not address itself to the mutual responsibilities and rights of individual households in a given local community. For these, the rural Tanzanians use the concept of ujima. As Mushi notes in his article, ‘ujima refers to the habitual practice of co-operation among villagers in certain peak seasons (cultivating, planting, harvesting, etc.) or in cases of emergency where someone needs to finish a certain job in a day or two with the help of his neighbours and relatives, instead of weeks or months of doing it alone’ (Mushi, 1971). This function was communal in the sense of implying mutual aid and reciprocity, but not in the sense of communal ownership. Those who assisted their neighbours did not expect a share in their harvest, only some entertainment at the completion of the task...What [President] Nyerere was asking of the peasants, however, was to go beyond ujima and adopt ujamaa as the guiding principle of life and work, not only within the household but also in the relations between households in their community” (Hyden 1980: 99).

Schwarte, 2010; Streck, 2009) and large-scale land acquisitions (De Schutter, 2009; FAO, 2010; Heri et al., 2011). RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

This paper is grounded in the empirical evaluation of the sustainable development impact of individual forestry and bioenergy projects in Tanzania and Uganda. It was based on fieldwork at the village and district level as well as interviews with key actors at the national level and consideration of national development policies, programmes and priorities. Fieldwork in both countries was carried-out over six months in 2009: Tanzania (Jan-May) and Uganda (May-July). To understand the effects of the 6 carbon projects in terms of strong and weak sustainability, empirical findings were condensed through a qualitative ranking exercise to compare sustainability impact across projects, considering both impacts at the village as well as the district-national level necessary for evaluation.

Country and Project Selection

I justify the selection of Tanzania and Uganda as a most-similar-systems design (see Gayle, 1988; Meckstroth, 1975; Przeworski and Teune, 1970). Tanzania and Uganda have often been selected for comparison because they share numerous socioeconomic conditions that allow differences to stand out (Croke, 2012; Fjeldstad et al., 2003; Harrison, 2001; Kjaer, 2004; Kyarimpa, 2009; Steffensen et al., 2004; Therkildsen, 2010).

I investigated a total of six afforestation and bioenergy projects across Tanzania and Uganda. Projects investigated in Tanzania include a private-sector led afforestation project, itself comprised of two subprojects (CDM-PDD, 2007a; 2008), one NGO-led improved cookstove project (KDA, 2008; UNDP, 2008), as well as a private-sector led biofuel project (Sun Biofuels, 2009). As large-scale land acquisitions, both the afforestation and biofuel projects have been the subject of intense international scrutiny (Carrington et al., 2011; Carrington and Valentino, 2011; Karumbidza and Menne, 2011; Oxfam, 2008). In Uganda, another three projects were investigated. These include an afforestation project in Rwoho Central Forest Reserve in southwestern Uganda (CDM-PDD, 2006a; b; c; d; 2009) and a carbon offset reforestation project operating in the voluntary carbon market operating according to the Plan Vivo standard (EcoTrust, 2011). Third, I investigated a bioenergy cogeneration project at Kakira Sugar Works which used sugarcane residue to generate electricity to offset domestic emissions (CDM-PDD, 2007b). See TTable 1 for summary information on the projects. Table 1: Six projects investigated across Tanzania and Uganda Country Project Reference Technical Name Reference Project Project Name Developer Implement- ation Period

Tanzania Tanzania Afforestation in grassland areas of (CDM-PDD, 2007a; Private 1997-2004/ Afforestation Uchindile & Mapanda; 2008) Sector 2006-2013 Reforestation at the Idete Forest Project Tanzania Karatu Energy Efficient Stove (KDA, 2008) NGO 2008-2010 Cookstove Project Tanzania Biofuel Sun Biofuels Kisarawe Project (Cleaver et al., 2010: Private 2006-2011 (Non-Carbon) 38-42; John, 2010; Sector (suspended) Sulle and Nelson, 2009: 46-54) Uganda Uganda Uganda Nile Basin Reforestation (CDM-PDD, 2006a; State Agency 2006-2010 Afforestation Project - No. 1-5 b; c; d; 2009)

Uganda Plan Vivo Trees for Global Benefits: A (EcoTrust, 2004; NGO 2003-onwards Reforestation Cooperative Community Land-Use 2007; 2008; 2009) Carbon Offset Project, Uganda Uganda Kakira Sugar Works Ltd. (KSW) (CDM-PDD, 2007b) Private 2004-2008 Cogeneration Cogeneration Project Sector Total No. 6 11

Projects were selected systematically as part of a larger investigation into carbon offset projects operating under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The focus on the CDM offered a degree of transparency and access to detailed project information that is unsurpassed in the international development literature. My general rule was to visit all afforestation and bioenergy projects that had reached the validation stage and were therefore listed on the CDM website. However, three projects were not identified until I arrived in country. The cookstove project in Tanzania was identified through personal communication with UNDP during deliberation on country selection. I did not identify the Tanzania biofuel project until I arrived in-country, selecting the Sun Biofuel project after learning that the Swedish backed SEKAB sugarcane ethanol project succumbed to the global financial crisis (Mande, 2009a). Similarly, information on the Plan Vivo reforestation project in Uganda was not obtained until fieldwork was initiated.

Village-Level Research

At the village level, a post-test-only comparative group design was used to compare the socioeconomic conditions of villages involved in investment projects with an appropriate “control” village in the tradition of policy evaluation (Langbein and Felbinger, 2006: 109-111). The objective was to gather socioeconomic data as well as villagers’ perceptions of sustainable development impact of investment projects in a comparative manner in order to identify each project’s impact on CNC and MMC. This comparative strategy was seen as an improvement over most other research into investment projects in the forest and bioenergy sectors. Most field-based research into forest carbon finance projects (Boyd et al., 2007; Gong et al., 2010; Karumbidza and Menne, 2011) and biofuel projects (Cleaver et al., 2010; Habib- Mintz, 2010; Martin et al., 2009; Sulle and Nelson, 2009) has relied on “one-shot” case-studies. While mindful of the benefits of case-studies (McKeown, 1999), because of a lack of a control group they are unable to attribute outcomes observed to specific causal factors: “what would have happened to outcome (Y) if there were no intervention (X) or if the intervention (X) had been different?” (Langbein and Felbinger, 2006: 59).

Field methods included key informant interviews as well as detailed household and village surveys to investigate sustainable development impact. Household surveys sought quantitative and qualitative household socioeconomic information as well as impressions of the foreign investment projects in the forestry and bioenergy sectors. In each village, 25 households were randomly targeted for household surveys, though logistical constraints prevented this number from being collected in certain cases. Altogether, 335 household surveys were undertaken, 70 local-level interviews recorded and an additional 10 local focus groups conducted. What I refer to as “village surveys” were also carried out in each village, administered as focus groups or to key informants to obtain basic information about village socioeconomic conditions. A total of 14 village surveys were conducted. Finally, 16 key local actors were interviewed including local government officials, project developers, private sector representatives and other local leaders. Fieldwork was always undertaken with a research assistant who also served as a translator when necessary.

A total of 13 villages were investigated during the course of fieldwork, 7 project villages and 6 control villages (Table 2). Villages were almost always coupled with control villages located nearby (under 30 km), in the same jurisdiction and, to the extent possible, of comparable size. See statistics on village population and household numbers in the table below. There were instances where logistical realities made simple village pairings difficult. I included as a “village” the community-based organization known by its acronym of RECPA that was involved in the afforestation project in Uganda. Second, households participating in the Plan Vivo reforestation project in Uganda were compared with a control group of households in the same sub-county not participating in the carbon project. Because the Plan Vivo project operates at the level of individual households, such a modification to the methodology appeared justified. For the Uganda bagasse cogeneration project, identifying a village within a reasonable distance to the project village that was not growing sugarcane proved logistically difficult because sugar mills have extensive outgrower catchment areas. Table 2: Basic comparative village statistics: population and households COUNTRY PROJECT Project/Control VILLAGE POPULATION HOUSEHOLDS

Tanzania Afforestation Project Mapanda 5,342 980 Control Luhunga 2,781 519 Project Idete 4,163 883 Control Ipilimo 2,675 604 Biofuel Project Mtamba 889 240 Control Maguruwe 548 154 Cookstove Project Endabash 9,400 ̴1,391 Control Bassodawish 5,036 920 Uganda Afforestation Project Kirungu 1,400 ̴350 Control Rwerazi 1,552 188 Plan Vivo Reforestation Project Plan Vivo HHs na* na* Control Control HHs na* na* Bagasse Cogeneration Project Kagogwa ̴1,250 178 Control NA * Bitereko sub-county has a population of approximately 25,200 and 4,738 households.

District and National-Level Research

Evaluation of the impact of projects on national CNC and MMC, was based on interviews with district and national actors as well as review of relevant policy documents, particularly national development plans and related policies—detailed below. District and national level interviews were undertaken with key informants. District interviews sought to understand district administrative procedures affecting foreign investment projects and evaluate projects in relation to other district development efforts. National-level interviews focused on climate change, forestry, energy and development policy. A total of seventy-three district and national level key informant interviews were undertaken: 39 in Tanzania and 34 in Uganda.

Data Analysis: Sustainability Qualitative Ranking Exercise

Strong and Weak Sustainability

The study is unique in framing research findings in terms of strong and weak sustainability. As Neumeyer (2003) observes, because neither strong nor weak sustainability can be empirically falsified, debates about sustainability are actually impossible to resolve scientifically. Both definitions embrace the definition of sustainable development as development that maintains the capacity to provide non-declining utility for

infinity (Neumayer, 2003: 7). The two paradigms differ, however, in their acceptance of economic substitutability between critical natural capital (CNC) and man-made capital (MMC)—capital itself is defined as “those items that form the capacity to provide utility” (Ibid.).

Strong sustainability requires that critical natural capital (CNC) be maintained or increased to ensure sustainability. The main difficulty with operationalizing strong sustainability is distinguishing CNC from other forms of natural capital (Neumayer, 2003: 24). CNC recognizes natural elements that provide significant functions to humans, the absence of which would lead to sharp declines in the capacity to maintain utility, or would risk such declines (De Groot et al., 2003; Ekins et al., 2003: 176). Biodiversity is not necessarily part of CNC. While biodiversity is increasingly being considered in terms of the ecosystem services it provides and contribution to ecological resilience (Hooper et al., 2005), it is unclear how critical a function biodiversity plays in specific circumstances (Thompson and Starzomski, 2007). Weak sustainability defines sustainability in terms of the total utility offered by CNC and MMC, with rising MMC capable of substituting for declines in CNC. To ensure sustainability, it is necessary to maintain intact the sum of CNC and MMC, though recognizing that one can replace the other. As Neumayer explains, “[t]his means that natural capital can be safely run down as long as enough MMC is built in exchange” (Neumayer, 2003: 22). The difficulty with evaluating weak sustainability is demonstrating that MMC is able to substitute for CNC should it be compromised.

An important aspect of sustainable development not captured in the discussion of strong and weak sustainability above is trade-offs between sustainable development at the local and national scales (Byres, 1979; Sah and Stiglitz, 2002). One school of thought, known as urban bias theory, is highly critical of such trade-offs (see Jones and Corbridge, 2010; Lipton, 1977). It privileges the cultivation of small-holder agriculture and light industry rather than the promotion of policies which would transfer surplus capital from peasant agriculture to industrial sectors (Bernstein and Brass, 1997: 9; Byres, 1979: 222; Singh, 1978: 92-93). But another school, which I call “rural transformation”, argues that trade-offs between rural and urban sectors—between the local and national—can be justified under certain conditions. Byres argues that investments should instead strive for a “continuing effect” that enlarges the rate of growth of output at future dates (Byres, 1979: 222). Kay convincingly argues that what is necessary is “a development strategy that generates a dynamic interaction between the [local and the national, rural and urban sectors]” (Kay, 2009: 117). This dynamic has been best documented in the case of East Asia’s industrial transformation and arguably has contributed to later success in the region towards the developmental state.2 Long-term sustainability may therefore hinge on the ability of the state to act as a legitimate broker of economic development. The definition of sustainability—strong or weak—that I assert in this paper subscribes to an ethic of Pareto efficiency: development must be sustainable at both the local and national levels to be sustainable. MMC and CNC benefits realized for the national economy cannot come at the cost to local communities or individuals nor increase the risks they face.

2 As Kay describes of the situation in post-WWII Taiwan, “[T]he industrialisation-induced squeeze only lasted for a few decades, as there was a shift from an urban to a rural bias during the 1970s. Thanks to the country's successful industrialisation the labour surplus gradually vanished and real industrial wages began to rise... Agriculture became increasingly inefficient relative to world agriculture and required increasing protection against imports. It also became a net recipient of subsidies from the state” Kay (2002).

Strong Sustainability Evaluation

For the evaluation of strong sustainability, I first considered how a project affected local CNC. This was determined inductively, based on observation of the presence or absence of an element of CNC in both a village involved in a project and its control village. In effect, the control village served as a baseline against which conditions in the project village were assessed. Distinguishing between natural capital and critical natural capital was possible by combining quantitative information obtained through household surveys supported by qualitative data obtained through surveys and focus groups. For example, if crop productivity was found lower in a project village than a control village and this corroborated with interviews stressing food insecurity issues and insufficient access to land, this was deemed as evidence that land represented local CNC and that this had been reduced by the project. Based on fieldwork findings, projects were scored according to whether they either decreased (-2), left unaffected (0) or increased (+2) local CNC. Note that in order to consider variation in project sustainable development impact at the local level, I discuss sustainable development impact in terms of 7 “cases”. While most cases corresponded to one project-one village pair, cases grouped villages together when a project had similar impacts on more than one village (Tanzania afforestation projects) or distinguished between villages involved in the same project when the sustainability impact differed (Uganda afforestation project).

Second, I identified CNC at the national level through interviews at the district and national levels as well as review of national development strategies, related government reports and legislation. Because CNC changes over time, I limited this document review to the time period when projects were initiated (generally the mid-2000s). Accordingly, the identification of critical natural capital considered Tanzania’s 2005 Tanzania's National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (VPO, 2005), also known by its Swahili acronym MKUKUTA; Uganda’s 2005 Poverty Eradication Action Plan (MoFPED, 2005). Natural resources and other environmental factors that were prioritized in these government reports were identified as national CNC. Similar to the scoring of local CNC, national CNC was scored according to whether a project decreased (-1), left unaffected (0) or increased (+1) national CNC. Considering project CNC ranking at the local and national levels allowed me to score each project in terms of strong sustainability. Given the commitment to Pareto efficiency, only if projects led to the increase or maintenance of CNC at the local level was it considered strongly sustainable. Projects that result in decreased local CNC though increasing national CNC were given a score of -2.3

Weak Sustainability Evaluation

Evaluation of weak sustainability proceeded by adding an evaluation of MMC impact to that of CNC. First, local MMC benefits were determined inductively, based on observation of the presence or absence of an element of MMC in both a village involved in a project and its control village. Again, the control village served as a baseline against which conditions in the project village was assessed. Based on

3 As discussed earlier, I treated biodiversity separately from CNC because it was not possible to determine if biodiversity itself was critical in its provision of human utility. But given alarm about the global loss of biodiversity, I considered it wrong not to include some evaluation of biodiversity. I thus assigned a biodiversity score in addition to a project’s effect on local and national CNC. However, I only added a biodiversity score if CNC increased or remained unchanged. For example, activities that lead to the conservation of biodiversity (forest conservation) but deprive local people of CNC in the process (agricultural land) do not meet the definition of sustainability I have used.

fieldwork findings, projects were scored according to whether they either decreased (-2), left unaffected (0) or increased (+2) local MMC. I considered opportunity costs in my evaluation of local MMC impact: the costs of an investment project should be evaluated by comparison to alternative economic activities that could have been undertaken had the project not been implemented. Second, I considered the MMC benefits of a project at the national level. This analysis was more straightforward than that for national CNC and simply required an evaluation if the MMC benefits of a project would extend beyond the village level. As discussed above, given the commitment to local-level Pareto efficiency, only if projects led to the increase or maintenance of MMC at the local level was it given a positive score. Projects that result in decreased local MMC though increasing national MMC are given a -2 score. Finally, it was necessary to combine CNC and MMC evaluations to determine if the conditions of weak sustainability had been maintained or violated. SUMMARY RESULTS

My results demonstrate that investment projects met conditions of strong sustainability in 4 of 7 cases and conditions of weak sustainability in 5 of 7 cases. In other words, there was only one case where I believe the conditions of strong sustainability had been compromised though MMC gains render the project’s impact sustainable in terms of weak sustainability. In another two cases, conditions of both strong and weak sustainability were violated. See Figure 3 for an overview of all seven cases in terms of placement in qualitative ranking exercise along strong sustainability and weak sustainability axes (also see tables in Appendix C to show breakdown of rankings for each axis). Summary tables indicating how projects affected CNC and MMC, at both local and national levels, are presented in Tables 3-6 below.

I comment briefly on these three cases of sustainability violation, while the interested reader can find much more detailed analysis of all cases as Appendix A to this paper. First, in the case of the Uganda cogeneration project’s impact on the village of Kagogwa, my findings suggest conditions of weak sustainability have been met though not strong sustainability. Increased demand for sugarcane by Kakira Sugar Works put upwards pressure on land, compromising farmland which came to constitute CNC. However, more precise economic measurement would be necessary to determine if MMC benefits in Kagogwa village outweigh the costs of CNC reductions, particularly household land size, as a result of sugarcane expansion. Here it would be necessary to determine the degree to which land scarcity in Kagogwa is due to sugarcane expansion in comparison to local population pressure. However, given a lack of tension around food prices and land scarcity in Kagogwa, I conclude here that MMC benefits are greater than these CNC costs so that the project meets conditions of weak sustainability.

Second, one project led to clear violations of the conditions for both strong sustainability and weak sustainability: the Uganda afforestation project in the case of Kirungu. Here the Uganda afforestation project delivered few economic benefits to villagers and cut villagers off from agriculture and grazing lands that had a direct effect on their food security. For generations, Kirungu villagers had been encroaching on land of the Rwoho Central Forest Reserve and the investment project saw the Reserve’s boundaries enforced for perhaps the first time. Nonetheless, this project met conditions for both strong sustainability and weak sustainability in the case of RECPA—the community-based organization involved in this project. However, the different effects of this project was due to the fact that Kirungu villagers were more isolated and heavily dependent on project lands for their livelihood while RECPA members were largely comprised of members based in a less isolated village whose lands were not affected by the project.

Finally, the Tanzania biofuel project also led to clear violations of both strong and weak sustainability, though in this case MMC losses were more dramatic than actual CNC losses. Despite significant controversy surrounding this project in local and international media (Carrington et al., 2011; John,

2010), my findings indicate that the project did not violate food security—at least in the case of Mtamba village—though there are legitimate concerns there about water access. More importantly were lost economic benefits: the suspension of the project due to financial problems facing British Sun Biofuels represents a significant opportunity cost that led the project to violate conditions of weak sustainability. Figure 3: Summary Sustainability Matrix

Table 3: Identification of Local CNC Losses and Benefits Country/Project/Village Local CNC Benefits Local CNC Costs Improved Reduced Reduced Critical Critical Water Soil Reliance on Reliance Agriculture Pasture Access Fertility Fossil Fuels on Non- Land Land Renewable Biomass Tanzania Afforestation – Mapanda & Idete / / / / / / Biofuel – Mtamba / / / / / Yes Cookstove – Endabash / / Yes / / / Uganda Afforestation – Kirungu / / / Yes / / Afforestation – RECPA / / / / / / Plan Vivo Reforestation – Bitereko / / / / / / Cogeneration-Kagogwa / / / Yes / /

Table 4: Identification of National CNC Benefits Country/Project/Village National CNC Benefits Land Reduced Reduced Reduced Reduced Degradation/ Reliance on Reliance on Reliance Reliance Improved Soil Non- Timber Imports on Fossil Fuel on Sugar Fertility Renewable Imports Imports Biomass Tanzania Afforestation – Mapanda & Idete / / / / / Biofuel – Mtamba / / / / / Cookstove – Endabash / / / / / Uganda Afforestation - Kirungu / / Yes / / Afforestation – RECPA / / Yes / / Plan Vivo Reforestation – Bitereko / / / / / Cogeneration-Kagogwa / / / Yes Yes

Table 5: Identification of Local MMC Benefits and Costs Country/Project/Village Local MMC Benefits Local MMC Opportunity Costs Employment Direct Subsidized Compensation Financial Payment Infrastructure Savings Tanzania Afforestation – Mapanda & Idete Yes / Yes Yes / / Biofuel – Mtamba / / / Yes / Yes Cookstove – Endabash Yes / Yes (stoves) / / / Uganda Afforestation - Kirungu Yes Yes, but insignificant Yes (roads) / / / Afforestation – RECPA Yes Yes, but delayed / / / / Plan Vivo Reforestation – Bitereko / Yes / / / / Cogeneration-Kagogwa Yes Yes / / / /

Table 6: Identification of National MMC Benefits Country/Project/Village National MMC Benefits Reduced Reduced Reduced Increased Land Rents Reliance Reliance on Reliance on Electricity to Central on Fossil Timber Imports Sugar Generation Government Fuels Imports Imports Tanzania Afforestation – Mapanda & Idete / / / / Yes Biofuel – Mtamba / / / / Unclear Cookstove – Endabash / / / / / Uganda Afforestation - Kirungu / Yes / / / Afforestation – RECPA / Yes / / / Plan Vivo Reforestation – Bitereko / / / / / Cogeneration-Kagogwa / / Yes Yes /

EXPLAINING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IMPACT

How do we explain patterns in the sustainable development impact of projects above? I argue that investment projects in the forest and bioenergy sectors involve the risk that they will be unsustainable, but the state plays a role in modifying these risks. Variation in the sustainable development impact of the projects investigated is explained by differences in the way that the state in Tanzania and Uganda allocates the risks involved in rural economic development through its land tenure and investment regime. The state certainly cannot control all factors affecting sustainability, such as population growth and drought (see Appendix B), but it can shape the risks that such factors pose.

On the one hand, large pay-offs for the rural poor, such as through successful large-scale land transactions in Tanzania, can entail high costs in terms of MMC should a project fail. The institutional framework in Tanzania for rural development places the burden of risk on villagers themselves through a collective land tenure system in combination with an aggressive foreign investment regime that is predicated on economic development taking places through large-scale, foreign investor-driven land acquisitions. The land tenure system in Tanzania does not allow villagers to engage directly with foreign investors to realize the economic potential of their land, but instead requires that they first transfer it to the central government who then leases it out to investors. This offloads project risks onto villagers who only receive compensation for their lands and not payment that reflects its true market value; the real benefits of any village investment project can only be the employment and ancillary benefits it generates. When investment projects are successful, villagers overlook the low rates of compensation as the direct economic benefits are large compared to other potential economic opportunities. But when a project fails, villagers are left with few benefits and little recourse as the land is no longer theirs. At the same time, the Tanzanian investment regime is very outward oriented and has created few incentives for domestic investors to become meaningfully involved in forestry or bioenergy.

On the other hand, the striking feature of the forestry and bioenergy carbon finance projects in Uganda was the absence of large-scale land acquisitions by foreign investors. This, I argue, is due to a land tenure system that recognizes individual, customary rights to land ownership and thus enables direct payments to individual landholders as well as a more selective foreign investment regime that curtails foreign acquisition of land. While projects in Uganda were more modest in size than those in Tanzania, the risks involved in Uganda’s projects were more equitably distributed between investors and smallholders. When encroachment was not a factor, which was the case in two of the three projects investigated, smallholders were able to secure considerable economic benefits. Furthermore, through organizational innovations of project developers, economic benefits were extended to those not holding sufficient land to participate directly. At the same time, Uganda’s investment regime places important restrictions on foreign investment in the rural sector in order to hinder large-scale land acquisitions. The apparent result is the promotion of domestic investors in the forest and bioenergy sectors—projects investigated in Uganda were implemented by a state agency, an Ugandan NGO and an Ugandan firm. While Uganda’s institutions share many similarities with neoliberalism, the selectivity of Uganda’s foreign investment regime suggests that the approach is better described as liberal developmentalism.

The situation is inverted for critical natural capital (CNC). Tanzania’s land tenure system mitigates the risk that land involved in investment projects constitutes CNC because the country’s land tenure system has locked away significant amounts of unused land from foreign investment as Village Land. The fact that so much Village Land is comprised of unused land is a result of boundaries maintained since prior to Ujamaa villagization. While apparently a frustration to the Tanzanian state’s aspirations for economic development, these boundaries are respected. While not existing as lines on map, boundaries between village and state lands are relatively well known and have been maintained since independence. Given the

collapse of the state, boundaries between state and customary land are much more contested in Uganda, which leads to problems of CNC when villagers establish themselves on state lands.

Land Tenure, Investment Regime and Man-Made Capital (MMC) Benefits

Uganda: Liberal Developmental Land Tenure-Investment Regime

Evidence of the Relationship between Land Tenure, Investment Regime and MMC

Two of the three projects in Uganda involved individual land rental contracts between individual households and project developers, including the Plan Vivo reforestation project and bagasse cogeneration project. The lack of formal titles did not pose a significant obstacle to advancing these projects. Indeed, both EcoTrust and KSW produced their own contracts which were functionally equivalent to formal government leases. For EcoTrust, the contract took the form of a “Plan Vivo”—a land management plan developed by each individual smallholder who maps out areas for tree-planting and long-term land-use. KSW contracts with individual outgrowers to ensure that cane is not diverted to other buyers and food is secure.4 Significantly, these contracts were enforceable: KSW had reportedly already taken 30 farmers to court for breach of contract.5

The association of MMC benefits with land use means that those without land or with insufficient land to take part in carbon finance projects cannot directly benefit from carbon finance projects while the carbon projects may also increase land scarcity. This was associated with two projects in Uganda. I observed indications, though inconclusive, that the expansion of KSW’s sugarcane supply in the context of the Uganda bagasse cogeneration project was having such an impact: villagers in Kagogwa not participating as sugarcane outgrowers in the cogeneration project had some of the smallest landholdings encountered in Uganda. However, there were no indications that the Plan Vivo project was driving the acquisition of land or otherwise putting pressure on land scarcity.

In both the Uganda cogeneration project and Plan Vivo reforestation project, the project developers had established special funds to extend benefits to non-participants. The BSGA and KSW have jointly established the Kakira Outgrowers for Rural Development (KORD), a local NGO, to promote development projects in the area. Similarly, EcoTrust established a Community Development Fund representing 10% of carbon sales of the Plan Vivo reforestation project to bring some project benefits to local residents unable to participate in the project. It would be important to gauge the impact such programmes are having, something which was unfortunately not feasible in the current dissertation.

Land Tenure in Uganda: Recognizing Individual, Customary Rights

The prevalence of such individual land rental contracts, I argue, is a consequence of Uganda’s more liberal land tenure system that recognizes individual, customary land rights. Uganda’s land tenure is unique in Africa in upholding individual land ownership rights—including customary land ownership rights. The trajectory of land tenure reform in Uganda has moved along an arc towards greater recognition of customary land tenure, including customary land ownership, and the curtailment of the discretionary

4 Business Manager, Kakira, Interview UD4, 9 June 2009; Small Business Owner (UD16), Kakira, Interview UD16, 8 June 2009. 5 NGO Officer (UD3), Kakira, Interview, 10 June 2009; Village Focus Group (U26), Kagogwa Village, 11 June 2009.

powers of land-owners that grew out of Uganda’s unique mailo land tenure system, itself the product of the colonial period (Coldham, 2000; Green, 2006). The fundamental principle of land tenure in Uganda distinguishes it from the Tanzanian and Moldovan experience: the 1995 Constitution of Uganda states that “Land in Uganda belongs to the citizens of Uganda and shall vest in them in accordance with the land tenure systems provided for in this Constitution” (Article 237(1)). Customary tenure is defined in the Land Act as tenure which applies: local customary regulation and management to individual and household ownership, use, occupation of, and transactions in, of land in perpetuity; providing for communal ownership and use of land; in which parcels of land may be recognized as subdivisions belonging to a person, a family or a traditional institution; and which is owned in perpetuity (Land Act: s.4(1)(a)-(h)).

Although smallholders and communities may choose to obtain formal proof of their customary lands, customary land ownership is legally recognized without it (Knight et al., 2011: 18). The Ugandan government still owns sizeable tracts of land such as forest reserves and protected areas,6 but the majority of Uganda’s land is not owned by government, but Ugandan citizens. The right of Ugandan citizens to own land is unique in sub-Saharan Africa. As legal experts have commented, “Ugandans have some of the most extensive legal protections for their land claims in Africa” (Knight et al., 2011: 18). Consequently, under the country’s land tenure system, large unused tracts of land do not exist; almost all lands are owned individually under customary law and project developers need to negotiate with (customary) landowners directly.

The reason why few customary land certificates have been issued, individual or community-based, is that Ugandans perceive efforts to formalize customary rights as an attempt by the government to extend its control: “Everybody believes government wants to grab their land, so [certification] is one way government will find out how much land they have and will tax them”.7 With consistent evidence that domestic land markets are operating in Uganda without the issuance of customary certificates (Baland et al., 2007; Deininger et al., 2008), there appears to be little incentive to obtain one. Furthermore, the administrative apparatus for producing freehold and customary land certificates has faced significant constraints in terms of human resources and organizational capacity. But the District Land Board in Bushenyi district, for example, was staffed by only five people at the time of 2009 field surveys and had registered fewer than 10% of land owners.8 If a land certificate is sought, Uganda landholders themselves favour freehold title, which may be leased to foreign investors. Foreign investors are permitted under Article 237(c) of the Constitution to lease land directly from Uganda citizens, albeit for a limited number of purposes discussed below.

Communal land tenure does not play a prominent role in Uganda. One reason for this is that, in contrast to Tanzania, land tenure in Uganda is distinct from village governments. Obtaining a community customary certificate is complicated by the need to first form a legal body to represent the “community”. In the words of one expert, “In order to apply for a title, there has to be a legal person, a legal entity. A ‘community’ is not a legal entity.”9 The particular legal body envisioned in the Land Act was a Communal Land Association (CLA). A CLA allows individual and common land to be managed by a collective and for any revenue generated to be retained by the community (Land Act: s.15-26). A number

6 Article 237(2)(b) of the Constitution recognizes the power of government to “hold in trust for the people and protect natural lakes, rivers, wetlands, forest reserves, game reserves, national parks and any land to be reserved for ecological and touristic purposes for the common good of all citizens.” 7 NGO Officer, Kampala, Interview UN16, 12 May 2009. 8 District Government Officer, Bushenyi, Interview UD14, 25 May 2009 9 Personal Communication, International Land Tenure Expert, London (2012, pers. comm.)

of unsuccessful applications have been made to formalize certain community forest management schemes into CLAs (EMPAFORM, 2006: 8; ULA, 2007: 7). However, as of 2009, no individual titles or CLAs had been granted in Uganda (ULA, 2007).10 Certainly no CLAs were encountered amongst the projects investigated during the course of fieldwork.

Nor does participatory forest management in Uganda rest on communal land tenure. The form of participatory forest management used in the Uganda afforestation project, collaborative forest management (CFM), is not designed to interact with CLAs but “with a forest user group for the purpose of managing a central or local forest reserve or part of it”(Forestry Act: s.15, MWLE, 2003). A “forest user group” is defined in the “as a group comprising members of a local community registered” as a non- governmental organization or community-based organization (CBOs). But as was seen in the Uganda afforestation project, CBOs do necessarily represent all village residents: membership in RECPA appeared to be beyond the reach of most Kirungu residents, which muted the projects local MMC benefits. The distinction between land tenure and village government bodies in Uganda thus does entail some risk—a situation that contrasts with Tanzania where village government remain key players in the governance of land.

Uganda’s Investment Regime: Steering Investment

Elements of developmentalism are most evident in Uganda’s investment regime. In contrast to Tanzania, there has been a conscious attempt by the Ugandan government to steer foreign investment in certain directions. The 2000 Investment Code Act allows the government to identify priority business areas for foreign investments, which are then eligible for special incentives. Relevant to the forestry and bioenergy sector are “crop processing” and “processing of forest products” (Investment Code Act: s.13(2)-(3)).11 Yet the Investment Code Act places important restrictions on leasing land to foreign investors. Section 10(2) states that no foreign investor shall acquire, be granted or lease land for the purpose of crop production or animal production. Nonetheless, under Section 10(4), the government may exempt any business from the restrictions above where it deems it necessary that land should be leased to ensure a regular supply of raw materials.12

It is not clear if the Ugandan government has granted exemptions for foreign investment in the forest and bioenergy sectors. On one hand, public lands in Uganda such as its forest reserves have been leased to foreign investors (Kron, 2011; NFA, 2005), though the largest forestry programme on private/customary lands, the Sawlog Production Grant Scheme (SPGS), is a public-private partnership designed to incentivize domestic investment (Jacovelli, 2009; SPGS, 2009). On the other hand, many news stories on

10 Multilateral Donor Agency Officer, Kampala, Interview UN3, 15 May 2009; NGO Officer, Kampala, Interview UN16, 12 May 2009. 11 Current priority areas include: 1. Crop processing, 2. Processing of forest products, 3. Fish processing, 4. Steel industry, 5. Chemical industries, 6. Textile and leather industry, 7. Oil milling industry, 8. Paper production, 9. Mining industry, 10. Glass and plastic products industry, 11. Ceramics industry, 12. Manufacturing of tools, implements, equipment and machinery, 13. Manufacture of industrial spare parts, 14. Construction and building industry, 15. Meat processing, 16. Tourism industry, 17. Real estate development industry, 18. Manufacture of building materials industry, 19. Packaging industry, 20. Transport industry, 21. Energy conservation industry, 22. Pharmaceutical industry, 23. Banking, 24. High-technology industry, 25. Telecommunication services, 12 This statutory instrument is known as the Investment Code (Acquisition of Land by Foreign Investors) (Exemption) Instrument. According to Angualia (2010: 15) the companies currently exempted are: Annamemi Agro- Products (U) Ltd, Channan Agricultural Company Ltd, Kibimba Rice Scheme Company Limited, Mukwano Industries Ltd, Nsimbe Estates Ltd, Rwenzori Highlands Tea Company Ltd and Tilda Uganda Ltd.

biofuels in Uganda refer to domestic rather than foreign companies (Biofuels Digest, 2011b; Kagolo, 2010; Onyango, 2011a; b; Pearce, 2007). While many sugarcane estates in Uganda are only partially owned by Uganda citizens, the lands were acquired well before the reign of Museveni and current investment regime. Given the surprising lack of foreign investment in biofuels in Uganda, this sector appears to not fall under the definition of “crop production” and is thus barred from foreign investment. Altogether, large-scale land acquisitions of private land by foreign investors for forestry and bioenergy of the type encountered in Tanzania do not seem feasible in Uganda.

The powers accorded to Uganda’s foreign investment agency also suggest a more active and selective role. Similar to the Tanzania Investment Centre, the Uganda Investment Authority (UIA) was established under the Act to be a “one-stop shop” allowing investors to register, obtain investment license and secure necessary secondary clearances (UIA, 2009: 8). In contrast to the situation in Tanzania, however, the Ugandan government has not granted the UIA as wide-ranging authority to compel cooperation by other government bodies. Consequently, the government can play only a limited role in inciting development in land, which is in contrast to Tanzania where the government has established a “Land Bank” under the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC)—a country to which we now turn.

Tanzania: Promoting Large-scale Land Acquisitions

Evidence of the Relationship between Land Tenure, Investment Regime and MMC

The most concrete example of how the risks involved in the “burden of the cost of development” is scaled against villagers in Tanzania comes from the two projects that involved large-scale land acquisitions. Specifically, my reconstruction of compensation rates for lands acquired for the Tanzanian biofuel and afforestation projects demonstrated that payment was only extended to a relatively small number of individuals in villages involved who could demonstrate they had active farms or other such fixed assets in the lands under question. This indicates that the central government abides by the interpretation that unused village land is General Land, as suggested in the Land Act. However, much of the public and media appear to subscribe to the interpretation of General Land in the Village Land Act that unused Village Land is also conserved Village Land for purposes of compensation. The common property system at the heart of Tanzania’s village land system made it difficult for villagers to arrange with foreign investors directly and created incentives for the central government to accelerate land deals that were not always in the best interest of locals.

Nonetheless, the low compensation rates in Tanzania do not alone determine the sustainability of projects involving large-scale land acquisitions. Important is the relationship between MMC and CNC costs and benefits. On the one hand, the biofuel project was controversial because villages have suffered a tremendous opportunity cost by agreeing to transfer their land towards a failed project which has been suspended indefinitely and which has not produced anticipated employment benefits. On the other hand, the afforestation project in Tanzania generated considerable MMC benefits as it employed nearly 30% of villagers surveyed. Indeed, villagers in Mapanda had transferred additional village lands to another forestry company as recently as 2007. While villagers had some grievances about the afforestation projects, on balance villagers found that benefits outweighed the low rates of compensation. Controversy surrounding the Tanzania biofuel project then is more a result of it being a bad business deal than due to low compensation rates. A possible remedy would be to provide villagers some legal recourse should an economic development project predicated upon the acquisition of village lands fail.

Tanzania is also well known for its advancement of participatory forest management, which was the result of significant institutional reform in Tanzania’s forest sector (Blomley and Iddi, 2009; Blomley and Ramadhani, 2006). Participatory forest management is a term encompassing two broad types of forest management: community forests (including village land forest reserves and community forest reserves)

and joint forest management (JFM). It is made possible through the 1999 Village Land Act, which recognizes village customary title, the 2002 Forest Act which enables local communities to declare and gazette forest reserves and the 1982 Local Government Act which enables the establishment of village by- laws covering forest access and use (Milledge et al., 2007: 97). The appeal of community forests is that villagers retain all benefits accruing from the forests they have established, including 100% of revenue from the sale of forest products, levying and retaining fines and confiscation of illegally harvested forest products (Blomley and Iddi, 2009: 33). In turn, JFM allows for the establishment of a special management agreement between a village government (or community group) to co-manage central, district and even private forest reserves (Forest Act: s.16).

But participatory forest management was absent from the forestry projects investigated nor was it undertaken in the context of the cookstove project, despite the fact that villagers were sourcing fuelwood from a nearby national forest reserve. This supports observations elsewhere that tree-planting is better managed as a system of individual private property than as a group system (Otsuka and Place, 2001: 18; Skutsch, 1985). For example, individual tree-planting was very popular in Luhunga, one of the control villages to the Tanzania afforestation projects. Here more than 40% of those surveyed were independently engaged in tree-planting on their household plots. Compared to what income farmers could hope to receive from growing maize, tree planting was simply more lucrative—by nearly a factor of two over a short 6-year time horizon (results not shown). Villagers in the control village of Luhunga had also planted a six hectare community forest. But its small size was an indication of limited organizational capacity to plant trees communally while villagers also voiced misgivings about the benefits that the community forest, still young, had generated.13 Indeed, there was a sense of frustration amongst some with the community-based model; village leaders did not want to see it extended to afforestation efforts under the carbon market. As one local government official in Luhunga explained: “Our opinion is not to deal with this issue [afforestation under the carbon market] in that kind of community basis because we have proved failure with so many projects that are based on community or all those projects which are under control of groups.”

The most striking example of participatory forest management’s failure was found in the case of the Tanzania biofuel project, where local forest reserves had been pillaged for the fuelwood trade despite their designation under JFM. The apparent reason for JFM’s shortcomings is that the Forest Act provides no guidance on how the benefits arising from JFM are to be shared (Blomley and Iddi, 2009: 33). In the area surrounding the Tanzania biofuel project, there have been frequent efforts to conserve forests and thwart the illegal charcoal economy, including an extensive international NGO effort in the 2000s to engage local villages in JFM (Kaale and Mwakifwamba, 2006). Mtamba village, involved with the Tanzania biofuel project, has sought JFM of Ruvu South Forest Reserve. The situation has verged on the edge of violence as armed charcoal traders threatened villagers and government forest guards alike (Kaale and Mwakifwamba, 2006: 19). A consortium of NGOs promoting forest conservation concluded that “the intended output of reducing pressure and dependence on forest resources in Kazimzumbwi, Pugu and Ruvu South [Forest Reserves] was not achieved… Conservation of the forest reserves required law enforcement and legal powers which [the project] partners NGOs did not have” (Ibid.: vi-viii). A more

13 Villager (T12), Luhunga Village, Interview T12, 1 March 2009. Another villager in Luhunga described the community forest in the following terms: “It seems as if we’re doing charity. We just planted the trees and take care of the forest, but we’re getting nothing from the forest” (Villager, Luhunga Village, Interview T13, 2 March 2009). Harvesting trees was not yet permitted within the community forest, though once mature, all royalties would accrue to the community group if the decision to harvest were made (Milledge et al., 2007: 245, Blomley & Iddi, 2009: 33- 34).

recent NGO report concluded that: “Much of [the Sun Biofuel project] area has already been degraded by the dense human population close to Dar es Salaam, although areas of natural coastal bushland, grassland and thicket are still present. But the severe charcoal crisis is the major source of forest clearance both in and outside forest reserves” (WWF, 2008: 52). Ironically, it was JFM’s failure and the extent of ensuing forest degradation due to illegal charcoal harvesting that made the area attractive for the Tanzania biofuel project.

Land Tenure in Tanzania: The Significance of Village Land

The empirical findings above can be explained by Tanzania’s land tenure system, which saw major reform in the 1990s, resulting in the 1999 Land Act and 1999 Village Land Act (GoT, 2008; McAuslan, 2003; Roughton, 2007; Shivji, 1998; Sundet, 2005). Despite reforms, the 1999 Land Acts maintain radical title of the President over all land, consistent with the British colonial system.14 Tanzanians cannot own land but are accorded land rights under a right of occupancy system (Land Act s.1-14). However, the new legislation also recognized customary lands rights through the creation of a new land tenure category, Village Land and customary rights to occupancy therein. Village Land is now one of three basic land tenure categories created under the Land Act (s.4), alongside Reserved Land and General Land. Reserved Land is generally protected areas and government forest reserves (Land Act: s.6). General Land is a residual category of land under the authority of the central government that is neither Reserved Land nor Village Land, though there is a lack of clarity as to whether this includes both occupied and unoccupied Village Land—an issue that is important in the context of projects involving land acquisitions.

Significantly, only General Land under the direct control of the central government can be leased to foreign investors (Land Act: s.22(1)(b); s.25(1)(h)). Because the majority of land in Tanzania is Village Land, foreign investment projects almost always involve some transfer of Village Land to General Land. Approximately 70% of Tanzania’s total land area is Village Land, 28% as Reserve Land but only 2% as General Land (MLHHSD, 2010; NLUPC, 2005).15 Outside of Tanzania’s already extensive protected areas system, 97% of the country’s lands are on Village Land. As I discuss in more detail below, the extent of Village Land in Tanzania means that large tracts of it are relatively unused by villagers.

The fact that most of Tanzania’s land lies locked away from foreign investment as Village Land was to be solved by compensating villagers for its transfer to General Land. In some of the most significant legal reforms under the 1999 Land Act and Village Land Act, villagers are now entitled to “full, fair and prompt compensation to any person whose right of occupancy or recognised long-standing occupation or customary use of land is revoked or otherwise interfered with to their detriment” for lands transferred into General Land (Land Act s.1(1)g and Village Land Act s.3(1)(h). Despite the apparent clarity of these compensation provisions, considerable controversy has surrounded compensation because, as my research

14 In responding to the recommendation of the 1994 Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Land Matters that the President be divested of radical title and invested in other government bodies, the government responded “The President as Head of State is responsible for the development of the country and the well-being of the people, and land being an important element for development has to be controlled by the President. If land is vested in [the] Board of Land Commissioners and the Village Assemblies then the Government will be turned into a beggar for land when required for development… The Investment Promotion Policy will be impossible when the Government does not have a say in land matters” (Shivji 1998: 81). 15 “Seventy percent of the land in Tanzania, the authority to transfer that land is the village authority. Now the national lands, we have the reserve, that is the state land, the national parks and forests and all of this, and the granted government. All this is thirty percent, formed under the authority of the nation,” (Interview with Director General of Tanzania’s National Land Use Planning Commission, Dar es Salaam, 30 March 2009).

has shown, the central government does not interpret compensation provisions to extend to unused village land.

Under the Land Act, compensation was only to be granted for “unexhausted improvements”. These are permanent investments in land such as trees, standing crops and produce “resulting from the expenditure of capital or labour by an occupier or any person acting on his own behalf” (Land Act: s.20.3 and Interpretation). In other words, compensation is only to be extended to used land. The Village Land Act at Section 7.1 goes into considerable detail about what might constitute Village Land; it includes fallowland, land used for depasturing cattle or passage for cattle “which the villagers have been, during the twelve years preceding the enactment of [the Village Land Act] regularly occupying and using as village land.” However, it is unclear how unoccupied and unused Village Land is treated under the law because of conflicting definitions of General Land (Isaksson and Sigte, 2010: 7-8; Sundet, 2005: 3-4). The Village Land Act defines General Land as “all public land which is not reserved or village land” (s.2). However, the Land Act defines General Land as “all public land which is not reserved land or village land and includes unoccupied or unused village land” (s.2, emphasis added). Furthermore, Section 181 of the Land Act states that it prevails in case of conflict. The upshot is that if deemed unused, land within village boundaries is considered de facto General Land without need for compensation.

Tanzania’s Investment Regime: Open, with Teeth

In contrast to the dilemma’s on bringing land to market under Tanzania’s land tenure system, Tanzania’s foreign investment regime is very open to investment, if not aggressively so. First, there are few restrictions on foreign investment in Tanzania. A NEPAD/OECD study concluded that “the [1997] Investment Act did away with sectoral restrictions on FDI from nearly every economic activity” (NEPAD/OECD, 2005: 47). This contrasts with the more selective, developmental investment regime in Uganda.

Second, in addition to liberalizing the international investment regime, the 1997 Investment Act also established an investment agency– the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC). Similar to its counterpart in Uganda, the objective of the TIC is “to co-ordinate, encourage, promote and facilitate investment in Tanzania and to advise the Government on investment policy and related matters” (Investment Act: s.5). But in contrast to the situation in Uganda, the TIC has been vested with important powers for co- ordination and authority to grant positive incentives to foreign investors in land and priority sectors.16 The 1997 Tanzania Investment Act states that all government departments, agencies and other public authorities “shall co-operate fully with the Centre in the performance of its functions” (s.16(1)) and empowers the TIC to request the in-house presence of officers from any other relevant ministry (s.16(8)). The 1999 Land Act also grants the TIC important powers over land: “Land to be designated for investment purposes...shall be identified, gazetted and allocated to the Tanzania Investment Centre which shall create derivative rights to investors” (s.20(2)). With such powers, the TIC has sought to play a more direct role in coordinating land acquisition through what is being called the Land Bank. However, to date, the TIC has not actually acquired land for the Land Bank (Isaksson and Sigte, 2010: 27). Instead, the TIC has played only a facilitative role in the land transfer process between investor and villages (Isaksson and Sigte, 2010: 37). Because of the individual land rights of Ugandan citizens are better protected, such a Land Bank is not possible in Uganda.

16 Tanzania Government Officer, Dar es Salaam, Interview TN8, 30 May 2010.

State-Society Boundaries and Critical Natural Capital (CNC)

With the possible exception of water access being compromised in the Tanzania biofuel project, the other two cases where CNC was compromised took the form of land scarcity, both in Uganda. While it is difficult to make generalizations from investigation of only six investment projects, my findings suggest that land tenure in Tanzania posed less risk for CNC than in Uganda. The reason I offer is that in contrast to the situation in Uganda, boundaries between state and village land have been relatively stable since independence, which means that acquisition of land that constitutes CNC is relatively uncommon because these deals need to take place through village government structures. In Uganda, the most egregious case of an investment project compromising CNC occurred where villagers were evicted from the land of a state forest reserve onto which they had encroached. This is categorically different from the individualized character of Uganda’s land tenure system, which was the focus of our discussion of MMC impact of forest and bioenergy investment projects.

Tanzania: Maintenance of Pre-Ujamaa Village Boundaries

Land involved in investment projects is less likely to constitute CNC because large tracts of Village Lands in Tanzania are unused and not critical to the food security of villagers. I attribute this largely to the accommodation of pre-Ujamaa village boundaries in Tanzania’s current land tenure system. In Tanzania, land scarcity issues did not arise in either the afforestation project or the biofuel project, where significant tracts of Village Land were transferred to foreign investors. My findings suggest that the extent of unused village lands in Tanzania is due to the centralization undertaken during Ujamaa villagization, where people were moved to more concentrated village centers but retained customary rights over scattered homesteads which could stretch over relatively large areas. These large land areas were recognized and accommodated in Tanzania’s current land tenure regime.

My finding that Village Land involved in investment projects was largely unused may appear paradoxical given global concerns about land grabs in sub-Saharan Africa. But my findings suggest that Ujamaa villagization retained traditional village boundaries, though concentrating villagers in settlements where public services and administration could be better offered. For example, during research into the afforestation projects in Tanzania, one respondent in Mapanda stated: “People were living there before [in the area acquired for afforestation] but when the company came here, no people were living there. No one was displaced.”17 During the village meeting it was explained that this was largely due to Ujamaa: “Not more than 50 [people had farms in the area acquired for afforestation]. They're not sure. It's like this— people were living there before, but they were living there before Ujamaa. So during Ujamaa [the] village, all of them, moved here. But maybe they left their things there, maybe trees. That's what the company compensated.”18 A similar situation is suggested for the Tanzania biofuel project. Villagers in Mtamba were found to have little control over the more distant, forested areas of Village Land that were acquired for the biofuel project. Indeed, much of this area appeared to have succumbed to the illegal charcoal trade, though certain areas were used for agriculture or set aside for their cultural significance (such as burial sites).

The above findings indicate that Tanzania’s current land tenure incorporates significant elements of Ujamaa villagization. Most important for our purposes, the Village Land Act recognized village demarcations established in the 1970s during Ujamaa villagization. Under the current Village Land Act,

17 Villager, Mapanda Village, Interview T20, 5 March 2009. 18 Village Focus Group (T1), Mapanda Village, 6 March 2009.

village boundaries under previous legislation are recognized (Village Land Act s.7(1)) while each village is eligible to receive a new land certificate or have recognized a certificate issued under previous legislation that confers upon the village council the functions of Village Land management and affirms the occupation and use of Village Land in accordance with the customary law of the area (Village Land Act s.7(7)b & c, my emphasis). Notably, the issuing of a village land certificate does not require that the exact extent of village lands be demarcated, only that village boundaries have been agreed (Village Land Act s.7(6)). The village councils of all villages investigated in Tanzania had recognized jurisdiction over village lands, as they all possessed a Certificate of Village Land. Consequently, villagers could claim customary rights over ancestral lands which they currently use only infrequently; it was such relatively unused land that was largely sought by investors for development projects. The period of Ujamaa villagization was also important for securing significant village governance structures (Blomley and Iddi, 2009: 8 & 14; Lund, 2007: 308).

It is notable that these formal village government organizations have largely displaced customary institutions at the local level (NLUPC, 2005: 1). Indeed, the repeal of colonial legislation that had accorded authority to chiefs was amongst the first legislative acts in Tanzania after independence (Mniwasa and Shauri, 2001), many of whom were simply maintained in position of authority by the British through their colonial policy of indirect rule (Crowder, 1964). There has thus been a continuity of relatively stable relations between the state and villages since Tanzania’s independence, a situation perhaps unique in sub-Saharan Africa.

Uganda: Unsettled State-Society Boundaries

Uganda’s land tenure system has not addressed challenges resulting from over fifteen years of civil conflict, particularly the problem of encroachment on state land. There are issues of illegal forest resource extraction in Tanzania (i.e., illegal charcoal production), but these are not of the character of Uganda’s encroachment where entire “illegal” settlements have been established on government lands. The state’s attempts to reassert itself in areas of encroachment increases the risk of land scarcity and infringing on CNC—something that proved unsustainable in Kirungu village who had encroached over the years onto Rwoho Central Forest Reserve, subject of the Uganda afforestation project. Though land pressure was also observed in the Uganda cogeneration project, such upward pressure on land appeared to be compensated by MMC benefits. It is the unsettled nature of boundaries between state and society that has led to serious compromises of CNC in Uganda; however, it is also one for which an apparent solution appears most evident, under the legal notion of “bona fide occupant” which is already well addressed in Uganda land tenure.

Mugyeni et al. (2005) present a succinct history of the problem of encroachment. The Forestry Policy of 1929, established under British colonial authority, led to the initial demarcation of forest reserves across Uganda, nationalizing all forests except those on private land (which in contrast to other colonies, was considerable in Uganda). By 1940, most forest reserves had been demarcated in the field, though the procedures are unlikely to have met current standards for free, prior and informed consent. Regardless, at independence in 1964, forests became property of the Ugandan government. However, during Uganda’s period of political instability from 1970-1986, the Forest Department lost control of the forest estate leading to outstanding losses in Uganda’s forest cover. Indeed, under the Amin regime during the 1970s, encroachment into the forest reserves was actively encouraged (van Orsdol, 1986; Webster et al., 2003: 167). Upon obtaining power in 1986 President Museveni initially ordered the eviction of all encroachers (van Orsdol, 1986; Webster et al., 2003: 167). His position has since vacillated: encouraging encroachment in the mid-1990s (Mugyeni et al., 2005: 31), permitting encroachment in a 2006 executive order (Candia, 2006), and insisting on their expulsion in 2009 (Tebajjukira, 2009).

The Constitution, Land Act and National Forestry and Tree-Planting Act are silent on the issue of encroachment. However, a close read of the Land Act and its intent to safeguard the rights of tenants vis- à-vis predatory landlords, makes it doubtful that the eviction of villagers who had encroached on central forest reserve land was entirely legal. The Land Act grants important rights to bona fide occupants, though often considered to apply to tenant-landlord relations on mailo land. Section 29(2)(a) of the Land Act states “‘Bona fide occupant’ means a person who before the coming into force of the Constitution had occupied and utilised or developed any land unchallenged by the registered owner or agent of the registered owner for twelve years.” Under the Land Act, bona fide occupants enjoy "tenancy by occupancy." This includes security of tenure (Land Act: s.31). It confers upon the tenant quasi-freehold land rights themselves, including inheritance and sub-dividing as well as the right of first refusal should the owner wish to sell (Coldham, 2000: 67). Amendments to the Land Act passed in 2010 seek to further limit the powers of landlords by setting sharp penalties for anyone who evicts or attempts to evict tenants without order of court and by requiring a six month grace period before an eviction order can be effected (Nalugo, 2010).

The notion of “bona fide occupant” resonates with the situation of residents of Kirungu village. While the villagers had knowingly encroached on the forest reserve, the fact that such usage had been on-going for generations (the village was settled in 1953, if not earlier) suggests an abdication of the government’s ownership responsibility of the area. The only difference is that the landowner is government, not a mailo landlord. In this light, it seems reasonable to assert that villagers such as those in Kirungu were in adverse possession of the forest reserve lands they occupied (see Mugyeni et al., 2005). If found in adverse possession of forest reserve land, Kirungu resident may be due compensation for loss of land to the forestry project. The Constitution grants government important powers to “acquire land in the public interest” (Article 237(2)(a)), but citizens are to be protected from the indiscriminate acquisition of land through Constitutional provisions requiring the provision of “prompt payment of fair and adequate compensation” (Article 26(2)(b)(i)). CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

I have demonstrated that an important part of the variation in the sustainable development impact of investment projects in forest and bioenergy sectors is explained by differences in the way that the state in Tanzania and Uganda has allocated the risks involved in rural economic development through its land tenure and investment regime as well as clarity of the boundary between state and village/customary lands. When sustainability was violated, this was typically found to be a consequence of factors within the control of the state: rules surrounding compensation for land acquisitions in Tanzania and evictions on public lands in Uganda. The way risks in rural economic development are allocated is ultimately a result of state political economy orientation. Weak sustainability for forestry and bioenergy project is best ensured by a system of rules that offers opportunities for smallholders to engage directly with international markets, creates incentives for domestic investors in the forest and bioenergy sector and avoids the risks of large-scale land transactions. However, in terms of strong sustainability, CNC losses are minimized by a land tenure regime that maintains a clear boundary between lands of the state and those of villages/customary lands.

Conditions of weak sustainability conform to what I have described as “liberal developmentalism”, which combines developmental and market incentives. An individualized land tenure system, such as that in Uganda, appears part of the country’s development strategy of promoting economic development amongst smallholders which is complemented by an investment regime which creates space for small- scale, domestic investors in the forest and bioenergy sectors. In contrast, strong sustainability, at least issues of CNC that have been the focus of this paper do not appear to be related to political economy orientation, but rather to the stability of the state’s role in rural areas.

Liberal developmentalism may appear an oxymoron in itself, let alone its identification with weak sustainability. But there are a number of reasons to consider it as a valid political economy orientation. First, the distinction between liberal economic reforms and those associated with developmentalism might be less significant than commonly believed. The reason is that liberal economic reforms have not really eliminated the state. Recalling Polanyi’s famously assertion that “Laissez-faire was planned; planning was not” (Polanyi, 2001 [1944]: 147), just the opposite may be true—a liberal market economy requires intervention. So the assumption that the state has been reduced to an inconsequential role in economic policy development during the process of liberalisation is at odds with empirical reality. What has occurred through structural adjustment has been a restructuring of existing institutions in order to be more supportive of markets—not the elimination of the state. For instance, while state agencies have often been considered as part and parcel of neoliberal economic reform in sub-Saharan Africa (Taliercio, 2004a; b), Fjeldstad and Moore (2009) present evidence that revenue agencies have actually enlarged state authority rather than reduced it.

Should we be surprised to find liberal developmentalism in sub-Saharan Africa? Drawing on Kohli’s (2004) insight that historical conditions have set the trajectory for state power for development in the developing world, I posit that liberal economic reforms have the opportunity to play the role of an animating set of ideas in sub-Saharan Africa more so than elsewhere in the developing world. Because African states were relatively powerless in the face of international organizations such as the IMF and World Bank, many of the opportunities to steer the economy towards developmental ends were only to be found in the institutions allowed under structural adjustment. Skillful states have been able to combine their developmental aspirations with such liberal economic bodies in a manner that was unintended by the international community. Overall, the findings of this paper suggest that the state in sub-Saharan Africa can effectively deliver on economic development, and even sustainable development, in a manner analogous to the developmental state though this may be restricted to certain sectors of the economy.

Second, the state may aspire to norms championed through liberal economic reforms because they are associated with more business-like, result-based management techniques but also serve as an animating set of ideas around which to base government policy. Certainly, improved performance and efficiency, purported goals of liberal economic reforms, would resonate with the state leadership in many countries. Managing by results produces information that the state can use to judge whether policy is effective or not. While it should not be assumed that economic policy in sub-Saharan Africa is only implemented based on economic grounds, neither should the economic development aspirations of state leaders be crudely dismissed as an objective beyond their grasp. Indeed, the analytical utility of neo-patrimonialism as an explanatory factor of political economy challenges in sub-Saharan Africa is increasingly being questioned (Mkandawire, 2001). To the extent that a commitment to liberal economic reforms helps state leaders provide direction to the bureaucracy, it may again play a more developmental role than commonly anticipated. However, as the case of Tanzania shows, if the state remains skeptical of market reforms, such the conditions for liberal developmentalism to arise do not present themselves.

Finally, my results also point to different ways in which land tenure and investment regimes in the two countries might be improved in order to promote sustainability. Tanzania’s land tenure system should be reformed in order to clarify the definition of General Land and compensation procedures for communal Village Land as well as to provide legal recourse for villagers should the project for which lands were acquired fail. In Uganda, the land tenure system would be improved by building greater flexibility into the state’s management of public lands, particularly given the country’s volatile history where encroachment was the norm. It would also be important for the government to be more transparent in the manner by which special exemptions are made towards foreign investment involving land. Weighing these reforms against one another, those in Tanzania appear more challenging as they require addressing fundamental economic and administrative arrangements between villagers and the state. Reforms suggested for

Uganda appear more superficial, and could be resolved by drawing on reforms undertaken in other areas of Uganda’s land tenure. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This research was supported with the generous support of Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) Postdoctoral Award; an International Development Research Centre (IDRC) Doctoral Research Award; Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) CGS Doctoral Scholarship; University of Toronto, Department of Political Science Student Award as well as support from Environment for Development-Tanzania. In Tanzania, fieldwork was assisted by Samwel Moses Ntapanta and Hamadiel Mgala. In Uganda, field assistance was provided by Maria Sarah Nadunga and Arinaitwe Euzobio. The author would like to thank the following for facilitating the research project: Razack Lokina at the University of Dar es Salaam (Department of Economics) and Mohammed Bukenya at Makerere University (Faculty of Forestry and Nature Conservation). Comments and discussion with colleagues at the LSE’s Department of International Development were invaluable as I revised previous versions of this manuscript. (Mushi, 1971) APPENDICES

Appendix A: Detailed Project Sustainability Evaluations

Strong & Weak Sustainability

Tanzania cookstove project

Implemented by a local NGO known as the Karatu Development Association (KDA), the Karatu Energy Efficient Stove Project aimed to disseminate and maintain 22,000 improved cookstoves amongst 50 villages in Karatu and Mbulu districts of northern Tanzania (KDA, 2008) (UNDP, 2008).19 KDA piloted the project in 2004 with a grant from a Danish NGO and had attracted assistance in 2008 from the UNDP’s Millennium Development Goals Carbon Facility for the expansion.20 The project was unique in three other respects. First it relied on a stove design that could be constructed and maintained locally yet was still highly thermally efficient. Second, the simplicity of its design which allowed it to be implemented by local women’s groups, facilitated stove adoption by working through appropriate gender channels. Third, after the first three years of the project, it anticipated distributing 70% of the surplus revenue generated from the sale of carbon credits (expected to be $0.6 million per year) amongst households involved; the remaining 30% would be invested in an energy fund under KDA.21

Results demonstrate that the cookstove project delivered considerable CNC benefits at the local level by reducing household consumption of firewood. An initial field survey undertaken by the NGO administering the project claimed an almost 70% reduction in fuelwood consumption (KDA, 2009). These results were largely verified during 2009 fieldwork which estimated that households in the project village consumed 6.6 kg/day in comparison to an average of 11.8 kg/day in the control village.22 The

19 NGO Officer, Karatu Town, Interview TD6, 3 April 2009. 20 NGO Officer, Karatu Town, Interview TD3, 4 April 2009. 21 NGO Officer, Karatu Town, Interview TD3, 4 April 2009. 22 Note that this is based on survey questions regarding weekly fuel consumption. For conversion, headloads were assumed to be 24 kg and sacks of charcoal 35 kg, as reported in KDA (2009). But Endabash’s average of 6.6 kg/day

subsidy made possible through the cookstove played a part in dissuading villagers from adopting charcoal stoves, which is usually the next stage in the “energy ladder” when households move away from basic firewood hearths (Kammen and Lew, 2005: 3). Of the households surveyed in 2009, nearly 60% already had stoves and approximately 20% said they were seeking to obtain one. Fueldwood is clearly a critical element of natural capital in Karatu district. During the German colonial period, the displacement of the Maasai and their cattle actually led to the re-establishment of miombo woodlands (Rohde and Hilhorst, 2001: 10; Snyder, 1996). But a tsetse scare prompted the British colonial authorities to clear the district of woodlands in 1940s-50s (Hocking et al., 1963; Hoppe, 2003). Various reports from Karatu dating from the 1970s (Thomas, 1977), 1980s (Helmfrid and Persson, 1987; Mwalyosi (1991) and Mwalyosi & Mohamed (1992) cited in Yanda and Madulu, 2005) and 1990s (Axelsson and Hagborg, 1994) attested to the fact that the fuelwood situation in the area was only getting worse. The Marang Forest Reserve itself saw 15–20% of its area degraded into wooded grassland and bushland (Meindertsman and Kessler, 1997 cited in Yanda & Madulu, 2005: 723).

The Tanzania cookstove project was clearly delivering MMC benefits at the local level. Of the households surveyed, nearly 60% already had adopted the improved stoves and approximately 20% said they were seeking to obtain one. While the popularity of the stoves in Endabash was due to the fuelwood reductions it led to, it was also linked to the price of stoves which was subsidized under the pilot project. The cost of the stoves was subsidized by nearly 60% under the pilot programme while under the full CDM project, costs would be almost fully covered.23 Those interviewed, largely women, claimed that the period of time a single headload of firewood would last was extended and they collected it less often which opened up more time and allowed some households to switch from collecting fuelwood to simply buying it.24 Significantly appeared to dissuade villagers from adopting charcoal stoves, which is usually the next stage in the “energy ladder” (Kammen and Lew, 2005: 3): Of the households surveyed in 2009, nearly 60% already had stoves and approximately 20% said they were seeking to obtain one—villagers in Endabash were actually demanding more stoves than the single workshop was able to provide.25 There was also a modest, local economic multiplier effect in the village as the cookstove project was effectively organized as small businesses to build and maintain the stoves: it employed 12 women technicians and hired six male labourers at the village to prepare materials at the workshop.26 The full project, which includes activities in Endabash and the ten other villages, is claimed to employ 30 people directly and indirectly provide part-time employment for 700 (KDA, 2008: 11).

While the project led to considerable CNC and MMC benefits at the local level, these benefits do not appear to have been recognized as critical for the central government. The reduction of fuelwood provides rather limited potential to leverage a “continuing effect” linking local economic benefits to national economic growth. Rather the Tanzanian central government has favoured modern energy practices. For example, although the 1992 National Energy Policy set the goal of arresting “woodfuel depletion by

represents households using improved cookstoves, traditional 3-stone hearths and charcoal. However, while the data are less robust due to the smaller sample size, a significant difference is maintained within Endabash data themselves: improved cookstove users consumed less than those using 3-stone hearths, 5.1 and 7.7 kg/day, respectively. 23 NGO Officer, Karatu Town, Interview TD3, 4 April 2009. 24 Villager, Endabash Village, Interview T40, 6 April 2009; Villager, Endabash Village, Interview T42, 8 April 2009; NGO Officer, Karatu Town, Interview TD3, 4 April 2009; Village Government Focus Group (T43), Bassodawish Village, 17 August 2009. 25 Village Government Focus Group (T43), Bassodawish Village, 17 August 2009; Village Government Focus Group (T7), Endabash Village, 9 April 2009. 26 Village Government Focus Group (T7), Endabash Village, 9 April 2009.

involving more appropriate land management practices and more efficient woodfuel technologies” (GoT, 1992: 5), the electricity and oil & gas sectors absorbed 95% of expenditures for the implementation of the 1992 policy (Mwandosya and Luhanga, 1993: 450). While the 2003 National Energy Policy (GoT, 2003a) also highlights biomass, its focus has been on new institutions for rural electricity generation (Lymio, 2007: 10). The only projects that the recently established Rural Energy Agency (REA) had been supporting were for rural electrification (REA, 2010). In 2009, a combined cookstove and tree-planting programme was being discussed by the district government, but the project lacked financing as budget support for forestry lagged behind expenditures for health, schools, roads and particulary water in the drought prone district.27 And while villagers can be accorded basic users rights to national forest reserves in Tanzania, there was no joint forest management agreements with Marang Forest Reserve. Thus, while highly meaningful at the local level, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the central government does not take the issue seriously. Current support for improved cookstoves comes mainly from donors and the NGO community (Sawe, 2009: 26). For example, one programme developed SADC and GTZ cites the government’s focus on rural electrification as a need for intervention (ProBEC, 2010). While the cookstove project was clearly transformative at the household level, the rather limited national development implications explain the lack of interest on the part of the national government and why most rural energy projects have focused instead on rural electrification.

Uganda afforestation project impact on RECPA

The Uganda afforestation project is actually comprised of five “small-scale” afforestation projects that together cover 2,015 ha of the approximately 6,000 ha available for tree-planting in Rwoho Central Forest Reserve (CFR) of southwestern Uganda (NFA, 2007a: 14-15). The first sections of the project to be implemented were in Ntungamo district, which was the focus of the fieldwork. The forest reserve has been the subject of a afforestation project known as the Uganda Nile Basin Reforestation Project implemented by National Forestry Authority (NFA) with financial and technical support from the World Bank.28

All project lands are under the authority of the Uganda’s National Forestry Authority (NFA); however, in order to engage local communities, an agreement was reached between the NFA and a local NGO—the Rwoho Environmental Conservation and Protection Association (RECPA). RECPA had been formed independently of the project in 1998, though formally gaining status in 2003 as a NGO, in order to plant trees around Rwoho village.29 Annual subscription is 5,000 Ush with a one-time initial fee of about 10,000 Ush which is used to maintain plantations on others’ land (Krishnan, 2010).30 In order to become a part of the project, members need to pay an additional 100,000 Ush for a share. So-called “small-scale” projects enjoy simplified accounting procedures though are also required to demonstrate that projects “are developed or implemented by low-income communities and individuals as determined by the host Party”

27 Karatu District Government Officer, Karatu Town, Interview TD5, 16 April 2009. 28 Note that though the project is actually described as a “reforestation” project, it is better designated as “afforestation”. While Rwoho is an even mix of Albizzia-Markhamia forest / Themeda-Chloris grass savannah (NFA, 2007a: 3-4), the planting sites were originally grassland as recently as the 1960s (CDM-PDD, 2009: 10). Some areas were subject to a limited tree-planting effort over 1964-1978 totaling 800 ha though again deforested due to disturbance or harvesting since at least 1990 (planting effort in Rwoho discussed in more detail below). This planting effort and designation of Rwoho as a CFR has compelled the project developers to designate the projects as reforestation, though afforestation of grassland would be more apt. 29 NGO Focus Group (U8), Rwoho, 19 May 2009. 30 NGO Focus Group (U8), Rwoho, 19 May 2009.

(UNFCCC, 2005: para 1(i)). About 10% of the project area was designated as community planting areas under a collaborative forest management (CFM) agreement, including limited use rights in a 200 meter buffer strip around Rwoho CFR (RECPA & NFA, 2006: 16). In 2007, NFA entered into a tree farming license with RECPA to plant 60 ha within the project area (NFA, 2007b). The goal has been to establish a 200 meter “community ring” as a buffer around Rwoho Central Forest Reserve.31

For the majority of RECPA’s membership, the afforestation project did not significantly affect local CNC in either a positive or negative way. While some have reported a membership of 270, a 2009 survey of RECPA found it to have 52 members in Rwoho and 12 in Kirungu who had planted a total of 160 ha and 11 ha over 1998-2009, respectively.32 For villages outside the central forest reserve, such as Rwoho village which hosted RECPA, the project did not affect agricultural or grazing land (Krishnan, 2010). Though the project has clearly compromised the grasslands that have been dominant in the forest reserve’s designated plantation sites, approximately twenty percent of the area will be planted with indigenous Maesopis (CDM-PDD, 2006d: 5). In terms of water quality, the National Forestry Authority has argued that the tree roots penetrate the soil and make it more porous for the absorption of rainwater (CDM-PDD, 2006d: 26).

The local MMC benefits appear significant for RECPA’s membership. In the community forest management area, members of RECPA are allocated special licenses for the commercial harvest of such resources including timber, charcoal/firewood and bee-keeping.33 Importantly, if the CDM project succeeds in attracting buyers for the carbon credits, RECPA shareholders would be entitled to carbon credits under the project which, along with forest harvesting, is expected to equal 150,000 Ush a year per ha (Krishnan, 2010). While carbon payments had not yet been delivered, the overall MMC impact resulting from RECPA’s membership appeared salutary.

Significantly, the Uganda afforestation project appeared to generate CNC and MMC benefits in the form of forest and timber products that were significant at the national level. Uganda’s current timber demand is met by timber plantations planted in the 1960s and 1970s which have almost all been exhausted (SPGS, 2007: 11). It has been estimated that at least 120,000 ha of plantation forest will be needed by 2020 (SPGS, 2011: 4), though only 52,000 ha of timber plantations have been planted in Uganda since 2004.34 In response to these scarcities, the government prioritized private and community forestry in the 2005 Poverty Eradication Action Plan and also advocated for linkages with the CDM (MoFPED, 2005: 77-78). More recently, and subsequent to the CDM projects investigated, Uganda’s 2010 National Development Plan (NDP) commits to restoring Uganda’s forest cover to 1990 levels, 4.9 million ha or 24% of the national territory, by 2015 (MoFPED, 2010: 95-96).

31 Community Forest Management Arrangement Agreement between the National Forestry Authority and Rwoho Environmental Conservation and Protection Association (February 9, 2007), Schedule: Establishment and Management of CFM Plantations by RECPA. 32 Based on survey undertaken by RECPA in 2009 for the author. 33 Community Forest Management Arrangement Agreement between the National Forestry Authority and Rwoho Environmental Conservation and Protection Association (February 9, 2007), Schedules: Timber Harvesting through Bee-Keeping. 34 Based on numbers presented in Kawooya (2011) & Tugumisirize (2011) and assuming that 80% of SPGS planting has taken place in CFRs, which was the case as recently as 2010 (Jacovelli, 2009: 121).

Tanzania afforestation project

The afforestation project is comprised of two afforestation carbon offset projects located in Mufindi and Kilombero districts operating under the CDM and associated with nearly 30,000 ha of land acquired from five villages (CDM-PDD 2007, 2008). Both afforestation projects have been implemented by Green Resources Limited (GRL), a Tanzanian subsidiary of a Norwegian forest company. The geography of the area is dominated by the Udzungwa escarpment. With its relatively humid conditions, the escarpment makes the area an attractive location for forestry and large-scale agriculture, in addition to subsistence farming. Unilever Tea Estates are located here, including a forest reserve for fuelling its operations, as well as a pyrethrum factory (Daley, 2005). There are also at least three other major forest reserves in the district, including the central government’s Sao Hill Plantations, a GRL timber mill as well as Mufindi Paper Mill—East Africa’s largest paper mill (Christiansson, 1985; GRAS, 2011; World Bank, 2003). The escarpment has also been tapped for its hydroelectric potential—completed in 2000, Kihansi dam provides 35% of Tanzania’s electricity (TANESCO, 2010).

The land acquisition process is important in the sustainability evaluation of this project. Village Council minutes in Mapanda and Idete indicate the villages agreed to transfers land to GRL, though perhaps unaware of the actual extent of lands being transferred; in both cases the initial request agreed to at the village level was reduced by the district government (see Purdon 2013: 1135-36). The EIA concluded that the project would “create employment to local community, generate revenue to the Government, contribute numerous socio-economic and environmental benefits as well as technology transfer to the country and the local community. The environmental benefits include conservation of biodiversity and ecological improvement through control of local microclimate and regulation of local hydrological processes in the project area” (CDM-PDD, 2007: 129-132). While a few individuals encountered in Mapanda and Idete questioned the land transfer on the grounds that it had not been sufficiently transparent,35 such disapproval appeared a minority. Most villagers indicated that they had the right to refuse the offer from GRL but chose not to.36 For example, at Idete’s village meeting it was stated “We could have said ‘No’. No one can restrict us from saying ‘No’ but we accepted because it is our land.”37

The afforestation projects in Tanzania had little effect, positive or negative, on local CNC of the villages of Mapanda and Idete. The main reason is that the planting sites for the afforestation project were unused village lands at considerable distance from the village. In the case of the afforestation projects, the lands acquired were not productive agricultural lands but mainly hilly Hyparrhenia grassland with a few scattered trees and shrubs (CDM-PDD, 2007a: 13-14; 2008: 8-9).38 Villagers interviewed supported this view. For example, one elder in Mapanda stated: “People were living there before but when the company came here, no people were living there. No one was displaced.”39 It would be noted that, in early 2009 tree-planting activities were taking place at least 15 km from the villages. Grazing did not appear to be significantly affected: livestock levels were low in Mapanda and its control village; while livestock levels

35 For example, one resident in Mapanda indicated that the Village Council set the terms of the agreement and that the arrangement was presented to the Village Assembly as if the deal were already concluded, with the result being that “The right to saying ‘No’ [was] not there” (Villager, Mapanda Village, Interview T2, 6 March 2009). 36 Village Focus Group (T1), Mapanda Village, 6 March 2009. 37 Villager, Idete Village, Interview T30, 10 March 2009 38 Hyparrhenia grasses are successful under conditions of low soil nutrient availability and are often associated with abandoned fields (Fynn et al., 2005). Hyparrhenia grasslands are also characterized by the regular occurrence of fire without which grasslands tend to become taken over by trees (Garnier and Dajoz, 2001). 39 Villager, Mapanda Village, Interview T20, 5 March 2009.

were relatively higher in Idete, they were significantly less than in the control village (Table A3). While there are legitimate concerns about timber plantations compromising ecosystem services, particularly water (Silveira and Alonso, 2009) (Scott and Lesch, 1997), villagers did not raise such issues. Notably, the afforestation projects have implemented a monitoring programme for water balance and water yield in the project areas (CDM-PDD, 2007a: 81; 2008: 65). But the pine (and some Eucalyptus) monoculture afforestation projects clearly compromised biodiversity--though some of the original grassland ecosystem is protected along with riverine areas (CDM-PDD, 2007a: 76-78; 2008: 62-64). However, while biodiversity is a global concern it did not appear linked to local CNC in this specific circumstance. It is also worth noting that government-owned Sao Hill Plantation in Mufindi district is also comprised of exotic tree species while villagers, especially in Mapanda and Luhunga, were found to dedicate between a significant share of their households land to pine too (Table A1).

The afforestation project clearly delivered MMC at the local level, even displacing agriculture production to a significant degree as a primary economic activity amongst villagers (Figure A1(a)). Most villagers were highly favourable towards the afforestation projects in Mapanda and Idete, especially in terms of employment and income.40 Nonetheless, villagers expressed three principle grievances about the performance of GRL: low wages, delays in providing agreed social services, communication and distance to the planting sites (Purdon 2013: 1141-42). However, GRL had begun to address these concerns, particularly social services. In late 2008, GRL had entered into formal contracts with Mapanda and Idete whereby it agreed to grant 10% of gross carbon revenues towards a list of prioritized development projects identified by the village. Subsequent to its land deal with GRL, in 2006 Mapanda transferred an additional 1,700 ha to Highland. While Higland offered better wages, villagers preferred GRL because of the provision of social services.41 Compensation for lands acquired was very modest. In some of the most significant legal reforms under the 1999 Land Acts, villagers are now entitled to “full, fair and prompt compensation” for lands transfer to foreign investors (Land Act s.1(1)g and Village Land Act s.3(1)(h)). My research has shown that compensation was provided to only a limited number of individuals (19 in Mapanda and 9 in Idete) who had made permanent investments in land such as farms, tree planting or clay pits and not other unused village lands. In total, $13,000 in compensation was paid for 681 ha to 28 individuals while I estimate that total land acquisition from these two villages at 16,315 ha and a local market value of $100,400 to $225,900 (Purdon 2013: 1143-45). There has been some confusion about land compensation because of differences between the Village Land Act and Land Act;42 however, Section 181 of the Land Act states that it prevails in case of conflict, which is consistent with research findings. Nonetheless, because most of the land was not actively being used, the local MMC benefits appear to have outweighed the low level of compensation villagers received.

40 Village Focus Group (T1), Mapanda Village, 6 March 2009 and Village Focus Group (T4), Idete Village, 12 March 2009. In addition, one businessman claimed that in 2003 there was only one retail shop in Mapanda and that by 2009 there were several. Other improvements associated with the projects were daily bus service connecting Mapanda to the district capital and better roads (Ibid.). In Idete, respondents indicated that they were expanding their agricultural lands in order to sell surplus crops to employees working on the projects (Villager, Idete Village, Interview T31, 10 March 2009 and Villager, Idete Village, Interview T34, 12 March 2009). 41 Villager, Mapanda Village, Interview T23, 6 March 2009. 42 The problem revolves around the definition of “General Land”. The Land Act defines General Land as “all public land which is not reserved land or village land and includes unoccupied or unused village land” (s.2). However, much of the public and media appear to subscribe to the interpretation in the Village Land Act as “all public land which is not reserved or village land” and expect compensation for all Village Land. For example, a recent publication on the Sun Biofuel paper writes “According to the Village Act of 1999, every piece of land has a value and without proper valuation, rights cannot be transferred” Habib-Mintz N (2010) Biofuel investment in Tanzania: omissions in implementation. Energy Policy 38:3985-3997..

While the projects did lead to significant timber resources, my review of Tanzanian forest policy suggests that tree-planting is not viewed as national CNC or considered a priority area for generating economic growth or other MMC benefits. Rather, timber processing and mills are more important for the forest sector given current timber stands.The forest sector has not one of the “lead” sectors identified for public investment under the 2005 National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (VPO, 2005: Annex 1, page 3). Industrial forests were stimated at approximately 135,000 ha in 2003 (World Bank, 2003: 3) and likely stands at 165,000 ha today. Approximately 80,000 ha is government owned—the most significant being the 41,600 ha of Sao Hill plantations in Mufindi district (Ibid.). The vast extent of government plantations allows the national government a monopoly on (legitimate) forest products and the power to set prices. Royalty fees and other permits are set out in “Schedule 14”of the official regulations of the 2004 Forest Regulations, which can only be changed through an act of Parliament (Milledge et al., 2007: 244-245). Writing about the government owned Sao Hill Plantations, the World Bank (2003) found that “there is a considerable surplus of sawlogs…over-aged plantations have reached 3,300 ha [approximately 8% of the plantation]” (p.74). This situation began to change in 2003 when Green Resources Ltd., a subsidiary of a Norwegian company, acquired and reopened the Sao Hill sawmill (GRL, 2011: 5). Similarly, the Mufindi Paper Mill was privatized and sold in 2004 to the Rai Group Ltd of Kenya, resuming operation in 2005 (Kulekana, 2008).43 Consequently, wood processing capacity in Tanzania has been on the rise since the mid-2000s, though this is not yet well captured in official statistics.

Uganda Plan Vivo reforestation project

The Plan Vivo reforestation project in Uganda seeks to encourage the planting of indigenous tree species on the lands of individual smallholder farmers. It is not a CDM project, but generates carbon credits for sale on the voluntary carbon markets under the Plan Vivo standard. The specific project investigated in Uganda is known as the Trees for Global Benefits: A Cooperative Community Land-Use Carbon Offset Project, Uganda, is being implemented by an Ugandan NGO known as the Environmental Conservation Trust of Uganda (EcoTrust). The Plan Vivo project was initiated in 2003 in Bitereko sub-county of Bushenyi district of southwestern Uganda with a local group known as the Bitereko Women’s Group serving as local coordinator. The project has since expanded to include a total of 1,210 ha involving 909 participants representing 250,000 trees (EcoTrust, 2011).

At the local level, the CNC benefits of the project were modest. The project delivered non-monetary benefits such as fuelwood (often obtained by pruning branches), control of erosion and shade. Grazing was permitted underneath the canopy and a number of respondents also cultivated crops there such as coffee, cassava and even sugarcane.44 The planting of indigenous species is arguably another sustainable development impact of the project. Ironically, the planting of indigenous species contributed to smallholders’ concerns about tenure security because such species are mostly planted in protected areas which implied that Plan Vivo trees indicated government land.45

However, the local MMC benefits of the project were considerable. Plan Vivo claimed to deliver approximately $761 USD per hectare in carbon payments over the course of a ten year financing period, with $532 USD delivered in the first three years (EcoTrust, 2011: 17, 31). This was largely confirmed

43 As of 2008, the mill was producing nearly 40,000 tonnes of paper annually, with plans to reach a maximum capacity of 130,000 tonnes. 44 Villager, Bitereko Subcounty, Interview U19, 27 May 2009; Villager (U20), Bitereko Subcounty, Interview U20, 27 May 2009. 45 NGO Officer, Bitereko Subcounty, Interview UD13, 26 May 2009.

through field surveys, where I estimated a total of $852 was delivered per hectare over ten years.46 Carbon payments to Plan Vivo participants have historically ranged from $3-6 per tCO2e (EcoTrust, 2008: Table 4; 2011: 17, 31).47 However, price did not appear to be a point of contention locally: “We couldn’t bargain for things we didn’t know” one farmer explained.48 Carbon payments only last until the tenth year, after which landholders remain contractually bound to maintain the trees until 20 years of age. After this, trees are expected to be selectively harvested between their 20th and 40th year. All told, Plan Vivo trees are expected to generate $7,750 per ha in revenues for landowners (Plan Vivo, No Date: Table 3). These figures are questionable, however. Some explained that indigenous species such as Maesopis was vulnerable to termites, which restricted its use to internal use, such as in furniture.49

These local MMC benefits largely benefitted smallholders with higher incomes and larger landholdings (Table A3)—a finding that corresponds with other studies (Carter, 2009: 22-23). Field surveys also indicated that Plan Vivo households had planted an average of 0.94 ha of indigenous species while also planting 0.50 ha of Eucalyptus (itself ineligible under the Plan Vivo standard) while the control group had planted no indigenous trees and had planted Eucalyptus at an average of only 0.19 ha. One reason for the skewed distribution of Plan Vivo land holdings is that any participant in the program needed a minimum of 1 ha to participate.50 To address concerns that only project participants are benefiting, the project has developed a special Community Development Fund, representing 10% of sales of carbon credits, in order to promote initiatives that are for the benefit of the “general community” (Plan Vivo-PDD, 2009).

However, the Plan Vivo reforestation project does not appear to be generating much in the way of CNC nor MMC benefits at the national level. Plan Vivo argues that the use of indigenous species minimizes the risk of natural disturbances and pest outbreaks (Plan Vivo-PDD, 2009). But given the fragmented and small-scale nature of the project, I did not consider the project contributing to national CNC. In terms of national MMC contributions, because of its reliance on low-utility Maesopis and the rather small-scale nature of the project, the project does not lend itself to industrial forestry and the significant timber shortages facing Uganda. This stands in contrast to the Sawlog Production Grant Scheme (SPGS), a successful public-private partnership funded by the EU to spur tree-planting and plantation establishment amongst private landholders. The disadvantage of SPGS is that it only works with landholders possessing a minimum of 25 ha of land (Jacovelli, 2009: 121), which would render ineligible all participants in the Plan Vivo project. As for fuelwood issues, smallholders in Bitereko sub-county relied more on Eucalyptus than Maesopis. Indeed, there has been a history of the Bitereko Women’s Group promoting Eucalyptus as part of renewable energy projects in the sub-county.51

46 Villager, Bitereko Subcounty, Interview U20, 27 May 2009. 47 It is estimated that indigenous tree species such as Maesopis sp. will sequester a total of 458 tCO2 per ha over a 20 year period (Plan Vivo, No Date -b). In order to be conservative, however, Plan Vivo sells only under half of the carbon sequestered over this twenty year period, 203 tCO2 per ha (EcoTrust, 2011: 31). 48 Villager, Bitereko Subcounty, Interview U16, 27 May 2009. 49 NGO Officer, Bitereko Subcounty, Interview UD13, 26 May 2009. 50 NGO Officer, Bitereko Subcounty, Interview UD13, 26 May 2009. 51 NGO Officer, Bitereko Subcounty, Interview UD13, 26 May 2009.

Weak Sustainability but Violation of Strong Sustainability

Uganda cogeneration project

The Kakira Sugar Works Ltd. (KSW) Cogeneration Project (CDM-PDD, 2007b) sought to expand bagasse cogeneration capacity at its mill, located in Jinja district, the surplus electricity from which has been exported to Uganda’s national grid. To increase cane supply, KSW has instead come to rely on local smallholder farmers as sugarcane outgrowers. The contribution of outgrowers has increased from 3216 ha in 1995, 10436 ha in 2006 (KSW, 2006) and reaching approximately 15360 ha by 2009.52 In order to secure sugarcane supply, KSW enters into a contract with individual outgrowers to supply cane to KSW and to ensure food security.53 Despite a lack of formal government land title, all outgrowers are registered with KSW in a computer database.54 Significantly, these contracts appeared enforceable: KSW had reportedly already taken 30 farmers to court for breach of contract.55 This is important as it indicates a certain degree of tenure security of household lands: KSW has had to contract with smallholder farmers in order to expand sugar production and has not been able to acquire additional lands directly.

I considered the sustainability impact of the Uganda cogeneration project by investigating the village of Kagogwa, on the perimeter of KSW’s estate. It is likely that the expansion of sugarcane production in the context of the bagasse cogeneration project was linked to food insecurity and land scarcity observed in Kagogwa village. Yet the project was also delivering significant MMC benefits at the local level, though it is unclear if this is capable for compensating for increasing land scarcity. Unfortunately, a lack of control village means that it is not possible to determine whether the observable land scarcity (and thus food scarcity) was due to expansion of Kakira Sugar Works (KSW) sugarcane estate or because of population growth. Nonetheless, the rather important MMC benefits which accrue to those able to participate directly and indirectly in the sugarcane expansion, suggest that it would have had a weakly sustainable effect if higher resolution cost-benefit analysis had been feasible. Considering elements of natural capital critical at the national level, the effect of the project was ambiguous because it had negative and positive effects on different elements of natural capital—sugar production and forests. But in terms of MMC, the project was clearly important, playing a key part of Uganda’s efforts to promote a sugar industry and reduce imports.

Food security was clearly an issue in Kagogwa. The majority of respondents reported they were food insecure, including three of the five household growing sugarcane (Table A4). Crop productivity in Kagogwa was not particularly different from other regions, particularly maize—the staple crop in the area—suggesting food insecurity was due to land shortages (Table A2). A local leader explained that farmers were unaware of fertilizer’s benefits,56 which was confirmed during household surveys (Table A2). Nor was there mention of smallholders irrigating their fields, though it was common knowledge that KSW used this for their sugarcane (also see World Bank, 1996: 3). Kagogwa villagers also possessed

52 Business Manager, Kakira District, Interview UD4, 9 June 2009. 53 Business Manager, Kakira District, Interview UD4, 9 June 2009; Small Business Owner, Kakira District, Interview UD16, 8 June 2009. 54 Village Focus Group (U26), Kagogwa Village, 11 June 2009 55 Village Focus Group (U26), Kagogwa Village, 11 June 2009; NGO Officer, Kakira District, Interview UD3, 10 June 2009. 56 Local Government Focus Group (U25), Kagogwa Village, 11 June 2009.

amongst the smallest household landholdings of any of the villages surveyed in Uganda (at an average of 0.6 ha) and had the highest degree of land tenancy of any village in Uganda investigated (Table A1). Nearly half of the households surveyed in Kagogwa were tenants: tenants who were found to have, on average, smaller landholdings than landowners (0.3 to 1.0 ha, respectively). This suggests that landlords have dedicated the majority of land to sugarcane production. Yet tenants were typically unable to engage in the sugarcane economy because KSW required them to possess 1 ha of land in order to participate in the outgrower scheme (KSW, 2006).

The risk of food security amongst villagers was to be regulated by KSW. After receiving an application for assistance from KSW, a supervisor would visit and make a sketch of the owner’s land and note the amount of land set aside for food.57 In addition to screening for a total of 1 ha, KSW would want to ensure that a minimum of 0.4-0.8 ha was set aside for food security.58 As was explained by the chairperson of the BSGA, “[KSW doesn’t] give you aid unless you have the space for food. If you don’t spare your land for food, they’ll not plant for you sugarcane.”59 In Kagogwa, the system appeared to be working relatively well: of the households surveyed, only two of the five growing sugarcane held less than 1 ha of land. Almost all of households planting sugarcane owned land; only one rented. There are reportedly some who plant sugarcane on their land after Kakira’s inspectors have completed their report.60 But as one resident observed, there was a potential conflict of interest: “The concern of Kakira is measuring that land that you have for sugarcane. They are not concerned about how much land you have for food.”61

Some Kagogwa residents maintained that food insecurity in the village was due to drought. This explanation is questionable because climatic conditions were relatively favourable across southern Uganda during the period when Kagogwa was investigated in May 2009 (FEWS NET, 2009e; f). Maize productivity was also relatively high, at 1018 kg/ha, in comparison to villages visited in Tanzania at approximately the same time (all other villages investigated in Uganda grew banana). See Table A2. But pressure may have played a role. Kagogwa was also only 11 km away from Jinja, the second largest city in Uganda. Jinja district also has amongst the highest population densities of any of the three districts investigated. Indeed, satellite imagery of KSW estate shows it surrounded on all sides by agricultural lands.Comparison with an appropriate control village, at least another village located further away from the city of Jinja to reduce the effect of population, would shed light on these causal processes. Because my investigation of the Uganda cogeneration project lacked an appropriate control village, I find it difficult to conclude whether land scarcity was due to the expansion of KSW sugar outcropping or to population growth.

The project was clearly delivering MMC benefits for those local landholders who possessed enough land to become sugarcane outgrowers. One hectare can produce 124 tonnes sugarcane over an 18 month period which leads to net profits of 2.5 million Ush.62 By way of comparison, maize was reported to generate 0.45-1.0 million USh per hectare. Furthermore, KSW was a ready and secure market which paid farmers

57 NGO Officer, Kakira District, Interview UD3, 10 June 2009. 58 NGO Officer, Kakira District, Interview UD3, 10 June 2009. 59 NGO Officer, Kakira District, Interview UD3, 10 June 2009. 60 Local Government Focus Group (U25), Kagogwa Village, 11 June 2009. 61 Local Government Focus Group (U25), Kagogwa Village, 11 June 2009. 62 A more fertile plot could produce 160 tonnes per hectare (Small Business Owner, Kakira District, Interview UD16, 8 June 2009).

within three days of receipt and accepted sugarcane nearly any time of year.63 A third-party evaluation concluded that “the standards of living of the people living in the surrounding areas engaged in cane supply to the factor[y] is above the average [of the] rural population in the country (DNV, 2008). At the same time, some outgrowers interviewed voiced displeasure with KSW, citing serious delays in payment, delivery of inputs and cutting permits and dependency on KSW for inputs, particularly seed cane.64

However, only five households were growing sugarcane in Kagogwa. The infrequency of sugarcane production was mostly due to a minimum household land size of one hectare required by KSW, which most owners and tenants alike were unable to meet. There were also a number of local entrepreneurs who rented land from a large number of landholders in order to sell cane to KSW.65 The sugar industry has also clearly had important multiplier effects in the local economy such as the provision of electricity (which was on its way in Kagogwa) and higher non-farm employment. Overall, a significant portion of the local population in Kagogwa directly or indirectly benefits from KSW in terms of MMC benefits. Otherwise, it was estimated that another 50 Kagogwa residents were working for KSW indirectly as cane cutters, drivers, porters and other forms of casual labour.66 This was observed in household surveys, where nearly 25% of respondents were working for KSW and thus, by extension, the project (Figure A1(f)).

Were these MMC benefits enough to offset increased land scarcity and rising local food prices? Kagogwa had the highest monthly expenditures of any village investigated in Uganda, dedicating over fifty percent to the purchase of food; however, annual incomes were amongst the lowest measured (Table A3). This suggests that Kagogwa villagers were relatively more reliant on exchange and less able to provide for themselves with available lands than amongst other villages investigated in Uganda. But food commodity prices were rising: the price of maize flour had risen from 500 per kg in 2007, 800 Ush per kg in 2008 and was currently 1400 Ush in 2009.67 There was concern amongst Kagogwa residents that the price of maize had already surpassed that of sugarcane.68 However, villagers assumed that KSW would raise the price of sugarcane in order to offset rising maize prices and ensure its cane supply.69

The primary determining factor of sugarcane’s contribution to farmers’ livelihoods was the price of cane, which has come to be negotiated on an annual basis between KSW and the Busoga Sugarcane Growers Association (BSGA). BSGA itself was established in 1993 “to unite all the farmers” in order to negotiate with KSW and is open to anyone registered with KSW.70 The board of the BSGA meets every two months with KSW management and every three months with delegates from the sixteen sub-counties of Jinja district.71 During the annual general assembly, KSW and BSGA finalize sugarcane pricing. The

63 NGO Officer, Kakira District, Interview UD3, 10 June 2009; Business Manager, Kakira District, Interview UD4, 9 June 2009. 64 Villager, Kakira District, Interview UD2, 10 June 2009. 65 Small Business Owner, Kakira District, Interview UD16, 8 June 2009. 66 Local Government Focus Group (U25), Kagogwa Village, 11 June 2009. 67 Local Government Focus Group (U25), Kagogwa Village, 11 June 2009; Village Focus Group (U26), Kagogwa Village, 11 June 2009. 68 Village Focus Group (U26), Kagogwa Village, 11 June 2009. 69 Village Focus Group (U26), Kagogwa Village, 11 June 2009. 70 Small Business Owner, Kakira District, Interview UD16, 8 June 2009. 71 NGO Officer, Kakira District, Interview UD3, 10 June 2009.

price was comprised of two components: an interim price representing 90% of the payment plus arrears, calculated as 35% percent of KSW’s profits after the close of the financial year. The interim price has risen from 24,000 Ush per tonne sugarcane in 1995 to 38,000 Ush in 2008 and 40,000 per tonne in 2009 (KSW, 2009).72 BSGA may have an upper hand in more recent negotiations. KSW appears considered of losing its farmers to competitor. It actually sought government intervention to prevent the new entrant from establishing the Mayuge Sugar Works in the area (Mugabi, 2011) which, KSW argues, is in contravention of the 2010 Sugar Policy (New Vision, 2011; Ogwang, 2011). KSW and the BSGA have jointly established a local development assistance organization: Kakira Outgrowers for Rural Development (KORD). KORD promotes development projects in the area focusing on roads, schools and education. It is funded jointly by BSGA and KSW with 250 Ush and 125 Ush taken from each tonne of sugarcane supplied by outgrowers and Kakira’s estates, respectively.73 KORD received a contribution of 350-425 million Ush in 2009 for local rural development projects. Casual labourers such as cane cutters and drivers are, however, not part of the BSGA.74

Finally, the sustainability of the Uganda cogeneration project is uncertain because both forests and sugarcane represent elements of CNC. Forest resources in Uganda, as suggested above, are considered an element of national CNC. Furthermore, the threat of further forest loss in southern Uganda has been at the heart of numerous recent controversies involving the expansion of sugarcane and palm oil production independently of the CDM—with Mabira central forest reserve being perhaps the most well-known recent example of such a controversy (Child, 2009). The expansion of the KSW’s sugarcane estate since the 1930s has clearly come at the expense of local forests and wetlands (see KSW, 2010). But Uganda also posts a sugar deficit that requires the importation of sugar (USCTA, 2010) which, from the government’s perspective, would also constitute national CNC. The country has been faced with sugar shortages and price spikes (Busharizi, 2011; Mukasa, 2011). What is clear is that the project delivered significant MMC benefits for Uganda’s national economy. These include greater sugar production, reduced sugar prices and increased electricity provision. Increasing rural electrification is a high priority for the government and is mentioned in the 2005 Poverty Eradication Action Plan and received special attention through a Rural Electrification Strategy and Plan 2001-2010 which established the Rural Electrification Agency (REA) and a rural electrification target of 10% by 2010.

72 It was reported that most farmers wanted a price of 45,000 per tonne, but KSW warned that too large a price rise would only trigger demand for higher prices from other labourers in the sugarcane supply chain (Small Business Owner, Kakira District, Interview UD16, 8 June 2009). With competition for sugarcane likely to increase in the region with arrival of Alam Group’s sugar mill in adjacent Mayuge district, there was an expectation amongst BSGA that sugarcane prices would continue to rise (NGO Officer, Kakira District, Interview UD3, 10 June 2009). The arrears price for 2008 was 3,681 Ush, making the final price for sugarcane 41,981 Ush per tonne minus contributions to KORD and BSGA (KSW, 2009). Significantly, BSGA had successfully negotiated to see the arrears price raised to 40% of KSW profits (NGO Officer, Kakira District, Interview UD3, 10 June 2009). 73 NGO Officer, Kakira District, Interview UD3, 10 June 2009; Business Manager, Kakira District, Interview UD4, 9 June 2009. 74 Small Business Owner, Kakira District, Interview UD16, 8 June 2009.

Violation of Strong and Weak Sustainability

Uganda afforestation in Kirungu

The sustainable development impact of the Uganda afforestation project in Rwoho Central Forest Reserve was investigated through comparison of Kirungu village, located adjacent to the forest reserve, with a control village located approximately 10 kilometers away and quite apart from the Reserve. My results indicate that the conditions both of strong sustainability and weak sustainability were violated in the case of Kirungu village, which contrasts to the project’s impact on members of RECPA, discussed above.

The village had been established on the border of Rwoho Central Forest Reserve at least since 1953, about the same time the Reserve itself was established (UFRIC, 1999), and had slowly encroached on Reserve land. From various interviews, I estimate that Kirungu lost approximately 300 ha of Reserve land that villagers had been using for generations for agricultural and grazing. This land clearly represented local CNC. Food security in Kirungu was critical at the time of the 2009 fieldwork—with nearly all households reporting food insecurity (Table A4). In contrast to its control village of Rwerazi, which was located well away from the Reserve, land holdings in Kirungu were smaller yet more land was left fallow and agricultural productivity was lower (Tables A1 and A2). Loss of access to CFR lands was directly linked by many Kirungu residents to food shortages they endured.75 For example, one resident explained “We used to grow crops in the forest and had enough food. But since [NFA] started, when they chased us from the forest, there has been a serious shortage of food.”76 Agricultural productivity was also lower in Kirungu.

Food insecurity was compounded by the Kirungu’s isolation from both traders and essential services. Located on a hilltop adjacent to the Rwoho CFR, access had been restricted until recently when the NFA was able to improve roads.77 Consequently, agricultural extension services have been slow to reach Kirungu and it depends on Rwoho village for medical services,78 approximately 5 km by foot. Notably the NAADS agriculture extension programme had only been heard about in Kirungu,79 but was present, though only very new, in Rwerazi.80 In part due to its greater proximity to local markets, the control village of Rwerazi was able to organize itself into a cooperative and sell more of its produce and gain a higher price.81 Climatic factors can also be ruled out: in southern Uganda climate conditions had generally been favourable during 2008-2009 (FEWS NET, 2009e; f).

There were a number of local MMC benefits of the project. A number of residents recognized the economic benefits of employment and other economic opportunities brought on by the project such as roads and future timber harvesting.82 First, road improvement by NFA made Kirungu more accessible to traders. Currently, Kirungu households sold significantly less of their banana production than in the

75 Villager, Kirungu Village, Interview U4, 21 May 2009; Villager, Kirungu Village, Interview U9, 20 May 2009. 76 Villager, Kirungu Village, Interview U9, 20 May 2009. 77 Village Government Officer, Kirungu Village, Interview U1, 22 May 2009; Villager, Kirungu Village, Interview U6, 20 May 2009. 78 Village Focus Group (U10), Kirungu village, 19 May 2009. 79 Village Focus Group (U10), Kirungu village, 19 May 2009. 80 Village Focus Group (U11), Rwerazi village, 23 May 2009. 81 Village Focus Group (U11), Rwerazi, 23 May 2009. 82 Village Government Officer (U1), Kirungu Village, Interview U1, 22 May 2009; Villager, Kirungu Village, Interview U5, 21 May 2009; Villager, Kirungu Village, Interview U7, 20 May 2009.

control village, 27% versus 71%. More significantly, second, was employment as labourers in the afforestation project, which represented the second most important economic activity after agriculture (Figure 1A(d)). Approximately 100 jobs in Kirungu had been created in the village through plantation activities.83 A day’s wage (for a work shift from 6am to 11am) was 1,500 Ush per day or 45,000 Ush ($22 USD) per month. But in contrast to afforestation projects in Tanzania, employment with the afforestation project in Kirungu has not supplanted agriculture as a primary occupation amongst residents. Finally, direct economic benefits of the project through RECPA were limited. Participation RECPA’s carbon group appeared to be beyond the reach of most Kirungu residents; in 2009, only 12 members from Kirungu had been involved.84

While the exact number is unclear, between 10-100 households had no choice but to leave the village because of lack of access to land.85 Many Kirungu residents also had to sell off their livestock when the afforestation project was implemented, as the NFA began impounding livestock caught grazing;86 illegal grazing is estimated to have affected 50% Rwoho CFR (RECPA & NFA, 2006: 10). The collection of fodder in the CFR is permitted and NFA has secured access for watering animals (RECPA & NFA, 2006).87 As the government has operated on the basis that Kirungu residents had been illegally encroaching on the forest reserve, no compensation was awarded to Kirungu residents for loss of land nor for livestock impounded. This did not happen immediately; NFA made at least three visits to sensitize villagers before enforcing the reserve’s boundaries.88 As a resident of nearby Rwoho village explained, “In the beginning it was almost total war. In fact, some of the seedlings were uprooted.”89 Yet for many Kirungu residents interviewed, the costs of losing land outweighed benefits of the afforestation project: “We lost a lot. We can’t compare to what we [were] getting [before].”90

An argument could be made that Kirungu was in adverse possession of lands villagers had come to occupy in Rwoho Central Forest Reserve (see Mugyeni et al., 2005). Villagers in Kirungu knew they were encroaching on the forest reserve: “Before the project began, so many people were knowing the boundary… They knew because [the boundary] was ever there. It was ever there for so long.” 91 The initial gazettement of the Bugamba and Rwoho Forest Reserves was undertaken in 1939 and extended over an area of 26,400 ha area, though subsequently reduced to their present size (RECPA & NFA, 2006: 9; Uganda Forest Department, 1984: 2). It is uncertain how well boundaries had been enforced in the early years of Rwoho CFR. The earliest planting records are in Bugamba CFR, to the north, from the mid- 1950s, with Rwoho CFR only being planted in the 1960s (Uganda Forest Department, 1984). It seems reasonable to conclude that until the afforestation project’s establishment, the boundaries of the rather remote Rwoho CFR had not been well-enforced.92 If accommodation for villagers could be made, either

83 Village Focus Group (U10), Kirungu, 19 May 2009. 84 Based on survey undertaken by RECPA in 2009 for the author. 85 Village Government Officer (U1), Kirungu Village, Interview, 22 May 2009; Villager, Kirungu Village, Interview U6, 20 May 2009. 86 Village Focus Group (U10), Kirungu, 19 May 2009; NGO Focus Group (U8), RECPA, 19 May 2009; Villagers, Kirungu Village, Interview U7, U8 and U9, 20 May 2009. 87 Village Focus Group (U10), Kirungu, 19 May 2009 88 Villager, Kirungu Village, Interview U6, 20 May 2009. 89 NGO Focus Group (U8), Rwoho Village, 19 May 2009 90 Villager, Kirungu Village, Interview U4, 21 May 2009. 91 Villager, Kirungu Village, Interview U6, 20 May 2009. 92 The project is not the first tree-planting effort in Kirungu, with a number of residents mentioning the “Peri-Urban Project” (Village Government Officer, Kirungu Village, Interview U1, 22 May 2009), a reference to one component of a World Bank Forestry Rehabilitation Project during the 1980s which sought to recruit local peoples for tree-

by granting them forest reserve land or compensating them with land in the vicinity, the sustainable development impact of the forestry project could be redeemed.

At the national level, the project clearly delivered not insignificant national MMC benefits, as discussed regarding the project’s impact on RECPA. In terms of national CNC benefits, because of our commitment to Pareto efficiency at the local level, these benefits cannot outweigh local CNC losses. Consequently, I concluded that the Uganda afforestation project has led to a violation of strong sustainability but not weak sustainability at the national level.

Tanzania biofuel project

The Tanzania biofuel project was located in Kisarawe district where, apart from subsistence agriculture, the economy had previously been based on the export of cashews (Jaffee, 1994). As cashew production has declined (Mitchell, 2004), cassava production for export has increased and Kisarawe district is now the leading producer in Tanzania (GoT, 2007: 18). The district is also renowned for its coastal rainforests, home to high biodiversity and endemic flora and fauna and three forest reserves: Pugu, Kazimzumbwi and Ruvu South (Burgess et al., 1998). There have been frequent efforts to conserve forests in the area, including an extensive international NGO effort to engage local villages in Joint Forest Management, JFM (Kaale and Mwakifwamba, 2006). Forests in the area are especially threatened by the charcoal trade. The control village Maguruwe lost the vast majority of the Kazimzumbwi Forest Reserve in the midst of implementing JFM during the 2000s (Kaale and Mwakifwamba, 2006: 19; van Beukeringa et al., 2007: 12). Similar problems have been reported for Ruvu South Forest Reserve, adjacent to Mtamba, where the situation has verged on the edge of violence as armed charcoal traders threatened villagers and government forest guards alike (Kaale and Mwakifwamba, 2006: 19).

The case of the Tanzania biofuel project in the case of Mtamba village also appeared to have violated the conditions of strong sustainability—though not for reasons related to food security—but had led to even more serious violations of weak sustainability as the biofuel project was suspended because of financial difficulties. However, the biofuel project has faced significant difficulties since 2009 fieldwork. Financing problems and drought in 2011 have forced Sun Biofuels to suspend operations and lay off 300- 600 workers (Lane, 2011; Simbeye, 2011), though under new ownership the plantation may continue (Carrington et al., 2011).As for the Tanzania, afforestation project, the land acquisition process is important in the sustainability evaluation of this project. Sun Biofuels is reported to have initially sought in 2006 between 18,000-50,000 ha from a number of villages but only managed to acquire 8,211 ha (Cleaver et al., 2010: 39; Sulle and Nelson, 2009: 16). Initial meetings with villagers also involved the Member of Parliament (MP) for Kisarawe District (Habib-Mintz, 2010: 8; Isaksson and Sigte, 2010), which raises concerns about political pressure to transfer land. In the case of Mtamba, its invitation to the initial meeting above arrived late (Oxfam, 2008: 22). A subsequent meeting was held 23 August 2006 between Mtamba and Sun Biofuels, also presided by the MP.93 It is not clear from the minutes of this meeting that villagers knew the amount of land that they were asked to transfer, though villagers sought to ensure employment and timely project information were part of the deal. Given the MP’s presence during meetings, some Mtamba residents indicated that the village had been “like forced” to accept the agreement and that the project “was not explained.”94 Another view however is that the presence of the

planting (World Bank, 1996a). However, there is little mention of this older World Bank project in any of the project documents, suggesting it had been rather ineffective. 93 A copy of the 23 August 2006 village meeting minutes were obtained by the author and translated. 94 Village Government Focus Group (T8), Mtamba Village, 30 April 2009.

MP legitimized the land acquisition: “As a MP, they are assumed to be working for public good…So if they say something, everybody says, ‘Ok, it's good. We cannot object.’ And that's what happened.”95

The food security situation observed during fieldwork was largely unrelated to land acquisitions but rather was due to local climate and the availability of rains. Evidence of this is provided by the comparative methods used: the food security situation was similar in Mtamba and its control village (Table A4). The majority of villagers in both Mtamba and its control Maguruwe reported that they faced food insecurity at some point in the 2008-2009 agricultural season. Maize crops in particular had suffered, reflected in low maize yields of 645 and 438 kg/ha in Mtamba and the control village, respectively (Table A2). This was largely due to a particularly bad drought in the area over 2008-2009 (FEWS NET, 2009a; d). Cassava yields in both the project village and its control were relatively high, but again without any significant difference between villages (Table A2). Indeed, in Mtamba surplus cassava was being sold on the market, and many villagers described their harvest in terms of lorry loads. As a tuber, cassava is often suggested as a security food because of its capacity to remain in the soil until needed (Liu et al., 2008). However, the traditional local dietary preference was for maize (Olson, 1996: 610). During fieldwork, agricultural extension workers from the Ministry of Agriculture were in Mtamba demonstrating methods and recipes for cooking cassava to encourage local consumption as a food security strategy. In addition, very few households possessed livestock, suggesting that grazing was not an important livelihood strategy in the area.

The reason that food security was not compromised by the biofuel project is that the lands acquired were largely degraded forest, already over-exploited as a result of charcoal and firewood production. The British company behind the project claimed: “No food cropping or community buildings were displaced and no communities were removed” (Sun Biofuels, 2009). The balance of available evidence supports this view, despite the fact that interviews were not able to confirm the extent of farming in the area transferred. One respondent indicated that there had been “a lot” of farms in the area while another stated that the land was “bare land used for charcoal and poles.” 96 At the village meeting it was stated that compensation had only been paid to individuals with fruit trees located inside the project lands, with no mention of farms having been displaced by the project.97 The degraded status of the lands acquired by Sun Biofuel is further substantiated by a recent NGO report which stated that: “Much of [the Sun Biofuel project] area has already been degraded by the dense human population close to Dar es Salaam, although areas of natural coastal bushland, grassland and thicket are still present. The severe charcoal crisis is the major source of forest clearance both in and outside forest reserves” (also see Kaale and Mwakifwamba, 2006: vi; WWF, 2008: 52). The overall impression is that the land acquired from Mtamba for the biofuel project had been heavily degraded by the charcoal trade and was therefore only used for agriculture to a limited extent. The reality of the charcoal trade makes it difficult to criticize the biofuel project in terms of biodiversity. Given difficulties posed by illegal charcoal extraction and establishing JFM in the area, forest restoration appears unrealistic.

There are concerns about the effect of the biofuel project on local CNC, particularly water access which was the most important development issue raised by Mtamba villagers.98 During the dry season there was

95 Villager, Mtamba Village, Interview T10, 1 May 2009. 96 Village Government Focus Group (T8), Mtamba Village, 30 April 2009; Villager, Mtamba Village, Interview T39, 1 May 2009. 97 Village Government Focus Group (T8), Mtamba Village, 30 April 2009. 98 Village Government Focus Group (T8), Mtamba Village, 30 April 2009.

only one reliable source of water available in the village,99 which Oxfam found was granted to Sun Biofuel (Oxfam, 2008: 22). While Sun Biofuel has granted Mtamba assurances that they will continue to have access to the waterhole, villagers did not have any documentation attesting to this during 2009 fieldwork. Mtamba Village Assembly minutes from 23 August 2006 indicate that villagers accused Sun Biofuel of placing the boundary without consulting them. While it is not clear from the minutes, this dispute may have been over access to water or, alternatively, burial grounds.100 Given current water scarcity Mtamba, there is cause for concern with the biofuel project. High yields from jatropha require irrigation (Gerbens-Leenes et al., 2009), though its capacity to grow under dry conditions can appear to make it appropriate for arid regions (for example, van Beukeringa et al., 2007: 22). Two futures are possible: one where Sun Biofuel (or its successor) competes for water with Mtamba and other villages or one where the company invests in the appropriate technology to ensure that sufficient water is available for all parties (see Ewing and Msangi, 2009). If done correctly, Sun Biofuel or its successor could bundle its irrigation needs with improved water provision for villagers—though this tends to violate strong sustainability by introducing irrigation technology to substitute for increased water use.

The biofuel project generated few MMC benefits. Sun Biofuel stated that 400 people across the 8 villages had been employed during this initial phase, and that employment would rise to 1,500 as the project continued (Daily News, 2010; Lane, 2010). In 2009, the Sun Biofuel project was only at its initial stage and employment in the project area by Mtamba residents was limited to manual labour, mostly clearing land—the clearing of 100 m2 of land was reportedly valued at 20,000 Tsh (US$7.7).101 But with the project’s suspension, there have been no employment benefits from the project. Also in contrast to the afforestation projects, it was learned during interviews that Sun Biofuel had not made any commitments to the provision of social services.102

Compensation to villagers for lands transferred for the biofuel project was small, similar to that of the afforestation project discussed earlier (see Purdon 2013: 1144-45). Total compensation for all 8,211 ha of the biofuel project lands was initially rumoured at $613 thousand, but by 2010 had been reduced to $220 thousand (Cleaver et al., 2010: 40; John, 2010; Kisembo, 2007; Lusekelo and Felister, 2008; Oxfam, 2008: 22; Simbeye, 2010). This was paid to 152 individuals for a total of 714 ha of land (Cleaver et al., 2010: 40; Oxfam, 2008: 22). The media tend to portray British-based Sun Biofuels as having paid insufficient compensation for lands acquired. However, compensation does not undermine the weak sustainability claims of the project. Patterns of compensation were the same between the Tanzania biofuel and the afforestation project, the latter which has not attracted significant controversy. The biofuel project was unsustainable in the sense of being a bad business deal, not because of levels of compensation.

Finally, in terms of national MMC, the project generated little in the way of benefits for the Tanzanian national economy. As a failed project, it cannot be assumed that land rents (estimated at $3,000 per year) still accrue to the central government. Even if the project had been successfully implemented, it promised to export most of the biofuel to Europe rather than use it to meet Tanzania’s energy needs, as discussed earlier. Either way, the benefits of the project at the national level can be described as modest at best.

99 Ibid. 100 The Village Assembly minutes from 23 August 2006 do not refer to water or burial grounds but only areas of significant “community activities”. 101 Village Government Focus Group (T8), Mtamba Village, 30 April 2009. 102 Ibid.

Finally, the biofuel project has also delivered little in the way of national CNC nor MMC benefits for Tanzania. The biofuel to be produced is destined for European markets, rather than domestic ones. Sun Biofuels has exported its first shipment of biofuel from Mozambique to Germany (Biofuels Digest, 2011a). Assuming biofuel from the Tanzania project would have similarly been exported, it would have done very little to address national CNC in Tanzania. In terms of national MMC, the project generated little in the way of benefits for the Tanzanian national economy. As a failed project, it is assumed that land rents from Sun Biofuels no longer accrue to the central government. Even if the project had been successfully implemented, it promised to export most of the biofuel to Europe rather than use it to meet Tanzania’s energy needs, as discussed earlier.

Table A1: Average household land holding and land use across villages investigated in Tanzania and Uganda COUNTRY PROJECT VILLAGE n SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD LAND USE LAND HOLDING* Farm Fallow Uncultivated Land Pasture Tree- Orchard/ Plan Tea/ Planting/ Fruit Vivo Sugar/ Total Grassland/ Native Timber Tree Tree Vineyard Forest Forest (ha) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) Tanzania Afforestation Mapanda 22 3.2 54.4 10.5 / / / / 35.1† / / / Luhunga (control) 24 7.0 38.1 16.3 3.5 3.5 / / 40.1† / / 2.7 Idete 23 3.5 57.1 13.6 18.9 5.1 / / 8.7 / / / Ipilimo (control) 24 3.7 59.7 9.0 22.8 22.8 / / 8.5 / / / Biofuel Mtamba 15 3.7 41.4 16.6 29.0 24.1 7.8 / / 9.9 / / Maguruwe (control) 24 2.6 65.6 25.8 8.2 8.2 / / / / / / Cookstove Endabash 24 1.5 77.4 10.6 10.0 7.3 / / / / / Bassodawish (control) 27 3.2 76.5 10.5 0.1 / 0.1 / / / / / Average 4.4 Uganda Afforestation Kirungu 27 1.0 91.7 5.0 0.39 / / / 3.0†† / / / Rwerazi (control) 29 2.0 92.0 0.5 2.6 / / / 4.7†† / / / Plan Vivo Plan Vivo HHs 29 6.2 64.6 10.4 0.9 / / / 7.9†† / 16.3 / Reforestation Control HHs 30 2.1 90.5 2.1 1.0 / / / 6.4†† / / / Bagasse Kagogwa 25 0.6 70.8 8.6 4.2 / / / / 2.7 / 13.7 Cogeneration -Tenant 11 0.3 80.0 9.8 / / / / / 4.5 / 5.6 -Owner 12 1.0 65.9 8.1 8.3 / / / / / / 17.6 Average 2.4 † Pine tree planting †† Eucalyptus tree planting * Independent samples t-test between each village pairing found no significant differences in mean land holding: Mapanda/Luhunga: t(29.8) = -1.66, p = 0.108; Idete/Ipilimo: t(45) = 0.158, p = 0.875; Mtamba/Magaruwe: t(37) = 1.12, p = 0.272. An additional independent samples t-test to account for unequal sample sizes between Mtamba and Magaruwe also found no significant difference in mean land holding (Mtamba/Maguruwen = 15: t(28) = 0.783, p = 0.440). Finally, independent samples t-test did not find mean land holding significantly different between the four villages investigated in the context of the afforestation projects significantly higher than in the two biofuel villages, though there was a trend towards larger landholdings amongst the afforestation projects (MAfforest = 4.5 ha/HH, MBiofuel 3.0 ha/HH, t(129.9) = 1.75, p =0.083)

Table A2: Agricultural productivity and input use across villages investigated in Tanzania and Uganda

COUNTRY PROJECT VILLAGE LAND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY INPUT USE HOLDING Seeds Chemical Insect- Organic Hired Storage Maize† Cassava†† Banana††† Wheat Fertilizer icide Manure Labour

ha kg/ha kg/ha kg/ha kg/ha % % % % % % Tanzania Afforestation Mapanda 7.0 823 / / / 41 23 82 32 50 5 Luhunga (control) 3.2 913 / / / 31 46 73 27 23 27 Idete 3.5 1,329 / / / 30 / / / 35 / Ipilimo (control) 3.7 1,185 / / / 58 29 71 58 54 54 Biofuel Mtamba 3.7 645 4,654 / / 6 / / / 13 / Maguruwe (control) 2.6 438 3,780 / / 42 / 4 4 13 / Cookstove Endabash 1.5 1,422* / / / 92 4 21 79 50 25 Bassodawish (control) 3.2 46 / / / 56 / 7 56 22 4 Uganda Afforestation Kirungu 1.0 918 1977 6,555 / 48 / 4 8 40 / Rwerazi (control) 2.0 687 1483 8,117 / 10 / / / 28 / Plan Vivo Plan Vivo 6.2 / 1102 6,996 / 30 10 7 / 27 / PV Control 2.1 / 973 6,119 / 33 / 3 3 20 / Bagasse Kagogwa 0.6 1,018 148 1284 / 69 3 / 17 7 / Cogeneration † Independent samples t-tests between each village pairing found no significant differences in mean maize productivity: Mapanda/Luhunga: t(34.2) = -0.607, p = 0.548; Idete/Ipilimo: t(44) = 0.430, p = 0.669; Mtamba/Magaruwe: t(16) = 0.65, p = 0.525. An additional independent samples t-test to account for unequal sample sizes between Mtamba and Magaruwe also found no significant difference (Mtamba/Maguruwen = 15: t(12) = 0.088, p = 0.931). However, independent samples t-test found mean maize productivity between the four villages investigated in the context of the afforestation projects significantly higher than in the two biofuel villages (MAfforest = 1067 kg/ha, MBiofuel 541 kg/ha, t(106) = 2.36, p = 0.020). †† Independent samples t-test between Mtamba and Magaruwe found no significant differences in mean cassava productivity: t(17.2) = 1.71, p = 0.106. An additional independent samples t-test to account for unequal sample sizes between Mtamba and Magaruwe also found no significant difference in mean cassava productivity (Mtamba/Maguruwen = 15 : t(25) = 1.31, p = 0.201). ††† Annual banana productivity was estimated from monthly bunch production, multiplied by 12 months and assuming that 1 bunch = 10 kg. Wairegi et al. (Wairegi et al., 2007) observed average bunch weights to fall within 9.8 to 11 kg. in southern Uganda. * Crop productivity in Endabash does not reflect the effects of drought in late 2008 and early 2009. Agricultural productivity in Endabash likely reflects harvests made prior to the drought of later 2008/2009; otherwise, they would have been expected to be similar to agricultural productivity in Bassodawish where data was gathered in August 2009 when the effect of the drought was observable.

Table A3: Household economic characteristics across villages in Tanzania, Uganda and Moldova

COUNTRY PROJECT VILLAGE HOUSEHOLD FINANCES† LIVESTOCK

Monthly % Expend Annual Income Cattle* Pigs** Sheep/ Expenditures on Food Goats***

USD % USD Head per Household Tanzania Afforestation Mapanda $46 67% / 0.09 0.86 0.27 Luhunga $50 35% / 0.04 0.71 2.1 Idete $26 38% / 1.2 0.13 0.22 Ipilimo $29 59% / 3.8 1.3 1.0 Biofuel Mtamba $147 68% / / / 0.13 Maguruwe $72 46% / / / 0.08 Cookstove Endabash $46 51% / 4.3 1.0 11.2 Bassodawish $92 57% / 7.2 0.1 6.5 Uganda Afforestation Kirungu $16 34% $522 0.2 0.4 1.1 Rwerazi $26 36% $1,681 1.7 0.2 0.7 Plan Vivo Plan Vivo Participants $45 40% $3,404 2.6 1.1 6.6 PV Control $18 71% $711 0.4 0.3 1.6 Bagasse Kagogwa $64 54% $579 0.1 0.1 0.3 Cogeneration -Tenant $33 77% $367 0.2 0.0 0.0 -Owner $84 46% $683 0.1 0.3 0.5 * Independent samples t-test between each village pairing found no significant differences in mean cattle possession: Mapanda/Luhunga: t(46) = 0.562, p = 0.577; Idete/Ipilimo: t(40.7) = -1.63, p = 0.111. Mean cattle possession was significantly higher amongst afforestation villages than biofuel villages (results not shown). ** Independent samples t-test between each village pairing found no significant differences in mean pig possession between Mapanda/Luhunga (t(46) = 0.420, p = 0.676). Mean pig possession was significantly higher in Ipilimo compared to Idete (t(25.3) = -3.07, p = 0.005) and amongst afforestation villages relative to biofuel villages(results not shown). *** Independent samples t-test between each village pairing found no significant differences in mean goat/sheep possession: Mapanda/Luhunga: t(25.5) = -1.05, p = 0.306; Idete/Ipilimo: t(31.8) = -1.32, p = 0.198; Mtamba/Magaruwe: t(32) = 0.536, p = 0.596. Mean sheep/goat possession was significantly higher amongst afforestation villages than biofuel villages (results not shown).

Table A4: Food security status across villages in Tanzania and Uganda Country Project Village Food Security n AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY Land Status Holding Maize† Cassava†† Banana†††

kg/ha kg/ha kg/ha ha Tanzania Afforestation Mapanda Food Insecure 6 845 / / 2.3 Food Secure 5 1038 / / 3.8 Luhunga Food Insecure 5 860 / / 5.7 Food Secure 10 1097 / / 2.2 Idete Food Insecure 1 1977 / / 2.1 Food Secure 21 1289 / / 4.0 Ipilimo Food Insecure 0 / / / / Food Secure 24 1185 / / 3.7 Biofuel Mtamba Food Insecure 5 563 4100 / 0.6 Food Secure 2 62 3521 / 0.6 Maguruwe Food Insecure 12 237 3713 / 1.2 Food Secure 4 99 4007 / 1.5 Cookstove* Endabash Food Insecure 19 1381 / / 1.4 Food Secure 4 1668 / / 1.8 Bassodawish Food Insecure 17 19 / / 2.8 Food Secure 5 92 / / 5.1 Uganda Afforestation Kirungu Food Insecure 24 / / 6810 1.0 Food Secure 3 / / 4019 1.1 Rwerazi Food Insecure 9 / / 6985 1.6 Food Secure 19 / / 8089 2.3 Plan Vivo Plan Vivo Participants Food Insecure 2 / / 7976 2.9 Reforestation Food Secure 28 / / 6926 6.4 PV Control Food Insecure 10 / / 6202 1.1 Food Secure 20 / / 6197 2.7 Bagasse Kagogwa** Food Insecure 21 1061 / / 0.7 Cogeneration Food Secure** 2 593 / / 1.4 † Mean maize productivity differed significantly across the six villages investigated: F(5, 97) = 5.74, p <.001. Post hoc Tukey-HSD tests showed that, in terms of maize productive, the maize productivity amongst the two villages involved with the biofuel project was less than the four villages investigated in the context of the afforestation projects. Differences in maize productivity between villages were not statistically significant. †† Two independent-samples t-test were conducted for cassava productivity to account for the unequal sample sizes. When all data were analyze, there was no significant difference in the scores for Mtamba (SD=1877) and Magaruwe (SDn=24=736); t (33)=1.16, p = 0.257; when equal sample sizes were analyzed, Mtamba (SD=1877) and Magaruwe (SDn=15=882); t (26)=1.29, p = 0.208. ††† Annual banana productivity was estimated from monthly bunch production, multiplied by 12 months and assuming that 1 bunch = 10 kg. Wairegi et al. (Wairegi et al., 2007) observed average bunch weights to fall within 9.8 to 11 kg. in southern Uganda. * Crop productivity in Endabash does not reflect the effects of drought in late 2008 and early 2009. Agricultural productivity in Endabash reflects harvests made prior to the drought of 2008/2009; while data in Bassodawish were gathered in August 2009 when the effect of the drought was observable. ** Of the two people claiming Good Food Security in Kagogwa, one was a tenant and the other owner, both were sugarcane producers possessing 1.3 ha.

Table A5: Carbon sequestration, carbon credit generation and payment schedule, per hectare, for Plan Vivo participants Source Y0 Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 Y7 Y8 Y9 Y10 Y20 TOTAL

Carbon Sequestration Tonnes CO2e Sequestration (Plan Vivo, No Date: / 1.4 2.9 4.5 6.2 8.0 9.8 11.8 13.8 15.9 18.1 45.0 414.0 Figure 1 & Table 7) Tonnes Carbon Credit (tCO2e) (Plan Vivo, No Date: / 0.6 1.3 2.0 2.8 3.6 4.4 5.3 6.2 7.2 8.2 20.2 186.5 Figure 2)

Payment % Total Payment 30% 20% 20% / / 10% / / / / 20% / 100% Payment Instalment (EcoTrust, 2011: 17, 31) $228 $152 $152 / / $76 / / / / $152 / $761 Payment Instalment Household Surveys $205 $130 $137 / / $69 / / / / $137 / $852

Costs First Five Years Establishment Household Surveys ------Costs From First Five Years ------/ / / / / / $238 Costs

Figure A1: Occupation across villages investigated in Tanzania, Uganda and Moldova

A) Occupations across four villages investigated for Tanzania afforestation project

B) Occupations across two villages investigated for Tanzania biofuel project

C) Occupations across two villages investigated for Tanzania cookstove project

D) Occupations across two villages investigated for Uganda afforestation project

E) Occupations across Uganda Plan Vivo participants and control group in Bitereko subcounty

F) Occupations in Kagogwa village investigated for Uganda cogeneration project

Appendix B: Alternative Factors in Sustainability and Food Security

Given the importance of correctly identifying causal factors in research on food security, I briefly explain here the various causal factors affecting food security in the cases investigated. A number of villages suffered from food insecurity in Tanzania and Uganda. Villages which stand out in Tanzania were the project and control villages investigated for the cookstove project in Tanzania (Endabash and Bassodawish) and, in Uganda, the project villages involved with the afforestation project (Kirungu) and the bagasse cogeneration project (Kagogwa). Was the project activity responsible for food insecurity? In only one case did food insecurity appear directly linked to a project: the case of Kirungu village involved in the afforestation project in Uganda. Evidence of this is provided by the comparative methods used: the food security situation was similar in villages involved with land acquisitions and their respective control villages, except in one case of Kirungu. Here the food security situation was significantly different from its control village (Table A4). For the other cases where food security was observed, drought and population pressure appeared to be the primary drivers. Overall, the comparative research design used was able to demonstrate that food security is not related directly to land acquisitions as suggested by the critical “land grab” literature (Anseeuw et al., 2011; Arrighi et al., 2010; Cotula and Vermeulen, 2011; Zoomers, 2011).

Drought

Drought was found to be the main factor driving food insecurity amongst villages investigated in Tanzania. In late 2008/early 2009, weather conditions had been favourable to agriculture in central Tanzania where the afforestation projects were found (FEWS NET, 2009a; b; c; d). But early 2009 was a particularly bad year in eastern and northern Tanzania where the biofuel and cookstove project, respectively, were located (Ibid.). Food security was a major issue in Karatu district, where the cookstoves were located, because of poor vuli rains over September to December 2008/2009 and utter failure of the masika rains from March to June 2009 (Ibid.). Instead of the loss of land due to land acquisitions, local climate remains the primary variable in explaining food security.

Food security did not appear to be a significant concern in any of the four villages investigated with regard to the Tanzania afforestation projects. This finding is not statistically robust with regards to the first village pairing of Mapanda and Luhunga as the household food security groupings sample size was not large enough. Mapanda in particular had a small sample size. The majority of households in its control village, Luhunga, were food secure though in Mapanda, where n=11, it was roughly even between food secure and insecure households, though noting the small sample size (Table A4). However, interviews indicated that food security was not an issue in 2009 in Mapanda and Luhunga, though it had been an issue in the recent past. The Mapanda ward government had banned the sale of food crops in 2008.103 As one village leader in Luhunga explained, “In some years, the rain will not be enough and we face some shortage of food. It depends on the season.”104 More robust are food security groupings in Idete and Ipilimo where food security was not found to be a concern (Table A4); a conclusion supported by interviews.105 Furthermore, differences in maize productivity between village pairings, where sample sizes were sufficiently large, were not statistically significant (Table A2). However, maize productivity in the

103 Village Focus Group (T1), Mapanda Village, 6 March 2009. 104 Villager, Luhunga Village, Interview T12, 1 March 2009. 105 Village Government Focus Group (T4), Idete Village, 12 March 2009; Village Government Officer, Ipilimo Village, Interview T11, 15 March 2009.

two villages involved with the Tanzania biofuel project was significantly less than in the four villages investigated in the context of the afforestation projects (MAfforest=1091 kg/ha, MBiofuel 650 kg/ha, MCookstove 734 kg/ha). Note that the national average for smallholder maize productivity was estimated at 750 kg/ha in 2003 (GoT, 2003b: xiii-xiv).

In contrast to the villages investigated in the context of the Tanzania afforestation projects, both village pairings investigated in the context of the Tanzania biofuel project and cookstove were found food insecure (Table A4). For the two villages investigated in the context of the biofuel project, differences in maize productivity and cassava between village pairings were also not statistically significant (Table A2). They were significantly different between the two villages investigated in the context of the cookstove project. In the control village of Bassodawish nearly three-quarters of respondents indicated that they were currently food insecure while crop productivity was almost zero (Table A4). In Endabash, maize productivity prior to the drought was high: estimated at over 1,400 kg/ha—the highest of any of the regions visited in Tanzania in 2009 (Table A2). This difference in agricultural productivity was however due to the difference in timing between sampling the Endabash and its control village: Agricultural productivity in Endabash reflects harvests made prior to the drought of 2008/2009; while data in Bassodawish were gathered in August 2009 when the effect of the drought was observable. If the two had been sampled at the same time, it is likely that crop productivity would have been similar. It should also be noted that there was little tradition of planting cassava in the two villages, a crop that was being promoted as a security food in Karatu district and farming continues to be rainfed.106

Input was relatively high in Mufindi district, where the Tanzania afforestation projects were located, as the result of the government led fertilizer voucher system (except for Idete where villagers claimed fertilizer was not necessary).107 See Table A2. At the time of fieldwork in early 2009, the voucher system had not yet arrived in Kisarawe district where the biofuel project was located and, consequently, inputs were generally underused. Compared to the other regions visited in Tanzania, there was relatively high use of purchased seeds and organic manure amongst villages investigated in the context of the cookstove project, but still very little use of fertilizer because of its relatively high price. The voucher system that had been initiated in Tanzania in 2009 had been received late in Endabash, after the January planting period.108 Partially because of the relatively heavy use of mechanization and continuous cultivation (insufficient fallow periods), soil fertility and erosion have become major issues in the district where the cookstove projects were located (Ringo et al., 2007: 70). More tractors were available in Endabash and there were between 10-20 milling machines in the Endabash town centre.109

106 Village Government Focus Group (T7), Endabash Village, 9 April 2009. 107 No fertilizer—organic nor inorganic—was used in Idete. Indeed, at the village council meeting it was stated that “even if the fertilizer was brought here, we will not participate because we don’t need it”. The villagers appeared justified: Idete had the highest maize productivity of any of the villages investigated at 1329 kg/ha. 108 Village Government Focus Group (T7), Endabash Village, 9 April 2009. 109 Village Government Focus Group (T7), Endabash Village, 9 April 2009.

Table A6: Relationship between food insecurity and projects Country/Project/Village Food Food Identified Cause Insecurity in Insecurity of Food Insecurity Project Village Attributed to Project Tanzania Afforestation – Mapanda & Idete No / / Biofuel – Mtamba Yes No Drought Cookstove – Endabash Yes No Drought Uganda Afforestation - Kirungu Yes Yes Individual and communal land loss Afforestation – RECPA NA NA NA Plan Vivo Reforestation – Bitereko No / / Cogeneration-Kagogwa Yes Indeterminate Sugarcane expansion or population growth

Population Pressure

Population pressure was really only a factor affecting food security in the case of the Uganda bagasse cogeneration project’s impact on Kagogwa. This project was located approximately 11 km from Jinja, Uganda’s second largest city. Jinja district also has the highest population densities of any of those investigated. But because of the lack of a control village in this case, it cannot be concluded with certainty that population density was the sole driver of land scarcity in this instance. It would be necessary to compare socioeconomic indicators in Kagogwa with an appropriate control village, at least another village located further away from the city of Jinja to reduce the effect of population.

Uganda and Tanzania are known to have some of the highest rural population growth rates in the world. Yet between the two African countries, Uganda’s population growth rate has been greater. Consequently Uganda has the highest rural population density of the three countries (Figure A2(b)). Individual landholdings amongst the villages were, on average, considerably smaller in Uganda than Tanzania, suggesting that population pressure in the former is more significant (see Table A1). Figure A1: Population statistics in Tanzania and Uganda A) Rural population growth, 1990-2010 B) Rural population density, 1992-2009

Source: World Bank (World Bank, 2011)

The above analysis pertains only to the state of food security at the time of 2009 fieldwork and does not consider the needs of a growing population in Tanzania and Uganda. Given a lack of information on

demographic trends in the villages involved and extent of village lands available, it is difficult to reach a firm conclusion on the amount of land needed for expansion. Population growth rates in rural areas amongst the three countries suggest a doubling of the villages in 30 years in Tanzania, 23 years in Uganda and nearly 200 years in Moldova (Table A7). Urban growth rates are faster, which was relevant in the case of the Uganda bagasse cogeneration project, and would see its population double in just sixteen years.

Is there enough land available for expansion amongst villages in Africa? An immediate answer to this question is not available for all lands because of a lack of information on current village land size in Tanzania and Uganda. The estimated future land needs of villages investigated are presented in Table A7, drawn from an estimate of current agricultural land use. It would be important to confirm exactly how much land has been retained for future agricultural growth in each village—something that was not feasible during 2009 fieldwork. Some information can be gleaned from recent population studies in Tanzania. Despite being located in areas with different population densities in Tanzania (AfricaScope, 2010), household land holdings were not found to differ significantly between the Tanzania afforestation and biofuel projects (Table A1). However, villages investigated in the course of the Tanzania cookstove project were of noticeably smaller size.

There are two factors that would however significantly reduce the amount of agricultural land required for expansion. First would be increasing yields on current farmlands rather than opening up new lands (Jama and Pizarro, 2008; Juma, 2010; Vitousek et al., 2009). This however assumes the adoption of modern agricultural practices and moving away from traditional, shifting agriculture practices (see Grandstaff, 1978). If a lack of use of inputs is any indicator, shifting cultivation remains the norm amongst the villages investigated—though there have been recent efforts to introduce a fertilizer voucher. A second factor that would reduce the amount of agricultural land required in the future is rural non-farm income. Rural non-farm income plays a significant role in assuring food security by providing income to purchase food in the face of external shocks such as drought (Barrett et al., 2001; Reardon, 1997). To the extent that the carbon finance projects create additional non-farm sources of income, they can actually increase local food security and resilience –though only in terms of weak sustainability, not strong sustainability.

Table A7: Future Land Needs of Villages Based on Population Growth Rates Country Project Village Avg Households Current Used Years to Double Total Assessment Land Ag Village Population* Available Holding Land Village Ag (Avg Land Land Holding x HHs) Rural Urban (Ha) (n) (Ha) (Yrs) (Yrs) (Ha) Tanzania Afforestation Mapanda 3.2 980 3,136 30 nr** Unknown Unknown Afforestation Idete 3.5 883 3,091 30 nr Unknown Unknown Biofuel Mtamba 3.7 240 888 30 nr Unknown Unknown Cookstove Endabash 1.5 920 1,380 30 nr Unknown Unknown Uganda Afforestation Kirungu 1.0 350 350 23 nr Unknown Unknown Plan Vivo Reforestation Bitereko Subcounty 4.1 4,738 7,000 23 nr Unknown Unknown Bagasse Cogeneration Kagogwa 0.6 178 107 23 16 Unknown Unknown *Source: 2010 Rural and Urban Population Growth Rates (World Bank, 2011) ** nr = not relevant ɸ Actual measure of available village agricultural land

Appendix C: Summary Sustainability Evaluation Tables Table A8: Evaluation of investment project impact in terms of strong sustainability Country/Project/Case CNC Strong Biodiversity Sustainability Local National Total Evaluation CNC CNC Score Strong Sustainability Tanzania Cookstove – Endabash 2 0 2 Yes ↑ Uganda Afforestation – RECPA 0 1 1 Yes ↓ Uganda Plan Vivo Ref - Bitereko 0 0 0 Yes ↑ Tanzania Afforestation – Mapanda & Idete 0 0 0 Yes ↓ Violation of Strong Sustainability Uganda Cogeneration - Kagogwa -2* 1 -2 No if CNCL ↓ ↓ Uganda Afforestation - Kirungu -2 1 -2 No ↓ Tanzania Biofuel – Mtamba -2** 0 -2 No ↓ *Unclear if land scarcity due to project or population growth; **Potential water scarcity issue engendered by jatropha plantations, though also avoidable.

Table A9: Evaluation of investment project impact in terms of weak sustainability Country/Project/Case CNC MMC CNC + MMC Weak Local National Local National Local Total Sustainability Evaluation CNC CNC MMC MMC Score Score Weak Sustainability Tanzania Cookstove – Endabash 2 0 2 0 4 4 Yes Uganda Afforestation – RECPA 0 1 2 1 2 4 Yes Tanzania Afforestation – Mapanda & Idete 0 0 3 1 3 4 Yes Uganda Plan Vivo Ref – Bitereko subcounty 0 0 3 0 3 3 Yes Uganda Cogeneration – Kagogwa -2* 1 3 1 1 2 Yes if MMCL ↑ ≥ CNCL ↓ Violation of Weak Sustainability Tanzania Biofuel - Mtamba -2*** 0 -2† 0 -4 -4 No Uganda Afforestation – Kirungu -2 1 2 1 -2 -2 No β Ranking Scores: Local MMC: 2 = increase, 0 = remains same; -2 = decrease; National CNC: 1 = increase, 0 = remains same, -1 = decrease. Ω National MMC: 1 = National MMC Increased; 0 = National MMC Remains Same; -1 = National MMC Decreased. † Opportunity cost of lands transferred to failed biofuel project. *Unclear if land scarcity due to investment project or population growth; **Reduction in pastureland (temporary) but also gains in soil fertility (long-term); ***Potential water scarcity issue engendered by jatropha plantations, though also avoidable.

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