The Bay of Pigs: the Botched Invasion of Cuba
The Bay of Pigs: The Botched Invasion of Cuba
Interviewer: Megan B. Vogel
Interviewee: Colonel Manuel Reina Pardo
Instructor: Mr. Whitman
February 17, 2015 Vogel 2
Table of Contents
Statement of Purpose 3
Interviewee Release Form 4
Interviewer Release Form 5
Biography 6
“The Bay of Pigs: The Botched Invasion of Cuba” 8
Interview Transcription 17
Interview Analysis 39
Works Consulted 43
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Statement of Purpose
The purpose of this oral history project and interview with Colonel Manuel Reina
Pardo is to be able to create a primary source by converging of evidence on a specific topic. As well, this project also helped to widen knowledge, for example, on the Bay of
Pigs invasion from the perspective of a pro-Revolutionary in Cuba.
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Biography
Manuel Reina Pardo was born in Santiago de Cuba, Cuba on March 28th, 1937.
He went to a public grammar school from the first to sixth grades and at the same time worked at his father’s carpentry workshop in the afternoons. In his early teens, he joined the Lucha Clandestina or Clandestine Fight, which was a Revolutionary Youth Group determined to revolt against Fulgencio Batista. Manuel was arrested several times in
Santiago while protesting with the Lucha Clandestina. Due to the trouble he was getting into, his father put him on a train at dawn one morning and sent him to Havana to be away from the hot-bed of the Revolution. Manuel lived in Havana with one of his aunts.
When he was roughly 23 years old, he got a job at the Public Health Center and joined one of the military militias, eventually becoming a fulltime member. He ended up following Fidel Castro from Santiago de Cuba to the Bay of Pigs in 1961, and was a part of the first squadron that went out with the purpose of trying to keep the Cuban-exile invaders away. Manuel Reina Pardo was the coordinator and a delegate to the Assembly of C.D.R. (Committee of Revolutionary Defense), and was also a delegate of the Popular
Choice and Secretary of the Cuban Communist Party. From 1962 to 1990, he served as Vogel 7 an officer and engineer in the Cuban army, and was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel in
1982. Currently, Colonel Pardo is retired and lives with his wife in Havana, Cuba, where they enjoy spending time with their children and grandchildren.
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The Bay of Pigs: The Botched Invasion of Cuba
The story of the botched invasion of Cuba in 1961, known as the Bay of Pigs, is one of overconfidence, lack of management, and breached security. The blame for the failure fell on the shoulders of the United States Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.) and a young, ambitious president, John F. Kennedy. Cuba had been known around the world for their intense political history and dedication to their country. From the Spanish occupation in 1898, up until the rise of President Fidel Castro (1959), Cubans showed their dedication to their country and their desire to maintain its independence. The battle for, and dedication to, freedom is apparent in the Bay of Pigs invasion. The Bay of Pigs invasion was an American military and political attempt to train Cuban exiles to overthrow Fidel Castro two years after he came to power. This plan was created and supported by the United States government, as well as the Central Intelligence Agency, which helped train and support the anti-revolutionary exiles for the upcoming invasion.
The attack was launched in April of 1961, roughly three months after John F. Kennedy became President of the United States. Despite the exiles’ rigorous training and dedication to overthrowing their homeland’s dictator, the Cuban Armed Forces that were supported by many Eastern Bloc countries ultimately defeated them. To better understand the Bay of Pigs, one must examine the Cold War, the reasoning behind the invasion, President Kennedy and Fidel Castro, as well as gain a first-hand perspective from someone who was present at the Bay of Pigs in 1961.
The Cold War was the struggle for power after World War II between the United
States and its allies against the Soviet Union and their allies. The Soviet Union and the
United States had joined forces during World War II to battle against Nazi Germany, but Vogel 9 soon after the war ended in May of 1945, that relationship began to deteriorate. The
Soviet Union began establishing pro-communist administrations in Eastern Europe. The
United States’ concern about the spread of Soviet and communist influence grew as the
Soviets became more forceful with their power in Eastern Europe. The growth of concern led to a policy that would hopefully thwart the spread of communist influence to
Western Europe. In the 1940s, the United States decided that they would back out of their original plan to get involved in European affairs. In 1947, the Truman Doctrine was written and, “pledged aid to governments threatened by communist subversion” (“The
Cold War”). That same year, the Marshall Plan was drafted, offering billions of dollars in economic assistance to eradicate political uncertainty (“The Cold War”).
Two years later, in 1949, the first mutual security and military alliance in the history of the United States, known as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), was established. With the creation of NATO, the Soviets decided that they would respond by joining together with the communist governments in Eastern Europe to form the Warsaw Pact. In 1959, Fidel Castro, with the help of many Cuban resistance movements, was able to overthrow Fulgencio Batista, the pro-American dictator. Cuba, under the reign of Castro, soon started to tighten its relationship with the Soviets. This caused tensions to rise between the United States and Cuba, mainly due to the fact that the Soviet Union was America’s main rival in the Cold War and communism was now a mere 90 miles from mainland United States.
In 1960, the presidential election was filled with talk about the Cold War. Both
Senator John F. Kennedy and Vice President Richard M. Nixon agreed that they would try their best to strengthen American military forces, promising a tough stand against the Vogel 10
Soviet Union and international communism. Kennedy, motivated by the knowledge of the Soviet Union’s growing intercontinental ballistic missile capability, promised to toughen America’s nuclear forces (“The Cold War”). Throughout John F. Kennedy’s political career, one of the main issues that he was forced to act on was the nuclear arms race with the Soviet Union. In his inaugural address, Kennedy stressed the significance of this and the status between the free world and the communist world. On January 1,
1959, after years of efforts to take over Cuba, Fidel Castro was able to gain control from
Fulgencio Batista’s forces by, “…mov[ing] swiftly to seize power throughout the island”
(Persons). A week later, Castro went to Havana to be sworn in as prime minister. This is when things started to change drastically between the United States and Cuba.
Many Cubans welcomed Fidel Castro while some were worried about his policies.
At the same time, United States officials were becoming nervous due to Castro’s rise to power. Although Batista had also been a dictator, the main difference between the two dictators was that Batista was considered pro-American. During this period, wealthy individuals and American corporations owned almost half of Cuba’s sugar plantations as well as ranches and mines. Batista did not try to do much to interfere with their influence but Castro, on the other hand, did not approve of this outside interference on Cuban businesses. He believed it was time for Cubans to take control of their country, unlike in
1895 when, “…the Americans came and took over” (Castro). Almost right after Castro gained power, he began to take steps to have American influence removed from the island. As he began to implement these new rules, some Cubans grew more upset with the way things were developing. Some of these rules included land reforms, Vogel 11 nationalizing industries controlled by America, such as sugar and mining, and a call for other Latin American governments to act with more self-government.
In late October of 1959, due to the growing concerns about Castro, President
Eisenhower approved a program with the Central Intelligence Agency, to support those in
Cuba opposing Castro. In response to Castro’s intense reforms, President Eisenhower, in early 1960, authorized the CIA to recruit 1,400 Cuban exiles living in Miami and began training them to overthrow Castro. Tensions between the two countries continued to rise even further, when Cuba established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. In response to this new alliance, the United States prohibited importation of Cuban sugar.
The Soviet Union decided to step in and help their Cuban allies out by agreeing to buy the sugar from Cuba, since the United States had comprised 80 percent of Cuba’s sugar exports.
In March of 1960, the C.I.A. began to train 300 Cuban guerrillas in America and in the Panama Canal Zone. In June, after an agreement between the United States and
President Ydigoras of Guatemala, the training moved to Guatemala. Later that month, in an Oval Office meeting, President Eisenhower approved of a policy paper created by the
C.I.A. against Castro. The paper had four main parts: (1), to form an opposition group in exile with the purpose of restoring the revolution that Castro had destroyed, (2), to set up a radio station to broadcast into Cuba, (3), to create an underground intelligence and action organization within the island of Cuba, alert to the orders and directions of the exile opposition, (4), to begin the training of a revolutionary force outside of Cuba and to create guerilla units for instantaneous deployment into Cuba with the purpose of organizing, training, and leading position forces employed there. During the meeting, Vogel 12
Eisenhower stated that he had no better plan for that situation and was concerned about breach of security, just as Senator Kennedy was worried about, “...a disaster that threatens the security of the whole Western Hemisphere” (Kennedy). He told everyone that they must be prepared to deny the existence of the plan and that only two or three people should have direct contact with the groups involved.
The plan for the invasion of Cuba called for two airstrikes against Cuban air bases, 1,400 men who would invade during dawn launching a surprise attack, and paratroopers who would drop before the attack to hopefully interfere with the advancement of Cuban forces. At the same time, a smaller force would land on the east coast of Cuba, in hope of creating confusion for Castro’s regime. The success of the plan would depend mainly on how many Cubans would join the invaders and if Castro would run out of planes. Despite of the United States’ efforts to keep the plan under wraps, knowledge of the invasion became known among Cuban exiles in Miami. Through so- called allies in Guatemala, Castro and his government were given information on the
Cuban exiles and their training camps (“The Bay of Pigs – 40 Years Later”). In January of 1961, The United States government terminated diplomatic relations with Cuba in order to advance the preparations for an invasion. President John F. Kennedy believed that if the United States was successful in overthrowing the Cuban leader, it would show
Russia, China, and skeptical American citizens, that he was serious about winning the
Cold War. In February of 1961, President Kennedy authorized the plan for the invasion,
“…the only thing I can say is that no war has posed a greater threat to our security”
(Rasenberger, “The Brilliant Disaster Part 1”). Vogel 13
The Bay of Pigs is located on the southern side of the island of Cuba. It is eighteen miles long and less than four miles wide (Rasenberger 227). Just across the road from the Bay of Pigs lies Cienaga de Zapata, a swamp that runs along the coast and created a “nearly impenetrable 1,850-square-mile barrier” (Rasenberger 227), which later ended up being critically important in the invasion. The location of Zapata was very significant in the invasion of the Bay of Pigs.
This operation started with three main landing points within and bordering the
Bay of Pigs. The first landing point was Playa Girón or Blue Beach, which would also be the most noteworthy out of the three. About seven hundred men from the invading fourth and sixth battalions would come in with tanks, tractors, and trucks, while Pepe San
Román, who was the commander of the brigade, was busy setting up headquarters on
Blue Beach.
The second landing point was just roughly twenty miles northwest of Girón near
Playa Larga or Red Beach, as it was known by the C.I.A. At Red Beach, about four hundred men of the second and fifth battalions would arrive, under deputy commander
Erneido Oliva.
And finally, the third landing point was located about twenty miles east of Girón, at what is known as Green Beach. Only the third battalion would be present there with roughly two hundred men, in charge of protecting the eastern side for the invasion. Due to the rural location of those beaches, there were only three roads that ran from the city to them. This was both an advantage and a disadvantage. If they were able to gain control of those three roads, then the invading force could make it harder for Castro’s troops to reach the beaches. Their thought process was that the only way they could gain control Vogel 14 was if the paratroopers from the first battalion were to land several miles into the island on the morning of the invasion. Tanks would later be sent out to help the paratroopers and to make it more difficult for the Cuban ground forces. If Castro’s army was not able to get through those three points, there would be no way for the Cuban army to advance and, if successful, those three points would provide a stronghold for forty miles
(Rasenberger, 228).
Shortly before midnight, two of the American ships carrying Cuban exiles, the
Barbara F and the Houston, headed a little towards the west of the bay, with twenty miles still to go before reaching their destination of Playa Larga. These two ships carried the second and fifth battalions. The four remaining ships, the Rio Escondido, Blagar,
Atlántico, and Caribe, continued on their path, heading north. The Río stopped short about five miles while the other three continued on, leading to the beginning of the invasion.
The first men to head into the water were the frogmen, five members of the underwater demolition team along with Grayston Lynch, a case officer at the C.I.A., who decided to join the frogmen on their quest. But within those first few minutes of landing, they were faced with problems caused by the C.I.A. First, Lynch was informed of the canceled D-Day air strikes and then was hit with another unfortunate event. A red marker light started flickering for no reason, in between the coral and the beach, a signal to the infantry as to where to land. Lynch ordered one of the men to go to the light and sit on it to cover it so that it would not draw attention from the pro-Castro Cubans, but right as he gave his order, a truck came down to the water, carrying two Cuban militiamen (Rasenberger, 231). At first, the militiamen mistook Lynch and the frogmen Vogel 15 for fishermen and tried to rescue them away from the coral, but Lynch, not knowing what the men were saying, opened fire as the frogmen followed his lead, “…blasting away with rifles and machine guns” (Rasenberger, 231). In need of assistance, Lynch urgently radioed Pepe San Román and told him to bring the Blagar closer to the beach. Over the next few minutes the Blagar approached the beach while the frogmen secured it and marked it off with the marker lights.
This first day of the invasion was filled with bullets, flying from one side to the other. Cuban planes attacked the angry exiles that were fighting to get their country back. They sank two escort ships and shot down half of the invading air force. This ruined the exiles’ hope of destroying Castro’s air force so it would be easier for them to invade. Bad weather was another major issue with this first day and hindered the ground forces (“Bay of Pigs”). Over the next twenty-four hours, Castro ordered his military of roughly 20,000 men to head towards the beach as the Cuban air force watched over the sky.
As the battle in Cuba continued to grow increasingly worse, Kennedy ordered an
“air-umbrella” at dawn (“The Bay of Pigs”). This meant that six unmarked American fighter planes would take off to help the brigade. But the B-26s, unfortunately, arrived an hour late. To make matters worse, Cubans shot down all of the American planes, ending the invasion later that same day.
Some exiles were lucky enough to escape, while the rest of them were either killed in battle or rounded up by Castro’s army to be imprisoned. Close to 1,200 men of Brigade
2056 surrendered while more than 100 members were killed. Over the next twenty months, the United States tried to negotiate deals with Fidel Castro for the Vogel 16 prisoners. President Kennedy himself made pleas and asked for contributions from pharmaceutical companies and baby food manufacturers to trade those goods with Cuba for the Cuban exiles. Luckily for the prisoners, this ended up working and Castro agreed to 53 million dollars worth of baby food and medicine in return for the prisoners (“The
Bay of Pigs”).
The Bay of Pigs invasion can be looked at from different perspectives: that what the C.I.A. and Kennedy Administration did was the right thing to do at the time or, that the C.I.A. went against official government orders. Many people also believed that fault for the disaster lay solely on the shoulders of President Kennedy because he was the one in charge and could have stopped the invasion. Historian Irwin F. Gellman, commenting on President John F. Kennedy and remarking how ignorant it was for him to let the invasion happen, said, “the answer is that because he is dumb” (Fracasso).
Historian Joshua H. Sandman stated that, “The Bay of Pigs fiasco however was an invaluable lesson for President John F. Kennedy." Years after the invasion, relations between the island of Cuba and the United States remained strained and quite weak. The invasion ultimately failed and it was just the beginning of many problems between the two countries.
Following the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Cuban Missile Crises took place in 1962, a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union on Soviet ballistic missiles in Cuba. The ongoing economic and financial embargo, initially imposed on
Cuba by the United States in October of 1960, has been the source of additional conflicts between both countries.
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Interviewee: Colonel Manuel Reina Pardo Interviewer: Megan B. Vogel Location: Colonel Manuel’s home, Havana, Cuba Date: December 29th, 2014 Translated from Spanish to English Translator: Richard C. Vogel
Megan Vogel: This is Megan Vogel and I am interviewing Manuel Reina Pardo on the topic of the Bay of Pigs as part of the American Century Oral History Project. The interview took place on December 29th, 2014 at his house located in Havana, Cuba. This interview was recorded using a recorder and cell.
MV: What was it like growing up in Cuba during the 1940’s and 1950’s?
Manuel Reina Pardo: I was born on March 28th, 1937 in Santiago de Cuba. So, I had a normal childhood, my normal family, my father was a carpenter. I had a normal childhood; my education was normal, for somebody relatively humble. I went to public school for grammar school, first through sixth grades and I combined that with working in my father’s workshop, carpenter’s workshop in the afternoon. Things started to change, after Batista had the coup d’état in 1952, that’s when youth started to get more involved politically and of course I was about that age, I would’ve been in my early teens to mid-teens. So, starting in 1953, Fidel became- Fidel Castro became active, and of course again the youth were really getting sick and tired of the repression of the Batista dictatorship and I joined Lucha Clandestina called Clandestine Fight, it was a group.
Remember the Lucha Clandestina that was all like behind the scenes. Starting in 1956 it became more open, resistance etcetera, and big top moment was late November early
December of 1956 when Fidel Castro disembarked, right, he came with his group and it took a couple of extra days because one of their compatriots fell overboard, so. So I was Vogel 18 detained, arrested, several times in Santiago, my father was really concerned because at one point they said, “If we catch you one more time that’s it, it’s over.” At one point, I guess my dad was so concerned, being a good dad, and said, “Okay, I want you out of
Santiago, this hot bed of the revolution,” he got me up at dawn, put me on a train, and sent me to Havana. I lived at an aunt’s house; this was a sister of my father, until the revolution happened, so at this point it’s 1957and the revolution is only months or a couple of years away. So after the revolution I worked obviously for, in the health center, public health center and that was my normal life. Okay, so, it was around this time that I joined one of the national militias and I became a full member of that. Okay, so I’m showing you my, uh it’s kind of an identity card and it says Mister Manuel Reina, carpenter, and it’s dated the 6th of April, 1960.
MV: Could I take pictures of these afterwards?
MRP: You can keep them!
MV: Gracias. How did you end up at a military academy? [00:06:18]
MRP: Your interest is in Playa Girón?
MV: Bay of Pigs, yes.
MRP: So this is where I incorporated or joined the militia. So, I was part of the militia like I said and on Sundays we would do military training, exercises, cleaning the weapons, and whatever other training just in case it was ever necessary.
MV: And how old were you when you ___?
MRP: So I was around 23 years old.
MV: Oh, okay. Vogel 19
MRP: So as part of the militia I received a telegram. 22nd, of 1960 at seven in the morning, October. I was supposed to report at seven in the morning to the fifth district, which is where they were concentrated to form part of the battalions, militia battalions.
MV: Is that what the telegraph said to do?
MRP: So the telegraph says on 22 slash 60 present yourself at seven in the morning in the fifth district and the explanation was – the purpose was to form part of the battalion.
MV: Okay and where is the fifth district?
MRP: So it was in Havana, it was a part of Havana. So after 1957 I’m here in Havana and no longer in Santiago.
MV: Oh okay, okay.
MRP: So on the 15th of December 1960, we went to school like military school, military training, the militia did, in a place called La Chorrera on a farm called La Merced. So that’s what it was called at the time, it’s no longer there, it was flooded out. We were there for fifteen days training; intensive training, so we finished the training on the 31st of
December and then we all went home. I was five blocks away; I lived five blocks away from the fifth district. No sooner were we all out and the order was given to return and I didn’t even hear that, I wasn’t even aware of that. Right, so I just went to my place of work unaware that we had been called back. On the eighth of April 1961, they transferred us to Cienfuegos, to the province of Cienfuegos. So at that point there was already talk, rumor going around that there might be an invasion from the United States, mercenaries, whatever; there was something afoot, clearly.
MV: But how did you know about that? Vogel 20
MRP: So I didn’t know, I was just a militiaman and essentially I just did what I was told. They sent us there, I went.
MV: Oh, okay.
MRP: So, because the fifth district was so close to my house, five blocks away, I could see that there was something going on, clearly there was a lot of activity and that’s how I found out and of course, rejoined the group. So, uh, so when I spoke to the commander,
Maurin, I realized that I had missed one of the first things which was to go to a place called Escambray and apparently the CO said don’t worry about it, grab your backpack, your clothes, and you’re going to Cienfuegos. So we were at the airport in Cienfuegos from the eighth until the seventeenth of April 1961, and we stayed at the airport until the seventeenth of April, which is when the first invasion or disembarkment [sic] uh occurred at the Cienaga de Zapata.
MV: Let me just ask more background questions before you get to the invasion, if you don’t mind.
MRP: Ah, okay.
MV: What was your family’s reaction to you joining the military?
MRP: So it was a positive reaction. At that time the overwhelming majority of the people in Cuba were for the revolution. There were few of the people who had either a lot of money, they lost whatever they lost and they were against it. But by and large people supported it.
MV: Where were you when you first heard about the overthrow of Batista? [00:15:27]
MRP: On the 31st of December of 59, Batista simply fled, he left. Correction, on the
31st of December of 58, uh Batista fled, he left. So at that point everybody was very Vogel 21 happy Batista was gone. So there was much, at that point, there was much rejoicing that
Batista was gone, uh Fidel Castro of course kind of gathered everybody together from his base in Santiago which was on the eastern part of the island and essentially, as said previously, the overwhelming majority was very much in favor of the revolution, the fact that Batista was gone and so on. So at that point uh Fidel took over Santiago and he sent his two main partners, uh Che, to take over La Cabaña and then Camilo Cienfuegos to take over Columbia. Right, and those were the two main concentrations of armed power, uh, that supported Batista. So the people took to the street, at that point, and took over and were looking of course for the people that had repressed us for so many years, uh, many of them escaped, however they had access to planes, to boats, etcetera, many were caught many were not.
MV: Where were you when you first heard that Batista had fled and what were your initial reactions?
MRP: I was here in Havana. I was living in Havana at the time.
MV: What were you initial feelings about it?
MRP: As said previously, the people just rejoiced that Batista was gone. The tyrant was gone, almost like the wicked old witch was dead, and of course I was a part of that, keep in mind that here I am, I’m young, I’m from Santiago de Cuba which was the hotbed of the revolution and I had injured my hand, and of course it looked to everybody like I had injured it in combat so I had to go underground, I had to be hiding all those years, so it was wonderful for me as well. Now the tyrant was gone and I could come out in the open.
MV: How aware were you of Castro before he came to power? [00:20:59] Vogel 22
MRP: So we knew about Fidel in starting in 1953 after the Santa ___? He was already the leader, so already we saw him as the leader of the youth and he was the hope, the person that was going to overthrow the dictatorship. So already at this time Fidel had something of a track record being a revolutionary, he had organized workers in different places including Santo Domingo in the Dominican Republic.
MV: What did you hope would happen to Cuba as a result of the change of leadership?
MRP: So as a normal citizen at the time, the hope was that Castro was going to get rid of the tyrant, the dictator, the repression. There was no real thought at that time of turning this into a socialist country.
MV: How did life change for you in Cuba and your family after 1959?
MRP: One of the first big changes obviously besides the fact that there is no longer this tyrannical dictatorship, repression, there were certain promises that Fidel made and he followed up on. There was a general level of satisfaction, there were many things that were implemented that were very positive, including agrarian reform, meaning the land, which used to belong to a handful of people and to foreign companies, American companies, was now redistributed among the peasants, the farmers, there was reform in education, education became free. The barracks were converted into schools, hospitals were open, so there was free healthcare, so there were a lot of positive things like that, and the people were very satisfied as a consequence.
MV: What were your thoughts about becoming a social/communist country? [00:25:35]
MRP: In general, we really didn’t make the distinctions about socialism, communism, etcetera. What we did see was that things seemed to be improving and we also had a tremendous amount of support, primarily from socialist/communist countries, primarily Vogel 23 the Soviet Union at the time and also Czechoslovakia and other countries like that, in fact, were it not for their support, their military, their arms, we would not perhaps had prevailed in Playa Girón which was the Bay of Pigs. So after the Bay of Pigs, there was the Cuban Missile Crisis, which we call the Crisis of October and the Soviets were very, very supportive. So you can see how for us, it made us feel comfortable with socialism, after all they were helping us, they were supporting us, how could socialism be all that bad?
MV: Right, how aware were you of the growing relationship Cuba had with the Soviet
Union?
MRP: First it started with some advisors, and later they actually sent some troops in, of course they sent us arms, and we started becoming closer and closer. In fact many Soviet troops died defending Cuba.
MV: Oh, wow.
MRP: And that’s why they started gaining our trust and support and sympathy and before you know it, we find ourselves we are all a part of this socialist camp.
MV: What were your feelings about the United States at that time? [00:29:29]
MRP: Not just my feelings but the feelings of the people in general, our country, Cubans never had anything against the United States. It was very clear to us that it was not the
American people who are responsible for all the things that were happening. It’s the government that’s responsible, not the people. As a consequence there has never really been any antipathy, any bad feelings, towards the American people, towards American citizens.
MV: Oh, okay. Vogel 24
MRP: In all the time, the political rhetoric was never really targeting Americans or U.S. citizens.
MV: How did the Cuban people get their information and news at that time?
MRP: While Fidel was up in the Serra Maestra, we would get the news through a station called Radio Rebelde. After the Revolution of course, all of the media was under the
Revolutionary Government. All of the media were controlled by Revolutionary
Government and we would have three major news reports, one in the morning, one at noon, and one in the evening; “The Written Press,” “The Media,” and “The Round
Table,” which you may have heard of. Have you heard of “The Round Table” which was responsible for a lot of things, including the return of those five prisoners?
MV: I have not heard of “The Round Table.”
MRP: No?!
MV: No (laughs.) What is “The Round Table?”
MRP: “The Round Table” is a place where journalists sit around a table and they discuss issues of the day.
MV: Oh, okay.
MRP: They analyze fundamental issues of the day. They call it a panel of ideas.
MV: When did you first think there might be an invasion? [00:34:44]
MRP: At the time we were mobilized down to Cienfuegos I already felt there was something going on, the counter revolutionary groups had all been defeated by that point.
Fidel, with the foresight that he had, and he was pretty good at that, could tell that there was something going on. The countries that we were friendly with, the countries that supported us, for instance the Soviet Union, were telling us that they had intel that there Vogel 25 was something like an invasion being planned. So for instance, they told us that there was a concentration of troops being trained in Nicaragua. This was at the time Somoza was the head of Nicaragua and he was an ally of the United States. There was a lot of military activity going on in the area including Guantanamo and it was all sorts of activity; air, naval, army, ground troops, there was a lot going on. Our Commander in
Chief, Fidel, decided to divide the troops and send them to different places and there’s the militia and I want to distinguish that from the regular army. Because the revolutionary army was insufficient for the militias, and each militia battalion had 1,000 men. The troops were distributed to different potential points of possible invasion.
MV: Can you tell me about your preparations for a potential invasion?
MRP: On the part of the United States or our part?
MV: On your part.
MRP: We formed the militia units, tank units… these were the regulars, and infantry, tank, and air force. On the 16th of April, the U.S. Air Force attacked three airports: San
Antonio, Ciudad Libertad, and Santiago de Cuba. They thought they had destroyed all of our airplanes… they only destroyed some of them and subsequently the next day, the invasion started. The element of surprise was on our side because Fidel had the foresight to spread out or deconcentrate the air force and that way the U.S. air force wasn’t able to destroy all of our planes, and we had planes available to repel the invaders. Going back to your question about the preparations, we did not know where the invasion would take place exactly and that’s why we were spread out in different places but of course my unit was in Cienfuegos, but there were already troops in different places, including already the
Bay of Pigs, Playa Girón and Playa Larga and other locations. Vogel 26
MV: What was your unit? What were you a part of? [00:41:42]
MRP: Battalion 117 of the Revolutionary Militia.
MV: What were you in charge of?
MRP: I was a militiaman.
MV: Oh. What information were you given about the possible attack on the Bay of
Pigs?
MRP: At six o’clock in the morning I was at the airport in Cienfuegos and we got the news that the invasion had started at the Playa Larga, Playa Girón which is the Bay of
Pigs.
MV: Mhm.
MRP: They moved us in trucks; my company was the third company, to a place called
Real Campiña in the area of Roba. So that’s where they gave us the rest of our equipment. Then we were given the order to march to Central Covadonga. The information that we had was that there had been a beachhead established and that they had landed, I guess parachuted by plane in five different locations including Playa Girón and also landing crafts. The first Battalion that was there which was number 339 from
Cienfuegos was the first one to have contact with the invaders. They reported back that the invaders are here, they’re disembarking and we got the order to start shooting and repel them. That’s the one that caused the most casualties. It was a lopsided fight, on the one hand you had rifles and machine guns and on the other hand you had tanks, heavy machine guns, bazookas, and other heavy armament. The air force had already been deployed from very early in the morning. The order had already been given to send tanks down to that area, Cienfuegos, Playa Girón, Playa Larga. The tanks were put on flatbeds Vogel 27 and they were moved that way over the highway. All the units of ours, light combat, the first and the second units had gone around the flanks. The other units had gone around and we were given marching orders to go on foot and of course remember that at the same time the air force was really wreaking havoc with the invaders. So we arrived around three or four in the afternoon at Covadonga, which was kind of a central sugar area. So the locals there managed to keep the invaders at bay by whatever means possible… they had shotguns, whatever, they were not regulars, they were not militia, they just did whatever they had to make sure that they stopped the advance of the invaders. The first one to arrive, which was my unit which was the light combat, when we got there we were able to successfully repel them and actually get them to retreat. We were able to keep them in this area called the Canal de Muñoz. There was only one way to get there and that was via a highway that was built during the Revolution and if you didn’t go via that highway you ended up getting, literally, stuck in the mud. So the invaders had taken over part of that highway, and we were given the order around seven/eight in the evening to go over there and take it back. So we all hopped up onto trucks, there were about twenty of them, before getting to the Canal de Muñoz where the invaders had kind of taken over. So now you’re in the heat of battle, they deployed, flanked, but it was very messy as you could imagine, you know, you’re shooting, you’re being shot at and we are trying to find whatever we could hide behind, a thin little stick, anything, and there we are, it’s very difficult to make any progress because it’s a swamp and we are literally sloshing through mud and all sorts of other tough stuff. So we started to advance along the road, we learned how to do this in militia training, you move forward just a little bit at a time and then you lie low, shoot, low, etcetera. The morning Vogel 28 of April 18th, we were somewhat protected as we got deeper into the Canal de Muñoz, it was a dry canal which means no boats could go through but it wasn’t dry for us, because of course it was very muddy. However, it did afford, some protection, as we were a little bit lower. The Commanders, Luca, Olivera, and Tomasovich, came in the morning and gave the orders. These were Commanders from the days in the Sierra Maestra and they got in front of the units and they took over. So the order was by noon we are going to take San Blas. So that’s when we started advancing very slowly, we were being shot at all the time, and we were shooting them. Slowly but surely we did make progress and the mercenaries started to retreat because we were advancing from different sides, we had out flanked them. We continued advancing and they continued retreating from San Blas to
Playa Girón. San Blas was an area the invaders had taken over the evening before and they were entrenched there at this point. We got to San Blas at twelve noon. So again, we take over San Blas, the invaders are retreating, they are shooting at us and we shooting at them, we got the order that anything we see, we could find, that would show that the U.S. Government had some role in this, we should make sure we take.
MV: Got it.
MRP: As I’m going along I saw a little container that seemed to have some pills, it looked like it could be some kind of medicine, so I picked it up, got up, went over to the
Commander and gave it to him, because underneath it said “made in the U.S.A.” When I saw “made in the U.S.A.” I immediately took it and that saved me. At that exact moment as I go to give Commander Luca the pill container, a bomb or a grenade, something, fell exactly in the place where I had been previously.
MV: Oh my gosh. Vogel 29
MRP: Out of my squadron I was the only one that survived. Three died immediately, two were wounded and died later. I hopped onto a truck after this and I went back to the central area in Covadonga, o the two that were wounded bled out between the battlefield and getting back to Covadonga. At this point they gave the order not to go back to the area of the battle. So for me I couldn’t go back. I had lost my squadron and as one person there was no reason for me to go back that day. That evening we stood watch over our fallen comrades and we had a service for them and buried them the next day.
Blas Roca Calderio himself was there, he belonged to the upper level, I’ll give more details later, but he was the one who actually spoke at the service and did the honors.
MV: What role did Castro play in the invasion? [1:01:12]
MRP: I’m going to tell you about that. (Laughs) Starting the morning of the seventeenth, as soon as we knew for sure that the invasion was starting at Playa Girón, he gave the order for the entire militia school to transfer there. So we just kept on pushing and pushing until they were stuck there in Playa Girón. First thing that the invaders did was that they had an airdrop here at Playa Larga and then Yagurama, Covadonga. So these were positions that they had taken, you can see where this was a beachhead. We buried my companions from the squadron on the morning of the 19th in the cemetery of
Covadonga. By the end of the 18th we had already pushed the enemy back to Playa
Girón, they were all concentrated there; there were many different ways for us to go in and attack further. I then jumped on a truck that was headed in that direction to bring food to the troops that were down in there and I managed to rejoin my unit. We continued advancing until we got to San Blas. That evening the tanks arrived and we continued advancing and the enemy continued retreating. They concentrated us there Vogel 30 because next is cleaning up action is what we would be doing next. So keep in mind these people that we are fighting against are mercenaries, they were paid to do this, they weren’t patriots, they were mercenaries. I say that, I don’t want to offend anybody, but these people were not patriots, they were mercenaries. Military term is mopping up action, so many of them, not only did they leave equipment and other things behind but they themselves were trying to hide in different places and we would go and comb the area carefully until we found and of course captured them and sent them back as prisoners. The people that we took prisoner we sent them to La Cabaña, which is a prison. We caught them, disarmed them, we gave them water, attended to some of their needs. Until we got them all together, the whole mopping up action didn’t take more than 72 hours, this is significant because what we understood was that were they to have the mercenaries, the invaders, if they had actually succeeded in surviving there for 72 hours they would have then received support from the United States because they would’ve felt it was legitimate if they are able to do 72 hours, they can do a lot more than that. The total amount of casualties, dead, was 156 on the Cuban side. The 156 is militia, soldiers, police, civilians, etcetera. 800 wounded on the Cuban side. On the mercenaries side, 300 dead and 1,200 prisoners. The whole thing was over by five-thirty in the afternoon on the 19th of April. Prisoners were exchanged for baby food.
MV: (Laughs)
MRP: Yeah, so the U.S. did something for our kids and we gave them their prisoners back. Of course there were problems here with a lack of foodstuff after the Revolution.
We had no interest in keeping 1,200 prisoners that we had to feed. Among the prisoners that we took were individuals that had fled after the Revolution and had decided that they Vogel 31 were coming back to take over Cuba again. Those on the other hand, we brought them to trial and some of them committed suicide and we punished the rest in other ways. Those that had committed atrocities or other crimes when they were here prior to the
Revolution, those we kept prisoner. A lot of people among the invaders who were from very wealthy families they came under the mistaken notion that as soon as they disembarked, as soon as they got off on the beach, that the people would rise and join them against Castro; and what happened was just the opposite. The people were against them, not for them, because remember the militia were the people.
MV: Mhm.
MRP: There were many examples one including a family that I knew, there were three brothers in Santiago, and they were taken prisoner and they were exchanged for baby food and frankly I would not want to be exchanged for baby food. If they could have, they would have been able to buy their freedom with money but we weren’t interested, what we wanted to do was discredit them.
MV: When did you go back to Havana?
MRP: We returned on the 24th of April, we went back to the area where the battalion was stationed, and from there each one of us went to our home. We went back home, had a couple of days off, and then everything was back to normal. After that, that’s when I started at the military school.
MV: Were there any celebrations following the invasion? [01:14:31]
MRP: Yes of course because there was tremendous show of support by the people for the Revolution. Most of us came back, many died, 156, but still most of us came back. Vogel 32
There was this bittersweet feeling of course many, many people were happy but what took the edge off that was the death of 156 of our comrades.
MV: What comes to mind when you see this image?
MRP: This photo was taken on the 16th of April a day before the invasion, on 12th street and 23rd street. This was to pay homage to the fallen soldiers in the places where the aerial bombings had taken place and had killed a bunch of people. This was his way of saying farewell to the fallen comrades; the cemetery is one block away from where this took place, the Cemetery Colón. He announced at this point that this all, the aerial bombings, where a prelude to the invasion. This was the point at which he mobilized all of the troops in Havana, both militia and regulars, and sent them to different areas where the invasion might possibly take place. My comrades and I, we were already in
Cienfuegos, we heard this speech on the radio. We were already in Cienfuegos when we heard this over the radio and found out there had already been these activities, aerial bombings, taking place in these different areas. It was at this point in this speech, this famous speech, where Fidel Castro proclaimed the socialist nature of the Revolution in
Cuba, up until that point, Megan, that word wasn’t really used, but at this point he Vogel 33 declared the socialist nature of the Cuban Revolution. This means that we who went to
Playa Girón, we were there in defense of socialism because of course on the 16th Fidel proclaimed the socialist nature and character of the Revolution and of course Playa
Girón, all of the action took place after that.
MV: It was a great victory for Cuba and for you but you lost everyone in your squadron, what were your emotions? [01:18:20]
MRP: It was really hard, imagine, I spent all these months training with these people from October of 1960 until April of 1961. Over that period we got closer and closer and in April of ’61, there was already a feeling of brotherhood among us. In fact, after we were mobilized to Cienfuegos, we lived, the squadron, lived in a little house together.
We improvised some place to live together, we were all together. We looked after one another; we had each other’s backs. You resign yourself to the fact that it was necessary, it had to be.
MV: How aware were you of the events of the Cuban Missile Crisis between Cuba, the
United States, and the Soviet Union?
MRP: After Playa Girón, by December of 1961, I had joined the Armed Forces, regular army. I matriculated in the military school of the Cadets of Managua. I went through a course as an engineer, but like an army engineer. I graduated of course as a military person, as a commemoration on the seventeenth of April of 1962. The seventeenth of
April, of course, commemorates the day of Playa Girón. I graduated as the head of a unit as an army engineer. In relation to the question that you asked me about the Crisis of
October otherwise known as the Cuban Missile Crisis, at that point I was already a member of the regular army, I’m an officer. I’m already the head of a unit of engineers. Vogel 34
We found out about the Cuban Missile Crisis because we were mobilized already to be combat ready. We were mobilized, we were combat ready, and we were ready for anything that might happen. For us it was clear, invasion was imminent. We felt ourselves surrounded by the U.S. Navy and all other U.S. military. We were absolutely, totally encircled and surrounded the entire island of Cuba. This was on Monday, October
22nd, of 1962, the alarm was given and we were told to mobilize. We mobilized every troop on the island, in the country, and we all took our positions, wherever that happened to be. There was a lot of tension in the country because we knew we were being accused of having inter-ballistic Missiles or nuclear warheads here in Cuba. This was at the time when John Kennedy was President of the United States.
MV: What is your relationship with Fidel Castro? [01:26:18]
MRP: Son to a father.
MV: And what about your relationship with Raul?
MRP: Same as with Fidel; son to a father. Keep in mind the people that led us at that time, they have won over our hearts forever, for people of my generation. We were part of this Revolution and part of success and triumph of this Revolution. We supported the
Revolution and think of all the things we went through; first there was the Revolution and winning the Revolution, then joining the militia, getting rid of the counter- revolutionaries, there was Playa Girón, Bay of Bigs, the Cuban Missile Crisis, after that there was Angola, I mean it was a constant process of support and strengthening and consolidating the Revolution. Don’t think that this is universal, not everybody feels the same way, but again in general, people of my generation feel this way for the reasons I just said, and certainly for me I feel like a son to a father. I’m a militant of the Vogel 35
Communist Party for 46 years, I’ve never had a problem, I have no intention of leaving the party or anything like that.
MV: What do you think is the historical legacy of Fidel Castro’s leadership of Cuba?
[01:29:04]
MRP: Once he felt that he could no longer continue leading the people of Cuba because of his failing health, he then addressed the people of Cuba so that they could understand what was going on. The people reacted in a very positive way. This is where he made clear that he would continue being the Supreme Leader of the Cuban people, but day-to- day operations and running of the country would be turned over to his younger brother,
Raul. There was a long history of Raul’s supporting and doing whatever necessary to help his brother Fidel and further the cause of Raul’s being named the successor in a sense, was due to his merit. It wasn’t just due to the fact he was Fidel’s brother.
MV: When you graduated from your military academy, what was your rank? [01:31:49]
MRP: When I graduated I was the head of this engineering unit and I had the rank of
Lieutenant.
MV: What was your length of service?
MRP: I was in the army for 32 years.
MV: When did you become a Colonel?
MRP: I was a Lieutenant Colonel in 1982.
MV: Were you a part of any other military action?
MRP: After the Bay of Pigs there was Cuban Missile Crisis, and then I was in Angola.
MV: When?
MRP: From 1988 until 1990. Vogel 36
MV: What did you do there?
MRP: Engineering.
MV: Have you served in any other non-military goals in your community?
MRP: Yes, definitely. In the community I was president of the C.D.R., I was a coordinator of C.D.R.s, and I was a delegate to the Assembly of C.D.R.s, I was a delegate, also, of the Popular Choice, and Secretary of the Cuban Communist Party.
After retirement where I am no longer associated with a central work group, so it’s a different zone that I’m a part of.
MV: What is a C.D.R.? [01:36:37]
MRP: It’s an organization of the people, of the masses; it’s the one that has the most people in it in Cuba. This started on September 28th of 1960, this started with a group of people that organized themselves in front of the Presidential Palace. Fidel was talking to the people and counter-revolutionaries lobbed a few bombs. So in order to stop these counter-revolutionaries, we will create a local defense group, so committee is the “C,” defense is the “D,” and of the Revolution is the “R.” So essentially it is a Committee of
Revolutionary Defense.
MV: What is the historical legacy of the Bay of Pigs?
MRP: The legacy is clearly the first time that the American imperialism was defeated and stopped. Up to the Bay of Pigs, the United States had imposed their will and created regime changes throughout the Americas, however they wanted. And this was the first time that they were stopped from doing that.
MV: What is your strongest memory from the Bay of Pigs? [01:39:58] Vogel 37
MRP: It was they very, very strong response, the unity of the people supporting the
Revolution.
MV: What are your thoughts on the recent attempts to normalize the relationship between the United States and Cuba?
MRP: It’s a dream of all Cubans. Again, because we never had any coral with the
American people. Remember, it’s almost been 56 years that we have persevered in our
Revolution and going back to what we said before, nothing personal against the
American people, so when President Obama announced normalization of relationship, or at least an attempt to normalize relationships, it was the happiness of the entire Cuban people. So after all these years, all the different governments, Presidencies, all attempting to undo the Cuban Revolution, and none of them were able to do it. It’s not like the U.S. doesn’t have the actual power to do it, meaning the military strength, but as our Commander and Chief, as Castro has said, “You can invade us, but you can’t govern us.” Certainly by freeing those three prisoners as an act of good faith, it’s clear that the
American people have reached a point where they realize that there’s no reason to continue with the policies of the past, there’s no advantage, there’s no reason for you guys to continue doing that.
MV: What are your hopes for the future of your country?
MRP: A couple of important things for the future, the Communist Party has changed line or policies, particularly in the economic area and so far over the last couple of years they have been following through on their promises. What Cuba really needs is economic development more than anything else. It’s not only Cuban people who want this; it’s also the American people who also want this. Recently we saw a poll that said Vogel 38
69 percent of the American people back Obama’s decision to normalize relationships with Cuba. As much on the Republican side as the Democrat side. The only people that are against what Obama wants to do are those few individuals, three or four, who happen to have some kind of vested interest in maintaining the status quo. These are the people when there was the first sign of danger, they fled, and now they are trying to reestablish themselves à-la-cheap.
MV: Lastly, is there anything that I didn’t ask you that you think is important that you want to talk about? [01:47:24]
MRP: I think it’s great that you’re interested in what went on and what is going to happen. You’re the future and I’m very pleased that you are interested in this for that reason.
MV: Gracias.
MRP: And this is why it’s important, because it’s the young people like you who are really interested in this and will actually do something about it. The older people, you know they just don’t care anymore. I’d love to be there the day you are going to present this to support you.
MV: I’ll see what day it is. (Laughs)
MRP: Or you can call me to let me know how things went.
MV: Thank you so much for sharing your information with me.
MRP: All this stuff is yours.
MV: Thank you.
Vogel 39
Analysis Paper
History is the study of past events that are related to a particular subject, place, organization, etcetera. In a broader sense, history is all that has happened, including everything that undergoes change. Being able to read and conduct interviews on different topics is significantly important due to the selective and more personal information that is obtained and presented, in contrast to textbooks and other sources of information, like the
Internet. The Oral History interview about the Bay of Pigs with Colonel Manuel Reina
Pardo explains the impact, not only socially and economically, but emotionally as well, that the Cuban Revolution had on the people of Cuba.
This interview helped to explain the importance of gaining a deeper sense of historical events in order to understand the developments that are taking place in this day and age. Studying history is vital in finding out how society has evolved over time, through the major events that shaped our world into what it is today. Examining the past gives us a perspective on what has happened and helps us analyze the impact of the decisions that led to those events. Had the decisions been different, the outcomes would most likely not have been the same, and History would tell a different story. Because of the fact that history plays a vital role in society, it is of great importance that it is as accurate as possible; it must be based on evidence and logical thought as opposed to erroneous theory, political ideology, or bias.
Oral history is a very important method in learning about historical events. It is a way of being able to obtain a personal and emotional connection, as well as additional details about a topic that one might not be able to receive through learning the subject in school, reading about the topic in a textbook, or searching online. Vogel 40
Oral history is the collection and study of historical information using voice recordings of interviews with people having personal knowledge of past events. As defined by Donald Ritchie, oral history “is a historical method that collects and preserves spoken memories through recorded interviews.” Sometimes in textbooks, since the authors have limited space for each topic, some very important and useful facts can be left out, leading to the reader not being able to get the full scope of the event. Memory also plays an important role in oral history. A person’s memory, over time, can change and can affect the outcome of an interview, if that person does not remember events effectively. Many times in a history book, it is difficult to find a primary source on the topic at hand and one is not able to get the same emotional connection, as it would be possible through reading a transcription or listening to someone tell their own story.
The interview with Colonel Manuel Reina Pardo was filled with emotional facts and feelings that covered the topic of the Bay of Pigs in 1961. More interesting than that is the fact that those facts and feelings come from a man who supported the Cuban
Revolution. Being in the first squadron that went out with the purpose of trying to block the Cuban exiles from invading their native country, Colonel Manuel managed to escape death but sadly had to watch all the other men in his squadron die. Although it was a very traumatic event, Colonel Manuel stated “you resign yourself to the fact that it was necessary, it had to be” (Reina Pardo, 33). Even though it was heartbreaking to see his buddies die, Colonel Manuel felt that they were out there defending their country. They all knew that their lives were on the line and they were at peace with taking that risk.
There was a lot of historical value that came along with the interview with
Colonel Manuel. There is a lack of historical facts from the side of a pro-Cuban Vogel 41
Revolutionist in many books and historical websites, so it was very interesting to get a perspective from someone who has lived under the Castro regime all of his life. For an outsider, living in Cuba does not seem like the most ideal situation, considering the lack of food, supplies, resources, opportunities, and Internet. On the other hand, according to
Colonel Manuel, living under those conditions was not as bad as someone might think and he was happy with the way his country was being run: “In general, we really didn’t make the distinctions about socialism … what we did see was that things seemed to be improving… it made us feel comfortable with socialism…” (Reina Pardo, 22). To many
Americans as well as some Cubans who decided to leave their country during the 1950’s,
Fidel Castro was the least desirable leader for Cuba to have, due to his oppressive views and the reforms that he implemented throughout the country. Castro did not approve of any American influence and believed that it was time “…for Cubans to take control of their country…” Along with the amount of historical value present, there were strengths and some limitations that came along with the interview. Due to the fact that Colonel
Manuel only speaks Spanish, it was hard to hold an interview that had complete fluidity when both the interviewer and interviewee only know basic words and phrases in each other’s languages.
One of the greatest strengths in the interview with Colonel Manuel was the fact that he was very open and willing to talk, giving an enormous amount of detail to every question asked; Mr. Reina Pardo had many photographs and awards that he presented during the interview which helped to better understand what he was talking about and helped to get more of a visual context. Contrasting with the strengths, there were some downsides, such as the language barrier, which made it harder to connect and get an Vogel 42 emotional feeling about what the interviewee was saying. It also meant that since everything was getting translated, some things were likely lost in translation; it was possible, as well, that there was a certain degree of bias from the way the interviewee views Fidel Castro. There is no doubt that Colonel Manuel considers Fidel Castro a great leader, due to the great respect he has for him and the emotional connection with the man that led them to victory over the United States.
From this process, I have learned the importance of oral history and how valuable it is to interview someone that had a direct participation in a historical event and who, as a consequence, had an impact in history. The interview is instrumental in getting their perspective on how those events helped shape history and our future. The opportunity to interview a Cuban who had participated in the Bay of Pigs seemed especially important.
The lack of diplomatic relationships and the travel limitations at the time made it more challenging, but also more necessary to obtain such an interview. The fact that the pool of interviewees just keeps getting smaller, due to the age factor, made the timing of it even more essential.
Vogel 43
Works Consulted
Ambrose, Stephen E., and Douglas Brinkley. Rise to Globalism: American Foreign
Policy Since 1938. New York: Penguin, 1997. Print.
"Bay of Pigs - 40 Years After - Chronology." The National Security Archive. N.p., n.d.
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