The London Gazette of FRIDAY, I Sth OCTOBER, 1948
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38432 5493 SUPPLEMENT TO The London Gazette OF FRIDAY, i sth OCTOBER, 1948 Registered as a newspaper MONDAY, 18 OCTOBER, 1948 COASTAL FORCE ACTIONS. The following Despatch was submitted to the ENCLOSURE i TO C.-iN-C., LEVANT'S LETTER. Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty on the i$th March, 1943, by Admiral Sir FROM ... The Captain Coastal Forces, HENRY H. HARWOOD, K.C.B., O.B.E., Mediterranean. Commander-in-Chief, Levant. DATE ... 2ist February, 1943. Levant, To ... The Commander-in-Chief, Levant. i$th March, 1943. The attached report and diagram from the MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS 61, 77, 82, 307 AND 315 Commanding Officer, 7th Motor Torpedo Boat —REPORT OP PROCEEDINGS i5TH/i6TH Flotilla are forwarded, with the following FEBRUARY, 1943. remarks. Forwarded for the information of Their Lord- i. The composition of this strike was as ships, concurring generally-in the remarks of follows::— the Captain- Coastal Forces. This operation resulted in a torpedo hit on an enemy mer- M.T.B.s 61 ") chant ship and damage to other enemy ships 77 (Flotilla Commanding I 7th Flotilla by gunfire.* Much valuable experience was Officer on board) f (Vospers) gained. 82 J 2. The remarks in paragraph 3 of the Cap- M.T.B.s 307 \ioth Flotilla tain Coastal Forces' letter are fully concurred 315 / (Elcos). in. M.T.B.S 77 and 82 should have fired As the loth Flotilla boats had been undocked both torpedoes at their targets. only the same day, it was impossible for them 3. The operation was carried out in the face to be ready in time to sail in 'company with of strong opposition in a spirited and deter- the other boats. It was unfortunate that the mined mannei, which bodes well for future two units were not able to join up, as in- operations. The diversion by the M.G.B.,was tended; results would probably have been far well planned and carried out. more effective had a laxger number of Motor Torpedo Boats been available to attack the 4. The freedom from mechanical trouble main enemy convoy. The results of this attack during the operation reflects credit on all con- were that one merchant vessel of medium cerned. size was definitely damaged with an expendi- (Signed) H. H. HARWOOD, ture of two torpedoes. There is now no reason Admiral, to suppose that this ship was the same as that Commander-in-Chief. subsequently sunk by an aircraft. 2. It is considered that Motor Torpedo Boat Admiralty footnote: * The action took place in the vicinity'of Maritime 77 was well handled 'by Lieutenant J. B. Island, off the western point of Sicily. Sturgeon, Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve. His 5494 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 18 OCTOBER, 1948 attacks were pressed home to short range, re- the main Motor Torpedo Boat striking force sulting in a hit with the only torpedo fired, had been removed from Malta a few days confirmed by Motor Torpedo Boat 82. It was previously. not known to the Commanding Officer that his (Signed) M. C. GILES, second torpedo had failed to fire until about twenty minutes later. • This misfire and the Lieutenant, R.N., casualty to the First Lieutenant when about for Captain, Absent on Duty. to release a depth charge, were two misfor- tunes which combined to spoil a very spirited ENCLOSURE 2 TO C.-iN-C., LEVANT'S LETTER. attack during which Motor Torpedo Boat 77 FROM ... The Senior Officer, 7th M.T.B. was subjected to intense enemy fire. Flotilla. DATE ... i7th February, 1943. 3. Motor Torpedo Boat 82 fired one torpedo only, which missed. The conclusions (para- To ... The Captain Coastal Forces, graph 13 (viii)) of the Flotilla Commanding Mediterranean. Officer are that both torpedoes should be fired Submitted: whenever a good target presents itself. This M.T.B.S 77 (V.7* on board), 82 and 61 is considered, without doubt, to be the correct sailed from Malta in accordance with previous procedure and has again been impressed on instructions, and passed the boom at 1500. Commanding Officers. Having reached the end of the swept channel a course was set for a position 15 miles due 4. Motor Torpedo Boat 61 (Lieutenant T. J. south of Maritime Island. All three .boats Bligh, Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve), were carrying a thousand gallons of upper- equipped as a gunboat, fought a prolonged deck fuel, and as this was the first time of and resolute action with the convoy escort, carrying it a speed of i8£ knots was allowed for which was greatly superior in- fire power. It engine revolutions giving 20 knots under normal is considered that this boat did particularly well; load. It was subsequently found that there her wheel steering was out ot order through- was no reduction in speed due to the extra out the action, during which she was steered load. with the tiller from att. M.T.B.s 307 and 315 were due to sail at 5. The conclusions of the Flotilla Command- approximately 1600, and catch us up en route, ing Officer are considered sound, particularly or failing that to rendezvous in position 15 paragraph 13 (viii), referred to above. The miles south of Maritime Isknd. R.D.JK.* with which these M.T.B.s are fitted 2. At 2140, an enemy report was received of was not used on this occasion, as the enemy one merchant vessel and two destroyers, steer- convoy appeared before it was expected. ing 240 degrees towards Maritimo Island. It .6. Motor Torpedo Boats 307 and 315, not was thought that these ships would be our having met the others at the rendezvous, were target, and that they would -eventually alter deprived of their target at the last moment by course to the southward, in which case bur its being sunk by a Wellington torpedo-bomber. position south of Maritimo Island would be The small fast enemy destroyer which had very suitable. been escorting the merchant ship was not a At 2320, M.T.B. 61 signalled that she had suitable torpedo target and these Motor Torpedo a defective dynamo and that it was necessary Boats are not sufficiently heavily armed with for her to stop. - Boats stopped at 2325 and guns to engage such a target with a good chance cut engines. At that moment an- enemy report of success. of four merchant vessels and three destroyers to the northward of us was received, and before 7. Mechanically, all the Motor Torpedo Boats it could 'be plotted on the chart M.T.B. 61 ran well and without giving any trouble. This reported that she had sighted a large merchant is a far more satisfactory state of affairs than vessel to starboard, about i| miles away. has recently been the case with boats of this type, and the improvement is largely due to 3. All boats were ordered to start up one the skill and enthusiasm of Lieutenant (E) engine, and M.T.B. 77 followed by M.T.B-. 82, W. R. Coverdale, Royal. Navy, the Coastal proceeded on a north-easterly course with the Force Base Engineer Officer. object of getting the target on the port bow". On closing it was observed that there were The conduct of officers and ships' companies two columns of ships, with a heavy escort of during this operation is reported to have been destroyers, and that we were steering on - a excellent. course almost exactly opposite to the port 8. It is considered that this force of Motor enemy column. • • Torpedo Boats was well led by Lieutenant The starboard column was sighted to1 port, R. A. M. Hennessy, Royal Navy, the Com- and consisted of a destroyer with two merchant manding Officer of the 7th Flotilla, who was vessels astern. As we were in an ideal posi- hampered by having only two Motor Torpedo tion to attack the leading ship of this column, Boats and one Motor Gun Boat, against the the signal " Attack with torpedoes " was made, enemy escort of four destroyers and three E- and all three boats acted independently. from, boatsf and merchant ships which were them- then on. selves armed. His small attacking force caused 4. M.T.B. 77 (Lieutenant J. B. Sturgeon;, great' confusion among the convoy, enemy R.N.V.R.) altered course to port to get on the ships firing on one another and some in the firing course to attack the leading merchant air. Under these conditions, a really adequate vessel of the starboard column. In order to force of Motor Torpedo Boats should have been avoid the'port column it was necessary to go able to sink several enemy ships. In this case on to all three engines and increase to 20 knots. Admiralty footnotes: Admiralty footnote: ' . ' • ' * R.D.F.—radar, * V.7—the Commapding O|&cer of 7th' M.T.B. t E-boats—similar to' British M.T.B.s. Flotilla. • • v. •...'.-••• •'.•'• SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 18 OCTOBER, 1948 5495 M.T.B. 77 was now crossing the centre of M.T.B. 82 altered course to the southward, the convoy and by some miracle remained being engaged by a destroyer and an E-boat. unobserved until the range of the target had 8. A cloud of black smoke was observed closed to 400 yards, and the port torpedo was alongside the leading merchant vessel of the fired. The torpedo was seen to run correctly, starboard column, preceded by a flash. This and we decided to alter course 100 degrees to was certainly caused by M.T.B.