10 / 2013

Strategic Depth through Soft Power: The Domestic Production and International Projection of Turkish Culture

Guest Editor: Mathieu Rousselin (Duisburg)

Turkish Soap Oper Aşk-ı Memnu (“Forbidden Love”) was aired between 2008 and 2010 and is one of the most popular Turkish television series in the Middle-East and in the Balkans Source: http://www.askimemnu.tv

Online Journal of the Center for Governance and Culture in University of St. Gallen www.gce.unisg.ch, www.euxeinos.ch ISSN 2296-0708 Managing Editor Maria Tagangaeva Center for Governance and Last Update May 27, 2013 Landis & Gyr Culture in Europe stiftung University of St.Gallen Contents

Strategic Depth through Soft Power: The Domestic Production and International Projection of Turkish Culture Editorial 3

Special note: Photography Exhibition „Catching the Europe in “ 6

Soft Power in Turkish Foreign Policy: New Instruments and Challenges by Selcen Öner, Bahçeşehir University, Istanbul 7

Turkish Soap Power: International Perspectives and Domestic Paradoxes by Mathieu Rousselin, Centre for Global Cooperation Research, University of Duisburg-Essen 16

Are New Sufis “Grey Turks”? by Marta Dominguez Diaz, University of St.Gallen 23

Istanbul: How ’s Cultural Capital Has Shaped Its Foreign Policy by Jennifer Brindisi, Istanbul/London 30

Euxeinos 10 (2013) 2 Strategic Depth through Soft Power: The Domestic Production and International Projection of Turkish Culture

uring the Opening March of the World Turkish/Oriental match of the white-skinned, DSocial Forum held in Tunis from March fair-haired and blue-eyed Daniel Craig in 26th to 30th 2013, thousands of participants James Bond or of Jack Bauer in the television walked up the Mohamed V avenue, one of Tu- series 24. Equally remarkable to a western au- nis’ forefront boulevards hosting a large num- dience, the Valley of the Wolves franchise heav- ber of government buildings and headquarters ily draws on anti-Americanism and anti-Sem- of large international companies. In doing so, itism for the portrayal of the villains. In Valley

Editorial they passed by two symbols of the Turkish of the Wolves: Iraq (2006), American soldiers presence in Tunisia: the Bosphore Académie, a are the bad guys, using Iraqi children as hu- private language school also acting as a Turk- man shields, blindly killing innocent guests at ish cultural centre and a number of bus stops a wedding ceremony and abusing detainees in covered with large-scale advertisements for sequences which are obvious references to re- the Turkish television series Magnificent Centu- al-life events such as the wedding-party mas- ry. If needed, these are welcome signs that the sacre in Mukaradeeb and the Abu-Ghraib tor- work undertaken in this issue is both timely ture scandal. The movie also showed a Jewish and important. doctor removing organs from injured civilians Indeed, Turkey is increasingly seen, if not so as to sell them to rich American and Jewish as a full-fledged counter-model, at least as pro- patients in the West awaiting transplantation. ducing and promoting cultural goods which Although the movie earned much criticism in openly challenge Hollywood codes. And these the US and in Europe, it was a good export productions are often exported internation- product throughout the Arab world. ally (sometimes with the active support of Such trivial examples are not isolated. the Turkish government) and are particularly Alone, they would be mere anecdotes, but tak- heartily welcomed in the Balkans, in the Black en together, they point to a growing trend as Sea region and in the Arab world, thereby well as to a characteristic feature of the Turk- positively contributing to the international im- ish foreign policy, in particular under the AKP age of Turkey as well as generating income for government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip the Turkish economy. One such example is the Erdoğan – namely the deliberate effort to pro- success of the Valley of the Wolves. Three movies mote Turkish culture abroad, and particularly were adapted from the television series, two of in the Arab world and in neighbouring coun- which openly deal with sensitive international tries of the Black Sea region, in order to gain issues (the Iraq war and the Gaza flotilla af- a series of political, diplomatic and commer- fair). These movies are noteworthy because cial advantages. The conceptual cornerstone they offer beautiful cases of mirrored depiction of this policy is Ahmet Davutoglu’s Strategic of heroism to a western audience. Indeed, Val- Depth, which contends that Turkish history ley of the Wolves does not break with the codes (Ottoman legacy) and geography (size and of modern chivalry or with the grotesquely ex- strategic location) provide the country with aggerated portrayal of good and evil. Instead, a significant soft power potential, which the these codes are merely reversed. Hence, the country ought to activate and use to its benefit undercover agent protecting the weak, de- by actively promoting its culture worldwide. fending helpless children and saving villages is played by Necati Şaşmaz, who is a kind of

Euxeinos 10 (2013) 3 Thematic scope of the issue discrepancies between the international image of Turkey and the domestic societal realities of In this context, this issue addresses the contemporary Turkey. question of Turkish soft power with a double emphasis on Turkish structures/institutions Individual contributions as well as on concrete empirical case studies. Stated otherwise, the purpose of this issue is The first paper “Soft Power in Turkish not to offer another theoretical contribution to Foreign Policy: New Instruments and Chal- the ongoing academic debate on soft power lenges” by Selcen Öner serves as a framing pa- – an issue which is better left to specialised per for the entire issue. It briefly highlights the scientific reviews. Another important caveat understanding of soft power within Turkish is the focus that the review Euxeinos oper- academia and goes on to introduce Strategic ates on governance and culture. This means Depth as the conceptual basis underpinning that a series of important economic, trade or Turkish foreign policy. It then reviews the in- financial issues which undeniably contribute stitutions and foreign policy instruments at to strengthen the power of attraction of Tur- the disposal of the Turkish state when trying to key will not be dealt with here. The interested promote its culture worldwide. It points to the reader may refer to scientific journals such proliferation of various cultural institutions as Turkish Studies, the International Review of which, as is the case for the Turkish Cultural Turkish Studies, the European Journal of Turkish Centres and the Yunus Emre Institutes, are de Studies or New perspectives on Turkey which facto placed in a situation of competition one have regularly addressed these issues at great with another. Another perhaps unexpected re- length. sult for the Western reader is the trade-off that The aim and added-value of this issue is some members of Turkish academia seem to therefore twofold. First, it aims at showing see between hard and soft power. how Turkish scholars understand and apply The second paper ”Turkish Soap Power: soft power and how the Turkish state has de- International perspectives and domestic para- veloped specific foreign policy instruments doxes” by myself is the first case study of the dedicated to the promotion of Turkey’s soft special issue and focuses on the domestic and power. Second, these strategies of soft power international success of Turkish television se- are illustrated by means of three case studies ries. These series often address pressing soci- dedicated to domestic and international suc- etal issues such as sexual emancipation, wom- cess of Turkish soap operas, to the spread of en rights, drug or alcohol consumption and Sufism in segments of the Turkish society and abortion which could be deemed offensive to the bids of Turkey’s capital city Istanbul by an Islamic audience. Yet, the manner with to host a series of international events. These which these issues are dealt with seems to case studies highlight the way in which cul- resonate across the Black Sea and Arab world, tural contents or messages are promoted and leading for instance to a situation in which the received internationally. They also point to last episode of the Turkish soap Gümüş / Noor subtle and interesting evolutions in the kind was viewed by 85 million people worldwide, of image Turkey wants to convey of itself. Fi- including half the total number of adult wom- nally, the same case studies identify certain en in the Arab world. Paradoxically enough,

Euxeinos 10 (2013) 4 the freedom of tone of Turkish producers has tempt to break the deadlock on EU accession been harshly criticised within Turkey by se- negotiations. A few years ahead and with ac- nior AKP politicians as well as by regulatory cession talks virtually frozen, the bid for the authorities such as the RTÜK. 2020 Summer Olympics is based on a different The third paper “Are New Sufis “Grey narrative, that of the “global vision”, whereby Turks”? Urbanite National Identities and Re- Istanbul has become the avant-garde of all ligious reconfigurations” by Marta Domin- Muslim nations and a city “looking at 360 de- guez Diaz addresses the recent revival of Sufi grees”, rather than a microcosm of religious thought in traditionally secular urban classes diversity with its eyes riveted on Europe. of Turkey. She argues that this movement ought to be understood as an attempt to break Mathieu Rousselin (Duisburg) with the old anti-religious discourse of “White Turks” while simultaneously keeping away from the traditional and rigorous religious About the Editor: practices of “Black Turks”. Stated otherwise, this movement does not imply a rejection of Mathieu Rousselin is a postdoctoral fellow at western modernity, which the so-called “Grey the centre for Global Cooperation Research Turks” still embraced for intellectual stimu- of the University of Duisburg-Essen. He lation. Rather, it corresponds to the desire to graduated from the Institut d’Études Politiques incorporate the warmth and wisdom of Sufi de Paris as well as from the College of Europe traditions into a contemporary Turkish iden- and completed his doctoral education at the tity otherwise perceived as overly cold and University of St. Gallen. His research interest “soulless”. In the Turkish literary landscape, lies in European external governance, in Elif Şafak stands out as the most prominent Mediterranean politics and in the study of representative of this spiritual revival. Inter- estingly, the international success of her books territorialisation processes. His work has may be taken as a sign that the interest in this been published in Journal of Contemporary westernised version of Sufism goes far beyond European Research, Émulations, WeltTrends, the border of Turkey. the Transformative Power of Europe Working The fourth and last paper “Istanbul: How Papers series and Cuadernos de Yuste Turkey’s Cultural Capital Has Shaped Its (forthcoming) Foreign Policy” by Jennifer Brindisi offers a e-mail: [email protected] convincing account of the way Turkey rede- fined its soft power strategy. Indeed, in the context of the 2010 European Capital of Cul- ture (ECoC) programme, Turkish policy mak- ers went to great length to promote Istanbul as a cosmopolitan, multi-religious and Euro- compatible capital city. Hence, the ECoC ap- plication emphasised the decisive historical contribution of Byzantium / Istanbul as cradle of the European civilisation, in a tactical at-

Euxeinos 10 (2013) 5 CATCHING EUROPE IN ISTANBUL

We are pleased to present in this Euxeinos issue three photography works from the Photography Exhibit “Catching Europe in Istanbul”. The exhibition was organized by , Turkey, as a part of a wide-ranging event to celebrate Europe Day on 9 May 2013. The pictures were collected through an open contest; six of 40 images were awarded. Because of participants’ diversity (background, age, nationality) and therefore diversity of ideas represented in the

special note pictures, the jury was composed by both professional photographers and academics. The three photographs presented in Euxeinos are accompanied by comments made by the photographers themselves. For further information please visit the website http://www.khas.edu.tr/en/ciesindex. php?id=115 Euxeinos Editorial Team, St.Gallen

Euxeinos 10 (2013) 6 Soft Power in Turkish Foreign Policy: New Instruments and Challenges

by Selcen Öner, Bahçeşehir University, Istanbul

Introduction ple especially for the opposition forces in the Arab world (Benli Altunışık, 2011, p.1). he term “soft power” was first used by Jo- This article discusses the domestic and Tseph Nye, who defined it as “the ability to external factors which positively influence shape the preferences of others” (Nye, 2004, p. the “soft power” of Turkey in the first decade 5). If others follow the lead of the power hold- of the 21st century. The place and role of soft er due to the power of attraction, we can speak power in Turkish foreign policy is analysed of “soft power”. According to Nye (2004), soft and a series of new soft power instruments power resources are cultural attraction, ideol- which have been introduced by Turkey are ogy and international institutions. Legitimacy evaluated. Lastly the challenges to Turkey’s and credibility are necessary conditions for the soft power are discussed. existence of “soft power”: because “if a state can make its power seem legitimate in the National and International Context eyes of others, it will encounter less resistance and Turkey’s “Soft Power” to its wishes” (Nye, 1990, p. 167). As Altınay (2008, p. 61) argues, winning hearts and minds Several internal and external develop- may be more effective than winning wars. ments have positively influenced the “soft While “hard power” assumes an emphasis power” of Turkey in the first decade of the on the agent, “soft power” emphasises the 21st century. The main internal development significance of perceptions of “others” about which caused changes in Turkish foreign the agent. The middle-sized countries usually policy approach is that the Justice and Devel- behave as “hard powers” if they think that opment Party (AKP), which has an Islamist there is an increase in threats to their security origin, came to power in 2002 together with a (Oğuzlu, 2007, pp. 82-84). new elite and political agenda (Bilgin, 2008). During the Cold War era and in the 1990s The main external development was the pros- as well, Turkey was considered mostly as a pect of EU membership for Turkey after the “hard power” because of the high influence of Helsinki Summit in December 1999 when its military in politics and deficiencies in its de- Turkey was given an official candidate status. mocracy and human rights. In the first decade The Europeanization of Turkey, which was of the 21st century several internal and exter- the main objective of the AKP during its first nal developments have positively contributed term in Government (2002-2007), has posi- to Turkey’s “soft power”. Turkey as a secular, tively influenced its “soft power” especially democratic state with a predominantly Mus- by the introduction of several reforms in the lim population has had a rising influence in areas of democracy, human rights and minor- the region after September 11. Especially after ity rights. These reforms decreased the influ- the Arab Spring there have been discussions ence of the military on politics and strength- on whether Turkey’s political and socio-eco- ened Turkish civil society. For instance, Öniş nomic transformation could provide an exam- (2009,pp. 8-9) argues that these reforms lead to

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a closer involvement of new actors in Turkish mon projects. foreign policy, such as business organisations During the second term (2007-2011) of the and civil society organisations. The EU played AKP government the cultural proximity with its part in these reforms by providing funds neighbouring countries was emphasized. In to the projects of Turkish civil society as well addition to its geostrategic importance, Tur- as opportunities for new interactions between key’s democracy and growing economy have civil society in Turkey and the member states, thereby positively influencing both the numerical development and the technical specialisation of Turkish civil society. Launched in October 2005, the EU accession nego- tiations rapidly stalled be- cause of the Cyprus issue and the resolute opposition to full membership of Turkey by the governments of France and Germany, who are major mo- tors of European integration. The “Alliance of Civiliza- Catching Europe in Istanbul: tions” project was launched Erdan Genç, student in electrical engineering, Stuttgart, Germany: „On the one side we have the typical Istanbul chestnut salesman with his little carriage, in 2005 by the Prime Min- standing on Istiklal Caddesi trying to earn some money. On the other side we have those isters of Turkey and Spain, “shadows” of the people walking up and down this magnificent street. This shadowlike appea- rance is a hint for the rush everyone is in. When looking down to the shoes we can recognize which was later adopted by high heels and sneakers. All together this reminds me of European influences in Istanbul. the Secretary General of the Another thing I really like about the picture is the color, which makes me think of what Orhan Pamuk describes as “hüzün”, a kind of melancholic feeling which is present all over Istanbul, UN to become an initiative especially in the days of winter.“ of UN. Its priority areas are © Erdan Genç youth, media, education and migration. The goal of the project is interreligious and cross-cultural dia- become the political and discursive basis of logue. It intends to generate a political will to the multi-dimensional and proactive Turk- counter prejudices, stereotypes and reciprocal ish foreign policy (Keyman, 2009, p.5). Tur- misgivings between and among persons and key’s regional and global engagements have groups belonging to different religious and even expanded to Africa, Asia as well as Latin cultural backgrounds (Ministry of Foreign Af- America. Its increasing proactiveness in re- fairs of Turkey, 2012). It was introduced as a gions such as the and the Bal- response to rising tensions between different kans has been criticized as reflections of “neo- religions and cultures especially after Septem- Ottomanism” (Ulusoy, 2005, p.245). İbrahim ber 11, by encouraging interactions and com- Kalın (2011, p.10), who is the Chief Advisor to

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Prime Minister of Turkey and head of the Pub- The main discourse of this new vision in Turk- lic Diplomacy Office, rejects the claims about ish foreign policy is the “zero problem poli- “neo-Ottomanism” in the new Turkish foreign cy” (komşularla sıfır problem politikası) with its policy; rather he considers these tendencies as neighbours, which reflects Turkey’s expecta- the reconciliation between Turkey and its his- tions with regard to its relations with neigh- tory and geography. bouring countries. Turkey wants to eliminate During the second term of the AKP gov- all problems in its relations with neighbours ernment there have been attempts to construct or at least to minimize them as much as pos- Turkey as a “center”. Turkey has become more sible. The main foundations of the new vision active in international organizations such as in Turkish foreign policy are security for all, the G-20, the Organization of Islamic Coopera- political dialogue, economic interdependence tion (OIC), while it also became a temporary and cultural harmony (Ministry of Foreign Af- member of the UN Security Council for the fairs, 2012). 2009-2010 period. Due to its growing economy According to one Turkish diplomat, Tur- and proactive foreign policy in various parts key’s historical and cultural background, its of the world, Turkey is sometimes referred to democracy, the dynamism of its economy, its as a “model country” for other countries in the young population, its lacking colonial history, Islamic world (Keyman, 2009, p. 12). Especial- its “zero problem policy” which is in accor- ly after the Arab uprisings in North Africa and dance with the “peace at home peace in the the Middle East, it has been widely discussed world” (“yurtta barış dünyada barış”) approach whether the Turkish model can be a source of of Atatürk, are the main pillars of Turkey’s soft emulation for these countries, thereby further power. He argues that the lack of a colonial strengthening the soft power of Turkey1. background facilitates the recognition and ac- ceptance of Turkey and its values especially in The Role of Soft Power in Turkey’s the countries which experienced colonisation Foreign Policy Strategy in their history. He emphasized that in order to use all this potential, a country has to be Ahmet Davutoğlu, who has been the powerful and stable, because nobody finds a Turkish Foreign Minister since 2009, has been country attractive, if it is weak and unstable influential in constructing a new approach in (Interview, 2012). In particular the rising eco- Turkish foreign policy which is based on the nomic growth rates in Turkey during the fi- “Strategic Depth” (Stratejik Derinlik) doctrine. nancial crisis in the Eurozone have increased the self-confidence of Turkey and its attrac- 1 TESEV’s public opinion surveys in the Arab world showed that Turkey has been quite attractive tiveness in its region. in the region. This attractiveness comes from Kalın (2010) contends that the soft power proactive Turkish foreign policy, the perception of of Turkey is based on its historical and geo- Turkey’s socio-economic transformation in the last graphical depth. Its historical heritage and decade as a success story and an increase of Turkish cultural depth have led to the emergence of cultural products, particularly Turkish TV series, in new fields of interaction. Thus, the historical the region. The popularity of these series has been influential in the increase in the number of visitors background of Turkey and its cultural connec- to Turkey from the Arab countries. (Benli Altunışık, tions with the neighbouring regions contrib- 2011: 1).

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ute to high levels of interactions with these The activities of Turkish public diplo- regions. Kalın (2011, pp. 5-10) makes refer- macy include conference series of “wise ence to Turkey’s history, culture, geography, men”, journalists group programs, country economic strength and democracy as the main programs, meetings with the representa- basis of Turkey’s soft power. He argues that tives of the foreign press, promotion activi- the influence of Turkey’s “soft power” extends ties, public diplomacy panels, foreign policy from the Balkans to the Middle East and Cen- workshops, Europe meetings and the İstanbul tral Asia. According to him a “new Turkey” Global Forum, which was held for the first is emerging as a result of a new geopolitical time in October 2012 with the participation imagination and the creation of Turkish public of politicians, academics, writers, journalists diplomacy. This diplomacy is aimed at telling and artists. The conference series of “wise the story of a new Turkey to a wide audience men” aims to bring politicians, intellectuals, in the world in an efficient and comprehensive journalists and specialists to Turkey such as way. Kalın defines public diplomacy as a plat- Seyyid Hüseyin Nasr, Harvey Cox, George form for the implementation of “soft power”. Friedman and Günter Verheugen. The jour- The Office of Public Diplomacy was es- nalist groups program aims to invite several tablished within the Turkish Prime Ministry in journalists from the foreign press to Turkey. 2010, which is one of the signs of institution- They usually stay for a week in Turkey, ac- alization of “soft power” in Turkey. The ac- companied by high level representatives of tivities of public diplomacy mainly have two public authorities. They can attend meetings pillars. One of them is “from state to society” together with several journalists, media repre- and the other one is “from society to society”. sentatives and research institutions of Turkey. The first one focuses on explaining the policies Until now, journalist groups from Syria, Iran, and activities of the government to an inter- Lebanon, Spain, USA, and Turkmenistan have national public by using official instruments. participated in this program. The goal of the For the second pillar, civil instruments such as meetings with the representatives of the for- CSOs, research institutes, press and universi- eign press in Turkey is to give them a chance ties are used (Kamu Diplomasisi, 2010) during to come together regularly with Turkish de- the communication activities. The goal of pub- cision-makers, who can inform them about lic diplomacy as one of the main instruments various policies and recent developments of Turkish foreign policy and its soft power is in Turkey. The country programmes aim to to increase the visibility of Turkey in interna- bring together the researchers and specialists tional public opinion. Public diplomacy activi- on Turkey from different countries and those ties include science and technology, economy, from Turkey. The meetings are held in foreign tourism, culture, arts, foreign aid and media, countries and organized by cooperating with which help to inform world public opinion one of the leading think tanks of that country. about the new potentials of Turkey. By coor- Public diplomacy panels are organized each dinating these activities, this office contributes month in a different city of Turkey through to Turkey’s strategic communication and effi- cooperation with a university and with the cient promotion in the world (Vizyon ve Mi- participation of specialists and high level bu- syon, 2010). reaucrats. The foreign policy workshops are

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held in different cities of Turkey and include ricultural development, tourism and industry. academics, foreign policy makers and PhD TİKA Programme Offices were established candidates. Europe meetings involve academ- first in Turkmenistan and then in 12 countries ics and thinkers, who are specialised in Euro- in 2002. It was expanded to 33 offices in 30 pean identity and culture and conduct discus- countries in 2012. In addition to the countries sions about the future of Europe. For example, in which there are TİKA offices, it undertakes Gil Anidjar, Susan Buck-Morss, Ian Almond, cooperative developmental activities in 100 Nilüfer Göle were invited to this program countries. TİKA has been conducting projects (Faaliyetler, 2010). In the last three years since and cooperative activities in the Balkans, the the Public Diplomacy Office was established Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East, Afri- within the framework of the “wise men” con- ca and Latin America. The development funds ference series, 80 persons have been invited, of Turkey amounted to 85 million US dollars while journalist groups from six countries in 2002, and 1.273 billion US dollars in 2011 were invited. In seven Turkish cities public di- (TİKA, 2013). plomacy panels were held, and as part of the In accordance with a multi-dimensional youth programmes student groups composed foreign policy, there is a necessity to pursue of 40 students were invited from , Tuni- a multi-dimensional strategy for the promo- sia and Libya (Koordinatörlüğümüz, 2013). tion of Turkey abroad, which covers a broad spectrum ranging from economy and trade to The New Instruments of Turkey’s Soft culture, from social development to education Power and from cultural diversity to richness of in- tellectual life. The promotion of Turkey is di- The abolishment of visa requirements for rected not only at foreigners but also at Turk- neighbouring countries such as Syria, Egypt, ish communities living abroad. In order to Lebanon and Iran has positively influenced promote Turkey abroad, exhibitions, Week of the “soft power” of Turkey by increasing inter- Turkey and Year of Turkey events and festivals actions between Turkey and these countries. are organized, Turkey participates in existing Turkish CSOs and business organisations such festivals and cultural events, while confer- as the Union of Chambers and Commodity ences on Turkish foreign policy are organized Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB) and the Turkish abroad and promotional publications and Confederation of Businessmen and Industri- documentaries are produced. For instance, in alists (TUSKON) have become more active in 2003, 2008, 2009 and 2013 a “Year of Turkey” the neighbouring regions. The Turkish Inter- was proclaimed in Japan, Russia, France and national Cooperation and Development Agen- China respectively. In 2009 which was pro- cy (TİKA) is a state institution which operates claimed as “Turkish Season” in France, 600 under the Turkish Prime Ministry since 1992. cultural, social, political, economic, scientific It is regarded as a foreign policy instrument activities were organized. That constituted the through which cooperative efforts have taken largest, the most comprehensive and longest place in the Middle East, Caucasus, Central series of events and promotion campaign real- Asia, the Balkans and Africa (Kaya and Tec- ized abroad in EU countries (Ministry of For- men, 2011, p. 13). TİKA deals with projects in eign Affairs, 2012). the fields of education, health, restoration, ag-

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Along these lines, chairs for Turkish stud- ducing Turkish culture, society and language. ies have been established in prominent univer- It aims to conduct research for the improved sities abroad to increase the number of studies promotion and teaching of Turkish culture, on Turkey in international academics and to history, language and literature and to sup- establish a discussion platform on Turkey in port scientific studies by cooperating with var- the public opinion of foreign countries. One of ious organizations and informing the wider the examples is the establishment of the “Chair public with various publications of the results of Contemporary Turkish Studies” at the Lon- of such activities. It also contributes to the don School of Economics. The Turkish Foreign training of academics and researchers deal- Ministry and other relevant institutions have ing with Turkish language, history, culture, been preparing proposals to establish further art and music and provides training through chairs for Turkish studies in foreign univer- certification programmes. It helps to establish sities and signing agreements in this regard Yunus Emre Turkish Cultural Centers in dif- (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012). ferent countries to promote the Turkish lan- Cultural diplomacy is carried out within guage, culture, arts and history. These centres the scope of Turkish foreign policy under the promote Turkey through cultural activities, jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. scientific projects and courses, while aiming to The Ministry of Culture and Tourism also strengthen friendship ties and increase cul- takes part in the promotion of Turkish cul- tural exchange with other countries (Yunus ture abroad (Kaya and Tecmen, 2011, p. 18). Emre Institute, 2013). Davutoğlu, who is also Turkish Cultural Centres were established the Chairman of the Yunus Emre Foundation by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The goal Board of Trustees, argues that “foreign policy is “to promote Turkish culture, language and is not carried out solely with diplomacy but art and to contribute to bilateral relations be- also with cultural, economic and trade net- tween Turkey and other countries, as well as to works”. During the opening ceremony of the help Turkish citizens in their adaptation to the Yunus Emre Turkish Cultural Center in Lon- country in which they live”. Currently these don, Turkish President Abdullah Gül argued centres are operating in Berlin, Hannover, Co- that there have been two major foreign initia- logne, Frankfurt, Almaty, Askhabad, Sarajevo, tives by Turkey in recent years. One of them is Tehran, Amman, Baghdad, Damascus and Yunus Emre Cultural Center and the other is Jerusalem. In addition to these, Turkish Lan- TİKA. He stated that “great countries exist not guage and Literature Departments and Turk- only with their diplomats but also with their ish courses which have been established with- cultural assets” (The Great Countries, 2010). in the foreign universities are supported by Yunus Emre centers were established in Alba- providing lecturers and technical equipment. nia, Belgium, Bosnia, Georgia, England, Iran, Several Turkish Education Centres have been Japan, Kazakhstan, Turkish Northern Cy- functioning abroad under the management prus, Kosovo, Lebanon, Hungary, Macedonia, of Ministry of National Education and TİKA Egypt, Poland, Romania and Syria. The loca- (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012). tions of the centers reflect the emphasis on the In addition, the Yunus Emre Institute was Balkans and the Middle East which is in ac- established in 2007 with the objective of intro- cordance with the common cultural heritage

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approach of Turkish foreign policy (Kaya and Turkey and Syria, stalled negotiations with Tecmen, 2011, p. 11). the EU especially because of the Cyprus is- As was argued by a Turkish diplomat (In- sue, and the loss of momentum of the reform terview, 2012), cultural activities are usually process particularly regarding freedom of very influential but their impacts can only be speech and media have negatively influenced observed in the medium or long-term. They Turkey’s “soft power”. In order for the reform help to overcome prejudices and stereotypes process in Turkey to gain speed again, several about Turkey, especially in European coun- things must take place. Firstly PKK terrorism tries and help to raise interest in Turkey and must be overcome and the Kurdish issue re- Turkish culture. Along these lines, the grow- solved, while the rising tensions with Syria ing popularity of some Turkish series in the must be quelled. With the beginning of the Middle East and the Balkans is another indi- peace process regarding the Kurdish issue in cator of the increase in Turkey’s “soft power”. 2013, Turkey’s “soft power” may evolve posi- tively if it is successful in ending PKK terror- Conclusion: The Challenges and the ism and solving of Kurdish issue. Secondly, if Future Prospect for “Soft Power” of Tur- a new democratic Constitution can be intro- key duced based on a compromise among differ- ent parts of Turkish society, it will positively Turkey, which has a democratic and sec- influence the consolidation of democracy in ular political system with a predominantly Turkey. These developments would add new Muslim population and an EU membership dynamics to the stalled negotiations with the prospect since 1999, has had an increasing in- EU. Given these preconditions, Turkey’s “soft fluence in its neighbouring regions. In the first power” might increase in the medium or long- and second periods of the AKP governments, term. Turkey tried to contribute to regional peace through constructive engagement and media- tion efforts. Turkey’s “zero problems policy” References approach contributed to Turkey’s “soft pow- er”, which includes a liberal visa policy with Altınay, Hakan, 2008. Turkey’s Soft Pow- its neighbours and increasing communication er: An Unpolished Gem or an Elusive Mirage?, and cooperation in the fields of economics, Insight Turkey, Vol.10, No.2. politics and culture. Benli Altunışık, Meliha, 2011. Challenges The strategy of external promotion and to Turkey’s Soft Power in the Middle East, Is- projection of Turkish culture, which is at the tanbul: TESEV Pub., June. core of the country’s soft power, is however Bilgin, Hasret Dikici, 2008. Foreign Policy insufficient as long as hard power and uncer- Orientation of Turkey’s Pro-Islamist Parties: tainty are dominant in the Middle East (Benli A Comparative Study of the AKP and Refah, Altunışık, 2011, p. 2-3). As Oğuzlu (2007, p. 95) Turkish Studies, Vol.9, No.3. argues, when threats and challenges to secu- Civil Society Monitoring Report 2012, 2013. rity of Turkey increase, it will probably lead to Summary of the Director, Istanbul: Tüsev an increase in the tendencies to act as a “hard Pub., March. power”. Similarly, growing tensions between Faaliyetler [Activities], Başbakanlık Kamu

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Diplomasisi Koordinatörlüğü [Turkish Prime icy, No.80, Autumn. Ministry Public Diplomacy Office], 2010. Oguzlu, Tarik, 2007. Soft Power in Turk- Available at: http://kdk.gov.tr/faaliyetler/15 ish Foreign Policy. Australian Journal of Inter- (Accessed 16 February 2013). national Affairs, Vol.61, No.1. Interview with a Turkish diplomat by the Öniş, Ziya, 2009. The New Wave of For- author, 15 October 2012. eign Policy Activism in Turkey: Drifting Away Kalın, İbrahim, 2011. Soft Power and Pub- from Europeanization? DIIS-Danish Institute lic Diplomacy in Turkey. Perceptions, Volume for International Studies Report , Vol. 5. XVI, No.3, Autumn. TİKA [Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Kalın, İbrahim, 2010. Türk Dış Politikası Ajansı Başkanlığı]. Available at: http://www. ve Kamu Diplomasisi [Turkish Foreign Policy tika.gov.tr/tika-hakkinda/1 (Accessed 12 Feb- and Public Diplomacy]. Available at: http:// ruary 2013) kdk.gov.tr/sag/turk-dis-politikasi-ve-kamu- Ulusoy, Hasan, 2005. A Constructivist diplomasisi/20 (Accessed 18 January 2013). Analysis of Turkey’s Foreign and Security Policy Kamu Diplomasisine Bakış, 2010. [Look- in the Post-Cold War Era. PhD Thesis, Middle ing Towards Public Diplomacy] , Başbakanlık East Technical University, October. Kamu Diplomasisi Koordinatörlüğü [Turk- Vizyon ve Misyon [Vision and Mis- ish Prime Ministry Public Diplomacy Office], sion], Başbakanlık Kamu Diplomasisi Available at: http://kdk.gov.tr/sag/kamu-di- Koordinatörlüğü [Turkish Prime Ministry plomasisine-bakis/21 (Accessed 28 January Public Diplomacy Office], 2010. Available at: 2013). http://kdk.gov.tr/kurumsal/vizyon-misyon/8 Kaya, Ayhan and Ayşe Tecmen, 2011. The (Accessed 12 February 2013). Role of Common Cultural Heritage in Exter- Yunus Emre Bulletin, 2010. No. 7, : nal Promotion of Modern Turkey: Yunus Emre Dinamik Form Pub., November. Cultural Centres. Working Paper. No. 4. Yunus Emre Institute. Available at: http:// Keyman, E. Fuat, 2009. Turkish Foreign yunusemreenstitusu.org/turkiye/index.php? Policy in the Era of Global Turmoil, SETA Poli- lang=en&page=68&anIIcat_1=0&anIIitm_1=1 cy Bief, Brief No. 39, December. (Accessed 15 February 2013). Koordinatörlüğümüz 3 Yaşında [Our Of- Yunus Emre Institute, 2010. Great Coun- fice is 3 Years Old], Başbakanlık Kamu Diplo- tries Exist Not Only With Their Diplomats But masisi Koordinatörlüğü [Turkish Prime Min- Also With Their Cultural Assets, 9 November. istry Public Diplomacy Office]. Available at: Available at: http://yunusemreenstitusu.org/ http://kdk.gov.tr/haber/koordinatorlugumuz- turkiye/index.php?lang=en&page=10&anIIc 3-yasinda/219 (Accessed 28 January 2013). at_2=0&anIIitm_2=43 (Accessed 15 February Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey. Avail- 2013). able at: www.mfa.gov.tr (Accessed 18 Novem- ber 2012). Nye, Joseph, 2004. Soft Power: The Means About the Author: to Success in World Politics, New York: Public Affairs. Dr. Selcen Öner is currently working as Nye, Joseph, 1990. Soft Power. Foreign Pol- Assist. Prof. Dr. at Bahçeşehir University at

Euxeinos 10 (2013) 14 Selcen Öner

the Department of EU Studies. She finished her PhD at EU Institute Department of EU Politics and International Relations in 2008. Recent publications: Öner, Selcen, Turkey and European Union: The Question of European Identity, Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Pub., 2011. Öner, Selcen,”Europeanisation of Civil Society in Turkey during the Accession Process to the European Union”, in Çiğdem Nas and Yonca Özer (eds.),Turkey and the European Union: Processes of Europeanisation, Surrey England, Ashgate Pub., 2012. e-mail: [email protected]

Euxeinos 10 (2013) 15 Turkish Soap Power: International Perspectives and Domestic Paradoxes

by Mathieu Rousselin, University of St.Gallen

etween 2005 and 2007, the Turkish melo- prompting the producers to convert the fic- Bdrama Gümüş (“Silver”) was aired on tional home of the two lovers into a successful . A typical TV soap opera in many re- museum which registered more than 70’000 gards, Gümüş essentially features a love story entries in 2008 just for Saudi visitors (Tristam, between the pretty dark-haired (and naturally 2009). large-bosomed) Noor, played by Songül Öden, After the success of Gümüş / Noor, Turk- and her equally attractive blue-eyed and fair- ish soap operas swept across the Middle East, haired husband Mohannad (played by Kıvanç bringing revenues to the booming Turkish TV Tatlıtuğ). A perfect husband, Mohannad treats industry1 and starting off the first reflections his wife kindly and as his equal – he even sup- on the contribution of the television dramas to ports her actively in her professional career Turkey’s soft power in the region (Matthews, as a fashion designer. The plot nonetheless 2011; Utkan, 2011). Indeed, soap operas not introduced very unconventional elements to only give precious insights into domestic Turk- an Islamic audience, such as premarital sex, ish politics (Hintz, 2012) but they also tackle repeated use of alcohol or abortion. Actresses deep philosophical, political and religious is- do not wear any veil and kisses are often ex- sues which are currently debated throughout changed on screen. the Middle East (Rohde, 2012a). This contrib- Given the enthusiastic reception of the utes to the success of these television dramas series by the Turkish audience, a handful of abroad and particularly in the Arab world, producers working for the Saudi-owned and transforming the Turkish television industry Dubai-based Middle East Broadcasting Center into a powerful soft power instrument. (MBC, the Arab world’s leading free-to-air TV This article offers to review three success- net) decided to air the series throughout the ful Turkish soaps and to investigate the rea- Arab world in 2008 and 2009. Renamed Noor sons behind their success both in Turkey and (the Arabic word for “light”), the series was internationally. On this basis, this article will dubbed from Turkish into Arabic using the then discuss the paradox between the liberal colloquial Syrian dialect but without interfer- approach to societal and religious issues in ing with the plot. This was to be the begin- the soaps and the increasingly restrictive line ning of a controversial pop-culture phenom- of the AKP government on issues of cultural enon (Buccianti, 2010). On the one hand, the freedoms. series was criticised by conservative religious forces for its immorality, to the point that a Saudi religious scholar justified the killing of people involved in the broadcasting of the show (Al-Jazeera, 2008). On the other hand, it 1 Between 2001 and 2011, a total of 65 is estimated that the last episode of Gümüş / Turkish television series have been sold abroad, Noor gathered 85 million viewers throughout generating revenues of more than 50 million dollars the Arab world including more than half the (Bugdayci, 2011). As of 2012, Turkey has sold 70 soap operas to a total of 39 countries in the Middle total number of adult women in the entire re- East, Balkans and Caucasus regions. Kazakhstan gion (Worth, 2008). Arab tourists flocked to (42) is the biggest buyer of Turkish soaps, followed Istanbul (where the storyline in Noor unfolds), by Bulgaria (27), Azerbaijan (23) and Macedonia (17) – source: Oxford Business Group, 2012.

Euxeinos 10 (2013) 16 Mathieu Rousselin

A Thousand and One Nights ing Sejn Husejnefendic from the University of Sarajevo, Radic also explains the success of Broadcasted on Turkish television be- the drama by the extent to which Binbir Gece tween 2006 and 2009, Binbir Gece (“A Thou- broke “the decades-long stereotypes about Turkey sand and One Nights”) tells the story of a as a country of Islamic orientation, and the posi- young and talented architect called Şehrazat tion of a woman as uneducated, conservative and Evliyaoğlu2 whose only son suffers from leu- completely dependent from the male partner/com- kaemia and can only be saved by a bone mar- panion/master”. row transplant. The surgery is however too expensive for Şehrazat. Having understood Forbidden Love her desperate situation, Şehrazat’s boss Onur Aksal offers to lend her a significant part of the Aşk-ı Memnu (“Forbidden Love”) was needed amount provided that she spends one aired between 2008 and 2010 and is a modern- night with him. Over time, their relationship day adaptation of the bestseller by Turkish turns into a genuine love affair and eventually author Halit Ziya Uşaklıgil (1867-1945). The ends with Onur and Şehrazat getting married, drama follows the wealthy widower Adnan despite the initial reluctance of Onur’s mother. (Selcuk Yöntem), who lives cloistered in a In the third season, Onur’s colleague Kerem beautiful house on the shores of the Bospo- İnceoğlu learns about the indecent proposal rus with his two children Nihal und Bülent, and publically reveals that Şehrazat accepted his nephew Behlül (Kıvanç Tatlıtuğ) and a money in exchange for a night with her then housemaid. A few blocks away lives the wid- boss. At first, this causes the separation of the ow Firdevs, mother of two daughters Peyker couple and forces both Onur and Şehrazat to und Bihter (Beren Saat), who inherited large rethink the terms and meaning of their rela- debts from her deceased husband and seeks to tionship. Both protagonists find out for them- seduce Adnan to keep her standard of living. selves that their love is genuine and stronger When Peyker gets married, Adnan comes out than the gossip, and their marriage is eventu- of his retreat and meets the beautiful Bihter. ally reinforced by the crisis. Both characters fall in love but Bihter’s mother The series was successfully aired through- Firdevs and Adnan’s daughter Nihal strongly out the Arab world and the Balkans, and it oppose their union. Bihter and Adnan’s love achieved a cult status in Slovakia, Croatia and eventually overcomes all plots and the cou- Serbia (Balkan Chronicle, 2010). To account ple gets married, with all protagonists mov- for the success of Binbir Gece beyond Turkish ing into Adnan’s villa. Yet, Adnan’s nephew borders and particularly in non-Muslim Bal- Behlül progressively becomes romantically in- kan countries, Radic (2010) suggests that con- volved with Bihter and endangers her couple. siderations of cultural proximity intervened in Bihter’s mother Firdevs manages to bring Ni- viewers’ decisions to watch the Turkish soap hal and Behlül together to save the marriage of rather than some of its US competitors. Quot- her daughter. On the day Nihal and Behlül are supposed to get married, Bihter wants to tell 2 The name recalls the legendary Persian queen Scheherazade, the vizier’s daughter who her husband Adnan about her extra-marital entertains King Shahryar in the collection of folk affair. Behlül convinces her not to do so and tales of the Islamic Golden Age.

Euxeinos 10 (2013) 17 Mathieu Rousselin

both spend their last moments together, when Magnificent Century they are discovered by Adnan. Ashamed, Bi- hter kills herself while Behlül flees, prompting Muhteşem Yüzyıl (“Magnificent Century”) all protagonists to leave the house and start a is a historical soap opera based on the life of new life elsewhere. the tenth Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent, The reasons for the success of Aşk-ı Mem- who reigned on the Ottoman Empire from nu are multiple. First, it is a tale of lust, lies and 1520 to his death in 1566. While much of the riches in the high society of Istanbul which is series depicts Suleiman’s accession and exer- typically portrayed by young and handsome cise of power, from daily politics to the prepa- actors wearing expensive clothing and living ration of bloody military campaigns against in unaffordable houses, much in the way other Christian Europe, the series heavily focuses American soaps did in their time (Dallas, Dy- on the intrigue and rivalries within Suleiman’s nasty, The Young and the Restless). But Forbid- harem, in particular between Mahidevran den Love presented a few innovative features (mother to Suleiman’s first born child) and for a Turkish audience: a careful depiction of Hürrem / Roxelana, daughter of a Ukrainian class division and a script which did include Orthodox priest, kidnapped by raiders in some fairly explicit sexual scenes – a rare fea- Crimea and sent to be a palace slave. After ture not only in Turkish soaps but in soaps in converting to Islam, Roxelana was eventually general. As a result of its liberal portrayal of freed and became the Sultan’s lawful wife, sexuality, Forbidden Love drew the sharp criti- bearing him five children and allegedly advis- cism of Family and Women’s Affairs Minister ing Suleiman on matters of state, in particular Selma Aliye Kavaf from the AKP party (Dişli with regard to the Ottoman Empire’s foreign Zibak, 2010). Another sign of the AKP’s dis- relations with European countries (such as the approval of the series can be found in the Polish state). Turkish Higher Board of Radio and Televi- Due the centrality of the historical figure sion’s (RTÜK) decision to fine the broadcast- of Suleiman in Turkish identity discourses ing channel (Kanal D) twice, on the grounds (Henne, 2012), Magnificent Century was prob- that the show was threatening Turkish family ably bound to be a divisive issue for contem- values3. In the same vein, the RTÜK recently porary political forces in Turkey. In a general exerted pressure on the producers of another context of “ottomania” (Tokyay, 2011), the television series (1 Erkek 1 Kadın – “One Man, portrayal of the political weight of women via One Woman”), on the grounds that their two the harem on the affairs of the Ottoman Em- lead (unmarried) characters ought to get mar- pire seems to have particularly upset conser- ried in the interest of promoting greater mo- vative forces within the AKP party (Fawler, rality (Hürriyet Daily News, 2012b). 2011b). Despite the series’ excellent ratings in Turkey and abroad, the portrayal of the Sul- tan as a womaniser, alcohol-drinker hedonist apparently offended over 70’000 viewers, who complained to the RTÜK – the latter eventu- ally demanding an apology from the broad- 3 The report, only available in Turkish, is mentioned by Tunç (2010) and in Hürriyet Daily casting channel for “wrongly exposing the News (2013).

Euxeinos 10 (2013) 18 Mathieu Rousselin

privacy of a historical person” (Fawler, 2011a). cess of Turkish television series in the Middle- Erdoğan himself denounced Magnificent Cen- East and in the Balkans is the fact that Turk- tury as “an attempt to insult our past, to treat our ish plots are culturally appealing to audiences history with disrespect and an effort to show our which have a share in the Ottoman/Muslim history in a negative light to the younger genera- history as well as to audiences which can iden- tions” (quoted in Rohde, 2012b). He later pub- tify with the Turkish way of life displayed in licly blamed the people involved in the dif- the series, while still being attracted by certain fusion of the television series: “That’s not the forms of modernity. As explained by Bah- Suleiman we know. Before my nation, I condemn rain’s Culture Minister Mai bint Mohammed both the director of this series and the owner of the Al Khalifa in an interview: television station. We have already alerted the au- thorities, and we are awaiting a judicial decision.” « [Contemporary Turkish] series present (quoted in Zalewski, 2012) In an obvious at- an image of stability wherein contemporary tempt to distance himself from Erdoğan and practices and Western lifestyles can co-exist to consolidate his stature as a potential suc- with Islamic and Arab identities and culture. cessor, Turkish President Abdullah Gül then The image both types of series reflect of Turkey is welcomed the contribution of Magnificent of an open and engaging culture, which seems to Century to the spread of Turkish culture and have found some balance between the different values (Dombey, 2012). traditions and practices of today’s world and Yet, in stark contrast with the stir caused which has both an Eastern and Western ap- in Turkey, it is estimated that Magnificent Cen- peal. This is very attractive to Bahraini and Arab tury attracted around 150 million viewers in audiences and presents us with an interesting cul- the Middle East, the Balkans and the Turkic tural dialogue and scope for exchange between Ar- republics (Altintaş, 2012). To take an example, abs and Turks today. » (Yinanç, 2012 – emphasis the series has been particularly successful in by the authors) Greece, with 1.2 million viewers per episode, prompting analysts to talk about “soap opera Sina Koloğlu, leading critic for the news- diplomacy”4 (Moore, 2013). paper Milliyet, offers an interesting though po- lemic variation on the same issue, pointing as The Turkish formula: culture, costs well to economic and technical considerations and courage such as the production costs of Turkish series and the learning curve of the Turkish televi- The first obvious reason behind the suc- sion industry:

4 As a matter of fact, the Greek interest in « U.S. cultural imperialism is finished. Years Turkish soap predates the Magnificent Century and ago we took reruns of ‘Dallas’ and ‘The Young and goes back to 2005, when the television series Ya- the Restless.’ Now Turkish screenwriters have banci Dama (“The Foreign Groom”) was first aired learned to adapt these shows to local themes in Greece under the title “The Borders of Love”. with Muslim storylines, Turkish production Subtitled but not dubbed, “The Borders of Love” values have improved, and Asians and Eastern Eu- was a love story between the poor son of Turkish baklava-makers and the rich daughter of a Greek ropeans are buying Turkish series, not American ship tycoon. or Brazilian or Mexican ones. They get the same

Euxeinos 10 (2013) 19 Mathieu Rousselin

cheating and the children out of wedlock and the lines will be much needed in the years to come incestuous affairs but with a Turkish sauce on to help us understand the effective contribu- top. » (quoted in Kimmelman, 2010 – empha- tion of the Turkish television industry on the sis by the authors) evolution of gender relationships within Arab societies. Nevertheless, the mere introduction of Muslim/Turkish cultural features at cheap Concluding remarks: the paradox of production costs is not sufficient to guarantee soap power Turkey success – and does not do justice to the creative audacity of Turkish screenwriters. Indeed, The booming Turkish television industry Turkish soaps routinely tackle in a very frontal is at the heart of an interesting paradox. manner hotly-debated cultural themes and re- On the one hand, Turkish series are ligious taboos such as the daily emotional and hugely successful both domestically and in- sexual life of an unmarried couple (“One Man, ternationally, representing a major economic One Woman”); extra-marital affairs, complex / trade interest, with important repercussions sexuality (“Forbidden Love”); non-standard for tourism. Surveys on the international im- family models and moral dilemmas (“A Thou- age of Turkey have highlighted the decisive sand and One Nights”); alcohol consumption contribution of the Turkish television soap and privacy of major historical figures (“Mag- operas with 78% of Arab respondents report- nificent Century”); abortion (“Noor”); drink- ing watching at least one Turkish series dur- ing, swearing and smoking (“Behzat Ç” – see ing the year (Salem, 2011). The same survey Public Radio International, 2012). concluded that: Yet, the most salient recurring issue in Turkish soaps is certainly the emancipation of « The impact of watching hours of these Turk- women, who are overwhelmingly depicted as ish soap operas cannot be underestimated as they unveiled, witty, independent, sexually active, have the effect of creating attachment, un- emotionally complex individuals, blossoming derstanding, and affection for Turkish iden- in their professional life, sometimes actively tity, culture, and values among wide regional intervening in the murky business of politics publics. Like Egyptian TV and cinema created a and consistently demanding equal rights and prominent cultural place for Egypt in previous de- equal treatment to their husbands. It is in this cades, Turkish television has made similar inroads sense that Professor Aslı Tunç from the Istan- in Arab (and Iranian) popular culture. This has bul Bilgi University describes the plots of most been complemented by a wave of tourism to Turkish soaps as “progressive and liberating” Turkey in which Arabs and Iranians from various (Moore, 2013). Keeping in mind that the Arab classes and walks of life have visited Turkey and viewers of Turkish soaps are mostly women become familiar and attached to its towns and cit- (Worth, 2008; Moore, 2013), one may sincere- ies, history and monuments, culture and people. » ly wonder whether female viewers will long (Salem, 2011:6-7 – emphasis by the authors) accept the discrepancy between the equality they could glimpse at on prime-time and the The Turkish government even considers inferior status to which they are often subject- its television industry as an official instrument ed in real life. Additional research along these

Euxeinos 10 (2013) 20 Mathieu Rousselin

of foreign policy, as evidenced by the decision List of references to air the series free of charge internationally or by recent declarations of AKP Vice Culture Altintaş B., 2012. Turkey debates soap op- and Tourism Minister Abdurrahman Arıcı5 era that angered prime minister. Today’s Za- (Hürriyet Daily News, 2012a). man, 27 November. Yet on the other hand, the liberal approach The Balkan Chronicle, 2010. Turkish Soap to societal and religious issues, which is pre- Operas Take Balkans by Storm, 31 December. cisely the reason why millions of Turkish and Buccianti A., 2010. Dubbed Turkish soap Arab viewers eagerly watch these soaps, is operas conquering the Arab world: social lib- being increasingly contested domestically by eration or cultural alienation? Arab Media & fractions of the AKP. Accusations of immoral- Society 10, Spring. Available at: http://www. ism have flourished in political discourses and arabmediasociety.com/?article=735 the RTÜK has fined producers for underpin- Bugdayci C., 2011. The soft power of ning Turkish family values. It is in this sense Turkish television. Southeast European Times, that Rohde (2012b) talks of Turkish soaps as July 23. an illustration of the “culture war” within Is- Dişli Zibak F., 2010. Do TV series pose a lam. Although surely excessive, the expression threat to family values? Today’s Zaman, 21 Feb- “culture war” points to the real (and univer- ruary. sal) challenge of finding an acceptable articu- Dombey D., 2012. Erdogan, Gul and the lation between cultural liberties (in particular magnificent Sultan. The World – Financial the freedom of cultural expression) and public Times Blog, November 29. Available at: http:// order. blogs.ft.com/the-world/2012/11/erdogan-gul- Turkish screenwriters have succeeded in and-the-magnificent-sultan/(restricted access) extending the perimeters of cultural liberties Fawler S., 2011a. Magnificent Century di- by tackling increasingly sensitive issues – in vides Turkish TV viewers over the life of Su- so doing, they met opposition and provoked leiman. The Guardian | The Observer, March 20 teeth-grinding, but they were protected from Fawler S., 2011b. The Dirt, and the Soap, open censorship by the success of their series, on the Ottoman Empire. New York Times, 17 which they could invoke as a sign of societal March. endorsement. But borders are meant to be test- Gonzalez-Quijano Y., 2008. Passions ed and the industry is now moving into even turques: un truc de femmes. Culture et Politique more burning issues than sexuality and the Arabes, August. Available online at: http://cpa. Ottoman past – namely the treatment of the hypotheses.org/263 Kurdish minority6 (Krajeski, 2012). Henne P., 2012. Of Sultans and Soap Op- eras. Huffington Post, 30 November. 5 A. Arıcı declared that “With TV series we Hintz L., 2012. Reading Turkish Politics can enter every house and spread the influence of Turkish culture” (Hüriyet, 2012a). Interestingly, the Turkish State did not ban this 6 After the complaint filed by Selahattin highly political production, but demanded that the Demirtaş, chairman of the pro-Kurdish Peace series be in Turkish rather than in Kurdish. The use and Democracy Party, against four Turkish of the word “Kurd” is also prohibited, prompting soaps deemed anti-Kurdish, producers launched characters to resort to euphemistic expressions Ayrılık Olmasaydı, the first openly Kurdish soap. such as “Let’s just say she is from Diyarbakır”.

Euxeinos 10 (2013) 21 Mathieu Rousselin

from a Soap Opera. Foreign Policy, 7 December able at: http://blogs.reuters.com/david-ro- Hürriyet Daily News, 2013. RTÜK to decide hde/2012/03/08/inside-islams-culture-war/ on length of lovemaking scenes in Turkish TV Salem P. 2011. Turkey’s image in the Arab series, 11 January. World, TESEV Foreign Policy Programme, May. Hürriyet Daily News, 2012a. Works con- Available at: http://www.tesev.org.tr/Upload/ tinue to give TV series to foreigners for free. Publication/de444c67-2c2d-4312-bb59-e902e- 12 October b944e50/Paul_Salem_FINAL.pdf Hürriyet Daily News, 2012b. State pressure Tokyay M., 2011.“Ottomania” on the rise in Turkey leads unmarried TV couples to tie in Turkey. SES Turkiye, 17 October. the knot, 30 May 30. Tristam P., 2009. Noor, or Gümüs, the Arab Al-Jazeera, 2008. Saudi scholar issues TV World’s Most Popular Television Soap Opera. death fatwa, 13 September. Middle East Issues. Available at: http://middlee- Kimmelman M., 2010. Turks Put Twist in ast.about.com/od/mediacultureandthearts/a/ Racy Soaps. New York Times, 17 June. noor-tv-show.htm Krajeski J., 2012. Turkey: Days of Their Tunç A., 2010. Aşk-i Memnu: A recent hype Lives, Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting, 30 of glamour, love and deception. News Etc., 27 March. June. Available at: http://en.habervesaire.com/ Matthews O., 2011. The Arab World’s haber/1884/ ‘Dallas’. Newsweek, 5 September. Utkan H. 2011. Series boost Turkish “soft Moore R., 2013. Soap Opera Diplomacy: power” in region. Hürriyet Daily News, 5 April. Turkish TV in Greece. The International, 12 Worth R., 2008. Arab TV Tests Societies’ February. Limits With Depictions of Sex and Equality. Oxford Business Group, 2012. Soap pow- New York Times, 26 September. er: The sweeping success of Turkish television Yinanç B. 2012. Turkish soap operas pro- series. The Report: Turkey 2012. Available at: vide chance for dialogue with Arabs. Hürriyet http://www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com/news/ Daily News, 5 April. soap-power-sweeping-success-turkish-televi- Zalewski P., 2012. Why Is Turkey’s Prime sion-series Minister at War with a Soap Opera? Time, 26 Public Radio international, 2012. Turkish December. TV show Behzat C draws ire of censors, ado- ration of public, 3 December. Available online at: http://www.pri.org/stories/arts-entertain- ment/turkish-tv-show-behzat-c-draws-ire-of- censors-adoration-of-public-12250.html Radic N., 2010. Turkish soap opera at- tracts regional audience. Southeast European Times, 20 December. Rohde D., 2012a. The Islamic World’s Culture War, Played Out on TV Soap Operas The Atlantic, 9 March. Rohde D., 2012b. Inside Islam’s cul- ture war. Opinion, Reuters, 8 March. Avail-

Euxeinos 10 (2013) 22 “Are New Sufis “Grey Turks”? Urbanite National Identities and Religious Reconfigurations

by Marta Dominguez Diaz, University of St.Gallen

ecularism is a central aspect to Turkey’s ect were soon disempowered, discredited for Sidentity as a nation. It has been and still is their backwardness and lost as a result their a driving force for political action and it also social and economic status and, ultimately, is a central element in shaping the societal dy- their public authority. namics of modern Turkey. In 1923, Mustafa In contrast to them, the change of system Kemal Ataturk (1881- permitted the develop- 1938) was resolute to es- ment of a new elite, sup- tablish a nascent Turkish portive of the Kemalist nation as a republican project that benefitted secularist state, and with economically from these that view his govern- political transforma- ment instilled a series tions. Thus, a new privi- of reforms.1 Through leged class emerged. legal and institutional They looked at Europe change, secular systems for sources of cultural of law and education and political inspiration were set up, and during Catching Europe in Istanbul: in a conscious attempt Yunus Emre Yildirim, student in Industrial Enginee- the transformation a se- ring, Kadir Has University, Turkey: of trying to disconnect ries of measures target- „My aim in this picture was to emphasize diversity in Istan- themselves from the Ot- bul; in this case, religious diversity. I thought it would be a ed the hitherto position good combination to capture an orthodox patriarchate and a toman past. For the new of power traditionally minaret together. I took the photo in Fener (very close to our class of Kemalist sup- university). It also fits with the European image in my mind held by the ulama within because Christianity symbolizes Europe, and Islam symbo- porters, the ethnic diver- the state administra- lizes Istanbul since 1453, but apart from my point of view, sity of the country and 2 people can understand very different things.“ tion. Religion was to be © Yunus Emre Yildirim the all-pervading nature relegated to the private of Islam (i.e. with a ten- sphere. Those among dency to manifest itself the former elites who could not or were not in all aspects of social life) were perceived as willing to embrace the new ideological proj- important impediments to social progress.3 In contraposition to “traditional” values, they of- 1 Atatürk’s programme of reforms ten came to identify themselves with a newly (commonly known as Atatürk Devrimleri) is a subject extensively dealt with by scholars of a variegated emergent urbanite culture, a “de-ethnicized” range of disciplines. For an introductory analysis identity with cosmopolitan aspirations and see, for example, Zurcher (2004) and Landau’s scarce sympathy for the social expression of (1984) edited volume. Islamic religiosities. 2 The term ulama refers to a diversity of For many Turks who were not part of this religious scholars that exist in Muslim societies. privileged minority, not only the turning to- In Turkey some of the most prominent religious institutions (e.g. sufi tekkes and Islamic schools) were abolished by the secularizing project. For a 3 For the Kemalists’ approach to race, more nuanced approach to the changing role of religion and ethnicity in the first years of the Turkey’s ulama see Amit Bein (2011). Republic see Cagaptay (2007).

Euxeinos 10 (2013) 23 Marta Dominguez Diaz

wards westernized modes of thought and life- purported arrogance towards other social ac- styles but also their often disenfranchised atti- tors and political factions, an attitude some tude towards the rest of the nation were viewed say may threaten the pillars of democratic rule as proof of the elite’s rejection and disapproval they are supposed to endorse. of Turkey’s cultural and religious roots and of The arrival to power of the religious and the actual identity of its current population. conservative Justice and Development Party The pejorative term Beyaz Türk (White Turk)4 (AKP) of Recep Tayyip Erdogan in 2002 with is since then often used to refer to the Kemalist an overwhelming support of the Black Turk supporters. However, as the Kemalist project majority vote meant a radical change in the consolidated, Beyaz Türk’s discourses were no position traditionally occupied by the secu- longer the pejorative stance of a minority but lar middle and upper classes, who began to an issue that threatened to divide the country lose the prominence they have held since the over issues of national identity. Over time, a advent of the Republic.5 In line with these substantial part of the fast growing urbanite political developments, a new social class of middle class have come to identify themselves economically influential Turks who are eager with White Turks’ political choices and views to publicly manifest ethnic and religious affili- of society. The once loosely defined as a rich, ation have contributed to further heating up educated, Westernized urbanite minority, the the debate on national identity issues centered Beyaz Türk, have more recently come to be as- around the question who better represents the sociated with a wider sector of society, who values of Turkey’s “modernity”? Among them seem to hold a negative attitude towards other there are public figures who, for example, do Turks. The political scientist Maya Arakon not hesitate to speak Turkish using specific (2011) has described White Turks as those who accents previously associated with the ru- sympathize with Kemalist ideology and who ral world or with the “periphery” and/or by often are uneasy with Kurds and religious wearing religious symbols like the headscarf people. According to her, White Turks believe in places originally reserved to the secular, de- ethnic particularism and public religious ex- spite persisting discrimination (SES Türkiye, pression should be eradicated through educa- 2012). The discursive monopoly held by Ke- tion and modernization. Arakon argues that malist supporters until recently needs to begin despite their modernizing appeal White Turks nowadays to accommodate or to learn to co- have started to be questioned on the very basis exist at least with other new identity projects. of the values they are supposed to defend, be- Hence, there is a new class of influential cause today, they are often criticized for their Muslims who currently appear more often in the media andintend to make their “Islamic 4 The term “White Turk” was first used by visibility” a symbol for the nation’s endorse- journalist Ufuk Güldemir in his 1992 book to refer ment of democratic values – in claiming re- to those who opposed to the presidency of Turgut Özal, the country’s first non-soldier president and a religious man of Kurdish origin. Turgut Özal’s 5 Erdogan himself is a Black Turk, to better background was questioned with regard to his understand how the Black/White Turks dyad appropriateness as a successor to Atatürk as the pictures into the transformation of national politics leader of the country and top commander of the in Turkey led by Erdogan and his party see Heper military. and Toktas (2003).

Euxeinos 10 (2013) 24 Marta Dominguez Diaz

spect primarily for the expression of religious choice to the White Turks’ sustained attempts identity. The case evidences that such disputes at mirroring themselves in the West. Now may not only have political implications, but the binary opposition between cosmopolitan- need to be also seen as a power struggle over secularist versus local Muslim identities is who holds the monopoly over the discursive no longer tenable. Here there is a new set of formation of meanings in relation to cultural religious ideologies that can be understood values and national identity. The dispute indi- as being partly foreign and partly imported, cates that religious issues and lifestyle choices yet not with a westernizing rather an Islamiz- are not trivial matters of mere individual con- ing agenda. They are to be viewed as modern cern, but explanatory windows into an intri- reconfigurations of religious traditions with cate network of social intersubjectivities; they innovative ways of looking at the nation-reli- are illustrative of how notions of identity re- gion dyad, the pursing of agendas that chal- late to and are intertwined with social stratifi- lenge both traditional interpretations of Islam cation, and social and political representation and of Turkishness and the identity project of and power. Kemalist modernities. In this regard, it is fair to suggest that modern Islamism is attempting * * * to develop cultural and political deconstruc- tions of fundamental identity markers, such Most of the more recent Islamist trends as the categories of “Turk” and “Muslim.” By in the Turkish religious market of public dis- renaming and re-conceptualizing central as- courses imply in the national context a pro- pects of religious ethos vis-à-vis new ways of found rethinking of Turkishness and Muslim articulating discourses of national belonging, identity. These Islamisms in their diverse Islamisms constitute a critique to traditional expressions can themselves be seen as ideo- Turkish categories of Muslim identity, includ- logical hybridizations between tradition and ing those elaborated by the tarikat (Sufi Or- modernity, between religion and secularism, ders) (Yavuz, 2003; Zubaida, 1996).7 between cosmopolitanism and locality. In Tur- believers, that is to say, to all the Muslims peoples key, they are both heirs and opponents of the from across the world. Therefore, the ummah is for Kemalist tradition. The new Islamist counter- Muslims a supra-national community of people elites epitomize this paradoxical and ambiva- with a common religion and whom they hold a lent nature: despite significantly owing their sense of a shared history. educational and professional identity to the 7 A Sufi Order is a religious organization state educational system, they are those who hierarchically organized in which devotees commit to perform a series of ritual practices regularly more fiercely oppose the attempts to threaten with the ultimate aim of attaining union with God. the visibility of Islam in the public sphere. Is- Membership in an Order can be formally sealed lamism has developed ideologies by which and the loyalty of the disciple to the master is, as Turks can connect to other Muslims in other a result, more closely monitored, but in most cases parts of the world. As a result, the cosmopoli- Sufi Orders are congregations of devotees that tanism of the ummah6 is presented as a counter- meet on a weekly basis. Commitment to the Order can be very informal and the relationship between 6 Ummah is an Arabic term generally devotee and sheikh may vary from being a close translated as “community” or “nation“. In Islam, one to being inexistent. For a good introduction to the term is used to refer to the community of religious life in Turkey, including a rich survey of

Euxeinos 10 (2013) 25 Marta Dominguez Diaz

Despite the fact that the state prohibited viation, a corrupted expression of what they the activity of Sufi Orders and closed their see as “normative” Islam. In particular, the lodges in 1925, these distinctively Islamic orga- use of music and of sung poetry in Sufi cer- nizations continued to operate in clandestine, emonies has been subjected to recurrent and and notwithstanding the governments’ initial violent condemnations (Al-Maqdisee [2003]). efforts to diminish the Sufis’ societal influence, Sufism is further criticized as being retrograde mystical orders had continued to be powerful and unable to converge with modern whilst forces for social and political articulation in genuinely Islamic views on religious authori- Modern Turkey until today. In the early 1950s ty and relationships with God (Sirriyeh, 1999). a less restrictive state attitude towards Islam Islamists seem to be competing to gain wider transformed Sufism into a subliminal influ- popular support in Turkey and elsewhere, ence within the political landscape of the coun- among audiences traditionally supportive of try. Traditional Sufi orders like the Naksibendi the tarikat. have a stronghold in some rural areas and sig- All these developments in the religious nificantly popular adherence among the urban landscape have had a direct impact on the poor. They were de facto integrated into the White Turks’ position in society. For some, the state machinery, together with Islamic groups increasing visibility of Islam in the public do- such as the Nurcus movement, and have been main has served to reinforce their adherence effective in the founding and policymaking to the secularist agenda of Kemalism even fur- of Islamic parties ever since. Although a bur- ther. Yet for some others it has opened up the geoning middle class interest in these groups possibility to elaborate a form of inner criti- has shaped the boom in religious expression cism within and towards the secularist project. in recent years, orders like the Naksibendi do Among the secular middle and upper classes still mainly appear to be associated with the a timid yet increasing interest in Islam seems unprivileged. Initially banned, they continued to be emerging. It has been suggested that this their activities by providing religious educa- results from growing disillusionment with the tion in secretive madrasahs (schools), offering secularizing agenda (Silverstein, 2007). Some support for needy people and politically mo- present the case of Alevism and how the gov- bilizing them and ultimately creating solid ernment has treated it, the headscarf issue, as networks of communal solidarity that later on well as the persistence of unofficial Islamic proved to be effective tools for political mobi- law tribunals in some rural areas as examples lization (Karasipahi, 2009). that attest the need for reviewing the State’s Likewise, the same anti-Sufi approach pursue of secularism (Koker, 2010). common in Islamist discourses in other parts Part of this discontent seems to have re- of the Muslim world has also been firmly up- cently been channeled by adherence to newly rooted since the 1990s in Turkey. A substantial emergent forms of Islamic religiosity. I would amount of Islamist forces have been critical of contend that these are religious choices that Sufism because mystical Islam is often equat- challenge both the traditional religious trends ed with popular piety (or with so-called ‘folk’ more commonly adhered to by Black Turks Islam) and in theological terms is seen as a de- and the White Turks’ quite generalized anti- religious attitude. Typically new adherents to prominent works see Hendrich (2011).

Euxeinos 10 (2013) 26 Marta Dominguez Diaz

Sufism will come to sympathize with a partic- Sufi thought, or even among the increasingly ular kind of Sufi religious movements. Despite widening of religious choices imported from the long-standing Turkish Sufi tradition as one the Arab World, they have turned to certain of the main forces in articulating popular ex- religiosities and groups that either originated pressions of Islamic piety, these “new Sufis” or suffered major doctrinal transformations are often not interested in the traditional tari- upon uprooting in western European and kat. They are instead more prone to explore North-American societies (e.g Naqshbandi- eclectic and post-modern spiritualities consist- Mujaddidis, Haqqaniyya, the Murabitun, ing of modern reformulations of Sufi doctrine Hazrat Inayat Khan’s movement among oth- (Silverstein, 2007). ers). Embracing Islam is for this new genera- To a certain extent, these new Sufis can be tion of “revert” Muslims a way of continuing seen as coverts to Islam. They have decided to their looking at the West for sources of cultur- embrace a religion they had prior little knowl- al, intellectual and now spiritual inspiration. edge of, but some would prefer to state they The new Sufi revival can be observed have “returned”8 to the practice of Islam. This in the media and in bookshops both in Tur- “return” can be understood as the result of a key and abroad, thereby contributing to the proselytizing discourse, a feature typical of worldwide diffusion of Turkish culture. To- Muslim conversion narratives in which Islam day, most television channels offer programs is portrayed as the “original and natural state on Islamic mysticism. Booksellers in Istiklal of being” and in which religious conversion is Caddesi and in other shopping areas of Istan- therefore understood to be a return to this pri- bul consider titles on Sufism to be among the mordial state. Alternatively, these new Sufis bestselling books. In those libraries, contem- may consider themselves non-practicing but porary Turkish literature and Sufi classics are “culturally” Muslims, thus moving towards offered on sale in English and other world lan- a more straight-forward Islamic identity in guages to satisfy the hunger and curiosity of which cultural and religious aspects are inte- the seven million tourists visiting Istanbul ev- grated. Among them, there is a sense of keep- ery year. Some of these works have been writ- ing with the White Turks’ intellectual tradition ten by Turks and are now bestsellers not only of looking at the West as a spring of moral mo- in Turkey but also in the West. Elif Şafak’s tivation. This then is a new turn in the phe- prolific literary output evidences such devel- nomena of cultural borrowings from Europe: opment. In recent years, she has consolidated instead of choosing among eminently Turkish a position as one of the most relevant voices in Turkish literature. The works of this resident 8 Scholars often consider this kind of religious follower a revert. The term ‘revert’ refers of Strasbourg, from 1997’s Pinhan (The Sufi) to to someone who was born Muslim and after a 2009’s Aşk (The Forty Rules of Love: A Novel period of religious disengagement comes back to of Rumi), deal with a wide range of subjects practice Islam. Revert Muslims who make sense related to Islamic mysticism and openly bor- of their identity by endorsing beliefs are often row from Sufi thought and cultural references. strongly critical of the milieu they come from. Aşk, Elif Şafak’ title which sold more than any Accordingly, Gilliat-Ray (1999) has suggested that in many aspects the experience of reversion to Islam novel in Turkey’s history, evidences the grow- bears significant similarities with the experience of ing interest in this westernized version of Su- conversion.

Euxeinos 10 (2013) 27 Marta Dominguez Diaz

fism.9 Turkey and the Structuring of Kurdish Iden- * * * tity: New Paradigms of Citizenship in the In conclusion, this article tried to briefly Twenty-first Century. Societal Peace and Ideal sketch the discursive genealogies of the recent Citizenship for Turkey, 49-69. 1 January. Sufi revival occurring in Turkey. It did so by Bein A., 2011. Ottoman Ulema, Turkish Re- presenting these new religious trajectories as public: Agents of Change and Guardians of Tradi- reactions against the anti-religious stances that tion, Stanford University Press. commonly characterize White Turks’ attitudes Cagaptay, S., 2004. Race, Assimilation towards Islam. I have argued that in feeling at- and Kemalism: Turkish Nationalism and the tracted towards Westernized modes of Sufi re- Minorities in the 1930s. Middle Eastern Stud- ligiosities, formerly secular Muslims are keep- ies, 40, 3, 86-101. ing with their tradition of looking westwards Gilliat-Ray, S., 1999. ‘Rediscovering Is- for intellectual stimulation, yet, interestingly, lam: A Muslim Journey of Faith’’. In: Lamb C. are incorporating a religious, and somehow, and Bryant M. D., eds. Religious Conversion: Islamic element to it. It is perhaps early to Contemporary Practices and Controversies, Lon- forecast how this will fit into the White versus don: Cassell. Black Turk disputes over national identity, but Guldemir, U., 1992. Texas-Malatya. by integrating a religious and in particular a Istanbul: Tekin Yayınevi. Muslim element into the Westernized identity Hendrich, B., 2011. Introduction – Be- pattern of secularism, they may run the risk of yond State Islam: Religiosity and Spirituality being accused by seculars of trying to come in Contemporary Turkey, European Journal of closer to Black Turkish ways and lifestyles. But Turkish Studies. Association pour la Recherche is it really fair and accurate to consider them sur le Moyen-Orient. Available at: http://ejts. a newly emergent class of “Grey Turks”? I do revues.org/4527 (consulted 1 March 2013). not think so. Heper, M., Toktas, S., 2003. Islam, Moder- nity, and Democracy in Contemporary Tur- List of references key: The Case of Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The Muslim World, 93,2, 157-185. Al-Maqdisee Abu Muhammad Ibn Karasipahi, S., 2009. Comparing Islam- Qudaamah, 2003. Condemning the practices of ic Resurgence Movements in Turkey and those who claim Sufism, Al-Ibaanah Book Pub- Iran. The Middle East Journal, 63, 1, 87-107. lishing. Available at:http://www.wiziq.com/ January 01. tutorial/144036-Condemning Koker, L., 2010. A key to the “democratic Arakon, M., 2011. The Making of Modern opening”: Rethinking citizenship, ethnicity and Turkish nation-state. Insight Turkey, 12, 2, 9 The novel explains the story of an 49-69. American Jewish woman who turns to Islam Landau, J. M., ed.1984. Ataturk and the when she discovers the works of the 13th century modernization of Turkey, Westview Press. founder of the Mevlevi order of whirling dervishes, Sirriyeh, E., 1999. Sufis and anti-Sufis: The Celaluddin Rumi. The book became so popular in Turkey that a grey-jacketed version was issued for defense, rethinking and rejection of sufism in the male buyers seemingly too embarrassed to be seen modern world. Richmond, Surrey: Curzon. holding the bright pink original edition!

Euxeinos 10 (2013) 28 Marta Dominguez Diaz

Tokyay, M., 2012. Headscarf discrimina- About the Author: tion spills over into private sector, SES Tür- kiye, 14th August. Avilable at: http://turkey. Dr Marta Dominguez Diaz (MA & PhD School setimes.com/en_GB/articles/ses/articles/re- of Oriental and African Studies, University portage/2012/08/14/reportage-01, (consulted 1 of London) is the Assistant Professor in March 2013). Islamic Studies (Anthropology) at the School Yavuz, M. H., 2003. Islamic political identity of Humanities and Social Sciences at the in Turkey. Oxford: Oxford University Press. University of St. Gallen, Switzerland. Some of Zubaida, S., 1996. Turkish Islam and Na- her recent publications include: ‘The One or tional Identity. Merip Middle East Report, 26, 1, the Many? Transnational Sufism and Locality 10. Zurcher, E. J., ed. 2004. Turkey: a modern in the British Būdshīshiyya.’ In: Gabriel, T.; history, I. B. Tauris. and Geaves, R. eds. 2013. Sufism in Britain, London: Continuum/Bloomsbury Academic; and ‘The Islam of “Our” Ancestors; An “imagined” Morisco Past Evoked in Today’s Andalusians’ Conversion Narratives.’ In: Larsson, G.; and Spielhaus, R. eds. 2013. Europe with or without Muslims, narratives of Europe, Journal of Muslims in Europe, Leiden: Brill. e-mail: [email protected]

Euxeinos 10 (2013) 29 Istanbul: How Turkey’s Cultural Capital Has Shaped Its Foreign Policy

by Jennifer Brindisi, Istanbul/London

Introduction had made limited progress on accession nego- tiations: only one of the 35 chapters required his paper compares descriptions of Istan- for EU membership had been resolved (Euro- Tbul from the time of the 2010 European pean Commission 2010, p. 5). Capital of Culture (ECoC) to the 2020 Olympic With so much work remaining, Turkish Games bid to show how the city has served officials used the ECoC programme toper- and influenced Turkey’s evolving foreign suade Europeans that Istanbul, and by exten- policy priorities. In using culture as a means sion, Turkey, belongs within Europe. Promo- for political analysis, this paper is indebted to tional pamphlets from the time described how Joseph S. Nye Jr.’s concept of soft power: “the “in terms of culture and civilisation, Istanbul ability to obtain preferred outcomes through is one of the richest cities in Europe […]. [The attraction” (2009, p. 160). It begins by asserting ECoC project] aims to take this important that Turkey presented Istanbul as a religiously chance to remind everyone that the roots of diverse, European city during the 2010 ECoC European culture lie in [Istanbul], and that in the hopes of galvanising its accession nego- [Turks] are a part of that culture” (Istanbul tiations with the European Union (EU). It then 2010 ECoC Agency 2010a, p. 20). Even Prime describes how these efforts failed to progress Minister Erdoğan proclaimed in 2010 that “Is- Turkey’s EU accession, inspiring Turkey to tanbul with its history, culture, civilisation assertively court alliances with other, mainly and people is a city that has its face turned Muslim, states as part of its ‘global vision’. toward Europe. As much as this city has inter- It concludes that Istanbul’s bid for the 2020 nalised European culture, European culture Olympic Games reflects this shift in foreign has been shaped by Istanbul” (Istanbul 2010 policy by highlighting the city’s Islamic heri- ECoC Agency 2010d, p. 28). Beyond shaping tage for the benefit of potential allies across Europeans’ perceptions of Istanbul’s past, the Asia, Africa and the Middle East. cultural activities were also designed to “proj- ect a new and different image of Istanbul as 2010 ECoC: a modern, contemporary European cultural Supporting Turkey-EU relations centre” (ECORYS 2011, p. 86). By forthrightly describing Istanbul as a European city, both Underpinning Istanbul’s bid for the 2010 the organisers and the Prime Minister hoped ECoC programme was, in part, Turkey’s long- that visitors would see it as such. standing interest in becoming a member of the Positioning Istanbul as a European city EU. Though Turkey joined the Council of Eu- was one tactic Turkey hoped would accelerate rope in 1949, its path to EU membership did its EU accession negotiations. Nuri Çolakoğlu, not begin until 1987, when it first lodged its Chairman of the Istanbul ECoC Select Com- application for membership. However, it “was mittee, even stated in a 2006 interview that not until 1999 that the Union recognised it as “Istanbul’s title as an ECOC can be useful as a candidate, and negotiations began only in it will attract many people to Istanbul in 2010 2005” (Pinder & Usherwood 2008, p. 138). By and so help people to see what actually Turkey the time of the 2010 ECoC programme, Turkey stands for. I am sure this will help ease the ten-

Euxeinos 10 (2013) 30 Jennifer Brindisi

sions during the tanbul is one of [EU] accession those rare places process” (Eura- where you can ctiv.com, 2006). find a syna- Once the ECoC gogue, a church was underway, and a mosque Prime Minister next to each oth- Erdoğan de- er on the same clared that “giv- street” (Eurac- en that Turkey tiv.com, 2006). is a candidate Prime Minister State destined Erdoğan also to join the Eu- expressed pride ropean Union, in the city for a Catching Europe in Istanbul: Istanbul’s desig- Gaïl Lefebvre, France, graphic designer - www.bookphotogail.com: similar reason: nation as a Euro- „I could have taken this picture in my neighborhood in Montreuil, a suburb of Paris. “The sound of Atmosphere, a kebab shop, pedestrian style: it all seems so close and similar to the pean Capital of corner of the street where I come from.“ prayers rising Culture will fur- © Gaïl Lefebvre from those min- ther the Europe- arets never sup- an political project, the European values, and presses the sound of church bells. Istanbul is a the sense of European belonging” (Istanbul capital of tolerance as much as it is of culture” 2010 ECoC Agency 2010d, p. 28). Thus, both (Istanbul 2010 ECoC Agency 2010d, p. 28). For the programme organisers and politicians Turkey, the 2010 Istanbul ECoC programme were clear in their objective of using Istanbul was a means of fostering Turkey-EU relations as a means of soft power to enhance their rela- by demonstrating the religious diversity of the tions with the EU. city, and by extension, Turkey. Istanbul’s religious diversity was high- lighted by two events prominently featured Bridging religious differences during in the ECoC programme. The first was the the 2010 ECoC programme exhibition, Legendary Istanbul: 8,000 Years of a Capital, held at the Sakıp Sabancı Museum. In One of the main objectives Turkey hoped recounting the history of the city, the exhibi- to achieve with the 2010 ECoC was to reassure tion employed many valuable Christian ob- Europe that a secular Muslim country could jects, like “a 14th-century book of the gospels be integrated to the EU, predominately com- of Matthew, Mark, Luke and John, written in prised of countries with Christian heritages. Arabic; a richly illustrated Armenian Bible; Istanbul, a city where Muslims, Christians and and a dictionary of Ottoman Turkish written Jews have co-existed in relative peace for thou- in Hebrew” (Fowler, 2010). The exhibition sands of years, functioned as an illustrative also featured “a planetarium-like projection to microcosm of Turkey’s integration into the EU. show how dozens of colourful domes inside In 2006 Mr Çolakoğlu even boasted how “Is- existing structures like churches and mosques

Euxeinos 10 (2013) 31 Jennifer Brindisi

reflect the commonalities rather than the di- key’s EU accession negotiations and instead visions among faiths” (Fowler, 2010). In the showed that while “Turkey has become ad- words of Guler Sabancı, one of the exhibition’s ept at transmitting messages, [...] symbolic sponsors, “the concept is to show the diver- achievements have far exceeded concrete sity of Istanbul through its domes, the domes ones” (Abramowitz & Barkey 2009, p. 126). In of every religion” (Fowler, 2010). Religious fact, the latest European Commission report diversity was also highlighted in one of the on Turkey from October 2012 states that eight documentaries screened, Three Days in Istan- chapters remain off the table and no chapter bul, which “reveals Istanbul’s codes embrac- will be provisionally closed until Turkey nor- ing fraternity of all religious communities that malises its relations with Cyprus (European have been living together in a great peace and Commission 2012, p. 5). happiness since 1453” (Istanbul 2010 ECoC This lack of progress has frustrated Turk- Agency, 2010b). More specifically, it showed ish officials, who are pressing for a decision to religious ceremonies performed by Muslims, be made ahead of Turkey’s 100 year anniver- Christians and Jews and highlighted the simi- sary in 2023. During a visit to Germany in Oc- larities between all three. tober 2012, Prime Minister Erdoğan was asked By choosing projects like these, the Turk- if Turkey would be an EU member by 2023 and ish ECoC Select Committee was trying to dem- replied: “They probably won’t string us along onstrate that differences between Christians that long. But if they do string us along until and Muslims, “which at first glance [seem] then the European Union will lose out, and at plausible, [become] dissolved into a complex the very least they will lose Turkey” (Coskun, and puzzling pattern of cultural and religious 2012). Despite this ultimatum, Mr Erdoğan exchanges that does not provide a reasonable made clear in February 2013 that Turkey has platform for the border demarcation of the EU not abandoned its EU ambitions: “Turkey has along religious lines” (Jung & Raudvere 2008, never given up on its European Union targets. p. 14). As stated in the ex-post evaluation of There may be some that are expecting [us] to Istanbul 2010, the cultural activities “contrib- steer away, but it is clear that we are continu- uted to the objective of redefining citizenship ing to take determined steps” (Hurriyet Daily in the context of Turkey’s hoped-for accession News, 2013). With accession negotiations at a to the EU, through projects that emphasised standstill, Turkey is still pursuing EU mem- values of tolerance [and] celebrated the diver- bership, but its interest is increasingly tem- sity of cultures and ethnic groups present in pered by frustration. the city” (ECORYS 2011, p. 67). In reviewing With its EU aspirations dwindling, Tur- all elements of the ECoC programme, it is clear key has begun to more actively pursue dip- that Istanbul was used as a means of enhanc- lomatic relations with other actors across the ing Turkey’s chances of EU membership. Middle East, Africa and Asia. According to Mr Erdoğan, this ‘global vision’ has already Looking beyond the EU towards a ‘global yielded results: “We have institutional ties vision’ with ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations], we have an observer status at the Despite the hopes pinned on the 2010 Arab League, we are a strategic partner of the ECoC programme, it failed to galvanise Tur- African Union, and we also have ties with the

Euxeinos 10 (2013) 32 Jennifer Brindisi

Organization of American States. [...] Those portunity to fashion Istanbul’s rich culture are not alternatives to European Union. We into an effective soft power tool. For example, see them as [factors] strengthening our stra- the 2020 Olympic Games bid book states that tegic relations” (Hurriyet Daily News, 2013). one of Turkey’s Games-related objectives is to Moreover, Mr Erdoğan stated in January 2013 enhance “Turkey’s position in the world” by that Turkey is pursuing membership with the “repositioning [...] Turkey’s image and repu- Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO): “If tation, with benefits for trade and society” (Is- we get into the SCO, we will say good-bye to tanbul 2020 Bid Committee 2013, p. 23). This the European Union. The Shanghai Five is bet- objective is also shared by politicians: when ter -- much more powerful. Pakistan wants in. meeting with the IOC in February 2013, Istan- India wants in as well. If the SCO wants us, bul’s Mayor, Kadir Topbaş, said that “Istanbul all of us will become members of this organ- 2020 is the first sports bid in Turkish history isation” (Uslu, 2013). While he may have been to have been officially launched by the Prime grandstanding slightly, Mr Erdoğan’s frustra- Minister, and it has been identified as a stra- tion with the EU and interest in working with tegic national priority” (Mackay, 2013). Even more receptive international partners ahead of Mr Erdoğan himself has commented that Tur- the 2023 centenary is clear. key’s aim in hosting the Olympic Games is to Implicit in Turkey’s ‘global vision’ is a “connect its cities with the world” as “Tur- foreign policy agenda grounded in self-deter- key is looking at the world 360 degrees, not mination, a stark contrast to the EU accession only with its economic strength but also with negotiations. In 2012, Turkish Foreign Minis- its soft power” (Hurriyet Daily News, 2013). ter Ahmet Davutoğlu wrote that henceforth While the 2010 ECoC programme failed to “our foreign policy will be conducted autono- progress Turkey-EU relations, the Olympic mously. We suffer from a perception that other Games represent an opportunity for Turkey to powers design regional politics and we only show its strengths to the world and advance perform the roles assigned to us. We need to its ‘global vision’. do away with this psychological sense of in- One way in which Turkey aspires to con- feriority which has permeated in many seg- nect with other countries during the 2020 ments of our society and amongst political Olympic Games is through Istanbul’s Islamic elites” (Davutoğlu 2012, p. 4). He justified his heritage. While specific examples of this are comments by highlighting Turkey’s new role provided below, it is necessary to first explain in “several regional and international organi- that many of the countries in which feature zations” as well as its participation in interna- in Turkey’s ‘global vision’ are Muslim. For tional conferences (2012, p. 4). No longer con- example, the SCO’s member states include tent to wait for the EU’s approval, Turkey is Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uz- increasingly asserting itself on the world stage. bekistan. With these potentially new partners, Turkey’s Muslim population is a commonal- 2020 Olympic Games: Supporting Turkey’s ity, not a point of departure, as with the EU. ‘global vision’ In fact, when speaking about joining the SCO, Mr Erdoğan even said: “The Shanghai Five is As Turkey fulfils its ‘global vision’, the better and more powerful [than the EU], and 2020 Olympic Games represent a fresh op- we have common values with them.” (Uslu,

Euxeinos 10 (2013) 33 Jennifer Brindisi

2013). While ‘values’ is a broad term, the only religion mentioned in the Istanbul 2020 Prime Minister may have been referencing, in Olympic Games bid book. While Istanbul is a part, the shared religious values of the region. multifaceted city, the fact remains that it sup- As Turkey deepens ties with the SCO and oth- ports over 3,000 mosques and less than 100 er organisations, Islam provides an important churches and synagogues (Istanbul Metropol- commonality. itan Municipality, 2008). More broadly, 99.8 In lobbying the IOC to select Istanbul for per cent of Turkish citizens identify as Mus- the 2020 Games, Turkish officials have cleverly lim (CIA, 2013). The 2020 Olympic Games bid aligned themselves with other Muslim coun- book mentions Istanbul’s Muslim culture six tries by implying that a victory for Istanbul times, but doesn’t discuss the city’s Christian would be a victory for the global Muslim com- or Jewish communities. For example, the bid munity. While in London for the 2012 Olym- book describes how in Istanbul “the Olympic pic Games, Mr Erdoğan complained that “no objective of universality will be reinforced by country with a majority of Muslim population embracing the Muslim culture, adding dis- has ever hosted the Olympics. [...] People will tinctive value to the Olympic and Paralympic ask ‘Why? What is missing [in these coun- brands, as a new chapter in Games history is tries]?’ ” (Hurriyet Daily News, 2012). Simi- opened” (Istanbul 2020 Bid Committee 2013, larly, the Istanbul Olympic Games bid book p. 25). Though a small detail, it nevertheless specifically points out that Istanbul would be presents an interesting point of comparison the “first games in a secular Muslim society” from the political agenda of 2010 to Turkey’s (Istanbul 2020 Bid Committee 2013, p. 17). Im- current ‘global vision’. plicit in these observations is that the Interna- tional Olympic Committee (IOC) should select Istanbul not only as a gesture to the Muslim world, but also to honour one of the Funda- Conclusion mental Principles of Olympism, as set out in the Olympic Charter: “Any form of discrimi- Turkey’s evolving foreign policy agenda nation with regard to a country or a person on is clearly reflected in comparing depictions of grounds of race, religion, politics, gender or Istanbul during 2010 ECoC programme to the otherwise is incompatible with belonging to 2020 Olympic Games bid. In 2010 Turkish au- the Olympic Movement” (International Olym- thorities made every effort to present the city pic Committee, 2011). By highlighting its Mus- as multi-religious to quell European fears that lim citizens to the IOC, rather than camouflag- a Muslim Turkey could not be integrated into ing them in the name of ‘religious diversity’ the residually Christian EU. However, their as with the 2010 ECoC programme, Turkey efforts were in vain: in 2013 EU accessions ne- is aligning itself with the world’s Muslim na- gotiations remain frozen and are likely to stay tions. In doing so, it is laying the groundwork that way unless there are unexpected changes for multilateral partnerships beyond the EU. in Turkish-Cypriot relations. Frustrated by Finally, while Turkey went to great what it perceives to be discrimination, Turkey lengths during the 2010 ECoC programme to has adopted a ‘global vision’, a foreign poli- demonstrate Istanbul’s religious diversity for cy agenda that prioritises deepened ties with the benefit of European audiences, Islam is the other Muslim nations and self-determination.

Euxeinos 10 (2013) 34 Jennifer Brindisi

As a result, the Turkish organisers of the 2020 Çolakoğlu on Istanbul’s 2010 Cultural Cap- Olympic Games bid have presented Istanbul ital bid. Available at: http://m.euractiv.com/ as representative of the Muslim world, a re- details.php?aid=189509 versal from earlier efforts to present the city as European Commission, 2010. Turkey 2010 a microcosm of European religious plurality. Progress Report. Brussels: European Whether Turkey wins the Olympic Games bid Commission. Avialabe at: http://ec.europa.eu/ and is then able to use the opportunity to fur- enlargement/pdf/ k e y _ d o c u - ther its foreign policy ambitions remains to be ments/2010/package/tr_rapport_2010_en.pdf seen. Regardless of the bid outcome, it is clear European Commission, 2012. Turkey 2012 that Istanbul has played a supporting role in Progress Report. Brussels: European shaping Turkey’s foreign policy and is likely Commission. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/ to continue to be deployed as a soft power tool. enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2012/pack- age/tr_rapport_2012_en.pdf Bibliography Fowler, S., 2010. In Istanbul, 8,000 Years of History. The New York Times. 3 September. Abramowitz, M., & Barkey, H.J., 2009. Available at: http://intransit.blogs.nytimes. Turkey’s Transformers: The AKP See Big. com/2010/09/03/in- istanbul-8000-years- Foreign Affairs 88 (6), pp. 118-128. Available at: of-history/ http://www.jstor.org/stable/20699720 Hurriyet Daily News, 2013. PM insists Tur- CIA., 2013. Turkey. In: The World Factbook. key still wants membership, criticizes EU Available at: https://www.cia.gov/ l i - terror stance. 11 February. Available at: http:// brary/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ www.hurriyetdaily news.com/pm-er- tu.html dogan-eu-envoys-meet-with-substantial- Coksun, O., 2012. EU will lose Turkey if agenda.aspx?pageID=238&nID=40885&News it hasn’t joined by 2023 - Erdogan. Reuters. 31 CatID=338 October. Available at: http://uk.reuters.com/ Hurriyet Daily News, 2012. PM links reli- article/ 2012/10/31/uk-germany-turkey-idUK- gion to bid to host Olympic Games. 30 July. BRE89T1TE20121031 Available at: http://www.hurriyetdailynews. Davutoğlu, A., 2012. Principles of Turk- com/pm-links-religion-to-bid- t o - h o s t - ish Foreign Policy and Regional Political olympic-games.aspx?pageID=238&nid=26608 Structuring. Turkish Policy Brief Series (3rd ed.). International Olympic Committee, 2011. Paris: International Policy and Leadership Olympic Charter. Lausanne: International Institute. Available at: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/ Olympic Committee. Available at: http:// site_media/html/bakanmakale_tepev.pdf www.olympic.org/Documents/olympic_char- ECORYS, 2011. Ex-Post Evaluation of 2010 ter_en.pdf European Capitals of Culture. UK: Istanbul 2010 ECoC Agency, 2010a. 2010: Rampton, J., McAteer, N., Mozuraityte, N., The Year in Which Change Begins. Levai, M. & Akçali, S. Available at: http:// Istanbul 2010 ECoC Agency, 2010b. Friday, ec.europa.eu/culture/documents/pdf/ecoc/ Saturday and Sunday in Istanbul. ecoc_2010_final_report.pdf Istanbul 2010 ECoC Agency. (2010c). Istan- Euractiv.com., 2006. Interview with Nuri bul is a World Within the World. Istanbul 2020 Bid Committee, 2013. Is-

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tanbul 2020 (1). Istanbul: Istanbul 2020 Bid About the Author: Committee. Available at: http://www.istan- bul2020.com.tr/ main/pdf/volume_1.pdf Jennifer Brindisi currently works as a political Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, 2008. consultant in London. She holds an MA Istanbul In Numbers. In: Istanbul 2010: E u - (Distinction) from the University of Warwick. ropean Capital of Culture. Available at: http:// Her thesis “European Cultural Identity and Its www.ibb.gov.tr/sites/ks/en-US/0-Exploring- Impact on Turkey’s Bid for EU Membership” The City/Location/Pages/IstanbulinNumbers. was published by the Global Political Trends aspx Center in Istanbul and won the first prize at the Jung, D., Raudvere, C., 2008. Religion, Poli- tics, and Turkey’s EU Accession. Michigan: Pal- 2011 EuroMed Forum for Young Researchers. grave Macmillan. She previously taught at Mackay, D., 2013. “New Turkey, New Bid” in Ankara and has published on Turkey-UK declares Arat as Istanbul 2020 deliver Candi- relations for the think-tank Bright Blue. dature file. Inside The Games. 7 January. Avail- e-mail: [email protected] able at: http://www.insidethegames.biz/ olympics/summer-olympics/2020/1012353- new-turkey-new-bid-declares-arat-as-istan- bul-2020-deliver-candidature-file Nye Jr., Joseph S., 2009. Get Smart: Com- bining Hard and Soft Power. Foreign Affairs 88 (4), 160-163. Available at: http://www.jstor. org/stable/20699631 Pinder, J., Usherwood, S., 2008. The Euro- pean Union: A Very Short Introduction (2nd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Uslu, E., 2013. Erdoğan considering Shanghai Five. Sunday’s Zaman. 27 January Available at: http://www.todayszaman.com/ columnist-305321-erdogan- considering- shanghai-five.html

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