Colombia's Elusive Quest for Peace
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COLOMBIA’S ELUSIVE QUEST FOR PEACE 26 March 2002 Latin America Report N°1 Bogotá/Brussels TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....................................................................i I. INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................................................1 II. HISTORICAL SYNOPSIS................................................................................................................2 A. THE “ERA OF VIOLENCE”, 1948-1965...................................................................................................2 B. THE RISE AND TRANSFORMATION OF THE INSURGENCY ...................................................................3 C. THE RISE AND TRANSFORMATION OF THE DRUG CARTELS AND THE PARAMILITARY FORCES ....4 D. PEACE EFFORTS 1982-1998 ....................................................................................................................5 III. CENTRAL ACTORS.........................................................................................................................7 A. PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT...................................................................................................................7 1. The State...............................................................................................................................................7 2. The Insurgents ......................................................................................................................................9 3. The Paramilitary Forces......................................................................................................................10 B. INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY .............................................................................................................11 1. The UN and the OAS..........................................................................................................................11 2. Neighbouring States and other Western Hemisphere Countries.........................................................11 3. United States.......................................................................................................................................12 4. Europe.................................................................................................................................................15 IV. HUMANTIARIAN CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFLICT ....................................................16 A. MASSACRES ...........................................................................................................................................16 B. ASSASSINATIONS....................................................................................................................................16 C. TORTURE................................................................................................................................................17 D. KIDNAPPING...........................................................................................................................................17 E. CHILDREN IN THE CONFLICT ...............................................................................................................18 F. INDISCRIMINATE MILITARY ATTACKS ON THE CIVILIAN POPULATION..........................................18 G. TERRORIST ACTS AGAINST INFRASTRUCTURE...................................................................................18 H. FORCED INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT ....................................................................................................18 V. DYNAMICS OF PEACE AND WAR, 1998-2002.........................................................................20 A. THE PASTRANA INITIATIVE ..................................................................................................................20 B. THE CRISIS OF JANUARY 2002.............................................................................................................22 C. THE FARC: MAKING WAR AND TALKING PEACE...............................................................................24 D. THE END OF THE PEACE PROCESS......................................................................................................25 VI. CONCLUSION: WHAT NOW IN COLOMBIA?.........................................................................27 A. RETHINKING THE WAY AHEAD ...........................................................................................................27 B. IMPROVING SECURITY PROTECTION ...................................................................................................28 C. RE-ENERGISING THE PEACE PROCESS................................................................................................29 D. COMBATING DRUG TRAFFICKING .......................................................................................................31 E. STRENGTHENING COLOMBIA’S INSTITUTIONS ...................................................................................32 APPENDICES A. GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS....................................................................................................................33 B. CHRONOLOGY OF GOVERNMENT OF COLOMBIA – FARC PEACE PROCESS 1998 – 2002................34 C. MAP OF COLOMBIA...............................................................................................................................41 D. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP ......................................................................................42 E. ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFING PAPERS.................................................................................................43 F. ICG BOARD MEMBERS .........................................................................................................................47 ICG Latin America Report N°1 26 March 2002 COLOMBIA’S ELUSIVE QUEST FOR PEACE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS Looking Back. In February 2002, negotiations to scope of suffering. The fighting that followed the end the most dangerous confrontation of Colombia's breakdown of negotiations, while less intense than decades of civil war collapsed. Nearly four years in the immediately preceding month, indicates that earlier, the newly-inaugurated President Andrés the FARC retains the capacity to operate effectively Pastrana had opened talks with the country’s major throughout much of the country and that there is remaining rebel groups, the Fuerzas Armadas little or no chance the government can impose a Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo military solution in the foreseeable future. (FARC) and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), with great enthusiasm and hope. But the At the same time, Colombia's importance as a fighting never ended while the talks sputtered on, source of narcotics has greatly increased, thereby and the country now appears headed for a new magnifying the stake of the international community round of violence in its cities and against its − including the country's neighbours and the U.S. − infrastructure. The international community is in finding a solution to the conflict. The legitimate concerned about the implications not only for rural economy has suffered greatly from war and Colombia’s people and its democratic institutions, price shocks over the last decade, making the grip of but also wider regional stability. coca producers even stronger. With support from Europe, Latin America and the Colombia has a potentially strong economy and a United States, President Pastrana granted the long democratic tradition that, though undermined largest insurgent group, the FARC, a demilitarised by a history of violence, is one of the proudest in zone (DMZ), the size of Switzerland, in the south Latin America. Its civil war has become inextricably of the country. Both he and the FARC, however, intertwined with the narcotics trade, which not only kept experienced third parties, Colombian and fuels the conflict but also appears to have altered international, at arm’s length. The negotiations, significantly the character of the insurgents and the courageous initiative though they were, appeared paramilitaries, who now have a dependable source to lack a consistent strategy. By the time Pastrana of income to fund weapons purchases and ensure declared them over and ordered the army to their staying power. reoccupy the (DMZ), the endeavour looked to most Colombians like little more than a mirage. The The surge in Colombia’s illicit narcotics industry international community has virtually unanimously since the 1980s, combined with the ideological supported his decision: in the post-11 September dislocations of the end of the Cold War, have made world, a strong stance against a terror organisation the FARC and ELN far different from earlier Latin has been an easy call. American guerrilla groups. Many of their leaders have become “military entrepreneurs” who feel little Throughout Pastrana’s tenure, all illegal armed need to cooperate and communicate with organisations − the FARC, the ELN and the Colombian society and even less with the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC, or international community. They have lost most of paramilitaries) − have intensified their attacks, their former popular support, and their power is now regularly violating human rights and expanding the reflected almost exclusively in military capabilities Colombia’s Elusive Quest for Peace ICG Latin America Report N°1, 26 March 2002 Page