The Liar Paradox and the Letter to Titus

PATRICK GRAY Rhodes College Memphis, TN 38112

ODYSSEUS WAS, BY REPUTATION, an exceptionally good liar (Plato Hipp. min. 364C-E). His habit of telling tales is a necessary survival skill as he makes his way home from the Trojan War.1 The habit proves hard to kick when he finally reaches Ithaca. In his encounters in the second half of the Odyssey with Eumaeus the loyal swineherd and with Penelope, his long-suffering wife, he does not immediately reveal his true identity but rather claims to be a man of Crete. This disguise is fit­ ting in light of the widely held opinion that Cretans were persistent prevaricators.2 Homer's choice of disguise for Odysseus may in fact be the earliest evidence for this reputation. So pervasive is this view of Crete that it finds its way into the pages of the NT. The author of the Letter to Titus describes the local population as ''always liars, evil beasts, lazy gluttons" (1:12), a characterization he conveniently borrows from one of their own. Whereas the commentary tradition has paid close attention to the negative stereotype of Cretans, one other aspect of its deployment has frequently escaped notice. When the author quotes "one of their own prophets" indicting Cre­ tans as "always liars" and then proceeds to remark that "this testimony is true," he in essence reproduces one of the most (in)famous antinomies of the ancient world.

1 See Adele J. Haft, "Odysseus, Idomeneus and Menones: The Cretan Lies oí Odyssey 13-19," CJ19 (1984) 289-306. 2 In Greek, "to play the Cretan" (Κρητίζειν) means "'to lie" (Plutarch A em. 23.6: Lys. 20.2). Their claim to be the site of the tomb of Zeus leads Callimachus {Hymn. 1.8-9) and many writers thereafter to label the Cretans a race of liars (cf. Lucían Phìlops 3; Tun. 6): see also Reggie M. Kidd. 'Titus as Apologia Grace for Liars, Beasts, and Bellies," HBT 21 (1999) 185-209. esp. 191- 97.

302 THE LIAR PARADOX AND THE LETTER TO TITUS 303

If Cretans are always liars, and if the speaker—usually identified as Epimenides3— is a Cretan, then he must be a liar. And if he is a liar, then his "testimony" cannot be true. On the other hand, if it is true that Cretans are always liars, then his testi­ mony corresponds to the facts of the case and he is not lying. But this would mean that not all Cretans are lying all the time, which would mean that the beginning premise was false. So if he is lying, then he is telling the truth (when he says that Cretans are always liars); and if he is telling the truth, then he must be lying (since he himself disproves the stated rule that Cretans are always liars). Logicians refer to this state of affairs as a paradox. In various forms this particular paradox was known in antiquity as the Liar (ό ψευδόμενος).4 Is the author oblivious to the logical and rhetorical havoc he has wrought?5

3 Clement of Alexandria is the first Christian writer to identify the speaker in Titus 1:12 as Epi­ menides {Strom. 1.59.2; cf. Jerome Comm. Tit 7). The original source of the hexameter verse quoted by the author of Titus is likely the Theogony or the Chresmoi of Epimenides; see J. Rendei Harris, "The Cretans Are Always Liars," Expositor 7, no. 2 (1906) 305-17; idem, "St. Paul and Epimenides," Expositor 15, no. 1 (1915) 29-35; and Robert Renehan, "Classical Greek Quotations in the New Testament," in The Heritage of the Early Church (ed. David Neiman and Margaret A. Schatkin; Orientalia Christiana Analecta 195; Rome: Pontificium Institutum Studiorum Orientalium, 1973) 35. G. M. Lee ("Epimenides in the Epistle to Titus [1:12]," NovT22 [1980] 96; cf. G. L. Huxley, Greek Epic Poetry [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969] 81-82), however, believes that the remark originated as a reply made to Epimenides by the Pythoness at Delphi, which later came to be included among the sayings of the Cretan seer. Jerome D. Quinn {The Letter to Titus: A new translation with notes and commentary and an introduction to Titus, I and II Timothy, the Pastoral Epistles [AB 35; New York: Doubleday, 1990] 108) believes that the author is quoting from an anthology that circulated in the Hellenistic period. For the legends surrounding the life of Epi­ menides, whom Plato calls a "divine man" {Leg. 1.642D-F), see Diog. Laert. 1.109-15. 4 Modern logicians frequently use "Liar Paradox" and "Epimenides Paradox" interchange­ ably (incorrectly so, according to Christoph Zimmer, "Die Lügner-Antinomie in Titus 1,12," LB 59 [1987] 77-99, esp. 85-92). Brief introductions to the problem may be found in A. N. Prior, "Epi­ menides the Cretan," Journal of Symbolic Logic 23 (1958) 261-66; and Alan Ross Anderson, "St. Paul's Epistle to Titus," in The Paradox of the Liar (ed. Robert L. Martin; New Haven: Yale Uni­ versity Press, 1970) 1-11. Richard L. Kirkham provides an overview of the proposed solutions {The­ ories of Truth [Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992] 271-306). The most comprehensive treatment of the Liar in antiquity is that of Alexander Rüstow, Der Lügner. Theorie/Geschichte und Auflösung (Leipzig: Teubner, 1910) 17-102. For a survey of the discussion among medieval Islamic com­ mentators, see Larry B. Miller, "A Brief History of the Liar Paradox," in Of Scholars, Savants, and Their Texts (ed. Ruth Link-Salinger; New York: Peter Lang, 1989) 173-82. Paul Vincent Spade treats the problem as it appears in Christian Scholastic texts ("The Origins of the Mediaeval Insolubilia Literature," Franciscan Studies 33 [1973] 292-309). The secondary literature dealing with the Liar and with related paradoxes of self-reference such as the Burali-Forti Paradox and Russell's Paradox is enormous and still growing; see Martin, Paradox of the Liar, 135-49; and, most recently, the bib­ liography in Elke Brendel, Die Wahrheit über den Lügner: Eine philosophisch-logische Analyse der Antinomie des Lügners (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1992). 5 This would appear to be the case when the psalmist, in 116:11, declares, "I said in my haste 'All men are liars'" {KJV; cf. JPS). Whereas the psalmist belongs to the class of "all men," he has indeed spoken hastily. The rendering of the RSV removes the contradiction ("I said in my conster- 304 THE CATHOLIC BIBLICAL QUARTERLY | 69,2007

Or was it his intention all along to fall into this conundrum? My aim in this essay is to test the hypothesis that the author is indeed aware of the contradiction by (1) examining the function and status of logical paradoxes in antiquity and (2) set­ ting the passage within the context of the pervasive paraenetic concerns about talk­ ativeness, taciturnity, and propriety in speech here and elsewhere in the Pastoral Epistles.

I. The Liar Paradox in Greco-Roman Antiquity If the author (be it Paul or someone writing in his name) is acquainted with the paradox, there are two possible explanations: Either he has encountered it directly, in some form or other, in the course of his schooling, or the paradox has already become part and parcel of Mediterranean cultural literacy in the first cen­ tury.6 Because it would be extremely difficult—in the absence of an explicit ref­ erence—to demonstrate beyond all doubt that the author had studied the Liar in some sort of formal manner, in practical terms these two possibilities stand at two points along a common continuum. Discussions of the Liar Paradox appear frequently in both technical and pop­ ular literature produced in the Hellenistic period as well as in the centuries fol­ lowing its purported appropriation in Titus. The Liar looms particularly large in the philosophical literature. Eubulides of Miletus, widely known as a critic of Aristotle and as the teacher of Demosthenes, is said to have formulated a number of classic logic problems such as the Liar, on account of which he became the butt of jokes by the comic poets (Diog. Laert. 2.108). Aristotle's successor as the head of the Lyceum, Theophrastus, wrote three books on the Liar (Diog. Laert. 5.49).7 It was common knowledge, however, that the Stoics were the specialists in this and other paradoxes (Cicero Div. 2 A Al; Fin. 4.4.8; Diog. Laert. 7.44).8 Chrysippus, who nation, 'Men are all a vain hope"'), but the XRSV restores it ("I said in my consternation, 'Every­ one is a liar'"). 6 Contemporary examples of paradoxes familiar to the general public might include: Which came first, the chicken or the egg? If God is omnipotent, can God create a rock so big that he is unable to lift it? What happens when an irresistible force meets at immovable object? If a tree falls in the forest and no one is present to hear it, does it make a sound? Can a man travel back in time and change history in such a way (e.g., by killing his own grandfather before his grandfather met his grandmother) that he would prevent himself from being born? Some of these puzzles are not, strictly speaking, paradoxes, but they are the type of logical conundrums that are well known and that nonspecialists regard as, at best, idle curiosities. "Aristotle himself anticipates its main lines in Soph el. 180a32, 180b2-7; see Joseph M. Bochenski, Ancient Formal Logic (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1957) 101. 8 Cicero devotes an entire treatise to the Paradoxa Stoicorum. The Epicureans, by contrast, were widely criticized on the grounds that they did not promulgate a systematic method for resolv­ ing similar dilemmas or detecting fallacies (Cicero Fin 1.7.22). THE LIAR PARADOX AND THE LETTER TO TITUS 305 had studied at the Academy in the middle of the third century B.C.E. before suc­ ceeding Cleanthes as the head of the Stoa, reportedly devoted more than a dozen works to the Liar, in addition to a "Reply to those who hold that Propositions may be at once False and True" (Diog. Laert. 7.196-97).9 Not only does the Liar figure prominently in the polemical discourse carried on between the various schools (Cicero Acad. post. 2.29.95-30.98), but the study of paradoxes also occupied a prominent place in the basic training in logic and rhetoric received by would-be philosophers and orators. Some neophytes saw this as a necessary evil to endure, but it appears that many more were overly zealous to become masters of the game. Epictetus, for example, criticizes those who come to the study of philosophy simply "to know what Chrysippus means in his treatise on The Liar" {Diatr. 2.17.34).10 Yet he takes issue with the popular view that "logic bears no fruit" (1.17.10; cf. Aulus Gellius Noct. att. 7.13.7). When Epictetus wants to emphasize how difficult it can be to master one's passions, he remarks that to resist the advances of a beautiful woman is an accomplishment even more impres­ sive than solving the Liar or a similarly knotty problem {Diatr. 2.18.18). Other exchanges recorded in the writings of Epictetus suggest that non- philosophers regarded such exercises as not only tedious but positively useless. When one's child dies or when one must endure torture, they ask, of what use is it to be able properly to identify the premises of the Liar {Diatr. 2.21.18)?11 Plutarch takes the criticism one step further when he says that the Stoics actually create more problems than they solve in their preoccupation with the Liar and other para­ doxes {Comm. not. 1070D). Sextus Empiricus expresses the intolerance of non- logicians of all times and places on this score when he excoriates the stereotypical Stoic {Pyr. 2.244):

And when he has made a collection of such trash he draws his eyebrows together, and expounds Dialectic and endeavours very solemnly to establish for us by syllogistic proofs that a thing becomes, a thing moves, snow is white, and we do not have horns; although it is probably sufficient to confront the trash with the plain fact in order to

9 See Rüstow, Der Lügner, 63-65; Walter Cavini, "Chrysippus on Speaking Truly and the Liar," in Dialektiker und Stoiker Zur Logik der Stoa und ihrer Vorläufer (ed. Klaus Döring and Theodor Ebert; Stuttgart: Steiner, 1993) 85-109; and Mano Mignucci, 'The Liar Paradox and the Stoics," in Topics in Stoic Philosophy (ed. Katerina Ierodiakonou; Oxford: Clarendon, 1999) 54-70, esp. 54-55. 10 Elsewhere Epictetus indicates that enthusiastic beginners have the opportunity to cultivate the virtue of patience, because, the Liar appears on the syllabus only of the advanced course in logic {Diatr. 3.2.7). 11 On the disputes about the utility of studying paradoxes, see Cicero Acad. post. 2.48.147; Seneca Ep. 45.4-11. Frustration with paradoxes played no small part in Sextus Empiricus's embrace of the skepticism of Pyrrho (Roy Sorensen. A Brief History of the Paradox' Philosophy and the Labyrinths of the Mind [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003] 148-61). 306 THE CATHOLIC BIBLICAL QUARTERLY | 69,2007

smash up their positive affirmation by means of the equipollent contradictory evi­ dence derived from appearances.12 Chrysippus was by all accounts the worst offender; his obsession with the Liar demonstrates, according to Plutarch, that "nature brought forth Chrysippus too not by chance but providentially when she wanted to turn life bottom side up and upside down" {Comm. not. 1059D-E).13 Philo of Alexandria echoes this sentiment when he characterizes an argument made by Chrysippus as coming from one who takes pleasure in paradox rather than truth {Aet. 48). In antiquity, philosophers of nearly every stripe took paradoxes quite seri­ ously, much to the delight of those who, like Aristophanes (Nub. 319-22), mocked them for it. No one could steer completely clear of them, not even those who, for instance, regarded Zeno of Elea as a show-off on account of his penchant for set­ ting out the terms of an argument and then turning around and arguing its antithe­ sis with equal force, a complaint also made by Plutarch against Chrysippus (Stoic, rep. 1035F-1036A). Orators likewise included the Liar in their standard repertoire of rhetorical tricks, despite the criticism leveled by some in the guild that it was a waste of time to hold forth at length on logic puzzles (Aulus Gellius Noct. att. 9.16.7; cf. Isocrates Or. 10.1; Seneca Ep. 111). Listeners sometimes turned the tables on the lecturers, much to Plutarch's chagrin, diverting their attention from the topic at hand by dragging them into pointless discussions of this and other hypothetical syllogisms (Rect. rat. aud. 43C). Not only was dwelling on paradoxes considered bad form in many circles, but it could even be hazardous to one's health. When one member of the school of Eubulides, the Megarian Diodorus Cronus, was unable to solve a logic problem posed to him by Stilpo during an audience with Ptolemy Soter, he immediately left the banquet and began writing tracts on the problem but eventually committed suicide, so distraught was he at his failure (Diog. Laert. 2.111-12). The Liar could be particularly dangerous. Athenaeus (Deipn. 9.40IE) relates the tale of Philetas, whose desire to solve the Liar kept him from eating and sleeping. His epitaph blames the paradox for his death: "Philetas of Cos am I,/'Twas The Liar who made me die,/And the bad nights caused thereby."14

12 The lyric from Gilbert and Sullivan's Pirates of Penzance captures the popular sentiment in a more light-hearted way: "How quaint the ways of Paradox!'At common sense she gaily mocks!" 13 Plutarch's chief complaint is that Chrysippus claims to be doing just the opposite {Stoic, rep. 1037B). 14 The translation is that of George Stock, Stoicism (London: Constable, 1908) 36; cf. Benson Mates, "Two Antinomies," in Skeptical Essays (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981) 15-57, esp. 15-16. Sorensen {BriefHistoiy of the Paradox, 197) refers to a similar incident in a 1967 episode of Star Trek in which an enemy android short-circuits when he encounters a version of the Liar Par­ adox. THE LIAR PARADOX AND THE LETTER TO TITUS 307

But discussion of paradoxes was not always deadly serious. Lucian's skew­ ering of the Stoics shows that their proclivity for logic chopping was sufficiently familiar to his audience that he could count on it for a laugh (Vit. auct. 22). A cer­ tain Taurus regularly invited philosophers to his home for potluck dinners, but each guest was to bring not food but rather a clever topic for conversation, preferably some sort of logic problem of the sort that would "pique a mind enlivened with wine" (Aulus Gellius Noct. att. 7.13.4). Saturnalia at Athens was the setting for similar gatherings described by Aulus Gellius (18.2.10), at which dinner guests would compete for prizes. These games included solving some "sophistical catch," the favorite being "When I lie and admit that I lie, do I lie or speak the truth?" Lucian offers a variation of this theme in a self-deprecating manner at the begin­ ning of his True History. Before he commences his parody of the poets, philoso­ phers, and historians of old for their falsehoods, he proudly admits, "I shall at least be truthful in saying that I am a liar" (Ver. hist. 1.4). "I shall escape the censure of the world," he continues, one suspects, with no small dose of irony, "by my own admission that I am not telling a word of truth."15 Many philosophers might observe that such examples are not genuinely paradoxical but rather belong to the class of pragmatic paradoxes, that is, contingent statements that behave like con­ tradictions or tautologies.16 They nevertheless appear quite frequently as literary devices in Greek comedy, as when Aristophanes has the cash-strapped Strepsiades promise Socrates that he will pay him a handsome fee once Socrates teaches him enough sophistry to outwit and escape his creditors (Nub. 239-46).

II. The Liar Paradox and the Testimony of Titus This survey demonstrates that paradoxes generally, and the Liar in particular, were well known from their frequent use in philosophy, oratory, comedy, and recre­ ational activities. Also manifest is no small measure of hostility directed at those who thereby waste precious time and energy—their own as well as that of others. Antipathy was widespread and long lasting, even if the response was typically less harsh than the one Augustine reported receiving when he had asked what God was doing before the creation of the world (Conf. 11.12.14): "Preparing hell for peo­ ple who ask such questions." On these grounds it seems improbable that anyone with a modicum of Hellenistic education would be unfamiliar with the Liar Para­ dox or that it would appear where it does in Titus by pure coincidence.17

13 For an analogous attempt at self-referential humor that makes use of paradox, see the anec­ dote about Menedemus related by Plutarch {Vit. püd. 536A-B). 16 Sorensen, Brief History of the Paradox, 162. 17 The simple fact that the hexameter from Epimenides appears in Titus indicates that the author has perhaps read it in situ or else that it was a well-known tag line. Kidd ("Titus as Apolo­ gia," 188) suggests that the citation reflects "a level of literary culture widely in circulation via 308 THE CATHOLIC BIBLICAL QUARTERLY | 69, 2007

The comment in Titus 1:13a ("This testimony is true") increases the likelihood that the author knows what he is doing. By itself, the collocation of the introduc­ tory formula ("one of their own") with the statement that Cretans always lie cre­ ates a conundrum. To editorialize that "this statement is true" is superfluous; obviously the author would not have quoted Epimenides so approvingly had he not thought it was accurate. Elsewhere in the Pauline corpus, to be sure, the reader receives assurance that some claim or other is reliable; thus, the addendum in v. 13a may simply be a function of the author's style. The Pastoral Epistles frequently exhibit this rhetorical tendency (1 Tim 1:15; 3:1; 4:9; 2 Tim 2:11; Titus 3:8). Throughout the Pastoral Epistles, however, the author always prefers the formula πιστός ό λόγος (KJV: "this is a faithful saying"; NRSV: "the saying is sure"; NIV: "this is a trustworthy saying").18 Why does he vary his phrasing here, and only here? Could it be that he wants specifically to use the word αληθής? It could be that he realizes—alas, too late—that he has become entangled in a Cretan web of con­ tradiction and wants to clear up potential confusion by declaring the preceding statement truthful.19 But if he is astute enough to spot his error, then he must be familiar with the paradox and, moreover, one would expect him to realize that he actually compounds the error by declaring, in lapidary fashion, that the statement is true. (Without the affirmation, in fact, the paradox has a fairly straightforward solution: One could assert that the statement attributed to Epimenides is simply false. All Cretans may be habitual liars, but some might on rare, unguarded occa­ sions tell the truth.) Alternatively, it may be that the author adds "this testimony is true" not obliv­ ious to the logical consequences or to clean up the logical mess created by his use of Cretan testimony to convict all Cretans of mendacity, but rather for the very reason that it leads to or exacerbates a contradiction of sorts. Given the contextual considerations laid out in the preceding paragraphs, however improbable, this read­ ing provides the most likely solution to the exegetical questions raised by Titus 1:12-13. In the secondary literature only Anthony Thiselton seriously entertains

handbooks, anthologies, and summaries" but not that the author has encountered the lines in their original literary setting. Lee ("Epimenides in the Epistle to Titus," 96) cites the waggish view that if it had not been well known, then "Paul" would not have known it. According to Ronald F. Hock ("Paul and Greco-Roman Education." in Paul in the Greco-Roman World [ed. J. Paul Sampley; Har­ nsburg: Trinity Press International, 2003] 198-227, esp. 217). the quotation of Epimenides in Titus 1:12 reflects "the maxim habit formed at school." 18 On the formula πιστός ό λόγος, see George W. Knight III. The Faithful Sayings in the Pas­ toral Letters (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1968); and I. Howard Marshall, A Critical and Exegetical Com- mentary on the Pastoral Epistles (ICC; London: Clark, 1999) 326-30. 19 This is proposed by A. T. Hanson. The Pastoral Epistles (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans. 1982) 177. When the use of a popular maxim results in a paradox or otherwise obscures the speaker's point, rhetorical theorists advise adding an επίλογος for clarification (Aristotle Rhet. 2.21.3-5). THE LIAR PARADOX AND THE LETTER TO TITUS 309 this possibility and concludes that the author deliberately uses the paradox as a light touch or "an ironic comment on logical regress ad infinitum."2® As Thiselton contends, the desire of most commentators to absolve or to convict the author of the sin of stereotyping Cretans diverts attention from what he is really doing in Titus. Rather, the author springs this syllogistic trap—on himself.—in order to highlight the counterproductive nature of the types of discourse Titus is told to dis­ courage among his Cretan co-religionists. Would the author of the Pastoral Epistles say that his aim is "to demonstrate a logical asymmetry between first-person and third-person utterances" or that he employs the paradox on account of "its frequent function as meta-language, to break out of a vicious circularity which may arise from within a single-level sys­ tem of propositions"?21 No, not exactly in such technical terms, even if he fre­ quently employs vocabulary from the very same stock as Greek logicians.22 The works of Plutarch, Lucían, and the comic playwrights nevertheless provide evi­ dence that, in uttering or alluding to a paradox (including the Liar), writers and speakers could wink at their audiences while simultaneously broaching some weightier subject or concern. A rhetorical precedent was therefore in place for the author to poke fun at himself in this manner and, in the same breath, to castigate the native population (as well as to cast aspersions on the opponents who are exploiting their vicious natural proclivities). Given that the implied reader of the correspondence is a close associate, the implied author could reasonably expect him to get the joke.

20 Anthony C. Thiselton, "The Logical Role of the Liar Paradox in Titus 1:12, 13: A Dissent from the Commentaries in the Light of Philosophical and Logical Analysis," Biblical Interpretation 2 (1994) 207-23, esp. 212. On the ironic use of paradoxes in antiquity, see also Gerhard Hotze, Paradoxien bei Paulus· Untersuchungen zu einer elementaren Denkform in seiner Theologie (NTAbh 33; Münster: Aschendorff, 1997) 43-44. Hotze's larger discussion of Paul's rhetoric (see pp. 72-138) is marred somewhat by an overly expansive definition, which allows him to find '"para­ doxes" in all of the undisputed letters. His study does not include the disputed epistles. 21 Thiselton, "Logical Role of the Liar Paradox in Titus 1:12, 13," 207, 223. 22 E.g.. έλέγχειν and cognates (1 Tim 5:20; 2 Tim 3:16; 4:2; Titus 1:9,13; 2:15; cf. Piatolo/ 18D; Phaedr 273B; Aristotle Soph elench. 170a24; Eth. Nie 1146a23); στερεός (2 Tim 2:19; cf. στέρησις: Aristotle Cat. 12a26); ενάντιος (Titus 2:8; cf. Aristotle Cat. 6al8; Metaph. 1018a25); άντικείμαι (1 Tim 1:10; 5:14; cf. Sext. Emp. Math. 8.88; Diog. Laert. 7.73); αποδεκτός and cognates (1 Tim 2:3; 5:4; cf. Aristotle Eth Nie 1139b31; Plutarch Comm. not. 1061A; Sext. Emp. Math. 11.83); απέραντος (1 Tim 1:4; cf Epictetus Ench. 44; Sext. Emp. Math. 8.429: Diog. Laert. 7.77- 78); άνάλυσις (2 Tim 4:6; cf. Aristotle An pr 5lai8); μάχομαι (2 Tim 2:24; cf. Sext. Emp. Math. 8.119); αλήθεια and cognates (1 Tim 2:4, 7; 3:15; 4:3; 2 Tim 2:15, 18, 25; 3:7, 8; 4:4; Titus 1:1, 14: cf. Sext. Emp. Pyr 2.81, 138; Diog. Laert. 7.66); κατηγορία (1 Tim 5:19; Titus 1:6; cf. Aristotle's Categonae passim); and υγιής and cognates (1 Tim 1:10; 6:3: 2 Tim 1:13; 4:3; Titus 1:9, 13; 2:1, 8; cf. Epictetus Diatr. 2.1.4; Sext. Emp. Math. 8.125-28). On the vocabulary, see the glossaries in Bochenski, Ancient Formal Logic, 118-20; and Benson Mates, Stoic Logic (Berkeley: University of California Press. 1961) 132-36. 310 THE CATHOLIC BIBLICAL QUARTERLY | 69,2007

III. Proper and Improper Speech in the Pastoral Epistles On the hypothesis that the author is consciously deploying the Liar Paradox, what larger aim might this rhetorical strategy serve? By reproducing the paradox in Titus 1:12, the author calls to mind the conventional wisdom that dwelling on such riddles is, at best, a fruitless exercise. Paradoxes constitute an abuse of lan­ guage insofar as they deal in clandestine nonsense and lead to a descent into the absurd.23 Viewed in light of the author's recurring emphasis on proper speech— and its intersection with such Hellenistic topoi as those concerning talkativeness and the behavior of good and bad philosophers24—the ironic turn in Titus comes into clearer focus. Just prior to the appearance of the quotation from Epimenides, he warns Titus about the ''empty talkers and deceivers" who are "teaching what they ought not teach" and thereby upsetting whole households; "they must be silenced," he states flatly (1:10-11). This charge comes on the heels of criteria for the selection of overseers, who must be able "to preach with sound doctrine and to refute those who contradict it" (1:9).25 Verbal profession of faith unaccompanied by virtuous behavior is detestable (1:16). Propriety in speech is thus a primary concern of the passage in which the author, by dabbling in paradox, plays fast and loose with words. This concern is not limited to the immediate context of the Cretan oracle. The older women, the author says, are not to be slanderers, while slaves are told not to talk back to their masters (2:3, 9). As a general rule they should "speak evil of no one" and "avoid quarreling" (3:2). This latter admonition appears in an expanded form in Titus 3:9: "Avoid stupid controversies, genealogies, dissensions, and quar­ rels about the law, for they are unprofitable and futile." (Perhaps this is why they are to send Zenas the lawyer on his way a few verses later in 3:13!) Titus is to model "sound speech" for the younger men so that the opponents "will have noth­ ing evil to say about us" (2:8). Otherwise, he will not be able effectively to

23 This is especially, but not exclusively, true of the syntactic and semantic paradoxes such as Berry's Paradox, Grelhng's Paradox, and the Liar. 24 On these topoi, see William A. Beardslee, "De Garruhtate (Mor. 502A-515A)," in Plutarch s Ethical Writings and Early Christianity (ed. Hans Dieter Betz; SCHNT 4; Leiden: Brill. 1978) 264- 88; and Abraham J. Malherbe, Moral Exhortation A Greco-Roman Sourcebook (LEC 4; Philadel­ phia: Westminster, 1986) 30-47. 2:> For the use of "soundness" (υγιής) by Hellenistic philosophers in logic and other philo­ sophical settings, see Plutarch Adul. amie. 20F; Philostr. Vit. Apoll. 5.12; Epictetus Diatr. 1.11.28; 2.15.2; 3.9.5; Sext. Emp. Pyr. 2.150; and the discussion of Martin Dibelius and Hans Conzelmann, The Pastoral Epistles (Hermeneia; trans. Philip Buttolph and Adela Yarbro; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1972) 24-25. On the function of "sound speech" in the Pastoral Epistles, see Margaret Y. MacDon- ald, The Pauline Churches. A Socio-Historical Study of Institutionalization in the Pauline and Deutero-Pauhne Writings (SNTSMS 60; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) 170-76. THE LIAR PARADOX AND THE LETTER TO TITUS 311

"declare" the gospel or to "exhort and reprove" those in his charge (2:15) or to "sharply rebuke" (1:13) the troublemakers who lead the author to invoke the tes­ timony of Epimenides.26 It is the author's hope that, once corrected, the Cretans will enjoy the hope of eternal life promised by God, "who never lies" (1:2). Titus is not the only member of the Pauline circle to whom such instructions are addressed. The letters to Timothy likewise exhibit sustained reflection on the use and abuse of speech, which complements the ironic use of the Liar Paradox in Titus.27 Timothy is to remind his flock "to avoid disputes about words which do no good but only ruin those who are listening" (2 Tim 2:14).28 "Profane chatter" is similarly denounced, "for it will lead people into more and more impiety, and their talk will spread like gangrene" (2:16-17a).29 Stupid and senseless controver­ sies, says the author in 2 Tim 2:23-24, do nothing but cause quarrels.30 If Timothy gets caught up in such exercises in futility, it will be all the more difficult for him to be a patient teacher, "correcting opponents with gentleness" (2:25). His most valuable resource in this effort is Scripture itself, which is "inspired by God and profitable for teaching, reproof, and correction" (3:16). The author's catalogue of appropriate pastoral habits of speech in 2 Timothy culminates in 4:2: "Preach the word, be urgent in season and out of season, convince, rebuke, and exhort, be unfailing in patience and in teaching." 1 Timothy features an even more consuming paraenetic concern regarding matters of speech. The author's first warning mentions individuals who have swerved from sound doctrine and "wandered off into worthless discussions" (1:6). They want to be teachers "without understanding either what they are saying or the things about which they make assertions" (1:7).31 Lying and perjury are among

26 Thiselton notes the way in which the instruction in Tinas 1:13 supports the construal of 1:12 offered here: "Either the writer throws to the winds the courtesy, gentleness, and self-control which he urges throughout the entire epistle or he employs the liar paradox quite specifically to demon­ strate the self-defeating ineffectiveness of making truth-claims which are given the lie by conduct which fails to match them" ("Logical Role of the Liar Paradox in Tims 1:12, 13," 214; emphasis in original). 27 See especially Robert J. Karris, "The Background and Significance of the Polemic of the Pastoral Epistles," JBL 92 (1973) 549-64; and Luke Timothy Johnson, "II Timothy and the Polemic against False Teachers: A Re-examination," Ohio Journal of Religious Studies 6, no. 2-7, no. 1 (1978-79) 1-26. 28 Varrò uses "disputes about words" (λογομαχία) to describe debates between the Stoics and the Epicureans: see Gerhard Kittel, "λέγω κτλ.," TDNT, 4. 143. 29 This is said in reference to Hymenaeus and Philetus, who are upsetting the faith of some (cf. Titus 1:11) with their false claims about the resurrection. 30 "Controversy" (ζήτησις) appears frequently as a standard term for philosophical discussion (Plato Crat 406A; Philo Spec. 1.345; Epictetus Diatr 1.22.17; 3.14.10); cf. έκζήτησις in 1 Tim 1:4. 31 For the use of διαβεβαιόομαι in reference to philosophical argumentation, see Aristotle Rhet. 2.13.1; Sext. Emp. Pyr. 1.191. 312 THE CATHOLIC BIBLICAL QUARTERLY | 69,2007 the sins that are contrary to sound doctrine (1:10), and the author himself confesses that he was once guilty of blasphemy and insulting Christ (1:13).32 But now he has made the "good confession,'' as have Timothy and Jesus (6:12-13). Here and elsewhere one finds statements reflecting the author's conviction that, whatever its dangers, speech can also have a positive impact on life in the Christian community. Certain prophetic utterances (1:18; 4:14) are to encourage and inspire Timothy as he fights the good fight of faith and, despite his youth, endeavors to provide for everyone an example in speech and conduct (4:12). He also receives nourishment from "the words of faith and of the good doctrine" (4:6). While supplications, prayers, intercessions, and thanksgivings may be of benefit to those on whose behalf they are offered, including kings and other leaders outside the boundaries of Christian fellowship (2:1), public reading of Scripture, preaching, and teaching should be a constant in their worship gatherings for insiders (4:13). As an incen­ tive, those who do the work of teaching and preaching receive double compensa­ tion (5:17). Notwithstanding its potential contribution, the author of 1 Timothy still sees more of the dangers posed by certain habits of speech. Candidates for the office of bishop must not be given to quarreling (3:3; cf. 2:8). Deacons must not be "double- tongued" (3:8). The women—be they deacons or deacons' wives—should not be slanderers (3:11). Women who "profess religion" are not permitted to teach but should rather learn in silence (2:10-12). Many of the widows in the church's care provide a negative example: they have become gossips and busybodies, "saying things they ought not say" (5:13). Timothy's success as a pastor will depend in part on his manner of speaking with these women as well as on the way in which he rebukes and exhorts the men in the congregation (5:1 -2).33 If any of them should teach anything contrary to "the sound words of our Lord Jesus Christ," Timothy can be sure that "he has a morbid appetite for controversy and for arguments about words, which lead to envy, dissension, slander, base suspicions, and wrangling among men who are mentally depraved and bereft of the truth" (6:3-5). Finally, 1 Timothy ends just as it began—with a warning about getting drawn into pointless arguing initiated by the opponents: "Avoid the godless chatter and contradictions of what is falsely called knowledge, for by professing it some have missed the mark" (6:20-21). Following F. C. Baur, many commentators see in these verses the telltale sign that the Pastoral Epistles are responding to Marcion some­ time in the second century.34 But it is not necessary to construe "knowledge"

32 1 Timothy 1:20 states that Hymenaeus and Alexander have not yet received the same mercy—they have been delivered to Satan ''so that they may learn not to blaspheme." 33 Note also the guidelines in 1 Tim 5:19 for handling testimony against elders. 34 F. C. Baur. Die sogenannten Pastoralbrief e des Apostels Paulus aufs neue kritisch unter­ sucht (Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta. 1835) 8-39; Walter Bauer, Orthodoxy and Heresy in Earliest Christi- THE LIAR PARADOX AND THE LETTER TO TITUS 313

(γνώσις) and "contradiction" (άντίθεσις) as covert allusions to Marcion or to some Gnostic teacher of a later period.35 The former term appears so frequently—in Pauline literature and elsewhere—that there is little warrant for interpreting it so narrowly. The latter term likewise appears regularly in contexts unrelated to second-century debates about heresy and orthodoxy. "Contradiction," or "antithe­ sis," is a standard term in Greek logic and rhetoric.36 Demetrius notes the frequent use of antithesis in invective and polemical discourse (Eloc. 5.247), and notes that it could be employed for comic purposes, namely, to mock rhetoricians by aping their characteristic habits of speaking (1.24).37 Such a nontheological usage of "antithesis" in 1 Tim 6:20 therefore fits quite comfortably within the Hellenistic- Roman literary milieu and also contributes to the overarching paraenetic program of the Pastoral Epistles. In using "antithesis" here, it seems unlikely that the author is consciously setting up the appropriation of the Liar Paradox in Titus or that he is chiefly worried about violations of the Aristotelian law of noncontradiction ("no proposition can be both true and not true at the same time and in the same sense"). It is nevertheless the case that the hortatory thrust is the same in both passages: Beware of teachers who put on dazzling dialectical displays while leading their students astray.

IV. Conclusion Paul wrote letters out of necessity. It was not his preferred way of communi­ cating with the churches he had founded nor with his partners in ministry (such as Timothy and Titus). Despite awkward encounters in Corinth and elsewhere, face- to-face meetings had one significant advantage over written correspondence: the speaker could quickly clear up any potential misunderstandings on the spot rather than waiting weeks or months only to discover the confusion. Irony, sarcasm, and various types of jesting are notoriously prone to misinterpretation when not accom­ panied by certain nonverbal cues such as a wink, a nod, or a nudge. Tone of voice

anity (German orig. 1934; ed. Robert A. Kraft and Gerhard Krodel; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1971) 222-28; and Charles B. Puskas, The Letters of Paul: An Introduction (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1993) 178-80. 35 See Dibelius and Conzelmann, Pastoral Epistles, 92; and J. N. D. Kelly, A Commentary on the Pastoral Epistles (BNTC; London: Black, 1963) 151-52. 36 For discussion of άντίθεσις and άντίθετον as well as the Latin equivalents contentio and contranum, see Plato Soph. 25ΊΈ: Aristotle Top. U3bl5; Metaph I054a23: Int. \9b20; Rhet 3.9.9, 10; 3.10.6; [Rhet Alex ] 26; Rhet. Her 1.14.24; 4.15.21; 4.45.58; Cicero Part. or. 6 21; Top. 17,21, 47-49, 53-57; Demetr. Eloc. 1.27; Quint. Inst 9.2.101; 9.3.32; 9.3.81, 92; see also Bochenski, Ancient Formal Logic, 36-37. 37 See also Quintiliano criticism {Inst. 9.3.74) of Gorgias and Isocrates for their overrehance on this figure of speech. 314 THE CATHOLIC BIBLICAL QUARTERLY | 69,2007 or facial expression would likely convey enough information for Titus to get the point of the paradox in 1:12 or to prevent the author from crying out, in Prufrock- ian despair, 'That is not what I meant at all." Would it be too clever by half if the author of Titus, by alluding to the Liar Paradox while writing in Paul's name, were himself a liar? Perhaps. The author of Titus—be it Paul or some other pastor devoted to continuing his legacy—recog­ nizes that λόγος has a tremendous capacity both for good and for ill. He intuits (and applies more generally to all verbal intercourse) the same insight expressed by Stephen Read. "Paradox is the philosophers' enchantment, their fetish," Read writes.38 "It fascinates them, as a light does a moth." Although light can illuminate, it can also consume. Anselm, Nicholas of Lyra, and other medieval philosophers and theologians will find a place for paradox in their prayers and meditations, but the Letter to Titus will be one of the last traces of the Liar seen in Christian liter­ ature for several centuries.39

38 Stephen Read. Thinking about Logic • An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) 2. 39 On the appropriation of paradox in prayer and in other religious settings, see I. T. Ramsey and Ninian Smart, "Paradox in Religion.*' Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 33 (1959) 195-232; Sorensen, BriefHistoiy of the Paradox, 168; and Michiko Yusa, "Paradox and Riddles." Encyclopedia of Religion (2nd ed.; ed. Lindsay Jones et al.; Detroit: Macmillan Reference, 2005) 10. 6986-92. Patristic and early medieval neglect of the Liar is discussed by Spade. "Origins of the Mediaeval Insolubilia Literature/' 296-97. ^s

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