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Wittgenstein's Investigations 1-133 Wittgenstein’s Investigations 1–133 ‘It is a genuinely important book…there is nothing I know of in print which goes into such sophisticated detail as Lugg in getting Wittgenstein right.’ Burton Dreben, Harvard and Boston Universities One of the greatest works of twentieth-century philosophy, Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations is also one of the most controversial. Wittgenstein’s Investigations 1–133 provides a clear and concise introduction to the crucial early sections of this classic work. Andrew Lugg discusses in detail what Wittgenstein says about meaning, metaphysics and philosophy in sections 1–133 of the Philosophical Investigations. Besides making Wittgenstein’s thought accessible to a general audience and explaining its philosophical significance, the book develops a radical interpretation of his remarks. It takes Wittgenstein’s text to epitomize his philosophical outlook and applies Wittgenstein’s philosophical strategy to his own words. Wittgenstein’s Investigations 1–133 will be a valuable resource for anyone interested in Wittgenstein, language and the history of twentieth- century philosophy. Andrew Lugg is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Ottawa. For Lynne Cohen, fellow traveller and partner for the best part of a lifetime. Wittgenstein’s Investigations 1–133 A guide and interpretation Andrew Lugg London and New York First published 2000 by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2003. ©2000 Andrew Lugg All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Lugg, Andrew Wittgenstein’s investigations 1–133: a guide and interpretation/ Andrew Lugg. p. cm. Includes index. 1. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889–1951. Philosophische Untersuchungen. 1–133. 2. Meaning (Philosophy). 3. Metaphysics. 4. Philosophy. I. Title: Wittgenstein’s investigations one through one hundred thirty-three. II. Title. B3376.W563 P529 2000 192–dc21 99–089678 ISBN 0-203-46757-4 Master e-book ISBN ISBN 0-203-77581-3 (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN 0-415-23245-7 (Print Edition) Contents Preface vii Acknowledgements x Introduction 1 Wittgenstein’s Preface 5 Sections1 and 2: The shopkeeper and the builders 8 Interlude (1): ‘No such thing was in question here’ 13 Sections 3 to 7: Teaching by training 17 Interlude (2): Dispersing the fog 24 Sections 8 to 17: Primitive applications 27 Interlude (3): ‘Every word in language signifies something’ 34 Sections 18 to 20: ‘Bring me a slab’ 37 Interlude (4): Real meanings 44 Sections 21 to 25: Reporting, asking and commanding 47 Interlude (5): ‘The multiplicity of language-games’ 55 Sections 26 to 32: Defining by pointing 58 Interlude (6): The demand for perfect exactness 65 Sections 33 to 38: Characteristic experiences and genuine names 69 Interlude (7): Naming as an occult process 76 v vi Contents Sections 39 to 47: Names and their bearers 80 Interlude (8): Rejecting the question 88 Sections 48 to 54: ‘But are these simple?’ 91 Interlude (9): ‘We must focus on the details’ 99 Sections 55 to 64: Indestructible elements and analysed forms 103 Interlude (10): ‘It is just another language-game’ 112 Sections 65 to 70: Family resemblances 115 Interlude (11): ‘You take the easy way out!’ 122 Sections 71 to 77: Seeing and understanding 125 Interlude (12): The requirement of determinate meanings 133 Sections 78 to 85: Definitions and rules 137 Interlude (13): ‘A rule stands there like a sign-post’ 145 Sections 86 to 92: ‘The essence of everything empirical’ 149 Interlude (14): ‘We feel as if we had to penetrate phenomena’ 156 Sections 93 to 103: ‘We are not striving after an ideal’ 160 Interlude (15): Subliming the logic of language 168 Sections 104 to 114: ‘Back to the rough ground!’ 171 Interlude (16): The illusion of philosophical depth 178 Sections 115 to 123: ‘Your scruples are misunderstandings’ 182 Interlude (17): Pictures and representations 190 Sections 124 to 133: ‘There is nothing to explain’ 193 Interlude (18): The proper aim of philosophy 200 Conclusion 204 Notes 208 Index 211 Preface Ludwig Wittgenstein is mainly known for two great works of philosophy, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, published in 1921, and the Philosophical Investigations, published posthumously in 1953. In the earlier work Wittgenstein purports to solve all the problems of philosophy; in the later work he rethinks some of the same problems and explores issues that he had previously overlooked, failed to appreciate properly or dismissed as unimportant. Though just as ambitious as the Tractatus, the Investigations is very different in form and spirit. It too deals with central problems of philosophy, but it is not as abstract or dogmatic. Here Wittgenstein does greater justice to the appeal and depth of past philosophy and devotes much more time and effort to exposing and confronting the grip of philosophical ideas on our thinking. The first 133 sections of the Investigations, the subject of the present work, deal with topics central to Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. They are some of the most carefully worked out sections of the book, and had Wittgenstein written nothing else they would still merit our attention. The philosophy of the rest of the Investigations is also of the highest order, but §§1–133, which constitute about a fifth of the book, deserve special attention (and are more than enough to consider in a single volume). Also §§134–142 are somewhat technical, and at §143 Wittgenstein embarks on a more detailed examination of a variety of issues, some of which are touched on in the sections we shall be considering. It is not by chance that §§1–133 deal with the themes they do; Wittgenstein took what he says here to be fundamental for what he was trying to achieve in the Investigations and elsewhere. My discussion is in the form of a commentary. I go through §§1–133 a paragraph at a time, sometimes even line by line, and relegate discussion of how the text should be understood to interspersed interludes. Wittgenstein’s remarks are exceptionally compressed, and it is easy to misconstrue what he is saying if one allows oneself the liberty of skipping vii viii Preface from section to section and disregards how they are arranged. Few authors were more reluctant to go into detail than Wittgenstein, and the further we stray from the text, the more likely we are to misconstrue him. While reading the Investigations from the beginning is not a panacea, it is a useful antidote to common misinterpretations of what he is saying. Half the battle, it seems to me, is to refrain from trying to make his remarks more perspicuous by reorganizing them and to avoid assuming he intended us to fill what appear to be gaps in his exposition in this or that particular way (or at all). Instead of regarding the Investigations as an arcane document that can be understood only by imposing an interpretation on it, we should try to meet it on its own terms and struggle to figure out what each of its sentences actually says. I have three main goals. First to provide a clear and concise introduction to §§1–133 of the Investigations, one accessible to those unfamiliar with Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Secondly to remedy what I take to be mistaken ways in which individual sections are often read. And thirdly to draw attention to what, for want of a better phrase, might be called Wittgenstein’s philosophical outlook. I believe it possible to do all three things at once since I believe what Wittgenstein is trying to say is best appreciated by working through his text from the beginning. In fact I am persuaded that the power and importance of the Investigations becomes clear only when it is studied section by section in the order Wittgenstein intended. To understand him one has to follow the trail he pioneers and explore the issues he takes up along with him. Grappling with the text is not one option among many, never mind a first step towards a philosophically more sophisticated account of Wittgenstein’s remarks. It is the only way to grasp what he is trying to convey. My strategy in what follows is somewhat similar to Wittgenstein’s own strategy. Just as Wittgenstein labours to clear away what he takes to be misleading ways of thinking about the world and our place in it, so I bend my energies to clearing away misleading ways of reading his text. In Wittgenstein’s view we are led for a variety of reasons to see things other than they are, and I believe we are swayed by equally extraneous factors to regard him as saying something he does not say. Also in much the same way as Wittgenstein attempts to get us to see what is in front of our very eyes, I try to get us to read the words on the page. In my opinion the Investigations has to be appreciated in the spirit of Wittgenstein himself, and we must resist the temptation to overinterpret and overstructure his remarks. At any rate the reader should bear in mind that I intend to apply what I take to be a central lesson of Wittgenstein’s philosophy to his own writing.
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