The Gödel Editorial Project: a Synopsis
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Mathematical Induction - a Miscellany of Theory, History and Technique
Mathematical Induction - a miscellany of theory, history and technique Theory and applications for advanced secondary students Part 4 Peter Haggstrom This work is subject to Copyright. It is a chapter in a larger work. You can however copy this chapter for educational purposes under the Statutory License of the Copyright Act 1968 - Part VB For more information [email protected] Copyright 2009 [email protected] The building blocks of Gödelʼs Theorem The foundations of Gödel’s Theorem (ie his undecidability theorem) are to be found in about 50 papers contained in a book by Jean van Heijenoort:, “From Frege to Gödel: A Source Book in Mathematical Logic, 1879 - 1931”. Every serious logic student has read this book. Van Heijenoort is worth mentioning even if only for his colourful past which is described by Benjamin H Yandell in his book “The Honors Class: Hilbert’s Problems and Their Solvers”, A K Peters, 2002, page 66. I quote in full: “ I assumed van Heijenoort was merely a logician as I gratefully pored over his book and was astounded when I learned that as a young man, in the 1930s, he had followed Leon Trotsky from Turkey to France to Norway to Mexico, as his body guard and secretary. Anita Feferman’s ”From Trotsky to Gödel”: The Life of Jean van Heijenoort” tells van Heijenoort’s remarkable story. Trotsky and his camp were pursued by Stalinist agents; van Heijenoort always packed a gun. Van Heijenoort had an affair with an artist Frida Kahlo. He epitomized cool and was attractive to women, and this continued even after he became a logician, He had grown tired of the rigors of life with Trotsky and traveled to New York in 1939 on a somewhat vague mission. -
Shorter Curriculum Vitae Akihiro Kanamori
SHORTER CURRICULUM VITAE AKIHIRO KANAMORI DESCRIPTION: Born 23 October 1948 in Tokyo, Japan; now a United States citizen. DEGREES: 1966-1970 California Institute of Technology, Bachelor of Science. 1970-1975 University of Cambridge (King's College), Doctor of Philosophy. Subject: Set Theory, Mathematics. Thesis: Ultrafilters over Uncountable Cardinals. Advisor: A.R.D. Mathias. This involved one year of research at: 1972-1973 University of Wisconsin, Madison. Advisor: K. Kunen. PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE: 1975-1977 Lectureship at the University of California, Berkeley. 1977-1981 Benjamin Pierce Assistant Professorship at Harvard University. 1981-1982 Assistant Professorship at Baruch College of the City University of New York. 1982-1983 Visiting Associate Professorship at Boston University. 1983-1992 Associate Professorship at Boston University. 1988-1989 Berman Visiting Professorship, Institute of Mathematics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem. 1992- Professorship at Boston University. 1995 Visiting Professorship, Institute of Mathematics, Hebrew Universiy of Jerusalem. 2002-2003 Senior Fellow of the Dibner Institute for the History of Science and Technology. Visiting Scholar at the Department of the History of Science at Harvard University. 1 2009-2010 Senior Fellow of the Lichtenberg-Kolleg, Institute for Advanced Study, G¨ottingen,Germany. Lecture Course on Set Theory, Mathematische Institut, G¨ottingen,Germany, June-July 2010. FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS: Marshall Scholarship (British Government), 1970-1972. Danforth Foundation Fellowship, 1970-1975. Woodrow Wilson Foundation Fellowship, 1970. 1984 New England Open Co-Champion of Chess. Equal First 1986 Greater Boston Chess Open. Equal Second, 1987 Massachusetts Chess Open Championship. Equal Sixth, 1989 Israel Open. Class Prize, 1992 New England Open Championship. 2002-2003 Senior Fellowship, Dibner Institute for the History of Science and Technology. -
How Peircean Was the “'Fregean' Revolution” in Logic?
HOW PEIRCEAN WAS THE “‘FREGEAN’ REVOLUTION” IN LOGIC? Irving H. Anellis Peirce Edition, Institute for American Thought Indiana University – Purdue University at Indianapolis Indianapolis, IN, USA [email protected] Abstract. The historiography of logic conceives of a Fregean revolution in which modern mathematical logic (also called symbolic logic) has replaced Aristotelian logic. The preeminent expositors of this conception are Jean van Heijenoort (1912–1986) and Don- ald Angus Gillies. The innovations and characteristics that comprise mathematical logic and distinguish it from Aristotelian logic, according to this conception, created ex nihlo by Gottlob Frege (1848–1925) in his Begriffsschrift of 1879, and with Bertrand Rus- sell (1872–1970) as its chief This position likewise understands the algebraic logic of Augustus De Morgan (1806–1871), George Boole (1815–1864), Charles Sanders Peirce (1838–1914), and Ernst Schröder (1841–1902) as belonging to the Aristotelian tradi- tion. The “Booleans” are understood, from this vantage point, to merely have rewritten Aristotelian syllogistic in algebraic guise. The most detailed listing and elaboration of Frege’s innovations, and the characteristics that distinguish mathematical logic from Aristotelian logic, were set forth by van Heijenoort. I consider each of the elements of van Heijenoort’s list and note the extent to which Peirce had also developed each of these aspects of logic. I also consider the extent to which Peirce and Frege were aware of, and may have influenced, one another’s logical writings. AMS (MOS) 2010 subject classifications: Primary: 03-03, 03A05, 03C05, 03C10, 03G27, 01A55; secondary: 03B05, 03B10, 03E30, 08A20; Key words and phrases: Peirce, abstract algebraic logic; propositional logic; first-order logic; quantifier elimina- tion, equational classes, relational systems §0. -
Georg Kreisel Correspondence with Jean Van Heijenoort
http://oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/c84q7wxh No online items Guide to the Georg Kreisel Correspondence with Jean van Heijenoort Daniel Hartwig Stanford University. Libraries.Department of Special Collections and University Archives Stanford, California October 2010 Copyright © 2015 The Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. All rights reserved. Note This encoded finding aid is compliant with Stanford EAD Best Practice Guidelines, Version 1.0. Guide to the Georg Kreisel SC0233 1 Correspondence with Jean van Heijenoort Overview Call Number: SC0233 Creator: Kreisel, Georg, 1923- Title: Georg Kreisel correspondence with Jean van Heijenoort Dates: 1949-1981 Physical Description: 6 Linear feet Summary: Correspondence, notes, memoranda, articles and other materials by Professor Georg Kreisel, sent to his colleague, Professor J. van Heijenoort of Harvard University. Includes some correspondence with other colleagues. Language(s): The materials are in English. Repository: Department of Special Collections and University Archives Green Library 557 Escondido Mall Stanford, CA 94305-6064 Email: [email protected] Phone: (650) 725-1022 URL: http://library.stanford.edu/spc Gift of J. van Heijenoort, 1981. Information about Access This collection is open for research. Ownership & Copyright All requests to reproduce, publish, quote from, or otherwise use collection materials must be submitted in writing to the Head of Special Collections and University Archives, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford, California 94304-6064. Consent is given on behalf of Special Collections as the owner of the physical items and is not intended to include or imply permission from the copyright owner. Such permission must be obtained from the copyright owner, heir(s) or assigns. -
Bio-Bibliographical Sketch of Jean Van Heijenoort
Lubitz’ TrotskyanaNet Jean Van Heijenoort Bio-Bibliographical Sketch Contents: Basic biographical data Biographical sketch Selective bibliography Sidelines, notes on archives Basic biographical data Name: Jean Van Heijenoort Other names (by-names, pseud. etc.): Alex Barbon ; Jacques Carton ; García Cestero ; Jarvis Gerland ; J.v.H. ; Vladimir Ivlev ; John ; Marcel Letourneur ; Daniel Logan ; Marc Loris ; K.M. ; M. Marcel ; Karl Mayer ; Karl Meyer ; Jean Rebel ; V. ; Van ; Jean Louis Maxime Van Heijenoort ; John Van Heijenoort ; Jean Vannier ; Ann Vincent ; J. Walter Wind ; Windy Date and place of birth: July 23, 1912, Creil (France) Date and place of death: March 29, 1986, México, D.F. (México) Nationality: French ; USA Occupations, careers: Professor of philosophy, mathematician, logician, archivist, writer, editor, translator, secretary, political activist Time of activity in Trotskyist movement: 1931 - 1948 Biographical sketch Jean Van Heijenoort was undoubtedly one of the most distinguished and devoted persons who shared the Trotskyist movement: first a secretary and bodyguard to Trotsky, then a secretary of the Fourth International and eventually one of the most eminent scholars in the field of modern mathematics and history of logic. His remark- able and quite extraordinary itinerary has been described and appraised by various renowned historians and scholars such as Pierre Broué or Irving H. Anellis, and a rich book-length biography about him from Anita B. Feferman's pen has been available since 19931. Jean (Louis Maxime) Van Heijenoort was born in Creil (Département Oise, France) on July 23, 1912 as son of a working-class family: his father was Jean Théodore Didier van Heijenoort (b. 1885), a Dutchman who had immigrated to France, and his mother was Charlotte Hélène Balagny (b. -
On Diagonal Argument. Russell Absurdities and an Uncountable Notion of Lingua Characterica
ON DIAGONAL ARGUMENT. RUSSELL ABSURDITIES AND AN UNCOUNTABLE NOTION OF LINGUA CHARACTERICA JAMES DOUGLASS KING Bachelor of Arts, University of Lethbridge, 1996 A Thesis Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of the University of Lethbridge in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree MASTER OF ARTS Department of Philosophy University of Lethbridge LETHBRIDGE, ALBERTA, CANADA © James Douglass King, 2004 ABSTRACT There is an interesting connection between cardinality of language and the distinction of lingua characterica from calculus rationator. Calculus-type languages have only a countable number of sentences, and only a single semantic valuation per sentence. By contrast, some of the sentences of a lingua have available an uncountable number of semantic valuations. Thus, the lingua-type of language appears to have a greater degree of semantic universality than that of a calculus. It is suggested that the present notion of lingua provides a platform for a theory of ambiguity, whereby single sentences may have multiply - indeed, uncountably - many semantic valuations. It is further suggested that this might lead to a pacification of paradox. This thesis involves Peter Aczel's notion of a universal syntax, Russell's question, Keith Simmons* theory of diagonal argument, Curry's paradox, and a 'Leibnizian' notion of language. iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The following people are due great thanks and gratitude for their constant support and understanding over the considerable time that it took to develop this thesis. They are each sine qua non of my success. Bryson Brown has supported my efforts from beginning to end, since my undergraduate studies when I first found my love of logic and philosophy; he also brought me to understand much that I have otherwise found obscure and/or irrelevant, and he provided important moral support. -
Future Pasts
FUTURE PASTS The Analytic Tradition in Twentieth-Century Philosophy Edited by JULIET FLOYD SANFORD SHIEH OXFORD VNWERSITY I'RSSS 2001 1879 Publication ofFr:ege's Begriffsschrift 1 Frege's Conception of Logic WARREN GOLDFARB Frege is of course an important progenitor of modern logic. The technical ad vances he made were compreheusive. He clearly depicted polyadic predication, negation. the conditional, and the quantifier as the bases of logic; and he gave an analysis of and a notation for t.he quantifier that enabled him to deal fully and perspicuously with multiple generality. Moreover. be argued that mathematical demonstrations, to be ti.illy rigorous, must be carried out using only explicitly for mulated rules, that is, syntactically specified axioms and rules of inference. Less clear, however. is the philosophical and interpretive question ofhow Frege understands his formalism and its purposes. Upon examination, it appears that Frege had a rather different view of the subject he was creating than we do nowa days. ln lectures and seminars as far back as the early 1960s, Burton Dreben called attention to differences between how Frege viewed i.he subject mauer of logic and how we do. The point has been taken up by several commentators, beginning with Jean van Heijenoort. 1 The technical development historically required to get from a Fregeau conception to our own was discussed in my "Logic in the Twenties: The Nature of the Quantifier."2 Yet there is currently litlle ap preciation of the philosophical import of these differences, that is, the role in Prege' s philosophy that his conception oflogic, as opposed to ours. -
On Godel's Way In: the Influence of Rudolf Carnap
On Godel's Way In: The Influence of Rudolf Carnap The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters Citation Goldfarb, Warren. 2005. On Godel's way in: The influence of Rudolf Carnap. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 11, no. 2: 185-193. Published Version http://dx.doi.org/10.2178/bsl/1120231629 Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3153305 Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http:// nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of- use#LAA On Godel's Way in: The Influence of Rudolf Carnap Author(s): Warren Goldfarb Source: The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Jun., 2005), pp. 185-193 Published by: Association for Symbolic Logic Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1556748 Accessed: 24/06/2009 18:20 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=asl. -
Some Views of Russell and Russell's Logic by His
SOME VIEWS OF RUSSELL AND RUSSELL’S LOGIC BY HIS CONTEMPORARIES, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO PEIRCE IRVING H. ANELLIS In the years prior to World War I, it was not yet definitively certain that the new logistic developed and espoused by Frege and Russell was the “wave of the future” of mathematical logic. Ernst Schröder’s Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik (1895– 1905) was still new and viewed as the cutting edge of (algebraic—as opposed to Aristote- lian) logic; Giuseppe Peano still proclaimed, in his earliest work on logic, his indebted- ness to George Boole, Charles Peirce, and Ernst Schröder, in the first footnote of his Arithmetices principia nova methodo exposita (1898), while, in a letter to Russell of 19 March 1901,1 Peano told Russell that his paper “Sur la logique des relations avec des ap- plications à la théorie des séries” on the logic of relations (1901) just “fills a gap between the work of Peirce and Schröder on the one hand and” his own “Formulaire on the other;” Alfred North Whitehead’s Treatise on Universal Algebra (1898) also still new, brought together the algebraic logic of Boole with the linear and multilinear algebras of Arthur Cayley, James Joseph Sylvester, William Rowan Hamilton, and Charles Peirce’s father Benjamin Peirce, and the calculus of extension of Hermann Grassmann. In his Treatise, Whitehead (p. x) not only named Hamilton and De Morgan as “the first to ex- press quite clearly the general possibilities of algebraic symbolism,” but continually ex- pressed his indebtedness to Boole, Grassmann, De Morgan, Schröder, and John Venn; and he described his Treatise (p. -
| Book Re Vie W S from Trotsky to Gödel, the Life of Jean Van
60 NAW 5/7 nr. 1 maart 2006 Boekbesprekingen A. Burdman Feferman From Trotsky to Gödel, The Life of Jean van Heijenoort A.K. Peters, 2001 Book Reviews 432 p., prijs $ 25,– | ISBN 1-56881-148-9 As one commentator said, this book is ‘stranger than fiction’. This well-written biography about the cultured logician van Heij- enoort was first published under a different title: ‘Politics, Logic and Love’, with the same subtitle and content. Indeed, Jean van Heijenoort (1912–1986) was active in these three fields in mem- orable ways. He was for seven years secretary and bodyguard of Trotsky; he was a logician having a wide-angle view, result- ing among other things in his publication From Frege to Gödel, a source book of the fundamental papers of modern mathematical logic with a fine choice of topics; and finally he was enchanted by women in such a way that it finally became fatal. When Jean van Heijenoort was two years old his father died, because of the lack of medical care during World War I. This re- sulted in the separation from his mother, who had to provide for a living, and he was raised by his (very catholic) aunt and two older (female) cousins. Later his mother remarried a man whom he did not like. This situation has given him an unhappy youth. After World War I young Jean was very painfully struck by the endless fields of crosses at a war cemetery. He ‘rejected —totally rejected— the system that caused the war. “I wanted something else.” During his school years van Heijenoort was impressed by the autobiography of Trotsky, both for its contents and style and he became a left-winged idealist. -
6 X 10.Long New.P65
Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-11514-8 - Kurt Godel: Essays for his Centennial Edited by Solomon Feferman, Charles Parsons and Stephen G. Simpson Excerpt More information GENERAL © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-11514-8 - Kurt Godel: Essays for his Centennial Edited by Solomon Feferman, Charles Parsons and Stephen G. Simpson Excerpt More information THE GODEL¨ EDITORIAL PROJECT: A SYNOPSIS SOLOMON FEFERMAN The final two volumes, numbers IV and V, of the Oxford University Press edition of the Collected Works of Kurt Godel¨ [3]–[7] appeared in 2003, thus completing a project that started over twenty years earlier. What I mainly want to do here is trace, from the vantage point of my personal involvement, the at some times halting and at other times intense development of the Godel¨ editorial project from the first initiatives following Godel’s¨ death in 1978 to its completion last year. It may be useful to scholars mounting similar editorial projects for other significant figures in our field to learn how and why various decisions were made and how the work was carried out, though of course much is particular to who and what we were dealing with. My hope here is also to give the reader who is not already familiar with the Godel¨ Works a sense of what has been gained in the process, and to encourage dipping in according to interest. Given the absolute importance of Godel¨ for mathematical logic, students should also be pointed to these important source materials to experience first hand the exercise of his genius and the varied ways of his thought and to see how scholarly and critical studies help to expand their significance. -
Cut As Consequence
Cut as Consequence Curtis Franks Department of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame, Indiana, USA The papers where Gerhard Gentzen introduced natural deduction and sequent calculi suggest that his conception of logic differs substantially from now dominant views introduced by Hilbert, G¨odel, Tarski, and others. Specifically, (1) the definitive features of natural deduction calculi allowed Gentzen to assert that his classical system nk is complete based purely on the sort of evidence that Hilbert called ‘experimental’, and (2) the structure of the sequent calculi li and lk allowed Gentzen to conceptualize completeness as a question about the relationships among a system’s individual rules (as opposed to the relationship between a system as a whole and its ‘semantics’). Gentzen’s conception of logic is compelling in its own right. It is also of historical interest because it allows for a better understanding of the invention of natural deduction and sequent calculi. 1. Introduction In the opening remarks of 1930, Kurt G¨odeldescribed the construction and use of formal axiomatic systems as found in the work of Whitehead and Russell—the procedure of ‘initially taking certain evident propositions as axioms and deriving the theorems of logic and mathematics from these by means of some precisely formulated principles of inference in a purely formal way’—and remarked that when such a procedure is followed, the question at once arises whether the ini- tially postulated system of axioms and principles of inference is complete, that is, whether it actually suffices for the derivation of every logico-mathematical proposition, or whether, perhaps, it is conceivable that there are true [wahre1] propositions .